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diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.depend b/crypto/openssh/.depend
index 2b29e3879da1..a94a82d0e6f7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/.depend
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.depend
@@ -1,175 +1,183 @@
-# DO NOT DELETE
+# Automatically generated by makedepend.
+# Run "make depend" to rebuild.
-addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h match.h log.h
-atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h
-audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h
-auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h
-auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-skey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h
-auth.o: authfile.h monitor_wrap.h ssherr.h compat.h channels.h
-auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h
-auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h
-auth2-hostbased.o: pathnames.h ssherr.h match.h
-auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h misc.h servconf.h ssherr.h
-auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h
-auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h
-auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h uidswap.h
-auth2-pubkey.o: auth-options.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h ssherr.h channels.h session.h
-auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h ssherr.h
-auth2.o: monitor_wrap.h digest.h
-authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h atomicio.h misc.h ssherr.h
-authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h krl.h
-bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h
-canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h canohost.h misc.h
-chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h
-channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h
-cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
-cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
-cipher-ctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-clientloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h
-clientloop.o: myproposal.h log.h misc.h readconf.h clientloop.h sshconnect.h authfd.h atomicio.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h ssherr.h hostfile.h
-compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h log.h match.h kex.h mac.h
-crc32.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crc32.h
-dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
-digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h log.h dispatch.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h opacket.h compat.h ssherr.h
-dns.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h ssherr.h dns.h log.h digest.h
-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ge25519.h fe25519.h sc25519.h
-entropy.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-fatal.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-fe25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h
-ge25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h sc25519.h ge25519.h ge25519_base.data
-groupaccess.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h
-gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-hash.o: crypto_api.h includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h log.h ssherr.h
-hmac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h digest.h hmac.h
-hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h sshkey.h hostfile.h log.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h hmac.h
-kex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h log.h match.h misc.h monitor.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-kex.o: digest.h
-kexc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h log.h digest.h ssherr.h
-kexc25519c.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h log.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h
-kexc25519s.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h kex.h mac.h log.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
-kexdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexdhc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexdhs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexecdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexecdhc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexecdhs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexgex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexgexc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexgexs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-krl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfile.h misc.h log.h digest.h bitmap.h krl.h
-log.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-loginrec.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h ssh.h loginrec.h log.h atomicio.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h canohost.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
-logintest.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h loginrec.h
-mac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h hmac.h umac.h mac.h misc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h
-md5crypt.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssh.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
-moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h
-monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h ssherr.h
-monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h monitor_fdpass.h
-monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-monitor_wrap.o: auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h ssherr.h
-msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h
-mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h ssherr.h
-nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h channels.h compat.h log.h
-opacket.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h
-packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h crc32.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h digest.h log.h canohost.h misc.h channels.h ssh.h
-packet.o: packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h
-progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h
-readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h uidswap.h
-readconf.o: myproposal.h digest.h
-readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssh.h uidswap.h
-rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h
-sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sc25519.h crypto_api.h
-scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h atomicio.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h progressmeter.h utf8.h
-servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h match.h channels.h
-servconf.o: groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssherr.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h
-serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h compat.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
-serverloop.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h session.h auth-options.h serverloop.h ssherr.h
-session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
-session.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfd.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshlogin.h serverloop.h canohost.h session.h kex.h mac.h monitor_wrap.h sftp.h atomicio.h
-sftp-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h atomicio.h progressmeter.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
-sftp-common.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
-sftp-glob.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
-sftp-server-main.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sftp.h misc.h xmalloc.h
-sftp-server.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h match.h uidswap.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
-sftp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h pathnames.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
-ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h
-ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h misc.h digest.h ssherr.h match.h
-ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h
-ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h uuencode.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h
-ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h
-ssh-keyscan.o: atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssherr.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h
-ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h ssherr.h
-ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h ssherr.h
-ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h
-ssh.o: sshbuf.h channels.h sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h ssherr.h myproposal.h utf8.h
-ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h log.h authfile.h misc.h
-ssh_api.o: version.h myproposal.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h
-sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h
-sshconnect.o: ssherr.h authfd.h
-sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h myproposal.h
-sshconnect2.o: sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h ssherr.h utf8.h
-sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h
-sshd.o: poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h ssherr.h
+# DO NOT DELETE
+addr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h
+addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h match.h log.h ssherr.h
+atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h
+audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h
+auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h
+auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth.o: authfile.h monitor_wrap.h compat.h channels.h
+auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h dispatch.h
+auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth2-hostbased.o: canohost.h monitor_wrap.h pathnames.h match.h
+auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h monitor_wrap.h
+auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth2-pubkey.o: pathnames.h uidswap.h auth-options.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h channels.h session.h sk-api.h
+auth2.o: digest.h
+auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h monitor_wrap.h
+authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h
+authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h krl.h
+bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h
+canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h canohost.h misc.h
+chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h
+channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h
+cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
+cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
+cipher-ctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h
+clientloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+clientloop.o: myproposal.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h clientloop.h sshconnect.h authfd.h atomicio.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h hostfile.h
+compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
+digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h log.h ssherr.h dispatch.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h compat.h
+dns.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h ssherr.h dns.h log.h digest.h
+ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ge25519.h fe25519.h sc25519.h
+entropy.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+fatal.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h
+fe25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h
+ge25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h sc25519.h ge25519.h ge25519_base.data
+groupaccess.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h ssherr.h
+gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
+hmac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h digest.h hmac.h
+hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h sshkey.h hostfile.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h pathnames.h digest.h hmac.h sshbuf.h
+kex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h ssh2.h atomicio.h version.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h
+kex.o: match.h misc.h monitor.h sshbuf.h digest.h
+kexc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h ssh2.h
+kexdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexecdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h
+kexgen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h
+kexgex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexgexc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexgexs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexsntrup761x25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h
+krl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfile.h misc.h log.h digest.h bitmap.h utf8.h krl.h
+log.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h match.h
+loginrec.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h ssh.h loginrec.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h canohost.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h sshbuf.h
+logintest.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h loginrec.h
+mac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h hmac.h umac.h mac.h misc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h
+md5crypt.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h sshbuf.h
+moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h sk-api.h
+monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h
+monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h monitor_fdpass.h
+monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h
+monitor_wrap.o: loginrec.h auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h
+msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h
+mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h
+nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h channels.h compat.h log.h
+packet.o: channels.h ssh.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h
+packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h digest.h log.h ssherr.h canohost.h misc.h
+platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h
+platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h
+progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h utf8.h
+readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+readconf.o: uidswap.h myproposal.h digest.h
+readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h uidswap.h
+rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h
+sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sc25519.h crypto_api.h
+scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h atomicio.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h progressmeter.h utf8.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h
+servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h
+servconf.o: kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h match.h channels.h groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h
+serverloop.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h session.h auth-options.h serverloop.h
+serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h compat.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
+session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
+session.o: rijndael.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfd.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshlogin.h serverloop.h canohost.h session.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h monitor_wrap.h sftp.h atomicio.h
+sftp-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h atomicio.h progressmeter.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sftp-common.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
+sftp-glob.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sftp-realpath.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sftp-server-main.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sftp.h misc.h xmalloc.h
+sftp-server.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h match.h uidswap.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
+sftp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h pathnames.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sshbuf.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sk-usbhid.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sntrup761.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+srclimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h canohost.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h srclimit.h xmalloc.h
+ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h digest.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
+ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h digest.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h
+ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-ecdsa-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h sshkey.h
+ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-ed25519-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssh.h digest.h
+ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssh.h
+ssh-keygen.o: cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
+ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h sshsig.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h cipher.h
+ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h
+ssh-keyscan.o: ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h
+ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h
+ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h
+ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h
+ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-sk-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h msg.h digest.h pathnames.h ssh-sk.h misc.h
+ssh-sk-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfd.h misc.h sshbuf.h msg.h uidswap.h ssh-sk.h
+ssh-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h channels.h
+ssh.o: sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h myproposal.h utf8.h
+ssh_api.o: authfile.h misc.h version.h myproposal.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h
+sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
+sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshbuf-io.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h atomicio.h
+sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
+sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h
+sshconnect.o: authfd.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h
+sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+sshconnect2.o: myproposal.h sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h utf8.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
+sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h
+sshd.o: poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h sk-api.h srclimit.h dh.h
ssherr.o: ssherr.h
-sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h sshkey-xmss.h match.h xmss_fast.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h
-sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h misc.h
-sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h
-ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h ttymodes.h
-uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h
-umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
-umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
-utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h
-uuencode.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h uuencode.h
-verify.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
-xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h
-xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h match.h ssh-sk.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
+sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h
+sshsig.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h authfd.h authfile.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshsig.h sshkey.h match.h digest.h
+sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h
+ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h compat.h sshbuf.h ttymodes.h
+uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h
+umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
+umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
+utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h
+verify.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
+xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h
+xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md b/crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0ad8bf5aaf44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml)
+[![C/C++ CI self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml)
+[![Upstream self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/upstream.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/upstream.yml)
+[![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/configs b/crypto/openssh/.github/configs
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..12578c067348
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/configs
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# usage: configs vmname test_config (or '' for default)
+#
+# Sets the following variables:
+# CONFIGFLAGS options to ./configure
+# SSHD_CONFOPTS sshd_config options
+# TEST_TARGET make target used when testing. defaults to "tests".
+# LTESTS
+
+config=$1
+
+TEST_TARGET="tests"
+LTESTS=""
+SKIP_LTESTS=""
+SUDO=sudo # run with sudo by default
+TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
+
+CONFIGFLAGS=""
+LIBCRYPTOFLAGS=""
+
+case "$config" in
+ default|sol64)
+ ;;
+ c89)
+ CC="gcc"
+ CFLAGS="-Wall -std=c89 -pedantic -Werror=vla"
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--without-openssl --without-zlib"
+ TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+ ;;
+ kitchensink)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-kerberos5 --with-libedit --with-pam"
+ CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --with-security-key-builtin --with-selinux"
+ CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --with-cflags=-DSK_DEBUG"
+ ;;
+ hardenedmalloc)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-ldflags=-lhardened_malloc"
+ ;;
+ kerberos5)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-kerberos5"
+ ;;
+ libedit)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-libedit"
+ ;;
+ pam-krb5)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam --with-kerberos5"
+ SSHD_CONFOPTS="UsePam yes"
+ ;;
+ *pam)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam"
+ SSHD_CONFOPTS="UsePam yes"
+ ;;
+ libressl-*)
+ LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/opt/libressl --with-rpath=-Wl,-rpath,"
+ ;;
+ openssl-*)
+ LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/opt/openssl --with-rpath=-Wl,-rpath,"
+ ;;
+ selinux)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-selinux"
+ ;;
+ sk)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--with-security-key-builtin"
+ ;;
+ without-openssl)
+ LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl"
+ TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+ ;;
+ valgrind-[1-4]|valgrind-unit)
+ # rlimit sandbox and FORTIFY_SOURCE confuse Valgrind.
+ CONFIGFLAGS="--without-sandbox --without-hardening"
+ CONFIGFLAGS="$CONFIGFLAGS --with-cppflags=-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0"
+ TEST_TARGET="t-exec USE_VALGRIND=1"
+ TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES=1
+ export TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES
+ # Valgrind slows things down enough that the agent timeout test
+ # won't reliably pass, and the unit tests run longer than allowed
+ # by github so split into three separate tests.
+ tests2="rekey integrity"
+ tests3="krl forward-control sshsig"
+ tests4="cert-userkey cert-hostkey kextype sftp-perm keygen-comment"
+ case "$config" in
+ valgrind-1)
+ # All tests except agent-timeout (which is flaky under valgrind)
+ #) and slow ones that run separately to increase parallelism.
+ SKIP_LTESTS="agent-timeout ${tests2} ${tests3} ${tests4}"
+ ;;
+ valgrind-2)
+ LTESTS="${tests2}"
+ ;;
+ valgrind-3)
+ LTESTS="${tests3}"
+ ;;
+ valgrind-4)
+ LTESTS="${tests4}"
+ ;;
+ valgrind-unit)
+ TEST_TARGET="unit USE_VALGRIND=1"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ *)
+ echo "Unknown configuration $config"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# The Solaris 64bit targets are special since they need a non-flag arg.
+case "$config" in
+ sol64*)
+ CONFIGFLAGS="x86_64 --with-cflags=-m64 --with-ldflags=-m64 ${CONFIGFLAGS}"
+ LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl64"
+ ;;
+esac
+
+case "${TARGET_HOST}" in
+ dfly58*|dfly60*)
+ # scp 3-way connection hangs on these so skip until sorted.
+ SKIP_LTESTS=scp3
+ ;;
+ hurd)
+ SKIP_LTESTS="forwarding multiplex proxy-connect hostkey-agent agent-ptrace"
+ ;;
+ minix3)
+ CC="clang"
+ LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl"
+ # Minix does not have a loopback interface so we have to skip any
+ # test that relies on it.
+ TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+ SKIP_LTESTS="addrmatch cfgparse key-options reexec agent connect"
+ SKIP_LTESTS="$SKIP_LTESTS keyscan rekey allow-deny-users connect-uri"
+ SKIP_LTESTS="$SKIP_LTESTS knownhosts-command sftp-uri brokenkeys"
+ SKIP_LTESTS="$SKIP_LTESTS exit-status login-timeout stderr-data"
+ SKIP_LTESTS="$SKIP_LTESTS cfgmatch forward-control multiplex transfer"
+ SKIP_LTESTS="$SKIP_LTESTS cfgmatchlisten forwarding reconfigure"
+ SUDO=""
+ ;;
+ nbsd4)
+ # System compiler will ICE on some files with fstack-protector
+ CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --without-hardening"
+ ;;
+ sol10|sol11)
+ # sol10 VM is 32bit and the unit tests are slow.
+ # sol11 has 4 test configs so skip unit tests to speed up.
+ TEST_TARGET="tests SKIP_UNIT=1"
+ ;;
+ win10)
+ # No sudo on Windows.
+ SUDO=""
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# If we have a local openssl/libressl, use that.
+if [ -z "${LIBCRYPTOFLAGS}" ]; then
+ # last-match
+ for i in /usr/local /usr/local/ssl /usr/local/opt/openssl; do
+ if [ -x ${i}/bin/openssl ]; then
+ LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=${i}"
+ fi
+ done
+fi
+
+CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} ${LIBCRYPTOFLAGS}"
+
+if [ -x "$(which plink 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
+ REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
+ export REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY
+fi
+
+export CC CFLAGS LTESTS SUDO TEST_TARGET TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/configure.sh b/crypto/openssh/.github/configure.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..e098730f02d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/configure.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. .github/configs $1
+
+set -x
+./configure ${CONFIGFLAGS}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh b/crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..adf2568ad1e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. .github/configs $1
+
+[ -z "${SUDO}" ] || ${SUDO} mkdir -p /var/empty
+
+set -ex
+
+output_failed_logs() {
+ for i in regress/failed*; do
+ if [ -f "$i" ]; then
+ echo -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ echo LOGFILE $i
+ cat $i
+ echo -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ fi
+ done
+}
+trap output_failed_logs 0
+
+if [ -z "${LTESTS}" ]; then
+ make ${TEST_TARGET} SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}"
+else
+ make ${TEST_TARGET} SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" LTESTS="${LTESTS}"
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "${SSHD_CONFOPTS}" ]; then
+ echo "rerunning t-exec with TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS='${SSHD_CONFOPTS}'"
+ if [ -z "${LTESTS}" ]; then
+ make t-exec SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS="${SSHD_CONFOPTS}"
+ else
+ make t-exec SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" LTESTS="${LTESTS}" TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS="${SSHD_CONFOPTS}"
+ fi
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh b/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..70a444e4eff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+case $(./config.guess) in
+*-darwin*)
+ brew install automake
+ exit 0
+ ;;
+esac
+
+TARGETS=$@
+
+PACKAGES=""
+INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="no"
+
+#echo "Setting up for '$TARGETS'"
+
+set -ex
+
+lsb_release -a
+
+if [ "${TARGETS}" = "kitchensink" ]; then
+ TARGETS="kerberos5 libedit pam sk selinux"
+fi
+
+for TARGET in $TARGETS; do
+ case $TARGET in
+ default|without-openssl|without-zlib|c89)
+ # nothing to do
+ ;;
+ kerberos5)
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES heimdal-dev"
+ #PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libkrb5-dev"
+ ;;
+ libedit)
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libedit-dev"
+ ;;
+ *pam)
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libpam0g-dev"
+ ;;
+ sk)
+ INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="yes"
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libfido2-dev libu2f-host-dev libcbor-dev"
+ ;;
+ selinux)
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libselinux1-dev selinux-policy-dev"
+ ;;
+ hardenedmalloc)
+ INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC=yes
+ ;;
+ openssl-noec)
+ INSTALL_OPENSSL=OpenSSL_1_1_1k
+ SSLCONFOPTS="no-ec"
+ ;;
+ openssl-*)
+ INSTALL_OPENSSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)
+ case ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} in
+ 1.*) INSTALL_OPENSSL="OpenSSL_$(echo ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} | tr . _)" ;;
+ 3.*) INSTALL_OPENSSL="openssl-${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ;;
+ esac
+ PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools"
+ ;;
+ libressl-*)
+ INSTALL_LIBRESSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)
+ case ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} in
+ master) ;;
+ *) INSTALL_LIBRESSL="v$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)" ;;
+ esac
+ PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools"
+ ;;
+ valgrind*)
+ PACKAGES="$PACKAGES valgrind"
+ ;;
+ *) echo "Invalid option '${TARGET}'"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+if [ "yes" = "$INSTALL_FIDO_PPA" ]; then
+ sudo apt update -qq
+ sudo apt install software-properties-common
+ sudo apt-add-repository ppa:yubico/stable
+fi
+
+if [ "x" != "x$PACKAGES" ]; then
+ sudo apt update -qq
+ sudo apt install -qy $PACKAGES
+fi
+
+if [ "${INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC}" = "yes" ]; then
+ (cd ${HOME} &&
+ git clone https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc.git &&
+ cd ${HOME}/hardened_malloc &&
+ make -j2 && sudo cp libhardened_malloc.so /usr/lib/)
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ]; then
+ (cd ${HOME} &&
+ git clone https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git &&
+ cd ${HOME}/openssl &&
+ git checkout ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} &&
+ ./config no-threads shared ${SSLCONFOPTS} \
+ --prefix=/opt/openssl &&
+ make && sudo make install_sw)
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}" ]; then
+ (mkdir -p ${HOME}/libressl && cd ${HOME}/libressl &&
+ git clone https://github.com/libressl-portable/portable.git &&
+ cd ${HOME}/libressl/portable &&
+ git checkout ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} &&
+ sh update.sh && sh autogen.sh &&
+ ./configure --prefix=/opt/libressl &&
+ make -j2 && sudo make install)
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..289b18b7f621
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+name: C/C++ CI
+
+on:
+ push:
+ branches: [ master, ci ]
+ pull_request:
+ branches: [ master ]
+
+jobs:
+ ci:
+ if: github.repository != 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted'
+ strategy:
+ fail-fast: false
+ matrix:
+ # First we test all OSes in the default configuration.
+ os: [ubuntu-20.04, ubuntu-18.04, macos-10.15, macos-11.0]
+ configs: [default]
+ # Then we include any extra configs we want to test for specific VMs.
+ # Valgrind slows things down quite a bit, so start them first.
+ include:
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-1 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-2 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-3 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-4 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-unit }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: c89 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: pam }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: kitchensink }
+ - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: hardenedmalloc }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-master }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-2.2.9 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-2.8.3 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-3.0.2 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-3.2.5 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-master }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-noec }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.0.1 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.0.1u }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.0.2u }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.1.0h }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.1.1 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.1.1k }
+ - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: pam }
+ - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: kerberos5 }
+ - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: libedit }
+ - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: sk }
+ - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: selinux }
+ - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: kitchensink }
+ - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: without-openssl }
+ - { os: macos-10.15, configs: pam }
+ - { os: macos-11.0, configs: pam }
+ runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+ - name: setup CI system
+ run: ./.github/setup_ci.sh ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ - name: autoreconf
+ run: autoreconf
+ - name: configure
+ run: ./.github/configure.sh ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ - name: make
+ run: make -j2
+ - name: make tests
+ run: ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ env:
+ TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS: 1
+ - name: save logs
+ if: failure()
+ uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
+ with:
+ name: ${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.configs }}-logs
+ path: |
+ config.h
+ config.log
+ regress/*.log
+ regress/valgrind-out/
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..df6eca714fb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+name: C/C++ CI self-hosted
+
+on:
+ push:
+ branches: [ master, ci ]
+
+jobs:
+ selfhosted:
+ if: github.repository == 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted'
+ runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+ env:
+ TARGET_HOST: ${{ matrix.os }}
+ strategy:
+ fail-fast: false
+ # We use a matrix in two parts: firstly all of the VMs are tested with the
+ # default config. "os" corresponds to a label associated with the worker.
+ matrix:
+ os:
+ - ARM64
+ - bbone
+ - dfly30
+ - dfly48
+ - dfly58
+ - dfly60
+ - fbsd6
+ - fbsd10
+ - fbsd12
+ - fbsd13
+ - hurd
+ - minix3
+ # - nbsd2
+ - nbsd3
+ - nbsd4
+ - nbsd8
+ - nbsd9
+ - obsd51
+ - obsd67
+ - obsd68
+ - obsd69
+ - obsdsnap
+ - openindiana
+ # - rocky84
+ - sol10
+ - sol11
+ - win10
+ configs:
+ - default
+ # Then we include any extra configs we want to test for specific VMs.
+ include:
+ - { os: ARM64, configs: pam }
+ - { os: dfly30, configs: without-openssl}
+ - { os: dfly48, configs: pam }
+ - { os: dfly58, configs: pam }
+ - { os: dfly60, configs: pam }
+ - { os: fbsd6, configs: pam }
+ - { os: fbsd10, configs: pam }
+ - { os: fbsd12, configs: pam }
+ - { os: fbsd13, configs: pam }
+ - { os: nbsd8, configs: pam }
+ - { os: nbsd9, configs: pam }
+ - { os: openindiana, configs: pam }
+ # - { os: rocky84, configs: pam }
+ - { os: sol10, configs: pam }
+ - { os: sol11, configs: pam-krb5 }
+ - { os: sol11, configs: sol64 }
+ # - { os: sol11, configs: sol64-pam }
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+ - name: autoreconf
+ run: autoreconf
+ - name: shutdown VM if running
+ run: vmshutdown
+ - name: startup VM
+ run: vmstartup
+ - name: configure
+ run: vmrun ./.github/configure.sh ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ - name: make
+ run: vmrun make
+ - name: make tests
+ run: vmrun ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.configs }}
+ - name: save logs
+ if: failure()
+ uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
+ with:
+ name: ${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.configs }}-logs
+ path: |
+ config.h
+ config.log
+ regress/*.log
+ regress/valgrind-out/
+ - name: shutdown VM
+ if: always()
+ run: vmshutdown
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f0493c12d7d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+name: Upstream self-hosted
+
+on:
+ push:
+ branches: [ master, ci ]
+
+jobs:
+ selfhosted:
+ if: github.repository == 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted'
+ runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+ env:
+ TARGET_HOST: ${{ matrix.os }}
+ strategy:
+ fail-fast: false
+ matrix:
+ os: [ obsdsnap, obsdsnap-i386, obsd69, obsd68 ]
+ configs: [ default, without-openssl ]
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+ - name: shutdown VM if running
+ run: vmshutdown
+ - name: startup VM
+ run: vmstartup
+ - name: update source
+ run: vmrun "cd /usr/src && cvs up -dPA usr.bin/ssh regress/usr.bin/ssh"
+ - name: make clean
+ run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && make obj && make clean"
+ - name: make
+ run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && if test '${{ matrix.configs }}' = 'without-openssl'; then make OPENSSL=no; else make; fi"
+ - name: make install
+ run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && sudo make install"
+ - name: make tests
+ run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/regress/usr.bin/ssh && make obj && make clean && if test '${{ matrix.configs }}' = 'without-openssl'; then make SUDO=sudo OPENSSL=no; else make SUDO=sudo; fi"
+ - name: save logs
+ if: failure()
+ uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
+ with:
+ name: ${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.configs }}-logs
+ path: |
+ /usr/obj/regress/usr.bin/ssh/*.log
+ - name: shutdown VM
+ if: always()
+ run: vmshutdown
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.gitignore b/crypto/openssh/.gitignore
index 650eb3c3c90c..5e4ae5a60d06 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/.gitignore
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.gitignore
@@ -1,28 +1,36 @@
Makefile
buildpkg.sh
config.h
config.h.in
+config.h.in~
+config.log
config.status
configure
+aclocal.m4
openbsd-compat/Makefile
openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile
openssh.xml
opensshd.init
survey.sh
**/*.0
**/*.o
+**/*.lo
+**/*.so
**/*.out
**/*.a
autom4te.cache/
scp
sftp
sftp-server
ssh
ssh-add
ssh-agent
ssh-keygen
ssh-keyscan
ssh-keysign
ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ssh-sk-helper
sshd
!regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
+!regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
+tags
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.skipped-commit-ids b/crypto/openssh/.skipped-commit-ids
index f1b3b7640a3f..1de78172232a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/.skipped-commit-ids
+++ b/crypto/openssh/.skipped-commit-ids
@@ -1,33 +1,51 @@
5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d remove libssh from makefiles
a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85 Makefile changes
f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee more Makefile
fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62 more Makefile refactoring
1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e moduli update
814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f remove redundant make defs
04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40 moduli update
+c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403 moduli update
+db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff moduli update
+5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f uuencode.c Makefile accident
+99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474 include sshbuf-misc.c
+9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5 sshbuf-misc.c in regress
+569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061 Makefile tweaks for !openssl
+58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987 moduli update
+4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf Makefile.inc
+14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada Makefile.inc
+8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e Makefile.inc
+d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0 Makefile.inc
+7b7b619c1452a459310b0cf4391c5757c6bdbc0f moduli update
+5010ff08f7ad92082e87dde098b20f5c24921a8f moduli regen script update
+3bcae7a754db3fc5ad3cab63dd46774edb35b8ae moduli regen script update
+52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54 moduli update
+07b5031e9f49f2b69ac5e85b8da4fc9e393992a0 Makefile.inc
+cc12a9029833d222043aecd252d654965c351a69 moduli-gen Makefile
+7ac6c252d2a5be8fbad4c66d9d35db507c9dac5b moduli update
Old upstream tree:
321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 Update DH groups
d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca Remove 1k bit groups
aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 Remove intermediate moduli
8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 put back SSH1 for 6.9
f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a Generate new moduli
edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef Regen moduli
052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 Switch to tame-based sandbox
7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 Remove moduli <2k
180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae Update moduli
f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead.
96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile
6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 Update moduli file
77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY
38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 Change COMPILER_VERSION tests
30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c resync integrity.sh shell
1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 integrity.sh reliability
fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 Makefile.inc bits
5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 Delete sshconnect1.c
ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c Makefile.inc warning flags
b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 moduli-gen.sh tweak
b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 Updated moduli
1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac rsa.[ch] already removed
e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 Makefile changes
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/CREDITS b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
index 43be5e5f26d5..6cc3512515eb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
+++ b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
@@ -1,102 +1,102 @@
Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
Ahsan Rashid <arms@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
Andre Lucas <andre@ae-35.com> - new login code, many fixes
Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> - Shadow password expiry support
Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za> - SCO fixes
Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com> - PAM bugfixes
Andrew Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk> - Bugfixes
Andy Sloane <andy@guildsoftware.com> - bugfixes
Aran Cox <acox@cv.telegroup.com> - SCO bugfixes
Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl> - IPv6 compat fixes
Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> - NeXT support
Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net> - Solaris debugging and fixes
Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru> - Configure fix
Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> - SunOS 4 & bug fixes
Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com> - Assorted patches
Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - OSF SIA support
Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com> - SuSE packaging
Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - Cygwin support
Chad Mynhier <mynhier@interstel.net> - Solaris Process Contract support
Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - AIX BFF package scripts
David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
-Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
+Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au> - HPUX fixes and enhancements
Gert Doering <gd@hilb1.medat.de> - bug and portability fixes
HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org> - Translations & doc fixes
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp> - IPv6 and bug fixes
Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE> - KRB4/AFS config patch
IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp> - bugfixes
Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi> - Patches
Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi> - Bugfixes
Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> - Many patches
Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH
Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de> - scp bugfixing
KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net> - scp fixes
Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> - Configure fixes
Kevin Cawlfield <cawlfiel@us.ibm.com> - AIX fixes.
Kevin O'Connor <kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com> - RSAless operation
Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com> - HP support, bugfixes, improvements
Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp> - Bugfixes
Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com> - Bugfixes
Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> - Bugfixes
Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca> - Solaris patches
Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> - bug fixes
Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se> - Linux fixes
Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net> - Features, bug fixes
Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net> - Bugfixes
Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> - AIX patches
Michael Steffens <michael_steffens at hp.com> - HP-UX fixes
Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> - Irix enhancements
Nakaji Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp> - Sony News-OS patch
Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com> - PAM environment patch
Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com> - SunOS 4.1.x fixes
Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk> - Assorted patches
Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> - Security fixes
Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz> - Bugfixes
Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - Bugfixes
Peter Kocks <peter.kocks@baygate.com> - Makefile fixes
Peter Stuge <stuge@cdy.org> - mdoc2man.awk script
Phil Hands <phil@hands.com> - Debian scripts, assorted patches
Phil Karn <karn@ka9q.ampr.org> - Autoconf fixes
Philippe WILLEM <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr> - Bugfixes
Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix
Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes
Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at siemens.com> - Reliant Unix fixes
Roumen Petrov <openssh@roumenpetrov.info> - Compile & configure fixes
SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes
Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> - many patches and technical assistance
Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes
Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords
Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes
Tobias Oetiker <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch> - Bugfixes
Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> - AIX auth fixes
Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com> - AIX support
Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu> - MD5 password support
Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de> - ReliantUNIX support
Wendy Palm <wendyp at cray.com> - Cray support.
Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org> - GNOME askpass enhancement
Apologies to anyone I have missed.
Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
index 0307f62e0557..288e90bbfe51 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
@@ -1,9706 +1,13703 @@
-commit aede1c34243a6f7feae2fb2cb686ade5f9be6f3d
+commit e1a596186c81e65a34ce13076449712d3bf97eb4
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 11:01:20 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Aug 20 14:03:49 2021 +1000
- Require OpenSSL 1.1.x series 1.1.0g or greater
-
- Previous versions have a bug with EVP_CipherInit() when passed a
- NULL EVP_CIPHER, per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
-
- ok dtucker@
+ depend
-commit 08300c211409c212e010fe2e2f2883e573a04ce2
+commit 5450606c8f7f7a0d70211cea78bc2dab74ab35d1
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 08:12:02 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Aug 20 13:59:43 2021 +1000
- unbreak compilation with --with-ssl-engine
-
- Missing last argument to OPENSSL_init_crypto()
+ update version numbers
-commit 1673274aee67ce0eb6f00578b6f3d2bcbd58f937
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Oct 16 14:45:57 2018 +1100
+commit feee2384ab8d694c770b7750cfa76a512bdf8246
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 20 03:22:55 2021 +0000
- Remove gcc spectre mitigation flags.
+ upstream: openssh-8.7
- Current impementions of the gcc spectre mitigation flags cause
- miscompilations when combined with other flags and do not provide much
- protection. Found by fweimer at redhat.com, ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8769dff0fd76ae3193d77bf83b439adee0f300cd
-commit 4e23deefd7959ef83c73ed9cce574423438f6133
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 16 10:51:52 2018 +1100
+commit 9a2ed62173cc551b2b5f479460bb015b19499de8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 20 10:48:13 2021 +1000
- Avoid deprecated OPENSSL_config when using 1.1.x
+ Also check pid in pselect_notify_setup.
- OpenSSL 1.1.x soft-deprecated OPENSSL_config in favour of
- OPENSSL_init_crypto; pointed out by Jakub Jelen
+ Spotted by djm@.
-commit 797cdd9c8468ed1125ce60d590ae3f1397866af4
+commit deaadcb93ca15d4f38aa38fb340156077792ce87
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 16:58:47 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Aug 20 08:39:33 2021 +1000
- Don't avoid our *sprintf replacements.
-
- Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements
- via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. From djm@
+ Prefix pselect functions to clarify debug messages
-commit e526127cbd2f8ad88fb41229df0c9b850c722830
+commit 10e45654cff221ca60fd35ee069df67208fcf415
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 16:43:35 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Aug 20 08:30:42 2021 +1000
- Check if snprintf understands %zu.
+ Fix race in pselect replacement code.
- If the platforms snprintf and friends don't understand %zu, use the
- compat replacement. Prevents segfaults on those platforms.
+ On the second and subsequent calls to pselect the notify_pipe was not
+ added to the select readset, opening up a race that om G. Christensen
+ discovered on multiprocessor Solaris <=9 systems.
+
+ Also reinitialize notify_pipe if the pid changes. This will prevent a
+ parent and child from using the same FD, although this is not an issue
+ in the current structure it might be in future.
-commit cf39f875191708c5f2f1a3c1c9019f106e74aea3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 09:48:05 2018 +1100
+commit 464ba22f1e38d25402e5ec79a9b8d34a32df5a3f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Aug 18 12:51:30 2021 +1000
- remove stale link, tweak
+ Check compiler for c99 declarations after code.
+
+ The sntrup761 reference code contains c99-style declarations after code
+ so don't try to build that if the compiler doesn't support it.
-commit a7205e68decf7de2005810853b4ce6b222b65e2a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 09:47:20 2018 +1100
+commit 7d878679a4b155a359d32104ff473f789501748d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Aug 17 15:12:04 2021 +1000
- update version numbers ahead of release
+ Remove trailing backslash on regress-unit-binaries
-commit 1a4a9cf80f5b92b9d1dadd0bfa8867c04d195391
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 03:48:04 2018 +0000
+commit b71b2508f17c68c5d9dbbe537686d81cedb9a781
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Aug 17 07:59:27 2021 +1000
- upstream: don't send new-style rsa-sha2-*-cert-v01@openssh.com names to
+ Put stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
- older OpenSSH that can't handle them. spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 662bbc402e3d7c9b6c322806269698106a6ae631
+ From Tom G. Christensen.
-commit dc8ddcdf1a95e011c263486c25869bb5bf4e30ec
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 13:08:59 2018 +1100
+commit 6a24567a29bd7b4ab64e1afad859ea845cbc6b8c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Aug 16 14:13:02 2021 +1000
- update depends
+ Improve github test driver script.
+
+ - use a trap to always output any failed regress logs (since the script
+ sets -e, the existing log output is never invoked).
+ - pass LTESTS and SKIP_LTESTS when re-running with sshd options (eg.
+ UsePAM).
-commit 26841ac265603fd2253e6832e03602823dbb4022
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 13:02:11 2018 +1100
+commit b467cf13705f59ed348b620722ac098fe31879b7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Aug 16 11:32:23 2021 +1000
- some more duplicated key algorithm lines
+ Remove deprecated ubuntu-16.04 test targets.
- From Adam Eijdenberg
+ Github has deprecated ubuntu-16.04 and it will be removed on 20
+ September.
-commit 5d9d17603bfbb620195a4581025052832b4c4adc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:56:36 2018 +1100
+commit 20e6eefcdf78394f05e453d456c1212ffaa6b6a4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Aug 15 23:25:26 2021 +1000
- fix duplicated algorithm specification lines
-
- Spotted by Adam Eijdenberg
+ Skip agent ptrace test on hurd.
-commit ebfafd9c7a5b2a7fb515ee95dbe0e44e11d0a663
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 00:52:46 2018 +0000
+commit 7c9115bbbf958fbf85259a061c1122e2d046aabf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Aug 15 19:37:22 2021 +1000
- upstream: typo in plain RSA algorithm counterpart names for
-
- certificates; spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfcdeb6f4fc9e7607f5096574c8f118f2e709e00
+ Add hurd test target.
-commit c29b111e7d87c2324ff71c80653dd8da168c13b9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:29:35 2018 +1100
+commit 7909a566f6c6a78fcd30708dc49f4e4f9bb80ce3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Aug 15 12:45:10 2021 +1000
- check pw_passwd != NULL here too
-
- Again, for systems with broken NIS implementations.
-
- Prompted by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ Skip scp3 tests on all dfly58 and 60 configs.
-commit fe8e8f349a553ef4c567acd418aac769a82b7729
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:03:15 2018 +1100
+commit e65198e52cb03534e8c846d1bca74c310b1526de
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Sat Aug 14 13:08:07 2021 -0700
- check for NULL return from shadow_pw()
-
- probably unreachable on this platform; pointed out by
- coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h: put bsd-signal.h before bsd-misc.h
+ to get sigset_t from signal.h needed for the pselect replacement.
-commit acc59cbe7a1fb169e1c3caba65a39bd74d6e030d
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 10 16:43:49 2018 +0000
+commit e50635640f79920d9375e0155cb3f4adb870eee5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 13 13:21:00 2021 +1000
- upstream: introducing openssh 7.9
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42d526a9fe01a40dd299ac58014d3349adf40e25
+ Test OpenSSH from OpenBSD head on 6.8 and 6.9.
-commit 12731158c75c8760a8bea06350eeb3e763fe1a07
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 10:29:29 2018 +1100
+commit e0ba38861c490c680117b7fe0a1d61a181cd00e7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 13 13:00:14 2021 +1000
- supply callback to PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey
-
- OpenSSL 1.1.0i has changed the behaviour of their PEM APIs,
- so that empty passphrases are interpreted differently. This
- probabalistically breaks loading some keys, because the PEM format
- is terrible and doesn't include a proper MAC.
+ Skip scp3 test on dragonfly 58 and 60.
- Avoid this by providing a basic callback to avoid passing empty
- passphrases to OpenSSL in cases where one is required.
-
- Based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2913; ok dtucker@
+ The tests hang, so skip until we figure them out.
-commit d1d301a1dd5d6cc3a9ed93ab7ab09dda4cb456e0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 10 14:57:00 2018 +1100
+commit dcce2a2bcf007bf817a2fb0dce3db83fa9201e92
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 12 23:59:25 2021 +0000
- in pick_salt() avoid dereference of NULL passwords
+ upstream: mention that CASignatureAlgorithms accepts +/- similarly to
- Apparently some NIS implementations can leave pw->pw_passwd (or the
- shadow equivalent) NULL.
+ the other algorithm list directives; ok jmc bz#3335
- bz#2909; based on patch from Todd Eigenschink
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d46b53995817052c78e2dce9dbd133963b073d9
-commit edbb6febccee084d212fdc0cb05b40cb1c646ab1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 9 05:42:23 2018 +0000
+commit 090a82486e5d7a8f7f16613d67e66a673a40367f
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 12 09:59:00 2021 +0000
- upstream: Treat all PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() errors when a passphrase
-
- is specified as "incorrect passphrase" instead of trying to choose between
- that and "invalid format".
+ upstream: In the editline(3) branch of the sftp(1) event loop,
- libcrypto can return ASN1 parsing errors rather than the expected
- decrypt error in certain infrequent cases when trying to decrypt/parse
- PEM private keys when supplied with an invalid passphrase.
+ handle SIGINT rather than ignoring it, such that the user can use Ctrl-C to
+ discard the currently edited command line and get a fresh prompt, just like
+ in ftp(1), bc(1), and in shells.
- Report and repro recipe from Thomas Deutschmann in bz#2901
+ It is critical to not use ssl_signal() for this particular case
+ because that function unconditionally sets SA_RESTART, but here we
+ need the signal to interrupt the read(2) in the el_gets(3) event loop.
- ok markus@
+ OK dtucker@ deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1d4cd92395f9743f81c0d23aab2524109580870
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8025115a773f52e9bb562eaab37ea2e021cc7299
-commit 2581333d564d8697837729b3d07d45738eaf5a54
+commit e1371e4f58404d6411d9f95eb774b444cea06a26
Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 5 14:26:09 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Aug 11 14:07:54 2021 +0000
- upstream: Support using service names for port numbers.
+ upstream: scp: tweak man page and error message for -3 by default
- * Try to resolve a port specification with getservbyname(3) if a
- numeric conversion fails.
- * Make the "Port" option in ssh_config handle its argument as a
- port rather than a plain integer.
+ Now that the -3 option is enabled by default, flip the documentation
+ and error message logic from "requires -3" to "blocked by -R".
- ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7f03633133205ab3dfbc67f9df7475fabae660d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a872592118444fb3acda5267b2a8c3d4c4252020
-commit e0d6501e86734c48c8c503f81e1c0926e98c5c4c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 07:47:35 2018 +0000
+commit 49f46f6d77328a3d10a758522b670a3e8c2235e7
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 11 14:05:19 2021 +0000
- upstream: when the peer sends a channel-close message, make sure we
+ upstream: scp: do not spawn ssh with two -s flags for
- close the local extended read fd (stderr) along with the regular read fd
- (stdout). Avoids weird stuck processed in multiplexing mode.
+ remote-to-remote copies
- Report and analysis by Nelson Elhage and Geoffrey Thomas in bz#2863
+ Do not add another "-s" to the argument vector every time an SFTP
+ connection is initiated. Instead, introduce a subsystem flag to
+ do_cmd() and add "-s" when the flag is set.
- ok dtucker@ markus@
+ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a48a2467fe938de4de69d2e7193d5fa701f12ae9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25df69759f323661d31b2e1e790faa22e27966c1
-commit 6f1aabb128246f445e33b8844fad3de9cb1d18cb
+commit 2a2cd00783e1da45ee730b7f453408af1358ef5b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 01:04:52 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Aug 11 08:55:04 2021 +0000
- upstream: factor out channel status formatting from
-
- channel_open_message() so we can use it in other debug messages
+ upstream: test -Oprint-pubkey
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3903ca28fcabad57f566c9d0045b41ab7d52ba
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d51afb6d1f287975fb6fddd7a2c00a3bc5094e0
-commit f1dd179e122bdfdb7ca3072d9603607740efda05
+commit b9f4635ea5bc33ed5ebbacf332d79bae463b0f54
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 00:10:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Aug 11 08:54:17 2021 +0000
- upstream: include a little more information about the status and
+ upstream: when verifying sshsig signatures, support an option
- disposition of channel's extended (stderr) fd; makes debugging some things a
- bit easier. No behaviour change.
+ (-Oprint-pubkey) to dump the full public key to stdout; based on patch from
+ Fabian Stelzer; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 483eb6467dc7d5dbca8eb109c453e7a43075f7ce
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0598000e5b9adfb45d42afa76ff80daaa12fc3e2
-commit 2d1428b11c8b6f616f070f2ecedce12328526944
+commit 750c1a45ba4e8ad63793d49418a0780e77947b9b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 00:04:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Aug 11 05:21:32 2021 +0000
- upstream: explicit_bzero here to be consistent with other kex*.c;
+ upstream: oops, missed one more %p
- report from coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90f146c5b5f5b1408700395e394f70b440856cb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7e62818d1564cc5cd9086eaf7a51cbd1a9701eb
-commit 5eff5b858e717e901e6af6596306a114de9f79f2
+commit b5aa27b69ab2e1c13ac2b5ad3f8f7d389bad7489
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 3 06:38:35 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Aug 11 05:20:17 2021 +0000
- upstream: Allow ssh_config IdentityAgent directive to accept
+ upstream: remove a bunch of %p in format strings; leftovers of
- environment variable names as well as explicit paths. ok dtucker@
+ debuggings past. prompted by Michael Forney, ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f0996e103876c53d8c9dd51dcce9889d700767b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4853a0d6c9cecaba9ecfcc19066e52d3a8dcb2ac
-commit a46ac4d86b25414d78b632e8173578b37e5f8a83
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 12:51:58 2018 +0000
+commit 419aa01123db5ff5dbc68b2376ef23b222862338
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Aug 11 09:21:09 2021 +1000
- upstream: mention INFO@openssh.com for sending SIGINFO
+ Add includes.h to compat tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900
-
-commit ff3a411cae0b484274b7900ef52ff4dad3e12876
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 22:49:40 2018 +1000
-
- only support SIGINFO on systems with SIGINFO
+ On platforms where closefrom returns void (eg glibc>=2.34) the prototype
+ for closefrom in its compat tests would cause compile errors. Remove
+ this and have the tests pull in the compat headers in the same way as
+ the main code. bz#3336.
-commit cd98925c6405e972dc9f211afc7e75e838abe81c
+commit 931f592f26239154eea3eb35a086585897b1a185
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 12:40:07 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Aug 10 03:35:45 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add server support for signalling sessions via the SSH
-
- channel/ session protocol. Signalling is only supported to sesssions that are
- not subsystems and were not started with a forced command.
-
- Long requested in bz#1424
+ upstream: adapt to scp -M flag change; make scp3.sh test SFTP mode too
- Based on a patch from markus@ and reworked by dtucker@;
- ok markus@ dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bea826f575862eaac569c4bedd1056a268be1c3
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 43fea26704a0f0b962b53c1fabcb68179638f9c0
-commit dba50258333f2604a87848762af07ba2cc40407a
+commit 391ca67fb978252c48d20c910553f803f988bd37
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 07:32:44 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Aug 10 03:33:34 2021 +0000
- upstream: remove big ugly TODO comment from start of file. Some of
-
- the mentioned tasks are obsolete and, of the remainder, most are already
- captured in PROTOCOL.mux where they better belong
+ upstream: Prepare for a future where scp(1) uses the SFTP protocol by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16d9d76dee42a5bb651c9d6740f7f0ef68aeb407
-
-commit 92b61a38ee9b765f5049f03cd1143e13f3878905
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 07:30:05 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Document mux proxy mode; added by Markus in openssh-7.4
+ default. Replace recently added -M option to select the protocol with -O
+ (olde) and -s (SFTP) flags, and label the -s flag with a clear warning that
+ it will be removed in the near future (so no, don't use it in scripts!).
- Also add a little bit of information about the overall packet format
+ prompted by/feedback from deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdb6f6ea8580ef96792e270cae7857786ad84a95
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ad72cc6f0023c9be9e316d8b30eb6d8d749cfc
-commit 9d883a1ce4f89b175fd77405ff32674620703fb2
+commit bfdd4b722f124a4fa9173d20dd64dd0fc69856be
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 01:48:57 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 9 23:56:36 2021 +0000
- upstream: s/process_mux_master/mux_master_process/ in mux master
-
- function names,
+ upstream: make scp -3 the default for remote-to-remote copies. It
- Gives better symmetry with the existing mux_client_*() names and makes
- it more obvious when a message comes from the master vs client (they
- are interleved in ControlMaster=auto mode).
+ provides a much better and more intuitive user experience and doesn't require
+ exposing credentials to the source host.
- no functional change beyond prefixing a could of log messages with
- __func__ where they were previously lacking.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b01f7c3fdf92692e1713a822a89dc499333daf75
-
-commit c2fa53cd6462da82d3a851dc3a4a3f6b920337c8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Sep 22 14:41:24 2018 +1000
-
- Remove unused variable in _ssh_compat_fflush.
-
-commit d1b3540c21212624af907488960d703c7d987b42
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 18:08:43 2018 +1000
-
- Import updated moduli.
-
-commit b5e412a8993ad17b9e1141c78408df15d3d987e1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:46:22 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Allow ssh_config ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the
+ thanks naddy@ for catching the missing argument in usage()
- timeout and allow X11 connections in untrusted mode indefinitely. ok dtucker@
+ "Yes please!" - markus@
+ "makes a lot of sense" - deraadt@
+ "the right thing to do" - dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ceed3f540b48e5803f933e59a03b20db10c69
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0d2af5f0965c5192ba5b2fa461c9f9b130e5dd9
-commit cb24d9fcc901429d77211f274031653476864ec6
+commit 2f7a3b51cef689ad9e93d0c6c17db5a194eb5555
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:23:17 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 9 23:49:31 2021 +0000
- upstream: when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method
+ upstream: make scp in SFTP mode try to use relative paths as much
- OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether
- GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config.
+ as possible. Previosuly, it would try to make relative and ~/-rooted paths
+ absolute before requesting transfers.
- This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI
- auth later, e.g.
-
- Match user djm
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-
- bz#2107; ok dtucker@
+ prompted by and much discussion deraadt@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46639d382ea99546a4914b545fa7b00fa1be5566
-commit bbc8af72ba68da014d4de6e21a85eb5123384226
+commit 2ab864010e0a93c5dd95116fb5ceaf430e2fc23c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:20:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 9 23:47:44 2021 +0000
- upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for
+ upstream: SFTP protocol extension to allow the server to expand
- being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered
- to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys
- without the entire revocation list being considered invalid.
+ ~-prefixed paths, in particular ~user ones. Allows scp in sftp mode to accept
+ these paths, like scp in rcp mode does.
- bz#2897; ok dtucker
+ prompted by and much discussion deraadt@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d794def9e4de348e1e777f6030fc9bafdfff392
-commit 383a33d160cefbfd1b40fef81f72eadbf9303a66
+commit 41b019ac067f1d1f7d99914d0ffee4d2a547c3d8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 03:11:36 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 9 23:44:32 2021 +0000
- upstream: Treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as ones
+ upstream: when scp is in SFTP mode, try to deal better with ~
- with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't
- try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to
- 'always').
+ prefixed paths. ~user paths aren't supported, but ~/ paths will be accepted
+ and prefixed with the SFTP server starting directory (more to come)
- Patch from Sven Wegener via bz#2896
+ prompted by and discussed with deraadt@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 527ff501cf98bf65fb4b29ed0cb847dda10f4d37
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 263a071f14555c045fd03132a8fb6cbd983df00d
-commit 0cbed248ed81584129b67c348dbb801660f25a6a
+commit b4b3f3da6cdceb3fd168b5fab69d11fba73bd0ae
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 23:40:16 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: actually make CASignatureAlgorithms available as a config
-
- option
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93fa7ff58314ed7b1ab7744090a6a91232e6ae52
+Date: Mon Aug 9 07:21:01 2021 +0000
-commit 62528870c0ec48cd86a37dd7320fb85886c3e6ee
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 08:07:03 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Import updated moduli.
+ upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40
-
-commit e6933a2ffa0659d57f3c7b7c457b2c62b2a84613
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 06:58:48 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: reorder CASignatureAlgorithms, and add them to the
+ exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing
+ after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok
+ markus@
- various -o lists; ok djm
+ (this was originally committed as r1.223 along with unrelated stuff that
+ I rolled back in r1.224)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecb88baecc3c54988b4d1654446ea033da359288
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1261fd667ad918484889ed3d7aec074f3956a74b
-commit aa083aa9624ea7b764d5a81c4c676719a1a3e42b
+commit 2ae7771749e0b4cecb107f9d4860bec16c3f4245
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:31:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 9 07:19:12 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix "ssh -Q sig" to show correct signature algorithm list
+ upstream: rever r1.223 - I accidentally committed unrelated changes
- (it was erroneously showing certificate algorithms); prompted by markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdee002f2f0c21456979deeb887fc889afb154d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb73f3865b2647a27dd94db73d6589506a9625f9
-commit ecac7e1f7add6b28874959a11f2238d149dc2c07
+commit 986abe94d481a1e82a01747360bd767b96b41eda
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:30:44 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 9 07:16:09 2021 +0000
- upstream: add CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client, allowing
+ upstream: show only the final path component in the progress meter;
- it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing
- certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@
+ more useful with long paths (that may truncate) and better matches
+ traditional scp behaviour; spotted by naddy@ ok deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26b544d0074f03ebb8a3ebce42317d8d7ee291a3
-commit 86e5737c39153af134158f24d0cab5827cbd5852
+commit 2b67932bb3176dee4fd447af4368789e04a82b93
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:28:06 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 9 07:13:54 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add sshd_config CASignatureAlgorithms option to allow
-
- control over which signature algorithms a CA may use when signing
- certificates. In particular, this allows a sshd to ban certificates signed
- with RSA/SHA1.
+ upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before
- ok markus@
+ exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing
+ after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b05c86ef8b52b913ed48d54a9b9c1a7714d96bac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef9dab5ef5ae54a6a4c3b15d380568e94263456c
-commit f80e68ea7d62e2dfafc12f1a60ab544ae4033a0f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 19 02:03:02 2018 +0000
+commit 724eb900ace30661d45db2ba01d0f924d95ecccb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 8 08:49:09 2021 +0000
- upstream: Make "ssh-add -q" do what it says on the tin: silence
+ upstream: xstrdup environment variable used by ForwardAgent. bz#3328
- output from successful operations.
+ from goetze at dovetail.com, ok djm@ deraadt@
- Based on patch from Thijs van Dijk; ok dtucker@ deraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4f754ecc055c10af166116ce7515104aa8522e1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760320dac1c3b26904284ba417a7d63fccc5e742
-commit 5e532320e9e51de720d5f3cc2596e95d29f6e98f
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 17 15:40:14 2018 +0000
+commit 86b4cb3a884846b358305aad17a6ef53045fa41f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 8 08:27:28 2021 +0000
- upstream: When choosing a prime from the moduli file, avoid
+ upstream: Although it's POSIX, not all shells used in Portable support
- re-using the linenum variable for something that is not a line number to
- avoid the confusion that resulted in the bug in rev. 1.64. This also lets us
- pass the actual linenum to parse_prime() so the error messages include the
- correct line number. OK markus@ some time ago.
+ the implicit 'in "$@"' after 'for i'.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d8e5d3e924d6e8eb70053e3defa23c151a00084
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c9aec6bca4868f85d2742b6ba5223fce110bdbc
-commit cce8cbe0ed7d1ba3a575310e0b63c193326ae616
+commit f2ccf6c9f395923695f22345e626dfd691227aaf
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:44:06 2018 +1000
+Date: Sun Aug 8 17:39:56 2021 +1000
- Fix openssl-1.1 fallout for --without-openssl.
+ Move portable specific settings down.
- ok djm@
+ This brings the top hunk of the file back in sync with OpenBSD
+ so patches to the CVS Id should apply instead of always being
+ rejected.
-commit 149519b9f201dac755f3cba4789f4d76fecf0ee1
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:37:48 2018 +1000
+commit 71b0eb997e220b0fc9331635af409ad84979f2af
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 8 07:27:52 2021 +0000
- add futex(2) syscall to seccomp sandbox
+ upstream: Move setting of USER further down the startup In portable
- Apparently needed for some glibc/openssl combinations.
+ we have to change this and having it in the same hunk as the CVS Id string
+ means applying changes fails every. single. time.
- Patch from Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87cd603eb6db58c9b430bf90adacb7f90864429b
-commit 4488ae1a6940af704c4dbf70f55bf2f756a16536
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:36:55 2018 +1000
+commit f0aca2706c710a0da1a4be705f825a807cd15400
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 8 06:38:33 2021 +0000
- really add source for authopt_fuzz this time
+ upstream: Drop -q in ssh-log-wrapper.sh to preserve logs.
+
+ scp and sftp like to add -q to the command line passed to ssh which
+ overrides the LogLevel we set in the config files and suppresses output
+ to the debug logs so drop any "-q" from the invoked ssh. In the one
+ case where we actually want to use -q in the banner test, call the ssh
+ binary directly bypassing the logging wrapper.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e2c97d3c964bda33a751374c56f65cdb29755b75
-commit 9201784b4a257c8345fbd740bcbdd70054885707
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:35:40 2018 +1000
+commit cf27810a649c5cfae60f8ce66eeb25caa53b13bc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 7 01:57:08 2021 +0000
- remove accidentally checked-in authopt_fuzz binary
+ upstream: Fix prototype mismatch for do_cmd. ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c1598bb5237a7ae0be99152f185e0071163714d
-commit beb9e522dc7717df08179f9e59f36b361bfa14ab
+commit 85de69f64665245786e28c81ab01fe18b0e2a149
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 05:26:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 01:55:01 2021 +0000
- upstream: second try, deals properly with missing and private-only
-
- Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
- received during public key authentication.
+ upstream: sftp-client.c needs poll.h
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains (where available) the key filename, its type and fingerprint,
- and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ remove unused variable
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1c6a8e9cfc4e108c359db77f24f9a40e1e25ea7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 233ac6c012cd23af62f237167a661db391055a16
-commit 6bc5a24ac867bfdc3ed615589d69ac640f51674b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 15:16:34 2018 +1000
+commit 397c4d72e50023af5fe3aee5cc2ad407a6eb1073
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Aug 7 11:30:57 2021 +1000
- fuzzer harness for authorized_keys option parsing
+ Include poll.h and friends for struct pollfd.
-commit 6c8b82fc6929b6a9a3f645151b6ec26c5507d9ef
+commit a9e2c533195f28627f205682482d9da384c4c52e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:44:04 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:14:17 2021 +0000
- upstream: revert following; deals badly with agent keys
+ upstream: do_upload() used a near-identical structure for
- revision 1.285
- date: 2018/09/14 04:17:12; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +47 -26; commitid: lflGFcNb2X2HebaK;
- Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
- received during public key authentication.
+ tracking expected status replies from the server to what do_download() was
+ using.
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
- the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ Refactor it to use the same structure and factor out some common
+ code into helper functions.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e496bd004e452d4b051f33ed9ae6a54ab918f56d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c167df8ab6df4a5292c32421922b0cf379e9054
-commit 6da046f9c3374ce7e269ded15d8ff8bc45017301
+commit 7b1cbcb7599d9f6a3bbad79d412604aa1203b5ee
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:44 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:12:09 2021 +0000
- upstream: garbage-collect moribund ssh_new_private() API.
+ upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode follow symlinks like
+
+ traditional scp(1) ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c05bf13b094093dfa01848a9306c82eb6e95f6c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97255e55be37e8e26605e4ba1e69f9781765d231
-commit 1f24ac5fc05252ceb1c1d0e8cab6a283b883c780
+commit 133b44e500422df68c9c25c3b6de35c0263132f1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:10:49 2021 +0000
- upstream: Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied,
+ upstream: fix incorrect directory permissions on scp -3
- offered and received during public key authentication.
+ transfers; ok markus@
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
- the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a01d59285a8a7e01185bb0a43316084b4f06a1f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64b2abaa5635a2be65ee2e77688ad9bcebf576c2
-commit 488c9325bb7233e975dbfbf89fa055edc3d3eddc
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 15:23:32 2018 +0000
+commit 98b59244ca10e62ff67a420856770cb700164f59
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:09:57 2021 +0000
- upstream: Fix warnings caused by user_from_uid() and group_from_gid()
+ upstream: a bit more debugging of file attributes being
- now returning const char *.
+ sent/received over the wire
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5fe571ea77cfa7b9035062829ab05eb87d7cc6f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f68c4e207b08ef95200a8b2de499d422808e089b
-commit 0aa1f230846ebce698e52051a107f3127024a05a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 10:31:47 2018 +1000
+commit c677e65365d6f460c084e41e0c4807bb8a9cf601
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:08:52 2021 +0000
- allow SIGUSR1 as synonym for SIGINFO
+ upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode output better match original
- Lets users on those unfortunate operating systems that lack SIGINFO
- still be able to obtain progress information from unit tests :)
-
-commit d64e78526596f098096113fcf148216798c327ff
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 19:05:48 2018 +1000
-
- add compat header
+ scp(1) by suppressing "Retrieving [path]" lines that were emitted to support
+ the interactive sftp(1) client. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06be293df5f156a18f366079be2f33fa68001acc
-commit a3fd8074e2e2f06602e25618721f9556c731312c
+commit 48cd39b7a4e5e7c25101c6d1179f98fe544835cd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 09:03:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:07:18 2021 +0000
- upstream: missed a bit of openssl-1.0.x API in this unittest
+ upstream: factor out a structure duplicated between downloading
+
+ and crossloading; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a73a54d7f7381856a3f3a2d25947bee7a9a5dbc9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96eede24d520569232086a129febe342e4765d39
-commit 86e0a9f3d249d5580390daf58e015e68b01cef10
+commit 318c06bb04ee21a0cfa6b6022a201eacaa53f388
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 05:06:51 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:06:30 2021 +0000
- upstream: use only openssl-1.1.x API here too
+ upstream: use sftp_client crossloading to implement scp -3
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ae877064597c349954b1b443769723563cecbc8f
-
-commit 48f54b9d12c1c79fba333bc86d455d8f4cda8cfc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 12:13:50 2018 +1000
-
- adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x API
+ feedback/ok markus@
- Polyfill missing API with replacement functions extracted from LibreSSL
-
-commit 86112951d63d48839f035b5795be62635a463f99
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 12:12:42 2018 +1000
-
- forgot to stage these test files in commit d70d061
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7db4c0086cfc12afc9cfb71d4c2fd3c7e9416ee9
-commit 482d23bcacdd3664f21cc82a5135f66fc598275f
+commit de7115b373ba0be3861c65de9b606a3e0e9d29a3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 02:08:33 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:02:41 2021 +0000
- upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x API in
+ upstream: support for "cross"-loading files/directories, i.e.
- OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@
+ downloading from one SFTP server while simultaneously uploading to another.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3982878e29d8df0fa4ddc502f5ff6126ac714235
-commit d70d061828730a56636ab6f1f24fe4a8ccefcfc1
+commit a50bd0367ff2063bbc70a387740a2aa6914de094
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:36:45 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:01:29 2021 +0000
- upstream: Include certs with multiple RSA signature variants in
+ upstream: factor our SSH2_FXP_OPEN calls into their own function;
- test data Ensure that cert->signature_key is populated correctly
+ "looks fine" markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 56e68f70fe46cb3a193ca207385bdb301fd6603a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3dea2153f08855c6d9dacc01973248944adeffb
-commit f803b2682992cfededd40c91818b653b5d923ef5
+commit e3c0ba05873cf3d3f7d19d595667a251026b2d84
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:23:48 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Aug 7 00:00:33 2021 +0000
- upstream: test revocation by explicit hash and by fingerprint
+ upstream: prepare for scp -3 implemented via sftp
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 079c18a9ab9663f4af419327c759fc1e2bc78fd8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194aac0dd87cb175334b71c2a30623a5ad55bb44
-commit 2de78bc7da70e1338b32feeefcc6045cf49efcd4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:22:43 2018 +0000
+commit 395d8fbdb094497211e1461cf0e2f80af5617e0a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 6 09:00:18 2021 +0000
- upstream: s/sshkey_demote/sshkey_from_private/g
+ upstream: Make diff invocation more portable.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 782bde7407d94a87aa8d1db7c23750e09d4443c4
+ POSIX does not require diff to have -N, so compare in both directions
+ with just -r, which should catch missing files in either directory.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e2ec8594556a6f369ed5a0a90c6806419b845f7
-commit 41c115a5ea1cb79a6a3182773c58a23f760e8076
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 16:50:01 2018 +1000
+commit d247a73ce27b460138599648d9c637c6f2b77605
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 4 21:28:00 2021 +0000
- delete the correct thing; kexfuzz binary
+ upstream: regression test for scp -3
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b44375d125c827754a1f722ec6b6b75b634de05d
-commit f0fcd7e65087db8c2496f13ed39d772f8e38b088
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 06:18:59 2018 +0000
+commit 35c8e41a6f6d8ad76f8d1cd81ac2ea23d0d993b2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 6 05:04:42 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix edit mistake; spotted by jmc@
+ upstream: Document "ProxyJump none". bz#3334.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd724e1c52c9d6084f4cd260ec7e1b2b138261c6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78cc6f55731f2cd35c3a41d5352ac1ee419eba7
-commit 4cc259bac699f4d2a5c52b92230f9e488c88a223
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:34:02 2018 +0000
+commit 911ec6411821bda535d09778df7503b92f0eafab
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 4 01:34:55 2021 +0000
- upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of
+ upstream: Allow for different (but POSIX compliant) behaviour of
- signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes
- ssh-dsa.
+ basename(3) and prevent a use-after-free in that case in the new sftp-compat
+ code.
- ok markus@
+ POSIX allows basename(3) to either return a pointer to static storage
+ or modify the passed string and return a pointer to that. OpenBSD does
+ the former and works as is, but on other platforms "filename" points
+ into "tmp" which was just freed. This makes the freeing of tmp
+ consistent with the other variable in the loop.
+
+ Pinpointed by the -portable Valgrind regress test. ok djm@ deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 750f3c19bd4440e4210e30dd5d7367386e833374
-commit ba9e788315b1f6a350f910cb2a9e95b2ce584e89
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:32:54 2018 +0000
+commit 6df1fecb5d3e51f3a8027a74885c3a44f6cbfcbd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 4 11:05:11 2021 +1000
- upstream: add sshkey_check_cert_sigtype() that checks a
-
- cert->signature_type against a supplied whitelist; ok markus
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caadb8073292ed7a9535e5adc067d11d356d9302
+ use openbsd-compat glob.h is required
-commit a70fd4ad7bd9f2ed223ff635a3d41e483057f23b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:31:30 2018 +0000
+commit 9ebd1828881dfc9014a344587934a5ce7db6fa1b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Aug 3 21:03:23 2021 +1000
- upstream: add cert->signature_type field and keep it in sync with
+ Missing space between macro arg and punctuation.
- certificate signature wrt loading and certification operations; ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8b8b9f76b66707a0cd926109c4383db8f664df3
+ From jmc@
+
+commit 0fd3f62eddc7cf54dcc9053be6f58998f3eb926a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Aug 3 21:02:33 2021 +1000
+
+ Avoid lines >80 chars. From jmc@
-commit 357128ac48630a9970e3af0e6ff820300a28da47
+commit af5d8094d8b755e1daaf2e20ff1dc252800b4c9b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:30:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Aug 3 01:05:24 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add "ssh -Q sig" to allow listing supported signature
+ upstream: regression tests for scp SFTP protocol support; mostly by
- algorithms ok markus@
+ Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a8c6eb6c249dc37823ba5081fce64876d10fe2b
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 36f1458525bcb111741ec8547eaf58b13cddc715
-commit 9405c6214f667be604a820c6823b27d0ea77937d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:21:34 2018 +0000
+commit e4673b7f67ae7740131a4ecea29a846593049a91
+Author: anton@openbsd.org <anton@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 29 15:34:09 2021 +0000
- upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygen
+ upstream: Treat doas with arguments as a valid SUDO variable.
+
+ Allows one to specify SUDO="doas -n" which I do while running make regress.
- to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4fe5814b5010dbf0885500d703bea06048d11005
-commit 50e2687ee0941c0ea216d6ffea370ffd2c1f14b9
+commit 197e29f1cca190d767c4b2b63a662f9a9e5da0b3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:19:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 2 23:38:27 2021 +0000
- upstream: log certificate fingerprint in authentication
+ upstream: support for using the SFTP protocol for file transfers in
- success/failure message (previously we logged only key ID and CA key
- fingerprint).
+ scp, via a new "-M sftp" option. Marked as experimental for now.
- ok markus@
+ Some corner-cases exist, in particular there is no attempt to
+ provide bug-compatibility with scp's weird "double shell" quoting
+ rules.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8ef2d172b7f1ddbcce26d6434b2de6d94f6c05d
+ Mostly by Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 with some tweaks by me. ok markus@
+ Thanks jmc@ for improving the scp.1 bits.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce4c9157ff17b650ace571c9f7793d92874051c
-commit de37ca909487d23e5844aca289b3f5e75d3f1e1f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 04:26:56 2018 +0000
+commit dd533c7ab79d61a7796b77b64bd81b098e0d7f9f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 30 14:28:13 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add FALLTHROUGH comments where appropriate. Patch from
+ upstream: fix a formatting error and add some Xr; from debian at
+
+ helgefjell de
- jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+ removed references to rlogin etc. as no longer relevant;
+ suggested by djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c48eb457be697a19d6d2950c6d0879f3ccc851d3
+ ok djm dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c431c303068d3aec5bb18573a0bd5e0cd77c5ae
-commit 247766cd3111d5d8c6ea39833a3257ca8fb820f2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 01:42:54 2018 +0000
+commit c7cd347a8823819411222c1e10a0d26747d0fd5c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 30 14:25:01 2021 +0000
- upstream: ssh -MM requires confirmation for all operations that
+ upstream: fix a formatting error and mark up known_hosts
- change the multiplexing state, not just new sessions.
+ consistently; issues reported by debian at helgefjell de
- mention that confirmation is checked via ssh-askpass
+ ok djm dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f1b45551ebb9cc5c9a4fe54ad3b23ce90f1f5c2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1fd8d21dc77f507685443832df0c9700481b0ce
-commit db8bb80e3ac1bcb3e1305d846cd98c6b869bf03f
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 28 12:25:53 2018 +0000
+commit 4455aec2e4fc90f64ae4fc47e78ebc9c18721738
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 28 05:57:42 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix misplaced parenthesis inside if-clause. it's harmless
+ upstream: no need to talk about version 2 with the -Q option, so
- and the only issue is showing an unknown error (since it's not defined)
- during fatal(), if it ever an error occurs inside that condition.
+ rewrite the text to read better;
- OK deraadt@ markus@ djm@
+ issue reported by debian at helgefjell de
+ ok djm dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: acb0a8e6936bfbe590504752d01d1d251a7101d8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59fe2e8219c37906740ad062e0fdaea487dbe9cf
-commit 086cc614f550b7d4f100c95e472a6b6b823938ab
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 28 12:17:45 2018 +0000
+commit bec429338e9b30d2c7668060e82608286a8a4777
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 27 14:28:46 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix build with DEBUG_PK enabled
-
- OK dtucker@
+ upstream: word fix; reported by debian at helgefjell de
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1568cf27726e9638a0415481c20c406e7b441c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c6fd22142422a25343c5bd1a618f31618f41ece
-commit 2678833013e97f8b18f09779b7f70bcbf5eb2ab2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:41:53 2018 +1000
+commit efad4deb5a1f1cf79ebefd63c6625059060bfbe1
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 27 14:14:25 2021 +0000
- Handle ngroups>_SC_NGROUPS_MAX.
+ upstream: standardise the grammar in the options list; issue
+
+ reported by debian at helgefjell de
+
+ ok dtucker djm
- Based on github pull request #99 from Darren Maffat at Oracle: Solaris'
- getgrouplist considers _SC_NGROUPS_MAX more of a guideline and can return
- a larger number of groups. In this case, retry getgrouplist with a
- larger array and defer allocating groups_byname. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac15575045d82f4b205a42cc7d5207fe4c3f8e6
-commit 039bf2a81797b8f3af6058d34005a4896a363221
+commit 1e11fb24066f3fc259ee30db3dbb2a3127e05956
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:06:57 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Aug 2 18:56:29 2021 +1000
- Initial len for the fmt=NULL case.
-
- Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. (OpenSSH never calls
- setproctitle with a null format so len is always initialized).
+ Check for RLIMIT_NOFILE before trying to use it.
-commit ea9c06e11d2e8fb2f4d5e02f8a41e23d2bd31ca9
+commit 0f494236b49fb48c1ef33669f14822ca4f3ce2f4
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:01:39 2018 +1000
+Date: Tue Jul 27 17:45:34 2021 +1000
- Include stdlib.h.
+ lastenv is only used in setenv.
- Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+ Prevents an unused variable warning on platforms that have setenv but
+ not unsetenv.
-commit 9617816dbe73ec4d65075f4d897443f63a97c87f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 27 13:08:01 2018 +1000
+commit a1f78e08bdb3eaa88603ba3c6e01de7c8671e28a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jul 26 12:45:30 2021 +1000
- document some more regress control env variables
-
- Specifically SKIP_UNIT, USE_VALGRING and LTESTS. Sort the list of
- environment variables.
+ Move SUDO to "make test" command line.
- Based on patch from Jakub Jelen
+ Environment variables don't get passed by vmrun, so move to command
+ line.
-commit 71508e06fab14bc415a79a08f5535ad7bffa93d9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 15:41:42 2018 +1000
+commit 02e624273b9c78a49a01239159b8c09b8409b1a0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jul 25 23:26:36 2021 +1000
- shorten temporary SSH_REGRESS_TMP path
-
- Previous path was exceeding max socket length on at least one platform (OSX)
+ Set SUDO for tests and cleanup.
-commit 26739cf5bdc9030a583b41ae5261dedd862060f0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 13:06:02 2018 +1000
+commit 460ae5d93051bab70239ad823dd784822d58baad
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jul 25 22:37:55 2021 +1000
- rebuild dependencies
+ Pass OPENSSL=no to make tests too.
-commit ff729025c7463cf5d0a8d1ca1823306e48c6d4cf
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 13:03:32 2018 +1000
+commit b398f499c68d74ebe3298b73757cf3f36e14e0cb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 25 12:27:37 2021 +0000
- fix path in distclean target
+ upstream: Skip unit and makefile-based key conversion tests when
+
+ we're building with OPENSSL=no.
- Patch from Jakub Jelen
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 20455ed9a977c93f846059d1fcb48e29e2c8d732
-commit 7fef173c28f7462dcd8ee017fdf12b5073f54c02
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 03:01:08 2018 +0000
+commit 727ce36c8c5941bde99216d27109405907caae4f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 25 12:13:03 2021 +0000
- upstream: memleak introduced in r1.83; from Colin Watson
+ upstream: Replace OPENSSL as the variable that points to the
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c019104c280cbd549a264a7217b67665e5732dc
+ openssl binary with OPENSSL_BIN. This will allow us to use the OPENSSL
+ variable from mk.conf or the make(1) command line indicating if we're
+ building with our without OpenSSL, and ultimately get the regress tests
+ working in the OPENSSL=no configuration.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d788fade3264d7803e5b54cae8875963f688c4e
-commit b8ae02a2896778b8984c7f51566c7f0f56fa8b56
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 21 13:56:27 2018 +0000
+commit 55e17101a9075f6a63af724261c5744809dcb95c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 24 02:57:28 2021 +0000
- upstream: AIX reports the CODESET as "ISO8859-1" in the POSIX locale.
-
- Treating that as a safe encoding is OK because even when other systems return
- that string for real ISO8859-1, it is still safe in the sense that it is
- ASCII-compatible and stateless.
+ upstream: Skip RFC4716 format import and export tests when built
- Issue reported by Val dot Baranov at duke dot edu. Additional
- information provided by Michael dot Felt at felt dot demon dot nl.
- Tested by Michael Felt on AIX 6.1 and by Val Baranov on AIX 7.1.
- Tweak and OK djm@.
+ without OpenSSL.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f1210e0b229817d10eb490d6038f507b8256a7
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d2c2d5d38c1acc2b88cc99cfe00a2eb8bb39dfa4
-commit bc44ee088ad269d232e514f037c87ada4c2fd3f0
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Tue Aug 21 08:57:24 2018 -0700
+commit f5ccb5895d39cd627ad9e7b2c671d2587616100d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 24 02:51:14 2021 +0000
- modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
- remove obsolete and un-needed include
+ upstream: Don't omit ssh-keygen -y from usage when built without
+
+ OpenSSL. It is actually available, albeit only for ed25519 keys.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a254c33d0e6a55c30c6b016a8d298d3cb7a7674
-commit 829fc28a9c54e3f812ee7248c7a3e31eeb4f0b3a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 20 15:57:29 2018 +1000
+commit 819d57ac23469f1f03baa8feb38ddefbada90fdc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 24 02:08:13 2021 +0000
- Missing unistd.h for regress/mkdtemp.c
+ upstream: Exclude key conversion options from usage when built
+
+ without OpenSSL since those are not available, similar to what we currently
+ do with the moduli screening options. We can also use this to skip the
+ conversion regression tests in this case.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c82caa398cf99cd4518c23bba5a2fc66b16bafe
-commit c8313e492355a368a91799131520d92743d8d16c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 17 05:45:20 2018 +1000
+commit b6673b1d2ee90b4690ee84f634efe40225423c38
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 24 13:02:51 2021 +1000
- update version numbers in anticipation of release
+ Test OpenBSD upstream with and without OpenSSL.
-commit 477b49a34b89f506f4794b35e3c70b3e2e83cd38
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 17:08:51 2018 +0200
+commit 9d38074b5453c1abbdf888e80828c278d3b886ac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 24 01:54:23 2021 +0000
- configure: work around GCC shortcoming on Cygwin
-
- Cygwin's latest 7.x GCC allows to specify -mfunction-return=thunk
- as well as -mindirect-branch=thunk on the command line, albeit
- producing invalid code, leading to an error at link stage.
+ upstream: test for first-match-wins in authorized_keys environment=
- The check in configure.ac only checks if the option is present,
- but not if it produces valid code.
+ options
- This patch fixes it by special-casing Cygwin. Another solution
- may be to change these to linker checks.
-
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1517c90276fe84b5dc5821c59f88877fcc34c0e8
-commit b0917945efa374be7648d67dbbaaff323ab39edc
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 17:05:05 2018 +0200
+commit 2b76f1dd19787e784711ea297ad8fc938b4484fd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 23 05:53:02 2021 +0000
- cygwin: add missing stdarg.h include
+ upstream: Simplify keygen-convert by using $SSH_KEYTYPES directly.
- Further header file standarization in Cygwin uncovered a lazy
- indirect include in bsd-cygwin_util.c
-
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cdbe408ec3671ea9ee9b55651ee551370d2a4108
-commit c3903c38b0fd168ab3d925c2b129d1a599593426
+commit 7d64a9fb587ba9592f027f7a2264226c713d6579
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 02:41:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jul 24 01:55:19 2021 +0000
- upstream: revert compat.[ch] section of the following change. It
-
- causes double-free under some circumstances.
+ upstream: don't leak environment= variable when it is not the first
- --
+ match
- date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh;
- fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366
- feedback and ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fbdc3dfe0032deaf003fd937eeb4d434ee4efe0
+
+commit db2130e2340bf923e41c791aa9cd27b9e926042c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 23 06:01:17 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: punctuation;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64be152e378c45975073ab1c07e0db7eddd15806
-commit 1b9dd4aa15208100fbc3650f33ea052255578282
+commit 03190d10980c6fc9124e988cb2df13101f266507
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Aug 12 20:19:13 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 05:56:47 2021 +0000
- upstream: better diagnosics on alg list assembly errors; ok
+ upstream: mention in comment that read_passphrase(..., RP_ALLOW_STDIN)
- deraadt@ markus@
+ will try to use askpass first. bz3314
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a557e74b839daf13cc105924d2af06a1560faee
+ convert a couple of debug() -> debug_f() while here
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e812aebc28fcc5db06d4710e0f73613dee545c
-commit e36a5f61b0f5bebf6d49c215d228cd99dfe86e28
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 11 18:08:45 2018 -0700
+commit 1653ece6832b2b304d46866b262d5f69880a9ec7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 23 05:07:16 2021 +0000
- Some AIX fixes; report from Michael Felt
+ upstream: Test conversion of ed25519 and ecdsa keys too.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3676d2d00e58e0d6d37f2878f108cc2b83bbe4bb
-commit 2f4766ceefe6657c5ad5fe92d13c411872acae0e
+commit 8b7af02dcf9d2b738787efd27da7ffda9859bed2
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 01:35:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 04:56:21 2021 +0000
- upstream: The script that cooks up PuTTY format host keys does not
+ upstream: Add test for exporting pubkey from a passphrase-protected
- understand the new key format so convert back to old format to create the
- PuTTY key and remove it once done.
+ private key.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a449a18846c3a144bc645135b551ba6177e38d3
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: da99d93e7b235fbd5b5aaa01efc411225e6ba8ac
-commit e1b26ce504662a5d5b991091228984ccfd25f280
+commit 441095d4a3e5048fe3c87a6c5db5bc3383d767fb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:44:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 03:54:55 2021 +0000
- upstream: improve
+ upstream: regression test for time-limited signature keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 40d839db0977b4e7ac8b647b16d5411d4faf2f60
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a6f3bd900dbee0a3c96f1ff23e032c93ab392bc
-commit 7c712966a3139622f7fb55045368d05de4e6782c
+commit 9e1882ef6489a7dd16b6d7794af96629cae61a53
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:42:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 05:24:02 2021 +0000
- upstream: Describe pubkey format, prompted by bz#2853
+ upstream: note successful authentication method in final "Authenticated
- While I'm here, describe and link to the remaining local PROTOCOL.*
- docs that weren't already mentioned (PROTOCOL.key, PROTOCOL.krl and
- PROTOCOL.mux)
+ to ..." message and partial auth success messages (all at LogLevel=verbose)
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a900f9b994ba4d53e7aeb467d44d75829fd1231
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06834b89ceb89f8f16c5321d368a66c08f441984
-commit ef100a2c5a8ed83afac0b8f36520815803da227a
+commit a917e973a1b90b40ff1e950df083364b48fc6c78
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:27:15 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 04:04:52 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix numbering
+ upstream: Add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart
+
+ to the ssh(1) -f flag. Last part of GHPR231 from Volker Diels-Grabsch. ok
+ dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc7a1764dff23fa4c5ff0e3379c9c4d5b63c9596
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b18aeda12efdebe2093d55263c90fe4ea0bce0d3
-commit ed7bd5d93fe14c7bd90febd29b858ea985d14d45
+commit e0c5088f1c96a145eb6ea1dee438010da78f9ef5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Aug 8 01:16:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 04:00:59 2021 +0000
- upstream: Use new private key format by default. This format is
-
- suported by OpenSSH >= 6.5 (released January 2014), so it should be supported
- by most OpenSSH versions in active use.
+ upstream: Add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows
- It is possible to convert new-format private keys to the older
- format using "ssh-keygen -f /path/key -pm PEM".
+ the config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) commandline.
+ Patch from Volker Diels-Grabsch via GHPR231; ok dtucker
- ok deraadt dtucker
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3bd4f2509a2103bfa2f710733426af3ad6d8ab8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66ddf3f15c76796d4dcd22ff464aed1edd62468e
-commit 967226a1bdde59ea137e8f0df871854ff7b91366
+commit e3957e21ffdc119d6d04c0b1686f8e2fe052f5ea
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 4 00:55:06 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 03:57:20 2021 +0000
- upstream: invalidate dh->priv_key after freeing it in error path;
+ upstream: make authorized_keys environment="..." directives
+
+ first-match-wins and more strictly limit their maximum number; prompted by
+ OOM reported by OSS-fuzz (35470).
- avoids unlikely double-free later. Reported by Viktor Dukhovni via
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/96 feedback jsing@ tb@
+ feedback and ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e317eb17c3e05500ae851f279ef6486f0457c805
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f63fc10dcd995e7aed9c378ad879161af83121
-commit 74287f5df9966a0648b4a68417451dd18f079ab8
+commit d0bb1ce731762c55acb95817df4d5fab526c7ecd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 31 03:10:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 23 03:37:52 2021 +0000
- upstream: delay bailout for invalid authentic
+ upstream: Let allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1)
- =?UTF-8?q?ating=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the?=
- =?UTF-8?q?=20request=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dar?=
- =?UTF-8?q?iusz=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ signatures support key lifetimes, and allow the verification mode to specify
+ a signature time to check at. This is intended for use by git to support
+ signing objects using ssh keys. ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4891882fbe413f230fe8ac8a37349b03bd0b70d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e2c67b7dcd94f0610194d1e8e4907829a40cf31
-commit 1a66079c0669813306cc69e5776a4acd9fb49015
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 31 03:07:24 2018 +0000
+commit 44142068dc7ef783d135e91ff954e754d2ed432e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 19 08:48:33 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen
+ upstream: Use SUDO when setting up hostkey.
- in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8402bbae67d578bedbadb0ce68ff7c5a136ef563
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 990cf4481cab8dad62e90818a9b4b36c533851a7
-commit 87f08be054b7eeadbb9cdeb3fb4872be79ccf218
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 13:18:28 2018 +1000
+commit 6b67f3f1d1d187597e54a139cc7785c0acebd9a2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 19 05:08:54 2021 +0000
- Remove support for S/Key
+ upstream: Increase time margin for rekey tests. Should help
+
+ reliability on very heavily loaded hosts.
- Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods
- like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor
- authentication via PAM or BSD Auth.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c28a0fce3ea89ebde441d7091464176e9730533
-commit 5d14019ba2ff54acbfd20a6b9b96bb860a8c7c31
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 12:03:17 2018 +0000
+commit 7953e1bfce9e76bec41c1331a29bc6cff9d416b8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jul 19 13:47:51 2021 +1000
- upstream: avoid expensive channel_open_message() calls; ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aea3b5512ad681cd8710367d743e8a753d4425d9
+ Add sshfp-connect.sh file missed in previous.
-commit e655ee04a3cb7999dbf9641b25192353e2b69418
+commit b75a80fa8369864916d4c93a50576155cad4df03
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 05:34:42 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 19 03:13:28 2021 +0000
- upstream: Now that ssh can't be setuid, remove the
+ upstream: Ensure that all returned SSHFP records for the specified host
- original_real_uid and original_effective_uid globals and replace with calls
- to plain getuid(). ok djm@
+ name and hostkey type match instead of only one. While there, simplify the
+ code somewhat and add some debugging. Based on discussion in bz#3322, ok
+ djm@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92561c0cd418d34e6841e20ba09160583e27b68c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a6a0a476eb7f9dfe8fe2c05a1a395e3e9b22ee4
-commit 73ddb25bae4c33a0db361ac13f2e3a60d7c6c4a5
+commit 1cc1fd095393663cd72ddac927d82c6384c622ba
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 05:13:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 19 02:21:50 2021 +0000
- upstream: Remove uid checks from low port binds. Now that ssh
+ upstream: Id sync only, -portable already has this.
- cannot be setuid and sshd always has privsep on, we can remove the uid checks
- for low port binds and just let the system do the check. We leave a sanity
- check for the !privsep case so long as the code is stil there. with & ok
- djm@
+ Put dh_set_moduli_file call inside ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. Fixes
+ build with OPENSSL=no.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9535cfdbd1cd54486fdbedfaee44ce4367ec7ca0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af54abbebfb12bcde6219a44d544e18204defb15
-commit c12033e102760d043bc5c98e6c8180e4d331b0df
+commit 33abbe2f4153f5ca5c874582f6a7cc91ae167485
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 03:55:22 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 19 02:46:34 2021 +0000
- upstream: ssh(1) no longer supports being setuid root. Remove reference
+ upstream: Add test for host key verification via SSHFP records. This
- to crc32 which went with protocol 1. Pointed out by deraadt@.
+ requires some external setup to operate so is disabled by default (see
+ comments in sshfp-connect.sh).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8763c25fd96ed91dd1abdab5667fd2e27e377b6
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c52c461bd1df3a803d17498917d156ef64512fd9
-commit 4492e2ec4e1956a277ef507f51d66e5c2aafaaf8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 14:15:28 2018 +1000
+commit f0cd000d8e3afeb0416dce1c711c3d7c28d89bdd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 19 02:29:28 2021 +0000
- correct snprintf truncation check in closefrom()
+ upstream: Add ed25519 key and test SSHFP export of it. Only test
- Truncation cannot happen unless the system has set PATH_MAX to some
- nonsensically low value.
+ RSA SSHFP export if we have RSA functionality compiled in.
- bz#2862, patch from Daniel Le
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4ff5181b8c9a5862e7f0ecdd96108622333a9af
-commit 149cab325a8599a003364ed833f878449c15f259
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 13:46:06 2018 +1000
+commit 0075511e27e5394faa28edca02bfbf13b9a6693e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 19 00:16:26 2021 +0000
- Include stdarg.h in mkdtemp for va_list.
+ upstream: Group keygen tests together.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07e2d25c527bb44f03b7c329d893a1f2d6c5c40c
-commit 6728f31bdfdc864d192773c32465b1860e23f556
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 17:12:35 2018 +0000
+commit 034828820c7e62652e7c48f9ee6b67fb7ba6fa26
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 18 23:10:10 2021 +0000
- upstream: Don't redefine Makefile choices which come correct from
-
- bsd.*.mk ok markus
+ upstream: Add test for ssh-keygen printing of SSHFP records.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fde9566b56eeb980e149bbe157a884838507c46b
-commit 21fd477a855753c1a8e450963669e28e39c3b5d2
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 13:56:23 2018 +0000
+commit 52c3b6985ef1d5dadb4c4fe212f8b3a78ca96812
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 17 00:38:11 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix indent; Clemens Goessnitzer
+ upstream: wrap some long lines
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5149a6d92b264d35f879d24608087b254857a83
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f5186b1466656762dae37d3e569438d900c350d
-commit 8e433c2083db8664c41499ee146448ea7ebe7dbf
-Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 13:10:56 2018 +0000
+commit 43ec991a782791d0b3f42898cd789f99a07bfaa4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 17 00:36:53 2021 +0000
- upstream: Use the caller provided (copied) pwent struct in
+ upstream: fix sftp on ControlPersist connections, broken by recent
- load_public_identity_files instead of calling getpwuid() again and discarding
- the argument. This prevents a client crash where tilde_expand_filename calls
- getpwuid() again before the pwent pointer is used. Issue noticed and reported
- by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com> ok djm@ deraadt@
+ SessionType change; spotted by sthen@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a067d74b5b098763736c94cc1368de8ea3f0b157
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c5ddc5698790ae6ff50d2a4f8f832f0eeeaa234
-commit e2127abb105ae72b6fda64fff150e6b24b3f1317
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 23 19:53:55 2018 +0000
+commit 073f45c236550f158c9a94003e4611c07dea5279
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 16 09:00:23 2021 +0000
- upstream: oops, failed to notice that SEE ALSO got messed up;
+ upstream: Explicitly check for and start time-based rekeying in the
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61c1306542cefdc6e59ac331751afe961557427d
-
-commit ddf1b797c2d26bbbc9d410aa4f484cbe94673587
-Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 23 19:02:49 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Point to glob in section 7 for the actual list of special
+ client and server mainloops.
- characters instead the C API in section 3.
+ Previously the rekey timeout could expire but rekeying would not start
+ until a packet was sent or received. This could cause us to spin in
+ select() on the rekey timeout if the connection was quiet.
- OK millert jmc nicm, "the right idea" deraadt
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a74fd215488c382809e4d041613aeba4a4b1ffc6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4356cf50d7900f3df0a8f2117d9e07c91b9ff987
-commit 01c98d9661d0ed6156e8602b650f72eed9fc4d12
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 22 12:16:59 2018 +0000
+commit ef7c4e52d5d840607f9ca3a302a4cbb81053eccf
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 14 06:46:38 2021 +0000
- upstream: Switch authorized_keys example from ssh-dss to ssh-rsa
+ upstream: reorder SessionType; ok djm
- since the former is no longer enabled by default. Pointed out by Daniel A.
- Maierhofer, ok jmc
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a196cef53d7524e0c9b58cdbc1b5609debaf8c7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7dd0b39e942b1caf4976a0b1cf0fed33d05418c
-commit 472269f8fe19343971c2d08f504ab5cbb8234b33
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 05:01:10 2018 +0000
+commit 8aa2f9aeb56506dca996d68ab90ab9c0bebd7ec3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:50 2021 +1000
- upstream: slightly-clearer description for AuthenticationMethods - the
-
- lists have comma-separated elements; bz#2663 from Hans Meier
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931c983d0fde4764d0942fb2c2b5017635993b5a
+ Make whitespace consistent.
-commit c59aca8adbdf7f5597084ad360a19bedb3f80970
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 14:53:42 2018 +1000
+commit 4f4297ee9b8a39f4dfd243a74c5f51f9e7a05723
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:12 2021 +1000
- Create control sockets in clean temp directories
-
- Adds a regress/mkdtemp tool and uses it to create empty temp
- directories for tests needing control sockets.
-
- Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2660; ok dtucker
+ Add ARM64 Linux self-hosted runner.
-commit 6ad8648e83e4f4ace37b742a05c2a6b6b872514e
+commit eda8909d1b0a85b9c3804a04d03ec6738fd9dc7f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 03:46:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 13 23:48:36 2021 +0000
- upstream: remove unused zlib.h
+ upstream: add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d274a9b467c7958df12668b49144056819f79f1
-
-commit 3ba6e6883527fe517b6e4a824876e2fe62af22fc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 19 23:03:16 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Fix typo in comment. From Alexandru Iacob via github.
+ configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no session) and -s
+ (subsystem) command-line flags.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eff4ec07c6c8c5483533da43a4dda37d72ef7f1d
-
-commit c77bc73c91bc656e343a1961756e09dd1b170820
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 13:48:51 2018 +1000
-
- Explicitly include openssl before zlib.
+ Part of GHPR#231 by Volker Diels-Grabsch with some minor tweaks;
+ feedback and ok dtucker@
- Some versions of OpenSSL have "free_func" in their headers, which zlib
- typedefs. Including openssl after zlib (eg via sshkey.h) results in
- "syntax error before `free_func'", which this fixes.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 726ee931dd4c5cc7f1d7a187b26f41257f9a2d12
-commit 95d41e90eafcd1286a901e8e361e4a37b98aeb52
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 19 10:28:47 2018 +0000
+commit 7ae69f2628e338ba6e0eae7ee8a63bcf8fea7538
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 12 02:12:22 2021 +0000
- upstream: Deprecate UsePrivilegedPort now that support for running
+ upstream: fix some broken tests; clean up output
- ssh(1) setuid has been removed, remove supporting code and clean up
- references to it in the man pages
-
- We have not shipped ssh(1) the setuid bit since 2002. If ayone
- really needs to make connections from a low port number this can
- be implemented via a small setuid ProxyCommand.
-
- ok markus@ jmc@ djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d03364610b7123ae4c6792f5274bd147b6de717e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1d5038edb511dc4ce1622344c1e724626a253566
-commit 258dc8bb07dfb35a46e52b0822a2c5b7027df60a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 18 11:34:04 2018 +0000
+commit f5fc6a4c3404bbf65c21ca6361853b33d78aa87e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jul 12 18:00:05 2021 +1000
- upstream: Remove support for running ssh(1) setuid and fatal if
-
- attempted. Do not link uidwap.c into ssh any more. Neuters
- UsePrivilegedPort, which will be marked as deprecated shortly. ok markus@
- djm@
+ Add configure-time detection for SSH_TIME_T_MAX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4ba5bf9c096f57a6ed15b713a1d7e9e2e373c42
+ Should fix printing cert times exceeding INT_MAX (bz#3329) on platforms
+ were time_t is a long long. The limit used is for the signed type, so if
+ some system has a 32bit unsigned time_t then the lower limit will still
+ be imposed and we would need to add some way to detect this. Anyone using
+ an unsigned 64bit can let us know when it starts being a problem.
-commit ac590760b251506b0a152551abbf8e8d6dc2f527
+commit fd2d06ae4442820429d634c0a8bae11c8e40c174
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 22:25:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 12 06:22:57 2021 +0000
- upstream: Slot 0 in the hostbased key array was previously RSA1,
+ upstream: Make limit for time_t test unconditional in the
- but that is now gone and the slot is unused so remove it. Remove two
- now-unused macros, and add an array bounds check to the two remaining ones
- (array is statically sized, so mostly a safety check on future changes). ok
- markus@
+ format_absolute_time fix for bz#3329 that allows printing of timestamps past
+ INT_MAX. This was incorrectly included with the previous commit. Based on
+ discussion with djm@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e4c0ca6cc1d8daeccead2aa56192a3f9d5e1e7a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 835936f6837c86504b07cabb596b613600cf0f6e
-commit 26efc2f5df0e3bcf6a6bbdd0506fd682d60c2145
+commit 6c29b387cd64a57b0ec8ae7d2c8d02789d88fcc3
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 11:05:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 12 06:08:57 2021 +0000
- upstream: Remove support for loading HostBasedAuthentication keys
+ upstream: Use existing format_absolute_time() function when
- directly in ssh(1) and always use ssh-keysign. This removes one of the few
- remaining reasons why ssh(1) might be setuid. ok markus@
+ printing cert validity instead of doing it inline. Part of bz#3329.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97f01e1448707129a20d75f86bad5d27c3cf0b7d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a13d4e3c4f59644c23745eb02a09b2a4e717c00c
-commit 3eb7f1038d17af7aea3c2c62d1e30cd545607640
+commit 99981d5f8bfa383791afea03f6bce8454e96e323
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 07:06:50 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 9 09:55:56 2021 +0000
- upstream: keep options.identity_file_userprovided array in sync when we
+ upstream: silence redundant error message; reported by Fabian Stelzer
- load keys, fixing some spurious error messages; ok markus
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e3d5200ee2cf9e35bda98de847302566c6a00
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9349a703016579a60557dafd03af2fe1d44e6aa2
-commit 2f131e1b34502aa19f345e89cabf6fa3fc097f09
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:59 2018 +0000
+commit e86097813419b49d5bff5c4b51d1c3a5d4d2d804
+Author: John Ericson <John.Ericson@Obsidian.Systems>
+Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500
- upstream: memleak in unittest; found by valgrind
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 168c23b0fb09fc3d0b438628990d3fd9260a8a5e
+ Re-indent krb5 section after pkg-config addition.
-commit de2997a4cf22ca0a524f0e5b451693c583e2fd89
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:13 2018 +0000
+commit 32dd2daa56c294e40ff7efea482c9eac536d8cbb
+Author: John Ericson <John.Ericson@Obsidian.Systems>
+Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500
- upstream: memleaks; found by valgrind
+ Support finding Kerberos via pkg-config
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ba22be53e753c899545f771e8399fc93cd844
+ This makes cross compilation easier.
-commit 61cc0003eb37fa07603c969c12b7c795caa498f3
+commit def7a72234d7e4f684d72d33a0f7229f9eee0aa4
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 14 16:49:01 2018 +1000
+Date: Fri Jul 9 14:34:06 2021 +1000
- Undef a few new macros in sys-queue.h.
-
- Prevents macro redefinition warnings on OSX.
+ Update comments about EGD to include prngd.
-commit 30a2c213877a54a44dfdffb6ca8db70be5b457e0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 13:40:20 2018 +1000
+commit b5d23150b4e3368f4983fd169d432c07afeee45a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 5 01:21:07 2021 +0000
- Include unistd.h for geteuid declaration.
+ upstream: Fix a couple of whitespace things. Portable already has
+
+ these so this removes two diffs between the two.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 769f017ebafd8e741e337b3e9e89eb5ac73c9c56
-commit 1dd32c23f2a85714dfafe2a9cc516971d187caa4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 13:38:10 2018 +1000
+commit 8f57be9f279b8e905f9883066aa633c7e67b31cf
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 5 01:16:46 2021 +0000
- Fallout from buffer conversion in AUDIT_EVENTS.
+ upstream: Order includes as per style(9). Portable already has
+
+ these so this removes a handful of diffs between the two.
- Supply missing "int r" and fix error path for sshbuf_new().
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bd7452d809b199c19bfc49511a798f414eb4a77
-commit 7449c178e943e5c4f6c8416a4e41d93b70c11c9e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:50 2018 +0000
+commit b75624f8733b3ed9e240f86cac5d4a39dae11848
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 5 00:50:25 2021 +0000
- upstream: make this use ssh_proxy rather than starting/stopping a
+ upstream: Remove comment referencing now-removed
- daemon for each testcase
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 608b7655ea65b1ba8fff5a13ce9caa60ef0c8166
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d864bfbd99a1d4429a58e301688f3be464827a9
-commit dbab02f9208d9baa134cec1d007054ec82b96ca9
+commit b67eb12f013c5441bb4f0893a97533582ad4eb13
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:19 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 5 00:25:42 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix leaks in unit test; with this, all unit tests are
+ upstream: allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote,
- leak free (as far as valgrind can spot anyway)
+ and scp -3 remote to remote copies. with & ok dtucker bz#1164
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b824d8b27998365379963440e5d18b95ca03aa17
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9b550f3a85ffbb079b6720833da31317901d6dd
-commit 2f6accff5085eb79b0dbe262d8b85ed017d1a51c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 11:39:25 2018 +1000
+commit 8c4ef0943e574f614fc7c6c7e427fd81ee64ab87
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 2 07:20:44 2021 +0000
- Enable leak checks for unit tests with valgrind
+ upstream: Remove obsolete comments about SSHv1 auth methods. ok
- Leave the leak checking on unconditionally when running with valgrind.
- The unit tests are leak-free and I want them to stay that way.
-
-commit e46cfbd9db5e907b821bf4fd0184d4dab99815ee
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 11:38:59 2018 +1000
-
- increase timeout to match cfgmatch.sh
+ djm@
- lets test pass under valgrind (on my workstation at least)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6060f70966f362d8eb4bec3da2f6c4712fbfb98f
-commit 6aa1bf475cf3e7a2149acc5a1e80e904749f064c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:54:18 2018 +1000
-
- rm regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o in distclean target
-
-commit eef1447ddb559c03725a23d4aa6d03f40e8b0049
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:26 2018 +1000
-
- repair !WITH_OPENSSL build
-
-commit 4d3b2f36fd831941d1627ac587faae37b6d3570f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:14 2018 +1000
-
- missing headers
-
-commit 3f420a692b293921216549c1099c2e46ff284eae
+commit 88908c9b61bcb99f16e8d398fc41e2b3b4be2003
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:57:46 2018 +1000
-
- Remove key.h from portable files too.
-
- Commit 5467fbcb removed key.h so stop including it in portable files
- too. Fixes builds on lots of platforms.
-
-commit e2c4af311543093f16005c10044f7e06af0426f0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 04:35:25 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jul 3 23:00:19 2021 +1000
- upstream: remove prototype to long-gone function
+ Remove reference to ChallengeResponse.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0414642ac7ce01d176b9f359091a66a8bbb640bd
+ challenge_response_authentication was removed from the struct, keeping
+ kbd_interactive_authentication.
-commit 394a842e60674bf8ee5130b9f15b01452a0b0285
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 18:55:11 2018 +0000
+commit 321874416d610ad2158ce6112f094a4862c2e37f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 3 20:38:09 2021 +1000
- upstream: treat ssh_packet_write_wait() errors as fatal; ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f88ba43c9d54ed2d911218aa8d3f6285430629c3
+ Move signal.h up include order to match upstream.
-commit 5467fbcb09528ecdcb914f4f2452216c24796790
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 18:53:29 2018 +0000
+commit 4fa83e2d0e32c2dd758653e0359984bbf1334f32
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 3 20:36:06 2021 +1000
- upstream: remove legacy key emulation layer; ok djm@
+ Remove old OpenBSD version marker.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d
+ Looks like an accidental leftover from a sync.
-commit 5dc4c59d5441a19c99e7945779f7ec9051126c25
-Author: martijn@openbsd.org <martijn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 08:19:35 2018 +0000
+commit 9d5e31f55d5f3899b72645bac41a932d298ad73b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 3 20:34:19 2021 +1000
- upstream: s/wuth/with/ in comment
+ Remove duplicate error on error path.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9de41468afd75f54a7f47809d2ad664aa577902c
+ There's an extra error() call on the listen error path, it looks like
+ its removal was missed during an upstream sync.
-commit 1c688801e9dd7f9889fb2a29bc2b6fbfbc35a11f
+commit 888c459925c7478ce22ff206c9ac1fb812a40caf
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 12:12:38 2018 +1000
+Date: Sat Jul 3 20:32:46 2021 +1000
- Include stdlib.h for declaration of free.
+ Remove some whitespace not in upstream.
- Fixes build with -Werror on at least Fedora and probably others.
-
-commit fccfa239def497615f92ed28acc57cfe63da3666
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:19:56 2018 +1000
-
- VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS logic was backwards :(
+ Reduces diff vs OpenBSD by a small amount.
-commit 416287d45fcde0a8e66eee8b99aa73bd58607588
+commit 4d2d4d47a18d93f3e0a91a241a6fdb545bbf7dc2
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:10:26 2018 +1000
+Date: Sat Jul 3 19:27:43 2021 +1000
- Fix sshbuf_new error path in skey.
+ Replace remaining references to ChallengeResponse.
+
+ Portable had a few additional references to ChallengeResponse related to
+ UsePAM, replaces these with equivalent keyboard-interactive ones.
-commit 7aab109b8b90a353c1af780524f1ac0d3af47bab
+commit 53237ac789183946dac6dcb8838bc3b6b9b43be1
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:06:18 2018 +1000
+Date: Sat Jul 3 19:23:28 2021 +1000
- Supply missing third arg in skey.
+ Sync remaining ChallengeResponse removal.
- During the change to the new buffer api the third arg to
- sshbuf_get_cstring was ommitted. Fixes build when configured with skey.
+ These were omitted from commit 88868fd131.
-commit 380320bb72cc353a901790ab04b6287fd335dc4a
+commit 2c9e4b319f7e98744b188b0f58859d431def343b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:03:34 2018 +1000
-
- Supply some more missing "int r" in skey
+Date: Sat Jul 3 19:17:31 2021 +1000
-commit d20720d373d8563ee737d1a45dc5e0804d622dbc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 09:56:36 2018 +1000
-
- disable valgrind memleak checking by default
-
- Add VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS knob to turn it back on.
+ Disable rocky84 to figure out why agent test fails
-commit 79c9d35018f3a5e30ae437880b669aa8636cd3cd
+commit bfe19197a92b7916f64a121fbd3c179abf15e218
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 09:54:00 2018 +1000
+Date: Fri Jul 2 15:43:28 2021 +1000
- Supply missing "int r" in skey code.
+ Remove now-unused SSHv1 enums.
+
+ sRhostsRSAAuthentication and sRSAAuthentication are protocol 1 options
+ and are no longer used.
-commit 984bacfaacbbe31c35191b828fb5b5b2f0362c36
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 09:36:58 2018 +0000
+commit c73b02d92d72458a5312bd098f32ce88868fd131
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 2 05:11:20 2021 +0000
- upstream: re-remove some pre-auth compression bits
+ upstream: Remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication in
- This time, make sure to not remove things that are necessary for
- pre-auth compression on the client. Add a comment that pre-auth
- compression is still supported in the client.
+ favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in SSHv1, the
+ latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were treated as somewhat but
+ not entirely equivalent. We retain the old name as deprecated alias so
+ config files continue to work and a reference in the man page for people
+ looking for it.
- ok markus@
+ Prompted by bz#3303 which pointed out the discrepancy between the two
+ when used with Match. Man page help & ok jmc@, with & ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 282c6fec7201f18a5c333bbb68d9339734d2f784
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c1bff8e5c9852cfcdab1f3ea94dfef5a22f3b7e
-commit 120a1ec74e8d9d29f4eb9a27972ddd22351ddef9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 19:39:52 2018 +1000
+commit f841fc9c8c7568a3b5d84a4cc0cefacb7dbc16b9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 2 15:20:32 2021 +1000
- Adapt portable to legacy buffer API removal
+ Fix ifdefs around get_random_bytes_prngd.
+
+ get_random_bytes_prngd() is used if either of PRNGD_PORT or PRNGD_SOCKET
+ are defined, so adjust ifdef accordingly.
-commit 0f3958c1e6ffb8ea4ba27e2a97a00326fce23246
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 09:13:30 2018 +0000
+commit 0767627cf66574484b9c0834500b42ea04fe528a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 2 14:30:23 2021 +1000
- upstream: kerberos/gssapi fixes for buffer removal
+ wrap get_random_bytes_prngd() in ifdef
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdf56fec95801e4563c47f21696f04cd8b60c4c
+ avoid unused static function warning
-commit c74ae8e7c45f325f3387abd48fa7dfef07a08069
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 06:45:29 2018 +0000
+commit f93fdc4de158386efe1116bd44c5b3f4a7a82c25
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jun 28 13:06:37 2021 +1000
- upstream: buffer.[ch] and bufaux.c are no more
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1a1852284e554f39525eb4d4891b207cfb3d3a0
+ Add rocky84 test target.
-commit a881e5a133d661eca923fb0633a03152ab2b70b2
+commit d443006c0ddfa7f6a5bd9c0ae92036f3d5f2fa3b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 06:43:52 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 25 06:30:22 2021 +0000
- upstream: one mention of Buffer that almost got away :)
+ upstream: fix decoding of X.509 subject name; from Leif Thuresson
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30d7c27a90b4544ad5dfacf654595710cd499f02
-
-commit 49f47e656b60bcd1d1db98d88105295f4b4e600d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:59:10 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: replace cast with call to sshbuf_mutable_ptr(); ok djm@
+ via bz3327 ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dfe9d29fa93d9231645c89084f7217304f7ba29
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ea2e28f39750dd388b7e317bc43dd997a217ae8
-commit cb30cd47041edb03476be1c8ef7bc1f4b69d1555
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:56:06 2018 +0000
+commit 2a5704ec142202d387fda2d6872fd4715ab81347
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 25 06:20:39 2021 +0000
- upstream: remove legacy buffer API emulation layer; ok djm@
+ upstream: Use better language to refer to the user. From l1ving
+
+ via github PR#250, ok jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2dd5dc17cbc23195be4299fa93be2707a0e08ad9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07ca3526626996613e128aeddf7748c93c4d6bbf
-commit 235c7c4e3bf046982c2d8242f30aacffa01073d1
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:53:45 2018 +0000
+commit 4bdf7a04797a0ea1c431a9d54588417c29177d19
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 25 03:38:17 2021 +0000
- upstream: sshd: switch monitor to sshbuf API; lots of help & ok
+ upstream: Replace SIGCHLD/notify_pipe kludge with pselect.
- djm@
+ Previously sshd's SIGCHLD handler would wake up select() by writing a
+ byte to notify_pipe. We can remove this by blocking SIGCHLD, checking
+ for child terminations then passing the original signal mask through
+ to pselect. This ensures that the pselect will immediately wake up if
+ a child terminates between wait()ing on them and the pselect.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d89bd02d33974fd35ca0b8940d88572227b34a48
-
-commit b8d9214d969775e409e1408ecdf0d58fad99b344
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:37:55 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: sshd: switch GSSAPI to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ In -portable, for platforms that do not have pselect the kludge is still
+ there but is hidden behind a pselect interface.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e48449ab4be3f006f7ba33c66241b7d652973e30
-
-commit c7d39ac8dc3587c5f05bdd5bcd098eb5c201c0c8
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:35:50 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: sshd: switch authentication to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ Based on other changes for bz#2158, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 880aa06bce4b140781e836bb56bec34873290641
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 202c85de0b3bdf1744fe53529a05404c5480d813
-commit c3cb7790e9efb14ba74b2d9f543ad593b3d55b31
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:29:36 2018 +0000
+commit c9f7bba2e6f70b7ac1f5ea190d890cb5162ce127
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 25 15:08:18 2021 +1000
- upstream: sshd: switch config to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ Move closefrom() to before first malloc.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72b02017bac7feac48c9dceff8355056bea300bd
+ When built against tcmalloc, tcmalloc allocates a descriptor for its
+ internal use, so calling closefrom() afterward causes the descriptor
+ number to be reused resulting in a corrupted connection. Moving the
+ closefrom a little earlier should resolve this. From kircherlike at
+ outlook.com via bz#3321, ok djm@
-commit 2808d18ca47ad3d251836c555f0e22aaca03d15c
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:26:02 2018 +0000
+commit 7ebfe4e439853b88997c9cfc2ff703408a1cca92
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 18 20:41:45 2021 +1000
- upstream: sshd: switch loginmsg to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ Put second -lssh in link line for sftp-server.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3cb4e54bff15c593602d95cc43e32ee1a4bac42
+ When building --without-openssl the recent port-prngd.c change adds
+ a dependency on atomicio, but since nothing else in sftp-server uses
+ it, the linker may not find it. Add a second -lssh similar to other
+ binaries.
-commit 89dd615b8b531979be63f05f9d5624367c9b28e6
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:20:26 2018 +0000
+commit e409d7966785cfd9f5970e66a820685c42169717
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 18 18:34:08 2021 +1000
- upstream: ttymodes: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ Try EGD/PRNGD if random device fails.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5df340c5965e822c9da21e19579d08dea3cbe429
+ When built --without-openssl, try EGD/PRGGD (if configured) as a last
+ resort before failing.
-commit f4608a7065480516ab46214f554e5f853fb7870f
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:18:10 2018 +0000
+commit e43a898043faa3a965dbaa1193cc60e0b479033d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 18 18:32:51 2021 +1000
- upstream: client: switch mux to sshbuf API; with & ok djm@
+ Split EGD/PRNGD interface into its own file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5948fb98d704f9c4e075b92edda64e0290b5feb2
+ This will allow us to use it when building --without-openssl.
-commit cecee2d607099a7bba0a84803e2325d15be4277b
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:03:30 2018 +0000
+commit acb2887a769a1b1912cfd7067f3ce04fad240260
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jun 17 21:03:19 2021 +1000
- upstream: client: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ Handle GIDs > 2^31 in getgrouplist.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60cb0356114acc7625ab85105f6f6a7cd44a8d05
+ When compiled in 32bit mode, the getgrouplist implementation may fail
+ for GIDs greater than LONG_MAX. Analysis and change from ralf.winkel
+ at tui.com.
-commit ff55f4ad898137d4703e7a2bcc81167dfe8e9324
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 20:39:28 2018 +0000
+commit 31fac20c941126281b527605b73bff30a8f02edd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 10 09:46:28 2021 +0000
- upstream: pkcs11: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile here too.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98cc4e800f1617c51caf59a6cb3006f14492db79
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6bfb0d455d493f24839034a629c5306f84dbd409
-commit 168b46f405d6736960ba7930389eecb9b6710b7e
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 13:37:10 2018 +0000
+commit a3a58acffc8cc527f8fc6729486d34e4c3d27643
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 10 09:43:51 2021 +0000
- upstream: Revert previous two commits
-
- It turns out we still support pre-auth compression on the client.
- Therefore revert the previous two commits:
-
- date: 2018/07/06 09:06:14; author: sf; commitid: yZVYKIRtUZWD9CmE;
- Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
-
- Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
-
- ok markus@
-
- date: 2018/07/06 09:05:01; author: sf; commitid: rEGuT5UgI9f6kddP;
- Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
-
- Support for this has been removed in 2016.
- COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+ upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile in case it was
- ok markus@
+ created with a very restrictive umask. This resyncs with -portable.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdfef526357e4e1483c86cf599491b2dafb77772
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07fd2af06df759d4f64b82c59094accca1076a5d
-commit ab39267fa1243d02b6c330615539fc4b21e17dc4
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:06:14 2018 +0000
+commit 249ad4ae51cd3bc235e75a4846eccdf8b1416611
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 10 09:37:59 2021 +0000
- upstream: Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
-
- Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
+ upstream: Set umask when creating hostkeys to prevent excessive
- ok markus@
+ permissions warning.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b1dbaf3d9a4085aaa10fec0b7a4364396561821
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 382841db0ee28dfef7f7bffbd511803e1b8ab0ef
-commit 95db395d2e56a6f868193aead6cadb2493f036c6
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:05:01 2018 +0000
+commit 9d0892153c005cc65897e9372b01fa66fcbe2842
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 10 03:45:31 2021 +0000
- upstream: Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
+ upstream: Add regress test for SIGHUP restart
- Support for this has been removed in 2016.
- COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+ while handling active and unauthenticated clients. Should catch anything
+ similar to the pselect bug just fixed in sshd.c.
- ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a99616c832627157113fcb0cf5a752daf2e6b58
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b3c19b5e75e43af1ebcb9586875b3ae3a4cac73
-commit f28a4d5cd24c4aa177e96b4f96957991e552cb70
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:03:02 2018 +0000
+commit 73f6f191f44440ca3049b9d3c8e5401d10b55097
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 10 03:14:14 2021 +0000
- upstream: Remove unused ssh_packet_start_compression()
+ upstream: Continue accept loop when pselect
- ok markus@
+ returns -1, eg if it was interrupted by a signal. This should prevent
+ the hang discovered by sthen@ wherein sshd receives a SIGHUP while it has
+ an unauthenticated child and goes on to a blocking read on a notify_pipe.
+ feedback deraadt@, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d34cf2f59aca5422021ae2857190578187dc2b4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0243c1c5544fca0974dae92cd4079543a3fceaa0
-commit 872517ddbb72deaff31d4760f28f2b0a1c16358f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 13:32:02 2018 +1000
+commit c785c0ae134a8e8b5c82b2193f64c632a98159e4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 8 22:30:27 2021 +0000
- Defer setting bufsiz in getdelim.
+ upstream: test that UserKnownHostsFile correctly accepts multiple
- Do not write to bufsiz until we are sure the malloc has succeeded,
- in case any callers rely on it (which they shouldn't). ok djm@
-
-commit 3deb56f7190a414dc264e21e087a934fa1847283
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 5 13:32:01 2018 +1000
-
- Fix other callers of read_environment_file.
+ arguments; would have caught readconf.c r1.356 regression
- read_environment_file recently gained an extra argument Some platform
- specific code also calls it so add the argument to those too. Fixes
- build on Solaris and AIX.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71ca54e66c2a0211b04999263e56390b1f323a6a
-commit 314908f451e6b2d4ccf6212ad246fa4619c721d3
+commit 1a6f6b08e62c78906a3032e8d9a83e721c84574e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:45 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jun 8 22:06:12 2021 +0000
- upstream: deal with API rename: match_filter_list() =>
+ upstream: fix regression in r1.356: for ssh_config options that
- match_filter_blacklist()
+ accepted multiple string arguments, ssh was only recording the first.
+ Reported by Lucas via bugs@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2da342be913efeb51806351af906fab01ba4367f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7cbf182f7449bf1cb7c5b4452667dc2b41170d6d
-commit 89f54cdf6b9cf1cf5528fd33897f1443913ddfb4
+commit 78e30af3e2b2dd540a341cc827c6b98dd8b0a6de
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jun 8 07:40:12 2021 +0000
- upstream: exercise new expansion behaviour of
-
- PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and, by proxy, test kex_assemble_names()
-
- ok markus@
+ upstream: test argv_split() optional termination on comments
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 292978902e14d5729aa87e492dd166c842f72736
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fd1c4a27a409897437c010cfd79c54b639a059c
-commit 187633f24c71564e970681c8906df5a6017dcccf
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:53:26 2018 +0000
+commit a023138957ea2becf1c7f93fcc42b0aaac6f2b03
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 8 07:05:27 2021 +0000
- upstream: add a comment that could have saved me 45 minutes of wild
+ upstream: Add testcases from bz#3319 for IPQoS and TunnelDevice
- goose chasing
+ being overridden on the command line.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d469b29ffadd3402c090e21b792d627d46fa5297
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 801674d5d2d02abd58274a78cab2711f11de14a8
-commit 312d2f2861a2598ed08587cb6c45c0e98a85408f
+commit 660cea10b2cdc11f13ba99c89b1bbb368a4d9ff2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:49:31 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jun 8 06:52:43 2021 +0000
- upstream: repair PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes (and friends) after RSA
-
- signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by
- wildcard.
-
- Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs
- are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps
- (e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected.
+ upstream: sprinkle some "# comment" at end of configuration lines
- Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they
- aren't full pattern-lists that support negation.
+ to test comment handling
- (lots of) feedback, ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cb82fbf40bda5c257a9f742c63b1798e5a8fdda7
-commit 303af5803bd74bf05d375c04e1a83b40c30b2be5
+commit acc9c32dcb6def6c7d3688bceb4c0e59bd26b411
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:43:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jun 8 06:51:47 2021 +0000
- upstream: some magic for RSA-SHA2 checks
+ upstream: more descriptive failure message
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e5a9b11368ff6d86e7b25ad10ebe43359b471cd4
-
-commit 7d68e262944c1fff1574600fe0e5e92ec8b398f5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 23:27:11 2018 +1000
-
- depend
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5300f6faf1d9e99c0cd10827b51756c5510e3509
-commit b4d4eda633af433d20232cbf7e855ceac8b83fe5
+commit ce04dd4eae23d1c9cf7c424a702f48ee78573bc1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:20:25 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 7 01:16:34 2021 +0000
- upstream: some finesse to fix RSA-SHA2 certificate authentication
+ upstream: test AuthenticationMethods inside a Match block as well
- for certs hosted in ssh-agent
+ as in the main config section
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebe0a686621b7cb8bb003ac520975279c28747f7
-commit d78b75df4a57e0f92295f24298e5f2930e71c172
+commit 9018bd821fca17e26e92f7a7e51d9b24cd62f2db
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:07:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 7 00:00:50 2021 +0000
- upstream: check correct variable; unbreak agent keys
+ upstream: prepare for stricter sshd_config parsing that will refuse
+
+ a config that has {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups} on a line with no subsequent
+ arguments. Such lines are permitted but are nonsensical noops ATM
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c36981fdf1f3ce04966d3310826a3e1e6233d93e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ef65463fcbc0bd044e27f3fe400ea56eb4b8f650
-commit 2f30300c5e15929d0e34013f38d73e857f445e12
+commit a10f929d1ce80640129fc5b6bc1acd9bf689169e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:42:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jun 8 07:09:42 2021 +0000
- upstream: crank version number to 7.8; needed for new compat flag
+ upstream: switch sshd_config parsing to argv_split()
+
+ similar to the previous commit, this switches sshd_config parsing to
+ the newer tokeniser. Config parsing will be a little stricter wrt
+ quote correctness and directives appearing without arguments.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
- for prior version; part of RSA-SHA2 strictification, ok markus@
+ tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who
+ caught bugs
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a11fc0efd2674c050712336b5093f5d408e32b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c4305631d20c2d194661504ce11e1f68b20d93e
-commit 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436
+commit ea9e45c89a4822d74a9d97fef8480707d584da4d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:39:54 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jun 8 07:07:15 2021 +0000
- upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature
+ upstream: Switch ssh_config parsing to use argv_split()
- In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
- requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
- ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
- matches the one in the signature itself.
+ This fixes a couple of problems with the previous tokeniser,
+ strdelim()
- In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
+ 1. strdelim() is permissive wrt accepting '=' characters. This is
+ intended to allow it to tokenise "Option=value" but because it
+ cannot keep state, it will incorrectly split "Opt=val=val2".
+ 2. strdelim() has rudimentry handling of quoted strings, but it
+ is incomplete and inconsistent. E.g. it doesn't handle escaped
+ quotes inside a quoted string.
+ 3. It has no support for stopping on a (unquoted) comment. Because
+ of this readconf.c r1.343 added chopping of lines at '#', but
+ this caused a regression because these characters may legitimately
+ appear inside quoted strings.
- Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
- HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
- (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
- options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
+ The new tokeniser is stricter is a number of cases, including #1 above
+ but previously it was also possible for some directives to appear
+ without arguments. AFAIK these were nonsensical in all cases, and the
+ new tokeniser refuses to accept them.
- Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
- "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
- with certificate keys.
+ The new code handles quotes much better, permitting quoted space as
+ well as escaped closing quotes. Finally, comment handling should be
+ fixed - the tokeniser will terminate only on unquoted # characters.
- feedback and ok markus@
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
+ tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who
+ caught bugs
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc72fd12af9d5398f4d9e159d671f9269c5b14d5
-commit 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 10:59:35 2018 +0000
+commit d786424986c04d1d375f231fda177c8408e05c3e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 8 07:02:46 2021 +0000
- upstream: allow sshd_config PermitUserEnvironment to accept a
-
- pattern-list of whitelisted environment variable names in addition to yes|no.
+ upstream: Check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before
- bz#1800, feedback and ok markus@
+ overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values supplied
+ on the command line. bz#3319, ok markus.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77dc2b468e0bf04b53f333434ba257008a1fdf24
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b08b898c324debb9195e6865d8999406938f74
-commit 6f56fe4b9578b0627667f8bce69d4d938a88324c
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 26 11:23:59 2018 +0000
+commit aae4b4d3585b9f944d7dbd3c9e5ba0006c55e457
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 8 06:54:40 2021 +0000
- upstream: Fix "WARNING: line 6 disappeared in /etc/moduli, giving up"
+ upstream: Allow argv_split() to optionally terminate tokenisation
- when choosing a prime. An extra increment of linenum snuck in as part of the
- conversion to getline(). OK djm@ markus@
+ when it encounters an unquoted comment.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0019225cb52ed621b71cd9f19ee2e78e57e3dd38
-
-commit 1eee79a11c1b3594f055b01e387c49c9a6e80005
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 2 14:13:30 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: One ampersand is enough to backgroud an process. OpenBSD
+ Add some additional utility function for working with argument
+ vectors, since we'll be switching to using them to parse
+ ssh/sshd_config shortly.
- doesn't seem to mind, but some platforms in -portable object to the second.
+ ok markus@ as part of a larger diff; tested in snaps
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6c3e404871764343761dc25c3bbe29c2621ff74
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd9c108cef2f713f24e3bc5848861d221bb3a1ac
-commit 6301e6c787d4e26bfae1119ab4f747bbcaa94e44
+commit da9f9acaac5bab95dca642b48e0c8182b246ab69
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 2 21:16:58 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jun 7 19:19:23 2021 +1000
- Add implementation of getline.
-
- Add getline for the benefit of platforms that don't have it. Sourced
- from NetBSD (OpenBSD's implementation is a little too chummy with the
- internals of FILE).
+ Save logs on failure for upstream test
-commit 84623e0037628f9992839063151f7a9f5f13099a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 26 02:02:36 2018 +0000
+commit 76883c60161e5f3808787085a27a8c37f8cc4e08
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jun 7 14:36:32 2021 +1000
- upstream: whitespace
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9276951caf4daf555f6d262e95720e7f79244572
+ Add obsdsnap-i386 upstream test target.
-commit 90e51d672711c19a36573be1785caf35019ae7a8
+commit d45b9c63f947ec5ec314696e70281f6afddc0ac3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jun 25 22:28:33 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 7 03:38:38 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix NULL dereference in open_listen_match_tcpip()
+ upstream: fix debug message when finding a private key to match a
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c968c1d29e392352383c0f9681fcc1e93620c4a9
+ certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it would
+ print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be showing the
+ private key's path. Patch from Alex Sherwin via GHPR247
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5af3be66d0f22c371dc1fe6195e774a18b2327b
-commit f535ff922a67d9fcc5ee69d060d1b21c8bb01d14
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 05:36:57 2018 +0000
+commit 530739d42f6102668aecd699be0ce59815c1eceb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jun 6 11:34:16 2021 +0000
- upstream: spelling;
+ upstream: Match host certificates against host public keys, not private
+
+ keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in a ssh-agent.
+ Reported by Miles Zhou in bz3524; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db542918185243bea17202383a581851736553cc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25f5bf70003126d19162862d9eb380bf34bac22a
-commit 80e199d6175904152aafc5c297096c3e18297691
+commit 4265215d7300901fd7097061c7517688ade82f8e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 03:02:17 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jun 6 03:40:39 2021 +0000
- upstream: test PermitListen with bare port numbers
+ upstream: Client-side workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4: this release
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b50a02dfb0ccaca08247f3877c444126ba901b3
+ allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails to
+ advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes clients of these
+ server to incorrectly match PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and potentially refuse
+ to offer valid keys.
+
+ Reported by and based on patch from Gordon Messmer via bz3213, thanks
+ also for additional analysis by Jakub Jelen. ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6d0b7351d5d44c45f3daaa26efac65847a564f7
-commit 87ddd676da0f3abd08b778b12b53b91b670dc93c
+commit bda270d7fb8522d43c21a79a4b02a052d7c64de8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 02:59:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jun 6 03:17:02 2021 +0000
- upstream: allow bare port numbers to appear in PermitListen directives,
+ upstream: degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the
- e.g.
+ limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to invoke it.
+ Reported by Hector Martin via bz3318
- PermitListen 2222 8080
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd9d1839c41811616ede4da467e25746fcd9b967
+
+commit d345d5811afdc2d6923019b653cdd93c4cc95f76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jun 6 03:15:39 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly marked
- is equivalent to:
+ as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it unavailable in
+ sftp-server read-only mode. Spotted by Hector Martin via bz3318
- PermitListen *:2222 *:8080
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f054465230787e37516c4b57098fc7975e00f067
+
+commit 2b71010d9b43d7b8c9ec1bf010beb00d98fa765a
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jun 5 13:47:00 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: PROTOCOL.certkeys: update reference from IETF draft to
- Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@
+ RFC
- "looks fine" markus@
+ Also fix some typos.
+ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e855b6c5a22b5b13f8ffa3897a868e40d349b44
-commit 26f96ca10ad0ec5da9b05b99de1e1ccea15a11be
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 15 07:01:11 2018 +0000
+commit aa99b2d9a3e45b943196914e8d8bf086646fdb54
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 4 23:41:29 2021 +1000
- upstream: invalidate supplemental group cache used by
+ Clear notify_pipe from readset if present.
- temporarily_use_uid() when the target uid differs; could cause failure to
- read authorized_keys under some configurations. patch by Jakub Jelen via
- bz2873; ok dtucker, markus
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48a345f0ee90f6c465a078eb5e89566b23abd8a1
+ Prevents leaking an implementation detail to the caller.
-commit 89a85d724765b6b82e0135ee5a1181fdcccea9c6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jun 10 23:45:41 2018 +0000
+commit 6de8dadf6b4d0627d35bca0667ca44b1d61c2c6b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 4 23:24:25 2021 +1000
+
+ space->tabs.
- upstream: unbreak SendEnv; patch from tb@
+commit c8677065070ee34c05c7582a9c2f58d8642e552d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 4 18:39:48 2021 +1000
+
+ Add pselect implementation for platforms without.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc808daced813242563b80976e1478de95940056
+ This is basically the existing notify_pipe kludge from serverloop.c
+ moved behind a pselect interface. It works by installing a signal
+ handler that writes to a pipe that the select is watching, then calls
+ the original handler.
+
+ The select call in serverloop will become pselect soon, at which point the
+ kludge will be removed from thereand will only exist in the compat layer.
+ Original code by markus, help from djm.
-commit acf4260f0951f89c64e1ebbc4c92f451768871ad
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 06:36:31 2018 +0000
+commit 7cd7f302d3a072748299f362f9e241d81fcecd26
+Author: Vincent Brillault <vincent.brillault@cern.ch>
+Date: Sun May 24 09:15:06 2020 +0200
- upstream: sort previous;
+ auth_log: dont log partial successes as failures
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27d80d8b8ca99bc33971dee905e8ffd0053ec411
+ By design, 'partial' logins are successful logins, so initially with
+ authenticated set to 1, for which another authentication is required. As
+ a result, authenticated is always reset to 0 when partial is set to 1.
+ However, even if authenticated is 0, those are not failed login
+ attempts, similarly to attempts with authctxt->postponed set to 1.
-commit 1678d4236451060b735cb242d2e26e1ac99f0947
+commit e7606919180661edc7f698e6a1b4ef2cfb363ebf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:18:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 4 06:19:07 2021 +0000
- upstream: slightly better wording re handing of $TERM, from Jakub
+ upstream: The RB_GENERATE_STATIC(3) macro expands to a series of
- Jelen via bz2386
+ function definitions and not a statement, so there should be no semicolon
+ following them. Patch from Michael Forney
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14bea3f069a93c8be66a7b97794255a91fece964
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c975dd180580f0bdc0a4d5b7d41ab1f5e9b7bedd
-commit 28013759f09ed3ebf7e8335e83a62936bd7a7f47
+commit c298c4da574ab92df2f051561aeb3e106b0ec954
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:03:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 4 05:59:18 2021 +0000
- upstream: add a SetEnv directive for sshd_config to allow an
+ upstream: rework authorized_keys example section, removing irrelevant
- administrator to explicitly specify environment variables set in sessions
- started by sshd. These override the default environment and any variables set
- by user configuration (PermitUserEnvironment, etc), but not the SSH_*
- variables set by sshd itself.
+ stuff, de-wrapping the example lines and better aligning the examples with
+ common usage and FAQs; ok jmc
- ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6a96c0001ccd7dd211df6cae9e961c20fd718c0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d59f1c9281f828148e2a2e49eb9629266803b75c
-commit 7082bb58a2eb878d23ec674587c742e5e9673c36
+commit d9cb35bbec5f623589d7c58fc094817b33030f35
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:01:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 4 05:10:03 2021 +0000
- upstream: add a SetEnv directive to ssh_config that allows setting
-
- environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting
- them)
-
- refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names.
+ upstream: adjust SetEnv description to clarify $TERM handling
- ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b8cc0124856bc1094949d55615e5c44390bcb22
-commit 3b9798bda15bd3f598f5ef07595d64e23504da91
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 02:58:02 2018 +0000
+commit 771f57a8626709f2ad207058efd68fbf30d31553
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 4 05:09:08 2021 +0000
- upstream: reorder child environment preparation so that variables
+ upstream: Switch the listening select loop from select() to
- read from ~/.ssh/environment (if enabled) do not override SSH_* variables set
- by the server.
+ pselect() and mask signals while checking signal flags, umasking for pselect
+ and restoring afterwards. Also restore signals before sighup_restart so they
+ don't remain blocked after restart.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59f9d4c213cdcef2ef21f4b4ae006594dcf2aa7a
+ This prevents a race where a SIGTERM or SIGHUP can arrive between
+ checking the flag and calling select (eg if sshd is processing a
+ new connection) resulting in sshd not shutting down until the next
+ time it receives a new connection. bz#2158, with & ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf85bf880fd78e00d7478657644fcda97b9a936f
-commit 0368889f82f63c82ff8db9f8c944d89e7c657db4
+commit f64f8c00d158acc1359b8a096835849b23aa2e86
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 03:35:36 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 4 05:02:40 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix incorrect expansion of %i in
+ upstream: allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is otherwise
- load_public_identity_files(); reported by Roumen Petrov
+ handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config to set TERM to
+ something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of "xterm-256color") for destinations
+ that lack terminfo entries. feedback and ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a827289e77149b5e0850d72a350c8b0300e7ef25
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b1ef4d5bc159c7d9d589d05e3017433e2d5758
-commit 027607fc2db6a0475a3380f8d95c635482714cb0
+commit 60107677dc0ce1e93c61f23c433ad54687fcd9f5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 01:55:40 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 4 04:02:21 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix some over-long lines and __func__ up some debug
+ upstream: correct extension name "no-presence-required" =>
- messages
+ "no-touch-required"
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70a60b4c8207d9f242fc2351941ba50916bb267
+ document "verify-required" option
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1879ff4062cf61d79b515e433aff0bf49a6c55c5
-commit 6ff6fda705bc204456a5fa12518dde6e8790bb02
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 11:26:14 2018 +0000
+commit ecc186e46e3e30f27539b4311366dfda502f0a08
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jun 2 13:54:11 2021 +1000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ Retire fbsd7 test target.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f98f16af10b28e24bcecb806cb71ea994b648fd6
+ It's the slowest of the selfhosted targets (since it's 32bit but has
+ most of the crypto algos). We still have coverage for 32bit i386.
-commit f2c06ab8dd90582030991f631a2715216bf45e5a
+commit 5de0867b822ec48b5eec9abde0f5f95d1d646546
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 17:43:36 2018 +1000
+Date: Wed Jun 2 11:21:40 2021 +1000
- Remove ability to override $LD.
-
- Since autoconf always uses $CC to link C programs, allowing users to
- override LD caused mismatches between what LD_LINK_IFELSE thought worked
- and what ld thought worked. If you do need to do this kind of thing you
- need to set a compiler flag such as gcc's -fuse-ld in LDFLAGS.
+ Check for $OPENSSL in md5 fallback too.
-commit e1542a80797b4ea40a91d2896efdcc76a57056d2
+commit 1db69d1b6542f8419c04cee7fd523a4a11004be2
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 13:55:59 2018 +1000
+Date: Wed Jun 2 11:17:54 2021 +1000
+
+ Add dfly60 target.
- Better detection of unsupported compiler options.
+commit a3f2dd955f1c19cad387a139f0e719af346ca6ef
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 2 00:17:45 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: Merge back shell portability changes
- Should prevent "unsupported -Wl,-z,retpoline" warnings during linking.
- ok djm@
+ bringing it back in sync with -portable.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c07905ba931e66ad7d849b87b7d19648007175d1
-commit 57379dbd013ad32ee3f9989bf5f5741065428360
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 14:29:43 2018 +0000
+commit 9d482295c9f073e84d75af46b720a1c0f7ec2867
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 1 23:56:20 2021 +0000
- upstream: test the correct configuration option name
+ upstream: Use a default value for $OPENSSL,
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 492279ea9f65657f97a970e0e7c7fd0b339fee23
+ allowing it to be overridden. Do the same in the PuTTY tests since it's
+ needed there and not exported by test-exec.sh.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c49dcd6aa7602a8606b7afa192196ca1fa65de16
-commit 6d41815e202fbd6182c79780b6cc90e1ec1c9981
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 09:26:42 2018 +0000
+commit 07660b3c99f8ea74ddf4a440e55c16c9f7fb3dd1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 24 10:25:18 2021 +0000
- upstream: some permitlisten fixes from markus@ that I missed in my
+ upstream: Find openssl binary via environment variable. This
- insomnia-fueled commits last night
+ allows overriding if necessary (eg in -portable where we're testing against a
+ specific version of OpenSSL).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26f23622e928996086e85b1419cc1c0f136e359c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 491f39cae9e762c71aa4bf045803d077139815c5
-commit 4319f7a868d86d435fa07112fcb6153895d03a7f
+commit 1a4d1da9188d7c88f646b61f0d6a3b34f47c5439
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 04:46:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 21 04:03:47 2021 +0000
- upstream: permitlisten/PermitListen unit test from Markus
+ upstream: fix memleak in test
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ab12eb42f0e14926980441cf7c058a6d1d832ea5
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e529d0982aa04666604936df43242e97a7a6f81
-commit fa09076410ffc2d34d454145af23c790d728921e
+commit 60455a5d98065a73ec9a1f303345856bbd49aecc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 04:31:51 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 21 03:59:01 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix regression caused by recent permitlisten option commit:
-
- authorized_keys lines that contained permitopen/permitlisten were being
- treated as invalid.
+ upstream: also check contents of remaining string
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef41d63a5a477b405d142dc925b67d9e7aaa31b
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d526fa07253f4eebbc7d6205a0ab3d491ec71a28
-commit 7f90635216851f6cb4bf3999e98b825f85d604f8
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:29:18 2018 +0000
+commit 39f6cd207851d7b67ca46903bfce4a9f615b5b1c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 21 03:48:07 2021 +0000
- upstream: switch config file parsing to getline(3) as this avoids
+ upstream: unit test for misc.c:strdelim() that mostly servces to
- static limits noted by gerhard@; ok dtucker@, djm@
+ highlight its inconsistencies
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6d702eabef0fa12e5a1d75c334a8c8b325298b5c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8d2bf970fcc01ccc6e36a5065f89b9c7fa934195
-commit 392db2bc83215986a91c0b65feb0e40e7619ce7e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:25:33 2018 +0000
+commit 7a3a1dd2c7d4461962acbcc0ebee9445ba892be0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu May 27 21:23:15 2021 +1000
- upstream: regress test for PermitOpen
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce8b5f28fc039f09bb297fc4a92319e65982ddaf
+ Put minix3 config in the host-specific block.
-commit 803d896ef30758135e2f438bdd1a0be27989e018
+commit 59a194825f12fff8a7f75d91bf751ea17645711b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:15 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon May 31 06:48:42 2021 +0000
- upstream: man bits for permitlisten authorized_keys option
+ upstream: Hash challenge supplied by client during FIDO key enrollment
+
+ prior to passing it to libfido2, which does expect a hash.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86910af8f781a4ac5980fea125442eb25466dd78
+ There is no effect for users who are simply generating FIDO keys using
+ ssh-keygen - by default we generate a random 256 bit challenge, but
+ people building attestation workflows around our tools should now have
+ a more consistent experience (esp. fewer failures when they fail to
+ guess the magic 32-byte challenge length requirement).
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8d5363a6a7ca3b23dc28f3ca69470472959f2b5
-commit 04df43208b5b460d7360e1598f876b92a32f5922
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:00 2018 +0000
+commit eb68e669bc8ab968d4cca5bf1357baca7136a826
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu May 27 21:14:15 2021 +1000
- upstream: man bits for PermitListen
+ Include login_cap.h for login_getpwclass override.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35b200cba4e46a16a4db6a80ef11838ab0fad67c
+ On minix3, login_getpwclass is __RENAME'ed to __login_getpwclass50 so
+ without this the include overriding login_getpwclass causes a compile
+ error.
+
+commit 2063af71422501b65c7a92a5e14c0e6a3799ed89
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu May 27 21:13:38 2021 +1000
+
+ Add minix3 test target.
-commit 93c06ab6b77514e0447fe4f1d822afcbb2a9be08
+commit 2e1efcfd9f94352ca5f4b6958af8a454f8cf48cd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:23:32 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed May 26 01:47:24 2021 +0000
- upstream: permitlisten option for authorized_keys; ok markus@
+ upstream: fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8650883018d7aa893173d703379e4456a222c672
+ when the update removed more host keys than remain present. Fix tested by
+ reporter James Cook, via bugs@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44f641f6ee02bb957f0c1d150495b60cf7b869d3
-commit 115063a6647007286cc8ca70abfd2a7585f26ccc
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:22:41 2018 +0000
+commit 9acd76e6e4d2b519773e7119c33cf77f09534909
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun May 23 18:22:57 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add a PermitListen directive to control which server-side
+ upstream: ssh: The client configuration keyword is
- addresses may be listened on when the client requests remote forwarding (ssh
- -R).
+ "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms"
- This is the converse of the existing PermitOpen directive and this
- includes some refactoring to share much of its implementation.
+ This fixes a mistake that slipped in when "HostbasedKeyTypes" was
+ renamed to "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms".
- feedback and ok markus@
+ Bug report by zack@philomathiclife.com
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15a931238c61a3f2ac74ea18a98c933e358e277f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d745a7e8e50b2589fc56877f322ea204bc784f38
-commit 7703ae5f5d42eb302ded51705166ff6e19c92892
+commit 078a0e60c92700da4c536c93c007257828ccd05b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 16:04:29 2018 +1000
+Date: Tue May 25 11:40:47 2021 +1000
- Use ssh-keygen -A to generate missing host keys.
+ Rename README.md to ci-status.md.
- Instead of testing for each specific key type, use ssh-keygen -A to
- generate any missing host key types.
+ The original intent was to provide a status page for the CIs configured
+ in that directory, but it had the side effect of replacing the top-level
+ README.md.
-commit e8d59fef1098e24f408248dc64e5c8efa5d01f3c
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 06:23:10 2018 +0000
+commit 7be4ac813662f68e89f23c50de058a49aa32f7e4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 19 01:24:05 2021 +0000
- upstream: add missing punctuation after %i in ssh_config.5, and
+ upstream: restore blocking status on stdio fds before close
- make the grammatical format in sshd_config.5 match that in ssh_config.5;
+ ssh(1) needs to set file descriptors to non-blocking mode to operate
+ but it was not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause
+ problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell, e.g.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e325663b9342f3d556e223e5306e0d5fa1a74fa0
-
-commit a1f737d6a99314e291a87856122cb4dbaf64c641
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 05:52:26 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: oops - further adjustment to text neccessary;
+ > $ cat > test.sh << _EOF
+ > #!/bin/sh
+ > {
+ > ssh -Fnone -oLogLevel=verbose ::1 hostname
+ > cat /usr/share/dict/words
+ > } | sleep 10
+ > _EOF
+ > $ ./test.sh
+ > Authenticated to ::1 ([::1]:22).
+ > Transferred: sent 2352, received 2928 bytes, in 0.1 seconds
+ > Bytes per second: sent 44338.9, received 55197.4
+ > cat: stdout: Resource temporarily unavailable
+
+ This restores the blocking status for fds 0,1,2 (stdio) before ssh(1)
+ abandons/closes them.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23585576c807743112ab956be0fb3c786bdef025
+ This was reported as bz3280 and GHPR246; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cc67346f05aa85a598bddf2383fcfcc3aae61ce
-commit 294028493471e0bd0c7ffe55dc0c0a67cba6ec41
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 05:50:18 2018 +0000
+commit c4902e1a653c67fea850ec99c7537f358904c0af
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 17 11:43:16 2021 +0000
- upstream: %U needs to be escaped; tweak text;
+ upstream: fix breakage of -W forwaring introduced in 1.554; reported by
+
+ naddy@ and sthen@, ok sthen@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30887b73ece257273fb619ab6f4e86dc92ddc15e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f72558e643a26dc4150cff6e5097b5502f6c85fd
-commit e5019da3c5a31e6e729a565f2b886a80c4be96cc
+commit afea01381ad1fcea1543b133040f75f7542257e6
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:31:48 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon May 17 07:22:45 2021 +0000
- upstream: Apply umask to all incoming files and directories not
+ upstream: Regenerate moduli.
- just files. This makes sure it gets applied to directories too, and prevents
- a race where files get chmodded after creation. bz#2839, ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83c93a2a07c584c347ac6114d6329b18ce515557
+
+commit be2866d6207b090615ff083c9ef212b603816a56
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon May 17 09:40:23 2021 +1000
+
+ Handle Android libc returning NULL pw->pw_passwd
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3168ee6c7c39093adac4fd71039600cfa296203b
+ Reported by Luke Dashjr
-commit a1dcafc41c376332493b9385ee39f9754dc145ec
+commit 5953c143008259d87342fb5155bd0b8835ba88e5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:52:37 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 14 05:20:32 2021 +0000
- upstream: Adapt to extra default verboisity from ssh-keygen when
+ upstream: fix previous: test saved no_shell_flag, not the one that just
- searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a single operation
- (ssh-keygen -HF ...) Patch from Anton Kremenetsky
+ got clobbered
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 519585a4de35c4611285bd6a7272766c229b19dd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8deace085d9d941b2d02f810243b9c302e5355d
-commit 76f314c75dffd4a55839d50ee23622edad52c168
+commit 1e9fa55f4dc4b334651d569d3448aaa3841f736f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 22 00:22:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 14 03:09:48 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL variable, to force all failures
+ upstream: Fix ssh started with ControlPersist incorrectly executing a
- to instantly abort the test. Useful in capturing clean logs for individual
- failure cases.
+ shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified. bz3290 reported by Richard
+ Schwab; patch from markus@ ok me
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: feba18cf338c2328b9601bd4093cabdd9baa3af1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ea4af16a95687302f7690bdbe36a6aabf87e1
-commit 065c8c055df8d83ae7c92e5e524a579d87668aab
+commit d1320c492f655d8f5baef8c93899d79dded217a5
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 03:51:06 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed May 12 11:34:30 2021 +0000
- upstream: Clean up comment.
+ upstream: Clarify language about moduli. While both ends of the
+
+ connection do need to use the same parameters (ie groups), the DH-GEX
+ protocol takes care of that and both ends do not need the same contents in
+ the moduli file, which is what the previous text suggested. ok djm@ jmc@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6adb35f384d447e7dcb9f170d4f0d546d3973e10
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0c18cc8e79c2fbf537a432a9070ed94e96a622a
-commit 01b048c8eba3b021701bd0ab26257fc82903cba8
+commit d3cc4d650ce3e59f3e370b101778b0e8f1c02c4d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:21:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 7 04:11:51 2021 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: include pid in LogVerbose spam
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5edb5e843ddc9b73a8e46518899be41d5709add
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aacb86f96ee90c7cb84ec27452374285f89a7f00
-commit 854ae209f992465a276de0b5f10ef770510c2418
+commit e3c032333be5fdbbaf2751f6f478e044922b4ec4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:05:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 7 03:09:38 2021 +0000
- upstream: make ssh_remote_ipaddr() capable of being called after
+ upstream: don't sigdie() in signal handler in privsep child process;
- the ssh->state has been torn down; bz#2773
+ this can end up causing sandbox violations per bz3286; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 167f12523613ca3d16d7716a690e7afa307dc7eb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7f40b2141dca4287920da68ede812bff7ccfdda
-commit 3e088aaf236ef35beeef3c9be93fd53700df5861
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:51:34 2018 +0000
+commit a4039724a3f2abac810735fc95cf9114a3856049
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 7 09:23:40 2021 +0000
- upstream: return correct exit code when searching for and hashing
+ upstream: Increase ConnectionAttempts from 4 to 10 as the tests
- known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF hostname); bz2772
- Report and fix from Anton Kremenetsky
+ occasionally time out on heavily loaded hosts.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac10ca13eb9bb0bc50fcd42ad11c56c317437b58
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 29a8cdef354fc9da471a301f7f65184770434f3a
-commit 9c935dd9bf05628826ad2495d3e8bdf3d3271c21
+commit c0d7e36e979fa3cdb60f5dcb6ac9ad3fd018543b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:33:53 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 7 02:26:55 2021 +0000
- upstream: make UID available as a %-expansion everywhere that the
+ upstream: dump out a usable private key string too; inspired by Tyson
- username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
- %U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
- for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
+ Whitehead
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 65572d5333801cb2f650ebc778cbdc955e372058
-commit d8748b91d1d6c108c0c260ed41fa55f37b9ef34b
+commit 24fee8973abdf1c521cd2c0047d89e86d9c3fc38
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:11:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 7 02:29:40 2021 +0000
- upstream: prefer argv0 to "ssh" when re-executing ssh for ProxyJump
+ upstream: correct mistake in spec - the private key blobs are encoded
- directive; bz2831, feedback and ok dtucker@
+ verbatim and not as strings (i.e. no 4-byte length header)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cec709a131499fbb0c1ea8a0a9e0b0915ce769e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3606b5d443d72118c5b76c4af6dd87a5d5a4f837
-commit fbb4b5fd4f8e0bb89732670a01954e18b69e15ba
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 07:11:01 2018 +0000
+commit f43859159cc62396ad5d080f0b1f2635a67dac02
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 4 22:53:52 2021 +0000
- upstream: Do not ban PTY allocation when a sshd session is restricted
-
- because the user password is expired as it breaks password change dialog.
+ upstream: Don't pass NULL as a string in debugging as it does not work
- regression in openssh-7.7 reported by Daniel Wagner
+ on some platforms in -portable. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc09c584c6f1964b00595e3abe7f83db4d90d73
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937c892c99aa3c9c272a8ed78fa7c2aba3a44fc9
-commit f6a59a22b0c157c4c4e5fd7232f868138223be64
+commit ac31aa3c6341905935e75f0539cf4a61bbe99779
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 04:25:46 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon May 3 00:16:45 2021 +0000
- upstream: Fix return value confusion in several functions (readdir,
+ upstream: more debugging for UpdateHostKeys signature failures
- download and fsync). These should return -1 on error, not a sftp status code.
-
- patch from Petr Cerny in bz#2871
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 651aa0220ad23c9167d9297a436162d741f97a09
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee95f03875e1725df15d5e4bea3e73493d57d36
-commit 1da5934b860ac0378d52d3035b22b6670f6a967e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 03:20:59 2018 +0000
+commit 8e32e97e788e0676ce83018a742203614df6a2b3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat May 1 20:07:47 2021 +1000
- upstream: If select() fails in ssh_packet_read_seqnr go directly to
-
- the error path instead of trying to read from the socket on the way out,
- which resets errno and causes the true error to be misreported. ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2614edaadbd05a957aa977728aa7a030af7c6f0a
-
-commit 4ef75926ef517d539f2c7aac3188b09f315c86a7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 13:36:58 2018 +1000
+ Add obsd69 test target.
- Permit getuid()/geteuid() syscalls.
-
- Requested for Linux/s390; patch from Eduardo Barretto via bz#2752;
- ok dtucker
-
-commit 4b22fd8ecefd059a66140be67f352eb6145a9d88
+commit f06893063597c5bb9d9e93f851c4070e77d2fba9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 22 00:13:26 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 30 04:29:53 2021 +0000
- upstream: support ProxyJump=none to disable ProxyJump
+ upstream: a little debugging in the main mux process for status
- functionality; bz#2869 ok dtucker@
+ confirmation failures in multiplexed sessions
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c06ee08eb78451b5837fcfd8cbebc5ff3a67a01
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6e27b87c95176107597035424e1439c3232bcb49
-commit f41bcd70f55b4f0fc4d8e1039cb361ac922b23fb
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 15 05:40:11 2018 +0000
+commit e65cf00da6bc31e5f54603b7feb7252dc018c033
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 30 04:02:52 2021 +0000
- upstream: correct keyowrd name (permitemptypasswords); from brendan
+ upstream: Remove now-unused skey function prototypes leftover from
- macdonell
+ skey removal.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef1bdbc936b2ea693ee37a4c20a94d4d43f5fda3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2fc36d519fd37c6f10ce74854c628561555a94c3
-commit f18bc97151340127859634d20d79fd39ec8a7f39
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 04:01:11 2018 +0000
+commit ae5f9b0d5c8126214244ee6b35aae29c21028133
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Apr 29 13:01:50 2021 +1000
- upstream: Emphasise that -w implicitly sets Tunnel=point-to-point
-
- and that users should specify an explicit Tunnel directive if they don't want
- this. bz#2365.
+ Wrap sntrup761x25519 inside ifdef.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a8d9c67ae213ead180481900dbbb3e04864560d
+ From balu.gajjala at gmail.com via bz#3306.
-commit 32e4e94e1511fe0020fbfbb62399d31b2d22a801
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon May 14 14:40:08 2018 +1000
+commit 70a8dc138a6480f85065cdb239915ad4b7f928cf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 28 14:44:07 2021 +1000
- sync fmt_scaled.c
-
- revision 1.17
- date: 2018/05/14 04:39:04; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +5 -2;
- commitid: 53zY8GjViUBnWo8Z;
- constrain fractional part to [0-9] (less confusing to static analysis); ok ian@
+ Add status badges for Actions-based tests.
-commit 54268d589e85ecc43d3eba8d83f327bdada9d696
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 14:04:40 2018 +1000
+commit 40b59024cc3365815381474cdf4fe423102e391b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 28 12:22:11 2021 +1000
- fix key-options.sh on platforms without openpty(3)
-
- Skip the pty tests if the platform lacks openpty(3) and has to chown(2)
- the pty device explicitly. This typically requires root permissions that
- this test lacks.
-
- bz#2856 ok dtucker@
+ Add obsdsnap (OpenBSD snapshot) test target.
-commit b2140a739be4c3b43cc1dc08322dca39a1e39d20
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 03:38:51 2018 +0000
+commit e627067ec8ef9ae8e7a638f4dbac91d52dee3e6d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 28 11:35:28 2021 +1000
- upstream: implement EMFILE mitigation for ssh-agent: remember the
-
- fd rlimit and stop accepting new connections when it is exceeded (with some
- grace). Accept is resumed when enough connections are closed.
-
- bz#2576. feedback deraadt; ok dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a85d9cec7b85741961e7116a49f8dae777911ea
+ Add test building upstream OpenBSD source.
-commit fdba503fdfc647ee8a244002f1581e869c1f3d90
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 03:22:55 2018 +0000
+commit 1b8108ebd12fc4ed0fb39ef94c5ba122558ac373
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 27 14:22:20 2021 +1000
- upstream: Explicit cast when snprintf'ing an uint64. Prevents
+ Test against OpenSSL 1.1.0h instead of 1.1.0g.
- warnings on platforms where int64 is long not long long. ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c5359e2fbfce11dea2d93f7bc257e84419bd001
+ 1.1.0g requires a perl glob module that's not installed by default.
-commit e7751aa4094d51a9bc00778aa8d07e22934c55ee
-Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 26 14:47:03 2018 +0000
+commit 9bc20efd39ce8525be33df3ee009f5a4564224f1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 27 12:37:59 2021 +1000
- upstream: Since the previous commit, ssh regress test sftp-chroot was
-
- failing. The sftp program terminated with the wrong exit code as sftp called
- fatal() instad of exit(0). So when the sigchld handler waits for the child,
- remember that it was found. Then don't expect that main() can wait again. OK
- dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfafd940c0de5297940c71ddf362053db0232266
+ Use the default VM type for libcrypto ver tests.
-commit 7c15301841e2e9d37cae732400de63ae9c0961d6
+commit 9f79e80dc40965c2e73164531250b83b176c1eea
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Apr 29 17:54:12 2018 +1000
+Date: Tue Apr 27 12:24:10 2021 +1000
- Use includes.h instead of config.h.
+ Always build OpenSSL shared.
- This ensures it picks up the definition of DEF_WEAK, the lack of which
- can cause compile errors in some cases (eg modern AIX). From
- michael at felt.demon.nl.
+ This is the default for current versions but we need it to test against
+ earlier versions.
-commit cec338967a666b7c8ad8b88175f2faeddf268116
+commit b3cc9fbdff2782eca79e33e02ac22450dc63bce9
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Apr 19 09:53:14 2018 +1000
+Date: Tue Apr 27 09:18:02 2021 +1000
- Omit 3des-cbc if OpenSSL built without DES.
+ Fix custom OpenSSL tests.
- Patch from hongxu.jia at windriver.com, ok djm@
+ Check out specified OpenSSL version. Install custom libcrypto where
+ configure expects to find it. Remove unneeded OpenSSL config time
+ options. Older OpenSSL versions were not make -j safe so remove it.
-commit a575ddd58835759393d2dddd16ebe5abdb56485e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 16 22:50:44 2018 +0000
+commit 77532609874a99a19e3e2eb2d1b7fa93aef963bb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 26 17:18:25 2021 +1000
- upstream: Disable SSH2_MSG_DEBUG messages for Twisted Conch clients
-
- without version numbers since they choke on them under some circumstances.
- https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9422 via Colin Watson
-
- Newer Conch versions have a version number in their ident string and
- handle debug messages okay. https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9424
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6cf7be262af0419c58ddae11324d9c0dc1577539
+ Export CC and CFLAGS for c89 test.
-commit 390c7000a8946db565b66eab9e52fb11948711fa
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 14 21:50:41 2018 +0000
+commit 33f62dfbe865f4de77980ab88774bf1eb5e4e040
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 26 17:13:44 2021 +1000
- upstream: don't free the %C expansion, it's used later for
-
- LocalCommand
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 857b5cb37b2d856bfdfce61289a415257a487fb1
+ Add c89 here too.
-commit 3455f1e7c48e2e549192998d330214975b9b1dc7
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 05:04:12 2018 +0000
+commit da9d59f526fce58e11cba49cd8eb011dc0bf5677
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 26 15:34:23 2021 +1000
- upstream: notify user immediately when underlying ssh process dies;
-
- patch from Thomas Kuthan in bz2719; ok dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78fac88c2f08054d1fc5162c43c24162b131cf78
+ Add test against OpenSSL w/out ECC.
-commit 1c5b4bc827f4abc3e65888cda061ad5edf1b8c7c
+commit 29e194a752359ebf85bf7fce100f23a0477fc4de
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 16:23:57 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Apr 26 14:49:59 2021 +1000
- Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child.
-
- The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth
- codepath, allow in systrace andbox too.
+ Ensure we can still build with C89.
-commit 0e73428038d5ecfa5d2a28cff26661502a7aff4e
+commit a38016d369d21df5d35f761f2b67e175e132ba22
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 16:06:29 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Apr 26 14:29:03 2021 +1000
- Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child.
-
- The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth
- codepath, allow in sandbox.
+ Interop test agains PuTTY.
-commit e9d910b0289c820852f7afa67f584cef1c05fe95
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 03:57:26 2018 +0000
+commit 095b0307a77be8803768857cc6c0963fa52ed85b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 26 14:02:03 2021 +1000
- upstream: Defend against user enumeration timing attacks. This
-
- establishes a minimum time for each failed authentication attempt (5ms) and
- adds a per-user constant derived from a host secret (0-4ms). Based on work
- by joona.kannisto at tut.fi, ok markus@ djm@.
+ Support testing against arbitary libcrytpo vers.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b7845b355bb7381703339c8fb0e57e81a20ae5ca
+ Add tests against various LibreSSL and OpenSSL versions.
-commit d97874cbd909eb706886cd0cdd418f812c119ef9
+commit b16082aa110fa7128ece2a9037ff420c4a285317
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:43:55 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Apr 26 13:35:44 2021 +1000
- Using "==" in shell tests is not portable.
-
- Patch from rsbecker at nexbridge.com.
+ Add fbsd10 test target.
-commit cfb1d9bc76734681e3dea532a1504fcd466fbe91
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:38:06 2018 +1000
+commit 2c805f16b24ea37cc051c6018fcb05defab6e57a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Apr 25 14:15:02 2021 +1000
- Fix tunnel forwarding broken in 7.7p1
+ Disable compiler hardening on nbsd4.
- bz2855, ok dtucker@
+ The system compiler supports -fstack-protector-all, but using it will
+ result in an internal compiler error on some files.
-commit afa6e79b76fb52a0c09a29688b5c0d125eb08302
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:31:42 2018 +1000
+commit 6a5d39305649da5dff1934ee54292ee0cebd579d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Apr 25 13:01:34 2021 +1000
- prefer to use getrandom() for PRNG seeding
-
- Only applies when built --without-openssl. Thanks Jann Horn for
- reminder.
+ Add nbsd3, nbsd4 and nbsd9 test targets.
-commit 575fac34a97f69bc217b235f81de9f8f433eceed
+commit d1aed05bd2e4ae70f359a394dc60a2d96b88f78c
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:13:33 2018 +1000
+Date: Sat Apr 24 22:03:46 2021 +1000
- Revert $REGRESSTMP changes.
-
- Revert 3fd2d229 and subsequent changes as they turned out to be a
- portability hassle.
+ Comment out nbsd2 test target for now.
-commit 10479cc2a4acd6faaf643eb305233b49d70c31c1
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 10:19:02 2018 +1000
+commit a6b4ec94e5bd5a8a18cd2c9942d829d2e5698837
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Apr 24 17:52:24 2021 +1000
- Many typo fixes from Karsten Weiss
-
- Spotted using https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell
+ Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker.
-commit 907da2f88519b34189fd03fac96de0c52d448233
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 00:14:10 2018 +0000
+commit 3737c9f66ee590255546c4b637b6d2be669a11eb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 19:49:46 2021 +1000
- upstream: more typos spotted by Karsten Weiss using codespell
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d906a2aea0663810a658b7d0bc61a1d2907d4d69
+ Replace "==" (a bashism) with "=".
-commit 37e5f4a7ab9a8026e5fc2f47dafb0f1b123d39e9
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 00:13:27 2018 +0000
+commit a116b6f5be17a1dd345b7d54bf8aa3779a28a0df
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 16:34:48 2021 +1000
- upstream: make this a bit more portable-friendly
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 62f7b9e055e8dfaab92b3825f158beeb4ca3f963
+ Add nbsd2 test target.
-commit 001aa55484852370488786bd40e9fdad4b465811
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 00:10:49 2018 +0000
+commit 196bf2a9bb771f45d9b0429cee7d325962233c44
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 14:54:10 2021 +1000
- upstream: lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss
-
- after checking with codespell tool
- (https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell)
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528
+ Add obsd68 test target.
-commit 260ede2787fe80b18b8d5920455b4fb268519c7d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 9 23:54:49 2018 +0000
+commit e3ba6574ed69e8b7af725cf5e8a9edaac04ff077
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 14:53:32 2021 +1000
- upstream: don't kill ssh-agent's listening socket entriely if we
-
- fail to accept a connection; bz#2837, patch from Lukas Kuster
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52413f5069179bebf30d38f524afe1a2133c738f
+ Remove dependency on bash.
-commit ebc8b4656f9b0f834a642a9fb3c9fbca86a61838
-Author: tj@openbsd.org <tj@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 9 20:41:22 2018 +0000
+commit db1f9ab8feb838aee9f5b99c6fd3f211355dfdcf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 14:41:13 2021 +1000
- upstream: the UseLogin option was removed, so remove it here too.
-
- ok dtucker
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7080be73a64d68e21f22f5408a67a0ba8b1b6b06
+ Add obsd67 test target.
-commit 3e36f281851fc8e9c996b33f108b2ae167314fbe
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 8 07:36:02 2018 +0000
+commit c039a6bf79192fe1daa9ddcc7c87dd98e258ae7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 11:08:23 2021 +1000
- upstream: tweak previous;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b9c23022ea7b9dddb62864de4e906000f9d7474
+ Re-add macos-11.0 test target.
-commit 8368571efd6693c5c57f850e23a2372acf3f865f
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 7 13:50:10 2018 +0000
+commit a6db3a47b56adb76870d59225ffb90a65bc4daf2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 10:28:28 2021 +1000
- upstream: tweak previous;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38e347b6f8e888f5e0700d01abb1eba7caa154f9
+ Add openindiana test target.
-commit 555294a7279914ae6795b71bedf4e6011b7636df
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 13:02:39 2018 +0000
+commit 3fe7e73b025c07eda46d78049f1da8ed7dfc0c69
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 23 10:26:35 2021 +1000
- upstream: Allow "SendEnv -PATTERN" to clear environment variables
-
- previously labeled for sendind. bz#1285 ok dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6fec9e3d0f366f15903094fbe1754cb359a0df9
+ Test krb5 on Solaris 11 too.
-commit 40f5f03544a07ebd2003b443d42e85cb51d94d59
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 04:15:45 2018 +0000
+commit f57fbfe5eb02df1a91f1a237c4d27165afd87c13
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Apr 22 22:27:26 2021 +1000
- upstream: relax checking of authorized_keys environment="..."
+ Don't always set SUDO.
- options to allow underscores in variable names (regression introduced in
- 7.7). bz2851, ok deraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69690ffe0c97ff393f2c76d25b4b3d2ed4e4ac9c
+ Rely on sourcing configs to set as appropriate.
-commit 30fd7f9af0f553aaa2eeda5a1f53f26cfc222b5e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 03:51:27 2018 +0000
+commit e428f29402fb6ac140b52f8f12e06ece7bb104a0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Apr 22 22:26:08 2021 +1000
- upstream: add a couple of missed options to the config dump; patch
-
- from Jakub Jelen via bz2835
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5970adadf6ef206bee0dddfc75d24c2019861446
+ Remove now-unused 2nd arg to configs.
-commit 8d6829be324452d2acd282d5f8ceb0adaa89a4de
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 03:34:27 2018 +0000
+commit cb4ff640d79b3c736879582139778f016bbb2cd7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 21 01:08:04 2021 +1000
- upstream: ssh does not accept -oInclude=... on the commandline, the
-
- Include keyword is for configuration files only. bz#2840, patch from Jakub
- Jelen
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 32d052b4a7a7f22df35fe3f71c368c02b02cacb0
+ Add win10 test target.
-commit 00c5222ddc0c8edcaa4ea45ac03befdc8013d137
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 5 22:54:28 2018 +0000
+commit 4457837238072836b2fa3107d603aac809624983
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 20 23:31:29 2021 +1000
- upstream: We don't offer CBC cipher by default any more. Spotted by
-
- Renaud Allard (via otto@)
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a559b1eef741557dd959ae378b665a2977d92dca
+ Add nbsd8 test target.
-commit 5ee8448ad7c306f05a9f56769f95336a8269f379
-Author: job@openbsd.org <job@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 4 15:12:17 2018 +0000
+commit bd4fba22e14da2fa196009010aabec5a8ba9dd42
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Apr 17 09:55:47 2021 +1000
- upstream: Update default IPQoS in ssh(1), sshd(8) to DSCP AF21 for
-
- interactive and CS1 for bulk
-
- AF21 was selected as this is the highest priority within the low-latency
- service class (and it is higher than what we have today). SSH is elastic
- and time-sensitive data, where a user is waiting for a response via the
- network in order to continue with a task at hand. As such, these flows
- should be considered foreground traffic, with delays or drops to such
- traffic directly impacting user-productivity.
-
- For bulk SSH traffic, the CS1 "Lower Effort" marker was chosen to enable
- networks implementing a scavanger/lower-than-best effort class to
- discriminate scp(1) below normal activities, such as web surfing. In
- general this type of bulk SSH traffic is a background activity.
-
- An advantage of using "AF21" for interactive SSH and "CS1" for bulk SSH
- is that they are recognisable values on all common platforms (IANA
- https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xml), and
- for AF21 specifically a definition of the intended behavior exists
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594#section-4.7 in addition to the definition
- of the Assured Forwarding PHB group https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2597, and
- for CS1 (Lower Effort) there is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3662
-
- The first three bits of "AF21" map to the equivalent IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE
- 802.11e, MPLS EXP/CoS and IP Precedence value of 2 (also known as "Immediate",
- or "AC_BE"), and CS1's first 3 bits map to IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e,
- MPLS/CoS and IP Precedence value 1 ("Background" or "AC_BK").
-
- OK deraadt@, "no objection" djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d11d2a4484f461524ef0c20870523dfcdeb52181
+ Add obsd51 target.
-commit 424b544fbda963f973da80f884717c3e0a513288
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 3 02:14:08 2018 +0000
+commit 9403d0e805c77a5741ea8c3281bbe92558c2f125
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 16 18:14:25 2021 +1000
- upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
+ Add fbsd13 target.
+
+commit e86968280e358e62649d268d41f698d64d0dc9fa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 16 13:55:25 2021 +1000
+
+ depend
+
+commit 2fb25ca11e8b281363a2a2a4dec4c497a1475d9a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 16 13:53:02 2021 +1000
+
+ crank version in README and RPM spec files
+
+commit b2b60ebab0cb77b5bc02d364d72e13db882f33ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 16 03:42:00 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: openssh-8.6
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5f3e133c846127ec114812248bc17eff07c3e19
-commit 323f66ce934df2da551f256f37d69822428e1ca1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 04:18:35 2018 +0000
+commit faf2b86a46c9281d237bcdec18c99e94a4eb820a
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 15 16:24:31 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add test for username options parsing order, prompted by
+ upstream: do not pass file/func to monitor; noted by Ilja van Sprundel;
- bz#2849.
+ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6985cd32f38596882a3ac172ff8c510693b65283
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ae5c063845c410283cbdce685515dcd19479fa
-commit e8f474554e3bda102a797a2fbab0594ccc66f097
+commit 2dc328023f60212cd29504fc05d849133ae47355
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 14:11:44 2018 +1000
+Date: Wed Apr 14 11:42:55 2021 +1000
- Expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 to PAM auth modules
+ sshd don't exit on transient read errors
- bz#2408, patch from Radoslaw Ejsmont; ok dtucker@
+ openssh-8.5 introduced a regression that would cause sshd to exit
+ because of transient read errors on the network socket (e.g. EINTR,
+ EAGAIN). Reported by balu.gajjala AT gmail.com via bz3297
-commit 014ba209cf4c6a159baa30ecebbaddfa97da7100
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Apr 3 12:18:00 2018 +1000
+commit d5d6b7d76d171a2e6861609dcd92e714ee62ad88
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 10 18:45:00 2021 +1000
- Import regenerated moduli file.
+ perform report_failed_grab() inline
-commit a0349a1cc4a18967ad1dbff5389bcdf9da098814
+commit ea996ce2d023aa3c6d31125e2c3ebda1cb42db8c
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:28 2018 +1000
+Date: Sat Apr 10 18:22:57 2021 +1000
- update versions in .spec files
+ dedicated gnome-ssk-askpass3 source
+
+ Compatibility with Wayland requires that we use the gdk_seat_grab()
+ API for grabbing mouse/keyboard, however these API don't exist in
+ Gtk+2.
+
+ This branches gnome-ssk-askpass2.c => gnome-ssk-askpass3.c and
+ makes the changes to use the gdk_seat_grab() instead of grabbing
+ mouse/focus separately via GDK.
+
+ In the future, we can also use the branched file to avoid some
+ API that has been soft-deprecated in GTK+3, e.g. gtk_widget_modify_fg
-commit 816ad38f79792f5617e3913be306ddb27e91091c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:20 2018 +1000
+commit bfa5405da05d906ffd58216eb77c4375b62d64c2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Apr 8 15:18:15 2021 +1000
- update version number
+ Ensure valgrind-out exists.
+
+ Normally the regress tests would create it, but running the unit tests
+ on their own would fail because the directory did not exist.
-commit 2c71ca1dd1efe458cb7dee3f8a1a566f913182c2
+commit 1f189181f3ea09a9b08aa866f78843fec800874f
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Mar 30 18:23:07 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Apr 8 15:17:19 2021 +1000
- Disable native strndup and strnlen on AIX.
+ Pass OBJ to unit test make invocation.
- On at least some revisions of AIX, strndup returns unterminated strings
- under some conditions, apparently because strnlen returns incorrect
- values in those cases. Disable both on AIX and use the replacements
- from openbsd-compat. Fixes problem with ECDSA keys there, ok djm.
+ At least the Valgrind unit tests uses $OBJ.
+
+commit f42b550c281d28bd19e9dd6ce65069164f3482b0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Apr 8 14:20:12 2021 +1000
+
+ Add pattern for valgrind-unit.
-commit 6b5a17bc14e896e3904dc58d889b58934cfacd24
+commit 19e534462710e98737478fd9c44768b50c27c4c6
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 26 13:12:44 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Apr 8 13:31:08 2021 +1000
- Include ssh_api.h for struct ssh.
+ Run unit tests under valgrind.
- struct ssh is needed by implementations of sys_auth_passwd() that were
- converted in commit bba02a50. Needed to fix build on AIX, I assume for
- the other platforms too (although it should be harmless if not needed).
+ Run a separate build for the unit tests under Valgrind. They take long
+ enough that running in parallel with the other Valgrind tests helps.
-commit bc3f80e4d191b8e48650045dfa8a682cd3aabd4d
+commit 80032102d05e866dc2a48a5caf760cf42c2e090e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 26 12:58:09 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Apr 8 13:25:57 2021 +1000
- Remove UNICOS code missed during removal.
+ ifdef out MIN and MAX.
- Fixes compile error on AIX.
+ In -portable, defines.h ensures that these are defined, so redefining
+ potentially causes a warning. We don't just delete it to make any
+ future code syncs a little but easier. bz#3293.
-commit 9d57762c24882e2f000a21a0ffc8c5908a1fa738
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000
+commit d1bd184046bc310c405f45da3614a1dc5b3e521a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 7 10:23:51 2021 +1000
- upstream: openssh-7.7
+ Remove only use of warn().
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41
+ The warn() function is only used in one place in portable and does not
+ exist upstream. Upgrade the only instance it's used to fail()
+ (the privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect, from back when that was new) and
+ remove the now-unused function.
-commit 4b7d8acdbbceef247dc035e611e577174ed8a87e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 26 09:37:02 2018 +1100
+commit fea8f4b1aa85026ad5aee5ad8e1599a8d5141fe0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 7 10:18:32 2021 +1000
- Remove authinfo.sh test dependency on printenv
+ Move make_tmpdir() into portable-specific area.
- Some platforms lack printenv in the default $PATH.
- Reported by Tom G. Christensen
+ Reduces diff vs OpenBSD and makes it more likely diffs will apply
+ cleanly.
-commit 4afeaf3dcb7dc70efd98fcfcb0ed28a6b40b820e
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 25 10:00:21 2018 -0700
+commit 13e5fa2acffd26e754c6ee1d070d0afd035d4cb7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 6 23:57:56 2021 +0000
- Use libiaf on all sysv5 systems
+ upstream: Add TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to print the
+
+ elapsed time in seconds of each test. This depends on "date +%s" which is
+ not specified by POSIX but is commonly implemented.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec3c8c19ff49b2192116a0a646ee7c9b944e8a9c
-commit bba02a5094b3db228ceac41cb4bfca165d0735f3
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 25 09:17:33 2018 -0700
+commit ef4f46ab4387bb863b471bad124d46e8d911a79a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 7 09:59:15 2021 +1000
- modified: auth-sia.c
- modified: openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
- modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
+ Move the TEST_SSH_PORT section down a bit.
- propogate changes to auth-passwd.c in commit
- 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 to other providers
- of sys_auth_passwd()
+ This groups the portable-specific changes together and makes it a
+ little more likely that patches will apply cleanly.
-commit d7a7a39168bdfe273587bf85d779d60569100a3f
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000
+commit 3674e33fa70dfa1fe69b345bf576113af7b7be11
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 7 10:05:10 2021 +1000
- upstream: openssh-7.7
+ Further split Valgrind tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41
+ Even split in two, the Valgrind tests take by far the longest to run,
+ so split them four ways to further increase parallelism.
-commit 9efcaaac314c611c6c0326e8bac5b486c424bbd2
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 24 19:28:43 2018 +0000
+commit 961af266b861e30fce1e26170ee0dbb5bf591f29
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 6 23:24:30 2021 +0000
- upstream: fix bogus warning when signing cert keys using agent;
+ upstream: include "ssherr.h" not <ssherr.h>; from Balu Gajjala via
- from djm; ok deraadt dtucker
+ bz#3292
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12e50836ba2040042383a8b71e12d7ea06e9633d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9535cd9966eb2e69e73d1ede1f44905c30310bd
-commit 393436024d2e4b4c7a01f9cfa5854e7437896d11
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 25 09:40:46 2018 +1100
+commit e7d0a285dbdd65d8df16123ad90f15e91862f959
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 7 08:50:38 2021 +1000
- Replace /dev/stdin with "-".
-
- For some reason sftp -b doesn't work with /dev/stdin on Cygwin, as noted
- and suggested by vinschen at redhat.com.
+ wrap struct rlimit in HAVE_GETRLIMIT too
-commit b5974de1a1d419e316ffb6524b1b277dda2f3b49
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Mar 23 13:21:14 2018 +1100
+commit f283a6c2e0a9bd9369e18462acd00be56fbe5b0d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 7 08:20:35 2021 +1000
- Provide $OBJ to paths in PuTTY interop tests.
+ wrap getrlimit call in HAVE_GETRLIMIT; bz3291
-commit dc31e79454e9b9140b33ad380565fdb59b9c4f33
+commit 679bdc4a5c9244f427a7aee9c14b0a0ed086da1f
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 16 09:06:31 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Apr 6 09:07:33 2021 +0000
- upstream: Tell puttygen to use /dev/urandom instead of /dev/random. On
+ upstream: Don't check return value of unsetenv(). It's part of the
- OpenBSD they are both non-blocking, but on many other -portable platforms it
- blocks, stalling tests.
+ environment setup and not part of the actual test, and some platforms
+ -portable runs on declare it as returning void, which prevents the test from
+ compiling.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 397d0d4c719c353f24d79f5b14775e0cfdf0e1cc
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f08543ee3cdebc404f2951f3e388cc82b844a1
-commit cb1f94431ef319cd48618b8b771b58739a8210cf
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Mar 22 07:06:11 2018 +0000
+commit 320af2f3de6333aa123f1b088eca146a245e968a
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 4 11:36:56 2021 +0000
- upstream: ssh/xmss: fix build; ok djm@
+ upstream: remove stray inserts; from matthias schmidt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9374ca41d4497f1c673ab681cc33f6e7c5dd186
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c36ebdc54e14bbf1daad70c6a05479a073d5c63
-commit 27979da9e4074322611355598f69175b9ff10d39
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Mar 22 07:05:48 2018 +0000
+commit 801f710953b24dd2f21939171c622eac77c7484d
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 4 06:11:24 2021 +0000
- upstream: ssh/xmss: fix deserialize for certs; ok djm@
+ upstream: missing comma; from kawashima james
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f44c41636c16ec83502039828beaf521c057dddc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31cec6bf26c6db4ffefc8a070715ebef274e68ea
-commit c6cb2565c9285eb54fa9dfbb3890f5464aff410f
+commit b3ca08cb174266884d44ec710a84cd64c12414ea
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 22 17:00:28 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Apr 5 23:46:42 2021 +1000
- Save $? before case statement.
-
- In some shells (FreeBSD 9, ash) the case statement resets $?, so save
- for later testing.
+ Install libcbor with libfido2.
-commit 4c4e7f783b43b264c247233acb887ee10ed4ce4d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000
+commit f3ca8af87a4c32ada660da12ae95cf03d190c083
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 3 18:21:08 2021 +1100
- upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to
+ enable authopt and misc unit tests
- "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509;
- pointed out by jsing@
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ac8b41dbfd90cffd525d58350c327195b0937793
+ Neither were wired into the build, both required some build
+ adaptations for -portable
-commit 500396b204c58e78ad9d081516a365a9f28dc3fd
+commit dc1b45841fb97e3d7f655ddbcfef3839735cae5f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:56:03 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 3 06:58:30 2021 +0000
- upstream: check valid-before option in authorized_keys
+ upstream: typos in comments; GHPR#180 from Vill
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7e1e4a84f7f099a290e5a4cbf4196f90ff2d7e11
-
-commit a76b5d26c2a51d7dd7a5164e683ab3f4419be215
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:54:04 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: explicitly specify RSA/SHA-2 keytype here too
+ =?UTF-8?q?e=20Skytt=C3=A4?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74d7b24e8c72c27af6b481198344eb077e993a62
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c732381ae0e2b680c79e67c40c1814b7ceed2c
-commit 3a43297ce29d37c64e37c7e21282cb219e28d3d1
+commit 53ea05e09b04fd7b6dea66b42b34d65fe61b9636
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:57 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 3 06:55:52 2021 +0000
- upstream: exlicitly include RSA/SHA-2 keytypes in
+ upstream: sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists with reality. GHPR#174 from
- PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes here
+ Matt Hazinski
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 954d19e0032a74e31697fb1dc7e7d3d1b2d65fe9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f05e4ca54d7e67b90fe58fe1bdb1d2a37e0e2696
-commit 037fdc1dc2d68e1d43f9c9e2586c02cabc8f7cc8
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 14 06:56:20 2018 +0000
+commit 57ed647ee07bb883a2f2264231bcd1df6a5b9392
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 3 17:47:37 2021 +1100
- upstream: sort expiry-time;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c7d82ee1e63e26ceb2b3d3a16514019f984f6bf
+ polish whitespace for portable files
-commit abc0fa38c9bc136871f28e452c3465c3051fc785
+commit 31d8d231eb9377df474746a822d380c5d68d7ad6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 3 06:18:40 2021 +0000
- upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to
+ upstream: highly polished whitespace, mostly fixing spaces-for-tab
- "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509;
- pointed out by jsing@
+ and bad indentation on continuation lines. Prompted by GHPR#185
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 376939466a1f562f3950a22314bc6505733aaae6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5c81f0cbdcc6144df1ce468ec1bac366d8ad6e9
-commit bf0fbf2b11a44f06a64b620af7d01ff171c28e13
+commit 34afde5c73b5570d6f8cce9b49993b23b77bfb86
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 3 05:54:14 2021 +0000
- upstream: add valid-before="[time]" authorized_keys option. A
+ upstream: whitespace (tab after space)
- simple way of giving a key an expiry date. ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1793b4dd5184fa87f42ed33c7b0f4f02bc877947
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e2b3f7674e985d3f7c27ff5028e690ba1c2efd4
-commit fbd733ab7adc907118a6cf56c08ed90c7000043f
+commit 7cd262c1c5a08cc7f4f30e3cab108ef089d0a57b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 19:17:26 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Apr 3 16:59:10 2021 +1100
- Add AC_LANG_PROGRAM to AC_COMPILE_IFELSE.
-
- The recently added MIPS ABI tests need AC_LANG_PROGRAM to prevent
- warnings from autoconf. Pointed out by klausz at haus-gisela.de.
+ Save config.h and config.log on failure too.
-commit c7c458e8261b04d161763cd333d74e7a5842e917
+commit 460aee9298f365357e9fd26851c22e0dca51fd6a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 7 23:53:08 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 3 05:46:41 2021 +0000
- upstream: revert recent strdelim() change, it causes problems with
+ upstream: fix incorrect plural; from Ville Skyt
- some configs.
-
- revision 1.124
- date: 2018/03/02 03:02:11; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +19 -8; commitid: nNRsCijZiGG6SUTT;
- Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and sshd_config quotes
- option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@
+ =?UTF-8?q?t=C3=A4=20via=20GHPR#181?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c40b1b81206d713c06b49d8477402c86babda5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92f31754c6296d8f403d7c293e09dc27292d22c9
-commit 0bcd871ccdf3baf2b642509ba4773d5be067cfa2
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 07:03:18 2018 +0000
+commit 082804c14e548cada75c81003a3c68ee098138ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 3 05:40:39 2021 +0000
- upstream: move the input format details to -f; remove the output
+ upstream: ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit -
- format details and point to sshd(8), where it is documented;
+ some PKCS#11 providers get upset if C_Initialize is not matched with
+ C_Finalize.
- ok dtucker
+ From Adithya Baglody via GHPR#234; ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95f17e47dae02a6ac7329708c8c893d4cad0004a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8e770e03b416ee9a58f9762e162add900f832b6
-commit 45011511a09e03493568506ce32f4891a174a3bd
-Author: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:28 2017 +0100
+commit 464ebc82aa926dd132ec75a0b064574ef375675e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 3 05:28:43 2021 +0000
- configure.ac: properly set seccomp_audit_arch for MIPS64
+ upstream: unused variable
- Currently seccomp_audit_arch is set to AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 or
- AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 (depending on the endinness) when openssh is built
- for MIPS64. However, that's only valid for n64 ABI. The right macros for
- n32 ABI defined in seccomp.h are AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 and
- AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, for big and little endian respectively.
-
- Because of that an sshd built for MIPS64 n32 rejects connection attempts
- and the output of strace reveals that the problem is related to seccomp
- audit:
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85f6a394c8e0f60d15ecddda75176f112007b205
+
+commit dc3c0be8208c488e64a8bcb7d9efad98514e0ffb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 3 05:21:46 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix two problems in string->argv conversion: 1) multiple
- [pid 194] prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, {len=57,
- filter=0x555d5da0}) = 0
- [pid 194] write(7, "\0\0\0]\0\0\0\5\0\0\0Ulist_hostkey_types: "..., 97) = ?
- [pid 193] <... poll resumed> ) = 2 ([{fd=5, revents=POLLIN|POLLHUP},
- {fd=6, revents=POLLHUP}])
- [pid 194] +++ killed by SIGSYS +++
+ backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and 2) quoted space in the
+ middle of a string was being incorrectly split.
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- This patch fixes that problem by setting the right value to
- seccomp_audit_arch taking into account the MIPS64 ABI.
+ A unit test for these cases has already been committed
- Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-
-commit 580086704c31de91dc7ba040a28e416bf1fefbca
-Author: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:11 2017 +0100
-
- configure.ac: detect MIPS ABI
+ prompted by and based on GHPR#223 by Eero Häkkinen; ok markus@
- Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-
-commit cd4e937aa701f70366cd5b5969af525dff6fdf15
-Author: Alan Yee <alyee@ucsd.edu>
-Date: Wed Mar 7 15:12:14 2018 -0800
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d7ef27abb4eeeaf6e167e9312e4abe9e89faf1e4
- Use https URLs for links that support it.
-
-commit c0a0c3fc4a76b682db22146b28ddc46566db1ce9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 20:03:07 2018 +1100
+commit f75bcbba58a08c670727ece5e3f8812125969799
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 3 16:22:48 2021 +1100
- Disable UTMPX on SunOS4.
+ missing bits from 259d648e
-commit 58fd4c5c0140f6636227ca7acbb149ab0c2509b9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 19:28:08 2018 +1100
+commit 4cbc4a722873d9b68cb5496304dc050d7168df78
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 31 21:59:26 2021 +0000
- Check for and work around buggy fflush(NULL).
+ upstream: cannot effectively test posix-rename extension after
+
+ changes in feature advertisment.
- Some really old platforms (eg SunOS4) segfault on fflush(NULL) so check
- for and work around. With klausz at haus-gisela.de.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e390bf88d379162aaa81b60ed86b34cb0c54d29
-commit 71e48bc7945f867029e50e06c665c66aed6d3c64
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 10:22:32 2018 +1100
+commit 259d648e63e82ade4fe2c2c73c8b67fe57d9d049
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 19 04:23:50 2021 +0000
- Remove extra XMSS #endif
+ upstream: add a test for misc.c:argv_split(), currently fails
- Extra #endif breaks compile with -DWITH_XMSS. Pointed out by Jack
- Schmidt via github.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ad6b96d6ebeb9643b698b3575bdd6f78bb144200
-commit 055e09e2212ff52067786bf6d794ca9512ff7f0c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 06:37:53 2018 +0000
+commit 473ddfc2d6b602cb2d1d897e0e5c204de145cd9a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 19 03:25:01 2021 +0000
- upstream: Update RSA minimum modulus size to 1024. sshkey.h rev 1.18
+ upstream: split
- bumped the minimum from 768 to 1024, update man page accordingly.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27563ab4e866cd2aac40a5247876f6787c08a338
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f6c03c0e4c58b3b9e04b161757b8c10dc8378c34
-commit 7e4fadd3248d6bb7d39d6688c76a613d35d2efc1
+commit 1339800fef8d0dfbfeabff71b34670105bcfddd2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Mar 4 01:46:48 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 31 22:16:34 2021 +0000
- upstream: for the pty control tests, just check that the PTY path
+ upstream: Use new limits@openssh.com protocol extension to let the
- points to something in /dev (rather than checking the device node itself);
- makes life easier for portable, where systems with dynamic ptys can delete
- nodes before we get around to testing their existence.
+ client select good limits based on what the server supports. Split the
+ download and upload buffer sizes to allow them to be chosen independently.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b1e455b821e62572bccd98102f8dd9d09bb94994
-
-commit 13ef4cf53f24753fe920832b990b25c9c9cd0530
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 16:21:20 2018 +1100
-
- Update PAM password change to new opts API.
-
-commit 33561e68e0b27366cb769295a077aabc6a49d2a1
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 14:56:09 2018 +1100
-
- Add strndup for platforms that need it.
+ In practice (and assuming upgraded sftp/sftp-server at each end), this
+ increases the download buffer 32->64KiB and the upload buffer
+ 32->255KiB.
- Some platforms don't have strndup, which includes Solaris 10, NetBSD 3
- and FreeBSD 6.
-
-commit e8a17feba95eef424303fb94441008f6c5347aaf
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 14:49:07 2018 +1100
-
- Flatten and alphabetize object file lists.
+ Patches from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
- This will make maintenance and changes easier. "no objection" tim@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ebd61c80d85b951b794164acc4b2f2fd8e88606c
-commit de1920d743d295f50e6905e5957c4172c038e8eb
+commit 6653c61202d104e59c8e741329fcc567f7bc36b8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:16:17 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 31 21:58:07 2021 +0000
- upstream: unit tests for new authorized_keys options API
+ upstream: do not advertise protocol extensions that have been
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 820f9ec9c6301f6ca330ad4052d85f0e67d0bdc1
+ disallowed by the command-line options (e.g. -p/-P/-R); ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a8a76b3f5131741aca4b41bfab8d101c9926205
-commit dc3e92df17556dc5b0ab19cee8dcb2a6ba348717
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 02:53:27 2018 +0000
+commit 71241fc05db4bbb11bb29340b44b92e2575373d8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 29 15:14:25 2021 +1100
- upstream: fix testing of pty option, include positive test and
-
- testing of restrict keyword
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4268f27c2706a0a95e725d9518c5bcbec9814c6d
+ gnome-ssh-askpass3 is a valid target here
-commit 3d1edd1ebbc0aabea8bbe61903060f37137f7c61
+commit 8a9520836e71830f4fccca066dba73fea3d16bda
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 02:51:55 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 19 02:22:34 2021 +0000
- upstream: better testing for port-forwarding and restrict flags in
+ upstream: return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281 ok
- authorized_keys
+ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ee771df8955f2735df54746872c6228aff381daa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117b31cf3c807993077b596bd730c24da9e9b816
-commit 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3
+commit 1269b8a686bf1254b03cd38af78167a04aa6ec88
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:15:51 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 19 02:18:28 2021 +0000
- upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API and
+ upstream: increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum
- remove the legacy one.
+ packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are borderline nonsensical
+ but not explicitly banned by the spec. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger,
+ feedback deraadt@ ok dtucker@
- Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
- between key file lines.
-
- feedback and ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e67d60d81bde7b84a742b4ee5a34001bdf80d9c
-commit 90c4bec8b5f9ec4c003ae4abdf13fc7766f00c8b
+commit 860b67604416640e8db14f365adc3f840aebcb1f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:06:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Mar 16 06:15:43 2021 +0000
- upstream: Introduce a new API for handling authorized_keys options.
-
- This API parses options to a dedicated structure rather than the old API's
- approach of setting global state. It also includes support for merging
- options, e.g. from authorized_keys, authorized_principals and/or
- certificates.
+ upstream: don't let logging clobber errno before use
- feedback and ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98badda102cd575210d7802943e93a34232c80a2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6cca370005c270c277c51c111bb6911e1680ec
-commit 26074380767e639ef89321610e146ae11016b385
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:01:50 2018 +0000
+commit 5ca8a9216559349c56e09039c4335636fd85c241
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 13 14:40:43 2021 +1100
- upstream: warn when the agent returns a signature type that was
+ Only call dh_set_moduli_file if using OpenSSL.
- different to what was requested. This might happen when an old/non-OpenSSH
- agent is asked to make a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature but only supports
- ssh-rsa. bz#2799 feedback and ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760c0f9438c5c58abc16b5f98008ff2d95cb13ce
+ Fixes link failure when configuring --without-openssl since dh.c is not
+ linked in.
-commit f493d2b0b66fb003ed29f31dd66ff1aeb64be1fc
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 21:40:15 2018 +0000
+commit 867a7dcf003c51d5a83f83565771a35f0d9530ac
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 13 13:52:53 2021 +1100
- upstream: apply a lick of paint; tweaks/ok dtucker
+ Don't install moduli during tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 518a6736338045e0037f503c21027d958d05e703
+ Now that we have TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE pointing to the moduli in the
+ soure directory we don't need to install the file to prevent warnings
+ about it being missing.
-commit 713d9cb510e0e7759398716cbe6dcf43e574be71
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 03:02:11 2018 +0000
+commit 0c054538fccf92b4a028008321d3711107bee6d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 13 13:51:26 2021 +1100
- upstream: Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and
+ Point TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE at our own moduli.
- sshd_config quotes option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@
+ This will allow the test to run without requiring a moduli file
+ installed at the configured default path.
+
+commit 4d48219c72ab0c71238806f057f0e9630b7dd25c
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 12 05:18:01 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: spelling
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd3a29fc2dc905e8780198e5a6a30b096de1a1cb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478bc3db04f62f1048ed6e1765400f3ab325e60f
-commit 94b4e2d29afaaaef89a95289b16c18bf5627f7cd
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 02:08:03 2018 +0000
+commit 88057eb6df912abf2678ea5c846d9d9cbc92752c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 12 04:08:19 2021 +0000
- upstream: refactor sshkey_read() to make it a little more, err,
+ upstream: Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the
- readable. ok markus
+ location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX. This will
+ allow us to run tests against arbitrary moduli files without having to
+ install them. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e9247b5762fdac3b6335dc606d3822121714c28
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8df99d60b14ecaaa28f3469d01fc7f56bff49f66
-commit 5886b92968b360623491699247caddfb77a74d80
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Mar 1 20:32:16 2018 +0000
+commit f07519a2af96109325b5a48b1af18b57601074ca
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 12 03:43:40 2021 +0000
- upstream: missing #ifdef for _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE; report by
+ upstream: pwcopy() struct passwd that we're going to reuse across a
- jmc@
+ bunch of library calls; bz3273 ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9039cb69a3f9886bfef096891a9e7fcbd620280b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6eafa977b2e44607b1b121f5de855107809b762
-commit 3b36bed3d26f17f6a2b7e036e01777770fe1bcd4
+commit 69d6d4b0c8a88d3d1288415605f36e2df61a2f12
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:14:53 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 10 06:32:27 2021 +0000
- upstream: Remove unneeded (local) include. ok markus@
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132812dd2296b1caa8cb07d2408afc28e4e60f93
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac6c252d2a5be8fbad4c66d9d35db507c9dac5b
-commit 27b9f3950e0289e225b57b7b880a8f1859dcd70b
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 03:56:44 2018 +0000
+commit e5895e8ecfac65086ea6b34d0d168409a66a15e1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 10 04:58:45 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add $OpenBSD$ markers to xmss files to help keep synced
+ upstream: no need to reset buffer after send_msg() as that is done
- with portable. ok djm@.
+ for us; patch from Mike Frysinger
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5233a27aafd1dfadad4b957225f95ae51eb365c1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 565516495ff8362a38231e0f1a087b8ae66da59c
-commit afd830847a82ebbd5aeab05bad6d2c8ce74df1cd
+commit 721948e67488767df0fa0db71ff2578ee2bb9210
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 03:03:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Mar 13 01:52:16 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add newline at end of file to prevent compiler warnings.
+ upstream: Add TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE variable to allow overriding of the
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52f247d4eafe840c7c14c8befa71a760a8eeb063
+ moduli file used during the test run.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: be10f785263120edb64fc87db0e0d6570a10220a
-commit 941e0d3e9bb8d5e4eb70cc694441445faf037c84
+commit 82fef71e20ffef425b932bec26f5bc46aa1ed41c
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Feb 28 19:59:35 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Mar 12 15:58:57 2021 +1100
- Add WITH_XMSS, move to prevent conflicts.
+ Allow (but return EACCES) fstatat64 in sandbox.
- Add #ifdef WITH_XMSS to ssh-xmss.c, move it in the other files to after
- includes.h so it's less likely to conflict and will pick up WITH_XMSS if
- added to config.h.
+ This is apparently used in some configurations of OpenSSL when glibc
+ has getrandom(). bz#3276, patch from Kris Karas, ok djm@
-commit a10d8552d0d2438da4ed539275abcbf557d1e7a8
+commit 1cd67ee15ce3d192ab51be22bc4872a6a7a4b6d9
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 27 14:45:17 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Mar 12 13:16:10 2021 +1100
- Conditionally compile XMSS code.
+ Move generic includes outside of ifdef.
- The XMSS code is currently experimental and, unlike the rest of OpenSSH
- cannot currently be compiled with a c89 compiler.
+ This ensures that the macros in log.h are defined in the case where
+ either of --with-solaris-projects or --with-solaris-privs are used
+ without --with-solaris-contracts. bz#3278.
-commit 146c3bd28c8dbee9c4b06465d9c9facab96b1e9b
+commit 2421a567a8862fe5102a4e7d60003ebffd1313dd
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:51:29 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Mar 10 17:41:21 2021 +1100
- Check dlopen has RTLD_NOW before enabling pkcs11.
+ Import regenerated moduli file.
-commit 1323f120d06a26074c4d154fcbe7f49bcad3d741
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 27 08:41:25 2018 +1100
+commit e99080c05d9d48dbbdb022538533d53ae1bd567d
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 6 20:36:31 2021 +0000
- Check for attributes on prototype args.
+ upstream: Fix PRINT macro, the suffix param to sshlog() was missing.
- Some compilers (gcc 2.9.53, 3.0 and probably others, see gcc bug #3481)
- do not accept __attribute__ on function pointer prototype args. Check for
- this and hide them if they're not accepted.
-
-commit f0b245b0439e600fab782d19e97980e9f2c2533c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 11:43:48 2018 +1100
+ Also remove redundant __func__ prefix from PRINT calls as the macro already
+ adds __FILE__, __func__ and __LINE__. From Christos Zoulas. OK dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01fdfa9c5541151b5461d9d7d6ca186a3413d949
- Check if HAVE_DECL_BZERO correctly.
+commit 160db17fc678ceb5e3fd4a7e006cc73866f484aa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 3 22:41:49 2021 +0000
-commit c7ef4a399155e1621a532cc5e08e6fa773658dd4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 17:42:56 2018 +1100
-
- Wrap <stdint.h> in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-
-commit ac53ce46cf8165cbda7f57ee045f9f32e1e92b31
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 16:24:23 2018 +1100
-
- Replace $(CURDIR) with $(PWD).
+ upstream: don't sshbuf_get_u32() into an enum; reported by goetze
- The former doesn't work on Solaris or BSDs.
-
-commit 534b2680a15d14e7e60274d5b29b812d44cc5a44
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:51:59 2018 +1100
-
- Comment out hexdump().
+ AT dovetail.com via bz3269
- Nothing currently uses them but they cause conflicts on at least
- FreeBSD, possibly others. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99a30a8f1df9bd72be54e21eee5c56a0f050921a
-commit 5aea4aa522f61bb2f34c3055a7de203909dfae77
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:39:14 2018 +1100
-
- typo: missing ;
-
-commit cd3ab57f9b388f8b1abf601dc4d78ff82d83b75e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:37:06 2018 +1100
+commit cffd033817a5aa388764b6661855dcdaabab0588
+Author: sthen@openbsd.org <sthen@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 3 21:40:16 2021 +0000
- Hook up flock() compat code.
+ upstream: typo in other_hostkeys_message() display output, ok djm
- Also a couple of minor changes: fail if we can't lock instead of
- silently succeeding, and apply a couple of minor style fixes.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 276f58afc97b6f5826e0be58380b737603dbf5f5
-commit b087998d1ba90dd1ddb6bfdb17873dc3e7392798
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:27:02 2018 +1100
+commit 7fe141b96b13bd7dc67ca985e14d55b9bd8a03fd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 3 08:42:52 2021 +0000
- Import flock() compat from NetBSD.
+ upstream: needs FILE*; from Mike Frysinger
- From NetBSD's src/trunk/tools/compat/flock.c, no OpenSSH changes yet.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dddb3aa9cb5792eeeaa37a1af67b5a3f25ded41d
-commit 89212533dde6798324e835b1499084658df4579e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:32:14 2018 +1100
+commit d2afd717e62d76bb41ab5f3ab4ce6f885c8edc98
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 2 21:31:47 2021 +1100
- Fix breakage when REGRESSTMP not set.
-
- BUILDDIR is not set where used for REGRESSTMP, use make's CURDIR
- instead. Pointed out by djm@.
+ update depend
-commit f885474137df4b89498c0b8834c2ac72c47aa4bd
+commit f0c4eddf7cf224ebcac1f07ac8afdb30c6e9fe0a
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:18:14 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Mar 2 21:30:14 2021 +1100
- XMSS-related files get includes.h
+ update relnotes URL
-commit 612faa34c72e421cdc9e63f624526bae62d557cc
+commit 67a8bb7fe62a381634db4c261720092e7d514a3d
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:55 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Mar 2 21:29:54 2021 +1100
- object files end with .o - not .c
+ update RPM spec version numbers
-commit bda709b8e13d3eef19e69c2d1684139e3af728f5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:22 2018 +1100
+commit 0a4b23b11b9a4e6eec332dd5c6ab2ac6f62aa164
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 2 01:48:18 2021 +0000
- avoid inclusion of deprecated selinux/flask.h
+ upstream: openssh-8.5
- Use string_to_security_class() instead.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 185e85d60fe042b8f8fa1ef29d4ef637bdf397d6
-commit 2e396439365c4ca352cac222717d09b14f8a0dfd
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 11:48:27 2018 +1100
+commit de3866383b6720ad4cad83be76fe4c8aa111a249
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 1 21:13:24 2021 +1100
- updatedepend
+ Only upload config logs if configure fails.
-commit 1b11ea7c58cd5c59838b5fa574cd456d6047b2d4
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 15:58:37 2018 +0000
+commit 85ff2a564ce838f8690050081176c1de1fb33116
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 28 22:56:30 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended
+ upstream: Add %k to list of keywords. From
- Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS
- in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok
- djm@
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20Eero=20H=C3=A4kkinenvia=20bz#3267?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c87f39a048cee2a7d1c8bab951b2f716256865e
-commit 7d330a1ac02076de98cfc8fda05353d57b603755
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 07:38:09 2018 +0000
+commit e774bac35933e71f924f4301786e7fb5bbe1422f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 28 01:50:47 2021 +0000
- upstream: some cleanup for BindInterface and ssh-keyscan;
+ upstream: Do not try to reset signal handler for signal 0 in
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a719ebeae22a166adf05bea5009add7075acc8c
-
-commit c7b5a47e3b9db9a0f0198f9c90c705f6307afc2b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 23:55:41 2018 +1100
-
- Invert sense of getpgrp test.
+ subprocess. Prevents spurious debug message. ok djm@
- AC_FUNC_GETPGRP tests if getpgrp(0) works, which it does if it's not
- declared. Instead, test if the zero-arg version we want to use works.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f9785e292dcf304457566ad4637effd27ad1d46
-commit b39593a6de5290650a01adf8699c6460570403c2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 13:25:15 2018 +1100
+commit 351c5dbbd74ce300c4f058112f9731c867c6e225
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 27 23:42:37 2021 +0000
- Add no-op getsid implmentation.
+ upstream: fix alphabetic ordering of options; spotted by Iain Morgan
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f955fec617d74af0feb5b275831a9fee813d7ad5
-commit 11057564eb6ab8fd987de50c3d7f394c6f6632b7
+commit 0d1c9dbe578597f8d45d3ac7690df10d32d743e5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 11:22:57 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Feb 27 12:25:25 2021 +1100
- bsd-statvfs: include sys/vfs.h, check for f_flags.
+ zlib is now optional.
-commit e9dede06e5bc582a4aeb5b1cd5a7a640d7de3609
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 10:20:31 2018 +1100
+commit b7c6ee7b437d9adfd19ef49d6c0f19f13f26f9b3
+Author: Jeffrey H. Johnson <61629094+johnsonjh@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Sat Feb 27 01:04:58 2021 +0000
- Handle calloc(0,x) where different from malloc.
+ Fix punctuatio and typo in README.md.
- Configure assumes that if malloc(0) returns null then calloc(0,n)
- also does. On some old platforms (SunOS4) malloc behaves as expected
- (as determined by AC_FUNC_MALLOC) but calloc doesn't. Test for this
- at configure time and activate the replacement function if found, plus
- handle this case in rpl_calloc.
+ Some very minor fixes, missing 's' and punctuation.
-commit 2eb4041493fd2635ffdc64a852d02b38c4955e0b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 24 21:06:48 2018 +1100
+commit 6248b86074804983e8f7a2058856a516dbfe2924
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 26 16:45:50 2021 +1100
- Add prototype for readv if needed.
+ Revert "ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified."
+
+ This reverts commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c.
+
+ Apologies - I accidentally pushed this.
-commit 6c8c9a615b6d31db8a87bc25033f053d5b0a831e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 24 20:46:37 2018 +1100
+commit 493339a940b13be6071629c3c2dd5a3b6fc17023
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 26 15:45:38 2021 +1100
- Check for raise and supply if needed.
+ detech BSD libc hash functions in libbsd / libmd
+
+ Some Linux distributions are shipping the BSD-style hashing functions
+ (e.g. SHA256Update) in libbsd and/or libmd. Detect this situation to
+ avoid header/replacement clashes later. ok dtucker@
-commit a9004425a032d7a7141a5437cfabfd02431e2a74
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 24 20:25:22 2018 +1100
+commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c
+Author: Dmitrii Turlupov <dturlupov@factor-ts.ru>
+Date: Thu Feb 4 16:27:31 2021 +0300
- Check for bzero and supply if needed.
+ ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified.
- Since explicit_bzero uses it via an indirect it needs to be a function
- not just a macro.
+ Allows the -b and -B options to be used together.
+ For example, when the interface is in the VRF.
-commit 1a348359e4d2876203b5255941bae348557f4f54
+commit 1fe4d70df94d3bcc2b35fd57cad6b5fc4b2d7b16
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 05:14:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 26 04:18:42 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add ssh-keyscan -D option to make it print its results in
+ upstream: remove this KEX fuzzer; it's awkward to use and doesn't play
- SSHFP format bz#2821, ok dtucker@
+ nice with popular fuzzing drivers like libfuzzer. AFAIK nobody has used it
+ but me.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 831446b582e0f298ca15c9d99c415c899e392221
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cad919522b3ce90c147c95abaf81b0492ac296c9
-commit 3e19fb976a47b44b3d7c4f8355269f7f2c5dd82c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 04:18:46 2018 +0000
+commit 24a3a67bd7421740d08803b84bd784e764107928
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 26 11:49:19 2021 +1100
- upstream: Add missing braces.
+ Remove macos-11.00 PAM test target too.
- Caught by the tinderbox's -Werror=misleading-indentation, ok djm@
+ These are failing apparently due to some kind of infrastructure problem,
+ making it look like every commit is busted.
+
+commit 473201783f732ca8b0ec528b56aa55fa0d8cf717
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 26 00:16:58 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: a bit more debugging behind #ifdef DEBUG_SK
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d44656af594c3b2366eb87d6abcef83e1c88a6ca
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9fbce14945721061cb322f0084c2165d33d1993
-commit b59162da99399d89bd57f71c170c0003c55b1583
+commit fd9fa76a344118fe1ef10b9a6c9e85d39599e9a8
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 15:20:42 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Feb 26 01:15:10 2021 +1100
- Check for ifaddrs.h for BindInterface.
+ Remove macos-11.0 from the test target list.
- BindInterface required getifaddr and friends so disable if not available
- (eg Solaris 10). We should be able to add support for some systems with
- a bit more work but this gets the building again.
+ It has been consistently failing for the past few days with a github
+ actions internal error.
-commit a8dd6fe0aa10b6866830b4688a73ef966f0aed88
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 14:19:11 2018 +1100
+commit 476ac8e9d33dbf96ef97aab812b8d7089d0cdc24
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Wed Feb 24 23:43:16 2021 +0100
- space before tab in previous
+ tidy the $INSTALLKEY_SH code layout a little
+
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 78178aa5017222773e4c23d9001391eeaeca8983
-commit b5e9263c7704247f9624c8f5c458e9181fcdbc09
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000
+commit 983e05ef3b81329d76d6a802b39ad0d1f637c06c
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue Sep 29 10:02:45 2020 +0000
- upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have
+ if unable to add a missing newline, fail
+
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 76b25e18f55499ea9edb4c4d6dc4a80bebc36d95
+
+commit 3594b3b015f6014591da88ba71bf6ff010be7411
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 13 14:12:58 2020 +0200
+
+ use $AUTH_KEY_DIR, now that we have it
+
+ since that was a change made since jjelen's commit was written
- $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured.
+ also, quote the variables
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 588cd8e5cbf95f3443d92b9ab27c5d73ceaf6616
-commit 3e9d3192ad43758ef761c5b0aa3ac5ccf8121ef2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 14:10:53 2018 +1100
+commit 333e25f7bc43cee6e36f766e39dad6f9918b318c
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue Sep 29 10:00:01 2020 +0000
- Use portable syntax for REGRESSTMP.
+ restorecon the correct directory
+
+ if using different path for authorized_keys file
+
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 791a3df47b48412c726bff6f7b1d190721e65d51
-commit 73282b61187883a2b2bb48e087fdda1d751d6059
+commit 9beeab8a37a49a9e3ffb1972fff6621ee5bd7a71
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 03:03:00 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Feb 25 03:27:34 2021 +0000
- upstream: unbreak interop test after SSHv1 purge; patch from Colin
-
- Watson via bz#2823
+ upstream: s/PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes/PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms/
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 807d30a597756ed6612bdf46dfebca74f49cb31a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3dbc005fa29f69dc23d97e433b6dffed6fe7cb69
-commit f8985dde5f46aedade0373365cbf86ed3f1aead2
+commit 2dd9870c16ddbd83740adeead5030d6840288c8f
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 03:42:57 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Feb 24 23:12:35 2021 +0000
- upstream: Skip sftp-chroot test when SUDO not set instead of
+ upstream: Rename pubkeyacceptedkeytypes to pubkeyacceptedalgorithms in
- fatal().
+ test to match change to config-dump output.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd4b5f1109b0dc09af4e5ea7d4968c43fbcbde88
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c9a4ad50306be873d032819d5e55c24eb74d5d
-commit df88551c02d4e3445c44ff67ba8757cff718609a
+commit b9225c3a1c3f5827e31d5d64a71b8e0504a25619
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Feb 24 01:18:08 2021 +0000
- upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have
+ upstream: Put obsolete aliases for hostbasedalgorithms and
- $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured.
+ pubkeyacceptedalgorithms after their current names so that the config-dump
+ mode finds and uses the current names. Spotted by Phil Pennock.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5dd10e93cccfaff3aaaa09060c917adff04a9b15
-commit 3b252c20b19f093e87363de197f1100b79705dd3
+commit 8b8b60542d6652b2c91e0ef9e9cc81bcb65e6b42
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 8 08:46:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 23 21:55:08 2021 +0000
- upstream: some helpers to check verbose/quiet mode
+ upstream: lots more s/key types/signature algorithms/ mostly in
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e736aac39e563f5360a0935080a71d5fdcb976de
+ HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms and HostKeyAlgorithms; prompted by Jakub Jelen
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f719de4385b1a89e4323b2549c66aae050129cb
-commit ac2e3026bbee1367e4cda34765d1106099be3287
+commit 0aeb508aaabc4818970c90831e3d21843c3c6d09
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 02:34:33 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 23 21:50:18 2021 +0000
- upstream: Add BindInterface ssh_config directive and -B
-
- command-line argument to ssh(1) that directs it to bind its outgoing
- connection to the address of the specified network interface.
+ upstream: Correct reference to signature algorithms as keys; from
- BindInterface prefers to use addresses that aren't loopback or link-
- local, but will fall back to those if no other addresses of the
- required family are available on that interface.
+ Jakub Jelen
- Based on patch by Mike Manning in bz#2820, ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f7ecee86fc811aa0f8e21e7a872eee044b4be5
+
+commit f186a020f2ba5f9c462a23293750e29ba0a746b1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 23 16:05:22 2021 +1100
+
+ Add a couple more test VMs.
+
+commit ffcdd3d90e74176b3bb22937ad1f65a6c1cd3f9d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 22 08:09:27 2021 +1100
+
+ Valgrind test: split and move up list.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5064d285c2851f773dd736a2c342aa384fbf713
+ Since the valgrind test takes so long it approaches the limit allowed by
+ github, move it to the head of the list so it's the first one started and
+ split the longest tests out into a second instance that runs concurrently
+ with the first.
-commit fcdb9d777839a3fa034b3bc3067ba8c1f6886679
+commit c3b1636770785cc2830dedd0f22ef7d3d3491d6d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 19 00:55:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 23 00:05:31 2021 +0000
- upstream: emphasise that the hostkey rotation may send key types
+ upstream: warn when the user specifies a ForwardAgent path that does
- that the client may not support, and that the client should simply disregard
- such keys (this is what ssh does already).
+ not exist and exit if ExitOnForwardFailure is set; bz3264
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f8ffbc32ac8d12be8f913d7c0ea55bef8622bf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72f7875865e723e464c71bf8692e83110699bf26
-commit ce066f688dc166506c082dac41ca686066e3de5f
+commit 5fcb0514949d61aadaf4a89cf16eb78fb47491ec
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 22 20:45:09 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Feb 20 13:34:02 2021 +1100
- Add headers for sys/audit.h.
+ Disable rlimit sandbox, doesn't work with valgrind
- On some older platforms (at least sunos4, probably others) sys/audit.h
- requires some other headers. Patch from klausz at haus-gisela.de.
+ Only run regress tests, runing unit tests as well makes it run longer
+ than allowed y github.
-commit 3fd2d2291a695c96a54269deae079bacce6e3fb9
+commit bb0b9bf45396c19486080d3eb0a159f94de7e6ba
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 19 18:37:40 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Feb 20 13:06:25 2021 +1100
- Add REGRESSTMP make var override.
-
- Defaults to original location ($srcdir/regress) but allows overriding
- if desired, eg a directory in /tmp.
+ Upload valgrind logs on failure.
-commit f8338428588f3ecb5243c86336eccaa28809f97e
+commit ebb3b75e974cb241c6b9b9f5881b09c7bd32b651
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 18 15:53:15 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Feb 19 22:18:50 2021 +1100
- Remove now-unused check for getrusage.
+ Rename "vm" to "os" in selfhosted to match c-cpp.
- getrusage was used in ssh-rand-helper but that's now long gone.
- Patch from klauszh at haus-gisela.de.
+ Should make it easier to share code or maybe merge at some point.
-commit 8570177195f6a4b3173c0a25484a83641ee3faa6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 04:43:11 2018 +0000
+commit 76c0be0fe0465cb2b975dbd409f8d38b55e55bcb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 19 22:15:22 2021 +1100
- upstream: Don't send IUTF8 to servers that don't like them.
-
- Some SSH servers eg "ConfD" drop the connection if the client sends the
- new IUTF8 (RFC8160) terminal mode even if it's not set. Add a bug bit
- for such servers and avoid sending IUTF8 to them. ok djm@
+ Upload regress failure logs in c-cpp too.
+
+commit 8751b6c3136f5225c40f41bbf29aa29e15795f6e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 19 22:13:36 2021 +1100
+
+ Comment out Solaris 64bit PAM build...
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26425855402d870c3c0a90491e72e2a8a342ceda
+ until I can figure out why it's failing.
+
+commit e9f6d563c06886b277c6b9abafa99fa80726dc48
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 19 10:20:17 2021 +1100
+
+ Actually run Valgrind tests.
+
+commit 41d232e226624f1a81c17091c36b44c9010aae62
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 19 10:16:56 2021 +1100
+
+ Add test against Valgrind.
+
+commit e6528d91f12fba05f0ea64224091c9d0f38bdf1d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 16:30:01 2021 +1100
+
+ Add fbsd12 test target.
+
+commit 6506cb2798d98ff03a7cc06567c392a81f540680
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 15:21:13 2021 +1100
+
+ Remove unused arg.
-commit f6dc2ba3c9d12be53057b9371f5109ec553a399f
+commit 93c31a623973b0fad508214593aab6ca94b11dcb
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 17:32:28 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 14:54:07 2021 +1100
- freezero should check for NULL.
+ Add DEBUG_SK to kitchensink builds.
-commit 680321f3eb46773883111e234b3c262142ff7c5b
+commit 65085740d3574eeb3289d592f042df62c2689bb0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 14:53:14 2021 +1100
+
+ Add bbone test target (arm32).
+
+commit 63238f5aed66148b8d6ca7bd5fb347d624200155
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 02:40:45 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Feb 18 02:49:35 2021 +0000
- upstream: Mention recent DH KEX methods:
+ upstream: Fix the hostkeys rotation extension documentation
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
- diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
- diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
+ The documentation was lacking the needed want-reply field in the initial
+ global request.
- From Jakub Jelen via bz#2826
+ https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/218 by dbussink
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51bf769f06e55447f4bfa7306949e62d2401907a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 051824fd78edf6d647a0b9ac011bf88e28775054
-commit 88c50a5ae20902715f0fca306bb9c38514f71679
+commit 34c5ef6e2d06d9f0e20cb04a9aebf67a6f96609a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 02:32:40 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Feb 18 02:15:07 2021 +0000
- upstream: stop loading DSA keys by default, remove sshd_config
+ upstream: make names in function prototypes match those in
- stanza and manpage bits; from Colin Watson via bz#2662, ok dtucker@
+ definition from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by
+ ZenithalHourlyRate
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d33a849f481684ff655c140f5eb1b4acda8c5c09
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c736307bf3f2c7cb24d6f82f244eee959485acd
-commit d2b3db2860c962927def39a52f67f1c23f7b201a
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 14 16:27:24 2018 +0000
+commit 88e3d4de31ab4f14cac658e9e0c512043b15b146
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 02:13:58 2021 +0000
- upstream: Ensure that D mod (P-1) and D mod (Q-1) are calculated in
+ upstream: unbreak SK_DEBUG builds
- constant time.
+ from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by
+ ZenithalHourlyRate
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d7259ce1b04d025411464decfa2f1a097b43eb
+
+commit 788cbc5b74a53956ba9fff11e1ca506271a3597f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 00:30:17 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: sftp-server: implement limits@openssh.com extension
- This avoids a potential side channel timing leak.
+ This is a simple extension that allows the server to clearly
+ communicate transfer limits it is imposing so the client doesn't
+ have to guess, or force the user to manually tune. This is
+ particularly useful when an attempt to use too large of a value
+ causes the server to abort the connection.
- ok djm@ markus@
+ Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71ff3c16be03290e63d8edab8fac053d8a82968c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f96293221e5aa24102d9bf30e4f4ef04d5f4fb51
-commit 4270efad7048535b4f250f493d70f9acfb201593
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 14 16:03:32 2018 +0000
+commit 324449a68d510720d0e4dfcc8e9e5a702fe6a48f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 12:06:25 2021 +1100
- upstream: Some obvious freezero() conversions.
+ support OpenSSL 3.x cipher IV API change
- This also zeros an ed25519_pk when it was not being zeroed previously.
+ OpenSSL renamed the "get current CIPHER_CTX" IV operation in 3.x.
+ This uses the new name if available.
- ok djm@ dtucker@
+ https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/13411
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c196a3c85c23ac0bd9b11bcadaedd90b7a2ce82
+ bz#3238 ok dtucker@
-commit affa6ba67ffccc30b85d6e98f36eb5afd9386882
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:32:04 2018 +1100
+commit 845fe9811c047063d935eca89188ed55c993626b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 11:25:38 2021 +1100
- Remove execute bit from modpipe.c.
+ prefer login_getpwclass() to login_getclass()
+
+ FreeBSD has login_getpwclass() that does some special magic for
+ UID=0. Prefer this to login_getclass() as its easier to emulate
+ the former with the latter.
+
+ Based on FreeBSD PR 37416 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
-commit 9879dca438526ae6dfd656fecb26b0558c29c731
+commit d0763c8d566119cce84d9806e419badf20444b02
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:26:16 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 10:45:27 2021 +1100
- Update prngd link to point to sourceforge.
+ Fixing quoting for installing moduli on target guest.
-commit b6973fa5152b1a0bafd2417b7c3ad96f6e87d014
+commit b3afc243bc820f323a09e3218e9ec8a30a3c1933
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:22:38 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 10:27:16 2021 +1100
+
+ Install moduli on target not host.
+
+commit f060c2bc85d59d111fa18a12eb3872ee4b9f7e97
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 18 10:33:58 2021 +1100
- Remove references to UNICOS.
+ don't free string returned by login_getcapstr(3)
+
+ OpenBSD and NetBSD require the caller to free strings returned
+ bu the login_* functions, but FreeBSD requires that callers don't.
+
+ Fortunately in this case, we can harmlessly leak as the process is
+ about to exec the shell/command.
+
+ From https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28617 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
-commit f1ca487940449f0b64f38f1da575078257609966
+commit bc9b0c25703215501da28aa7a6539f96c0fa656f
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:18:37 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 10:10:00 2021 +1100
- Remove extra newline.
+ Skip unit tests on sol11 to speed things up.
-commit 6d4e980f3cf27f409489cf89cd46c21501b13731
+commit 161873035c12cc22211fc73d07170ade47746bc5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:16:54 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 10:09:27 2021 +1100
- OpenSSH's builtin entropy gathering is long gone.
+ Remove SKIP_UNIT as it needs to be a make arg.
-commit 389125b25d1a1d7f22e907463b7e8eca74af79ea
+commit 1c293868e4b4e8e74e3ea15b8dff90f6b089967a
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 21:43:01 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 10:05:03 2021 +1100
- Replace remaining mysignal() with signal().
+ Always intall moduli.
- These seem to have been missed during the replacement of mysignal
- with #define signal in commit 5ade9ab. Both include the requisite
- headers to pick up the #define.
+ Allows us to run tests without falling back to a fixed modulus. Ensure that
+ the directory exists.
-commit 265d88d4e61e352de6791733c8b29fa3d7d0c26d
+commit 5c8f41ad100601ec2fdcbccdfe92890c31f81bbe
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 20:06:19 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 09:59:09 2021 +1100
- Remove remaining now-obsolete cvs $Ids.
+ Quote SSHD_CONFOPTS in case it contains spaces.
-commit 015749e9b1d2f6e14733466d19ba72f014d0845c
+commit 4653116c1f5384ea7006e6396d9b53c33d218975
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 17:01:54 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 18 09:51:18 2021 +1100
- Regenerate dependencies after UNICOS removal.
+ Fix labels on targets (dots vs underscores).
-commit ddc0f3814881ea279a6b6d4d98e03afc60ae1ed7
+commit 4512047f57ca3c6e8cd68f0cc69be59e98b25287
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 09:10:46 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Feb 17 21:47:48 2021 +1100
- Remove UNICOS support.
-
- The code required to support it is quite invasive to the mainline
- code that is synced with upstream and is an ongoing maintenance burden.
- Both the hardware and software are literal museum pieces these days and
- we could not find anyone still running OpenSSH on one.
+ More compact representation of config matrix.
-commit 174bed686968494723e6db881208cc4dac0d020f
+commit 0406cd09f05c2e419b113dd4c0eac8bc34ec915b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 18:12:47 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Feb 17 21:19:18 2021 +1100
- Retpoline linker flag only needed for linking.
+ Skip unit tests on hosted VMs to speed things up.
-commit 075e258c2cc41e1d7f3ea2d292c5342091728d40
+commit 4582612e6147d766c336198c498740242fb8f1ec
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 17:36:43 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Feb 17 20:21:29 2021 +1100
- Default PidFile is sshd.pid not ssh.pid.
+ Merge macos and ubuntu tests.
-commit 49f3c0ec47730ea264e2bd1e6ece11167d6384df
+commit 09f4b84654b71099559492e9aed5e1a38bf24815
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 16:27:09 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Feb 17 18:41:30 2021 +1100
- Remove assigned-to-but-never-used variable.
-
- 'p' was removed in previous change but I neglected to remove the
- otherwise-unused assignment to it.
+ Convert most github hosted tests to new config structure.
-commit b8bbff3b3fc823bf80c5ab226c94f13cb887d5b1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 03:36:56 2018 +0000
+commit 65380ff7e054be1454e5ab4fd7bb9c66f8fcbaa9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Feb 17 18:27:36 2021 +1100
- upstream: remove space before tab
+ Only run selfhosted tests from selfhosted repo.
+
+commit f031366535650b88248ed7dbf23033afdf466240
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 15 14:11:43 2021 +1100
+
+ Add self-hosted runners for VMs of other platforms.
+
+ Github only hosts a limited number of platforms, and the runner code
+ is only supported on slightly wider range of platforms. To increase
+ our test coverage beyond that, we run the runner natively on a VM host,
+ where it runs a jobs that boot VMs of other platforms, waits for them
+ to come up then runs the build and test by ssh'ing into the guest.
+ This means that the minimum dependencies for the guests are quite low
+ (basically just sshd, a compiler and make).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 674edd214d0a7332dd4623c9cf8117301b012890
+ The interface to the VM host is fairly simple (basically 3 scripts:
+ vmstartup, vmrun and vmshutdown), but those are specific to the VM host
+ so are not in the public repo. We also mount the working directory on the
+ host via sshfs, so things like artifact upload by the runner also work.
+
+ As part of this we are moving the per-test-target configs into a single
+ place (.github/configs) where there will be referenced by a single short
+ "config" key. I plan to make the github-hosted runners use this too.
+
+ The self-hosted runners are run off a private repo on github since that
+ prevents third parties from accessing them[0], and since runner quota is
+ limited on private repos, we avoid running the tests we run on the public
+ repo.
+
+ [0] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/hosting-your-own-runners/about-self-hosted-runners#self-hosted-runner-security-with-public-repositories
-commit 05046d907c211cb9b4cd21b8eff9e7a46cd6c5ab
+commit 64bbd7444d658ef7ee14a7ea5ccc7f5810279ee7
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 21:16:56 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Feb 17 03:59:00 2021 +0000
- upstream Don't reset signal handlers inside handlers.
+ upstream: Make sure puttygen is new enough to successfully run the
- The signal handlers from the original ssh1 code on which OpenSSH
- is based assume unreliable signals and reinstall their handlers.
- Since OpenBSD (and pretty much every current system) has reliable
- signals this is not needed. In the unlikely even that -portable
- is still being used on such systems we will deal with it in the
- compat layer. ok deraadt@
+ PuTTY interop tests, otherwise skip them.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f53a1015cb6908431b92116130d285d71589612c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 34565bb50b8aec58331ed02a5e9e0a9a929bef51
-commit 3c51143c639ac686687c7acf9b373b8c08195ffb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 09:07:29 2018 +1100
+commit da0a9afcc446a30ca49dd216612c41ac3cb1f2d4
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 15 20:43:15 2021 +0000
- Whitespace sync with upstream.
+ upstream: ssh: add PermitRemoteOpen for remote dynamic forwarding
+
+ with SOCKS ok djm@, dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64fe7b6360acc4ea56aa61b66498b5ecc0a96a7c
-commit 19edfd4af746bedf0df17f01953ba8c6d3186eb7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 08:25:46 2018 +1100
+commit b696858a7f9db72a83d02cb6edaca4b30a91b386
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 15 20:36:35 2021 +0000
- Whitespace sync with upstream.
+ upstream: factor out opt_array_append; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 571bc5dd35f99c5cf9de6aaeac428b168218e74a
-commit fbfa6f980d7460b3e12b0ce88ed3b6018edf4711
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 21:25:11 2018 +1300
+commit ad74fc127cc45567e170e8c6dfa2cfd9767324ec
+Author: dlg@openbsd.org <dlg@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 15 11:09:22 2021 +0000
- Move signal compat code into bsd-signal.{c,h}
+ upstream: ProxyJump takes "none" to disable processing like
+
+ ProxyCommand does
+
+ ok djm@ jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 941a2399da2193356bdc30b879d6e1692f18b6d3
-commit 24d2a33bd3bf5170700bfdd8675498aa09a79eab
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 21:20:39 2018 +1300
+commit 16eacdb016ccf38dd9959c78edd3a6282513aa53
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 12 03:49:09 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: sftp: add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation
+
+ patch from Mike Frysinger
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c114db88d505864075bfe7888b7c8745549715b
- Include headers for linux/if.h.
+commit e04fd6dde16de1cdc5a4d9946397ff60d96568db
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 12 03:14:18 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: factor SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION parsing into its own
- Prevents configure-time "present but cannot be compiled" warning.
+ function and remove an unused variable; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1a938657fbf7ef0ba5e73b30365734a0cc96559
-commit bc02181c24fc551aab85eb2cff0f90380928ef43
+commit 1bb130ed34721d46452529d094d9bbf045607d79
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 19:45:47 2018 +1300
+Date: Thu Feb 11 10:18:05 2021 +1100
- Fix test for -z,retpolineplt linker flag.
+ Add __NR_futex_time64 to seccomp sandbox.
+
+ This is apparently needed for (some) 32 bit platforms with glibc 2.33.
+ Patch from nix at esperi.org.uk and jjelen at redhat.com via bz#3260.
-commit 3377df00ea3fece5293db85fe63baef33bf5152e
+commit f88a7a431212a16e572ecabd559e632f369c363e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 09:32:37 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Feb 6 09:37:01 2021 +1100
- Add checks for Spectre v2 mitigation (retpoline)
+ Add a hostname function for systems that don't have it.
- This adds checks for gcc and clang flags for mitigations for Spectre
- variant 2, ie "retpoline". It'll automatically enabled if the compiler
- supports it as part of toolchain hardening flag. ok djm@
+ Some systems don't have a hostname command (it's not required by POSIX).
+ The do have uname -n (which is), but as found by tim@ some others (eg
+ UnixWare) do not report the FQDN from uname -n.
-commit d9e5cf078ea5380da6df767bb1773802ec557ef0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:25:34 2018 +0000
+commit 5e385a71ef2317856f37c91a98658eb12eb5a89c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 5 22:03:40 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Roll back the hostname->uname change in rev 1.10. It turns
- constify some private key-related functions; based on
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/56 by Vincent Brillault
+ out uname -n doesn't do what we need for some platforms in portable, so we'll
+ fix the original problem (that some other platforms don't have hostname at
+ all) by providing wrapper function to implement it.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dcb94a41834a15f4d00275cb5051616fdc4c988c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 827a707d6201d5a8e196a8c28aec1d2c76c52341
-commit a7c38215d564bf98e8e9eb40c1079e3adf686f15
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:03:54 2018 +0000
+commit b446c214279de50ed8388e54897eb1be5281c894
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 5 06:01:58 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: hostname is not specified by POSIX but uname -n is, so use
- Mention ServerAliveTimeout in context of TCPKeepAlives;
- prompted by Christoph Anton Mitterer via github
+ the latter for portability. Patch from Geert Hendrickx via github PR#208.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0cf1b5bd3f1fbf41d71c88d75d93afc1c880ca2
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6a79c7c4d141a0d05ade4a042eb57dddbce89f3
-commit 62562ceae61e4f7cf896566592bb840216e71061
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 06:54:38 2018 +0000
+commit 1cb6ce98d658e5fbdae025a3bd65793980e3b5d9
+Author: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat Nov 21 12:22:23 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ Using explicit_memset for the explicit_bzero compatibility layer.
+
+ Favoriting the native implementation in this case.
+
+commit 2e0beff67def2120f4b051b1016d7fbf84823e78
+Author: Luca Weiss <luca@z3ntu.xyz>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 14:19:23 2020 +0100
+
+ Deny (non-fatal) statx in preauth privsep child.
+
+commit a35d3e911e193a652bd09eed40907e3e165b0a7b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 5 02:20:23 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove debug message from sigchld handler. While this
- clarify IgnoreUserKnownHosts; based on github PR from
- Christoph Anton Mitterer.
+ works on OpenBSD it can cause problems on other platforms. From kircherlike
+ at outlook.com via bz#3259, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fff2c17620c342fb2f1f9c2d2e679aab3e589c3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e241d7ac1ee77e3de3651780b5dc47b283a7668
-commit 4f011daa4cada6450fa810f7563b8968639bb562
+commit 69338ab46afe9e3dfb7762ad65351d854077c998
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 06:40:28 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 2 22:36:59 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Shorter, more accurate explanation of
- NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost without the confusing example. Prompted by
- Christoph Anton Mitterer via github and bz#2293.
+ upstream: whitespace
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19dc96bea25b80d78d416b581fb8506f1e7b76df
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 544bb092e03fcbecb420196cd0f70af13ea868ad
-commit 77e05394af21d3f5faa0c09ed3855e4505a5cf9f
+commit f71219a01d8f71c4b3ed7e456337a84ddba1653e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 06:15:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 2 22:36:46 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix memleaks in private key deserialisation; enforce more
- Disable RemoteCommand and RequestTTY in the ssh session
- started by scp. sftp is already doing this. From Camden Narzt via github; ok
- dtucker
+ consistency between redundant fields in private key certificate and private
+ key body; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59e2611141c0b2ee579c6866e8eb9d7d8217bc6b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dec344e414d47f0a7adc13aecf3760fe58101240
-commit ca613249a00b64b2eea9f52d3834b55c28cf2862
+commit 3287790e78bf5b53c4a3cafb67bb5aa03e3910f0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 05:48:46 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Feb 2 22:35:14 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: memleak on error path; ok markus@
- Refuse to create a certificate with an unusable number of
- principals; Prompted by gdestuynder via github
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cfae2451e8f07810e3e2546dfdcce66984cbd29
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2091a36d6ca3980c81891a6c4bdc544e63cb13a8
-commit b56ac069d46b6f800de34e1e935f98d050731d14
+commit 3dd0c64e08f1bba21d71996d635c7256c8c139d1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 05:43:26 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 31 22:55:29 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: more strictly enforce KEX state-machine by banning packet
- fatal if we're unable to write all the public key; previously
- we would silently ignore errors writing the comment and terminating newline.
- Prompted by github PR from WillerZ; ok dtucker
+ types once they are received. Fixes memleak caused by duplicate
+ SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (spotted by portable OpenSSH kex_fuzz via
+ oss-fuzz #30078).
+
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18fbfcfd4e8c6adbc84820039b64d70906e49831
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 87331c715c095b587d5c88724694cdeb701c9def
-commit cdb10bd431f9f6833475c27e9a82ebb36fdb12db
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 11:18:38 2018 +1100
+commit 7a92a324a2e351fabd0ba8ef9b434d3b12d54ee3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 31 10:50:10 2021 +0000
- Add changelog entry for binary strip change.
+ upstream: Set linesize returned by getline to zero when freeing and
+
+ NULLing the returned string. OpenBSD's getline handles this just fine, but
+ some implementations used by -portable do not. ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d7bd5169d3397654247db9655cc69a9908d165c
-commit fbddd91897cfaf456bfc2081f39fb4a2208a0ebf
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 11:14:54 2018 +1100
+commit a5dfc5bae8c16e2a7caf564758d812c7672480b5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 30 16:32:29 2021 +1100
- Remove unused variables.
+ allow a fuzz case to contain more than one request
+
+ loop until input buffer empty, no message consumed or 256 messages
+ processed
-commit 937d96587df99c16c611d828cded292fa474a32b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 11:12:45 2018 +1100
+commit 0ef24ad60204022f7e33b6e9d171172c50514132
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 30 16:28:23 2021 +1100
- Don't strip binaries so debuginfo gets built.
+ expect fuzz cases to have length prefix
- Tell install not to strip binaries during package creation so that the
- debuginfo package can be built.
+ might make life a little easier for the fuzzer, e.g. it can now
+ produce valid (multi-request) messages by smashing two cases together.
-commit eb0865f330f59c889ec92696b97bd397090e720c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 10:33:11 2018 +1100
+commit de613f2713d2dfcd3b03c00e5558a40997f52712
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 30 12:03:30 2021 +1100
- Fix bogus dates in changelog.
+ ssh-agent fuzzer
-commit 7fbde1b34c1f6c9ca9e9d10805ba1e5e4538e165
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 10:25:15 2018 +1100
+commit 7e96c877bcb2fb645355a687b8cb7347987c1c58
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 30 12:02:46 2021 +1100
- Remove SSH1 from description.
+ move keys out of kex_fuzz.cc into separate header
+
+ add certificates and missing key types
-commit 9c34a76f099c4e0634bf6ecc2f40ce93925402c4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 10:19:16 2018 +1100
+commit 76f46d75664fdaa1112739ca523ff85ee4eb52b4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 30 12:02:10 2021 +1100
- Add support for compat-openssl10 build dep.
+ some fixed test data (mostly keys) for fuzzing
-commit 04f4e8193cb5a5a751fcc356bd6656291fec539e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:57:04 2018 +1100
+commit 7c2e3d6de1f2edb0c8b4725b4c2b56360e032b19
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 30 00:56:38 2021 +0000
- Add leading zero so it'll work when rhel not set.
+ upstream: add a SK_DUMMY_INTEGRATE define that allows the dummy
- When rhel is not set it will error out with "bad if". Add leading zero
- as per https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:DistTag so it'll work
- on non-RHEL.
+ security key middleware to be directly linked; useful for writing fuzzers,
+ etc.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0ebd00159b58ebd85e61d8270fc02f1e45df1544
-commit 12abd67a6af28476550807a443b38def2076bb92
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:56:34 2018 +1100
+commit 1a4b92758690faa12f49079dd3b72567f909466d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 06:29:46 2021 +0000
- Update openssl-devel dependency.
+ upstream: fix the values of enum sock_type
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18d048f4dbfbb159ff500cfc2700b8fb1407facd
-commit b33e7645f8813719d7f9173fef24463c8833ebb3
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 18:19:58 2014 -0500
+commit 8afaa7d7918419d3da6c0477b83db2159879cb33
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 06:28:10 2021 +0000
- Add mandir with-mandir' for RHEL 5 compatibility.
+ upstream: give typedef'd struct a struct name; makes the fuzzer I'm
+
+ writing a bit easier
- Activate '--mandir' and '--with-mandir' settings in setup for RHEL
- 5 compatibility.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1052ab521505a4d8384d67acb3974ef81b8896cb
-commit 94f8bf360eb0162e39ddf39d69925c2e93511e40
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 18:18:51 2014 -0500
+commit 1e660115f0c7c4a750cd31e468ff889f33dd8088
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 11:09:14 2021 +1100
- Discard 'K5DIR' reporting.
-
- It does not work inside 'mock' build environment.
+ fuzz diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 kex too
+
+commit be5f0048ea2aaeddd27be7dcca23aaad345fa16c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 29 11:03:35 2021 +1100
-commit bb7e54dbaf34b70b3e57acf7982f3a2136c94ee5
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 18:17:15 2014 -0500
+ support for running kex fuzzer with null cipher
- Add 'dist' to 'rel' for OS specific RPM names.
+commit 3d59e88c0e42182c3749b446ccd9027933c84be4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 28 20:55:16 2021 +1100
+
+ make with -j2 to use available CPUs.
-commit 87346f1f57f71150a9b8c7029d8c210e27027716
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 14:17:38 2014 -0500
+commit 66dd9ddb5d2ea8c407908c8e8468c9d6e71db05b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 28 14:31:01 2021 +1100
- Add openssh-devel >= 0.9.8f for redhat spec file.
+ Add test against openssl head and libressl head.
-commit bec1478d710866d3c1b119343a35567a8fc71ec3
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 13:10:24 2014 -0500
+commit 237dbb34e24b6b7ea888d54bda4d17da0a0fd0fa
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 28 14:30:50 2021 +1100
- Enhance BuildRequires for openssh-x11-askpass.
+ Remove whitespace.
-commit 3104fcbdd3c70aefcb0cdc3ee24948907db8dc8f
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 13:04:14 2014 -0500
+commit d983e1732b8135d7ee8d92290d6dce35f736ab88
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 23:49:46 2021 +0000
- Always include x11-ssh-askpass SRPM.
+ upstream: fix leak: was double allocating kex->session_id buffer
- Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in redhat SRPM, even if unused.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3765f4cc3ae1df874dba9102a3588ba7b48b8183
-commit c61d0d038d58eebc365f31830be6e04ce373ad1b
+commit 1134a48cdcef8e7363b9f6c73ebdd24405066738
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:43:12 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Jan 28 08:57:31 2021 +1100
- this is long unused; prompted by dtucker@
+ correct kex name in disabled code
-commit 745771fb788e41bb7cdad34e5555bf82da3af7ed
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 02:37:36 2018 +0000
+commit 67f47f1965abafc1830a287761125c2f4790857e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 10:15:08 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: this needs kex.h now
- Remove unused sKerberosTgtPassing from enum. From
- calestyo via github pull req #11, ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1008f8870865a7c4968b7aed402a0a9e3e5b9540
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5a42166c5aa002197217421a971e48be7cb5d41
-commit 1f385f55332db830b0ae22a7663b98279ca2d657
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 8 04:12:32 2018 +0000
+commit 39be3dc209f28f9c1ebfeba42adde8963b01e1cd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 10:05:28 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make ssh->kex->session_id a sshbuf instead of u_char*/size_t
- Rename struct umac_ctx to umac128_ctx too. In portable
- some linkers complain about two symbols with the same name having differing
- sizes. ok djm@
+ and use that instead of global variables containing copies of it. feedback/ok
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cbebf8bdd3310a9795b4939a1e112cfe24061ca3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4b1b1ca4afd2e37cb9f64f737b30a6a7f96af68
-commit f1f047fb031c0081dbc8738f05bf5d4cc47acadf
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 22:52:45 2018 +0000
+commit 4ca6a1fac328477c642329676d6469dba59019a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 09:26:53 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: remove global variable used to stash compat flags and use the
- ssh_free checks for and handles NULL args, remove NULL
- checks from remaining callers. ok djm@
+ purpose-built ssh->compat variable instead; feedback/ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb926825c53724c069df68a93a2597f9192f7e7b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c4f200e112dae6bcf99f5bae1a5629288378a06
-commit aee49b2a89b6b323c80dd3b431bd486e51f94c8c
+commit bba229b6f3328171f5e3ae85de443002523c0452
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 8 12:36:22 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Jan 27 12:34:07 2021 +1100
- Set SO_REUSEADDR in regression test netcat.
+ Install moduli file before tests.
- Sometimes multiplex tests fail on Solaris with "netcat: local_listen:
- Address already in use" which is likely due to previous invocations
- leaving the port in TIME_WAIT. Set SO_REUSEADDR (in addition to
- SO_REUSEPORT which is alread set on platforms that support it). ok djm@
+ Reduces warnings during test runs.
-commit 1749991c55bab716877b7c687cbfbf19189ac6f1
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 05:17:56 2018 +0000
+commit 1b83185593a90a73860a503d753a95ca6d726c00
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 11:58:26 2021 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Convert some explicit_bzero()/free() calls to freezero().
-
- ok deraadt@ dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f566ab99149650ebe58b1d4b946ea726c3829609
+ Run one test with -Werror to catch warnings.
-commit 94ec2b69d403f4318b7a0d9b17f8bc3efbf4d0d2
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 05:15:49 2018 +0000
+commit d1532d90074b212054d5fd965f833231b09982f5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 27 00:37:26 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Remove some #ifdef notyet code from OpenSSL 0.9.8 days.
+ upstream: Logical not bitwise or. ok djm@
- These functions have never appeared in OpenSSL and are likely never to do
- so.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d4dc855cf04951b93c45caa383e1ac9af0a3b0e5
+
+commit 507b448a2465a53ab03a88acbc71cc51b48ca6ac
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 26 15:40:17 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: move HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms to the right place in
- "kill it with fire" djm@
+ alphabetical order
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fee9560e283fd836efc2631ef381658cc673d23e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d766820d33dd874d944c14b0638239adb522c7ec
-commit 7cd31632e3a6607170ed0c9ed413a7ded5b9b377
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 02:06:50 2018 +0000
+commit e26c980778b228bdd42b8353cc70101cf49b731b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 26 11:25:01 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Remove unused variables leftover from refactoring. ok
- Remove all guards for calls to OpenSSL free functions -
- all of these functions handle NULL, from at least OpenSSL 1.0.1g onwards.
+ djm@
- Prompted by dtucker@ asking about guards for RSA_free(), when looking at
- openssh-portable pr#84 on github.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b3ad58bff828fcf874e54b2fc27a4cf1d9505e8
+
+commit e9f78d6b06fc323bba1890b2dc3b8423138fb35c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 26 05:32:21 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: Rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and
- ok deraadt@ dtucker@
+ HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, which more
+ accurately reflects its effect. This matches a previous change to
+ PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous names are retained as aliases. ok
+ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 954f1c51b94297d0ae1f749271e184141e0cadae
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49451c382adc6e69d3fa0e0663eeef2daa4b199e
-commit 3c000d57d46882eb736c6563edfc4995915c24a2
+commit 48d0d7a4dd31154c4208ec39029d60646192f978
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 09:19:38 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Jan 26 14:48:07 2021 +1100
- Remove obsolete "Smartcard support" message
+ Disable sntrup761 if compiler doesn't support VLAs.
- The configure checks that populated $SCARD_MSG were removed in commits
- 7ea845e4 and d8f60022 when the smartcard support was replaced with
- PKCS#11.
+ The sntrup761 code sourced from supercop uses variable length
+ arrays. Although widely supported, they are not part of the ANSI
+ C89 spec so if the compiler does not support VLAs, disable the
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com KEX method by replacing the kex
+ functions with no-op ones similar to what we do in kexecdh.c.
+
+ This should allow OpenSSH to build with a plain C89 compiler again.
+ Spotted by tim@, ok djm@.
-commit 3e615090de0ce36a833d811e01c28aec531247c4
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 6 06:01:54 2018 +0000
+commit 37c70ea8d4f3664a88141bcdf0bf7a16bd5fd1ac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 26 00:54:49 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: refactor key constraint parsing in ssh-agent
- Replace "trojan horse" with the correct term (MITM).
- From maikel at predikkta.com via bz#2822, ok markus@
+ Key constraints parsing code previously existed in both the "add regular
+ key" and "add smartcard key" path. This unifies them but also introduces
+ more consistency checking: duplicated constraints and constraints that
+ are nonsensical for a particular situation (e.g. FIDO provider for a
+ smartcard key) are now banned.
+
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e86ac64c512057c89edfadb43302ac0aa81a6c53
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 511cb1b1c021ee1d51a4c2d649b937445de7983c
-commit 3484380110d437c50e17f87d18544286328c75cb
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 5 05:37:46 2018 +0000
+commit e0e8bee8024fa9e31974244d14f03d799e5c0775
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 26 00:53:31 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: more ssh-agent refactoring
- Add a couple of non-negativity checks to avoid close(-1).
+ Allow confirm_key() to accept an additional reason suffix
- ok djm
+ Factor publickey userauth parsing out into its own function and allow
+ it to optionally return things it parsed out of the message to its
+ caller.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4701ce0b37161c891c838d0931305f1d37a50880
+ feedback/ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29006515617d1aa2d8b85cd2bf667e849146477e
-commit 5069320be93c8b2a6584b9f944c86f60c2b04e48
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 5 05:36:49 2018 +0000
+commit dfe18a295542c169ffde8533b3d7fe42088e2de7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 26 00:51:30 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make struct hostkeys public; I have no idea why I made it
- The file descriptors for socket, stdin, stdout and stderr
- aren't necessarily distinct, so check if they are the same to avoid closing
- the same fd several times.
+ opaque originally.
- ok djm
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d71fd22e9a32f5639d4ba6e25a2f417fc36ac1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e50780b34d4bbe628d69b2405b024dd749d982f3
-commit 2b428f90ea1b21d7a7c68ec1ee334253b3f9324d
+commit 3b44f2513cae89c920e8fe927b9bc910a1c8c65a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 5 04:02:53 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 26 00:49:30 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: move check_host_cert() from sshconnect,c to sshkey.c and
+
+ refactor it to make it more generally usable and testable.
- I accidentially a word
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4547ee713fa941da861e83ae7a3e6432f915e14a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 536f489f5ff38808c1fa711ba58d4579b636f9e4
-commit 130283d5c2545ff017c2162dc1258c5354e29399
+commit 1fe16fd61bb53944ec510882acc0491abd66ff76
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 25 03:34:43 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 26 00:47:47 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: use recallocarray to allocate the agent sockets table;
- certificate options are case-sensitive; fix case on one
- that had it wrong.
+ also clear socket entries that are being marked as unused.
- move a badly-place sentence to a less bad place
+ spinkle in some debug2() spam to make it easier to watch an agent
+ do its thing.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 231e516bba860699a1eece6d48532d825f5f747b
-
-commit 89f09ee68730337015bf0c3f138504494a34e9a6
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 24 12:20:44 2018 +1100
-
- crypto_api.h needs includes.h
+ ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74582c8e82e96afea46f6c7b6813a429cbc75922
-commit c9c1bba06ad1c7cad8548549a68c071bd807af60
-Author: stsp@openbsd.org <stsp@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 20:00:58 2018 +0000
+commit cb7b22ea20a01332c81c0ddcb3555ad50de9cce2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 26 00:46:17 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: factor out common code in the agent client
+
+ Add a ssh_request_reply_decode() function that sends a message to
+ the agent, reads and parses a success/failure reply.
+ Use it for all requests that only expect success/failure
- Fix a logic bug in sshd_exchange_identification which
- prevented clients using major protocol version 2 from connecting to the
- server. ok millert@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8668dec04586e27f1c0eb039ef1feb93d80a5ee9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0c1f4d5e6cfa525d62581e2b8de93be0cb85adb
-commit a60c5dcfa2538ffc94dc5b5adb3db5b6ed905bdb
-Author: stsp@openbsd.org <stsp@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 18:33:49 2018 +0000
+commit d1e578afe7cd48140ad6e92a453f9b035363fd7f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 25 06:00:17 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make ssh hostbased authentication send the signature
- Add missing braces; fixes 'write: Socket is not
- connected' error in ssh. ok deraadt@
+ algorithm in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets instead of the key type.
+ This make HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is supposed to - filter on
+ signature algorithm and not key type.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db73a3a9e147722d410866cac34d43ed52e1ad24
-
-commit 20d53ac283e1c60245ea464bdedd015ed9b38f4a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 16:49:43 2018 +1100
-
- rebuild depends
+ spotted with dtucker@ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25bffe19f0326972f5728170f7da81d5f45c78c6
-commit 552ea155be44f9c439c1f9f0c38f9e593428f838
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 16:49:22 2018 +1100
+commit 95eca1e195a3b41baa1a725c2c5af8a09d885e4b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jan 23 18:26:05 2021 +1100
- one SSH_BUG_BANNER instance that got away
+ ifdef new instance of sin6_scope_id
+
+ Put inside HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID similar to
+ existing instance. Should fix error on UnixWare 7.
-commit 14b5c635d1190633b23ac3372379517fb645b0c2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:27:21 2018 +0000
+commit 6ffdcdda128045226dda7fbb3956407978028a1e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 18 11:43:34 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Drop compatibility hacks for some ancient SSH
- implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
+ upstream: Fix long->int for convtime tests here too. Spotted by
- These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
- final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
- compliant SSH implementations.
+ tobhe@.
- ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be81c67db57647f907f4e881fb9341448606138
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a87094f5863312d00938afba771d25f788c849d0
-commit 7c77991f5de5d8475cbeb7cbb06d0c7d1611d7bb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:17:04 2018 +0000
+commit b55b7565f15327d82ad7acbddafa90b658c5f0af
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 22 02:46:40 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes->PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
- try harder to preserve errno during
- ssh_connect_direct() to make the final error message possibly accurate;
- bz#2814, ok dtucker@
+ here too.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57de882cb47381c319b04499fef845dd0c2b46ca
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b64a640f8ce8c21d9314da9df7ce2420eefde3a
-commit 9e9c4a7e57b96ab29fe6d7545ed09d2e5bddbdec
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:12:12 2018 +0000
+commit ee9c0da8035b3168e8e57c1dedc2d1b0daf00eec
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 22 02:44:58 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Rename PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to
- unbreak support for clients that advertise a protocol
- version of "1.99" (indicating both v2 and v1 support). Busted by me during
- SSHv1 purge in r1.358; bz2810, ok dtucker
+ PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. While the two were originally equivalent, this
+ actually specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. Some key
+ types (eg RSA) can be used by multiple algorithms (eg ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-512)
+ so the old name is becoming increasingly misleading. The old name is
+ retained as an alias. Prompted by bz#3253, help & ok djm@, man page help jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8f9c2bee11afc16c872bb79d6abe9c555bd0e4b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0346b2f73f54c43d4e001089759d149bfe402ca5
-commit fc21ea97968264ad9bb86b13fedaaec8fd3bf97d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:06:25 2018 +0000
+commit a8e798feabe36d02de292bcfd274712cae1d8d17
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 15 02:58:11 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Change types in convtime() unit test to int to match change
- don't attempt to force hostnames that are addresses to
- lowercase, but instead canonicalise them through getnameinfo/getaddrinfo to
- remove ambiguities (e.g. ::0001 => ::1) before they are matched against
- known_hosts; bz#2763, ok dtucker@
+ its new type. Add tests for boundary conditions and fix convtime to work up
+ to INT_MAX. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba0863ff087e61e5c65efdbe53be3cb92c9aefa0
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ba2b81e9a3257fff204b020affe85b604a44f97e
-commit d6364f6fb1a3d753d7ca9bf15b2adce961324513
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:01:15 2018 +0000
+commit 9bde1a420626da5007bf7ab499fa2159b9eddf72
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 15 04:31:25 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Make output buffer larger to prevent potential truncation
- avoid modifying pw->pw_passwd; let endpwent() clean up
- for us, but keep a scrubbed copy; bz2777, ok dtucker@
+ warnings from compilers not smart enough to know the strftime calls won't
+ ever fully fill "to" and "from". ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 715afc0f59c6b82c4929a73279199ed241ce0752
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83733f1b01b82da88b9dd1769475952aff10bdd7
-commit a69bbb07cd6fb4dfb9bdcacd370ab26d0a2b4215
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 13 00:24:09 2018 +0000
+commit 02da325f10b214219eae2bb1bc2d3bf0c2f13f9f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 15 02:58:11 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Change types in convtime() unit test to int to match
- clarify authorship; prodded by and ok markus@
+ change its new type. Add tests for boundary conditions and fix convtime to
+ work up to INT_MAX. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1938eee58c89b064befdabe232835fa83bb378c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dc0475f1484ac2f47facdfcf9221f9472145de
-commit 04214b30be3d3e73a01584db4e040d5ccbaaddd4
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:37:21 2018 +0000
+commit 5339ab369c225b40bc64d5ec3374f5c91b3ad609
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 15 02:32:41 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: In waitfd(), when poll returns early we are subtracting
- group shared source files (e.g. SRCS_KEX) and allow
- compilation w/o OPENSSL ok djm@
+ the elapsed time from the timeout each loop, so we only want to measure the
+ elapsed time the poll() in that loop, not since the start of the function.
+ Spotted by chris.xj.zhu at gmail.com, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 199df060978ee9aa89b8041a3dfaf1bf7ae8dd7a
-commit 25cf9105b849932fc3b141590c009e704f2eeba6
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:21:49 2018 +0000
+commit a164862dfa863b54b7897f66e1dd75437f086c11
+Author: rob@openbsd.org <rob@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 14 19:45:06 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Minor grammatical correction.
- move subprocess() so scp/sftp do not need uidswap.o; ok
- djm@
+ OK jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6601b8360388542c2e5fef0f4085f8e54750bea8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de0fad0581e212b2750751e479b79c18ff8cac02
-commit b0d34132b3ca26fe94013f01d7b92101e70b68bb
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:18:46 2018 +0000
+commit 8635e7df7e3a3fbb4a4f6cd5a7202883b2506087
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jan 13 18:00:57 2021 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- switch ssh-pkcs11-helper to new API; ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0c0ed2a568e25b1d2024f3e630f3fea837c2a42
+ Merge Mac OS X targets into a single config.
-commit ec4a9831184c0c6ed5f7f0cfff01ede5455465a3
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:15:36 2018 +0000
+commit ac112ade990585c511048ed4edaf2d9fc92b61f0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 12 19:22:47 2021 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- split client/server kex; only ssh-keygen needs
- uuencode.o; only scp/sftp use progressmeter.o; ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee
+ Add Mac OS X test targets.
-commit ec77efeea06ac62ee1d76fe0b3225f3000775a9e
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:15:17 2018 +0000
+commit 1050109b4b2884bf50fd1b3aa084c7fd0a42ae90
+Author: anatasluo <luolongjuna@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 11 13:51:39 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ Remove duplicated declaration in fatal.c .
+
+commit 7d0f8a3369579dfe398536eb4e3da7bc15da9599
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 11 04:48:22 2021 +0000
+
+ upstream: Correct spelling of persourcenetblocksize in config-dump
- only ssh-keygen needs uuencode.o; only scp/sftp use
- progressmeter.o
+ mode.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecdc49e2b6bde6b6b0e52163d621831f6ac7b13d
-commit 25aae35d3d6ee86a8c4c0b1896acafc1eab30172
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:14:44 2018 +0000
+commit ba328bd7a6774f30daaf90b83f1933cc4afc866c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 9 12:31:46 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- uuencode.h is not used
+ upstream: Adjust kexfuzz to addr.c/addrmatch.c split.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 238eb4659f3c119904326b9e94a5e507a912796c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1d8d23bb548078020be2fb52c4c643efb190f0eb
-commit 4f29309c4cb19bcb1774931db84cacc414f17d29
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 3 19:50:43 2018 +1100
+commit b08ef25552443e94c0857d5e3806dd019ccc55d7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 9 12:24:30 2021 +0000
- unbreak fuzz harness
+ upstream: Update unittests for addr.c/addrmatch.c split.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: de2b415fb7af084a91c6ef147a90482d8f771eef
-commit f6b50bf84dc0b61f22c887c00423e0ea7644e844
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 05:46:35 2017 +0000
+commit 6d30673fedec2d251f4962c526fd0451f70c4d97
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 11 02:12:57 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Change convtime() from returning long to returning int.
- another libssh casualty
+ On platforms where sizeof(int) != sizeof(long), convtime could accept values
+ >MAX_INT which subsequently truncate when stored in an int during config
+ parsing. bz#3250, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 839b970560246de23e7c50215095fb527a5a83ec
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8fc932683d6b4660d52f50911d62bd6639c5db31
-commit 5fb4fb5a0158318fb8ed7dbb32f3869bbf221f13
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 03:01:49 2017 +0000
+commit 7a57adb8b07b2ad0aead4b2e09ee18edc04d0481
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 9 12:51:12 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- missed one (unbreak after ssh/lib removal)
+ upstream: add a comma to previous;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cfdd132143131769e2d2455e7892b5d55854c322
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9139433701c0aa86a0d3a6c7afe10d1c9c2e0869
-commit e6c4134165d05447009437a96e7201276688807f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 00:41:22 2017 +0000
+commit 3a923129534b007c2e24176a8655dec74eca9c46
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 9 12:10:02 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize
- unbreak unit tests after removal of src/usr.bin/ssh/lib
+ options which provide more fine grained MaxStartups limits. Man page help
+ jmc@, feedback & ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3a79760494147b20761cbd2bd5c20e86c63dc8f9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2f68664e3d02c0895b35aa751c48a2af622047b
-commit d45d69f2a937cea215c7f0424e5a4677b6d8c7fe
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 00:00:28 2017 +0000
+commit d9a2bc71693ea27461a78110005d5a2d8b0c6a50
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 9 11:58:50 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Move address handling functions out into their own file
- revert stricter key type / signature type checking in
- userauth path; too much software generates inconsistent messages, so we need
- a better plan.
+ in order to reuse them for per-source maxstartups limiting. Supplement with
+ some additional functions from djm's flowtools that we'll also need. ok djm@
+ (as part of a larger diff).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a44ddc991c803c4ecc8f1ad40e0ab4d22e1c519
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3e7d9ccc6c9b82e25cfef0ec83598e8e2327cbf
+
+commit b744914fcb76d70761f1b667de95841b3fc80a56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jan 9 00:36:05 2021 +1100
-commit c5a6cbdb79752f7e761074abdb487953ea6db671
+ Add test against Graphene hardened malloc.
+
+commit 6cb52d5bf771f6769b630fce35a8e9b8e433044f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 19 00:49:30 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 8 04:49:13 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make CheckHostIP default to 'no'. It doesn't provide any
- explicitly test all key types and their certificate
- counterparts
+ perceptible value and makes it much harder for hosts to change host keys,
+ particularly ones that use IP-based load-balancing.
- refactor a little
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e9ecd5580821b9ef8b7106919c6980d8e45ca8c4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0db98413e82074f78c7d46784b1286d08aee78f0
-commit f689adb7a370b5572612d88be9837ca9aea75447
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 11:41:56 2017 +0000
+commit 309b642e1442961b5e57701f095bcd4acd2bfb5f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 8 15:50:41 2021 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- use cmp in a loop instead of diff -N to compare
- directories. The former works on more platforms for Portable.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c3aa72807f9c488e8829a26ae50fe5bcc5b57099
+ Run tests with sudo for better coverage.
-commit 748dd8e5de332b24c40f4b3bbedb902acb048c98
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 19 16:17:59 2017 +1100
+commit c336644351fa3c715a08b7a292e309e72792e71e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 8 14:26:32 2021 +1100
- remove blocks.c from Makefile
+ Add Ubuntu 16.04 and 20.04 test targets.
-commit 278856320520e851063b06cef6ef1c60d4c5d652
+commit 4c7af01f9dcc1606dec033e7665a042cb0d8ec52
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 19 00:24:34 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 8 02:57:24 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: If a signature operation on a FIDO key fails with a
- include signature type and CA key (if applicable) in some
- debug messages
+ "incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the user, then
+ request a PIN and retry the operation.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b71615cc20e78cec7105bb6e940c03ce9ae414a5
-
-commit 7860731ef190b52119fa480f8064ab03c44a120a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 23:16:23 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ This smoothes over a few corner cases including FIDO devices that
+ require PINs for all hosted credentials, biometric FIDO devices that
+ fall back to requiring PIN when reading the biometric failed, devices
+ that don't implement reading credProtect status for downloaded keys
+ and probably a few more cases that I haven't though of yet.
- unbreak hostkey rotation; attempting to sign with a
- desired signature algorithm of kex->hostkey_alg is incorrect when the key
- type isn't capable of making those signatures. ok markus@
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ae46864e1f5859831ec0d115ee5ea50953a906
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 176db8518933d6a5bbf81a2e3cf62447158dc878
-commit 966ef478339ad5e631fb684d2a8effe846ce3fd4
+commit 64ddd0fe68c4a7acf99b78624f8af45e919cd317
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 23:14:34 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 8 02:44:14 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: don't try to use timespeccmp(3) directly as a qsort(3)
- log mismatched RSA signature types; ok markus@
+ comparison function - it returns 0/1 and not the -1/0/1 that qsort expectes.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 381bddfcc1e297a42292222f3bcb5ac2b7ea2418
-
-commit 349ecd4da3a985359694a74635748009be6baca6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 23:13:42 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ fixes sftp "ls -ltr" under some circumstances.
- pass kex->hostkey_alg and kex->hostkey_nid from pre-auth
- to post-auth unpriviledged child processes; ok markus@
+ Based on patch by Masahiro Matsuya via bz3248.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a35bc7af0a5f8a232d1361f79f4ebc376137302
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65b5e9f18bb0d10573868c3516de6e5170adb163
-commit c9e37a8725c083441dd34a8a53768aa45c3c53fe
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 17:28:54 2017 +0000
+commit 599df78f3008cf78af21f8977be3e1dd085f8e2e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 8 02:33:13 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Update the sntrup761 creation script and generated code:
- Add helper function for uri handing in scp where a
- missing path simply means ".". Also fix exit code and add warnings when an
- invalid uri is encountered. OK otto@
+ - remove unneeded header files and typedefs and rely on crypto_api.h - add
+ defines to map types used to the crypto_api ones instead of typedefs. This
+ prevents typedef name collisions in -portable. - remove CRYPTO_NAMESPACE
+ entirely instead of making it a no-op - delete unused functions and make the
+ remaining ones that aren't exported static.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47dcf872380586dabf7fcc6e7baf5f8ad508ae1a
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b9d0cf3acd5a3c1091da8afe00c904d38cf5783
-commit 04c7e28f83062dc42f2380d1bb3a6bf0190852c0
+commit 16448ff529affda7e2a15ee7c3200793abde0759
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 02:25:15 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 8 02:19:24 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: mention that DisableForwarding is valid in a sshd_config
- pass negotiated signing algorithm though to
- sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in
- the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
+ Match block reported by Fredrik Eriksson in bz3239
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a71c3d84b597f5e43e4b40d5232797daf0993f6
-commit 931c78dfd7fe30669681a59e536bbe66535f3ee9
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 02:22:29 2017 +0000
+commit 91bac5e95b1b0debf9b2b4f05c20dcfa96b368b9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 4 21:58:58 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: estructure sntrup761.sh to process all files in a single
- sshkey_sigtype() function to return the type of a
- signature; ok markus@
+ list, which will make it easier to reorder. Re-inline int32_MINMAX. ok
+ tobhe@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3772b065ad6eed97285589bfb544befed9032e8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d145c6c19b08bb93c9e14bfaa7af589d90f144c0
-commit 4cdc5956f2fcc9e9078938db833142dc07d8f523
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 14 21:07:39 2017 +0000
+commit 4d96a3ebab2224f17e639a15078e03be1ad3736d
+Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 3 18:05:21 2021 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Prevent redefinition of `crypto_int32' error with gcc3.
- Replace ED25519's private SHA-512 implementation with a
- call to the regular digest code. This speeds up compilation considerably. ok
- markus@
+ Fixes compilation on luna88k.
+
+ Feedback millert@
+ Found by and ok aoyama@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fcce8c3bcfe7389462a28228f63c823e80ade41c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f305ddfe575a26cc53431af3fde3f4aeebed9ba6
-commit 012e5cb839faf76549e3b6101b192fe1a74d367e
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 12 15:06:12 2017 +0000
+commit a23954eeb930ccc8a66a2710153730769dba31b6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 1 22:00:49 2021 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Create a persistent umac128.c source file: #define the
- output size and the name of the entry points for UMAC-128 before including
- umac.c. Idea from FreeBSD. ok dtucker@
+ Undef int32 after sort routines.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 463cfacfa07cb8060a4d4961e63dca307bf3f4b1
+ This prevents typedef'ing crypto_int32 twice, in sntrup761.c and
+ crypto_api.h, which some compilers (at least some GCCs) don't accept.
-commit b35addfb4cd3b5cdb56a2a489d38e940ada926c7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 16:23:28 2017 +1100
+commit 148b8a661c3f93e4b6d049ee902de3d521261fbc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 31 12:47:22 2020 +1100
- Update .depend with empty config.h
+ fix: missing pieces of previous commit
-commit 2d96f28246938e0ca474a939d8ac82ecd0de27e3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 16:21:55 2017 +1100
+commit 3d999be7b987c848feda718cfcfcdc005ddf670d
+Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 30 14:13:28 2020 +0000
- Ensure config.h is always in dependencies.
+ upstream: Use int64_t for intermediate values in int32_MINMAX to
- Put an empty config.h into the dependency list to ensure that it's
- always listed and consistent.
-
-commit ac4987a55ee5d4dcc8e87f7ae7c1f87be7257d71
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 10 19:37:57 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ prevent signed 32-bit integer overflow.
- ssh/lib hasn't worked towards our code-sharing goals for
- a quit while, perhaps it is too verbose? Change each */Makefile to
- specifying exactly what sources that program requires, compiling it seperate.
- Maybe we'll iterate by sorting those into seperatable chunks, splitting up
- files which contain common code + server/client specific code, or whatnot.
- But this isn't one step, or we'd have done it a long time ago.. ok dtucker
- markus djm
+ Found by and ok djm@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f0704768e34cf45fdd792bac4011c6971881bb3
-commit 48c23a39a8f1069a57264dd826f6c90aa12778d5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 10 05:55:29 2017 +0000
+commit 5c1953bf98732da5a76c706714ac066dbfa015ac
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 29 12:40:54 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Put remote client info back into the ClientAlive
- connection termination message. Based in part on diff from lars.nooden at
- gmail, ok djm
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80a0f619a29bbf2f32eb5297a69978a0e05d0ee0
+ adapt KEX fuzzer to PQ kex change
-commit aabd75ec76575c1b17232e6526a644097cd798e5
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 8 03:45:52 2017 +0000
+commit 659864fe81dbc57eeed3769c462679d83e026640
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 29 01:02:15 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Adapt to replacement of
- time_t printing needs %lld and (long long) casts ok djm
+ sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org with
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a93bc2b0d42a39b8f8de8bb74d07ad2e5e83ef7
+ Also test sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com in unittests/kex
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cfa3506b2b077a9cac1877fb521efd2641b6030c
-commit fd4eeeec16537870bd40d04836c7906ec141c17d
+commit 2c71cec020219d69df84055c59eba5799a1233ec
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 8 02:14:33 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 29 00:59:15 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Update/replace the experimental post-quantim hybrid key
- fix ordering in previous to ensure errno isn't clobbered
- before logging.
+ exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime (coupled with X25519).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e260bc1e145a9690dcb0d5aa9460c7b96a0c8ab2
-
-commit 155072fdb0d938015df828836beb2f18a294ab8a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 8 02:13:02 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org method is
+ replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com. Per the authors,
+ sntrup4591761 was replaced almost two years ago by sntrup761.
+
+ The sntrup761 implementaion, like sntrup4591761 before it, is public
+ domain code extracted from the SUPERCOP cryptography benchmark
+ suite (https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html).
+
+ Thanks for Daniel J Bernstein for guidance on algorithm selection.
+ Patch from Tobias Heider; feedback & ok markus@ and myself
- for some reason unix_listener() logged most errors twice
- with each message containing only some of the useful information; merge these
+ (note this both the updated method and the one that it replaced are
+ disabled by default)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1978a7594a9470c0dddcd719586066311b7c9a4a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf582b772d81ee24e911bb6f4b2aecfd39338ae
-commit 79c0e1d29959304e5a49af1dbc58b144628c09f3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 14:38:33 2017 +1100
+commit 09d070ccc3574ae0d7947d212ed53c7268ef7e1f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 07:40:26 2020 +0000
- Add autogenerated dependency info to Makefile.
+ upstream: tweak the description of KnownHostsCommand in ssh_conf.5,
- Adds a .depend file containing dependency information generated by
- makedepend, which is appended to the generated Makefile by configure.
+ and add entries for it to the -O list in scp.1 and sftp.1;
- You can regen the file with "make -f Makefile.in depend" if necessary,
- but we'll be looking at some way to automatically keep this up to date.
+ ok djm
- "no objection" djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba31ebea03f38f8d218857f7ce16a500c3e4aff
-commit f001de8fbf7f3faddddd8efd03df18e57601f7eb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 13:42:51 2017 +1100
+commit 931c93389a80e32272712459b1102d303844453d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 19:43:55 2020 +1100
- Fix pasto in ldns handling.
-
- When ldns-config is not found, configure would check the wrong variable.
- ok djm@
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+commit 397b1c4d393f97427283a4717e9015a2bd31b8a5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 19:42:37 2020 +1100
+
+ whitespace at EOL
+
+commit 33fa3ac547e5349ca34681cce6727b2f933dff0a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 19:21:26 2020 +1100
-commit c5bfe83f67cb64e71cf2fe0d1500f6904b0099ee
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Sat Dec 9 10:12:23 2017 +1100
+ Improve AIX text.
- Portable switched to git so s/CVS/git/.
+commit 0f2e21c9dca89598b694932b5b05848380a23ec0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 18:56:54 2020 +1100
+
+ Include stdio.h for FILE in misc.h.
+
+ Fixes build on at least OpenBSD.
-commit bb82e61a40a4ee52e4eb904caaee2c27b763ab5b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Sat Dec 9 08:06:00 2017 +1100
+commit 3e9811e57b57ee66b0f70d99d7258da3153b0e8a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 18:31:50 2020 +1100
- Remove now-used check for perl.
+ ensure $LOGNAME is set in tests
-commit e0ce54c0b9ca3a9388f9c50f4fa6cc25c28a3240
+commit 3eb647cbb34d87a063aa7714256c6e56103fffda
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Dec 6 05:06:21 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 22 06:47:24 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: more detail for failing tests
- don't accept junk after "yes" or "no" responses to
- hostkey prompts. bz#2803 reported by Maksim Derbasov; ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c68c0e5a521cad7e7f68e54c54ebf86d6c10ee1d
+
+commit 2873f19570d4d8758be24dbf78332be9a779009b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 06:03:36 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: regress test for KnownHostsCommand
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1b159fb2253be973ce25eb7a7be26e6f967717c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ffc77464320b6dabdcfa0a72e0df02659233a38a
-commit 609d96b3d58475a15b2eb6b3d463f2c5d8e510c0
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 5 23:59:47 2017 +0000
+commit 0121aa87bab9ad2365de2d07f2832b56d5ff9871
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 03:05:31 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Remove lines accidentally left behind in the ProxyJump
+
+ parsing fix r1.345.
- Replace atoi and strtol conversions for integer arguments
- to config keywords with a checking wrapper around strtonum. This will
- prevent and flag invalid and negative arguments to these keywords. ok djm@
+ ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99ae3981f3d608a219ccb8d2fff635ae52c17998
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe767c108c8117bea33767b080ff62eef2c55f5c
-commit 168ecec13f9d7cb80c07df3bf7d414f4e4165e84
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 5 23:56:07 2017 +0000
+commit da4bf0db942b5f0278f33238b86235e5813d7a5a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 22 00:15:22 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand that allows the client
- Add missing break for rdomain. Prevents spurious
- "Deprecated option" warnings. ok djm@
+ to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to the usual files.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba28a675d39bb04a974586241c3cba71a9c6099a
+ The command accepts bunch of %-expansions, including details of the
+ connection and the offered server host key. Note that the command may
+ be invoked up to three times per connection (see the manpage for
+ details).
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2433cff4fb323918ae968da6ff38feb99b4d33d0
-commit 927f8514ceffb1af380a5f63ab4d3f7709b1b198
+commit a34e14a5a0071de2036826a00197ce38c8b4ba8b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 5 01:30:19 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 22 00:12:22 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: move subprocess() from auth.c to misc.c
- include the addr:port in bind/listen failure messages
+ make privilege dropping optional but allow it via callbacks (to avoid
+ need to link uidswap.c everywhere)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fdadb69fe1b38692608809cf0376b71c2c28e58e
+ add some other flags (keep environment, disable strict path safety check)
+ that make this more useful for client-side use.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80ea9fdcc156f1a18e9c166122c759fae1637bf
-commit a8c89499543e2d889629c4e5e8dcf47a655cf889
+commit 649205fe388b56acb3481a1b2461f6b5b7c6efa6
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 29 05:49:54 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 21 22:48:41 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Remove explicit rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se test since the
- Import updated moduli.
+ cipher was removed.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 524d210f982af6007aa936ca7f4c977f4d32f38a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: aa93cddb4ecd9bc21446a79008a1a53050e64f17
-commit 3dde09ab38c8e1cfc28252be473541a81bc57097
+commit 03e93c753d7c223063ad8acaf9a30aa511e5f931
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 28 21:10:22 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 21 11:09:32 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Remove the pre-standardization cipher
- Have sftp print a warning about shell cleanliness when
- decoding the first packet fails, which is usually caused by shells polluting
- stdout of non-interactive starups. bz#2800, ok markus@ deraadt@.
+ rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc which was
+ standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and disabled by default
+ since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly documented in ssh.1 in 2001.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 88d6a9bf3470f9324b76ba1cbd53e50120f685b5
-
-commit 6c8a246437f612ada8541076be2414846d767319
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 1 17:11:47 2017 +1100
-
- Replace mkinstalldirs with mkdir -p.
+ This will reduce the amount of work the cipher/kex regression tests need
+ to do by a little bit. ok markus@ djm@
- Check for MIKDIR_P and use it instead of mkinstalldirs. Should fix "mkdir:
- cannot create directory:... File exists" during "make install".
- Patch from eb at emlix.com.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb460acc18290a998fd70910b19c29b4e4f199ad
-commit 3058dd78d2e43ed0f82ad8eab8bb04b043a72023
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 1 17:07:08 2017 +1100
+commit a11ca015879eab941add8c6bdaaec7d41107c6f5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 21 09:19:53 2020 +0000
- Pull in newer install-sh from autoconf-2.69.
+ upstream: properly fix ProxyJump parsing; Thanks to tb@ for
+
+ pointing out my error (parse_ssh_uri() can return -1/0/1, that I missed).
+ Reported by Raf Czlonka via bugs@
- Suggested by eb at emlix.com
+ ok tb@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a2991a3794bcaf1ca2b025212cce11cdb5f6b7d6
-commit 79226e5413c5b0fda3511351a8511ff457e306d8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 1 16:55:35 2017 +1100
+commit d97fb879724f1670bf55d9adfea7278a93c33ae2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 21 01:31:06 2020 +0000
- Remove RSA1 host key generation.
+ upstream: adapt to API change in hostkeys_foreach()/load_hostkeys()
- SSH1 support is now gone, remove SSH1 key generation.
- Patch from eb at emlix.com.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dcb468514f32da49a446372453497dc6eeafdbf3
-commit 2937dd02c572a12f33d5c334d518f6cbe0b645eb
+commit bf7eb3c266b7fd4ddda108fcf72b860af2af6406
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 28 06:09:38 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 16 14:02:24 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: few more things needs match.c and addrmatch.c now that
- more whitespace errors
+ log.c calls match_pattern_list()
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e11c125378327b648940b90145e0d98beb05abb
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f7c95c76b150d0aeb00a67858b9579b7d1b2db74
+
+commit 2c64f24e27a5e72a7f59e515fc4f4985355237ae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Dec 21 14:02:56 2020 +1100
-commit 7f257bf3fd3a759f31098960cbbd1453fafc4164
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 28 06:04:51 2017 +0000
+ Pull in missing rev 1.2.
- upstream commit
+commit 0f504f592d15d8047e466eb7453067a6880992a8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 20 23:40:19 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: plumb ssh_conn_info through to sshconnect.c; feedback/ok
- whitespace at EOL
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76d3965202b22d59c2784a8df3a8bfa5ee67b96a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8d14a09cda3f1dc55df08f8a4889beff74e68b0
-commit 5db6fbf1438b108e5df3e79a1b4de544373bc2d4
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 25 06:46:22 2017 +0000
+commit 729b05f59ded35483acef90a6f88aa03eae33b29
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 20 23:38:00 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: allow UserKnownHostsFile=none; feedback and ok markus@
- Add monotime_ts and monotime_tv that return monotonic
- timespec and timeval respectively. Replace calls to gettimeofday() in packet
- timing with monotime_tv so that the callers will work over a clock step.
- Should prevent integer overflow during clock steps reported by wangle6 at
- huawei.com. "I like" markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74d684264814ff806f197948b87aa732cb1b0b8a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c46d515eac94a35a1d50d5fd71c4b1ca53334b48
-commit 2d638e986085bdf1a40310ed6e2307463db96ea0
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 25 05:58:47 2017 +0000
+commit b4c7cd1185c5dc0593d47eafcc1a34fda569dd1d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 20 23:36:51 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: load_hostkeys()/hostkeys_foreach() variants for FILE*
+
+ Add load_hostkeys_file() and hostkeys_foreach_file() that accept a
+ FILE* argument instead of opening the file directly.
- Remove get_current_time() and replace with calls to
- monotime_double() which uses CLOCK_MONOTONIC and works over clock steps. "I
- like" markus@
+ Original load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() are implemented using
+ these new interfaces.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad2f7d2414e2cfcaef99877a7a5b0baf2242952
+ Add a u_int note field to the hostkey_entry and hostkey_foreach_line
+ structs that is passed directly from the load_hostkeys() and
+ hostkeys_foreach() call. This is a lightweight way to annotate results
+ between different invocations of load_hostkeys().
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ff6db13ec9ee4edfa658b2c38baad0f505d8c20
-commit ba460acae48a36ef749cb23068f968f4d5d90a24
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Nov 24 16:24:31 2017 +1100
+commit 06fbb386bed666581095cb9cbc7a900e02bfe1b7
+Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 19 22:09:21 2020 +0000
- Include string.h for explicit_bzero.
+ upstream: Print client kem key with correct length.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91689e14a4fc6c270e265a32d1c8faba63a45755
-commit a65655fb1a12b77fb22f9e71559b9d73030ec8ff
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 24 10:23:47 2017 +1100
+commit 0ebead6593e2441e4af2735bbe2cd097607cd0d3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 17 23:28:50 2020 +0000
- fix incorrect range of OpenSSL versions supported
+ upstream: fix possible error("%s", NULL) on error paths
- Pointed out by Solar Designer
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b3833c2cb985453ecca1d76803ebb8f3b736a11
-commit 83a1e5dbec52d05775174f368e0c44b08619a308
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 15 02:10:16 2017 +0000
+commit d060bc7f6e6244f001e658208f53e3e2ecbbd382
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 17 23:26:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: refactor client percent_expand() argument passing;
- downgrade a couple more request parsing errors from
- process-fatal to just returning failure, making them consistent with the
- others that were already like that.
+ consolidate the common arguments into a single struct and pass that around
+ instead of using a bunch of globals. ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c111461f7a626690a2d53018ef26557b34652918
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 035e6d7ca9145ad504f6af5a021943f1958cd19b
-commit 93c68a8f3da8e5e6acdc3396f54d73919165e242
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 15 00:13:40 2017 +0000
+commit 43026da035cd266db37df1f723d5575056150744
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 17 23:10:27 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: prepare readconf.c for fuzzing; remove fatal calls and
- fix regression in 7.6: failure to parse a signature request
- message shouldn't be fatal to the process, just the request. Reported by Ron
- Frederick
+ fix some (one-off) memory leaks; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5d01b3819caa1a2ad51fc57d6ded43f48bbcc05
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91c6aec57b0e7aae9190de188e9fe8933aad5ec5
-commit 548d3a66feb64c405733932a6b1abeaf7198fa71
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 14 00:45:29 2017 +0000
+commit bef92346c4a808f33216e54d6f4948f9df2ad7c1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 14 03:13:12 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- fix problem in configuration parsing when in config dump mode
- (sshd -T) without providing a full connection specification (sshd -T -C ...)
+ upstream: use _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR instead of hardcoded .ssh in path
- spotted by bluhm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7125faf5740eaa9d3a2f25400a0bc85e94e28b8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c1048468813107baa872f5ee33ba51623630e01
-commit 33edb6ebdc2f81ebed1bceadacdfb8910b64fb88
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 05:18:44 2017 +0000
+commit a5ab499bd2644b4026596fc2cb24a744fa310666
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 14:01:27 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- reuse parse_multistate for parse_flag (yes/no arguments).
- Saves a few lines of code and makes the parser more consistent wrt case-
- sensitivity. bz#2664 ok dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2ad1b6086858d5db71c7b11e5a74dba6d60efef
+ basic KEX fuzzer; adapted from Markus' unittest
-commit d52131a98316e76c0caa348f09bf6f7b9b01a1b9
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 05:14:04 2017 +0000
+commit 021ff33e383c77b11badd60cec5b141a3e3fa532
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 13:57:43 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- allow certificate validity intervals that specify only a
- start or stop time (we already support specifying both or neither)
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9be486545603c003030bdb5c467d1318b46b4e42
+ use options that work with recent clang
-commit fbe8e7ac94c2fa380421a9205a8bc966549c2f91
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 03:46:52 2017 +0000
+commit e4d1a0b40add800b6e9352b40c2223e44acc3a45
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 02:41:10 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: shuffle a few utility functions into sftp-client.c; from
- allow "cd" and "lcd" commands with no explicit path
- argument. lcd will change to the local user's home directory as usual. cd
- will change to the starting directory for session (because the protocol
- offers no way to obtain the remote user's home directory). bz#2760 ok
- dtucker@
+ Jakub Jelen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15333f5087cee8c1ed1330cac1bd0a3e6a767393
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fdeb1aae1f6149b193f12cd2af158f948c514a2a
-commit 0208a48517b5e8e8b091f32fa4addcd67c31ca9e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 03:18:53 2017 +0000
+commit ace12dc64f8e3a2496ca48d36b53cb3c0a090755
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 02:29:56 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the
- attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an
- incomplete list of) all criteria. ok djm@, man page help jmc@
+ upstream: make ssh_free(NULL) a no-op
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4e773c4212d3dea486d0259ae977551aab2c1fc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42cb285d94789cefe6608db89c63040ab0a80fa0
-commit c357eed5a52cd2f4ff358b17e30e3f9a800644da
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 02:32:19 2017 +0000
+commit 3b98b6e27f8a122dbfda9966b1afeb3e371cce91
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 02:29:25 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: memleak of DH public bignum; found with libfuzzer
- typos in ECDSA certificate names; bz#2787 reported by
- Mike Gerow
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824938b6aba1b31321324ba1f56c05f84834b163
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e913b542c3764b100b1571fdb0d0e5cc086fe97
-commit ecbf005b8fd80b81d0c61dfc1e96fe3da6099395
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 02:29:17 2017 +0000
+commit 553b90feedd7da5b90901d73005f86705456d686
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 02:27:57 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Private keys in PEM format have been encrypted by AES-128 for
- a while (not 3DES). bz#2788 reported by Calum Mackay
+ upstream: fix minor memleak of kex->hostkey_alg on rekex
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd33da7acbbb3c882f0a0ee56007a35ce0d8a11a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3969c74966d4ccdfeff5e5f0df0791919aef50
-commit 81c9ccdbf6ddbf9bfbd6f1f775a5a7c13e47e185
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 14:52:51 2017 +1100
+commit ac0364b85e66eb53da2f9618f699ba6bd195ceea
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 02:27:08 2020 +0000
- Check for linux/if.h when enabling rdomain.
+ upstream: typos: s/hex/kex/ in error messages
- musl libc doesn't seem to have linux/if.h, so check for its presence
- before enabling rdomain support on Linux.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43a026c9571dd779ec148de1829cf5a6b6651905
-commit fa1b834cce41a1ce3e6a8d57fb67ef18c9dd803f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 14:09:45 2017 +1100
+commit ee22db7c5885a1d90219202c0695bc621aa0409b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 4 02:25:13 2020 +0000
- Add headers for sys/sysctl.h and net/route.h
+ upstream: make program name be const
- On at least older OpenBSDs, sys/sysctl.h and net/route.h require
- sys/types and, in the case of sys/sysctl.h, sys/param.h for MAXLOGNAME.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ece25680ec637fdf20502721ccb0276691df5384
-commit 41bff4da21fcd8a7c6a83a7e0f92b018f904f6fb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 02:22:41 2017 +0000
+commit 2bcbf679de838bb77a8bd7fa18e100df471a679c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 30 05:36:39 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Ignore comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config,
- avoid unused variable warnings for !WITH_OPENSSL; patch from
- Marcus Folkesson
+ similar to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320, with & ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c01d27a3f907acdc3dd4ea48170fac3ba236d229
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdbf9fc5bc72b1a14266f5f61723ed57307a6db4
-commit 6b373e4635a7470baa94253dd1dc8953663da9e8
-Author: Marcus Folkesson <marcus.folkesson@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat Oct 28 19:48:39 2017 +0200
+commit b755264e7d3cdf1de34e18df1af4efaa76a3c015
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 28 12:52:32 2020 +0000
- only enable functions in dh.c when openssl is used
+ upstream: Include cipher.h for declaration of cipher_by_name.
- Signed-off-by: Marcus Folkesson <marcus.folkesson@gmail.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ddfebbca03ca0e14e00bbad9d35f94b99655d032
-commit 939b30ba23848b572e15bf92f0f1a3d9cf3acc2b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 1 00:04:15 2017 +0000
+commit 022def7bd16c3426a95e25f57cb259d54468341c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 28 03:27:59 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: check result of strchr() against NULL rather than
- fix broken stdout in ControlPersist mode, introduced by me in
- r1.467 and reported by Alf Schlichting
+ searched-for characters; from zhongjubin@huawei.com
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3750a16e02108fc25f747e4ebcedb7123c1ef509
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6f57de1d4a4d25f8db2d44e8d58d847e247a4fe
-commit f21455a084f9cc3942cf1bde64055a4916849fed
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Oct 31 10:09:33 2017 +1100
+commit 57bf03f0217554afb8980f6697a7a0b88658d0a9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 27 10:12:30 2020 +0000
- Include includes.h for HAVE_GETPAGESIZE.
+ upstream: Document ssh-keygen -Z, sanity check its argument earlier and
- The configure script checks for getpagesize() and sets HAVE_GETPAGESIZE in
- config.h, but bsd-getpagesize.c forgot to include includes.h (which
- indirectly includes config.h) so the checks always fails, causing linker
- issues when linking statically on systems with getpagesize().
+ provide a better error message if it's not correct. Prompted by bz#2879, ok
+ djm@ jmc@
- Patch from Peter Korsgaard <peter at korsgaard.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 484178a173e92230fb1803fb4f206d61f7b58005
-commit f2ad63c0718b93ac1d1e85f53fee33b06eef86b5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 30 22:01:52 2017 +0000
+commit 33313ebc1c7135085676db62189e3520341d6b73
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 27 00:49:58 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Set the specified TOS/DSCP for interactive use prior to
- whitespace at EOL
+ TCP connect. The connection phase of the SSH session is time-sensitive (due
+ to server side login grace periods) and is frequently interactive (e.g.
+ entering passwords). The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after
+ authentication completes.
+
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f4b5df99b28c6f63478deb916c6ed0e794685f07
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f31ab10d9233363a6d2c9996007083ba43a093f1
-commit c6415b1f8f1d0c2735564371647fd6a177fb9a3e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 30 21:59:43 2017 +0000
+commit b2bcec13f17ce9174238a704e91d52203e916432
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 27 00:37:10 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: clean up passing of struct passwd from monitor to preauth
- whitespace at EOL
+ privsep process. No longer copy entire struct w/ pointer addresses, but pass
+ remaining scalar fields explicitly,
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 19b1394393deee4c8a2114a3b7d18189f27a15cd
+ Prompted by Yuichiro NAITO, feedback Thorsten Glaser; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9925df75a56732c43f3663e70dd15ff413ab3e53
-commit e4d4ddbbba0e585ca3ec3a455430750b4622a6d3
-Author: millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 20:08:36 2017 +0000
+commit 19af04e2231155d513e24fdc81fbec2217ae36a6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 22 22:38:26 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when loading PKCS#11 keys, include the key fingerprints
- Use printenv to test whether an SSH_USER_AUTH is set
- instead of using $SSH_USER_AUTH. The latter won't work with csh which treats
- unknown variables as an error when expanding them. OK markus@
+ and provider/slot information in debug output.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f601e878dd8b71aa40381573dde3a8f567e6f2d1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 969a089575d0166a9a364a9901bb6a8d9b8a1431
-commit 116b1b439413a724ebb3320633a64dd0f3ee1fe7
-Author: millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 24 19:33:32 2017 +0000
+commit 9b9465ea856e15b9e9890b4ecb4110d7106e7766
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 22 22:37:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when mentioning that the host key has changed, don't
- Add tests for URI parsing. OK markus@
+ report the type because it is ambiguous as to whether it referred to the
+ known or new host key. bz3216; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5d1df19874f3b916d1a2256a905526e17a98bd3b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d5ce4a83dbcf44e340a572e361decad8aab7bad
-commit dbe0662e9cd482593a4a8bf58c6481bfe8a747a4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 01:57:06 2017 +0000
+commit 637017a7dd3281d3f2df804993cc27c30dbfda47
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 25 17:38:46 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- whitespace at EOL
+ Use "=" not "==" in string test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c95549cf5a07d56ea11aaff818415118720214f6
+ POSIX says "=" is string comparison and some shells (eg HP-UX) will
+ complain about "==".
-commit d2135474344335a7c6ee643b6ade6db400fa76ee
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 01:01:17 2017 +0000
+commit 9880f3480f9768897f3b8e714d5317fb993bc5b3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 20 17:16:51 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- whitespace at EOL (lots)
+ Restore correct flags during localtime_r check.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 757257dd44116794ee1b5a45c6724973de181747
+ We were restoring the wrong thing CPPFLAGS (we used CFLAGS) for any
+ platform that doesn't have localtime_r.
-commit b77c29a07f5a02c7c1998701c73d92bde7ae1608
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 00:18:41 2017 +0000
+commit 41935882f4e82de60dbd6e033eabe79e1b963518
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 20 03:16:56 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: When doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a
- improve printing of rdomain on accept() a little
+ read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with write and
+ execute permissions in the interim so that we can actually complete the
+ transfer, then set the directory permission as the final step. (The execute
+ bit is only likely to be an issue with a non-POSIX server). bz#3222, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5da58db2243606899cedaa646c70201b2d12247a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a82606212f2796e31f0e1af94a63355a7ad5d903
-commit 68d3bbb2e6dfbf117c46e942142795b2cdd0274b
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 26 06:44:01 2017 +0000
+commit 0f90440ca70abab947acbd77795e9f130967956c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 20 13:37:54 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ Add new pselect6_time64 syscall on ARM.
- mark up the rdomain keyword;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b597d0ad0ad20e94dbd61ca066057e6f6313b8a
+ This is apparently needed on armhfp/armv7hl. bz#3232, patch from
+ jjelen at redhat.com.
-commit 0b2e2896b9d0d6cfb59e9ec8271085296bd4e99b
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 06:19:46 2017 +0000
+commit 3a7c46c72b6a1f643b1fc3589cd20d8320c3d9e1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 20 02:14:16 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- tweak the uri text, specifically removing some markup to
- make it a bit more readable;
+ upstream: Explicitly initialize all members of the
- issue reported by - and diff ok - millert
+ find_by_key_ctx struct. Initializing a single member should be enough
+ (the spec says the remainder should be initialized as per the static
+ rules) but some GCCs warn on this which prevents us testing with -Werror
+ on those. ok deraadt@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b56a20208040b2d0633536fd926e992de37ef3f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 687126e60a27d30f02614760ef3c3ae4e8d6af28
-commit 7530e77bdc9415386d2a8ea3d086e8b611b2ba40
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 06:18:06 2017 +0000
+commit 076cb616b87d1ea1d292973fcd0ba38c08ea6832
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 19 23:05:05 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: draft-ietf-secsh-architecture is now RFC4251.
- simplify macros in previous, and some minor tweaks;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6efeca3d8b095b76e21b484607d9cc67ac9a11ca
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cb0bb58c2711fb5ed519507659be1dcf179ed403
-commit eb9c582b710dc48976b48eb2204218f6863bae9a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 31 00:46:29 2017 +1100
+commit 85cceda21f1471548e04111aefe2c4943131c1c8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 17 11:23:58 2020 +0000
- Switch upstream git repository.
-
- Previously portable OpenSSH has synced against a conversion of OpenBSD's
- CVS repository made using the git cvsimport tool, but this has become
- increasingly unreliable.
-
- As of this commit, portable OpenSSH now tracks a conversion of the
- OpenBSD CVS upstream made using the excellent cvs2gitdump tool from
- YASUOKA Masahiko: https://github.com/yasuoka/cvs2gitdump
-
- cvs2gitdump is considerably more reliable than gitcvsimport and the old
- version of cvsps that it uses under the hood, and is the same tool used
- to export the entire OpenBSD repository to git (so we know it can cope
- with future growth).
-
- These new conversions are mirrored at github, so interested parties can
- match portable OpenSSH commits to their upstream counterparts.
-
- https://github.com/djmdjm/openbsd-openssh-src
- https://github.com/djmdjm/openbsd-openssh-regress
+ upstream: Specify that the KDF function is bcrypt. Based on github
- An unfortunate side effect of switching upstreams is that we must have
- a flag day, across which the upstream commit IDs will be inconsistent.
- The old commit IDs are recorded with the tags "Upstream-ID" for main
- directory commits and "Upstream-Regress-ID" for regress commits.
+ PR#214 from rafork, ok markus@, mdoc correction jmc@
- To make it clear that the commit IDs do not refer to the same
- things, the new repository will instead use "OpenBSD-ID" and
- "OpenBSD-Regress-ID" tags instead.
-
- Apart from being a longwinded explanation of what is going on, this
- commit message also serves to synchronise our tools with the state of
- the tree, which happens to be:
-
- OpenBSD-ID: 9c43a9968c7929613284ea18e9fb92e4e2a8e4c1
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b33b385719420bf3bc57d664feda6f699c147fef
-
-commit 2de5c6b53bf063ac698596ef4e23d8e3099656ea
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 08:42:33 2017 +1100
-
- fix rdomain compilation errors
-
-commit 6bd5b569fd6dfd5e8c8af20bbc41e45c2d6462ab
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 14:15:42 2017 +1100
-
- autoconf glue to enable Linux VRF
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8f2853e7edbcd483f31b50da77ab80ffa18b4ef
-commit 97c5aaf925d61641d599071abb56012cde265978
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 14:09:56 2017 +1100
+commit 5b9720f9adbd70ba5a994f407fe07a7d016d8d65
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 15 22:34:58 2020 +0000
- basic valid_rdomain() implementation for Linux
+ upstream: revert r1.341; it breaks ProxyJump; reported by sthen@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ac2f945b26cb86d936eed338f77861d6da8356a
-commit ce1cca39d7935dd394080ce2df62f5ce5b51f485
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:47:59 2017 +1100
+commit 04088725ec9c44880c01799b588cd4ba47b3e8bc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 07:30:44 2020 +0000
- implement get/set_rdomain() for Linux
+ upstream: scrub keyboard-interactive authentication prompts coming
+
+ from the server through asmprintf() prior to display; suggested by and ok
+ dtucker@
- Not enabled, pending implementation of valid_rdomain() and autoconf glue
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31fe93367645c37fbfe4691596bf6cf1e3972a58
-commit 6eee79f9b8d4a3b113b698383948a119acb82415
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:22:29 2017 +1100
+commit 5442b491d0ee4bb82f6341ad0ee620ef3947f8c5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 04:53:12 2020 +0000
- stubs for rdomain replacement functions
+ upstream: prefix keyboard interactive prompts with (user@host) to
+
+ make it easier to determine which connection they are associated with in
+ cases like scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224 ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e6189b04b46c867662f8a6759cf3ecb5f59170
-commit f5594f939f844bbb688313697d6676238da355b3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:13:57 2017 +1100
+commit 2992e4e7014ac1047062acfdbbf6feb156fef616
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 17:56:11 2020 +1100
- rename port-tun.[ch] => port-net.[ch]
+ Remove use of TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME.
- Ahead of adding rdomain support
+ It was only set by the recently removed AC_HEADER_TIME macro, replace
+ with simple inclusions of both sys/time.h and time.h. Should prevent
+ mis-detection of struct timespec.
-commit d685e5a31feea35fb99e1a31a70b3c60a7f2a0eb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 02:10:39 2017 +0000
+commit e3f27006f15abacb7e89fda3f5e9a0bd420b7e38
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 14:20:43 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ Revert "detect Linux/X32 systems"
- uninitialised variable in PermitTunnel printing code
+ This reverts commit 5b56bd0affea7b02b540bdbc4d1d271b0e4fc885.
- Upstream-ID: f04dc33e42855704e116b8da61095ecc71bc9e9a
+ The approach used was incorrect; discussion in bz#3085
-commit 43c29bb7cfd46bbbc61e0ffa61a11e74d49a712f
+commit e51dc7fab61df36e43f3bc64b673f88d388cab91
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:10:59 2017 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 13 13:22:15 2020 +1100
- provide hooks and fallbacks for rdomain support
+ SELinux has deprecated security_context_t
+
+ (it was only ever a char* anyway)
-commit 3235473bc8e075fad7216b7cd62fcd2b0320ea04
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 11:25:43 2017 +1100
+commit b79add37d118276d67f3899987b9f0629c9449c3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 13 13:43:30 2020 +1100
- check for net/route.h and sys/sysctl.h
+ Remove obsolete AC_HEADER_TIME macro.
+
+ AC_HEADER_TIME is marked as obsolete in autoconf-2.70 and as far as I
+ can tell everything we have that might be old enough to need it doesn't.
-commit 4d5456c7de108e17603a0920c4d15bca87244921
+commit d5d05cdb3d4efd4a618aa52caab5bec73097c163
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:21:37 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Nov 12 22:56:00 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, display
- transfer ownership of stdout to the session channel by
- dup2'ing /dev/null to fd 1. This allows propagation of remote stdout close to
- the local side; reported by David Newall, ok markus@
+ any other host names/addresses already associated with the key. E.g.
- Upstream-ID: 8d9ac18a11d89e6b0415f0cbf67b928ac67f0e79
-
-commit 68af80e6fdeaeb79432209db614386ff0f37e75f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:19:47 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ > The authenticity of host 'test (10.0.0.1)' can't be established.
+ > ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:milU4MODXm8iJQI18wlsbPG7Yup+34fuNNmV08qDnax.
+ > This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
+ > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:1: host.example.org,10.0.0.1
+ > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:2: [hashed name]
+ > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:3: [hashed name]
+ > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:4: host
+ > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:5: [host]:2222
+ > Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])?
- add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
- keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on which rdomain(4) a
- connection was recevied on. ok markus@
+ feedback and ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 27d8fd5a3f1bae18c9c6e533afdf99bff887a4fb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6f58a77b49f1368b5883b3a1f776447cfcc7ef4
-commit 35eb33fb957979e3fcbe6ea0eaee8bf4a217421a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:17:08 2017 +0000
+commit 819b44e8b9af6ce18d3ec7505b9f461bf7991a1f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 12 22:38:57 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- add sshd_config RDomain keyword to place sshd and the
- subsequent user session (including the shell and any TCP/IP forwardings) into
- the specified rdomain(4)
+ upstream: Prevent integer overflow when ridiculously large
- ok markus@
+ ConnectTimeout is specified, capping the effective value (for most platforms)
+ at 24 days. bz#3229, ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: be2358e86346b5cacf20d90f59f980b87d1af0f5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62d4c4b7b87d111045f8e9f28b5b532d17ac5bc0
-commit acf559e1cffbd1d6167cc1742729fc381069f06b
+commit add926dd1bbe3c4db06e27cab8ab0f9a3d00a0c2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:15:35 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Nov 11 05:22:32 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix logic error that broke URI parsing in ProxyJump
- Add optional rdomain qualifier to sshd_config's
- ListenAddress option to allow listening on a different rdomain(4), e.g.
+ directives; ok dtucker@
- ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 rdomain 4
-
- Upstream-ID: 24b6622c376feeed9e9be8b9605e593695ac9091
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96d48839b1704882a0e9a77898f5e14b2d222705
-commit b9903ee8ee8671b447fc260c2bee3761e26c7227
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 24 19:41:45 2017 +0000
+commit 4340dd43928dfe746cb7e75fe920b63c0d909a9a
+Author: claudio@openbsd.org <claudio@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 10 07:46:20 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Free the previously allocated msg buffer after writing it
- Kill dead store and some spaces vs. tabs indent in
- parse_user_host_path(). Noticed by markus@
+ out. OK djm@
- Upstream-ID: 114fec91dadf9af46c7c94fd40fc630ea2de8200
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18c055870fc75e4cb9f926c86c7543e2e21d7fa4
-commit 0869627e00f4ee2a038cb62d7bd9ffad405e1800
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 24 06:27:42 2017 +0000
+commit fcf429a4c69d30d8725612a55b37181594da8ddf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 11 12:30:46 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ Prevent excessively long username going to PAM.
- tweak previous; ok djm
+ This is a mitigation for a buffer overflow in Solaris' PAM username
+ handling (CVE-2020-14871), and is only enabled for Sun-derived PAM
+ implementations. This is not a problem in sshd itself, it only
+ prevents sshd from being used as a vector to attack Solaris' PAM.
+ It does not prevent the bug in PAM from being exploited via some other
+ PAM application.
- Upstream-ID: 7d913981ab315296be1f759c67b6e17aea38fca9
+ Based on github PR#212 from Mike Scott but implemented slightly
+ differently. ok tim@ djm@
-commit e3fa20e2e58fdc88a0e842358778f2de448b771b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 23 16:25:24 2017 +1100
+commit 10dce8ff68ef615362cfcab0c0cc33ce524e7682
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 23:19:03 2020 +0000
- avoid -Wsign-compare warning in argv copying
+ upstream: unbreak; missing NULL check
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6613dfab488123f454d348ef496824476b8c11c0
-commit b7548b12a6b2b4abf4d057192c353147e0abba08
+commit d5a0cd4fc430c8eda213a4010a612d4778867cd9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 23 05:08:00 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Nov 8 22:37:24 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when requesting a security key touch on stderr, inform the
- Expose devices allocated for tun/tap forwarding.
+ user once the touch has been recorded; requested by claudio@ ok markus@
- At the client, the device may be obtained from a new %T expansion
- for LocalCommand.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b76ee444490e546b9ea7f879e4092ee0d256233
+
+commit 292bcb2479deb27204e3ff796539c003975a5f7a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Nov 9 00:33:35 2020 +1100
+
+ Remove preprocessor directive from log macro calls.
- At the server, the allocated devices will be listed in a
- SSH_TUNNEL variable exposed to the environment of any user sessions
- started after the tunnel forwarding was established.
+ Preprocessor directives inside macro calls, such as the new log macros,
+ are undefined behaviour and do not work with, eg old GCCs. Put the
+ entire log call inside the ifdef for OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521.
+
+commit 71693251b7cbb7dd89aaac18815147124732d0d3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 12:10:20 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add a comment documenting the source of the moduli group
- ok markus
+ sizes.
- Upstream-ID: e61e53f8ae80566e9ddc0d67a5df5bdf2f3c9f9e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aec0725ce607630caaa62682624c6763b350391c
-commit 887669ef032d63cf07f53cada216fa8a0c9a7d72
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Oct 21 23:06:24 2017 +0000
+commit 4d94b031ff88b015f0db57e140f481bff7ae1a91
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Nov 8 11:46:12 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Replace WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs in log calls with a macro.
- Add URI support to ssh, sftp and scp. For example
- ssh://user@host or sftp://user@host/path. The connection parameters
- described in draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 are not implemented since
- the ssh fingerprint format in the draft uses md5 with no way to specify the
- hash function type. OK djm@
+ The log calls are themselves now macros, and preprocessor directives inside
+ macro arguments are undefined behaviour which some compilers (eg old GCCs)
+ choke on. It also makes the code tidier. ok deraadt@
- Upstream-ID: 4ba3768b662d6722de59e6ecb00abf2d4bf9cacc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc12a9029833d222043aecd252d654965c351a69
-commit d27bff293cfeb2252f4c7a58babe5ad3262c6c98
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 13:22:00 2017 +1100
+commit 6d2564b94e51184eb0b73b97d13a36ad50b4f810
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 6 17:11:16 2020 +1100
- Fix missed RCSID merges
+ Fix function body for variadic macro test.
+
+ AC_LANG_PROGRAM puts its second argument inside main() so we don't need
+ to do it ourselves.
-commit d3b6aeb546242c9e61721225ac4387d416dd3d5e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 02:13:41 2017 +0000
+commit 586f9bd2f5980e12f8cf0d3c2a761fa63175da52
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 6 16:53:24 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ Remove AC_PROC_CC_C99 obsoleted in autoconf 2.70.
- more RCSIDs
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 1aecbe3f8224793f0ec56741a86d619830eb33be
+ Since we only use it to make sure we can handle variadic macros,
+ explicitly check only for that. with & ok djm@
-commit b011edbb32e41aaab01386ce4c0efcc9ff681c4a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 01:56:39 2017 +0000
+commit a019e353df04de1b2ca78d91b39c393256044ad7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 6 13:56:41 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ Replace AC_TRY_COMPILE obsoleted in autoconf 2.70.
- add RCSIDs to these; they make syncing portable a bit
- easier
-
- Upstream-ID: 56cb7021faea599736dd7e7f09c2e714425b1e68
+ Replace with the equivalent AC_COMPILE_IFELSE.
-commit 6eb27597781dccaf0ec2b80107a9f0592a0cb464
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 12:54:15 2017 +1100
+commit 771b7795c0ef6a2fb43b4c6c66b615c2085cb9cd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 6 13:55:33 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ Move AC_PROG_CC_C99 to immediately afer AC_PROG_CC.
- Apply missing commit 1.11 to kexc25519s.c
-
- Upstream-ID: 5f020e23a1ee6c3597af1f91511e68552cdf15e8
+ This puts the related C version selection output in the same place.
-commit 6f72280553cb6918859ebcacc717f2d2fafc1a27
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 12:52:50 2017 +1100
+commit e5591161f21ab493c6284a85ac3c0710ad94998f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 6 13:54:17 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER() is obsoleted in autoconf 2.70.
- Apply missing commit 1.127 to servconf.h
-
- Upstream-ID: f14c4bac74a2b7cf1e3cff6bea5c447f192a7d15
+ Replace with the non-obsoleted AC_CHECK_HEADERS().
-commit bb3e16ab25cb911238c2eb7455f9cf490cb143cc
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 18 05:36:59 2017 +0000
+commit 05bcd0cadf160fd4826a2284afa7cba6ec432633
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 3 22:53:12 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fold consecutive '*' wildcards to mitigate combinatorial
- remove unused Pp;
+ explosion of recursive searches; ok dtucker
- Upstream-ID: 8ad26467f1f6a40be887234085a8e01a61a00550
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d18bcb39c40fb8a1ab61153db987e7d11dd3792b
-commit 05b69e99570553c8e1eafb895b1fbf1d098d2e14
+commit 7d680448db5858dc76307663f78d0b8d3c2b4a3d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 18 02:49:44 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 30 01:50:07 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: print reason in fatal error message when
- In the description of pattern-lists, clarify negated
- matches by explicitly stating that a negated match will never yield a
- positive result, and that at least one positive term in the pattern-list must
- match. bz#1918
+ kex_assemble_namelist() fails
- Upstream-ID: 652d2f9d993f158fc5f83cef4a95cd9d95ae6a14
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9975ee8db6c98d6f32233d88051b2077ca63dab
-commit eb80e26a15c10bc65fed8b8cdb476819a713c0fd
+commit 95d1109fec7e89ad21f2a97e92bde1305d32a353
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 21:13:54 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 29 03:13:06 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix sshd_config SetEnv directive inside Match blocks; part of
- log debug messages sent to peer; ok deraadt markus
+ github PR#201 from github user manuelm
- Upstream-ID: 3b4fdc0a06ea5083f61d96e20043000f477103d9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9772e3748abff3ad65ae8fc43d026ed569b1d2bc
-commit 071325f458d615d7740da5c1c1d5a8b68a0b4605
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 16:50:45 2017 +0000
+commit b12b835dc022ba161afe68348e05a83dfbcb1515
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 29 03:01:18 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- trim permitrootlogin description somewhat, to avoid
- ambiguity; original diff from walter alejandro iglesias, tweaked by sthen and
- myself
+ upstream: fix type of nid in type_bits_valid(); github PR#202 from
- ok sthen schwarze deraadt
+ github user thingsconnected
- Upstream-ID: 1749418b2bc073f3fdd25fe21f8263c3637fe5d2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 769d2b040dec7ab32d323daf54b854dd5dcb5485
-commit 10727487becb897a15f658e0cb2d05466236e622
+commit 1a14c13147618144d1798c36a588397ba9008fcc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 06:45:18 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 29 02:52:43 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- mention SSH_USER_AUTH in the list of environment
- variables
+ upstream: whitespace; no code change
- Upstream-ID: 1083397c3ee54b4933121ab058c70a0fc6383691
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: efefc1c47e880887bdee8cd2127ca93177eaad79
-commit 224f193d6a4b57e7a0cb2b9ecd3b6c54d721d8c2
+commit 815209abfdd2991fb92ad7d2e33374916cdcbcf4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 06:24:51 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 29 02:47:23 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: UpdateHostkeys: fixed/better detection of host keys that
- BIO_get_mem_data() is supposed to take a char* as pointer
- argument, so don't pass it a const char*
+ exist under other names and addresses; spotted by and debugged with lots of
+ help from jca@
- Upstream-ID: 1ccd91eb7f4dd4f0fa812d4f956987cd00b5f6ec
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5113d7f550bbd48243db1705afbf16b63792d4b7
-commit cfa46825b5ef7097373ed8e31b01a4538a8db565
-Author: benno@openbsd.org <benno@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 9 20:12:51 2017 +0000
+commit a575cf44e59a65506c67bddb62a712208a7a279c
+Author: Duncan Eastoe <duncan.eastoe@att.com>
+Date: Wed Oct 21 10:11:10 2020 +0100
- upstream commit
+ session.c: use "denylist" terminology
- clarify the order in which config statements are used. ok
- jmc@ djm@
+ Follow upstream (6d755706a0059eb9e2d63517f288b75cbc3b4701) language
+ improvements in this portable-specific code.
+
+commit 33267feaffd5d98aa56d2f0b3a99ec352effe938
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 27 16:46:31 2020 +1100
+
+ Remove checks for strict POSIX mkdtemp()
- Upstream-ID: e37e27bb6bbac71315e22cb9690fd8a556a501ed
+ We needed a mkdtemp() that accepted template paths that did not
+ end in XXXXXX a long time ago for KRB4, but that code is long
+ deprecated. We no longer need to replace mkdtemp() for strictly
+ following POSIX. ok dtucker@
-commit dceabc7ad7ebc7769c8214a1647af64c9a1d92e5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 5 15:52:03 2017 +0000
+commit 492d70e18bad5a8c97d05f5eddac817171e88d2c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 26 00:39:04 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Minor man page fixes (capitalization, commas) identified by
- replace statically-sized arrays in ServerOptions with
- dynamic ones managed by xrecallocarray, removing some arbitrary (though
- large) limits and saving a bit of memory; "much nicer" markus@
+ the manpage-l10n project via bz#3223. feedback deraadt@, ok jmc@
- Upstream-ID: 1732720b2f478fe929d6687ac7b0a97ff2efe9d2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab83af0daf18369244a72daaec6c4a58a9eb7e2c
-commit 2b4f3ab050c2aaf6977604dd037041372615178d
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 5 12:56:50 2017 +0000
+commit eab2888cfc6cc4e2ef24bd017da9835a0f365f3f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 19 22:49:23 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Adapt XMSS to new logging infrastructure. With markus@, ok
- %C is hashed; from klemens nanni ok markus
+ djm@.
- Upstream-ID: 6ebed7b2e1b6ee5402a67875d74f5e2859d8f998
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c35ec3aa0f710e4e3325187ceff4fa3791686de
-commit a66714508b86d6814e9055fefe362d9fe4d49ab3
+commit f7bd11e4941620991f3e727cd0131b01f0311a58
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 4 18:50:23 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Oct 19 08:07:08 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix SEGV on fatal() errors spotted by dtucker@
- exercise PermitOpen a little more thoroughly
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: f41592334e227a4c1f9a983044522de4502d5eac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 75f155a1ac61e364ed00dc379e2c42df81067ce2
-commit 609ecc8e57eb88e2eac976bd3cae7f7889aaeff6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 26 22:39:25 2017 +0000
+commit 7715a3b171049afa1feffb1d5a1245dfac36ce99
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 19 10:54:41 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
+ Use fatal_fr not fatal_r when passing r.
- UsePrivilegeSeparation is gone, stop trying to test it.
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 796a5057cfd79456a20ea935cc53f6eb80ace191
+ Caught by the PAM -Werror tinderbox build.
-commit 69bda0228861f3dacd4fb3d28b60ce9d103d254b
+commit 816036f142ecd284c12bb3685ae316a68d2ef190
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 4 18:49:30 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Oct 18 11:32:01 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: use the new variant log macros instead of prepending
- fix (another) problem in PermitOpen introduced during the
- channels.c refactor: the third and subsequent arguments to PermitOpen were
- being silently ignored; ok markus@
+ __func__ and appending ssh_err(r) manually; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 067c89f1f53cbc381628012ba776d6861e6782fd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f14b80bcfa85414b2a1a6ff714fb5362687ace8
-commit 66bf74a92131b7effe49fb0eefe5225151869dc5
+commit 9e2c4f64224f68fb84c49b5182e449f94b0dc985
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 2 19:33:20 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Oct 18 11:21:59 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: variants of the log methods that append a ssherr.h string
- Fix PermitOpen crash; spotted by benno@, ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ from a supplied error code; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: c2cc84ffac070d2e1ff76182c70ca230a387983c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aed98c4435d48d036ae6740300f6a8357b7cc0bf
-commit d63b38160a59039708fd952adc75a0b3da141560
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 1 10:32:25 2017 +1100
+commit 28cb0a4b03940d1ee576eb767a81a4113bdc917e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 18 11:14:27 2020 +0000
- update URL again
+ upstream: remove a level of macro indirection; ok markus@
- I spotted a typo in the draft so uploaded a new version...
-
-commit 6f64f596430cd3576c529f07acaaf2800aa17d58
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 1 10:01:56 2017 +1100
-
- sync release notes URL
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c529d06e902c5d1a6b231e1bec6157f76dc67c9
-commit 35ff70a04dd71663a5ac1e73b90d16d270a06e0d
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 1 10:01:25 2017 +1100
+commit 9cac1db52e6c4961c447910fe02cd68a3b2f9460
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 18 11:13:45 2020 +0000
- sync contrib/ssh-copy-id with upstream
+ upstream: add some variant log.h calls that prepend the calling
+
+ function name; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be1b2e2455b271ddb7457bc195c5367644f4e48
-commit 290843b8ede85f8b30bf29cd7dceb805c3ea5b66
+commit d55dfed34ef6ef1f028d552a90d5f3dba8dd6f7b
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 1 09:59:19 2017 +1100
+Date: Sat Oct 17 22:55:24 2020 +1100
- update version in RPM spec files
+ missing header
-commit 4e4e0bb223c5be88d87d5798c75cc6b0d4fef31d
+commit 999d7cb79a3a73d92a6dfbf174c33da0d984c7a2
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 1 09:58:24 2017 +1100
+Date: Sat Oct 17 22:47:52 2020 +1100
- update agent draft URL
+ sync regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c
-commit e4a798f001d2ecd8bf025c1d07658079f27cc604
+commit 3554b4afa38b3483a3302f1be18eaa6f843bb260
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 30 22:26:33 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Oct 17 01:28:20 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make the log functions that exit (sshlogdie(),
- openssh-7.6; ok deraadt@
+ sshfatal(), etc) have identical signatures. Makes things a bit more
+ consistent...
- Upstream-ID: a39c3a5b63a1baae109ae1ae4c7c34c2a59acde0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd0ae124733389d7c0042e135c71ee9091362eb9
-commit 5fa1407e16e7e5fda9769d53b626ce39d5588d4d
+commit 616029a85ad7529b24bb8c4631d9607c0d6e7afe
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 27 06:45:53 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 16 14:34:33 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add space between macro arg and punctuation;
- tweak EposeAuthinfo; diff from lars nooden
-
- tweaked by sthen; ok djm dtucker
-
- Upstream-ID: 8f2ea5d2065184363e8be7a0ba24d98a3b259748
-
-commit bba69c246f0331f657fd6ec97724df99fc1ad174
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 28 16:06:21 2017 -0700
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb81e2ed5a77832fe62ab30a915ae67cda57633e
- don't fatal ./configure for LibreSSL
-
-commit 04dc070e8b4507d9d829f910b29be7e3b2414913
+commit f812a36cee5727147bc897d34ab9af068dd4561e
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 28 14:54:34 2017 -0700
-
- abort in configure when only openssl-1.1.x found
-
- We don't support openssl-1.1.x yet (see multiple threads on the
- openssh-unix-dev@ mailing list for the reason), but previously
- ./configure would accept it and the compilation would subsequently
- fail. This makes ./configure display an explicit error message and
- abort.
-
- ok dtucker@
-
-commit 74c1c3660acf996d9dc329e819179418dc115f2c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Sep 27 07:44:41 2017 +1000
+Date: Sat Oct 17 12:03:34 2020 +1100
- Check for and handle calloc(p, 0) = NULL.
+ check for and require a C99 capable compiler
- On some platforms (AIX, maybe others) allocating zero bytes of memory
- via the various *alloc functions returns NULL, which is permitted
- by the standards. Autoconf has some macros for detecting this (with
- the exception of calloc for some reason) so use these and if necessary
- activate shims for them. ok djm@
+ recent logging changes use __VA_ARGS__.
-commit 6a9481258a77b0b54b2a313d1761c87360c5f1f5
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 21 19:18:12 2017 +0000
+commit f9ea6515202b59a1e2d5b885cafc1b12eff33016
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 17 11:51:20 2020 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- test reverse dynamic forwarding with SOCKS
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 95cf290470f7e5e2f691e4bc6ba19b91eced2f79
+ logging is now macros, remove function pointers
-commit 1b9f321605733754df60fac8c1d3283c89b74455
+commit 0f938f998626e8359324f803157cd7c9f8f403e2
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 26 16:55:55 2017 +1000
+Date: Sat Oct 17 11:42:26 2020 +1100
- sync missing changes in dynamic-forward.sh
+ adapt sk-dummy's fatal implementation to changes
-commit 44fc334c7a9ebdd08addb6d5fa005369897fddeb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Sep 25 09:48:10 2017 +1000
+commit afbd9ec9e2dbad04834ce7ce53e58740434f32a5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 17 11:33:13 2020 +1100
- Add minimal strsignal for platforms without it.
+ fix netcat build problem
-commit 218e6f98df566fb9bd363f6aa47018cb65ede196
+commit 793b583d097381730adaf6f68bed3c343139a013
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 24 13:45:34 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 16 13:26:13 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: LogVerbose keyword for ssh and sshd
+
+ Allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line pattern-
+ lists.
- fix inverted test on channel open failure path that
- "upgraded" a transient failure into a fatal error; reported by sthen and also
- seen by benno@; ok sthen@
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: b58b3fbb79ba224599c6cd6b60c934fc46c68472
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c294c25732d1b4fe7e345cb3e044df00531a6356
-commit c704f641f7b8777497dc82e81f2ac89afec7e401
+commit 752250caabda3dd24635503c4cd689b32a650794
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 24 09:50:01 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 16 13:24:45 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: revised log infrastructure for OpenSSH
- write the correct buffer when tunnel forwarding; doesn't
- matter on OpenBSD (they are the same) but does matter on portable where we
- use an output filter to translate os-specific tun/tap headers
+ log functions receive function, filename and line number of caller.
+ We can use this to selectively enable logging via pattern-lists.
- Upstream-ID: f1ca94eff48404827b12e1d12f6139ee99a72284
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51a472610cbe37834ce6ce4a3f0e0b1ccc95a349
-commit 55486f5cef117354f0c64f991895835077b7c7f7
+commit acadbb3402b70f72f14d9a6930ad41be97c2f9dc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 23 22:04:07 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 16 02:37:12 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: use do_log2 instead of function pointers to different log
- fix tunnel forwarding problem introduced in refactor;
- reported by stsp@ ok markus@
+ functions
- Upstream-ID: 81a731cdae1122c8522134095d1a8b60fa9dcd04
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 88077b826d348c58352a6b394755520f4e484480
-commit 609d7a66ce578abf259da2d5f6f68795c2bda731
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 21 19:16:53 2017 +0000
+commit 95b0bcfd1531d59e056ae8af27bb741391f26ab0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 14 00:55:17 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make UpdateHostkeys still more conservative: refuse to
- Add 'reverse' dynamic forwarding which combines dynamic
- forwarding (-D) with remote forwarding (-R) where the remote-forwarded port
- expects SOCKS-requests.
+ proceed if one of the keys offered by the server is already in known_hosts
+ under another name. This avoid collisions between address entries for
+ different host aliases when CheckHostIP=yes
- The SSH server code is unchanged and the parsing happens at the SSH
- clients side. Thus the full SOCKS-request is sent over the forwarded
- channel and the client parses c->output. Parsing happens in
- channel_before_prepare_select(), _before_ the select bitmask is
- computed in the pre[] handlers, but after network input processing
- in the post[] handlers.
+ Also, do not attempt to fix known_hosts with incomplete host/ip matches
+ when there are no new or deprecated hostkeys.
- help and ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: aa25a6a3851064f34fe719e0bf15656ad5a64b89
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95c19842f7c41f9bd9c92aa6441a278c0fd0c4a3
-commit 36945fa103176c00b39731e1fc1919a0d0808b81
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 20 05:19:00 2017 +0000
+commit a336ce8c2c55547cc00e0070a18c55f30bb53fb6
+Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 12 08:36:36 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Use strsignal in debug message instead of casting for the
- benefit of portable where sig_atomic_t might not be int. "much nicer"
- deraadt@
+ upstream: Zap unused family parameter from ssh_connect_direct()
- Upstream-ID: 2dac6c1e40511c700bd90664cd263ed2299dcf79
-
-commit 3e8d185af326bf183b6f78597d5e3d2eeb2dc40e
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 19 12:10:30 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ sshconnect.c r1.241 from 2013 made it unused; found while reading code.
- Use explicit_bzero() instead of bzero() before free() to
- prevent the compiler from optimizing away the bzero() call. OK djm@
+ OK djm
- Upstream-ID: cdc6197e64c9684c7250e23d60863ee1b53cef1d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 219ba6d7f9925d0b7992918612680399d86712b5
-commit 5b8da1f53854c0923ec6e927e86709e4d72737b6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 19 04:24:22 2017 +0000
+commit e545d94b713effab8e6c7dfabbfb76c1d84d7498
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Sun Oct 4 00:15:46 2020 +0200
- upstream commit
+ shift contents of long $() into filter_ids()
- fix use-after-free in ~^Z escape handler path, introduced
- in channels.c refactor; spotted by millert@ "makes sense" deraadt@
+ This was prompted by the fact that posh does not deal with $()
+ that contains comments where the comment includes an odd number
+ of single-quotes. It seems to get befuddled into trying to find
+ the matching quote.
+ Regardless, making a function for filtering the unneeded ids
+ seems much neater than avoiding apostrophes,
+ so that's what I've done.
- Upstream-ID: 8fa2cdc65c23ad6420c1e59444b0c955b0589b22
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 3dab3366a584427045c8a690a93282f02c09cf24
-commit a3839d8d2b89ff1a80cadd4dd654336710de2c9e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 18 12:03:24 2017 +0000
+commit fd360174596047b52aa1cddda74d85012a03ca4b
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 23:15:16 2020 +0200
- upstream commit
+ combine if/elif to avoid duplication of the action
- Prevent type mismatch warning in debug on platforms where
- sig_atomic_t != int. ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: 306e2375eb0364a4c68e48f091739bea4f4892ed
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 42aeb1cc53d3f7f6e78edc210fb121fda0834914
-commit 30484e5e5f0b63d2c6ba32c6b85f06b6c6fa55fc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 18 09:41:52 2017 +0000
+commit f7c3a39b016dd77709ecbf18da8282f967b86cd7
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 21:45:16 2020 +0200
- upstream commit
-
- Add braces missing after channels refactor. ok markus@
+ shellcheck tidyage
- Upstream-ID: 72ab325c84e010680dbc88f226e2aa96b11a3980
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 5b08f840e78ac544288b3983010a1b0585e966fd
-commit b79569190b9b76dfacc6d996faa482f16e8fc026
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 19 12:29:23 2017 +1000
+commit 108676c3f26be6c873db0dd8754063699908727b
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 21:10:03 2020 +0200
- add freezero(3) replacement
+ tidy up test of $SCRATCH_DIR creation
- ok dtucker@
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 2d8b22d96c105d87743ffe8874887b06f8989b93
-commit 161af8f5ec0961b10cc032efb5cc1b44ced5a92e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 19 10:18:56 2017 +1000
+commit a9c9e91a82bc1a2cf801b4e3ef27a941dbd27717
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Wed Sep 16 16:13:30 2020 +0200
- move FORTIFY_SOURCE into hardening options group
+ add -s flag: to install keys via SFTP
- It's still on by default, but now it's possible to turn it off using
- --without-hardening. This is useful since it's known to cause problems
- with some -fsanitize options. ok dtucker@
-
-commit 09eacf856e0fe1a6e3fe597ec8032b7046292914
-Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 13 14:58:26 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ This is prompted by:
+
+ https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3201
- Print SKIPPED if sudo and doas configuration is missing.
- Prevents that running the regression test with wrong environment is reported
- as failure. Keep the fatal there to avoid interfering with other setups for
- portable ssh. OK dtucker@
+ Thanks go to Matthias Blümel for the idea, and the helpful patch, from
+ which this patch grew.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: f0dc60023caef496ded341ac5aade2a606fa234e
+ SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: f7c76dc64427cd20287a6868f672423b62057614
-commit cdede10899892f25f1ccdccd7a3fe5e5ef0aa49a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 7 03:52:55 2017 +0000
+commit f92424970c02b78852ff149378c7f2616ada4ccf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 11 22:14:38 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: UpdateHostkeys: check for keys under other names
- Remove obsolete privsep=no fallback test.
+ Stop UpdateHostkeys from automatically removing deprecated keys from
+ known_hosts files if the same keys exist under a different name or
+ address to the host that is being connected to.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 7d6e1baa1678ac6be50c2a1555662eb1047638df
-
-commit ec218c105daa9f5b192f7aa890fdb2d4fdc4e9d8
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 7 00:53:51 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ This avoids UpdateHostkeys from making known_hosts inconsistent in
+ some cases. For example, multiple host aliases sharing address-based
+ known_hosts on different lines, or hosts that resolves to multiple
+ addresses.
- Remove non-privsep test since disabling privsep is now
- deprecated.
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 77ad3f3d8d52e87f514a80f285c6c1229b108ce8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6444a705ba504c3c8ccddccd8d1b94aa33bd11c1
-commit 239c57d5bc2253e27e3e6ad7ac52ec8c377ee24e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 28 10:32:08 2017 +0000
+commit d98f14b5328922ae3085e07007d820c4f655b57a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 11 22:13:37 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: UpdateHostkeys: better CheckHostIP handling
+
+ When preparing to update the known_hosts file, fully check both
+ entries for both the host and the address (if CheckHostIP enabled)
+ and ensure that, at the end of the operation, entries for both are
+ recorded.
- Don't call fatal from stop_sshd since it calls cleanup
- which calls stop_sshd which will probably fail in the same way. Instead,
- just bail. Differentiate between sshd dying without cleanup and not shutting
- down.
+ Make sure this works with HashKnownHosts too, which requires maintaining
+ a list of entry-types seen across the whole file for each key.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: f97315f538618b349e2b0bea02d6b0c9196c6bc4
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 374dc263103f6b343d9671f87dbf81ffd0d6abdd
-commit aea59a0d9f120f2a87c7f494a0d9c51eaa79b8ba
+commit af5941ae9b013aac12585e84c4cf494f3728982f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 14 04:32:21 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Oct 11 22:12:44 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: UpdateHostkeys: better detect manual host entries
- Revert commitid: gJtIN6rRTS3CHy9b.
+ Disable UpdateHostkeys if the known_hosts line has more than two
+ entries in the pattern-list. ssh(1) only writes "host" or "host,ip"
+ lines so anything else was added by a different tool or by a human.
- -------------
- identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but other DNS RR
- types are present and display a more useful error message for this
- case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@
- -------------
+ ok markus@
- This caused unexpected failures when VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes, SSHFP results
- are missing but the user already has the key in known_hosts
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e434828191fb5f3877d4887c218682825aa59820
+
+commit 6247812c76f70b2245f3c23f5074665b3d436cae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 8 01:15:16 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: don't misdetect comma-separated hostkey names as wildcards;
- Spotted by dtucker@
+ spotted by naddy@
- Upstream-ID: 97e31742fddaf72046f6ffef091ec0d823299920
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b874edfec7fc324a21b130bdb42f912177739ce
-commit 871f1e4374420b07550041b329627c474abc3010
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 12 18:01:35 2017 +1000
+commit 67146c7d022a170be3cdad2f5f40259a663fb266
+Author: wangxp006 <wangxiaopeng7@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu Oct 8 17:49:59 2020 +0800
- adapt portable to channels API changes
+ fix TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS var
-commit 4ec0bb9f9ad7b4eb0af110fa8eddf8fa199e46bb
+commit 3205eaa3f8883a34fa4559ddef6c90d1067c5cce
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 12 07:55:48 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 8 00:31:05 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- unused variable
+ upstream: clarify conditions for UpdateHostkeys
- Upstream-ID: 2f9ba09f2708993d35eac5aa71df910dcc52bac1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9cba714cf6aeed769f998ccbe8c483077a618e27
-commit 9145a73ce2ba30c82bbf91d7205bfd112529449f
+commit e8dfca9bfeff05de87160407fb3e6a5717fa3dcb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 12 07:32:04 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 7 06:38:16 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: remove GlobalKnownHostsFile for this test after
- fix tun/tap forwarding case in previous
+ UpdateHostkeys change
- Upstream-ID: 43ebe37a930320e24bca6900dccc39857840bc53
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a940ad79d59343319613ba8fc46b6ef24aa3f8e1
-commit 9f53229c2ac97dbc6f5a03657de08a1150a9ac7e
+commit 4aa2717d7517cff4bc423a6cfba3a2defb055aea
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 12 06:35:31 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 7 02:26:28 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Disable UpdateHostkeys when hostkey checking fails
- Make remote channel ID a u_int
+ If host key checking fails (i.e. a wrong host key is recorded for the
+ server) and the user elects to continue (via StrictHostKeyChecking=no),
+ then disable UpdateHostkeys for the session.
- Previously we tracked the remote channel IDs in an int, but this is
- strictly incorrect: the wire protocol uses uint32 and there is nothing
- in-principle stopping a SSH implementation from sending, say, 0xffff0000.
+ reminded by Mark D. Baushke; ok markus@
- In practice everyone numbers their channels sequentially, so this has
- never been a problem.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98b524f121f4252309dd21becd8c4cacb0c6042a
+
+commit 04c06d04475f1f673e9d9743710d194453fe3888
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 7 02:25:43 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix UpdateHostkeys/HashKnownHosts/CheckHostIP bug
- ok markus@
+ When all of UpdateHostkeys, HashKnownHosts and ChechHostIP
+ were enabled and new host keys were learned, known_hosts IP
+ entries were not being recorded for new host keys.
- Upstream-ID: b9f4cd3dc53155b4a5c995c0adba7da760d03e73
+ reported by matthieu@ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a654a8290bd1c930aac509e8158cf85e42e49cb7
-commit dbee4119b502e3f8b6cd3282c69c537fd01d8e16
+commit b70e33711291f3081702133175a41cccafc0212a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 12 06:32:07 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 7 02:24:51 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: don't UpdateHostkeys when the hostkey is verified by the
- refactor channels.c
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile file, support only UserKnownHostsFile matches
- Move static state to a "struct ssh_channels" that is allocated at
- runtime and tracked as a member of struct ssh.
+ suggested by Mark D. Baushke; feedback and ok markus@
- Explicitly pass "struct ssh" to all channels functions.
-
- Replace use of the legacy packet APIs in channels.c.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eabb771a6add676c398d38a143a1aff5f04abbb9
+
+commit aa623142e426ca1ab9db77b06dcc9b1b70bd102b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 7 02:22:23 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: revert kex->flags cert hostkey downgrade back to a plain
- Rework sshd_config PermitOpen handling: previously the configuration
- parser would call directly into the channels layer. After the refactor
- this is not possible, as the channels structures are allocated at
- connection time and aren't available when the configuration is parsed.
- The server config parser now tracks PermitOpen itself and explicitly
- configures the channels code later.
+ key (commitid VtF8vozGOF8DMKVg). We now do this a simpler way that needs less
+ plumbing.
ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 11828f161656b965cc306576422613614bea2d8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb92d25b216bff8c136da818ac2221efaadf18ed
-commit abd59663df37a42152e37980113ccaa405b9a282
+commit f4f14e023cafee1cd9ebe4bb0db4029e6e1fafac
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 7 23:48:09 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 7 02:20:35 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: simply disable UpdateHostkeys when a certificate
- typo in comment
+ successfully authenticated the host; simpler than the complicated plumbing
+ via kex->flags we have now.
- Upstream-ID: a93b1e6f30f1f9b854b5b964b9fd092d0c422c47
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80e39644eed75717d563a7f177e8117a0e14f42c
-commit 149a8cd24ce9dd47c36f571738681df5f31a326c
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 4 06:34:43 2017 +0000
+commit e79957e877db42c4c68fabcf6ecff2268e53acb5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 7 02:18:45 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostkeys by default if VerifyHostKeyDNS is
- tweak previous;
+ enabled; suggested by Mark D. Baushke
- Upstream-ID: bb8cc40b61b15f6a13d81da465ac5bfc65cbfc4b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85a1b88592c81bc85df7ee7787dbbe721a0542bf
-commit ec9d22cc251cc5acfe7b2bcef9cc7a1fe0e949d8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 8 12:44:13 2017 +1000
+commit 3d4c2016bae1a6f14b48c1150a4c79ca4c9968bd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 6 07:12:04 2020 +0000
- Fuzzer harnesses for sig verify and pubkey parsing
+ upstream: Agent protocol draft is now at rev 4. ok djm@
- These are some basic clang libfuzzer harnesses for signature
- verification and public key parsing. Some assembly (metaphorical)
- required.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c01ea3aae48aab45e01b7421b0fca2dad5e7837
-commit de35c382894964a896a63ecd5607d3a3b93af75d
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 8 12:38:31 2017 +1000
+commit af889a40ffc113af9105c03d7b32131eb4372d50
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 4 09:45:01 2020 +0000
- Give configure ability to set CFLAGS/LDFLAGS later
+ upstream: when ordering host key algorithms in the client, consider
- Some CFLAGS/LDFLAGS may disrupt the configure script's operation,
- in particular santization and fuzzer options that break assumptions
- about memory and file descriptor dispositions.
+ the ECDSA key subtype; ok markus@
- This adds two flags to configure --with-cflags-after and
- --with-ldflags-after that allow specifying additional compiler and
- linker options that are added to the resultant Makefiles but not
- used in the configure run itself.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3097686f853c61ff61772ea35f8b699931392ece
+
+commit 2d39fc9f7e039351daa3d6aead1538ac29258add
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 4 03:04:02 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Allow full range of UIDs and GIDs for sftp chown and
- E.g.
+ chgrp on 32bit platforms instead of being limited by LONG_MAX. bz#3206,
+ found by booking00 at sina.cn, ok markus@
- env CC=clang-3.9 ./configure \
- --with-cflags-after=-fsantize=address \
- --with-ldflags-after="-g -fsanitize=address"
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373b7bbf1f15ae482d39567ce30d18b51c9229b5
-commit 22376d27a349f62c502fec3396dfe0fdcb2a40b7
+commit 396d32f3a1a16e54df2a76b2a9b237868580dcbe
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 3 23:33:13 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Oct 3 09:22:26 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Expand ssh_config's StrictModes option with two new
- settings:
-
- StrictModes=accept-new will automatically accept hitherto-unseen keys
- but will refuse connections for changed or invalid hostkeys.
-
- StrictModes=off is the same as StrictModes=no
+ upstream: There are lots of place where we want to redirect stdin,
- Motivation:
-
- StrictModes=no combines two behaviours for host key processing:
- automatically learning new hostkeys and continuing to connect to hosts
- with invalid/changed hostkeys. The latter behaviour is quite dangerous
- since it removes most of the protections the SSH protocol is supposed to
- provide.
-
- Quite a few users want to automatically learn hostkeys however, so
- this makes that feature available with less danger.
-
- At some point in the future, StrictModes=no will change to be a synonym
- for accept-new, with its current behaviour remaining available via
- StrictModes=off.
-
- bz#2400, suggested by Michael Samuel; ok markus
+ stdout and/or stderr to /dev/null. Factor all these out to a single
+ stdfd_devnull() function that allows selection of which of these to redirect.
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 0f55502bf75fc93a74fb9853264a8276b9680b64
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3033ba5a4c47cacfd5def020d42cabc52fad3099
-commit ff3c42384033514e248ba5d7376aa033f4a2b99a
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 1 15:41:26 2017 +0000
+commit 1286981d08b8429a64613215ce8bff3f6b32488a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 08:30:47 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: enable UpdateHostkeys by default when the configuration
- remove blank line;
+ has not overridden UserKnownHostsFile; ok markus@ "The timing is perfect"
+ deraadt@
- Upstream-ID: 2f46b51a0ddb3730020791719e94d3e418e9f423
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62df71c9c5242da5763cb473c2a2deefbd0cef60
-commit b828605d51f57851316d7ba402b4ae06cf37c55d
+commit 332f21537293d66508f7342dc643bc7fe45f0f69
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 1 05:53:56 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Oct 3 08:12:59 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostkeys when a wildcard hostname pattern
- identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but
- other DNS RR types are present and display a more useful error message for
- this case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@
+ is encountered or when a certificate host key is in use. feedback/ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 8f7a5a8344f684823d8317a9708b63e75be2c244
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6e5575af7e6732322be82ec299e09051a5413bd
-commit 8042bad97e2789a50e8f742c3bcd665ebf0add32
+commit 13cee44ef907824083d89cb9395adbbd552e46c1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 1 05:50:48 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Oct 3 08:11:28 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: record when the host key checking code downgrades a
- document available AuthenticationMethods; bz#2453 ok
- dtucker@
+ certificate host key to a plain key. This occurs when the user connects to a
+ host with a certificate host key but no corresponding CA key configured in
+ known_hosts; feedback and ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 2c70576f237bb699aff59889dbf2acba4276d3d0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ada81853ff9ee7824c62f440bcf4ad62030c901
-commit 71e5a536ec815d542b199f2ae6d646c0db9f1b58
+commit 12ae8f95e2e0c273e9e7ef930b01a028ef796a3f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Aug 30 03:59:08 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Oct 3 04:15:06 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: prefer ed25519 signature algorithm variants to ECDSA; ok
- pass packet state down to some of the channels function
- (more to come...); ok markus@
+ markus@
- Upstream-ID: d8ce7a94f4059d7ac1e01fb0eb01de0c4b36c81b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82187926fca96d35a5b5afbc091afa84e0966e5b
-commit 6227fe5b362239c872b91bbdee4bf63cf85aebc5
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 29 13:05:58 2017 +0000
+commit e5ed753add7aa8eed6b167e44db6240a76404db2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 03:40:38 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- sort options;
+ upstream: want time.h here too
- Upstream-ID: cf21d68cf54e81968bca629aaeddc87f0c684f3c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fafee8f1108c64ad8b282f9a1ed5ea830d8c58a7
-commit 530591a5795a02d01c78877d58604723918aac87
-Author: dlg@openbsd.org <dlg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 29 09:42:29 2017 +0000
+commit 66bd9fdf8b7762eb6a85cabbb1ae4ed955679f60
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 02:18:33 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- add a -q option to ssh-add to make it quiet on success.
+ upstream: split introductory paragraph, and insert ominous words about
- if you want to silence ssh-add without this you generally redirect
- the output to /dev/null, but that can hide error output which you
- should see.
-
- ok djm@
+ the glob issue, which cannot be fully fixed and really requires completely
+ replacing scp with a completely different subsystem. team effort to find the
+ right words..
- Upstream-ID: 2f31b9b13f99dcf587e9a8ba443458e6c0d8997c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58e1f72d292687f63eb357183036ee242513691c
-commit a54eb27dd64b5eca3ba94e15cec3535124bd5029
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Aug 27 00:38:41 2017 +0000
+commit 86cc8ce002ea10e88a4c5d622a8fdfab8a7d261f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 13:38:55 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Increase the buffer sizes for user prompts to ensure that
- they won't be truncated by snprintf. Based on patch from cjwatson at
- debian.org via bz#2768, ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: 6ffacf1abec8f40b469de5b94bfb29997d96af3e
+ use relative rather than system include here
+
+commit 922cfac5ed5ead9f796f7d39f012dd653dc5c173
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 13:38:41 2020 +1000
-commit dd9d9b3381a4597b840d480b043823112039327e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Aug 28 16:48:27 2017 +1000
+ add some openbsd-compat licenses we missed
- Switch Capsicum header to sys/capsicum.h.
-
- FreeBSD's <sys/capability.h> was renamed to <sys/capsicum.h> in 2014 to
- avoid future conflicts with POSIX capabilities (the last release that
- didn't have it was 9.3) so switch to that. Patch from des at des.no.
+commit ce941c75ea9cd6c358508a5b206809846c8d9240
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Sat Oct 3 00:20:07 2020 +0200
-commit f5e917ab105af5dd6429348d9bc463e52b263f92
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Sun Aug 27 08:55:40 2017 +1000
+ un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
- Add missing includes for bsd-err.c.
+commit 18ea5f4b88e303677d2003b95e5cb864b439e442
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Fri Oct 2 21:30:10 2020 +0200
+
+ ksh doesn't grok 'local'
- Patch from cjwatson at debian.org via bz#2767.
+ and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
+ see how things go without it.
-commit 878e029797cfc9754771d6f6ea17f8c89e11d225
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 25 13:25:01 2017 +1000
+commit d9e727dcc04a52caaac87543ea1d230e9e6b5604
+Author: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu Oct 1 12:09:08 2020 +0300
+
+ Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
+
+commit a1a856d50c89be3206f320baa4bfb32fff4e826f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 30 09:11:39 2020 +0000
- Split platform_sys_dir_uid into its own file
+ upstream: Regen moduli.
- platform.o is too heavy for libssh.a use; it calls into the server on
- many platforms. Move just the function needed by misc.c into its own
- file.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04967f8c43e9854ac34b917bcd6f5ac96c53a693
+
+commit fa1fe3ead7069d90d3c67d62137ad66acfcc9f48
+Author: HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 27 20:06:20 2020 +0900
-commit 07949bfe9133234eddd01715592aa0dde67745f0
+ Restore first section title of INSTALL
+
+commit 279261e1ea8150c7c64ab5fe7cb4a4ea17acbb29
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Aug 23 20:13:18 2017 +1000
+Date: Sun Sep 27 17:25:01 2020 +1000
- misc.c needs functions from platform.c now
+ update version numbers
-commit b074c3c3f820000a21953441cea7699c4b17d72f
+commit 58ca6ab6ff035ed12b5078e3e9c7199fe72c8587
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 18 05:48:04 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Sep 27 07:22:05 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: openssh 8.4
- add a "quiet" flag to exited_cleanly() that supresses
- errors about exit status (failure due to signal is still reported)
-
- Upstream-ID: db85c39c3aa08e6ff67fc1fb4ffa89f807a9d2f0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a29e5b372d2c00e297da8a35a3b87c9beb3b4a58
-commit de4ae07f12dabf8815ecede54235fce5d22e3f63
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 18 05:36:45 2017 +0000
+commit 9bb8a303ce05ff13fb421de991b495930be103c3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 22 10:07:43 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Move several subprocess-related functions from various
- locations to misc.c. Extend subprocess() to offer a little more control over
- stdio disposition.
-
- feedback & ok dtucker@
-
- Upstream-ID: 3573dd7109d13ef9bd3bed93a3deb170fbfce049
+ sync with upstream ssh-copy-id rev f0da1a1b7
-commit 643c2ad82910691b2240551ea8b14472f60b5078
+commit 0a4a5571ada76b1b012bec9cf6ad1203fc19ec8d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 12 06:46:01 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Sep 21 07:29:09 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: close stdin when forking after authentication too; ok markus
- make "--" before the hostname terminate command-line
- option processing completely; previous behaviour would not prevent further
- options appearing after the hostname (ssh has a supported options after the
- hostname for >20 years, so that's too late to change).
-
- ok deraadt@
-
- Upstream-ID: ef5ee50571b98ad94dcdf8282204e877ec88ad89
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43db17e4abc3e6b4a7b033aa8cdab326a7cb6c24
-commit 0f3455356bc284d7c6f4d3c1614d31161bd5dcc2
+commit d14fe25e6c3b89f8af17e2894046164ac3b45688
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 12 06:42:52 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Sep 20 23:31:46 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: close stdout/stderr after "ssh -f ..." forking
- Switch from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for encrypting
- new-style private keys. The latter having the advantage of being supported
- for no-OpenSSL builds; bz#2754 ok markus@
+ bz#3137, ok markus
- Upstream-ID: 54179a2afd28f93470471030567ac40431e56909
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2d83cc4dea1665651a7aa924ad1ed6bcaaab3e2
+
+commit 53a33a0d745179c02108589e1722457ca8ae4372
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 20 15:57:09 2020 +1000
+
+ .depend
-commit c4972d0a9bd6f898462906b4827e09b7caea2d9b
+commit 107eb3eeafcd390e1fa7cc7672a05e994d14013e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 11 04:47:12 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Sep 20 05:47:25 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: cap channel input buffer size at 16MB; avoids high memory use
+
+ when peer advertises a large window but is slow to consume the data we send
+ (e.g. because of a slow network)
- refuse to a private keys when its corresponding .pub key
- does not match. bz#2737 ok dtucker@
+ reported by Pierre-Yves David
- Upstream-ID: 54ff5e2db00037f9db8d61690f26ef8f16e0d913
+ fix with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1452771f5e5e768876d3bfe2544e3866d6ade216
+
+commit acfe2ac5fe033e227ad3a56624fbbe4af8b5da04
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 18 22:02:53 2020 +1000
+
+ libfido2 1.5.0 is recommended
-commit 4b3ecbb663c919132dddb3758e17a23089413519
+commit 52a03e9fca2d74eef953ddd4709250f365ca3975
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 11 04:41:08 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 18 08:16:38 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: handle multiple messages in a single read()
- don't print verbose error message when ssh disconnects
- under sftp; bz#2750; ok dtucker@
+ PR#183 by Dennis Kaarsemaker; feedback and ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 6d83708aed77b933c47cf155a87dc753ec01f370
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8570bb4d02d00cf70b98590716ea6a7d1cce68d1
-commit 42a8f8bc288ef8cac504c5c73f09ed610bc74a34
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 11 04:16:35 2017 +0000
+commit dc098405b2939146e17567a25b08fc6122893cdf
+Author: pedro martelletto <pedro@ambientworks.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 18 08:57:29 2020 +0200
- upstream commit
+ configure.ac: add missing includes
- Tweak previous keepalive commit: if last_time + keepalive
- <= now instead of just "<" so client_alive_check will fire if the select
- happens to return on exact second of the timeout. ok djm@
+ when testing, make sure to include the relevant header files that
+ declare the types of the functions used by the test:
- Upstream-ID: e02756bd6038d11bb8522bfd75a4761c3a684fcc
+ - stdio.h for printf();
+ - stdlib.h for exit();
+ - string.h for strcmp();
+ - unistd.h for unlink(), _exit(), fork(), getppid(), sleep().
-commit b60ff20051ef96dfb207b6bfa45c0ad6c34a542a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 11 03:58:36 2017 +0000
+commit b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 18 05:23:03 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to
- Keep track of the last time we actually heard from the
- client and use this to also schedule a client_alive_check(). Prevents
- activity on a forwarded port from indefinitely preventing the select timeout
- so that client_alive_check() will eventually (although not optimally) be
- called.
+ prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the
+ best-preference default algorithm.
- Analysis by willchan at google com via bz#2756, feedback & ok djm@
+ feedback and ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: c08721e0bbda55c6d18e2760f3fe1b17fb71169e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f
-commit 94bc1e7ffba3cbdea8c7dcdab8376bf29283128f
+commit f93b187ab900c7d12875952cc63350fe4de8a0a8
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 28 14:50:59 2017 +1000
+Date: Fri Sep 18 14:55:48 2020 +1000
- Expose list of completed auth methods to PAM
+ control over the colours in gnome-ssh-askpass[23]
- bz#2408; ok dtucker@
+ Optionally set the textarea colours via $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR and
+ $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR. These accept the usual three or six digit
+ hex colours.
-commit c78e6eec78c88acf8d51db90ae05a3e39458603d
+commit 9d3d36bdb10b66abd1af42e8655502487b6ba1fa
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 21 14:38:16 2017 +1000
+Date: Fri Sep 18 14:50:38 2020 +1000
- fix problems in tunnel forwarding portability code
-
- This fixes a few problems in the tun forwarding code, mostly to do
- with host/network byte order confusion.
+ focus improvement for gnome-ssh-askpass[23]
- Based on a report and patch by stepe AT centaurus.uberspace.de;
- bz#2735; ok dtucker@
+ When serving a SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none information dialog, ensure
+ then <enter> doesn't immediately close the dialog. Instead, require an
+ explicit <tab> to reach the close button, or <esc>.
-commit 2985d4062ebf4204bbd373456a810d558698f9f5
+commit d6f507f37e6c75a899db0ef8224e72797c5563b6
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 25 09:22:25 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Sep 16 03:07:31 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Remove unused buf, last user was removed when switching
- Make WinSCP patterns for SSH_OLD_DHGEX more specific to
- exclude WinSCP 5.10.x and up. bz#2748, from martin at winscp.net, ok djm@
+ to the sshbuf API. Patch from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior.
- Upstream-ID: 6fd7c32e99af3952db007aa180e73142ddbc741a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 250fa17f0cec01039cc4abd95917d9746e24c889
-commit 9f0e44e1a0439ff4646495d5735baa61138930a9
+commit c3c786c3a0973331ee0922b2c51832a3b8d7f20f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 24 04:34:28 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Sep 9 21:57:27 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: For the hostkey confirmation message:
- g/c unused variable; make a little more portable
+ > Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])?
+
+ compare the fingerprint case sensitively; spotted Patrik Lundin
+ ok dtucker
- Upstream-ID: 3f5980481551cb823c6fb2858900f93fa9217dea
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73097afee1b3a5929324e345ba4a4a42347409f2
-commit 51676ec61491ec6d7cbd06082034e29b377b3bf6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 23 23:37:02 2017 +0000
+commit f2950baf0bafe6aa20dfe2e8d1ca4b23528df617
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 11 14:45:23 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ New config-build-time dependency on automake.
+
+commit 600c1c27abd496372bd0cf83d21a1c119dfdf9a5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Sep 6 21:56:36 2020 +1000
+
+ Add aclocal.m4 and config.h.in~ to .gitignore.
+
+ aclocal.m4 is now generated by autoreconf.
+
+commit 4bf7e1d00b1dcd3a6b3239f77465c019e61c6715
+Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:03 2020 +0200
+
+ Quote the definition of OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD
+
+ autoreconf complains about underquoted definition of
+ OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD after aclocal.m4 has been and now is beeing
+ recreated.
- Allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an explicit
- ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system default; ok dtucker@
+ Quote OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD as suggested.
- Upstream-ID: 77906ff8c7b660b02ba7cb1e47b17d66f54f1f7e
+ Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
-commit 6c1fbd5a50d8d2415f06c920dd3b1279b741072d
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 21 14:24:26 2017 +1000
+commit a2f3ae386b5f7938ed3c565ad71f30c4f7f010f1
+Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:02 2020 +0200
- mention libedit
+ Move the local m4 macros
+
+ The `aclocal' step is skipped during `autoreconf' because aclocal.m4 is
+ present.
+ Move the current aclocal.m4 which contains local macros into the m4/
+ folder. With this change the aclocal.m4 will be re-created during
+ changes to the m4/ macro.
+ This is needed so the `aclocal' can fetch m4 macros from the system if
+ they are references in the configure script. This is a prerequisite to
+ use PKG_CHECK_MODULES.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
-commit dc2bd308768386b02c7337120203ca477e67ba62
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 19 08:30:41 2017 +0000
+commit 8372bff3a895b84fd78a81dc39da10928b662f5a
+Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
+Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:01 2020 +0200
- upstream commit
+ Remove HAVE_MMAP and BROKEN_MMAP
+
+ BROKEN_MMAP is no longer defined since commit
+ 1cfd5c06efb12 ("Remove portability support for mmap")
- fix support for unknown key types; ok djm@
+ this commit also removed other HAVE_MMAP user. I didn't find anything
+ that defines HAVE_MMAP. The check does not trigger because compression
+ on server side is by default COMP_DELAYED (2) so it never triggers.
- Upstream-ID: 53fb29394ed04d616d65b3748dee5aa06b07ab48
+ Remove remaining HAVE_MMAP and BROKEN_MMAP bits.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
-commit fd0e8fa5f89d21290b1fb5f9d110ca4f113d81d9
+commit bbf20ac8065905f9cb9aeb8f1df57fcab52ee2fb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 19 01:15:02 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Sep 9 03:10:21 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: adapt to SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR crank
- switch from select() to poll() for the ssh-agent
- mainloop; ok markus
-
- Upstream-ID: 4a94888ee67b3fd948fd10693973beb12f802448
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0f3e76bdc8f9dbd9d22707c7bdd86051d5112ab8
-commit b1e72df2b813ecc15bd0152167bf4af5f91c36d3
+commit 9afe2a150893b20bdf9eab764978d817b9a7b783
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 14 03:18:21 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 28 03:17:13 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Ensure that address/mask mismatches are flagged at
- Make ""Killed by signal 1" LogLevel verbose so it's not
- shown at the default level. Prevents it from appearing during ssh -J and
- equivalent ProxyCommand configs. bz#1906, bz#2744, feedback&ok markus@
+ config-check time. ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: debfaa7e859b272246c2f2633335d288d2e2ae28
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8f5f4c2c0bf00e6ceae7a1755a444666de0ea5c2
-commit 1f3d202770a08ee6752ed2a234b7ca6f180eb498
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 13 19:16:33 2017 +0000
+commit c76773524179cb654ff838dd43ba1ddb155bafaa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 9 03:08:01 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when writing an attestation blob for a FIDO key, record all
- man pages with pseudo synopses which list filenames end
- up creating very ugly output in man -k; after some discussion with ingo, we
- feel the simplest fix is to remove such SYNOPSIS sections: the info is hardly
- helpful at page top, is contained already in FILES, and there are
- sufficiently few that just zapping them is simple;
+ the data needed to verify the attestation. Previously we were missing the
+ "authenticator data" that is included in the signature.
- ok schwarze, who also helpfully ran things through a build to check
- output;
+ spotted by Ian Haken
+ feedback Pedro Martelletto and Ian Haken; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 3e211b99457e2f4c925c5927d608e6f97431336c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8439896e63792b2db99c6065dd9a45eabbdb7e0a
-commit 7f13a4827fb28957161de4249bd6d71954f1f2ed
-Author: espie@openbsd.org <espie@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 10 14:09:59 2017 +0000
+commit c1c44eeecddf093a7983bd91e70b446de789b363
+Author: pedro martelletto <pedro@ambientworks.net>
+Date: Tue Sep 1 17:01:55 2020 +0200
- upstream commit
+ configure.ac: fix libfido2 back-compat
- zap redundant Makefile variables. okay djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604
+ - HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROD -> HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT;
+ - check for fido_dev_get_touch_begin(), so that
+ HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN gets defined.
-commit dc44dd3a9e2c9795394e6a7e1e71c929cbc70ce0
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 8 18:32:54 2017 +0000
+commit 785f0f315bf7ac5909e988bb1ac3e019fb5e1594
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 31 04:33:17 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: refuse to add verify-required (PINful) FIDO keys to
- slightly rework previous, to avoid an article issue;
+ ssh-agent until the agent supports them properly
- Upstream-ID: 15a315f0460ddd3d4e2ade1f16d6c640a8c41b30
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 125bd55a8df32c87c3ec33c6ebe437673a3d037e
-commit 853edbe057a84ebd0024c8003e4da21bf2b469f7
+commit 39e88aeff9c7cb6862b37ad1a87a03ebbb38c233
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 7 03:53:12 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 31 00:17:41 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add RCS IDs to the few files that are missing them; from
- When generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A), clobber
- existing keys if they exist but are zero length. zero-length keys could
- previously be made if ssh-keygen failed part way through generating them, so
- avoid that case too. bz#2561 reported by Krzysztof Cieplucha; ok dtucker@
+ Pedro Martelletto
- Upstream-ID: f662201c28ab8e1f086b5d43c59cddab5ade4044
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39aa37a43d0c75ec87f1659f573d3b5867e4a3b3
-commit 43616876ba68a2ffaece6a6c792def4b039f2d6e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 1 22:55:44 2017 +0000
+commit 72730249b38a676da94a1366b54a6e96e6928bcb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 28 03:15:52 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Check that the addresses supplied to Match Address and
- actually remove these files
+ Match LocalAddress are valid when parsing in config-test mode. This will
+ catch address/mask mismatches before they cause problems at runtime. Found by
+ Daniel Stocker, ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d0b10c69fad5d8fda4c703e7c6804935289378b
-commit 83fa3a044891887369ce8b487ce88d713a04df48
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 1 13:50:45 2017 +0000
+commit 2a3a9822311a565a9df48ed3b6a3c972f462bd7d
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 12:34:00 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge
- the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus
+ upstream: sentence fix; from pedro martelletto
- Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f95b84a1e94e9913173229f3787448eea2f8a575
-commit 738c73dca2c99ee78c531b4cbeefc2008fe438f0
+commit ce178be0d954b210c958bc2b9e998cd6a7aa73a9
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 14 14:26:36 2017 +1000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 20:01:52 2020 +1000
- make explicit_bzero/memset safe for sz=0
+ tweak back-compat for older libfido2
-commit 8433d51e067e0829f5521c0c646b6fd3fe17e732
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 11 18:47:56 2017 -0700
+commit d6f45cdde031acdf434bbb27235a1055621915f4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 09:46:04 2020 +0000
- modified: configure.ac
- UnixWare needs BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON like Solaris
- Analysis by Robbie Zhang
+ upstream: debug()-print a little info about FIDO-specific key
+
+ fields via "ssh-keygen -vyf /path/key"
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf315c4fe77db43947d111b00155165cb6b577cf
-commit ff3507aea9c7d30cd098e7801e156c68faff7cc7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 7 11:21:27 2017 +1000
+commit b969072cc3d62d05cb41bc6d6f3c22c764ed932f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 09:43:28 2020 +0000
- typo
+ upstream: skip a bit more FIDO token selection logic when only a
+
+ single token is attached.
+
+ with Pedro Martelletto
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e4a324bd9814227ec1faa8cb619580e661cca9ac
-commit d79bceb9311a9c137d268f5bc481705db4151810
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 30 04:17:23 2017 +0000
+commit 744df42a129d7d7db26947b7561be32edac89f88
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 06:15:22 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- Only call close once in confree(). ssh_packet_close will
- close the FD so only explicitly close non-SSH channels. bz#2734, from
- bagajjal at microsoft.com, ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92714b6531e244e4da401b2defaa376374e24be7
+
+commit e32479645ce649b444ba5c6e7151304306a09654
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 03:55:22 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: adapt to API changes
- Upstream-ID: a81ce0c8b023527167739fccf1732b154718ab02
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5f147990cb67094fe554333782ab268a572bb2dd
-commit 197dc9728f062e23ce374f44c95a2b5f9ffa4075
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Thu Jun 29 15:40:25 2017 +1000
+commit bbcc858ded3fbc46abfa7760e40389e3ca93884c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 12:37:12 2020 +1000
- Update link for my patches.
+ degrade semi-gracefully when libfido2 is too old
-commit a98339edbc1fc21342a390f345179a9c3031bef7
+commit 9cbbdc12cb6a2ab1e9ffe9974cca91d213c185c2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 28 01:09:22 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:15:36 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: dummy firmware needs to match API version numner crank (for
- Allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in ssh-agent as a CA when
- signing certificates. bz#2377 ok markus
+ verify-required resident keys) even though it doesn't implement this feature
- Upstream-ID: fb42e920b592edcbb5b50465739a867c09329c8f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 86579ea2891e18e822e204413d011b2ae0e59657
-commit c9cdef35524bd59007e17d5bd2502dade69e2dfb
+commit c1e76c64956b424ba260fd4eec9970e5b5859039
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 06:35:24 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 02:11:09 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- regress test for ExposeAuthInfo
+ upstream: remove unreachable code I forgot to delete in r1.334
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 190e5b6866376f4061c411ab157ca4d4e7ae86fd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ed6078251a0959ee8deda443b9ae42484fd8b18
-commit f17ee61cad25d210edab69d04ed447ad55fe80c1
+commit 0caff05350bd5fc635674c9e051a0322faba5ae3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 07:08:57 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:08:45 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Request PIN ahead of time for certain FIDO actions
+
+ When we know that a particular action will require a PIN, such as
+ downloading resident keys or generating a verify-required key, request
+ the PIN before attempting it.
- correct env var name
+ joint work with Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 721e761c2b1d6a4dcf700179f16fd53a1dadb313
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 863182d38ef075bad1f7d20ca485752a05edb727
-commit 40962198e3b132cecdb32e9350acd4294e6a1082
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 06:57:04 2017 +0000
+commit b649b3daa6d4b8ebe1bd6de69b3db5d2c03c9af0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:08:19 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: preserve verify-required for resident FIDO keys
+
+ When downloading a resident, verify-required key from a FIDO token,
+ preserve the verify-required in the private key that is written to
+ disk. Previously we weren't doing that because of lack of support
+ in the middleware API.
- spelling;
+ from Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@ and myself
- Upstream-ID: 606f933c8e2d0be902ea663946bc15e3eee40b25
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 201c46ccdd227cddba3d64e1bdbd082afa956517
-commit 33f86265d7e8a0e88d3a81745d746efbdd397370
+commit 642e06d0df983fa2af85126cf4b23440bb2985bf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 06:38:11 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:07:51 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: major rework of FIDO token selection logic
+
+ When PINs are in use and multiple FIDO tokens are attached to a host, we
+ cannot just blast requests at all attached tokens with the PIN specified
+ as this will cause the per-token PIN failure counter to increment. If
+ this retry counter hits the token's limit (usually 3 attempts), then the
+ token will lock itself and render all (web and SSH) of its keys invalid.
+ We don't want this.
- don't pass pointer to struct sshcipher between privsep
- processes, just redo the lookup in each using the already-passed cipher name.
- bz#2704 based on patch from Brooks Davis; ok markus dtucker
+ So this reworks the key selection logic for the specific case of
+ multiple keys being attached. When multiple keys are attached and the
+ operation requires a PIN, then the user must touch the key that they
+ wish to use first in order to identify it.
- Upstream-ID: 2eab434c09bdf549dafd7da3e32a0d2d540adbe0
+ This may require multiple touches, but only if there are multiple keys
+ attached AND (usually) the operation requires a PIN. The usual case of a
+ single key attached should be unaffected.
+
+ Work by Pedro Martelletto; ok myself and markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 637d3049ced61b7a9ee796914bbc4843d999a864
-commit 8f574959272ac7fe9239c4f5d10fd913f8920ab0
+commit 801c9f095e6d8b7b91aefd98f5001c652ea13488
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 06:34:38 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:07:09 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- refactor authentication logging
+ upstream: support for requiring user verified FIDO keys in sshd
- optionally record successful auth methods and public credentials
- used in a file accessible to user sessions
+ This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding
+ sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the
+ user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt.
+ Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the
+ signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag
+ through and adding ways to require it.
feedback and ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 090b93036967015717b9a54fd0467875ae9d32fb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a2313aae153e043d57763d766bb6d55c4e276e6
-commit e2004d4bb7eb01c663dd3a3e7eb224f1ccdc9bba
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 06:28:50 2017 +0000
+commit 9b8ad93824c682ce841f53f3b5762cef4e7cc4dc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 27 01:06:18 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: support for user-verified FIDO keys
+
+ FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
+ required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
+ operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
+ themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
- word fix;
+ This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
+ the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
+ future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
+ another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
+ requires a PIN before each authentication.
- Upstream-ID: 8539bdaf2366603a34a9b2f034527ca13bb795c5
+ feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
-commit 4540428cd0adf039bcf5a8a27f2d5cdf09191513
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 05:37:44 2017 +0000
+commit 1196d7f49d4fbc90f37e550de3056561613b0960
+Author: cheloha@openbsd.org <cheloha@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 12 01:23:45 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: ssh-keyscan(1): simplify conloop() with timercmp(3),
- switch sshconnect.c from (slightly abused) select() to
- poll(); ok deraadt@ a while back
+ timersub(3); ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: efc1937fc591bbe70ac9e9542bb984f354c8c175
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a102acb544f840d33ad73d40088adab4a687fa27
-commit 6f8ca3b92540fa1a9b91670edc98d15448e3d765
+commit d0a195c89e26766d3eb8f3e4e2a00ebc98b57795
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 05:35:05 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Aug 11 09:49:57 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: let ssh_config(5)'s AddKeysToAgent keyword accept a time
- use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for
- matching host certificate principal names; bz#2728; ok dtucker@
+ limit for keys in addition to its current flag options. Time-limited keys
+ will automatically be removed from ssh-agent after their expiry time has
+ passed; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: dc2e11c83ae9201bbe74872a0c895ae9725536dd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 792e71cacbbc25faab5424cf80bee4a006119f94
-commit 8904ffce057b80a7472955f1ec00d7d5c250076c
+commit e9c2002891a7b8e66f4140557a982978f372e5a3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 24 05:24:11 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Aug 11 09:45:54 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: let the "Confirm user presence for key ..." ssh-askpass
- no need to call log_init to reinitialise logged PID in
- child sessions, since we haven't called openlog() in log_init() since 1999;
- ok markus@
+ notification respect $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 0906e4002af5d83d3d544df75e1187c932a3cf2e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c1a616b348779bda3b9ad46bf592741f8e206c1
-commit e238645d789cd7eb47541b66aea2a887ea122c9b
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 23 07:24:48 2017 +0000
+commit eaf8672b1b52db2815a229745f4e4b08681bed6d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 21 00:04:13 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Remove check for 'ent' command.
- When using the escape sequence &~ the code path is
- client_loop() -> client_simple_escape_filter() -> process_escapes() -> fork()
- and the pledge for this path lacks the proc promise and therefore aborts the
- process. The solution is to just add proc the promise to this specific
- pledge.
-
- Reported by Gregoire Jadi gjadi ! omecha.info
- Insight with tb@, OK jca@
-
- Upstream-ID: 63c05e30c28209519f476023b65b0b1b0387a05b
+ It was added in 8d1fd57a9 for measuring entropy of ssh_prng_cmds which
+ has long since been removed and there are no other references to it.
-commit 5abbb31c4e7a6caa922cc1cbb14e87a77f9d19d3
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 23 03:30:42 2017 +0000
+commit 05c215de8d224e094a872d97d45f37f60c06206b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Aug 17 21:34:32 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Import regenerated moduli.
-
- Upstream-ID: b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95
+ Wrap stdint.h include in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 849c5468b6d9b4365784c5dd88e3f1fb568ba38f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 23 03:25:53 2017 +0000
+commit eaf2765efe8bc74feba85c34295d067637fc6635
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 10 13:24:09 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Run the screen twice so we end up with more candidate
- groups. ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157
+ sync memmem.c with OpenBSD
-commit 4626e39c7053c6486c1c8b708ec757e464623f5f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 14 00:31:38 2017 +0000
+commit ed6bef77f5bb5b8f9ca2914478949e29f2f0a780
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 7 17:12:16 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Always send any PAM account messages.
- Add user@host prefix to client's "Permisison denied"
- messages, useful in particular when using "stacked" connections where it's
- not clear which host is denying. bz#2720, ok djm@ markus@
-
- Upstream-ID: de88e1e9dcb050c98e85377482d1287a9fe0d2be
+ If the PAM account stack reaturns any messages, send them to the user
+ not just if the check succeeds. bz#2049, ok djm@
-commit c948030d54911b2d3cddb96a7a8e9269e15d11cd
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 13 12:13:59 2017 +0000
+commit a09e98dcae1e26f026029b7142b0e0d10130056f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 7 15:37:37 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Do not require that unknown EXT_INFO extension values not
- contain \0 characters. This would cause fatal connection errors if an
- implementation sent e.g. string-encoded sub-values inside a value.
-
- Reported by Denis Bider; ok markus@
-
- Upstream-ID: 030e10fdc605563c040244c4b4f1d8ae75811a5c
+ Output test debug logs on failure.
-commit 6026f48dfca78b713e4a7f681ffa42a0afe0929e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 13 11:22:15 2017 +0000
+commit eb122b1eebe58b29a83a507ee814cbcf8aeded1b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 7 15:11:42 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- missing prototype.
+ Add ability to specify exact test target.
+
+commit c2ec7a07f8caabb4d8e00c66e7cd46bf2cd1e922
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 7 14:21:15 2020 +1000
+
+ Document --without-openssl and --without-zlib.
+
+commit 651bb3a31949bbdc3a78b2ede95a77bce0c72984
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Aug 7 14:15:11 2020 +1000
+
+ Add without-openssl without-zlib test target.
+
+commit 9499f2bb01dc1032ae155999b2d7764b9491341f
+Author: Stefan Schindler <dns2utf8@estada.ch>
+Date: Wed Aug 5 19:00:52 2020 +0200
+
+ Add CI with prepare script
- Upstream-ID: f443d2be9910fd2165a0667956d03343c46f66c9
+ * Only use heimdal kerberos implementation
+ * Fetch yubico/libfido2 (see: https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2)
+ * Add one target for
+ * all features
+ * each feature alone
+ * no features
-commit bcd1485075aa72ba9418003f5cc27af2b049c51b
+commit ea1f649046546a860f68b97ddc3015b7e44346ca
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 10 23:41:25 2017 +1000
+Date: Wed Aug 5 08:58:57 2020 +1000
- portability for sftp globbed ls sort by mtime
+ support NetBSD's utmpx.ut_ss address field
- Include replacement timespeccmp() for systems that lack it.
- Support time_t struct stat->st_mtime in addition to
- timespec stat->st_mtim, as well as unsorted fallback.
+ bz#960, ok dtucker
-commit 072e172f1d302d2a2c6043ecbfb4004406717b96
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 10 06:36:46 2017 +0000
+commit 32c63e75a70a0ed9d6887a55fcb0e4531a6ad617
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 4 14:59:21 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ wrap a declaration in the same ifdefs as its use
- print '?' instead of incorrect link count (that the
- protocol doesn't provide) for remote listings. bz#2710 ok dtucker@
-
- Upstream-ID: c611f98a66302cea452ef10f13fff8cf0385242e
+ avoids warnings on NetBSD
-commit 72be5b2f8e7dc37235e8c4b8d0bc7b5ee1301505
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 10 06:33:34 2017 +0000
+commit c9e3be9f4b41fda32a2a0138d54c7a6b563bc94d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 4 14:58:46 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ undef TAILQ_CONCAT and friends
- implement sorting for globbed ls; bz#2649 ok dtucker@
-
- Upstream-ID: ed3110f351cc9703411bf847ba864041fb7216a8
+ Needed for NetBSD. etc that supply these macros
-commit 5b2f34a74aa6a524cd57e856b23e1b7b25007721
+commit 2d8a3b7e8b0408dfeb933ac5cfd3a58f5bac49af
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 9 06:47:13 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 3 02:53:51 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: ensure that certificate extensions are lexically sorted.
- return failure rather than fatal() for more cases during
- mux negotiations. Causes the session to fall back to a non-mux connection if
- they occur. bz#2707 ok dtucker@
+ Previously if the user specified a custom extension then the everything would
+ be in order except the custom ones. bz3198 ok dtucker markus
- Upstream-ID: d2a7892f464d434e1f615334a1c9d0cdb83b29ab
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d97deb90587b06cb227c66ffebb2d9667bf886f0
-commit 7f5637c4a67a49ef256cb4eedf14e8590ac30976
+commit a8732d74cb8e72f0c6366015687f1e649f60be87
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 9 06:43:01 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Aug 3 02:43:41 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: allow -A to explicitly enable agent forwarding in scp and
- in description of public key authentication, mention that
- the server will send debug messages to the client for some error conditions
- after authentication has completed. bz#2709 ok dtucker
+ sftp. The default remains to not forward an agent, even when ssh_config
+ enables it. ok jmc dtucker markus
- Upstream-ID: 750127dbd58c5a2672c2d28bc35fe221fcc8d1dd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36cc526aa3b0f94e4704b8d7b969dd63e8576822
-commit 2076e4adb986512ce8c415dd194fd4e52136c4b4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 9 06:40:24 2017 +0000
+commit ab9105470a83ed5d8197959a1b1f367399958ba1
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 3 02:42:49 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: clang -Wimplicit-fallthrough does not recognise /*
- better translate libcrypto errors by looking deeper in
- the accursed error stack for codes that indicate the wrong passphrase was
- supplied for a PEM key. bz#2699 ok dtucker@
+ FALLTHROUGH */ comments, which is the style we currently use, and gives too
+ many boring warnings. ok djm
- Upstream-ID: 4da4286326d570f4f0489459bb71f6297e54b681
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07b5031e9f49f2b69ac5e85b8da4fc9e393992a0
-commit ad0531614cbe8ec424af3c0fa90c34a8e1ebee4c
+commit ced327b9fb78c94d143879ef4b2a02cbc5d38690
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 9 04:40:04 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 31 04:19:37 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Also compare username when checking for JumpHost loops.
- Add comments referring to the relevant RFC sections for
- rekeying behaviour.
+ bz#3057, ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 6fc8e82485757a27633f9175ad00468f49a07d40
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bbc1d138adb34c54f3c03a15a91f75dbf418782
-commit ce9134260b9b1247e2385a1afed00c26112ba479
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 9 14:43:47 2017 +1000
+commit ae7527010c44b3376b85d036a498f136597b2099
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 31 15:19:04 2020 +1000
- drop two more privileges in the Solaris sandbox
+ Remove AC_REVISION.
- Drop PRIV_DAX_ACCESS and PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO.
- Patch from huieying.lee AT oracle.com via bz#2723
+ It hasn't been useful since we switched to git in 2014. ok djm@
-commit e0f609c8a2ab940374689ab8c854199c3c285a76
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Jun 9 13:36:29 2017 +1000
+commit 89fc3f414be0ce4e8008332a9739a7d721269e50
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 28 19:40:30 2020 +1000
- Wrap stdint.h include in #ifdef.
+ Use argv in OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE test.
+
+ configure.ac is not detecting -Wextra in compilers that implement the
+ option. The problem is that -Wextra implies -Wunused-parameter, and the
+ C excerpt used by aclocal.m4 does not use argv. Patch from pedro at
+ ambientworks.net, ok djm@
-commit 1de5e47a85850526a4fdaf77185134046c050f75
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 7 01:48:15 2017 +0000
+commit 62c81ef531b0cc7ff655455dd34f5f0c94f48e82
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 22:12:07 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- unbreak after sshv1 purge
+ Skip ECDSA-SK webauthn test when built w/out ECC
+
+commit 3ec9a6d7317236a9994887d8bd5d246af403a00d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 20 13:09:25 2020 +1000
+
+ Add ssh-sk-helper and manpage to RPM spec file
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 8ea01a92d5f571b9fba88c1463a4254a7552d51b
+ Based on patch from Fabio Pedretti
-commit 550c053168123fcc0791f9952abad684704b5760
+commit a2855c048b3f4b17d8787bd3f24232ec0cd79abe
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 6 09:12:17 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 17 07:09:24 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add %k to the TOKENs for Match Exec for consistency with
- Fix compression output stats broken in rev 1.201. Patch
- originally by Russell Coker via Debian bug #797964 and Christoph Biedl. ok
- djm@
+ the other keywords that recently got %k.
- Upstream-ID: 83a1903b95ec2e4ed100703debb4b4a313b01016
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1857d1c40f270cbc254fca91e66110641dddcfdb
-commit 55d06c6e72a9abf1c06a7ac2749ba733134a1f39
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 2 06:06:10 2017 +0000
+commit 69860769fa9f4529d8612ec055ae11912f7344cf
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 05:59:05 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- rationalise the long list of manual CDIAGFLAGS that we
- add; most of these were redundant to -Wall -Wextra
+ upstream: fix macro slip in previous;
- Upstream-ID: ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 624e47ab209450ad9ad5c69f54fa69244de5ed9a
-commit 1527d9f61e6d50f6c2b4a3fa5b45829034b1b0b1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 1 06:59:21 2017 +0000
+commit 40649bd0822883b684183854b16d0b8461d5697b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 07:10:24 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add test for '%k' (HostKeyAlias) TOKEN.
- no need to bzero allocated space now that we use use
- recallocarray; ok deraadt@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8ed1ba1a811790031aad3fcea860a34ad7910456
+
+commit 6736fe680704a3518cb4f3f8f6723b00433bd3dd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:26:58 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add tests for expansions on UserKnownHostsFile.
- Upstream-ID: 53333c62ccf97de60b8cb570608c1ba5ca5803c8
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bccf8060306c841bbcceb1392644f906a4d6ca51
-commit cc812baf39b93d5355565da98648d8c31f955990
+commit 287dc6396e0f9cb2393f901816dbd7f2a7dfbb5f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 1 06:58:25 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:51:32 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: log error message for process_write() write failures
- unconditionally zero init size of buffer; ok markus@
- deraadt@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f733d7b3b05e3c68967dc18dfe39b9e8fad29851
+
+commit 8df5774a42d2eaffe057bd7f293fc6a4b1aa411c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:43:42 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add a '%k' TOKEN that expands to the effective HostKey of
+
+ the destination. This allows, eg, keeping host keys in individual files
+ using "UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k". bz#1654, ok djm@, jmc@
+ (man page bits)
- Upstream-ID: 218963e846d8f26763ba25afe79294547b99da29
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7084d723c9cc987a5c47194219efd099af5beadc
-commit 65eb8fae0d7ba45ef4483a3cf0ae7fd0dbc7c226
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 1 16:25:09 2017 +1000
+commit c4f239944a4351810fd317edf408bdcd5c0102d9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 17 03:23:10 2020 +0000
- avoid compiler warning
+ upstream: Add %-TOKEN, environment variable and tilde expansion to
+
+ UserKnownHostsFile, allowing the file to be automagically split up in the
+ configuration (eg bz#1654). ok djm@, man page parts jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e1b406caf147638bb51558836a72d6cc0bd1b18
-commit 2d75d74272dc2a0521fce13cfe6388800c9a2406
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 1 06:16:43 2017 +0000
+commit dbaaa01daedb423c38124a72c471982fb08a16fb
+Author: solene@openbsd.org <solene@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 07:50:46 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: - Add [-a rounds] in ssh-keygen man page and usage() -
- some warnings spotted by clang; ok markus@
+ Reorder parameters list in the first usage() case - Sentence rewording
- Upstream-ID: 24381d68ca249c5cee4388ceb0f383fa5b43991b
+ ok dtucker@
+ jmc@ noticed usage() missed -a flag too
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f06b9afe91cc96f260b929a56e9930caecbde246
-commit 151c6e433a5f5af761c78de87d7b5d30a453cf5e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 1 15:25:13 2017 +1000
+commit 69924a92c3af7b99a7541aa544a2334ec0fb092c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 05:40:05 2020 +0000
- add recallocarray replacement and dependency
+ upstream: start sentence with capital letter;
- recallocarray() needs getpagesize() so add a tiny replacement for that.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab06581d51b2b4cc1b4aab781f7f3cfa56cad973
-commit 01e6f78924da308447e71e9a32c8a6104ef4e888
+commit 5b56bd0affea7b02b540bdbc4d1d271b0e4fc885
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 1 15:16:24 2017 +1000
+Date: Fri Jul 17 13:15:50 2020 +1000
- add *.0 manpage droppings
+ detect Linux/X32 systems
+
+ This is a frankenstein monster of AMD64 instructions/calling conventions
+ but with a 4GB address space. Allegedly deprecated but people still run
+ into it causing weird sandbox failures, e.g. bz#3085
-commit 4b2e2d3fd9dccff357e1e26ce9a5f2e103837a36
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 1 04:51:58 2017 +0000
+commit 9c9ddc1391d6af8d09580a2424ab467d0a5df3c7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 06:43:16 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Fix previous by calling the correct function.
- fix casts re constness
-
- Upstream-ID: e38f2bac162b37dbaf784d349c8327a6626fa266
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 821cdd1dff9c502cceff4518b6afcb81767cad5a
-commit 75b8af8de805c0694b37fcf80ce82783b2acc86f
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 10:54:00 2017 +0000
+commit f1a4798941b4372bfe5e46f1c0f8672fe692d9e4
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 05:36:50 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Update test to match recent change in match.c
- make sure we don't pass a NULL string to vfprintf
- (triggered by the principals-command regress test); ok bluhm
-
- Upstream-ID: eb49854f274ab37a0b57056a6af379a0b7111990
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 965bda1f95f09a765050707340c73ad755f41167
-commit 84008608c9ee944d9f72f5100f31ccff743b10f2
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 10:04:29 2017 +0000
+commit d7e71be4fd57b7c7e620d733cdf2333b27bfa924
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 15:30:43 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- use SO_ZEROIZE for privsep communication (if available)
+ Adjust portable code to match changes in 939d787d,
+
+commit fec89f32a84fd0aa1afc81deec80a460cbaf451a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 04:27:34 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add default for number of rounds (-a). ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: abcbb6d2f8039fc4367a6a78096e5d5c39de4a62
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cb7e9aa04ace01a98e63e4bd77f34a42ab169b15
-commit 9e509d4ec97cb3d71696f1a2f1fdad254cbbce11
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 09:15:42 2017 +0000
+commit aaa8b609a7b332be836cd9a3b782422254972777
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 14 23:57:01 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: allow some additional control over the use of ssh-askpass
- Switch to recallocarray() for a few operations. Both
- growth and shrinkage are handled safely, and there also is no need for
- preallocation dances. Future changes in this area will be less error prone.
- Review and one bug found by markus
+ via $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE, including force-enable/disable. bz#69 ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 822d664d6a5a1d10eccb23acdd53578a679d5065
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a1e6cbbf6241ddc4405c4246caa2c249f149eb2
-commit dc5dc45662773c0f7745c29cf77ae2d52723e55e
+commit 6368022cd4dd508671c4999a59ec5826df098530
Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 08:58:52 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 7 02:47:21 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: correct recently broken comments
- These shutdown() SHUT_RDWR are not needed before close()
- ok djm markus claudio
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 964d9a88f7de1d0eedd3f8070b43fb6e426351f1
+
+commit 6d755706a0059eb9e2d63517f288b75cbc3b4701
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 5 23:59:45 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: some language improvements; ok markus
- Upstream-ID: 36f13ae4ba10f5618cb9347933101eb4a98dbcb5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 939d787d571b4d5da50b3b721fd0b2ac236acaa8
-commit 1e0cdf8efb745d0d1116e1aa22bdc99ee731695e
+commit b0c1e8384d5e136ebdf895d1434aea7dd8661a1c
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 08:09:45 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 10:12:26 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: update setproctitle after re-exec; ok djm
- clear session keys from memory; ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: ecd178819868975affd5fd6637458b7c712b6a0f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc92d122f9184ec2a9471ade754b80edd034ce8b
-commit 92e9fe633130376a95dd533df6e5e6a578c1e6b8
+commit cd119a5ec2bf0ed5df4daff3bd14f8f7566dafd3
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 07:00:13 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 10:11:33 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: keep ignoring HUP after fork+exec; ok djm
- remove now obsolete ctx from ssh_dispatch_run; ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: 9870aabf7f4d71660c31fda91b942b19a8e68d29
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7679985a84ee5ceb09839905bb6f3ddd568749a2
-commit 17ad5b346043c5bbc5befa864d0dbeb76be39390
+commit 8af4a743693ccbea3e15fc9e93edbeb610fa94f4
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 05:34:14 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 10:10:17 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: don't exit the listener on send_rexec_state errors; ok
- use the ssh_dispatch_run_fatal variant
+ djm
- Upstream-ID: 28c5b364e37c755d1b22652b8cd6735a05c625d8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57cbd757d130d3f45b7d41310b3a15eeec137d5c
-commit 39896b777320a6574dd06707aebac5fb98e666da
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 05:08:46 2017 +0000
+commit 03da4c2b70468f04ed1c08518ea0a70e67232739
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 15 04:55:47 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Use $OBJ to find key files. Fixes test when run on an obj
- another ctx => ssh conversion (in GSSAPI code)
+ directory (on OpenBSD) or out of tree (in Portable).
- Upstream-ID: 4d6574c3948075c60608d8e045af42fe5b5d8ae0
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 938fa8ac86adaa527d64a305bd2135cfbb1c0a17
-commit 6116bd4ed354a71a733c8fd0f0467ce612f12911
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 14:56:07 2017 +1000
+commit 73f20f195ad18f1cf633eb7d8be95dc1b6111eea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 4 23:11:23 2020 +1000
- fix conversion of kexc25519s.c to struct ssh too
-
- git cvsimport missed this commit for some reason
+ Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit d40dbdc85b6fb2fd78485ba02225511b8cbf20d7
+commit aa6fa4bf3023fa0e5761cd8f4b2cd015d2de74dd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 04:29:44 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 07:25:18 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: put back the mux_ctx memleak fix, but only for channels of
- spell out that custom options/extensions should follow the
- usual SSH naming rules, e.g. "extension@example.com"
+ type SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER; Specifically SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels
+ should not have this structure freed.
- Upstream-ID: ab326666d2fad40769ec96b5a6de4015ffd97b8d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b213ae60405f77439e2b06262f054760c9d325
-commit 2a108277f976e8d0955c8b29d1dfde04dcbb3d5b
+commit d8195914eb43b20b13381f4e5a74f9f8a14f0ded
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 04:17:12 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 07:17:35 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: revert r1.399 - the lifetime of c->mux_ctx is more complex;
- one more void *ctx => struct ssh *ssh conversion
+ simply freeing it here causes other problems
- Upstream-ID: d299d043471c10214cf52c03daa10f1c232759e2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fee8ca94e2485faa783839541962be2834c5ed
-commit c04e979503e97f52b750d3b98caa6fe004ab2ab9
+commit 20b5fab9f773b3d3c7f06cb15b8f69a2c081ee80
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 31 00:43:04 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 3 07:02:37 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: avoid tilde_expand_filename() in expanding ~/.ssh/rc - if
- fix possible OOB strlen() in SOCKS4A hostname parsing;
- ok markus@
+ sshd is in chroot mode, the likely absence of a password database will cause
+ tilde_expand_filename() to fatal; ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: c67297cbeb0e5a19d81752aa18ec44d31270cd11
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e20aee6159e8b79190d18dba1513fc1b7c8b7ee1
-commit a3bb250c93bfe556838c46ed965066afce61cffa
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 19:38:17 2017 +0000
+commit c8935081db35d73ee6355999142fa0776a2af912
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 06:46:41 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when redirecting sshd's log output to a file, undo this
- tweak previous;
+ redirection after the session child process is forked(); ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: 66987651046c42d142f7318c9695fb81a6d14031
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6df86dd653c91f5bc8ac1916e7680d9d24690865
-commit 1112b534a6a7a07190e497e6bf86b0d5c5fb02dc
-Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 18:58:37 2017 +0000
+commit 183c4aaef944af3a1a909ffa01058c65bac55748
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 06:29:57 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: start ClientAliveInterval bookkeeping before first pass
- Add RemoteCommand option to specify a command in the
- ssh config file instead of giving it on the client's command line. This
- command will be executed on the remote host. The feature allows to automate
- tasks using ssh config. OK markus@
+ through select() loop; fixed theoretical case where busy sshd may ignore
+ timeouts from client; inspired by and ok dtucker
- Upstream-ID: 5d982fc17adea373a9c68cae1021ce0a0904a5ee
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96bfc4b1f86c7da313882a84755b2b47eb31957f
-commit eb272ea4099fd6157846f15c129ac5727933aa69
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:29:59 2017 +0000
+commit 6fcfd303d67f16695198cf23d109a988e40eefb6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 15:28:27 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ add check for fido_cred_set_prot() to configure
+
+commit f11b23346309e4d5138e733a49321aedd6eeaa2f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 05:09:06 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Only reset the serveralive check when we receive traffic from
- switch auth2 to ssh_dispatch API; ok djm@
+ the server and ignore traffic from a port forwarding client, preventing a
+ client from keeping a connection alive when it should be terminated. Based
+ on a patch from jxraynor at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev and bz#2265, ok
+ djm@
- Upstream-ID: a752ca19e2782900dd83060b5c6344008106215f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a941a575a5cbc244c0ef5d7abd0422bbf02c2dcd
-commit 5a146bbd4fdf5c571f9fb438e5210d28cead76d9
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:27:22 2017 +0000
+commit adfdbf1211914b631c038f0867a447db7b519937
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 15:15:15 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- switch auth2-none.c to modern APIs; ok djm@
+ sync sys-queue.h with OpenBSD upstream
- Upstream-ID: 07252b58e064d332214bcabbeae8e08c44b2001b
+ needed for TAILQ_CONCAT
-commit 60306b2d2f029f91927c6aa7c8e08068519a0fa2
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:26:49 2017 +0000
+commit 1b90ddde49e2ff377204082b6eb130a096411dc1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 3 05:08:41 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix memory leak of mux_ctx; patch from Sergiy Lozovsky
- switch auth2-passwd.c to modern APIs; ok djm@
+ via bz3189 ok dtucker
- Upstream-ID: cba0a8b72b4f97adfb7e3b3fd2f8ba3159981fc7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db249bd4526fd42d0f4f43f72f7b8b7705253bde
-commit eb76698b91338bd798c978d4db2d6af624d185e4
+commit 55ef3e9cbd5b336bd0f89205716924886fcf86de
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:25:42 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Jul 1 16:28:31 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: free kex in ssh_packet_close; ok djm semarie
- switch auth2-hostbased.c to modern APIs; ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: 146af25c36daeeb83d5dbbb8ca52b5d25de88f4e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbc181e90d3d32fd97b10d75e68e374270e070a2
-commit 2ae666a8fc20b3b871b2f1b90ad65cc027336ccd
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:23:52 2017 +0000
+commit e1c401109b61f7dbc199b5099933d579e7fc5dc9
+Author: bket@openbsd.org <bket@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jun 27 13:39:09 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Replace TAILQ concatenation loops with TAILQ_CONCAT
- protocol handlers all get struct ssh passed; ok djm@
+ OK djm@
- Upstream-ID: 0ca9ea2a5d01a6d2ded94c5024456a930c5bfb5d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454b40e09a117ddb833794358970a65b14c431ef
-commit 94583beb24a6c5fd19cedb9104ab2d2d5cd052b6
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:19:15 2017 +0000
+commit 14beca57ac92d62830c42444c26ba861812dc837
+Author: semarie@openbsd.org <semarie@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 11:26:01 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: backout 1.293 fix kex mem-leak in ssh_packet_close at markus
+
+ request
- ssh: pass struct ssh to auth functions, too; ok djm@
+ the change introduced a NULL deref in sshpkt_vfatal() (uses of ssh->kex after
+ calling ssh_packet_clear_keys())
- Upstream-ID: d13c509cc782f8f19728fbea47ac7cf36f6e85dd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c9a6721411461b0b1c28dc00930d7251a798484
-commit 5f4082d886c6173b9e90b9768c9a38a3bfd92c2b
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:18:15 2017 +0000
+commit 598c3a5e3885080ced0d7c40fde00f1d5cdbb32b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 16:07:12 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ document a PAM spec problem in a frustrated comment
+
+commit 976c4f86286d52a0cb2aadf4a095d379c0da752e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:42:16 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: avoid spurious error message when ssh-keygen creates files
- sshd: pass struct ssh to auth functions; ok djm@
+ outside ~/.ssh; with dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: b00a80c3460884ebcdd14ef550154c761aebe488
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0c662d44607e00ec78c266ee60752beb1c7e08
-commit 7da5df11ac788bc1133d8d598d298e33500524cc
+commit 32b2502a9dfdfded1ccdc1fd6dc2b3fe41bfc205
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 15:30:06 2020 +1000
+
+ missing ifdef SELINUX; spotted by dtucker
+
+commit e073106f370cdd2679e41f6f55a37b491f0e82fe
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:12:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: regress test for ssh-add -d; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3a2e044be616afc7dd4f56c100179e83b33d8abf
+
+commit c809daaa1bad6b1c305b0e0b5440360f32546c84
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:16:41 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:16:23 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add test for mux w/-Oproxy; ok djm
- remove unused wrapper functions from key.[ch]; ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 764d5c696e2a259f1316a056e225e50023abb027
+
+commit 3d06ff4bbd3dca8054c238d2a94c0da563ef7eee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:16:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: handle EINTR in waitfd() and timeout_connect() helpers;
+
+ bz#3071; ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: ea0f4016666a6817fc11f439dd4be06bab69707e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08fa87be50070bd8b754d9b1ebb1138d7bc9d8ee
-commit ff7371afd08ac0bbd957d90451d4dcd0da087ef5
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:15:17 2017 +0000
+commit fe2ec0b9c19adeab0cd9f04b8152dc17f31c31e5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:04:07 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: allow "ssh-add -d -" to read keys to be deleted from
- sshkey_new() might return NULL (pkcs#11 code only); ok
- djm@
+ stdin bz#3180; ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: de9f2ad4a42c0b430caaa7d08dea7bac943075dd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15c7f10289511eb19fce7905c9cae8954e3857ff
-commit beb965bbc5a984fa69fb1e2b45ebe766ae09d1ef
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:13:40 2017 +0000
+commit a3e0c376ffc11862fa3568b28188bd12965973e1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:03:36 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: constify a few things; ok dtucker (as part of another
- switch sshconnect.c to modern APIs; ok djm@
+ diff)
- Upstream-ID: 27be17f84b950d5e139b7a9b281aa487187945ad
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c17fc987085994d752304bd20b1ae267a9bcdf6
-commit 00ed75c92d1f95fe50032835106c368fa22f0f02
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 14:10:53 2017 +0000
+commit 74344c3ca42c3f53b00b025daf09ae7f6aa38076
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 05:02:03 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Defer creation of ~/.ssh by ssh(1) until we attempt to
- switch auth2-pubkey.c to modern APIs; with & ok djm@
+ write to it so we don't leave an empty .ssh directory when it's not needed.
+ Use the same function to replace the code in ssh-keygen that does the same
+ thing. bz#3156, ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 8f08d4316eb1b0c4ffe4a206c05cdd45ed1daf07
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c073b569be1a60f4de36f491a4339bc4ae870f
-commit 54d90ace1d3535b44d92a8611952dc109a74a031
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 08:52:19 2017 +0000
+commit c9e24daac6324fcbdba171392c325bf9ccc3c768
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 26 04:45:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Expand path to ~/.ssh/rc rather than relying on it
- switch from Key typedef with struct sshkey; ok djm@
+ being relative to the current directory, so that it'll still be found if the
+ shell startup changes its directory. Since the path is potentially longer,
+ make the cmd buffer that uses it dynamically sized. bz#3185, with & ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 3067d33e04efbe5131ce8f70668c47a58e5b7a1f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36e33ff01497af3dc8226d0c4c1526fc3a1e46bf
-commit c221219b1fbee47028dcaf66613f4f8d6b7640e9
+commit 07f5f369a25e228a7357ef6c57205f191f073d99
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 08:49:58 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:12:09 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix kex mem-leak in ssh_packet_close; ok djm
- remove ssh1 references; ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: fc23b7578e7b0a8daaec72946d7f5e58ffff5a3d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2e9533f393620383afd0b68ef435de8d5e8abe4
-commit afbfa68fa18081ef05a9cd294958509a5d3cda8b
+commit e35995088cd6691a712bfd586bae8084a3a922ba
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 30 08:49:32 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:10:38 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix ssh -O proxy w/mux which got broken by no longer
- revise sshkey_load_public(): remove ssh1 related
- comments, remove extra open()/close() on keyfile, prevent leak of 'pub' if
- 'keyp' is NULL, replace strlcpy+cat with asprintf; ok djm@
+ making ssh->kex optional in packet.c revision 1.278 ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 6175e47cab5b4794dcd99c1175549a483ec673ca
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b65df04a064c2c6277359921d2320c90ab7d917
-commit 813f55336a24fdfc45e7ed655fccc7d792e8f859
+commit 250246fef22b87a54a63211c60a2def9be431fbd
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 26 20:34:49 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:09:53 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: support loading big sshd_config files w/o realloc; ok
- sshbuf_consume: reset empty buffer; ok djm@
+ djm
- Upstream-ID: 0d4583ba57f69e369d38bbd7843d85cac37fa821
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9238e810074ac907f0cf8cee1737ac04983171
-commit 6cf711752cc2a7ffaad1fb4de18cae65715ed8bb
+commit 89b54900ac61986760452f132bbe3fb7249cfdac
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 26 19:35:50 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:08:53 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- remove SSH_CHANNEL_XXX_DRAINING (ssh1 only); ok djm@
+ upstream: allow sshd_config longer than 256k; ok djm
- Upstream-ID: e2e225b6ac67b84dd024f38819afff2554fafe42
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83f40dd5457a64c1d3928eb4364461b22766beb3
-commit 364f0d5edea27767fb0f915ea7fc61aded88d3e8
+commit e3fa6249e6d9ceb57c14b04dd4c0cfab12fa7cd5
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 26 19:34:12 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 24 15:07:33 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: only call sshkey_xmss_init() once for KEY_XMSS_CERT; ok
- remove channel_input_close_confirmation (ssh1 only); ok
- djm@
+ djm
- Upstream-ID: 8e7c8c38f322d255bb0294a5c0ebef53fdf576f1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0002ffb7f20f538b014d1d0735facd5a81ff096
-commit 8ba0fd40082751dbbc23a830433488bbfb1abdca
+commit 37f2da069c0619f2947fb92785051d82882876d7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 26 01:40:07 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 23:44:27 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: some clarifying comments
- fix references to obsolete v00 cert format; spotted by
- Jakub Jelen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5268479000fd97bfa30ab819f3517139daa054a2
+
+commit b659319a5bc9e8adf3c4facc51f37b670d2a7426
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 06:37:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: updated argument name for -P in first synopsis was
- Upstream-ID: 7600ce193ab8fd19451acfe24fc2eb39d46b2c4f
+ missed in previous;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d84dc3050469884ea91e29ee06a371713f2d0b7
-commit dcc714c65cfb81eb6903095b4590719e8690f3da
-Author: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
-Date: Wed May 24 23:21:19 2017 -0400
+commit 02a9222cbce7131d639984c2f6c71d1551fc3333
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 06:36:40 2020 +0000
- configure: actually set cache vars when cross-compiling
+ upstream: supply word missing in previous;
- The cross-compiling fallback message says it's assuming the test
- passed, but it didn't actually set the cache var which causes
- later tests to fail.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16a38b049f216108f66c8b699aa046063381bd23
+
+commit 5098b3b6230852a80ac6cef5d53a785c789a5a56
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 16:54:02 2020 +1000
-commit 947a3e829a5b8832a4768fd764283709a4ca7955
+ missing files for webauthn/sshsig unit test
+
+commit 354535ff79380237924ac8fdc98f8cdf83e67da6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat May 20 02:35:47 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 06:00:06 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add support for verification of webauthn sshsig signature,
- there's no reason to artificially limit the key path
- here, just check that it fits PATH_MAX; spotted by Matthew Patton
+ and example HTML/JS to generate webauthn signatures in SSH formats (also used
+ to generate the testdata/* for the test).
- Upstream-ID: 858addaf2009c9cf04d80164a41b2088edb30b58
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc575be5bb1796fdf4b8aaee0ef52a6671a0f6fb
-commit 773224802d7cb250bb8b461546fcce10567b4b2e
+commit bb52e70fa5330070ec9a23069c311d9e277bbd6f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 19 21:07:17 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:58:35 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add support for FIDO webauthn (verification only).
- Now that we no longer support SSHv1, replace the contents
- of this file with a pointer to
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00 It's better edited,
- doesn't need to document stuff we no longer implement and does document stuff
- that we do implement (RSA SHA256/512 signature flags)
+ webauthn is a standard for using FIDO keys in web browsers. webauthn
+ signatures are a slightly different format to plain FIDO signatures - this
+ support allows verification of these. Feedback and ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: da8cdc46bbcc266efabd565ddddd0d8e556f846e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab7e3a9fb5782d99d574f408614d833379e564ad
-commit 54cd41a4663fad66406dd3c8fe0e4760ccd8a899
+commit 64bc121097f377142f1387ffb2df7592c49935af
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 17 01:24:17 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:56:23 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: refactor ECDSA-SK verification a little ahead of adding
- allow LogLevel in sshd_config Match blocks; ok dtucker
- bz#2717
+ support for FIDO webauthn signature verification support; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 662e303be63148f47db1aa78ab81c5c2e732baa8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9f478fd8e0c1bd17e511ce8694f010d8e32043e
-commit 277abcda3f1b08d2376686f0ef20320160d4c8ab
+commit 12848191f8fe725af4485d3600e0842d92f8637f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 16 16:56:15 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:54:10 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: support for RFC4648 base64url encoding; ok markus
- remove duplicate check; spotted by Jakub Jelen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef22c55e772dda05c112c88412c0797fec66eb4
+
+commit 473b4af43db12127137c7fc1a10928313f5a16d2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:53:26 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: better terminology for permissions; feedback & ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 30c2996c1767616a8fdc49d4cee088efac69c3b0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff2a71803b5ea57b83cc3fa9b3be42b70e462fb9
-commit adb47ce839c977fa197e770c1be8f852508d65aa
+commit fc270baf264248c3ee3050b13a6c8c0919e6559f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 16 16:54:05 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Jun 22 05:52:05 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: better terminology for permissions; feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffb220b435610741dcb4de0e7fc68cbbdc876d2c
+
+commit 00531bb42f1af17ddabea59c3d9c4b0629000d27
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 07:21:42 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Correct synopsis and usage for the options accepted when
- mention that Ed25519 keys are valid as CA keys; spotted
- by Jakub Jelen
+ passing a command to ssh-agent. ok jmc@
- Upstream-ID: d3f6db58b30418cb1c3058211b893a1ffed3dfd4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b36f0679cb0cac0e33b361051b3406ade82ea846
-commit 6bdf70f01e700348bb4d8c064c31a0ab90896df6
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue May 9 14:35:03 2017 +1000
+commit b4556c8ad7177e379f0b60305a0cd70f12180e7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 19:22:00 2020 +1000
- clean up regress files and add a .gitignore
+ Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker to bcrypt_pbkdf.
-commit 7bdb2eeb1d3c26acdc409bd94532eefa252e440b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 8 22:57:38 2017 +0000
+commit 1babb8bb14c423011ca34c2f563bb1c51c8fbf1d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 19:10:47 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Extra brackets around sizeof() in bcrypt.
- remove hmac-ripemd160; ok dtucker
-
- Upstream-ID: 896e737ea0bad6e23327d1c127e02d5e9e9c654d
+ Prevents following warning from clang 10:
+ bcrypt_pbkdf.c:94:40: error: expression does not compute the number of
+ elements in this array; element type is ´uint32_tÂ[...]
+ place parentheses around the ´sizeof(uint64_t)´ expression to
+ silence this warning
-commit 5f02bb1f99f70bb422be8a5c2b77ef853f1db554
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 8 06:11:06 2017 +0000
+commit 9e065729592633290e5ddb6852792913b2286545
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 18:47:56 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Add includes.h to new test.
- make requesting bad ECDSA bits yield the same error
- (SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH) as the same mistake for RSA/DSA
+ Fixes warnings eg "´bounded´ attribute directive ignor" from gcc.
+
+commit e684b1ea365e070433f282a3c1dabc3e2311ce49
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 18:38:39 2020 +1000
+
+ Skip OpenSSL specific tests w/out OpenSSL.
- Upstream-ID: bf40d3fee567c271e33f05ef8e4e0fa0b6f0ece6
+ Allows unit tests to pass when configure'ed --without-openssl.
-commit d757a4b633e8874629a1442c7c2e7b1b55d28c19
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 8 06:08:42 2017 +0000
+commit 80610e97a76407ca982e62fd051c9be03622fe7b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 17:15:27 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Hook sshsig tests up to Portable Makefiles.
+
+commit 5dba1fcabacaab46693338ec829b42a1293d1f52
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 19 05:07:09 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Test that ssh-agent exits when running as as subprocess
- fix for new SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH error value
+ of a specified command (ie "ssh-agent command"). Would have caught bz#3181.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: c38a6e6174d4c3feca3518df150d4fbae0dca8dc
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 895b4765ba5153eefaea3160a7fe08ac0b6db8b3
-commit 2e58a69508ac49c02d1bb6057300fa6a76db1045
+commit 68e8294f6b04f9590ea227e63d3e129398a49e27
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 8 06:03:39 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 19 04:34:21 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: run sshsig unit tests
- helps if I commit the correct version of the file. fix
- missing return statement.
-
- Upstream-ID: c86394a3beeb1ec6611e659bfa830254f325546c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 706ef17e2b545b64873626e0e35553da7c06052a
-commit effaf526bfa57c0ac9056ca236becf52385ce8af
+commit 5edfa1690e9a75048971fd8775f7c16d153779db
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 8 01:52:49 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 19 04:32:09 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: basic unit test for sshsig.[ch], including FIDO keys
- remove arcfour, blowfish and CAST here too
+ verification only so far
- Upstream-Regress-ID: c613b3bcbef75df1fe84ca4dc2d3ef253dc5e920
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb1f946c8fc59206bc6a6666e577b5d5d7e45896
-commit 7461a5bc571696273252df28a1f1578968cae506
+commit e95c0a0e964827722d29b4bc00d5c0ff4afe0ed2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 8 00:21:36 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 19 03:48:49 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- I was too aggressive with the scalpel in the last commit;
- unbreak sshd, spotted quickly by naddy@
+ upstream: basic unit test for FIDO kep parsing
- Upstream-ID: fb7e75d2b2c7e6ca57dee00ca645e322dd49adbf
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8089b88393dd916d7c95422b442a6fd4cfe00c82
-commit bd636f40911094a39c2920bf87d2ec340533c152
+commit 7775819c6de3e9547ac57b87c7dd2bfd28cefcc5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun May 7 23:15:59 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Jun 18 23:34:19 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: check public host key matches private; ok markus@ (as
- Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length. Improve reporting
- for keys that do not meet this requirement. ok markus@
+ part of previous diff)
- Upstream-ID: b385e2a7b13b1484792ee681daaf79e1e203df6c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65a4f66436028748b59fb88b264cb8c94ce2ba63
-commit 70c1218fc45757a030285051eb4d209403f54785
+commit c514f3c0522855b4d548286eaa113e209051a6d2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun May 7 23:13:42 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Jun 18 23:33:38 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: avoid spurious "Unable to load host key" message when
- Don't offer CBC ciphers by default in the client. ok
- markus@
+ sshd can load a private key but no public counterpart; with & ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 94c9ce8d0d1a085052e11c7f3307950fdc0901ef
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0713cbdf9aa1ff8ac7b1f78b09ac911af510f81b
-commit acaf34fd823235d549c633c0146ee03ac5956e82
+commit 7fafaeb5da365f4a408fec355dac04a774f27193
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun May 7 23:12:57 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 12 05:26:37 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: correct RFC number; from HARUYAMA Seigo via GH PR191
- As promised in last release announcement: remove
- support for Blowfish, RC4 and CAST ciphers. ok markus@ deraadt@
-
- Upstream-ID: 21f8facdba3fd8da248df6417000867cec6ba222
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d03b6c96ca98bfbc23d3754c3c33e1fe0852e10
-commit 3e371bd2124427403971db853fb2e36ce789b6fd
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 5 10:42:49 2017 +0000
+commit 3a7f654d5bcb20df24a134b6581b0d235da4564a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 06:18:07 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: unbreak "sshd -ddd" - close of config passing fd happened too
- more simplification and removal of SSHv1-related code;
- ok djm@
+ early. ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: d2f041aa0b79c0ebd98c68a01e5a0bfab2cf3b55
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49346e945c6447aca3e904e65fc400128d2f8ed0
-commit 2e9c324b3a7f15c092d118c2ac9490939f6228fd
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 5 10:41:58 2017 +0000
+commit 3de02be39e5c0c2208d9682a3844991651620fcc
+Author: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
+Date: Mon May 25 11:10:44 2020 +0200
- upstream commit
-
- remove superfluous protocol 2 mentions; ok jmc@
-
- Upstream-ID: 0aaf7567c9f2e50fac5906b6a500a39c33c4664d
+ Add support for AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
-commit 744bde79c3361e2153cb395a2ecdcee6c713585d
+commit ea547eb0329c2f8da77a4ac05f6c330bd49bdaab
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu May 4 06:10:57 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:25:35 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make sshbuf_putb(b, NULL) a no-op
- since a couple of people have asked, leave a comment
- explaining why we retain SSH v.1 support in the "delete all keys from agent"
- path.
-
- Upstream-ID: 4b42dcfa339813c15fe9248a2c1b7ed41c21bbb4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 976fdc99b500e347023d430df372f31c1dd128f7
-commit 0c378ff6d98d80bc465a4a6a787670fb9cc701ee
+commit 69796297c812640415c6cea074ea61afc899cbaa
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu May 4 01:33:21 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:24:36 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make sshbuf_dump() args const
- another tentacle: cipher_set_key_string() was only ever
- used for SSHv1
-
- Upstream-ID: 7fd31eb6c48946f7e7cc12af0699fe8eb637e94a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4a5accae750875d665b862504169769bcf663bd
-commit 9a82e24b986e3e0dc70849dbb2c19aa6c707b37f
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 3 21:49:18 2017 +0000
+commit 670428895739d1f79894bdb2457891c3afa60a59
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:24:16 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: wrap long line
- restore mistakenly deleted description of the
- ConnectionAttempts option ok markus@
-
- Upstream-ID: 943002b1b7c470caea3253ba7b7348c359de0348
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed405a12bd27bdc9c52e169bc5ff3529b4ebbbb2
-commit 768405fddf64ff83aa6ef701ebb3c1f82d98a2f3
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 3 21:08:09 2017 +0000
+commit 2f648cf222882719040906722b3593b01df4ad1a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 03:15:26 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Correct historical comment: provos@ modified OpenSSH to
- remove miscellaneous SSH1 leftovers; ok markus@
+ work with SSLeay (very quickly replaced by OpenSSL) not SSL in general. ok
+ deraadt, historical context markus@
- Upstream-ID: af23696022ae4d45a1abc2fb8b490d8d9dd63b7c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7209e07a2984b50411ed8ca5a4932da5030d2b90
-commit 1a1b24f8229bf7a21f89df21987433283265527a
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 3 10:01:44 2017 +0000
+commit 56548e4efcc3e3e8093c2eba30c75b23e561b172
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 3 08:23:18 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- more protocol 1 bits removed; ok djm
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- Upstream-ID: b5b977eaf756915acb56aef3604a650e27f7c2b9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54
-commit 2b6f799e9b230cf13a7eefc05ecead7d8569d6b5
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 3 06:32:02 2017 +0000
+commit 8da801f585dd9c534c0cbe487a3b1648036bf2fb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 5 13:20:10 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Test fallthrough in OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE.
- more protocol 1 stuff to go; ok djm
+ clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does not understand /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ comments and we don't use the __attribute__((fallthrough)) that it's
+ looking for. This has the effect of turning off -Wimplicit-fallthrough
+ where it does not currently help (particularly with -Werror). ok djm@
+
+commit 049297de975b92adcc2db77e3fb7046c0e3c695d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 3 08:23:18 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- Upstream-ID: 307a30441d2edda480fd1661d998d36665671e47
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54
-commit f10c0d32cde2084d2a0b19bc47d80cb93e85a093
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 2 17:04:09 2017 +0000
+commit b458423a38a3140ac022ffcffcb332609faccfe3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 1 07:11:38 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Remove now-unused proto_spec and associated definitions.
- rsa1 is no longer valid;
+ ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 9953d09ed9841c44b7dcf7019fa874783a709d89
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e2b18e3aa6ee22a7b69c39f2d3bd679ec35c362
-commit 42b690b4fd0faef78c4d68225948b6e5c46c5163
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 2 14:06:37 2017 +0000
+commit 5ad3c3a33ef038b55a14ebd31faeeec46073db2c
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 21:22:02 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Fix error message on close(2) and add printf format
- add PubKeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the -o list: scp(1) has
- it, so i guess this should too;
+ attributes. From Christos Zoulas, OK markus@
- Upstream-ID: 7fab32e869ca5831d09ab0c40d210b461d527a2c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41523c999a9e3561fcc7082fd38ea2e0629ee07e
-commit d852603214defd93e054de2877b20cc79c19d0c6
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 2 13:44:51 2017 +0000
+commit 712ac1efb687a945a89db6aa3e998c1a17b38653
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 11:17:56 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Make dollar_expand variadic and pass a real va_list to
- remove now obsolete protocol1 options from the -o
- lists;
+ vdollar_percent_expand. Fixes build error on arm64 spotted by otto@.
- Upstream-ID: 828e478a440bc5f9947672c392420510a362b3dd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181910d7ae489f40ad609b4cf4a20f3d068a7279
-commit 8b60ce8d8111e604c711c4cdd9579ffe0edced74
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 2 09:05:58 2017 +0000
+commit 837ffa9699a9cba47ae7921d2876afaccc027133
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 29 20:39:00 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- more -O shuffle; ok djm
+ Omit ToS setting if we don't have IPV6_TCLASS too.
- Upstream-ID: c239991a3a025cdbb030b73e990188dd9bfbeceb
+ Fixes tests on old BSDs.
-commit 3575f0b12afe6b561681582fd3c34067d1196231
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 2 08:54:19 2017 +0000
+commit f85b118d2150847cc333895296bc230e367be6b5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 09:02:44 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Pass a NULL instead of zeroed out va_list from
- remove -1 / -2 options; pointed out by jmc@
+ dollar_expand. The original intent was in case there's some platform where
+ va_list is not a pointer equivalent, but on i386 this chokes on the memset.
+ This unbreaks that build, but will require further consideration.
- Upstream-ID: 65d2a816000741a95df1c7cfdb5fa8469fcc7daa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b90afcd8e1137a1d863204060052aef415baaf7
-commit 4f1ca823bad12e4f9614895eefe0d0073b84a28f
+commit ec1d50b01c84ff667240ed525f669454c4ebc8e9
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 2 08:06:33 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri May 29 05:48:39 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: remove a stray .El;
- remove options -12 from usage();
-
- Upstream-ID: db7ceef25132e63b50ed05289bf447fece1d1270
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ddfe6f8a15fe10209db6664ecbe7896f1d167c
-commit 6b84897f7fd39956b849eac7810319d8a9958568
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 2 07:13:31 2017 +0000
+commit 058674a62ffe33f01d871d46e624bc2a2c22d91f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 04:32:26 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add regression and unit tests for ${ENV} style
- tidy up -O somewhat; ok djm
+ environment variable expansion in various keywords (bz#3140). ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 804405f716bf7ef15c1f36ab48581ca16aeb4d52
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4d9ceb95d89365b7b674bc26cf064c15a5bbb197
-commit d1c6b7fdbdfe4a7a37ecd48a97f0796b061c2868
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 1 22:09:48 2017 +0000
+commit 0b15892fc47d6840eba1291a6be9be1a70bc8972
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 01:21:35 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- when freeing a bitmap, zero all it bytes; spotted by Ilya
- Kaliman
+ upstream: Unit test for convtime. ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 834ac024f2c82389d6ea6b1c7d6701b3836e28e4
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cec4239efa2fc4c7062064f07a847e1cbdbcd5dd
-commit 0f163983016c2988a92e039d18a7569f9ea8e071
+commit 188e332d1c8f9f24e5b6659e9680bf083f837df9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 1 14:08:26 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri May 29 05:37:03 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: mention that wildcards are processed in lexical order;
- this one I did forget to "cvs rm"
+ bz#3165
- Upstream-ID: 5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8856f3d1612bd42e9ee606d89386cae456dd165c
-commit 21ed00a8e26fe8a772bcca782175fafc2b0890ed
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 1 09:27:45 2017 +0000
+commit 4a1b46e6d032608b7ec00ae51c4e25b82f460b05
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 04:25:40 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Allow some keywords to expand shell-style ${ENV}
- don't know why cvs didn't exterminate these the first
- time around, I use rm -f and everuthing...
+ environment variables on the client side. The supported keywords are
+ CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent and IdentityFile, plus
+ LocalForward and RemoteForward when used for Unix domain socket paths. This
+ would for example allow forwarding of Unix domain socket paths that change at
+ runtime. bz#3140, ok djm@
- pointed out by sobrado@
-
- Upstream-ID: a6c44a0c2885330d322ee01fcfd7f6f209b1e15d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a2e801fc2d4df2fe0e58f50d9c81b03822dffa
-commit d29ba6f45086703fdcb894532848ada3427dfde6
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon May 1 13:53:07 2017 +1000
+commit c9bab1d3a9e183cef3a3412f57880a0374cc8cb2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 14:49:16 2020 +1000
- Define INT32_MAX and INT64_MAX if needed.
+ depend
-commit 329037e389f02ec95c8e16bf93ffede94d3d44ce
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon May 1 13:19:41 2017 +1000
+commit 0b0d219313bf9239ca043f20b1a095db0245588f
+Author: sobrado <sobrado@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 3 23:06:28 2015 +0000
- Wrap stdint.h in HAVE_STDINT_H
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
+
+ synchronize synopsis and usage.
-commit f382362e8dfb6b277f16779ab1936399d7f2af78
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 1 02:27:11 2017 +0000
+commit 0f04c8467f589f85a523e19fd684c4f6c4ed9482
+Author: chl <chl@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 26 19:12:28 2015 +0000
- upstream commit
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
remove unused variable
- Upstream-ID: 66011f00819d0e71b14700449a98414033284516
+ ok tedu@
-commit dd369320d2435b630a5974ab270d686dcd92d024
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:34:55 2017 +0000
+commit d6a81050ace2630b06c3c6dd39bb4eef5d1043f8
+Author: tobias <tobias@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 21:22:50 2015 +0000
- upstream commit
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- eliminate explicit specification of protocol in tests and
- loops over protocol. We only support SSHv2 now.
+ The code in socks.c writes multiple times in a row to a socket. If the socket becomes invalid between these calls (e.g. connection closed), write will throw SIGPIPE. With this patch, SIGPIPE is ignored so we can handle write's -1 return value (errno will be EPIPE). Ultimately, it leads to program exit, too -- but with nicer error message. :)
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 0082838a9b8a382b7ee9cbf0c1b9db727784fadd
+ with input by and ok djm
-commit 557f921aad004be15805e09fd9572969eb3d9321
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:33:48 2017 +0000
+commit bf3893dddd35e16def04bf48ed2ee1ad695b8f82
+Author: tobias <tobias@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 26 10:36:03 2015 +0000
- upstream commit
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- remove SSHv1 support from unit tests
+ Check for short writes in fdpass(). Clean up while at it.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 395ca2aa48f1f7d23eefff6cb849ea733ca8bbfe
+ ok djm
-commit e77e1562716fb3da413e4c2397811017b762f5e3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 1 00:03:18 2017 +0000
+commit e18435fec124b4c08eb6bbbbee9693dc04f4befb
+Author: jca <jca@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 14 22:40:22 2015 +0000
- upstream commit
+ partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream
- fixup setting ciphercontext->plaintext (lost in SSHv1 purge),
- though it isn't really used for much anymore.
+ Support for nc -T on IPv6 addresses.
- Upstream-ID: 859b8bce84ff4865b32097db5430349d04b9b747
-
-commit f7849e6c83a4e0f602dea6c834a24091c622d68e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon May 1 09:55:56 2017 +1000
-
- remove configure --with-ssh1
+ ok sthen@
-commit f4a6a88ddb6dba6d2f7bfb9e2c9879fcc9633043
+commit 4c607244054a036ad3b2449a6cb4c15feb846a76
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:29:10 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri May 29 03:14:02 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- flense SSHv1 support from ssh-agent, considerably
- simplifying it
+ upstream: fix compilation on !HAVE_DLOPEN platforms; stub function
- ok markus
+ was not updated to match API change. From Dale Rahn via beck@ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 71d772cdcefcb29f76e01252e8361e6fc2dfc365
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b8d054afe34c9ac85e417dae702ef981917b836
-commit 930e8d2827853bc2e196c20c3e000263cc87fb75
+commit 224418cf55611869a4ace1b8b07bba0dff77a9c3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:28:41 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri May 29 03:11:54 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix exit status for downloading of FIDO resident keys;
- obliterate ssh1.h and some dead code that used it
-
- ok markus@
+ from Pedro Martelletto, ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 1ca9159a9fb95618f9d51e069ac8e1131a087343
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0da77dc24a1084798eedd83c39a002a9d231faef
-commit a3710d5d529a34b8f56aa62db798c70e85d576a0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:28:12 2017 +0000
+commit 1001dd148ed7c57bccf56afb40cb77482ea343a6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 29 01:20:46 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- exterminate the -1 flag from scp
+ upstream: Fix multiplier in convtime when handling seconds after
- ok markus@
+ other units. bz#3171, spotted by ronf at timeheart.net, ok djm@.
- Upstream-ID: 26d247f7065da15056b209cef5f594ff591b89db
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95b7a848e1083974a65fbb6ccb381d438e1dd5be
-commit aebd0abfaa8a41e75d50f9f7934267b0a2d9acb4
+commit 7af1e92cd289b7eaa9a683e9a6f2fddd98f37a01
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:26:54 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed May 27 22:37:53 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix Include before Match in sshd_config; bz#3122 patch
- purge the last traces of SSHv1 from the TTY modes
- handling code
-
- ok markus
+ from Jakub Jelen
- Upstream-ID: 963a19f1e06577377c38a3b7ce468f121b966195
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b0aaf135fe6732b5d326946042665dd3beba5f4
-commit dfa641f758d4b8b2608ab1b00abaf88df0a8e36a
+commit 0a9a611619b0a1fecd0195ec86a9885f5d681c84
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:26:16 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed May 27 21:59:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- remove the (in)famous SSHv1 CRC compensation attack
- detector.
+ upstream: Do not call process_queued_listen_addrs() for every
- Despite your cameo in The Matrix movies, you will not be missed.
-
- ok markus
+ included file from sshd_config; patch from Jakub Jelen
- Upstream-ID: 44261fce51a56d93cdb2af7b6e184be629f667e0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ff603d6f06a7fab4881f12503b53024799d0a49
-commit e5d3bd36ef67d82092861f39b5bf422cb12b31a6
+commit 16ea1fdbe736648f79a827219134331f8d9844fb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:25:03 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed May 27 21:25:18 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix crash in recallocarray when deleting SendEnv
- undo some local debugging stuff that I committed by
- accident
+ variables; spotted by & ok sthen@
- Upstream-ID: fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b881e8e849edeec5082b5c0a87d8d7cff091a8fd
-commit 3d6d09f2e90f4ad650ebda6520bf2da446f37f14
+commit 47adfdc07f4f8ea0064a1495500244de08d311ed
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:23:54 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed May 27 22:35:19 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: two new tests for Include in sshd_config, checking whether
- remove SSHv1 support from packet and buffer APIs
-
- ok markus@
+ Port directives are processed correctly and handling of Include directives
+ that appear before Match. Both tests currently fail. bz#3122 and bz#3169 -
+ patch from Jakub Jelen
- Upstream-ID: bfc290053d40b806ecac46317d300677d80e1dc9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8ad5a4a385a63f0a1c59c59c763ff029b45715df
-commit 05164358577c82de18ed7373196bc7dbd8a3f79c
+commit 47faad8f794516c33864d866aa1b55d88416f94c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed May 27 23:26:23 2020 +1000
+
+ Document that libfido2 >= 1.4.0 is needed.
+
+commit 4be563994c0cbe9856e7dd3078909f41beae4a9c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:21:54 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue May 26 01:59:46 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix memleak of signature; from Pedro Martelletto
- remove SSHv1-related buffers from client code
-
- Upstream-ID: dca5d01108f891861ceaf7ba1c0f2eb274e0c7dd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0a6eb07e77c001427d738b220dd024ddc64b2bb
-commit 873d3e7d9a4707d0934fb4c4299354418f91b541
+commit 0c111eb84efba7c2a38b2cc3278901a0123161b9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:18:44 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue May 26 01:26:58 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Restrict ssh-agent from signing web challenges for FIDO
+
+ keys.
+
+ When signing messages in ssh-agent using a FIDO key that has an
+ application string that does not start with "ssh:", ensure that the
+ message being signed is one of the forms expected for the SSH protocol
+ (currently pubkey authentication and sshsig signatures).
- remove KEY_RSA1
+ This prevents ssh-agent forwarding on a host that has FIDO keys
+ attached granting the ability for the remote side to sign challenges
+ for web authentication using those keys too.
+
+ Note that the converse case of web browsers signing SSH challenges is
+ already precluded because no web RP can have the "ssh:" prefix in the
+ application string that we require.
ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 7408517b077c892a86b581e19f82a163069bf133
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ab6012574ed0352d2f097d307f4a988222d1b19
-commit 788ac799a6efa40517f2ac0d895a610394298ffc
+commit 9c5f64b6cb3a68b99915202d318b842c6c76cf14
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:18:22 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue May 26 01:09:05 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: improve logging for MaxStartups connection throttling:
- remove SSHv1 configuration options and man pages bits
-
- ok markus@
+ have sshd log when it starts and stops throttling and periodically while in
+ this state. bz#3055 ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 84638c23546c056727b7a7d653c72574e0f19424
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e07a09a62ab45d790d3d2d714f8cc09a9ac7ab9
-commit e6882463a8ae0594aacb6d6575a6318a41973d84
+commit 756c6f66aee83a5862a6f936a316f761532f3320
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:17:37 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue May 26 01:06:52 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add fmt_timeframe() (from bgpd) to format a time
- remove SSH1 make flag and associated files ok markus@
+ interval in a human- friendly format. Switch copyright for this file from BSD
+ to MIT to make it easier to add Henning's copyright for this function. ok
+ markus@
- Upstream-ID: ba9feacc5787337c413db7cf26ea3d53f854cfef
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 414a831c662df7e68893e5233e86f2cac081ccf9
-commit cdccebdf85204bf7542b7fcc1aa2ea3f36661833
+commit 2a63ce5cd6d0e782783bf721462239b03757dd49
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:15:04 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon May 18 04:29:35 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: avoid possible NULL deref; from Pedro Martelletto
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6099c3fbb70aa67eb106e84d8b43f1fa919b721
+
+commit 4b307faf2fb0e63e51a550b37652f7f972df9676
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 15 08:34:03 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshd listener must not block if reexecd sshd exits
- remove SSHv1 ciphers; ok markus@
+ in write(2) on config_s[0] if the forked child exits early before finishing
+ recv_rexec_state (e.g. with fatal()) because config_s[1] stays open in the
+ parent. this prevents the parent from accepting new connections. ok djm,
+ deraadt
- Upstream-ID: e5ebc5e540d7f23a8c1266db1839794d4d177890
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ccfeb939ccd55bda914dc3fe84582158c4a9ef
-commit 97f4d3083b036ce3e68d6346a6140a22123d5864
+commit af8b16fb2cce880341c0ee570ceb0d84104bdcc0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:13:25 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri May 15 03:57:33 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix off-by-one error that caused sftp downloads to make
- remove compat20/compat13/compat15 variables
+ one more concurrent request that desired. This prevented using sftp(1) in
+ unpipelined request/response mode, which is useful when debugging. Patch from
+ Stephen Goetze in bz#3054
- ok markus@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41b394ebe57037dbc43bdd0eef21ff0511191f28
+
+commit d7d753e2979f2d3c904b03a08d30856cd2a6e892
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 22:38:41 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: we are still aiming for pre-C99 ...
- Upstream-ID: 43802c035ceb3fef6c50c400e4ecabf12354691c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a240fc9cbe60bc4e6c3d24d022eb4ab01fe1cb38
-commit 99f95ba82673d33215dce17bfa1512b57f54ec09
+commit 2ad7b7e46408dbebf2a4efc4efd75a9544197d57
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:11:45 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed May 13 10:08:02 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Enable credProtect extension when generating a resident
- remove options.protocol and client Protocol
- configuration knob
+ key.
- ok markus@
+ The FIDO 2.1 Client to Authenticator Protocol introduced a "credProtect"
+ feature to better protect resident keys. This option allows (amone other
+ possibilities) requiring a PIN prior to all operations that may retrieve
+ the key handle.
- Upstream-ID: 5a967f5d06e2d004b0235457b6de3a9a314e9366
+ Patch by Pedro Martelletto; ok djm and markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 013bc06a577dcaa66be3913b7f183eb8cad87e73
-commit 56912dea6ef63dae4eb1194e5d88973a7c6c5740
+commit 1e70dc3285fc9b4f6454975acb81e8702c23dd89
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 30 23:10:43 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed May 13 09:57:17 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: always call fido_init(); previous behaviour only called
- unifdef WITH_SSH1 ok markus@
+ fido_init() when SK_DEBUG was defined. Harmless with current libfido2, but
+ this isn't guaranteed in the future.
- Upstream-ID: 9716e62a883ef8826c57f4d33b4a81a9cc7755c7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7ea20ff2bcd98dd12015d748d3672d4f01f0864
-commit d4084cd230f7319056559b00db8b99296dad49d5
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 29 06:06:01 2017 +0000
+commit f2d84f1b3fa68d77c99238d4c645d0266fae2a74
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 09:55:57 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: preserve group/world read permission on known_hosts
- tweak previous;
+ file across runs of "ssh-keygen -Rf /path". The old behaviour was to remove
+ all rights for group/other. bz#3146 ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: a3abc6857455299aa42a046d232b7984568bceb9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc369d0e0b5dd826430c63fd5f4b269953448a8a
-commit 249516e428e8461b46340a5df5d5ed1fbad2ccce
+commit 05a651400da6fbe12296c34e3d3bcf09f034fbbf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 29 04:12:25 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed May 13 09:52:41 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when ordering the hostkey algorithms to request from a
- allow ssh-keygen to include arbitrary string or flag
- certificate extensions and critical options. ok markus@ dtucker@
+ server, prefer certificate types if the known_hosts files contain a key
+ marked as a @cert-authority; bz#3157 ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 2cf28dd6c5489eb9fc136e0b667ac3ea10241646
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f194573e5bb7c01b69bbfaabc68f27c9fa5e0db
-commit 47a287bb6ac936c26b4f3ae63279c02902ded3b9
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 06:15:03 2017 +0000
+commit 829451815ec207e14bd54ff5cf7e22046816f042
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 12 01:41:32 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix non-ASCII quote that snuck in; spotted by Gabriel
- sort;
+ Kihlman
- Upstream-ID: 7e6b56e52b039cf44d0418e9de9aca20a2d2d15a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04bcde311de2325d9e45730c744c8de079b49800
-commit 36465a76a79ad5040800711b41cf5f32249d5120
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 14:44:28 2017 +1000
+commit 5a442cec92c0efd6fffb4af84bf99c70af248ef3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 11 02:11:29 2020 +0000
- Typo.
+ upstream: clarify role of FIDO tokens in multi-factor
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308
+ authentictation; mostly from Pedro Martelletto
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fbe05685a1f99c74b1baca7130c5a03c2df7c0ac
-commit 9d18cb7bdeb00b20205fd13d412aae8c0e0457ed
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 14:41:17 2017 +1000
+commit ecb2c02d994b3e21994f31a70ff911667c262f1f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 05:13:14 2020 +0000
- Add 2 regress commits I applied by hand.
+ upstream: fix compilation with DEBUG_KEXDH; bz#3160 ok dtucker@
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 832e771948fb45f2270e8b8895aac36d176ba17a
-commit 9504ea6b27f9f0ece64e88582ebb9235e664a100
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 14:33:43 2017 +1000
+commit 3ab6fccc3935e9b778ff52f9c8d40f215d58e01d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu May 14 12:22:09 2020 +1000
- Merge integrity.sh rev 1.22.
+ prefer ln to cp for temporary copy of sshd
- Merge missing bits from Colin Watson's patch in bz#2658 which make integrity
- tests more robust against timeouts. ok djm@
+ I saw failures on the reexec fallback test on Darwin 19.4 where
+ fork()ed children of a process that had it's executable removed
+ would instantly fail. Using ln to preserve the inode avoids this.
-commit 06ec837a34542627e2183a412d6a9d2236f22140
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 14:30:03 2017 +1000
+commit f700d316c6b15a9cfbe87230d2dca81a5d916279
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed May 13 15:24:51 2020 +1000
- Id sync for integrity.sh rev 1.21 which pulls in some shell portability fixes
+ Actually skip pty tests when needed.
-commit e0194b471efe7d3daedc9cc66686cb1ab69d3be8
-Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 17 11:02:31 2017 +0000
+commit 08ce6b2210f46f795e7db747809f8e587429dfd2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed May 13 13:56:45 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Change COMPILER_VERSION tests which limited additional
- warnings to gcc4 to instead skip them on gcc3 as clang can handle
- -Wpointer-sign and -Wold-style-definition.
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: e48d7dc13e48d9334b8195ef884dfbc51316012f
+ Skip building sk-dummy library if no SK support.
-commit 6830be90e71f46bcd182a9202b151eaf2b299434
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 03:24:53 2017 +0000
+commit 102d106bc2e50347d0e545fad6ff5ce408d67247
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 12:08:34 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ explicitly manage .depend and .depend.bak
- include key fingerprint in "Offering public key" debug
- message
-
- Upstream-ID: 964749f820c2ed4cf6a866268b1a05e907315c52
+ Bring back removal of .depend to give the file a known state before
+ running makedepend, but manually move aside the current .depend file
+ and restore it as .depend.bak afterwards so the stale .depend check
+ works as expected.
-commit 066437187e16dcafcbc19f9402ef0e6575899b1d
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 03:21:12 2017 +0000
+commit 83a6dc6ba1e03b3fa39d12a8522b8b0e68dd6390
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 12:03:42 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Avoid relying on implementation-specific behavior when
- detecting whether the timestamp or file size overflowed. If time_t and off_t
- are not either 32-bit or 64-bit scp will exit with an error. OK djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: f31caae73ddab6df496b7bbbf7da431e267ad135
+ make depend
-commit 68d3a2a059183ebd83b15e54984ffaced04d2742
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 28 03:20:27 2017 +0000
+commit 7c0bbed967abed6301a63e0267cc64144357a99a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed May 13 12:01:10 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ revert removal of .depend before makedepend
- Add SyslogFacility option to ssh(1) matching the
- equivalent option in sshd(8). bz#2705, patch from erahn at arista.com, ok
- djm@
+ Commit 83657eac4 started removing .depend before running makedepend
+ to reset the contents of .depend to a known state. Unfortunately
+ this broke the depend-check step as now .depend.bak would only ever
+ be created as an empty file.
- Upstream-ID: d5115c2c0193ceb056ed857813b2a7222abda9ed
+ ok dtucker
-commit e13aad66e73a14b062d13aee4e98f1e21a3f6a14
-Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 27 13:40:05 2017 +0000
+commit 58ad004acdcabf3b9f40bc3aaa206b25d998db8c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue May 12 12:58:46 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- remove a static array unused since rev 1.306 spotted by
- clang ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: 249b3eed2446f6074ba2219ccc46919dd235a7b8
+ prepare for 8.3 release
-commit 91bd2181866659f00714903e78e1c3edd4c45f3d
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 27 11:53:12 2017 +0000
+commit 4fa9e048c2af26beb7dc2ee9479ff3323e92a7b5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 8 21:50:43 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Avoid potential signed int overflow when parsing the file
- size. Use strtoul() instead of parsing manually. OK djm@
+ Ensure SA_SIGNAL test only signals itself.
- Upstream-ID: 1f82640861c7d905bbb05e7d935d46b0419ced02
+ When the test's child signals its parent and it exits the result of
+ getppid changes. On Ubuntu 20.04 this results in the ppid being that
+ of the GDM session, causing it to exit. Analysis and testing from pedro
+ at ambientworks.net
-commit 17a54a03f5a1d35e33cc24e22cd7a9d0f6865dc4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Apr 25 08:32:27 2017 +1000
+commit dc2da29aae76e170d22f38bb36f1f5d1edd5ec2b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 8 13:31:53 2020 +1000
- Fix typo in "socketcall".
+ sync config.guess/config.sub with latest versions
- Pointed out by jjelen at redhat.com.
+ ok dtucker@
-commit 8b0eee148f7cf8b248c30d1bae57300f2cc5aafd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Apr 24 19:40:31 2017 +1000
+commit a8265bd64c14881fc7f4fa592f46dfc66b911f17
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 6 20:58:01 2020 +0000
- Deny socketcall in seccomp filter on ppc64le.
-
- OpenSSL is using socket() calls (in FIPS mode) when handling ECDSA keys
- in privsep child. The socket() syscall is already denied in the seccomp
- filter, but in ppc64le kernel, it is implemented using socketcall()
- syscall, which is not denied yet (only SYS_SHUTDOWN is allowed) and
- therefore fails hard.
+ upstream: openssh-8.3; ok deraadt@
- Patch from jjelen at redhat.com.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c8831ec88b9c750f5816aed9051031fb535d22c1
-commit f8500b2be599053daa05248a86a743232ec6a536
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 17 14:31:23 2017 +0000
+commit 955854cafca88e0cdcd3d09ca1ad4ada465364a1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 6 20:57:38 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: another case where a utimes() failure could make scp send
- Recognize nl_langinfo(CODESET) return values "646" and ""
- as aliases for "US-ASCII", useful for different versions of NetBSD and
- Solaris. Found by dtucker@ and by Tom G. Christensen <tgc at jupiterrise dot
- com>. OK dtucker@ deraadt@
+ a desynchronising error; reminded by Aymeric Vincent ok deraadt markus
- Upstream-ID: 38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ea611d34d8ff6d703a7a8bf858aa5dbfbfa7381
-commit 7480dfedf8c5c93baaabef444b3def9331e86ad5
-Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 17 11:02:31 2017 +0000
+commit 59d531553fd90196946743da391f3a27cf472f4e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu May 7 15:34:12 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Check if -D_REENTRANT is needed for localtime_r.
- Change COMPILER_VERSION tests which limited additional
- warnings to gcc4 to instead skip them on gcc3 as clang can handle
- -Wpointer-sign and -Wold-style-definition.
-
- Upstream-ID: 5cbe348aa76dc1adf55be6c0e388fafaa945439a
+ On at least HP-UX 11.11, the localtime_r declararation is behind
+ ifdef _REENTRANT. Check for and add if needed.
+
+commit c13403e55de8cdbb9da628ed95017b1d4c0f205f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue May 5 11:32:43 2020 +1000
+
+ Skip security key tests if ENABLE_SK not set.
-commit 4d827f0d75a53d3952288ab882efbddea7ffadfe
+commit 4da393f87cd52d788c84112ee3f2191c9bcaaf30
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 4 00:24:56 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri May 1 04:03:14 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: sure enough, some of the test data that we though were in
- disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode;
- reported by Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
+ new format were actually in the old format; fix from Michael Forney
- Upstream-ID: 5d9c8f2fa8511d4ecf95322994ffe73e9283899b
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41a5c43a61b0f0b1691994dbf16dfb88e8af933
-commit ef47843af0a904a21c920e619c5aec97b65dd9ac
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Mar 26 00:18:52 2017 +0000
+commit 15bfafc1db4c8792265ada9623a96f387990f732
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 04:00:29 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make mktestdata.sh generate old/new format keys that we
- incorrect renditions of this quote bother me
+ expect. This script was written before OpenSSH switched to new-format private
+ keys by default and was never updated to the change (until now) From Michael
+ Forney
- Upstream-ID: 1662be3ebb7a71d543da088119c31d4d463a9e49
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 38cf354715c96852e5b71c2393fb6e7ad28b7ca7
-commit d9048861bea842c4eba9c2dbbf97064cc2a5ef02
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Mar 31 11:04:43 2017 +1100
+commit 7882d2eda6ad3eb82220a85294de545d20ef82db
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 03:58:02 2020 +0000
- Check for and use gcc's -pipe.
+ upstream: portability fix for sed that always emil a newline even
- Speeds up configure and build by a couple of percent. ok djm@
-
-commit 282cad2240c4fbc104c2f2df86d688192cbbe4bb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 16:34:44 2017 +1100
-
- Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.16 from OpenBSD.
+ if the input does not contain one; from Michael Forney
- Fix overly-conservative overflow checks on mulitplications and add checks
- on additions. This allows scan_scaled to work up to +/-LLONG_MAX (LLONG_MIN
- will still be flagged as a range error). ok millert@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9190c3ddf0d2562ccc02c4a95fce0e392196bfc7
-commit c73a229e4edf98920f395e19fd310684fc6bb951
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 16:34:02 2017 +1100
+commit 8074f9499e454df0acdacea33598858a1453a357
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 03:36:25 2020 +0000
- Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.15 from OpenBSD.
+ upstream: remove obsolete RSA1 test keys; spotted by Michael Forney
- Collapse underflow and overflow checks into a single block.
- ok djm@ millert@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6384ba889594e217d166908ed8253718ab0866da
-commit d427b73bf5a564f663d16546dbcbd84ba8b9d4af
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 16:32:57 2017 +1100
+commit c697e46c314aa94574af0d393d80f23e0ebc9748
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat May 2 18:34:47 2020 +1000
- Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.14 from OpenBSD.
-
- Catch integer underflow in scan_scaled reported by Nicolas Iooss.
- ok deraadt@ djm@
+ Update .depend.
-commit d13281f2964abc5f2e535e1613c77fc61b0c53e7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 12:39:39 2017 +1100
+commit 83657eac42941f270c4b02b2c46d9a21f616ef99
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat May 2 18:29:40 2020 +1000
- Don't check privsep user or path when unprivileged
+ Remove use of tail for 'make depend'.
- If running with privsep (mandatory now) as a non-privileged user, we
- don't chroot or change to an unprivileged user however we still checked
- the existence of the user and directory. Don't do those checks if we're
- not going to use them. Based in part on a patch from Lionel Fourquaux
- via Corinna Vinschen, ok djm@
+ Not every tail supports +N and we can do with out it so just remove it.
+ Prompted by mforney at mforney.org.
-commit f2742a481fe151e493765a3fbdef200df2ea7037
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 10:50:31 2017 +1100
+commit d25d630d24c5a1c64d4e646510e79dc22d6d7b88
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat May 2 07:19:43 2020 +0000
- Remove SHA256 EVP wrapper implementation.
+ upstream: we have a sshkey_save_public() function to save public keys;
- All supported versions of OpenSSL should now have SHA256 so remove our
- EVP wrapper implementaion. ok djm@
-
-commit 5346f271fc76549caf4a8e65b5fba319be422fe9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 10:23:58 2017 +1100
-
- Remove check for OpenSSL < 0.9.8g.
+ use it and save a bunch of redundant code.
- We no longer support OpenSSL < 1.0.1 so remove check for unreliable ECC
- in OpenSSL < 0.9.8g.
-
-commit 8fed0a5fe7b4e78a6810b133d8e91be9742ee0a1
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 10:16:15 2017 +1100
-
- Remove compat code for OpenSSL < 0.9.7.
+ Patch from loic AT venez.fr; ok markus@ djm@
- Resyncs that code with OpenBSD upstream.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93e030a0ebcd0fd9054ab30db501ec63454ea5f
-commit 608ec1f62ff22fdccc3952e51463d79c43cbd0d3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Mar 29 09:50:54 2017 +1100
+commit e9dc9863723e111ae05e353d69df857f0169544a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 18:32:25 2020 +1000
- Remove SSHv1 code path.
+ Use LONG_LONG_MAX and friends if available.
- Server-side support for Protocol 1 has been removed so remove !compat20
- PAM code path.
+ If we don't have LLONG_{MIN,MAX} but do have LONG_LONG_{MIN,MAX}
+ then use those instead. We do calculate these values in configure,
+ but it turns out that at least one compiler (old HP ANSI C) can't
+ parse "-9223372036854775808LL" without mangling it. (It can parse
+ "-9223372036854775807LL" which is presumably why its limits.h defines
+ LONG_LONG_MIN as the latter minus 1.)
+
+ Fixes rekey test when compiled with the aforementioned compiler.
-commit 7af27bf538cbc493d609753f9a6d43168d438f1b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Mar 24 09:44:56 2017 +1100
+commit aad87b88fc2536b1ea023213729aaf4eaabe1894
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 06:31:42 2020 +0000
- Enable ldns when using ldns-config.
+ upstream: when receving a file in sink(), be careful to send at
+
+ most a single error response after the file has been opened. Otherwise the
+ source() and sink() can become desyncronised. Reported by Daniel Goujot,
+ Georges-Axel Jaloyan, Ryan Lahfa, and David Naccache.
+
+ ok deraadt@ markus@
- Actually enable ldns when attempting to use ldns-config. bz#2697, patch
- from fredrik at fornwall.net.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c14d233c97349cb811a8f7921ded3ae7d9e0035
-commit 58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 22 12:43:02 2017 +1100
+commit 31909696c4620c431dd55f6cd15db65c4e9b98da
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 06:28:52 2020 +0000
- Missing header on Linux/s390
+ upstream: expose vasnmprintf(); ok (as part of other commit) markus
- Patch from Jakub Jelen
+ deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e80cea441c599631a870fd40307d2ade5a7f9b5
-commit 096fb65084593f9f3c1fc91b6d9052759a272a00
+commit 99ce9cefbe532ae979744c6d956b49f4b02aff82
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 22:08:06 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri May 1 04:23:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: avoid NULL dereference when attempting to convert invalid
- remove /usr/bin/time calls around tests, makes diffing test
- runs harder. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger
+ ssh.com private keys using "ssh-keygen -i"; spotted by Michael Forney
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 81c1083b14dcf473b23d2817882f40b346ebc95c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e56e6d26973967d11d13f56ea67145f435bf298
-commit 6b853c6f8ba5eecc50f3b57af8e63f8184eb0fa6
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 21 08:47:55 2017 +1100
+commit 6c6072ba8b079e6f5caa38b011a6f4570c14ed38
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 15:09:26 2020 +1000
- Fix syntax error on Linux/X32
+ See if SA_RESTART signals will interrupt select().
- Patch from Mike Frysinger
+ On some platforms (at least older HP-UXes such as 11.11, possibly others)
+ setting SA_RESTART on signal handers will cause it to not interrupt
+ select(), at least for calls that do not specify a timeout. Try to
+ detect this and if found, don't use SA_RESTART.
+
+ POSIX says "If SA_RESTART has been set for the interrupting signal, it
+ is implementation-dependent whether select() restarts or returns with
+ [EINTR]" so this behaviour is within spec.
-commit d38f05dbdd291212bc95ea80648b72b7177e9f4e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 13:38:27 2017 +1100
+commit 90a0b434ed41f9c505662dba8782591818599cb3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 1 13:55:03 2020 +1000
- Add llabs() implementation.
+ fix reversed test
-commit 72536316a219b7394996a74691a5d4ec197480f7
+commit c0dfd18dd1c2107c73d18f70cd164f7ebd434b08
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 12:23:04 2017 +1100
+Date: Fri May 1 13:29:16 2020 +1000
- crank version numbers
+ wrap sha2.h inclusion in #ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
-commit 3be52bc36bdfd24ded7e0f46999e7db520fb4e3f
+commit a01817a9f63dbcbbc6293aacc4019993a4cdc7e3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 01:18:59 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Apr 28 04:59:29 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: adapt dummy FIDO middleware to API change; ok markus@
- openssh-7.5
-
- Upstream-ID: b8b9a4a949427c393cd868215e1724ceb3467ee5
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8bb84ee500c2eaa5616044314dd0247709a1790f
-commit db84e52fe9cfad57f22e7e23c5fbf00092385129
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 12:07:20 2017 +1100
+commit 261571ddf02ea38fdb5e4a97c69ee53f847ca5b7
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 18:28:37 2020 +0000
- I'm a doofus.
+ upstream: tweak previous; ok markus
- Unbreak obvious syntax error.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41895450ce2294ec44a5713134491cc31f0c09fd
-commit 89f04852db27643717c9c3a2b0dde97ae50099ee
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 11:53:34 2017 +1100
+commit 5de21c82e1d806d3e401b5338371e354b2e0a66f
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 17:12:20 2020 +0000
- on Cygwin, check paths from server for backslashes
+ upstream: bring back debug() removed in rev 1.74; noted by pradeep
- Pointed out by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero
-
-commit 7ef1f9bafc2cc8d97ff2fbd4f280002b6e8ea5d9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 11:48:34 2017 +1100
-
- Yet another synonym for ASCII: "646"
+ kumar
- Used by NetBSD; this unbreaks mprintf() and friends there for the C
- locale (caught by dtucker@ and his menagerie of test systems).
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d134d22ab25979078a3b48d058557d49c402e65
-commit 9165abfea3f68a0c684a6ed2e575e59bc31a3a6b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 20 09:58:34 2017 +1100
+commit ea14103ce9a5e13492e805f7e9277516ff5a4273
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 30 17:07:10 2020 +0000
- create test mux socket in /tmp
+ upstream: run the 2nd ssh with BatchMode for scp -3
- Creating the socket in $OBJ could blow past the (quite limited)
- path limit for Unix domain sockets. As a bandaid for bz#2660,
- reported by Colin Watson; ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77994fc8c7ca02d88e6d0d06d0f0fe842a935748
-commit 2adbe1e63bc313d03e8e84e652cc623af8ebb163
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 15 07:07:39 2017 +0000
+commit 59d2de956ed29aa5565ed5e5947a7abdb27ac013
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 28 04:02:29 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: when signing a challenge using a FIDO toke, perform the
- disallow KEXINIT before NEWKEYS; ok djm; report by
- vegard.nossum at oracle.com
+ hashing in the middleware layer rather than in ssh code. This allows
+ middlewares that call APIs that perform the hashing implicitly (including
+ Microsoft's AFAIK). ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 3668852d1f145050e62f1da08917de34cb0c5234
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9fc8630aba26c75d5016884932f08a5a237f37d
-commit 2fbf91684d76d38b9cf06550b69c9e41bca5a71c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Thu Mar 16 14:05:46 2017 +1100
+commit c9d10dbc0ccfb1c7568bbb784f7aeb7a0b5ded12
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 26 09:38:14 2020 +0000
- Include includes.h for compat bits.
+ upstream: Fix comment typo. Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3565f056003707a5e678e60e03f7a3efd0464a2b
-commit b55f634e96b9c5b0cd991e23a9ca181bec4bdbad
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Thu Mar 16 13:45:17 2017 +1100
+commit 4d2c87b4d1bde019cdd0f00552fcf97dd8b39940
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 25 06:59:36 2020 +0000
- Wrap stdint.h in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+ upstream: We've standardized on memset over bzero, replace a couple
+
+ that had slipped in. ok deraadt markus djm.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5be055554ee93e6cc66b0053b590bef3728dbd6
-commit 55a1117d7342a0bf8b793250cf314bab6b482b99
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Mar 16 11:22:42 2017 +1100
+commit 7f23f42123d64272a7b00754afa6b0841d676691
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 12:21:58 2020 +1000
- Adapt Cygwin config script to privsep knob removal
+ Include sys/byteorder.h for htons and friends.
- Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+ These are usually in netinet/in.h but on HP-UX they are not defined if
+ _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED is set. Only needed for netcat in the regression
+ tests.
-commit 1a321bfdb91defe3c4d9cca5651724ae167e5436
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 15 03:52:30 2017 +0000
+commit d27cba58c972d101a5de976777e518f34ac779cb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 1 09:21:52 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- accidents happen to the best of us; ok djm
+ Fix conditional for openssl-based chacha20.
- Upstream-ID: b7a9dbd71011ffde95e06f6945fe7197dedd1604
+ Fixes warnings or link errors when building against older OpenSSLs.
+ ok djm
-commit 25f837646be8c2017c914d34be71ca435dfc0e07
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 15 02:25:09 2017 +0000
+commit 20819b962dc1467cd6fad5486a7020c850efdbee
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 15:07:55 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Error out if given RDomain if unsupported.
- fix regression in 7.4: deletion of PKCS#11-hosted keys
- would fail unless they were specified by full physical pathname. Report and
- fix from Jakub Jelen via bz#2682; ok dtucker@
-
- Upstream-ID: 5b5bc20ca11cacb5d5eb29c3f93fd18425552268
+ If the config contained 'RDomain %D' on a platform that did not support
+ it, the error would not be detected until runtime resulting in a broken
+ sshd. Detect this earlier and error out if found. bz#3126, based on a
+ patch from jjelen at redhat.com, tweaks and ok djm@
-commit a8c5eeacf032a7d3408957e45dd7603cc1baf55f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 15 02:19:09 2017 +0000
+commit 2c1690115a585c624eed2435075a93a463a894e2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 03:33:21 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Fix incorrect error message for "too many known hosts files."
- Fix segfault when sshd attempts to load RSA1 keys (can
- only happen when protocol v.1 support is enabled for the client). Reported by
- Jakub Jelen in bz#2686; ok dtucker
+ bz#3149, patch from jjelen at redhat.com.
- Upstream-ID: 8fdaec2ba4b5f65db1d094f6714ce64b25d871d7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0fcb07ed5cf7fd54ce340471a747c24454235e5
-commit 66705948c0639a7061a0d0753266da7685badfec
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 07:19:07 2017 +0000
+commit 3beb7276e7a8aedd3d4a49f9c03b97f643448c92
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 02:19:40 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Mark the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option as
- deprecated, effectively making privsep mandatory in sandboxing mode. ok
- markus@ deraadt@
+ upstream: Remove leave_non_blocking() which is now dead code
- (note: this doesn't remove the !privsep code paths, though that will
- happen eventually).
+ because nothing sets in_non_blocking_mode any more. Patch from
+ michaael.meeks at collabora.com, ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: b4c52666256c4dd865f8ce9431af5d6ce2d74a0a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c403cefe97a5a99eca816e19cc849cdf926bd09c
-commit f86586b03fe6cd8f595289bde200a94bc2c191af
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 18:26:29 2017 +1100
+commit 8654e3561772f0656e7663a0bd6a1a8cb6d43300
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 23 21:28:09 2020 +0000
- Make seccomp-bpf sandbox work on Linux/X32
+ upstream: ce examples of "Ar arg Ar arg" with "Ar arg arg" and
- Allow clock_gettime syscall with X32 bit masked off. Apparently
- this is required for at least some kernel versions. bz#2142
- Patch mostly by Colin Watson. ok dtucker@
+ stop the spread;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af0e952ea0f5e2019c2ce953ed1796eca47f0705
-commit 2429cf78dd2a9741ce27ba25ac41c535274a0af6
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 18:01:52 2017 +1100
+commit 67697e4a8246dd8423e44b8785f3ee31fee72d07
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 24 11:10:18 2020 +1000
- require OpenSSL >=1.0.1
+ Update .depend.
-commit e3ea335abeab731c68f2b2141bee85a4b0bf680f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 17:48:43 2017 +1100
+commit d6cc76176216fe3fac16cd20d148d75cb9c50876
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 14:07:00 2020 +1000
- Remove macro trickery; no binary change
-
- This stops the SC_ALLOW(), SC_ALLOW_ARG() and SC_DENY() macros
- prepending __NR_ to the syscall number parameter and just makes
- them explicit in the macro invocations.
+ Mailing list is now closed to non-subscribers.
- No binary change in stripped object file before/after.
+ While there, add a reference to the bugzilla. ok djm@
-commit 5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 13:15:18 2017 +1100
+commit cecde6a41689d0ae585ec903b190755613a6de79
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 12:09:40 2020 +1000
- support ioctls for ICA crypto card on Linux/s390
+ Put the values from env vars back.
- Based on patch from Eduardo Barretto; ok dtucker@
+ This merges the values from the recently removed environment into make's
+ command line arguments since we actually need those.
-commit b1b22dd0df2668b322dda174e501dccba2cf5c44
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 14:19:36 2017 +1100
+commit 300c4322b92e98d3346efa0aec1c094c94d0f964
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 11:33:15 2020 +1000
- Plumb conversion test into makefile.
+ Pass configure's egrep through to test-exec.sh.
+
+ Use it to create a wrapper function to call it from tests. Fixes the
+ keygen-comment test on platforms with impoverished default egrep (eg
+ Solaris).
-commit f57783f1ddfb4cdfbd612c6beb5ec01cb5b9a6b9
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 01:20:29 2017 +0000
+commit c8d9796cfe046f00eb8b2096d2b7028d6a523a84
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 22 10:56:44 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Add unit test for convtime().
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 8717bc0ca4c21120f6dd3a1d3b7a363f707c31e1
+ Remove unneeded env vars from t-exec invocation.
-commit 8884b7247d094cd11ff9e39c325ba928c5bdbc6c
+commit 01d4cdcd4514e99a4b6eb9523cd832bbf008d1d7
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 01:10:07 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Apr 21 23:14:58 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Backslash '$' at then end of string. Prevents warning on
- Add ASSERT_LONG_* helpers.
+ some shells.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: fe15beaea8f5063c7f21b0660c722648e3d76431
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5dc27ab624c09d34078fd326b10e38c1ce9c741f
-commit c6774d21185220c0ba11e8fd204bf0ad1a432071
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 00:55:37 2017 +0000
+commit 8854724ccefc1fa16f10b37eda2e759c98148caa
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 21 18:27:23 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Fix convtime() overflow test on boundary condition,
- spotted by & ok djm.
+ Sync rev 1.49.
- Upstream-ID: 51f14c507ea87a3022e63f574100613ab2ba5708
+ Prevent infinite for loop since i went from ssize_t to size_t. Patch from
+ eagleoflqj via OpenSSH github PR#178, ok djm@, feedback & ok millert@
-commit f5746b40cfe6d767c8e128fe50c43274b31cd594
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 00:25:03 2017 +0000
+commit d00d07b6744d3b4bb7aca46c734ecd670148da23
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 20 04:44:47 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: regression test for printing of private key fingerprints and
- Check for integer overflow when parsing times in
- convtime(). Reported by nicolas.iooss at m4x.org, ok djm@
+ key comments, mostly by loic AT venez.fr (slightly tweaked for portability)
+ ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: 35e6a4e98f6fa24df50bfb8ba1307cf70e966f13
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8dc6c4feaf4fe58b6d634cd89afac9a13fd19004
-commit f5907982f42a8d88a430b8a46752cbb7859ba979
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 13:38:15 2017 +1100
-
- Add a "unit" target to run only unit tests.
-
-commit 9e96b41682aed793fadbea5ccd472f862179fb02
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 14 12:24:47 2017 +1100
+commit a98d5ba31e5e7e01317352f85fa63b846a960f8c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 20 04:43:57 2020 +0000
- Fix weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg inspection
+ upstream: fix a bug I introduced in r1.406: when printing private key
- Syscall arguments are passed via an array of 64-bit values in struct
- seccomp_data, but we were only inspecting the bottom 32 bits and not
- even those correctly for BE systems.
+ fingerprint of old-format key, key comments were not being displayed. Spotted
+ by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker
- Fortunately, the only case argument inspection was used was in the
- socketcall filtering so using this for sandbox escape seems
- impossible.
-
- ok dtucker
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d98e4f9eb168eea733d17e141e1ead9fe26e533
-commit 8ff3fc3f2f7c13e8968717bc2b895ee32c441275
+commit 32f2d0aad42c15e19bd3b07496076ca891573a58
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 11 23:44:16 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 07:16:07 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: repair private key fingerprint printing to also print
- regress tests for loading certificates without public keys;
- bz#2617 based on patch from Adam Eijdenberg; ok markus@ dtucker@
+ comment after regression caused by my recent pubkey loading refactor.
+ Reported by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 0145d19328ed995b73fe2d9da33596b17429d0d0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8db49acbee6a6ccb2a4259135693b3cceedb89e
-commit 1e24552716194db8f2f620587b876158a9ef56ad
+commit 094dd513f4b42e6a3cebefd18d1837eb709b4d99
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 11 23:40:26 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 07:15:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: refactor out some duplicate private key loading code;
- allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a private
- key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key. bz#2617 based on patch
- from Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ markus@
+ based on patch from loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: 295668dca2c39505281577217583ddd2bd4b00b9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5eff2476b0d8d0614924c55e350fb7bb9c84f45e
-commit 0fb1a617a07b8df5de188dd5a0c8bf293d4bfc0e
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 11 13:07:35 2017 +0000
+commit 4e04f46f248f1708e39b900b76c9693c820eff68
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 06:12:41 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Don't count the initial block twice when computing how
- many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode.
- ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL
+ upstream: add space beteen macro arg and punctuation;
- Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c93a6cbb4bf9468fc4c13e64bc1fd4efee201a44
-commit ef653dd5bd5777132d9f9ee356225f9ee3379504
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 07:18:32 2017 +0000
+commit 44ae009a0112081d0d541aeaa90088bedb6f21ce
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 17 04:27:03 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: auth2-pubkey r1.89 changed the order of operations to
- krl.c
+ checking AuthorizedKeysFile first and falling back to AuthorizedKeysCommand
+ if no key was found in a file. Document this order here; bz3134
- Upstream-ID: fc5e695d5d107d730182e2da7b23f00b489e0ee1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afce0872cbfcfc1d4910ad7722e50f792a1dce12
-commit d94c1dfef2ea30ca67b1204ada7c3b537c54f4d0
+commit f96f17f920f38ceea6f3c5cb0b075c46b8929fdc
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Mar 12 10:48:14 2017 +1100
+Date: Fri Apr 17 14:07:15 2020 +1000
- sync fmt_scaled.c with OpenBSD
-
- revision 1.13
- date: 2017/03/11 23:37:23; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +14 -1; commitid: jnFKyHkB3CEiEZ2R;
- fix signed integer overflow in scan_scaled. Found by Nicolas Iooss
- using AFL against ssh_config. ok deraadt@ millert@
- ----------------------------
- revision 1.12
- date: 2013/11/29 19:00:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +6 -5;
- fairly simple unsigned char casts for ctype
- ok krw
- ----------------------------
- revision 1.11
- date: 2012/11/12 14:07:20; author: halex; state: Exp; lines: +4 -2;
- make scan_scaled set errno to EINVAL rather than ERANGE if it encounters
- an invalid multiplier, like the man page says it should
+ sys/sysctl.h is only used on OpenBSD
- "looks sensible" deraadt@, ok ian@
- ----------------------------
- revision 1.10
- date: 2009/06/20 15:00:04; author: martynas; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4;
- use llabs instead of the home-grown version; and some comment changes
- ok ian@, millert@
- ----------------------------
+ so change the preprocessor test used to include it to check
+ __OpenBSD__, matching the code that uses the symbols it declares.
-commit 894221a63fa061e52e414ca58d47edc5fe645968
+commit 54688e937a69c7aebef8a3d50cbd4c6345bab2ca
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 05:01:13 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:38:47 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix reversed test that caused IdentitiesOnly=yes to not
- When updating hostkeys, accept RSA keys if
- HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA keytype. Previously, ssh could ignore RSA
- keys when any of the ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods was enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms
- nit ssh-rsa (SHA1 signatures) was not. bz#2650 reported by Luis Ressel; ok
- dtucker@
+ apply to keys loaded from a PKCS11Provider; bz3141, ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: c5e8cfee15c42f4a05d126158a0766ea06da79d2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3dd6424b94685671fe84c9b9dbe352fb659f677
-commit dd3e2298663f4cc1a06bc69582d00dcfee27d73c
+commit 267cbc87b5b6e78973ac4d3c7a6f807ed226928c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:34:42 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: mention that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are
- make hostname matching really insensitive to case;
- bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@
+ not considered for HostbasedAuthentication when the target user is root;
+ bz3148
- Upstream-ID: e467622ff154269e36ba8b6c9e3d105e1c4a9253
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe4c1256929e53f23af17068fbef47852f4bd752
-commit 77a9be9446697fe8b5499fe651f4a82a71a4b51f
+commit c90f72d29e84b4a2709078bf5546a72c29a65177
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:30:05 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" ignore
- reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns
+ rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only" to allow
+ .shosts files but not .rhosts. ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: 4ef509a66b96c7314bbcc87027c2af71fa9d0ba4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d08d6930ed06377a80cf53923c1955e9589342e9
-commit 61b8ef6a66efaec07e023342cb94a10bdc2254dc
+commit 321c7147079270f3a154f91b59e66219aac3d514
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 04:27:32 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 17 03:23:13 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a
- better match sshd config parser behaviour: fatal() if
- line is overlong, increase line buffer to match sshd's; bz#2651 reported by
- Don Fong; ok dtucker@
+ sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks; bz3148, ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: b175ae7e0ba403833f1ee566edf10f67443ccd18
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e042467d703bce640b1f42c5d1a62bf3825736e8
-commit db2597207e69912f2592cd86a1de8e948a9d7ffb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 04:26:06 2017 +0000
+commit ca5403b085a735055ec7b7cdcd5b91f2662df94c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 11 20:20:09 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add space between macro arg and punctuation;
- ensure hostname is lower-case before hashing it;
- bz#2591 reported by Griff Miller II; ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e579e4d95eef13059c30931ea1f09ed8296b819c
+
+commit 8af0244d7b4a65eed2e62f9c89141c7c8e63f09d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 15 10:58:02 2020 +1000
+
+ Add sys/syscall.h for syscall numbers.
- Upstream-ID: c3b8b93804f376bd00d859b8bcd9fc0d86b4db17
+ In some architecture/libc configurations we need to explicitly include
+ sys/syscall.h for the syscall number (__NR_xxx) definitions. bz#3085,
+ patch from blowfist at xroutine.net.
-commit df9936936c695f85c1038bd706d62edf752aca4b
+commit 3779b50ee952078018a5d9e1df20977f4355df17
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 11 10:16:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Refactor private key parsing. Eliminates a fair bit of
- make hostname matching really insensitive to case;
- bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@
+ duplicated code and fixes oss-fuzz#20074 (NULL deref) caused by a missing key
+ type check in the ECDSA_CERT parsing path.
- Upstream-ID: e632b7a9bf0d0558d5ff56dab98b7cca6c3db549
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4711981d88afb7196d228f7baad9be1d3b20f9c9
-commit 67eed24bfa7645d88fa0b883745fccb22a0e527e
+commit b6a4013647db67ec622c144a9e05dd768f1966b3
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 04:11:00 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 10 00:54:03 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add tests for TOKEN expansion of LocalForward and
- Remove old null check from config dumper. Patch from
- jjelen at redhat.com vi bz#2687, ok djm@
+ RemoteForward.
- Upstream-ID: 824ab71467b78c4bab0dd1b3a38e8bc5f63dd528
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 90fcbc60d510eb114a2b6eaf4a06ff87ecd80a89
-commit 183ba55aaaecca0206184b854ad6155df237adbe
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 04:07:20 2017 +0000
+commit abc3e0a5179c13c0469a1b11fe17d832abc39999
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 6 09:43:55 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add utf8.c for asmprintf used by krl.c
- fix regression in 7.4 server-sig-algs, where we were
- accidentally excluding SHA2 RSA signature methods. bz#2680, patch from Nuno
- Goncalves; ok dtucker@
-
- Upstream-ID: 81ac8bfb30960447740b9b8f6a214dcf322f12e8
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 433708d11165afdb189fe635151d21659dd37a37
-commit 66be4fe8c4435af5bbc82998501a142a831f1181
+commit 990687a0336098566c3a854d23cce74a31ec6fe2
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:53:11 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 10 00:52:07 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add TOKEN percent expansion to LocalFoward and RemoteForward
- Check for NULL return value from key_new. Patch from
- jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@
+ when used for Unix domain socket forwarding. Factor out the code for the
+ config keywords that use the most common subset of TOKENS into its own
+ function. bz#3014, ok jmc@ (man page bits) djm@
- Upstream-ID: 059e33cd43cba88dc8caf0b1936fd4dd88fd5b8e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bffc9f7e7b5cf420309a057408bef55171fd0b97
-commit ec2892b5c7fea199914cb3a6afb3af38f84990bf
+commit 2b13d3934d5803703c04803ca3a93078ecb5b715
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:10:37 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: let sshkey_try_load_public() load public keys from the
+
+ unencrypted envelope of private key files if not sidecar public key file is
+ present.
- reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: b4b48b4487c0821d16e812c40c9b09f03b28e349
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 252a0a580e10b9a6311632530d63b5ac76592040
-commit 7fadbb6da3f4122de689165651eb39985e1cba85
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:48:57 2017 +0000
+commit d01f39304eaab0352793b490a25e1ab5f59a5366
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:09:24 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: simplify sshkey_try_load_public()
- Check for NULL argument to sshkey_read. Patch from
- jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: c2d00c2ea50c4861d271d0a586f925cc64a87e0e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05a5d46562aafcd70736c792208b1856064f40ad
-commit 5a06b9e019e2b0b0f65a223422935b66f3749de3
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:45:40 2017 +0000
+commit f290ab0833e44355fc006e4e67b92446c14673ef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:08:46 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type()
- Plug some mem leaks mostly on error paths. From jjelen
- at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@
+ Extracts a public key from the unencrypted envelope of a new-style
+ OpenSSH private key.
+
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 3fb030149598957a51b7c8beb32bf92cf30c96f2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44d7ab446e5e8c686aee96d5897b26b3939939aa
-commit f6edbe9febff8121f26835996b1229b5064d31b7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:24:48 2017 +0000
+commit 8d514eea4ae089626a55e11c7bc1745c8d9683e4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:07:19 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: simplify sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type()
+
+ Try new format parser for all key types first, fall back to PEM
+ parser only for invalid format errors.
- Plug mem leak on GLOB_NOMATCH case. From jjelen at
- redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 8016a7ae97719d3aa55fb723fc2ad3200058340d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0173bbb3a5cface77b0679d4dca0e15eb5600b77
-commit 566b3a46e89a2fda2db46f04f2639e92da64a120
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:22:40 2017 +0000
+commit 421169d0e758351b105eabfcebf42378ebf17217
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:05:59 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: check private key type against requested key type in
- Plug descriptor leaks of auth_sock. From jjelen at
- redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@
+ new-style private decoding; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 248acb99a5ed2fdca37d1aa33c0fcee7be286d88
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d44b3a34ce12ce5187fb6f6e441a88c8c51662
-commit 8a2834454c73dfc1eb96453c0e97690595f3f4c2
+commit 6aabfb6d22b36d07f584cba97f4cdc4363a829da
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:18:24 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:04:32 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: check that pubkey in private key envelope matches actual
+
+ private key
- correctly hash hosts with a port number. Reported by Josh
- Powers in bz#2692; ok dtucker@
+ (this public key is currently unusued)
+
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 468e357ff143e00acc05bdd2803a696b3d4b6442
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 634a60b5e135d75f48249ccdf042f3555112049c
-commit 9747b9c742de409633d4753bf1a752cbd211e2d3
+commit c0f5b2294796451001fd328c44f0d00f1114eddf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 03:15:58 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 8 00:01:52 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: refactor private key parsing a little
+
+ Split out the base64 decoding and private section decryption steps in
+ to separate functions. This will make the decryption step easier to fuzz
+ as well as making it easier to write a "load public key from new-format
+ private key" function.
- don't truncate off \r\n from long stderr lines; bz#2688,
- reported by Brian Dyson; ok dtucker@
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: cdfdc4ba90639af807397ce996153c88af046ca4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de31d80fb9062aa01901ddf040c286b64ff904e
-commit 4a4b75adac862029a1064577eb5af299b1580cdd
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 02:59:51 2017 +0000
+commit 8461a5b3db34ed0b5a4a18d82f64fd5ac8693ea8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 6 20:54:34 2020 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Include openssl-compat.h before checking ifdefs.
- Validate digest arg in ssh_digest_final; from jjelen at
- redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: dbe5494dfddfe523fab341a3dab5a79e7338f878
+ Fixes problem where unsuitable chacha20 code in libressl would be used
+ unintentionally.
+
+commit 931c50c5883a9910ea1ae9a371e4e815ec56b035
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 6 10:04:56 2020 +1000
+
+ fix inverted test for LibreSSL version
-commit bee0167be2340d8de4bdc1ab1064ec957c85a447
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 13:40:18 2017 +1100
+commit d1d5f728511e2338b7c994968d301d8723012264
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 4 23:04:41 2020 +0000
- Check for NULL from malloc.
+ upstream: Indicate if we're using a cached key in trace output.
- Part of bz#2687, from jjelen at redhat.com.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 409a7b0e59d1272890fda507651c0c3d2d3c0d89
-commit da39b09d43b137a5a3d071b51589e3efb3701238
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Mar 10 13:22:32 2017 +1100
+commit a398251a4627367c78bc483c70c2ec973223f82c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Apr 5 08:43:57 2020 +1000
- If OSX is using launchd, remove screen no.
+ Use /usr/bin/xp4g/id if necessary.
- Check for socket with and without screen number. From Apple and Jakob
- Schlyter via bz#2341, with contributions from Ron Frederick, ok djm@
+ Solaris' native "id" doesn't support the options we use but the one
+ in /usr/bin/xp4g does, so use that instead.
-commit 8fb15311a011517eb2394bb95a467c209b8b336c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 8 12:07:47 2017 +0000
+commit db0fdd48335b5b01114f78c1a73a195235910f81
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 4 22:14:26 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Some platforms don't have "hostname -s", so use cut to trim
- quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump commandline; the
- [ / ] characters can confuse some shells (e.g. zsh). Reported by Lauri
- Tirkkonen via bugs@
+ short hostname instead.
- Upstream-ID: 65cdd161460e1351c3d778e974c1c2a4fa4bc182
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebcf36a6fdf287c9336b0d4f6fc9f793c05307a7
-commit 18501151cf272a15b5f2c5e777f2e0933633c513
+commit e7e59a9cc8eb7fd5944ded28f4d7e3ae0a5fdecd
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 6 02:03:20 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 07:53:10 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Compute hash locally and re-enable %C tests.
- Check l->hosts before dereferencing; fixes potential null
- pointer deref. ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: 81c0327c6ec361da794b5c680601195cc23d1301
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 94d1366e8105274858b88a1f9ad2e62801e49770
+
+commit abe2b245b3ac6c4801e99bc0f13289cd28211e22
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 17:25:46 2020 +1100
+
+ prefer libcrypto chacha20-poly1305 where possible
-commit d072370793f1a20f01ad827ba8fcd3b8f2c46165
+commit bc5c5d01ad668981f9e554e62195383bc12e8528
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 6 00:44:51 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 05:43:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Temporarily remove tests for '%C' since the hash contains the
- linenum is unsigned long so use %lu in log formats. ok
- deraadt@
+ local hostname and it doesn't work on any machine except mine... spotted by
+ djm@
- Upstream-ID: 9dc582d9bb887ebe0164e030d619fc20b1a4ea08
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d4c3585b9fcbbff14f4a5a5fde51dbd0d690401
-commit 12d3767ba4c84c32150cbe6ff6494498780f12c9
+commit 81624026989654955a657ebf2a1fe8b9994f3c87
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 3 06:13:11 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 06:07:57 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: r1.522 deleted one too many lines; repair
- fix ssh-keygen -H accidentally corrupting known_hosts that
- contained already-hashed entries. HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED is only set by
- hostkeys_foreach() when hostname matching is in use, so we need to look for
- the hash marker explicitly.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af8851fd7a99e4a887b19aa8f4c41a6b3d25477
+
+commit 668cb3585ce829bd6e34d4a962c489bda1d16370
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 05:53:52 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sort -N and add it to usage();
- Upstream-ID: da82ad653b93e8a753580d3cf5cd448bc2520528
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b00e8db37c2b0a54c7831fed9e5f4db53ada332
-commit d7abb771bd5a941b26144ba400a34563a1afa589
+commit 338ccee1e7fefa47f3d128c2541e94c5270abe0c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 28 06:10:08 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 05:48:57 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: avoid another compiler warning spotted in -portable
- small memleak: free fd_set on connection timeout (though
- we are heading to exit anyway). From Tom Rix in bz#2683
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d29c51ac844b287c4c8bcaf04c63c7d9ba3b8c7
+
+commit 9f8a42340bd9af86a99cf554dc39ecdf89287544
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:07:48 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: this needs utf8.c too
- Upstream-ID: 10e3dadbb8199845b66581473711642d9e6741c4
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 445040036cec714d28069a20da25553a04a28451
-commit 78142e3ab3887e53a968d6e199bcb18daaf2436e
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 27 14:30:33 2017 +0000
+commit 92115ea7c3a834374720c350841fc729e7d5c8b2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 03:14:03 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add percent_expand test for 'Match Exec'.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41c14fd6a0b54d66aa1e9eebfb9ec962b41232f
+
+commit de34a440276ae855c38deb20f926d46752c62c9d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:43:24 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix format string (use %llu for uint64, not %lld). spotted by
- errant dot; from klemens nanni
+ Darren and his tinderbox tests
- Upstream-ID: 83d93366a5acf47047298c5d3ebc5e7426f37921
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b4587c3d9d46a7be9bdf028704201943fba96c2
-commit 8071a6924c12bb51406a9a64a4b2892675112c87
+commit 9cd40b829a5295cc81fbea8c7d632b2478db6274
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 24 03:16:34 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:34:15 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add a flag to re-enable verbose output when in batch
- might as well set the listener socket CLOEXEC
+ mode; requested in bz3135; ok dtucker
- Upstream-ID: 9c538433d6a0ca79f5f21decc5620e46fb68ab57
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ad2ed0e6440562ba9c84b666a5bbddc1afe2e2b
-commit d5499190559ebe374bcdfa8805408646ceffad64
+commit 6ce51a5da5d333a44e7c74c027f3571f70c39b24
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 19 00:11:29 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:32:21 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: chacha20-poly1305 AEAD using libcrypto EVP_chacha20
- add test cases for C locale; ok schwarze@
+ Based on patch from Yuriy M. Kaminskiy. ok + lots of assistance along the
+ way at a2k20 tb@
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 783d75de35fbc923d46e2a5e6cee30f8f381ba87
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e08754c13d31258bae6c5e318cc96219d6b10f0
-commit 011c8ffbb0275281a0cf330054cf21be10c43e37
+commit eba523f0a130f1cce829e6aecdcefa841f526a1a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 19 00:10:57 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:27:03 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make Chacha20-POLY1305 context struct opaque; ok tb@ as
- Add a common nl_langinfo(CODESET) alias for US-ASCII
- "ANSI_X3.4-1968" that is used by Linux. Fixes mprintf output truncation for
- non-UTF-8 locales on Linux spotted by dtucker@; ok deraadt@ schwarze@
+ part of a larger diff at a2k20
- Upstream-ID: c6808956ebffd64066f9075d839f74ff0dd60719
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4609b7263284f95c9417ef60ed7cdbb7bf52cfd
-commit 0c4430a19b73058a569573492f55e4c9eeaae67b
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 7 23:03:11 2017 +0000
+commit ebd29e90129cf18fedfcfe1de86e324228669295
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:06:26 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix debug statement
- Remove deprecated SSH1 options RSAAuthentication and
- RhostsRSAAuthentication from regression test sshd_config.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42c6edeeda5ce88b51a20d88c93be3729ce6b916
+
+commit 7b4d8999f2e1a0cb7b065e3efa83e6edccfc7d82
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 04:03:51 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: the tunnel-forwarding vs ExitOnForwardFailure fix that I
+
+ committed earlier had an off-by-one. Fix this and add some debugging that
+ would have made it apparent sooner.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 8066b753d9dce7cf02ff87af5c727ff680d99491
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 082f8f72b1423bd81bbdad750925b906e5ac6910
-commit 3baa4cdd197c95d972ec3d07f1c0d08f2d7d9199
+commit eece243666d44ceb710d004624c5c7bdc05454bc
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 17 02:32:05 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 03:12:11 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: %C expansion just added to Match Exec should include
- Do not show rsa1 key type in usage when compiled without
- SSH1 support.
+ remote user not local user.
- Upstream-ID: 068b5c41357a02f319957746fa4e84ea73960f57
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80f1d976938f2a55ee350c11d8b796836c8397e2
-commit ecc35893715f969e98fee118481f404772de4132
+commit d5318a784d016478fc8da90a38d9062c51c10432
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 17 02:31:14 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:33:31 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add regression test for percent expansions where possible.
- ifdef out "rsa1" from the list of supported keytypes when
- compiled without SSH1 support. Found by kdunlop at guralp.com, ok djm@
-
- Upstream-ID: cea93a26433d235bb1d64b1d990f19a9c160a70f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7283be8b2733ac1cbefea3048a23d02594485288
-commit 10577c6d96a55b877a960b2d0b75edef1b9945af
+commit 663e84bb53de2a60e56a44d538d25b8152b5c1cc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 17 02:04:15 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:40:32 2020 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make failures when establishing "Tunnel" forwarding terminate
- For ProxyJump/-J, surround host name with brackets to
- allow literal IPv6 addresses. From Dick Visser; ok dtucker@
+ the connection when ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled; bz3116; ok dtucker
- Upstream-ID: 3a5d3b0171250daf6a5235e91bce09c1d5746bf1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef4b4808de0a419c17579b1081da768625c1d735
-commit b2afdaf1b52231aa23d2153f4a8c5a60a694dda4
+commit ed833da176611a39d3376d62154eb88eb440d31c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:27:12 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Make with config keywords support which
+
+ percent_expansions more consistent. - %C is moved into its own function and
+ added to Match Exec. - move the common (global) options into a macro. This
+ is ugly but it's the least-ugly way I could come up with. - move
+ IdentityAgent and ForwardAgent percent expansion to before the config dump
+ to make it regression-testable. - document all of the above
+
+ ok jmc@ for man page bits, "makes things less terrible" djm@ for the rest.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b65664bd6d8ae2a9afaf1a2438ddd1b614b1d75
+
+commit 6ec7457171468da2bbd908b8cd63d298b0e049ea
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:26:56 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: give ssh-keygen the ability to dump the contents of a
+
+ binary key revocation list: ssh-keygen -lQf /path bz#3132; ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b76afc4e3b74ab735dbde4e5f0cfa1f02356033b
+
+commit af628b8a6c3ef403644d83d205c80ff188c97f0c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 3 02:25:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: add allocating variant of the safe utf8 printer; ok
+
+ dtucker as part of a larger diff
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 037e2965bd50eacc2ffb49889ecae41552744fa0
+
+commit d8ac9af645f5519ac5211e9e1e4dc1ed00e9cced
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 16 02:17:02 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Cast lifetime to u_long for comparison to prevent unsigned
+
+ comparison warning on 32bit arches. Spotted by deraadt, ok djm.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a75b2540bff5ab4fa00b4d595db1df13bb0515a
+
+commit 0eaca933ae08b0a515edfccd5cc4a6b667034813
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 14 20:58:46 2020 +1100
+
+ Include fido.h when checking for fido/credman.h.
+
+ It's required for fido_dev_t, otherwise configure fails with
+ when given --with-security-key-builtin.
+
+commit c7c099060f82ffe6a36d8785ecf6052e12fd92f0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:18:45 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: some more speeling mistakes from
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 02471c079805471c546b7a69d9ab1d34e9a57443
+
+commit 1d89232a4aa97fe935cd60b8d24d75c2f70d56c5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 04:16:27 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: improve error messages for some common PKCS#11 C_Login
+
+ failure cases; based on patch from Jacob Hoffman-Andrews in bz3130; ok
+ dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8b849621b4a98e468942efd0a1c519c12ce089e
+
+commit 5becbec023f2037394987f85ed7f74b9a28699e0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 04:01:56 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() for kex_exchange_identification()
+
+ errors. This ensures that the logged errors are consistent with other
+ transport- layer errors and that the relevant IP addresses are logged. bz3129
+ ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c22891f0b9e1a6cd46771cedbb26ac96ec2e6ab
+
+commit eef88418f9e5e51910af3c5b23b5606ebc17af55
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:24:49 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Don't clear alarm timers in listening sshd. Previously
+
+ these timers were used for regenerating the SSH1 ephemeral host keys but
+ those are now gone so there's no need to clear the timers either. ok
+ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 280d2b885e4a1ce404632e8cc38fcb17be7dafc0
+
+commit d081f017c20a3564255873ed99fd7d024cac540f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:17:07 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: spelling errors in comments; no code change from
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ea64f6d84f7bac5636dbd38968592cb5eb924
+
+commit c084a2d040f160bc2b83f13297e3e3ca3f5dbac6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 03:12:17 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: when downloading FIDO2 resident keys from a token, don't
+
+ prompt for a PIN until the token has told us that it needs one. Avoids
+ double-prompting on devices that implement on-device authentication (e.g. a
+ touchscreen PIN pad on the Trezor Model T). ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b78903dd4422d7d3204095a31692fb69130817
+
+commit 955c4cf4c6a1417c28d4e1040702c4d9bf63645b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 14:30:16 2020 +1100
+
+ sync fnmatch.c with upstream to fix another typo
+
+commit 397f217e8640e75bb719a8e87111b4bd848fb3df
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 14:24:23 2020 +1100
+
+ another spelling error in comment
+
+commit def31bc5427579ec3f7f2ce99f2da1338fdc0c9f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 13 14:23:07 2020 +1100
+
+ spelling mistakes
+
+ from https://fossies.org/linux/misc/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz/codespell.html
+
+commit 8bdc3bb7cf4c82c3344cfcb82495a43406e87e83
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:54 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix relative includes in sshd_config; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa29b0da3c93cbc3a1d4c6bcd58af43c00ffeb5b
+
+commit e32ef97a56ae03febfe307688858badae3a70e5a
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:14 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix use-after-free in do_download_sk; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96b49623d297797d4fc069f1f09e13c8811f8863
+
+commit 5732d58020309364bf31fa125354e399361006db
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:50 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: do not leak oprincipals; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4691d9387eab36f8fda48f5d8009756ed13a7c4c
+
+commit 8fae395f34c2c52cdaf9919aa261d1848b4bb00b
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:27 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: initialize seconds for debug message; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 293fbefe6d00b4812a180ba02e26170e4c855b81
+
+commit 46e5c4c8ffcd1569bcd5d04803abaa2ecf3e4cff
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:50 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: correct return code; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 319d09e3b7f4b2bc920c67244d9ff6426b744810
+
+commit 31c39e7840893f1bfdcbe4f813b20d1d7e69ec3e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:15 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: principalsp is optional, pubkey required; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2cc3ea5018c28ed97edaccd7f17d2cc796f01024
+
+commit e26a31757c5df2f58687cb9a4853d1418f39728e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:26:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove unused variables in ssh-pkcs11-helper; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13e572846d0d1b28f1251ddd2165e9cf18135ae1
+
+commit 1b378c0d982d6ab522eda634b0e88cf1fca5e352
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:48 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: return correct error in sshsk_ed25519_sig; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52bf733df220303c260fee4f165ec64b4a977625
+
+commit fbff605e637b068061ab6784ff03e3874890c092
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:12 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix possible null-deref in check_key_not_revoked; ok
+
+ djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80855e9d7af42bb6fcc16c074ba69876bfe5e3bf
+
+commit bc30b446841fc16e50ed6e75c56ccfbd37b9f281
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:24:39 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: ssh_fetch_identitylist() returns the return value from
+
+ ssh_request_reply() so we should also check against != 0 ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d0028769d03e665688c61bb5fd943e18614952
+
+commit 7b4f70ddeb59f35283d77d8d9c834ca58f8cf436
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:23:17 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshkey_cert_check_authority requires reason to be set;
+
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f7a6f19540ed5749763c2f9530c0897c94aa552
+
+commit 05efe270df1e925db0af56a806d18b5063db4b6d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:21:28 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: passphrase depends on kdfname, not ciphername (possible
+
+ null-deref); ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d39668edf5e790b5837df4926ee1141cec5471c
+
+commit 1ddf5682f3992bdacd29164891abb71a19c2cf61
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:44 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: consistently check packet_timeout_ms against 0; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8fb8cb2c96c980f075069302534eaf830929928
+
+commit 31f1ee54968ad84eb32375e4412e0318766b586b
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:02 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: initialize cname in case ai_canonname is NULL or too
+
+ long; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c27984636fdb1035d1642283664193e91aab6e37
+
+commit a6134b02b5264b2611c8beae98bb392329452bba
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:19:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix uninitialized pointers for forward_cancel; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 612778e6d87ee865d0ba97d0a335f141cee1aa37
+
+commit 16d4f9961c75680aab374dee762a5baa0ad507af
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:16:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: exit on parse failures in input_service_request; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a7e1bfded26051d5aa893c030229b1ee6a0d5d2
+
+commit 5f25afe5216ba7f8921e04f79aa4ca0624eca820
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix null-deref on calloc failure; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a313519579b392076b7831ec022dfdefbec8724a
+
+commit ff2acca039aef16a15fce409163df404858f7aa5
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: exit if ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 fails; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0864ad4fe8bf28ab21fd1df766e0365c11bbc0dc
+
+commit 31c860a0212af2d5b6a129e3e8fcead51392ee1d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:14:13 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: pkcs11_register_provider: return < 0 on error; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfc8321315b787e4d40da4bdb2cbabd4154b0d97
+
+commit 15be29e1e3318737b0768ca37d5b4a3fbe868ef0
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:13:29 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshsig: return correct error, fix null-deref; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d1af7cd538b8b23e621cf7ab84f11e7a923edcd
+
+commit 6fb6f186cb62a6370fba476b6a03478a1e95c30d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:12:55 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: vasnmprintf allocates str and returns -1; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dae4c9e83d88471bf3b3f89e3da7a107b44df11c
+
+commit 714e1cbca17daa13f4f98978cf9e0695d4b2e0a4
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 6 18:11:10 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshpkt_fatal() does not return; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7dfe847e28bd78208eb227b37f29f4a2a0929929
+
+commit 9b47bd7b09d191991ad9e0506bb66b74bbc93d34
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 28 01:07:28 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: no-touch-required certificate option should be an
+
+ extension, not a critical option.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 626b22c5feb7be8a645e4b9a9bef89893b88600d
+
+commit dd992520bed35387fc010239abe1bdc0c2665e38
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 28 01:06:05 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: better error message when trying to use a FIDO key
+
+ function and SecurityKeyProvider is empty
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e56602c2ee8c82f835d30e4dc8ee2e4a7896be24
+
+commit b81e66dbe0345aef4717911abcb4f589fff33a0a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 27 02:32:37 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Drop leading space from line count that was confusing
+
+ ssh-keygen's screen mode.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3bcae7a754db3fc5ad3cab63dd46774edb35b8ae
+
+commit d5ba1c03278eb079438bb038266d80d7477d49cb
Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 15 23:38:31 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Feb 26 13:40:09 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: change explicit_bzero();free() to freezero()
+
+ While freezero() returns early if the pointer is NULL the tests for
+ NULL in callers are left to avoid warnings about passing an
+ uninitialised size argument across a function boundry.
+
+ ok deraadt@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2660fa334fcc7cd05ec74dd99cb036f9ade6384a
+
+commit 9e3220b585c5be19a7431ea4ff8884c137b3a81c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 26 11:46:51 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Have sftp reject "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and
+
+ scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it since protocol 1
+ support has been removed. Spotted by shivakumar2696 at gmail.com, ok
+ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b79f95559a1c993214f4ec9ae3c34caa87e9d5de
+
+commit ade8e67bb0f07b12e5e47e7baeafbdc898de639f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 26 01:31:47 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove obsolete XXX comment. ok deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc462cc843947feea26a2e21c750b3a7469ff01b
+
+commit 7eb903f51eba051d7f65790bab92a28970ac1ccc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 24 04:27:58 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix typo. Patch from itoama at live.jp via github PR#173.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5cdaafab38bbdea0d07e24777d00bfe6f972568a
+
+commit b2491c289dd1b557a18a2aca04eeff5c157fc5ef
+Author: Nico Kadel-Garcia <nkadel@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat Oct 12 17:51:01 2019 -0400
+
+ Switch %define to %global for redhat/openssh.spec
+
+commit b18dcf6cca7c7aba1cc22e668e04492090ef0255
+Author: mkontani <itoama@live.jp>
+Date: Fri Feb 21 00:54:49 2020 +0900
+
+ fix some typos and sentence
+
+commit 0001576a096f788d40c2c0a39121cff51bf961ad
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 21 00:04:43 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix some typos and an incorrect word in docs. Patch from
+
+ itoama at live.jp via github PR#172.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ee8f93a7201fef431b9001725ab8b269d5874
+
+commit 99ff8fefe4b2763a53778d06b5f74443c8701615
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 20 05:58:08 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Update moduli generation script to new ssh-keygen
+
+ generation and screening command line flags.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5010ff08f7ad92082e87dde098b20f5c24921a8f
+
+commit 700d16f5e534d6de5a3b7105a74a7a6f4487b681
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 20 05:41:51 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b7b619c1452a459310b0cf4391c5757c6bdbc0f
+
+commit 4753b74ba0f09e4aacdaab5e184cd540352004d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 20 16:42:50 2020 +1100
+
+ Import regenerated moduli.
+
+commit 11d427162778c18fa42917893a75d178679a2389
+Author: HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 14 16:14:23 2020 +0900
+
+ Fix typos in INSTALL: s/avilable/available/ s/suppports/supports/
+
+commit 264a966216137c9f4f8220fd9142242d784ba059
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 18 08:58:33 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Ensure that the key lifetime provided fits within the
+
+ values allowed by the wire format (u32). Prevents integer wraparound of the
+ timeout values. bz#3119, ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8afe6038b5cdfcf63360788f012a7ad81acc46a2
+
+commit de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 18 08:49:49 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when using
+
+ ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037
+
+commit 30144865bfa06b12239cfabc37c45e5ddc369d97
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 16 21:15:43 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: document -F none; with jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0eb93b75473d2267aae9200e02588e57778c84f2
+
+commit 011052de73f3dbc53f50927ccf677266a9ade4f6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:55:51 2020 +1100
+
+ Remove unused variable warning.
+
+commit 31c9348c5e4e94e9913ec64b3ca6e15f68ba19e5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:53:24 2020 +1100
+
+ Constify aix_krb5_get_principal_name.
+
+ Prevents warning about discarding type qualifiers on AIX.
+
+commit 290c994336a2cfe03c5496bebb6580863f94b232
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:36 2020 +1100
+
+ Check if TILDE is already defined and undef.
+
+ Prevents redefinition warning on AIX.
+
+commit 41a2e64ae480eda73ee0e809bbe743d203890938
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:00 2020 +1100
+
+ Prevent unused variable warning.
+
+commit d4860ec4efd25ba194337082736797fce0bda016
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 17 22:48:50 2020 +1100
+
+ Check if getpeereid is actually declared.
+
+ Check in sys/socket.h (AIX) and unistd.h (FreeBSD, DragonFLy and OS X).
+ Prevents undeclared function warning on at least some versions of AIX.
+
+commit 8aa3455b16fddea4c0144a7c4a1edb10ec67dcc8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 14 00:39:20 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: openssh-8.2
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a1340ff65fad0d84b997ac58dd1b393dec7c19b
+
+commit 72f0ce33f0d5a37f31bad5800d1eb2fbdb732de6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 12 09:28:35 2020 +1100
+
+ crank version numbers
+
+commit b763ed05bd1f1f15ae1727c86a4498546bc36ca8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 11 12:51:24 2020 +1100
+
+ Minor documentation update:
+
+ - remove duplication of dependency information (it's all in INSTALL).
+ - SSHFP is now an RFC.
+
+commit 14ccfdb7248e33b1dc8bbac1425ace4598e094cb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 9 11:23:35 2020 +1100
+
+ Check if UINT32_MAX is defined before redefining.
+
+commit be075110c735a451fd9d79a864e01e2e0d9f19d2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 15:07:27 2020 +1100
+
+ typo; reported by Phil Pennock
+
+commit 963d71851e727ffdd2a97fe0898fad61d4a70ba1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:57:31 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sync the description of the $SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment
+
+ variable with that of the SecurityKeyProvider ssh/sshd_config(5) directive,
+ as the latter was more descriptive.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0488f09530524a7e53afca6b6e1780598022552f
+
+commit d4d9e1d40514e2746f9e05335d646512ea1020c6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:54:44 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add ssh -Q key-sig for all key and signature types.
+
+ Teach ssh -Q to accept ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5) algorithm keywords as
+ an alias for the corresponding query. Man page help jmc@, ok djm@.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e110aee3db2fc4bc5bee2d893b7128fd622e0f8
+
+commit fd68dc27864b099b552a6d9d507ca4b83afd6a76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:27:54 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix two PIN entry bugs on FIDO keygen: 1) it would allow more
+
+ than the intended number of prompts (3) and 2) it would SEGV too many
+ incorrect PINs were entered; based on patch by Gabriel Kihlman
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c0011f28ba8bd8adf2014424b64960333da1718
+
+commit 96bd895a0a0b3a36f81c14db8c91513578fc5563
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:48:23 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: When using HostkeyAlgorithms to merely append or remove
+
+ algorithms from the default set (i.e. HostkeyAlgorithms=+/-...), retain the
+ default behaviour of preferring those algorithms that have existing keys in
+ known_hosts; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 040e7fcc38ea00146b5d224ce31ce7a1795ee6ed
+
+commit c7288486731734a864b58d024b1395029b55bbc5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:46:31 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: expand HostkeyAlgorithms prior to config dump, matching
+
+ other algorithm lists; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66f0fca8cc5ce30405a2867bc115fff600671d0
+
+commit a6ac5d36efc072b15690c65039754f8e44247bdf
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:34:58 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add Include to the list of permitted keywords after a
+
+ Match keyword. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 342e940538b13dd41e0fa167dc9ab192b9f6e2eb
+
+commit a47f6a6c0e06628eed0c2a08dc31a8923bcc37ba
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:30:54 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Replace "security key" with "authenticator" in program
+
+ messages.
+
+ This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and
+ distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key".
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e
+
+commit 849a9b87144f8a5b1771de6c85e44bfeb86be9a9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 11:28:14 2020 +1100
+
+ Don't look for UINT32_MAX in inttypes.h
+
+ ... unless we are actually going to use it. Fixes build on HP-UX
+ without the potential impact to other platforms of a header change
+ shortly before release.
+
+commit a2437f8ed0c3be54ddd21630a93c68ebd168286f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 12:02:22 2020 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit 9716e8c4956acdd7b223d1642bfa376e07e7503d
+Author: Michael Forney <mforney@mforney.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 19:17:26 2019 -0800
+
+ Fix sha2 MAKE_CLONE no-op definition
+
+ The point of the dummy declaration is so that MAKE_CLONE(...) can have
+ a trailing semicolon without introducing an empty declaration. So,
+ the macro replacement text should *not* have a trailing semicolon,
+ just like DEF_WEAK.
+
+commit d596b1d30dc158915a3979fa409d21ff2465b6ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 4 09:58:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: require FIDO application strings to start with "ssh:"; ok
+
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 94e9c1c066d42b76f035a3d58250a32b14000afb
+
+commit 501f3582438cb2cb1cb92be0f17be490ae96fb23
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 3 23:47:57 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: revert enabling UpdateHostKeys by default - there are still
+
+ corner cases we need to address; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff7ad941bfdc49fb1d8baa95fd0717a61adcad57
+
+commit 072f3b832d2a4db8d9880effcb6c4d0dad676504
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 3 08:15:37 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: use better markup for challenge and write-attestation, and
+
+ rejig the challenge text a little;
+
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f351e6da9edfdc907d5c3fdaf2e9ff3ab0a7a6f
+
+commit 262eb05a22cb1fabc3bc1746c220566490b80229
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 3 21:22:15 2020 +1100
+
+ mention libfido2 in dependencies section
+
+commit ccd3b247d59d3bde16c3bef0ea888213fbd6da86
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 3 19:40:12 2020 +1100
+
+ add clock_gettime64(2) to sandbox allowed syscalls
+
+ bz3093
+
+commit adffbe1c645ad2887ba0b6d24c194aa7a40c5735
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 09:45:34 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Output (none) in debug in the case in the CheckHostIP=no case
+
+ as suggested by markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ab9117ee5261cbbd1868717fcc3142eea6385cf
+
+commit 58c819096a2167983e55ae686486ce317b69b2d1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 09:22:22 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Prevent possible null pointer deref of ip_str in debug.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37b252e2e6f690efed6682437ef75734dbc8addf
+
+commit 0facae7bc8d3f8f9d02d0f6bed3d163ff7f39806
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 07:36:50 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: shuffle the challenge keyword to keep the -O list sorted;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08efad608b790949a9a048d65578fae9ed5845fe
+
+commit 6fb3dd0ccda1c26b06223b87bcd1cab9ec8ec3cc
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 1 06:53:12 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak previous;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c42851cdc88583402b4ab2b110a6348563626d3
+
+commit 92725d4d3fde675acc0ca040b48f3d0c7be73b7f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 1 17:25:09 2020 +1100
+
+ Use sys-queue.h from compat library.
+
+ Fixes build on platforms that don't have sys/queue.h (eg MUSL).
+
+commit 677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:25:08 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: regress test for sshd_config Include directive; from Jakub
+
+ Jelen
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0d9224de3297c7a5f51ba68d6e3725a2a9345fa4
+
+commit d4f4cdd681ab6408a98419f398b75a55497ed324
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:13:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: whitespace
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 564cf7a5407ecf5da2d94ec15474e07427986772
+
+commit 245399dfb3ecebc6abfc2ef4ee2e650fa9f6942b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:11:25 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: force early logging to stderr if debug_flag (-d) is set;
+
+ avoids missing messages from re-exec config passing
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02484b8241c1f49010e7a543a7098e6910a8c9ff
+
+commit 7365f28a66d1c443723fbe6f4a2612ea6002901e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:08:08 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: mistake in previous: filling the incorrect buffer
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 862ee84bd4b97b529f64aec5d800c3dcde952e3a
+
+commit c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 22:42:45 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add a sshd_config "Include" directive to allow inclusion
+
+ of files. This has sensible semantics wrt Match blocks and accepts glob(3)
+ patterns to specify the included files. Based on patch by Jakub Jelen in
+ bz2468; feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36ed0e845b872e33f03355b936a4fff02d5794ff
+
+commit ba261a1dd33266168ead4f8f40446dcece4d1600
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 22:25:59 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: spelling fix;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c079523c4b161725a4b15dd06348186da912402
+
+commit 771891a044f763be0711493eca14b6b0082e030f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 22:25:34 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: document changed default for UpdateHostKeys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25c390b21d142f78ac0106241d13441c4265fd2c
+
+commit d53a518536c552672c00e8892e2aea28f664148c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 22:19:32 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: enable UpdateKnownHosts=yes if the configuration
+
+ specifies only the default known_hosts files, otherwise select
+ UpdateKnownHosts=ask; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab401a5ec4a33d2e1a9449eae6202e4b6d427df7
+
+commit bb63ff844e818d188da4fed3c016e0a4eecbbf25
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 18:54:42 2020 +1100
+
+ Look in inttypes.h for UINT32_MAX.
+
+ Should prevent warnings on at least some AIX versions.
+
+commit afeb6a960da23f0a5cbc4b80cca107c7504e932a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:21:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() instead of plain fatal() for
+
+ ssh_packet_write_poll() failures here too as the former yields better error
+ messages; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f7a6ca95bc2b716c2e948fc1370753be772d8e3
+
+commit 65d6fd0a8a6f31c3ddf0c1192429a176575cf701
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:57 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: check the return value of ssh_packet_write_poll() and
+
+ call sshpkt_fatal() if it fails; avoid potential busy-loop under some
+ circumstances. Based on patch by Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c79fe5cf4f0cd8074cb6db257c1394d5139408ec
+
+commit dce74eab0c0f9010dc84c62500a17771d0131ff3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:05 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: have sshpkt_fatal() save/restore errno before we
+
+ potentially call strerror() (via ssh_err()); ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5590df31d21405498c848245b85c24acb84ad787
+
+commit 14ef4efe2bf4180e085ea6738fdbebc199458b0c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 29 08:17:49 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: markus suggests a simplification to previous
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10bbfb6607ebbb9a018dcd163f0964941adf58de
+
+commit 101ebc3a8cfa78d2e615afffbef9861bbbabf1ff
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 29 07:51:30 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: give more context to UpdateHostKeys messages, mentioning
+
+ that the changes are validated by the existing trusted host key. Prompted by
+ espie@ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3d95f4a45f2692f4143b9e77bb241184dbb8dc5
+
+commit 24c0f752adf9021277a7b0a84931bb5fe48ea379
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 08:01:34 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: changes to support FIDO attestation
+
+ Allow writing to disk the attestation certificate that is generated by
+ the FIDO token at key enrollment time. These certificates may be used
+ by an out-of-band workflow to prove that a particular key is held in
+ trustworthy hardware.
+
+ Allow passing in a challenge that will be sent to the card during
+ key enrollment. These are needed to build an attestation workflow
+ that resists replay attacks.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457dc3c3d689ba39eed328f0817ed9b91a5f78f6
+
+commit 156bef36f93a48212383235bb8e3d71eaf2b2777
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 07:24:15 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask when in quiet mode; "work for
+
+ me" matthieu@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d7b5eb91accf935ed9852650a826d86db2ddc7
+
+commit ec8a759b4045e54d6b38e690ffee4cbffc53c7b7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 12:57:25 2020 +1100
+
+ compat for missing IPTOS_DSCP_LE in system headers
+
+commit 4594c7627680c4f41c2ad5fe412e55b7cc79b10c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 01:49:36 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: make IPTOS_DSCP_LE available via IPQoS directive; bz2986,
+
+ based on patch by veegish AT cyberstorm.mu
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9902bf4fbb4ea51de2193ac2b1d965bc5d99c425
+
+commit da22216b5db3613325aa7b639f40dc017e4c6f69
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 27 20:51:32 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask if command is specified; ok
+
+ djm@ sthen@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5bcc45eadb78896637d4143d289f1e42c2ef5d7
+
+commit 1e1db0544fdd788e2e3fc21d972a7ccb7de6b4ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
+
+commit 0d1144769151edf65f74aee9a4c8545c37861695
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 15:09:15 2020 +1100
+
+ Move definition of UINT32_MAX.
+
+ This allows us to always define it if needed not just if we also
+ define the type ourself.
+
+commit f73ab8a811bc874c2fb403012aa8e4bfdcaf5ec7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
+
+commit 0373f9eba2b63455dceedbd3ac3d5dca306789ff
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 14:09:17 2020 +1100
+
+ Include signal.h to prevent redefintion of _NSIG.
+
+commit 638a45b5c1e20a8539100ca44166caad8abf26f8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 13:40:51 2020 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h in tests inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit 74dfc2c859c906eaab1f88a27fd883115ffb928f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:14:45 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: for UpdateHostKeys, don't report errors for unsupported
+
+ key types - just ignore them. spotted by and ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91769e443f6197c983932fc8ae9d39948727d473
+
+commit b59618246c332e251160be0f1e0e88a7d4e2b0ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:13:20 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: downgrade error() for missing subsequent known_hosts
+
+ files to debug() as it was intended to be; spotted by dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18cfea382cb52f2da761be524e309cc3d5354ef9
+
+commit 469df611f778eec5950d556aabfe1d4efc227915
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:33:27 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: clarify that BatchMode applies to all interactive prompts
+
+ (e.g. host key confirmation) and not just password prompts.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97b001883d89d3fb1620d2e6b747c14a26aa9818
+
+commit de40876c4a5d7c519d3d7253557572fdfc13db76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:28:06 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: tidy headers; some junk snuck into sshbuf-misc.c and
+
+ sshbuf-io.c doesn't need SSHBUF_INTERNAL set
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27a724d2e0b2619c1a1490f44093bbd73580d9e6
+
+commit 6a107606355fa9547884cad6740e6144a7a7955b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 10:28:21 2020 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit 59d01f1d720ebede4da42882f592d1093dac7adc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:13:09 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: improve the error message for u2f enrollment errors by
+
+ making ssh-keygen be solely responsible for printing the error message and
+ convertint some more common error responses from the middleware to a useful
+ ssherr.h status code. more detail remains visible via -v of course.
+
+ also remove indepedent copy of sk-api.h declarations in sk-usbhid.c
+ and just include it.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a8ffa870d9a3e0cfd76544bcdeef5c9fb1f1bb
+
+commit 99aa8035554ddb976348d2a9253ab3653019728d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:02:13 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: factor out reading/writing sshbufs to dedicated
+
+ functions; feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc09e5f1950b7acc91b8fdf8015347782d2ecd3d
+
+commit 065064fcf455778b0918f783033b374d4ba37a92
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:49:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: add a comment describing the ranges of channel IDs that
+
+ we use; requested by markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83a1f09810ffa3a96a55fbe32675b34ba739e56b
+
+commit 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:41:01 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: make sshd_config:ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the
+
+ connection killing behaviour, rather than killing the connection after
+ sending the first liveness test probe (regardless of whether the client was
+ responsive) bz2627; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af79c35f4c9fa280643b6852f524bfcd9bccdaf
+
+commit bf986a9e2792555e0879a3145fa18d2b49436c74
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:36:22 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: clarify order of AllowUsers/DenyUsers vs
+
+ AllowGroups/DenyGroups; bz1690, ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5637584ec30db9cf64822460f41b3e42c8f9facd
+
+commit 022ce92fa0daa9d78830baeb2bd2dc3f83c724ba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:17:18 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no
+
+ comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the comment. bz2564
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd8ca9340d7017631a27f4ed5358a4cfddec16f
+
+commit 0b813436bbf6546638b10c1fa71f54691bcf5e63
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:09:14 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: group14-sha1 is no longer a default algorithm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a96f04d5e9c2ff760c6799579dc44f69b4ff431d
+
+commit 3432b6e05d5c583c91c566c5708fed487cec79ac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:02:51 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: reword HashKnownHosts description a little more; some
+
+ people found the wording confusing (bz#2560)
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac30896598694f07d498828690aecd424c496988
+
+commit f80d7d6aa98d6eddc5df02412efee6db75673d4c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:01:00 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: weaken the language for what HashKnownHosts provides with
+
+ regards to known_hosts name privacy, it's not practical for this option to
+ offer any guarantee that hostnames cannot be recovered from a disclosed
+ known_hosts file (e.g. by brute force).
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13f1e3285f8acf7244e9770074296bcf446c6972
+
+commit 846446bf3e7421e6671a4afd074bdf15eecd7832
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 06:40:20 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: the GatewayPorts vs -R listen address selection logic is
+
+ still confusing people, so add another comment explaining the special
+ handling of "localhost"; bz#3258
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6bf0f0fbf1c7092bf0dbd9c6eab105970b5b53a
+
+commit 734f2f83f5ff86f2967a99d67be9ce22dd0394dd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 06:03:10 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: mention that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name to address
+
+ translation; prompted by bz3099
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dda8e54d566b29855e76bebf9cfecce573f5c23
+
+commit e1e97cae19ff07b7a7f7e82556bc048c3c54af63
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 16:30:22 2020 +1100
+
+ include tunnel device path in error message
+
+commit 0ecd20bc9f0b9c7c697c9eb014613516c8f65834
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 04:48:26 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: unrevert this:
+
+ > revision 1.217
+ > date: 2019/11/27 03:34:04; author: dtucker; state: Exp; lines: +5 -7; commitid: wkiMn49XJyjzoJIs;
+ > Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were
+ > left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in
+ > bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
+
+ Darren was right the first time; ok dtucker@ "agreed" markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 641dd1b99a6bbd85b7160da462ae1be83432c7c8
+
+commit a0c81d2402eedc514b9c9f25ef9604eb0576b86a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 02:57:53 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Move setting $NC into test-exec since it's now used by
+
+ multiple tests, and in -portable we use our own local copy to avoid
+ portability problems.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ceb78445fcaac317bec2fc51b3f0d9589048c114
+
+commit e16dfa94f86358033531c4a97dcb51508ef84d49
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 13:05:42 2020 +1100
+
+ Put EC key export inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+ Fixes link error when building against an OpenSSL that does not have
+ ECC.
+
+commit 94a2e5951b374e1a89761ceaff72e66eb1946807
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:27:56 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Wait a bit longer for the multiplex master to become ready
+
+ since on very slow hosts the current delay is not sufficient and the test
+ will fail.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6d90c7475d67ac3a95610b64af700629ece51a48
+
+commit b2df804f571d77b07059f087b90955ffbc2f67d4
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 10:08:17 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add a connection test for proxycommand. This would have
+
+ caught the problem caused by ssh.c rev 1.507 wherein Host and Hostname were
+ swapped. Prompted by beck@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d218500ae6aca4c479c27318fb5b09ebc00f7aae
+
+commit c6f06fd38a257b9fcc7d6760f8fb6d505dccb628
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:22:31 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: set UpdateKnownHosts=ask by default; bz#2894; ok
+
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09cb3177f3a14c96428e14f347e976a8a531fee
+
+commit 7955633a554397bc24913cec9fd7285002935f7e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:21:08 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow UpdateKnownHosts=yes to function when multiple
+
+ known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys, ssh will now search
+ subsequent known_hosts files, but will add new/changed host keys to the first
+ specified file only. bz#2738
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ded6d878a03e57d5aa20bab9c31f92e929dbc6c
+
+commit e5a278a62ab49dffe96929fa8d8506c6928dba90
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:06:48 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: process security key provider via realpath() in agent,
+
+ avoids malicious client from being able to cause agent to load arbitrary
+ libraries into ssh-sk-helper.
+
+ reported by puck AT puckipedia.com; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1086643df1b7eee4870825c687cf0c26a6145d1c
+
+commit 89a8d4525e8edd9958ed3df60cf683551142eae0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:03:36 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: expose PKCS#11 key labels/X.509 subjects as comments
+
+ Extract the key label or X.509 subject string when PKCS#11 keys
+ are retrieved from the token and plumb this through to places where
+ it may be used as a comment.
+
+ based on https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/138
+ by Danielle Church
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cae1fda10d9e10971dea29520916e27cfec7ca35
+
+commit a8c05c640873621681ab64d2e47a314592d5efa2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 23:56:01 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak proctitle to include sshd arguments, as these are
+
+ frequently used to distinguish between multiple independent instances of the
+ server. New proctitle looks like this:
+
+ $ pgrep -lf sshd
+ 12844 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups
+
+ requested by sthen@ and aja@; ok aja@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf235a561c655a3524a82003cf7244ecb48ccc1e
+
+commit 8075fccbd4f70a4371acabcfb47562471ff0de6f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 23:54:40 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: add xextendf() to extend a string with a format
+
+ (reallocating as necessary). ok aja@ as part of a larger diff
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30796b50d330b3e0e201747fe40cdf9aa70a77f9
+
+commit d15c8adf2c6f1a6b4845131074383eb9c3d05c3d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 05:33:01 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: minor tweaks to ssh-keygen -Y find-principals:
+
+ emit matched principals one per line to stdout rather than as comma-
+ separated and with a free-text preamble (easy confusion opportunity)
+
+ emit "not found" error to stderr
+
+ fix up argument testing for -Y operations and improve error message for
+ unsupported operations
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d9c9a671ab07fc04a48f543edfa85eae77da69c
+
+commit c3368a5d5ec368ef6bdf9971d6330ca0e3bdca06
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:28:57 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove ssh-rsa (SHA1) from the list of allowed CA
+
+ signature algorithms ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da3481fca8c81e6951f319a86b7be67502237f57
+
+commit 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:27:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default to
+
+ a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
+ the user; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
+
+commit 8dfb6a202c96cdf037c8ce05e53e32e0e0b7b454
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:00:31 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091, patch
+
+ from Jakub Jelen ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a58edec8b9f07acab4b962a71a5125830d321b51
+
+commit 72a8bea2d748c8bd7f076a8b39a52082c79ae95f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 23:31:52 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fixes based on feedback
+
+ from Markus:
+
+ use "principals" instead of principal, as allowed_signers lines may list
+ multiple.
+
+ When the signing key is a certificate, emit only principals that match
+ the certificate principal list.
+
+ NB. the command -Y name changes: "find-principal" => "find-principals"
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab575946ff9a55624cd4e811bfd338bf3b1d0faf
+
+commit 0585b5697201f5d8b32e6f1b0fee7e188268d30d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 01:29:23 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Do not warn about permissions on symlinks.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 339d4cbae224bd8743ffad9c3afb0cf3cb66c357
+
+commit 415192348a5737a960f6d1b292a17b64d55b542c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 11:19:12 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Handle zlib compression being disabled now that it's
+
+ optional.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0af4fbc5168e62f89d0350de524bff1cb00e707a
+
+commit fbce7c1a898ae75286349822950682cf46346121
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:53:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix typo in comment.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1d7a6553208bf439378fd1cf686a828aceb353a
+
+commit ba247af8e9e302910e22881ef9d307a8afeef036
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:19:59 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: When checking for unsafe directories, ignore non-directories
+
+ (ie symlinks, where permissions are not relevant).
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb6cfc8b022becb62b2dcb99ed3f072b3326e501
+
+commit 74deb7029be4c00810443114aac9308875a81dae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 22:17:24 2020 +1100
+
+ zlib is now optional.
+
+commit 633a2af47ee90291aaf93969aeee1e5046074c7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 22:16:51 2020 +1100
+
+ Plumb WITH_ZLIB into configure.
+
+ This allows zlib support to be disabled by ./configure --without-zlib.
+
+commit 7f8e66fea8c4e2a910df9067cb7638999b7764d5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:24:29 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Make zlib optional. This adds a "ZLIB" build time option
+
+ that allows building without zlib compression and associated options. With
+ feedback from markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c6e1133a90fd15a3aa865bdedc53bab28b7910
+
+commit 69ac4e33023b379e9a8e9b4b6aeeffa6d1fcf6fa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:54:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove trailing period characters from pub/priv key
+
+ pathnames - they make them needlessly more difficult to cut and paste without
+ error; ok markus@ & dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcfd1a5723fcac0711feee7665edc66ae2335a
+
+commit 945bf52c3c815d95b1e842ebf6c910c3524bd5bb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 21:06:45 2020 +1100
+
+ Fix a couple of mysig_t leftovers.
+
+commit 84226b447d45fe4542613de68c2ca59a890d7c01
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 18:55:24 2020 +1100
+
+ Remove mysignal wrapper.
+
+ We switched the main code to use sigaction(), so the wrapper is no
+ longer used.
+
+commit 5533c2fb7ef21172fa3708d66b03faa2c6b3d93f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:16:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: new sentence, new line;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6c3f2f36ec77e99198619b38a9f146655281925
+
+commit 3bf2a6ac791d64046a537335a0f1d5e43579c5ad
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:10:22 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around
+
+ sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler
+ preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce
+ the potential for short read/write operations.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
+
+commit e027c044c796f3a01081a91bee55741204283f28
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 04:54:34 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: missing header change from previous; spotted by dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 321ce74c0a5bbd0f02fa3f20cb5cf2a952c6b96f
+
+commit 7e1323102b1b04eef391b01e180710a2d408a7ab
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:42:41 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Check for and warn about StrictModes permission problems. ok tb@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4841704ccdee50ee7efc6035bc686695c6ac2991
+
+commit 84de1c27f845d15c859db44e7070a46f45504b66
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:35:07 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Also test PuTTY chacha20.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7af6a0e8763b05f1f8eee6bca5f31fcb16151040
+
+commit c7ed15a39695ecd5f1f21842d8d9cd22246d4ee2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:24:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Also test PuTTY ecdh kex methods.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec4017dce612131842398a03e93007a869c2c133
+
+commit c4b3a128954ee1b7fbcbda167baf8aca1a3d1c84
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 02:46:49 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove unsupported algorithms from list of defaults at run
+
+ time and remove ifdef and distinct settings for OPENSSL=no case.
+
+ This will make things much simpler for -portable where the exact set
+ of algos depends on the configuration of both OpenSSH and the libcrypto
+ it's linked against (if any). ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0116d0183dcafc7a9c40ba5fe9127805c5dfdd2
+
+commit 56cffcc09f8a2e661d2ba02e61364ae6f998b2b1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 02:43:48 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: add a new signature operations "find-principal" to look
+
+ up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-signers file.
+ Work by Sebastian Kinne; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f782cc7e18e38fcfafa62af53246a1dcfe74e5d
+
+commit 65cf8730de6876a56595eef296e07a86c52534a6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 07:38:30 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Ignore whitespace when checking explict fingerprint.
+
+ When confirming a host key using the fingerprint itself, ignore leading and
+ trailing whitespace. ok deraadt@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cafd7f803bbdcd40c3a8f8f1a77747e6b6d8c011
+
+commit 8d3af6ebdf524b34087a0a3ae415b5141ba10572
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 07:31:27 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Increase keyscan timeout from default. On slow hosts 3
+
+ concurrent keyscans can hit the default 5 second timeout, so increase to 15
+ seconds.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 16383dec166af369b7fb9948572856f5d544c93f
+
+commit 6c30c9adbeeed09a8a9e7a69974cfa1f1ddd1e9e
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:58:23 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from default kex to
+
+ see what happens. general mostly ok
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 216b7b8462d2ef5f4531f26cb2cb839b2153dad9
+
+commit 4a32c0ca44a2dc2a358f69b5d43c08e528b44b39
+Author: claudio@openbsd.org <claudio@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:51:51 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: For ssh-keygen -lF only add a space after key fingerprint
+
+ when there is a comment. This makes copy-paste of fingerprints into ssh
+ easier. OK djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa01d95624f65c1eb4dc7c575d20d77c78010dfd
+
+commit 37d3b736506760e4ebc7fe56255f7b8ea823a00c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:49:16 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: some __func__ and strerror(errno) here; no functional
+
+ change
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ddd5f848b99ea560b31d3fba99ceed66cef37
+
+commit e2031b05c74c98b141179ceab13a323cf17d01e5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 02:25:21 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: factor out parsing of allowed-signers lines
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ee6aeff608371826019ea85e55bfa87f79d06e
+
+commit 47160e1de8c2f638f0ef41cef42c976417b61778
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 10:30:13 2020 +1100
+
+ unbreak fuzzer support for recent ssh-sk.h changes
+
+commit 70d38c3cfd4550e8ee66cc3bf1b91aa339c91df5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 22:39:57 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: expose the number of currently-authenticating connections
+
+ along with the MaxStartups limit in the proctitle; suggestion from Philipp
+ Marek, w/ feedback from Craig Miskell ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a6db2dc1641a5df8eddf7d6652176e359dffb3
+
+commit a78c66d5d2144bd49779bc80a647346bd3d7233d
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:40:04 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: document the default value of the ControlPersist option;
+
+ ok dtucker@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0788e7f2b5a9d4e36d3d2ab378f73329320fef66
+
+commit b46a6325849e40aa2e4b0d962a6f00f708f6576a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 09:28:32 2020 +1100
+
+ remove accidental change in f8c11461
+
+commit 80d3bebcab96fe1d177e45906e10db16895da01d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 11:06:09 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: don't #ifdef out the KRL code when compiling without
+
+ libcrypto support; it works just fine and disabling it breaks a few tests. ok
+ dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f6272c4241eb4b04de78b012fe98b2b555ad44
+
+commit f8c11461aa6db168fc5e7eeae448b4cbbf59642a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 08:06:27 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: pass SSH_SK_HELPER explicitly past $SUDO to avoid it getting
+
+ cleared; with dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 03178a0580324bf0dff28f7eac6c3edbc5407f8e
+
+commit b5fcb0ac1cc0ef01aeec1c089146298654ab3ae0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 07:07:31 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: check access(ssh-sk-helper, X_OK) to provide friendly
+
+ error message for misconfigured helper paths
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061bcc262155d12e726305c91394ac0aaf1f8341
+
+commit 56bced43c14dc6fa2bfa1816007e441644105609
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 06:09:56 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Document sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org. Patch
+
+ from jtesta@positronsecurity.com via github PR#151.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3d48168623045c258245c340a5a2af7dbb74edc
+
+commit 4a05d789b86314fef7303824f69defbc6b96ed60
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:56 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix ssh-keygen not displaying authenticator touch
+
+ prompt; reported by jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d4f582fc194eb3897ebcbfe286c49958ba2859
+
+commit 881aded0389d999375f926051491a944c6d8752b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:27 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: a little more verbosity in sign_and_send_pubkey() debug
+
+ messages
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6da47a0e6373f6683006f49bc2a516d197655508
+
+commit b715fdc71bbd009d0caff691ab3fc04903c4aee8
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 18 21:16:43 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: one more replacement "(security) key" -> "(FIDO)
+
+ authenticator"
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 031bca03c1d1f878ab929facd561911f1bc68dfd
+
+commit 84911da1beeb6ed258a43468efb316cd39fb6855
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 18 15:45:41 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: undo merge error and replace the term "security key"
+
+ again
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 341749062c089cc360a7877e9ee3a887aecde395
+
+commit e8c06c4ee708720efec12cd1a6f78a3c6d76b7f0
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 17 20:13:47 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Document loading of resident keys from a FIDO
+
+ authenticator.
+
+ * Rename -O to -K to keep "-O option" available.
+ * Document -K.
+ * Trim usage() message down to synopsis, like all other commands.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 015c2c4b28f8e19107adc80351b44b23bca4c78a
+
+commit 0d005d6372a067b59123dec8fc6dc905f2c09e1e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 15:07:30 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: sync ssh-keygen.1 and ssh-keygen's usage() with each
+
+ other and reality ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdf64454f2c3604c25977c944e5b6262a3bcce92
+
+commit b8a4ca2ebfddab862f7eb1ea2a07fb9f70330429
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 11 16:23:10 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: revise the fix for reversed arguments on
+
+ expand_proxy_command()
+
+ Always put 'host' before 'host_arg' for consistency. ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ba5b25472779f1b1957295fcc6907bb961472a3
+
+commit 57b181eaf2d34fd0a1b51ab30cb6983df784de5a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 10 23:43:26 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: pass the log-on-stderr flag and log level through to
+
+ ssh-sk-helper, making debugging a bit easier. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e7aea6bf5770d3f38b7c7bba891069256c5a49a
+
+commit a8bd5fdbdb7581afc7123a042a7cd6ca25357388
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:32:16 2020 +1100
+
+ Wrap copy_environment_blacklist() in #ifdef
+
+ It's only needed for USE_PAM or HAVE_CYGWIN cases and will cause compiler
+ warnings otherwise.
+
+commit 10ecc647fc1db8d2dde9f6b9b826b201dfc48b62
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:20:05 2020 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit b3f7009c9ffa5891283ed96e043001e09934a8d4
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 11:56:48 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix missing prototype warning for copy_environment
+
+ This function is only used in this file, and only on Cygwin, so make
+ it static and hide it behind HAVE_CYGWIN. Prevents missing prototype
+ warning.
+
+commit 0c428c0e991e2c4fabc48cf5d9b8f84c9412e0c3
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 13:58:11 2020 +0100
+
+ configure.ac: fix ldns test
+
+ When running ./configure --with-ldns, if ldns-config cannot be found, we
+ add -Iyes/include to CPPFLAGS and -Lyes/lib to LDFLAGS. Fix that.
+
+commit 6089abf715e2784751c9f62697e09bb103295b93
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 12:13:26 2020 +0100
+
+ Make sshpam_password_change_required static.
+
+ sshpam_password_change_required is only used in auth-pam.c, so make it
+ static to prevent a mising prototype warning.
+
+commit 5a9b9c82851b7bc219dc3a65962a80803c76c102
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 12:24:51 2020 +0100
+
+ sandbox-darwin.c: fix missing prototypes.
+
+ Include the right header just like the other sandbox files.
+ Fixes missing prototype warnings for ssh_sandbox_* functions.
+
+commit 335dc93526942a650f6c69666b3f6ca44d0a2910
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 11:09:27 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix a few warnings when on Mac OS X.
+
+ Include stdlib.h for calloc, malloc, free and setenv.
+
+commit 0488dc2d3050ea1a99ef5cf44afc50ffbf3f1315
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 10:32:23 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix building without openssl.
+
+ This fixes the following when there are no openssl headers on the system:
+ ssh-ecdsa-sk.c:34:10: fatal error: 'openssl/bn.h' file not found
+
+commit e6b7157b4ef29c83ec3a2d1d7c927e4b8898f9bb
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:08:55 2020 +0100
+
+ Add config.log to .gitignore
+
+commit 515e10ddf9644010b88cfd7ecf601f4306d42232
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:16:31 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix typo in README.md, s/crytpo/crypto/
+
+commit 1af3354aea3c4bfa5b5ecfb5d1ff3ad231c2073c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:22:36 2020 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit 429170f273ce1b0140f8111a45ba69390d98de3a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 14:41:47 2020 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit a0989b60211b6f1c2313e1397c526d883a23a075
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 14:26:41 2020 +1100
+
+ Include compat header for definitions.
+
+commit e0cedcad51fe02683943bf4f1ad2961aa3f35313
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 09:42:52 2020 +1100
+
+ Improve search for 'struct timespec'.
+
+ Make struct timespec test consistent with existing timeval test.
+ Include time.h for timespec in compat header where required.
+
+commit acaf9e058594310001ce64468ed2923dc6323e81
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 12:43:03 2020 +1100
+
+ Update depend to remove rmd160.h.
+
+commit 26b2675b0c3e3efea11a52609073aec01736ec84
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 07:24:46 2020 +1100
+
+ Remove configure test & compat code for ripemd160.
+
+ RIPEMD160 support was removed upstream in 2017, however we still had
+ a configure test and compat code for it, so clean those up now.
+
+commit ed3ad71b17adcd1fb4431d145f53cee1c6a1135e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 9 03:28:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command(); spotted
+
+ by anton@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db1c32478a01dfbc9c4db171de0f25907bea5775
+
+commit cd53476383f0cf475f40ba8ac8deb6b76dd5ce4e
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 07:43:28 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: put the fido options in a list, and tidy up the text a
+
+ little; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 491ce15ae52a88b7a6a2b3b6708a14b4aacdeebb
+
+commit 30f704ebc0e9e32b3d12f5d9e8c1b705fdde2c89
+Author: Jeremy Drake <github@jdrake.com>
+Date: Fri Oct 11 18:31:05 2019 -0700
+
+ Deny (non-fatal) ipc in preauth privsep child.
+
+ As noted in openssh/openssh-portable#149, i386 does not have have
+ _NR_shmget etc. Instead, it has a single ipc syscall (see man 2 ipc,
+ https://linux.die.net/man/2/ipc). Add this syscall, if present, to the
+ list of syscalls that seccomp will deny non-fatally.
+
+commit b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22
+Author: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue Jan 7 16:26:45 2020 -0800
+
+ seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox.
+
+ This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with
+ upcoming glibc ( 2.31 )
+
+commit 3cc60c899a92a469e5118310ba6b74cb57215618
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:39:30 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: missing else in check_enroll_options()
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e058fb918fda56ddbbf0bee910101004cec421d4
+
+commit ff5784e2698d6c41e9f39ce4df24968c1beeb2bb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:24:28 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix error message
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1eb52025658eb78ea6223181e552862198d3d505
+
+commit dd2acc8b862c09751621995fba2d5fa6f4e24cc9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:07:50 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: adapt sk-dummy to SK API changes
+
+ also, make it pull prototypes directly from sk-api.c and #error
+ if the expected version changes. This will make any future regress
+ test breakage because of SK API changes much more apparent
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 79b07055de4feb988e31da71a89051ad5969829d
+
+commit c312ca077cd2a6c15545cd6b4d34ee2f69289174
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:00:46 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Extends the SK API to accept a set of key/value options
+
+ for all operations. These are intended to future-proof the API a little by
+ making it easier to specify additional fields for without having to change
+ the API version for each.
+
+ At present, only two options are defined: one to explicitly specify
+ the device for an operation (rather than accepting the middleware's
+ autoselection) and another to specify the FIDO2 username that may
+ be used when generating a resident key. These new options may be
+ invoked at key generation time via ssh-keygen -O
+
+ This also implements a suggestion from Markus to avoid "int" in favour
+ of uint32_t for the algorithm argument in the API, to make implementation
+ of ssh-sk-client/helper a little easier.
+
+ feedback, fixes and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 973ce11704609022ab36abbdeb6bc23c8001eabc
+
+commit 2ab335712d084d9ccaf3f53afc3fa9535329da87
+Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 5 16:28:22 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix CanonicalizeHostname, broken by rev 1.507
+
+ Issue noticed and reported by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com>
+ ok dtucker@ markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 749f3168ec520609c35b0c4e1984e5fa47f16094
+
+commit 69e44ba701b90b0f530d64c3fe4363ea86e50cd3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 09:02:53 2020 +1100
+
+ Fix typo: 'you' -> 'your'.
+
+ bz#3108 from jmckitrick@gmail.com.
+
+commit 7652a57662969bd5c61448b3843ec6d407ad12be
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 08:56:46 2020 +1100
+
+ Remove auth-skey.c.
+
+ S/Key support was removed in OpenSSH 7.8 but this file was missed.
+
+commit c593cc5e826c9f4ec506e22b629d37cabfaacff9
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 3 07:33:33 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: the download resident keys option is -K (upper) not -k
+
+ (lower); ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71dc28a3e1fa7c553844abc508845bcf5766e091
+
+commit ff31f15773ee173502eec4d7861ec56f26bba381
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 3 03:02:26 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: what bozo decided to use 2020 as a future date in a regress
+
+ test?
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b953df5a7e14081ff6cf495d4e8d40e153cbc3a
+
+commit 680eb7749a39d0e4d046e66cac4e51e8e3640b75
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 3 02:46:19 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: implement recent SK API change to support resident keys
+
+ and PIN prompting in the dummy middleware that we use for the tests. Should
+ fix breakage spotted by dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 379cf9eabfea57aaf7f3f59dafde59889566c484
+
+commit 86834fe6b54ac57b8528c30cf0b27e5cac5b7af7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 13:25:38 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Update keygen moduli screen test to match recent command
+
+ line option change to ssh-keygen(1).
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 744a72755004377e9669b662c13c6aa9ead8a0c3
+
+commit 9039971887cccd95b209c479296f772a3a93e8e7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 22:40:09 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: ability to download FIDO2 resident keys from a token via
+
+ "ssh-keygen -K". This will save public/private keys into the current
+ directory.
+
+ This is handy if you move a token between hosts.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d57c1f9802f7850f00a117a1d36682a6c6d10da6
+
+commit 878ba4350d57e905d6bb1865d8ff31bdfe5deab4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 22:38:33 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: add sshkey_save_public(), to save a public key; ok
+
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5d6f96a966d10d7fa689ff9aa9e1d6767ad5a076
+
+commit 3b1382ffd5e71eff78db8cef0f3cada22ff29409
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 16:10:00 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: simplify the list for moduli options - no need for
+
+ -compact;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6492c72280482c6d072be46236b365cb359fc280
+
+commit 0248ec7c763dee9ff730a589e3d166eac5c74d7c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 13:41:31 2020 +1100
+
+ ssh-sk-null.cc needs extern "C" {}
+
+commit 5ca4b414effe4b56f0cfe3058c92391aa8a43871
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 10:56:29 2020 +1100
+
+ add dummy ssh-sk API for linking with fuzzers
+
+commit c4b2664be7ba25e4c233315b25212dec29b727ab
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 21:04:09 2019 +1100
+
+ refresh depend
+
+commit 3093d12ff80927cf45da08d9f262a26680fb14ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:49:52 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove the -x option currently used for
+
+ FIDO/U2F-specific key flags. Instead these flags may be specified via -O.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f23ebde2a8a7e1bf860a51055a711cffb8c328c1
+
+commit ef65e7dbaa8fac3245aa2bfc9f7e09be7cba0d9d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:25:29 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: document SK API changes in PROTOCOL.u2f
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52622363c103a3c4d3d546050480ffe978a32186
+
+commit 43ce96427b76c4918e39af654e2fc9ee18d5d478
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: translate and return error codes; retry on bad PIN
+
+ Define some well-known error codes in the SK API and pass
+ them back via ssh-sk-helper.
+
+ Use the new "wrong PIN" error code to retry PIN prompting during
+ ssh-keygen of resident keys.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9663c6a2bb7a0bc8deaccc6c30d9a2983b481620
+
+commit d433596736a2cd4818f538be11fc94783f5c5236
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:03 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: improve some error messages; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ccd8ddabb8df4f995107dd3b7ea58220e93cb81
+
+commit c54cd1892c3e7f268b21e1f07ada9f0d9816ffc0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:23:28 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: SK API and sk-helper error/PIN passing
+
+ Allow passing a PIN via the SK API (API major crank) and let the
+ ssh-sk-helper API follow.
+
+ Also enhance the ssh-sk-helper API to support passing back an error
+ code instead of a complete reply. Will be used to signal "wrong PIN",
+ etc.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1bd6b0a2421646919a0c139b8183ad76d28fb71
+
+commit 79fe22d9bc2868c5118f032ec1200ac9c2e3aaef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:22:49 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: implement loading resident keys in ssh-add
+
+ "ssh-add -O" will load resident keys from a FIDO2 token and add them
+ to a ssh-agent.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 608104ae957a7d65cb84e0a3a26c8f60e0df3290
+
+commit 27753a8e21887d47fe6b5c78a4aed0efe558a850
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:59 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: implement loading of resident keys in ssh-sk-helper
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b273c23769ea182c55c4a7b8f9cbd9181722011a
+
+commit 14cea36df397677b8f8568204300ef654114fd76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:16 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: resident keys support in SK API
+
+ Adds a sk_load_resident_keys() function to the security key
+ API that accepts a security key provider and a PIN and returns
+ a list of keys.
+
+ Implement support for this in the usbhid middleware.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e984e4e87f4999ce447a6178c4249a9174eff0
+
+commit 2fe05fcb4a2695f190b4fcf27770b655586ab349
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:20:36 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Factor out parsing of struct sk_enroll_response
+
+ We'll reuse this for extracting resident keys from a device.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bc1efd9c6897eac4df0983746cf6578c1542273
+
+commit 4532bd01d57ee13c3ca881eceac1bf9da96a4d7e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:19:52 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: basic support for generating FIDO2 resident keys
+
+ "ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk|ed25519-sk -x resident" will generate a
+ device-resident key.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e1b3c56a4b11d85047bd6c6c705b7eef4d58431
+
+commit 3e60d18fba1b502c21d64fc7e81d80bcd08a2092
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 03:30:09 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove single-letter flags for moduli options
+
+ Move all moduli generation options to live under the -O flag.
+
+ Frees up seven single-letter flags.
+
+ NB. this change break existing ssh-keygen commandline syntax for moduli-
+ related operations. Very few people use these fortunately.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d498f3eaf28128484826a4fcb343612764927935
+
+commit 1e645fe767f27725dc7fd7864526de34683f7daf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 03:28:41 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: prepare for use of ssh-keygen -O flag beyond certs
+
+ Move list of available certificate options in ssh-keygen.1 to the
+ CERTIFICATES section.
+
+ Collect options specified by -O but delay parsing/validation of
+ certificate options until we're sure that we're acting as a CA.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33e6bcc29cfca43606f6fa09bd84b955ee3a4106
+
+commit 20ccd854245c598e2b47cc9f8d4955d645195055
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 27 08:28:44 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: sort -Y internally in the options list, as is already
+
+ done in synopsis;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86d033c5764404057616690d7be992e445b42274
+
+commit 5b6c954751dd3677466cda7adb92e4f05446c96c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 27 08:25:07 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: in the options list, sort -Y and -y;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24c2e6a3aeab6e050a0271ffc73fdff91c10dcaa
+
+commit 141df487ba699cfd1ec3dcd98186e7c956e99024
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 21 20:22:34 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Replace the term "security key" with "(FIDO)
+
+ authenticator".
+
+ The polysemous use of "key" was too confusing. Input from markus@.
+ ok jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12eea973a44c8232af89f86e4269d71ae900ca8f
+
+commit fbd9729d4eadf2f7097b6017156387ac64302453
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 21 02:33:07 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: unit tests for ForwardAgent=/path; from Eric Chiang
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f693f78290b2c17725dab2c614dffe4a88c8da
+
+commit e5b7cf8edca7e843adc125621e1dab14507f430a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 02:39:05 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: test security key host keys in addition to user keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fb45326106669a27e4bf150575c321806e275b1
+
+commit 40be78f503277bd91c958fa25ea9ef918a2ffd3d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 21 02:19:13 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path
+
+ specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent option to
+ accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment variable in addition
+ to yes/no.
+
+ Patch by Eric Chiang, manpage by me; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98f2ed80bf34ea54d8b2ddd19ac14ebbf40e9265
+
+commit 416f15372bfb5be1709a0ad1d00ef5d8ebfb9e0e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 20:28:55 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: SSH U2F keys can now be used as host keys. Fix a garden
+
+ path sentence. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67d7971ca1a020acd6c151426c54bd29d784bd6b
+
+commit 68010acbcfe36167b3eece3115f3a502535f80df
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:42:42 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Move always unsupported keywords to be grouped with the other
+
+ ones. Move oSecurityProvider to match the order in the OpCodes enum. Patch
+ from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061e4505861ec1e02ba3a63e3d1b3be3cad458ec
+
+commit 8784b02dc49e1c98df4e7aca466be2f652ed4ad1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:29:21 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove obsolete opcodes from the configuation enum.
+
+ Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 395c202228872ce8d9044cc08552ac969f51e01b
+
+commit 345be6091bdc9be09c90a937d1320f97c01fab2a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:11:38 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove now-obsolete config options from example in
+
+ comment. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35862beb0927b1cb0af476ec23cc07f6e3006101
+
+commit ae024b22c4fd68e7f39681d605585889f9511108
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 19 15:09:30 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Document that security key-hosted keys can act as host
+
+ keys.
+
+ Update the list of default host key algorithms in ssh_config.5 and
+ sshd_config.5. Copy the description of the SecurityKeyProvider
+ option to sshd_config.5.
+
+ ok jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edadf3566ab5e94582df4377fee3b8b702c7eca0
+
+commit bc2dc091e0ac4ff6245c43a61ebe12c7e9ea0b7f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 19 03:50:01 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: "Forward security" -> "Forward secrecy" since that's the
+
+ correct term. Add "MAC" since we use that acronym in other man pages. ok
+ naddy@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35529e511788586725fb63bda3459e10738c5f5
+
+commit e905f7260d72bc0e33ef5f10a0db737ff6e77ba7
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 17 16:21:07 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: cut obsolete lists of crypto algorithms from outline of
+
+ how SSH works ok markus@ jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e34973f232ab48c4d4f5d07df48d501708b9160
+
+commit f65cf1163ff01531ae02f3f9210391d0d692f699
+Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 13:58:53 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: strdup may return NULL if memory allocation fails. Use
+
+ the safer xstrdup which fatals on allocation failures.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b608d387120630753cbcb8110e0b019c0c9a0d0
+
+commit 57634bfc5708477826c0be265ddc59b9d83e4886
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 03:16:58 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: sort sk-* methods behind their plain key methods cousins
+
+ for now
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c97e22c2b28c0d12ee389b8b4ef5f2ada7908828
+
+commit b8df8fe920e697edcc69c520390b78c3b7ad9d84
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:46:15 2019 +1100
+
+ Mac OS X has PAM too.
+
+commit bf8de8b8251af69b5ce96a8faa69145af156af4d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:37:06 2019 +1100
+
+ Show portable tarball pattern in example.
+
+commit a19ef613e98141cc37c8acdeebe285b9dbe2531e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:35:59 2019 +1100
+
+ OpenSSL is now optional.
+
+commit 1a7217ac063e48cf0082895aeee81ed2b8a57191
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:58:33 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: adapt to ssh-sk-client change
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 40481999a5928d635ab2e5b029e8239c112005ea
+
+commit a7fc1df246e80bfdabd09b069b91c72f9c578ca8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 18:47:14 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: it's no longer possible to disable privilege separation
+
+ in sshd, so don't double the tests' work by trying both off/on
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d366665466dbd09e9b707305da884be3e7619c68
+
+commit 3145d38ea06820a66c0f5e068f49af14fd2b7ac1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 20:59:23 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: don't treat HostKeyAgent=none as a path either; avoids
+
+ spurious warnings from the cfgparse regress test
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba49ea7a5c92b8a16cb9c2e975dbb163853afc54
+
+commit 747e25192f436e71dd39e15d65aa32bca967533a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 20:57:15 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: do not attempt to find an absolute path for sshd_config
+
+ SecurityKeyProvider=internal - unbreaks cfgparse regress test
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2ddcf525c0dc3c8339522360c10b3c70f1fd641
+
+commit 9b6e30b96b094ad787511a5b989253e3b8fe1789
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 19:47:10 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow ssh-keyscan to find security key hostkeys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1fe822a7f714df19a7e7184e3a3bbfbf546811d3
+
+commit 56584cce75f3d20aaa30befc7cbd331d922927f3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:57:30 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow security keys to act as host keys as well as user
+
+ keys.
+
+ Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose
+ the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling,
+ but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is
+ less risk.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c
+
+commit 5af6fd5461bb709304e6979c8b7856c7af921c9e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 13:55:56 2019 +1100
+
+ Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in seccomp sandbox.
+
+ Needed on Linux ARM. bz#3100, patch from jjelen@redhat.com.
+
+commit fff8ff6dd580e1a72ba09a6775d185175cdc8d13
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:27:02 2019 +1100
+
+ Put SK ECDSA bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+ Fixes build when linking against OpenSSLs built with no-ec.
+
+commit 9244990ecdcfa36bb9371058111685b05f201c1e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 09:21:46 2019 +1100
+
+ remove a bunch of ENABLE_SK #ifdefs
+
+ The ssh-sk-helper client API gives us a nice place to disable
+ security key support when it is wasn't enabled at compile time,
+ so we don't need to check everywere.
+
+ Also, verification of security key signatures can remain enabled
+ all the time - it has no additional dependencies. So sshd can
+ accept security key pubkeys in authorized_keys, etc regardless of
+ the host's support for dlopen, etc.
+
+commit a33ab1688b5c460a7e2a301418241ce1b13b2638
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 09:15:06 2019 +1100
+
+ ssh-sk-client.c needs includes.h
+
+commit 633778d567ad50b63d2a3bca5e1b97d279d236d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 08:40:33 2019 +1100
+
+ only link ssh-sk-helper against libfido2
+
+commit 7b47b40b170db4d6f41da0479575f6d99dd7228a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 08:20:52 2019 +1100
+
+ adapt Makefile to ssh-sk-client everywhere
+
+commit f45f3a8a12e2bee601046b916e6c5cd6eae08048
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 07:53:11 2019 +1100
+
+ fixup
+
+commit d21434766764d5babf99fc3937c19b625c0f6334
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 13 20:16:56 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: actually commit the ssh-sk-helper client code; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd2ea776a5bbbf4d452989d3c3054cf25a5e0589
+
+commit 611073fb40ecaf4ac65094e403edea3a08deb700
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:11:14 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: perform security key enrollment via ssh-sk-helper too.
+
+ This means that ssh-keygen no longer needs to link against ssh-sk-helper, and
+ only ssh-sk-helper needs libfido2 and /dev/uhid* access;
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9464233fab95708d2ff059f8bee29c0d1f270800
+
+commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:37 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, NULL); ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91482c1ada9adb283165d48dafbb88ae91c657bd
+
+commit b52ec0ba3983859514aa7b57d6100fa9759fe696
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:10 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: use ssh-sk-helper for all security key signing operations
+
+ This extracts and refactors the client interface for ssh-sk-helper
+ from ssh-agent and generalises it for use by the other programs.
+ This means that most OpenSSH tools no longer need to link against
+ libfido2 or directly interact with /dev/uhid*
+
+ requested by, feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1abcd3aea9a7460eccfbf8ca154cdfa62f1dc93f
+
+commit c33d46868c3d88e04a92610cdb429094aeeb5847
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 22:19:47 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: add a note about the 'extensions' field in the signed
+
+ object
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67c01e0565b258e0818c1ccfe1f1aeaf9a0d4c7b
+
+commit a62f4e1960691f3aeb1f972e009788b29e2ae464
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 10 23:37:31 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: some more corrections for documentation problems spotted
+
+ by Ron Frederick
+
+ document certifiate private key format
+ correct flags type for sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc4e9a1ed7f9f7f9dd83e2e2c59327912e933e74
+
+commit 22d4beb79622fc82d7111ac941269861fc7aef8d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 10 23:21:56 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: loading security keys into ssh-agent used the extension
+
+ constraint "sk-provider@openssh.com", not "sk@openssh.com"; spotted by Ron
+ Frederick
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbfba09edbe023abadd5f59c1492df9073b0e51d
+
+commit 75f7f22a43799f6d25dffd9d6683de1601da05a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:43:19 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as
+
+ CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
+
+commit 516605f2d596884cedc2beed6b262716ec76f63d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:37:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: when acting as a CA and using a security key as the CA
+
+ key, remind the user to touch they key to authorise the signature.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe58733edd367362f9766b526a8b56827cc439c1
+
+commit c4036fe75ea5a4d03a2a40be1f3660dcbbfa01b2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:36:08 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: chop some unnecessary and confusing verbiage from the
+
+ security key protocol description; feedback from Ron Frederick
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 048c9483027fbf9c995e5a51b3ac502989085a42
+
+commit 59175a350fe1091af7528b2971e3273aa7ca7295
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 6 03:06:08 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix setting of $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT - it shouldn't be set
+
+ when asking passphrases, only when confirming the use of a key (i.e. for
+ ssh-agent keys added with "ssh-add -c keyfile")
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6643c82960d9427d5972eb702c917b3b838ecf89
+
+commit 36eaa356d391a23a2d4e3a8aaa0223abc70b9822
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 6 02:55:21 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: bring the __func__
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71a3a45b0fe1b8f680ff95cf264aa81f7abbff67
+
+commit 483cc723d1ff3b7fdafc6239348040a608ebc78d
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 30 07:07:59 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak the Nd lines for a bit of consistency; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876651bdde06bc1e72dd4bd7ad599f42a6ce5a16
+
+commit afffd310360b155df2133d1f5f1ab2f4e939b570
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:22:06 2019 +1100
+
+ Check if memmem is declared in system headers.
+
+ If the system (or one of the dependencies) implements memmem but does
+ not define the header, we would not declare it either resulting in
+ compiler warnings. Check for declaration explicitly. bz#3102.
+
+commit ad8cd420797695f3b580aea1034b9de60bede9b9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:12:01 2019 +1100
+
+ Sort depends.
+
+commit 5e3abff39e01817f6866494416f2ada25c316018
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:09:34 2019 +1100
+
+ Sort .depend when rebuilding.
+
+ This makes diffs more stable between makedepend implementations.
+
+commit 5df9d1f5c0943367d9b68435f4c82224ce11a73f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:06:43 2019 +1100
+
+ Update depend to include sk files.
+
+commit 9a967c5bbfca35835165f7d8a6165009f5b21872
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Dec 9 20:25:26 2019 +1100
+
+ Describe how to build libcrypto as PIC.
+
+ While there, move the OpenSSL 1.1.0g caveat closer to the other version
+ information.
+
+commit b66fa5da25c4b5b67cf9f0ce7af513f5a6a6a686
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Dec 9 17:23:22 2019 +1100
+
+ Recommend running LibreSSL or OpenSSL self-tests.
+
+commit fa7924008e838cded7e8a561356ffe5e06e0ed64
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Dec 6 14:17:26 2019 +1100
+
+ Wrap ECC specific bits in ifdef.
+
+ Fixes tests when built against an OpenSSL configured with no-ec.
+
+commit 2ff822eabd7d4461743f22d3b9ba35ab76069df5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 20:21:36 2019 +1100
+
+ Wrap sha2.h include in ifdef.
+
+ Fixes build --without-openssl on at least Fedora.
+
+commit 443848155ffcda65a6077aac118c861b503a093f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 15:10:21 2019 +1100
+
+ compile sk-dummy.so with no-PIE version of LDFLAGS
+
+ This lets it pick up the -L path to libcrypto for example.
+
+commit 37f5b5346e4cc6a894245aa89d2930649bb7045b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 14:48:46 2019 +1100
+
+ includes.h for sk-dummy.c, dummy
+
+commit b218055e59a7c1a1816f7a55ca18e3f3c05d63a4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 12:32:23 2019 +1100
+
+ (yet) another x-platform fix for sk-dummy.so
+
+ Check for -fPIC support from compiler
+
+ Compile libopenbsd-compat -fPIC
+
+ Don't mix -fPIE and -fPIC when compiling
+
+commit 0dedb703adcd98d0dbc4479f5f312a2bd3df2850
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 11:53:57 2019 +1100
+
+ needs includes.h for WITH_OPENSSL
+
+commit ef3853bb94c2c72e7eda0de6cec0bcb1da62058f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 11:52:23 2019 +1100
+
+ another attempt at sk-dummy.so working x-platform
+
+ include a fatal() implementation to satisfy libopenbsd-compat
+
+ clean up .lo and .so files
+
+ .gitignore .lo and .so files
+
+commit d46ac56f1cbd5a855a2d5e7309f90d383dcf6431
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 00:13:29 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: lots of dependencies go away here with ed25519 no longer
+
+ needing the ssh_digest API.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 785847ec78cb580d141e29abce351a436d6b5d49
+
+commit 7404b81f25a4a7847380c0f0cf7f1bea5f0a5cd3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 00:11:21 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: perform hashing directly in crypto_hash_sha512() using
+
+ libcrypto or libc SHA512 functions rather than calling ssh_digest_memory();
+ avoids many dependencies on ssh code that complicate standalone use of
+ ed25519, as we want to do in sk-dummy.so
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a3c37593d3ba7add037b587cec44aaea088496d
+
+commit d39a865b7af93a7a9b5a64cf7cf0ef4396c80ba3
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 12:24:31 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: improve the text for -A a little; input from naddy and
+
+ djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9cdfb1d6dbb9887c4bf3bb25f9c7a94294c988d
+
+commit 9a0e01bd0c61f553ead96b5af84abd73865847b8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 12:23:25 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: reshuffle the text to read better; input from naddy,
+
+ djmc, and dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0b2aca2b67614dda3d6618ea097bf0610c35013
+
+commit 5ca52c0f2e5e7f7d01d8d557b994b5c2087bed00
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 18:09:07 2019 +1100
+
+ $< doesn't work as` I thought; explicily list objs
+
+commit 18e84bfdc5906a73405c3b42d7f840013bbffe34
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 05:20:54 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak wording
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd002ca1599b71331faca735ff5f6de29e32222e
+
+commit 8ef5bf9d03aa0f047711cff47f5ffbe3b33ff8c9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 13:12:30 2019 +1100
+
+ missing .SUFFIXES line makes make sad
+
+commit 323da82b8ea993b7f2c5793fd53b4f5ca105d19d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 09:53:42 2019 +1100
+
+ (hopefully) fix out of tree builds of sk-dummy.so
+
+commit d8b2838c5d19bf409d44ede4d32df8ee47aeb4cd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 22:32:11 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove stray semicolon after closing brace of function;
+
+ from Michael Forney
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda95acb799bb160d15e205ee126117cf33da3a7
+
+commit 6e1d1bbf5a3eca875005e0c87f341a0a03799809
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 05:38:43 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Revert previous commit. The channels code still uses int
+
+ in many places for channel ids so the INT_MAX check still makes sense.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 532e4b644791b826956c3c61d6ac6da39bac84bf
+
+commit 48989244658b9748b6801034ff4ffbdfc6b1520f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 16:03:12 2019 +1100
+
+ wire sk-dummy.so into test suite
+
+commit f79364bacaebde4f1c260318ab460fceacace02f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 05:00:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: use error()+_exit() instead of fatal() to avoid running
+
+ cleanup handlers in child process; spotted via weird regress failures in
+ portable
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6902a9bb3987c7d347774444f7979b8a9ba7f412
+
+commit 70ec5e5e2681bcd409a9df94a2fec6f57a750945
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 03:34:04 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check
+
+ and cast that were left over from the type conversion. Noted by
+ t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad105b6a905284e780b1fd7ff118e1c346e90b5
+
+commit ad44ca81bea83657d558aaef5a1d789a9032bac3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 23:43:10 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: test FIDO2/U2F key types; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 367e06d5a260407619b4b113ea0bd7004a435474
+
+commit c6efa8a91af1d4fdb43909a23a0a4ffa012155ad
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 23:41:23 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: add dummy security key middleware based on work by
+
+ markus@
+
+ This will allow us to test U2F/FIDO2 support in OpenSSH without
+ requiring real hardware.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88b309464b8850c320cf7513f26d97ee1fdf9aae
+
+commit 8635afa1cdc21366d61730d943f3cf61861899c8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 22:42:26 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak previous;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4c097364c75da320f1b291568db830fb1ee4883
+
+commit e0d38ae9bc8c0de421605b9021d8144e4d8ff22b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 03:04:27 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: more debugging; behind DEBUG_SK
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a978896227118557505999ddefc1f4c839818b60
+
+commit 9281d4311b8abc63b88259f354944c53f9b0b3c7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 21:47:49 2019 +1100
+
+ unbreak fuzzers for recent security key changes
+
+commit c5f1cc993597fed0a9013743556b1567f476c677
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 10:32:35 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: unbreak tests for recent security key changes
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2cdf2fcae9962ca4d711338f3ceec3c1391bdf95
+
+commit 64988266820cc90a45a21672be9d762cbde8d34d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 06:53:04 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: unbreak after security key support landed
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ab578b0dbeb2aa6d9969b54a9c1bad329c0dcba
+
+commit e65e25c81e22ea622e89a142a303726a3882384f
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 21 05:18:47 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove workaround for broken 'openssl rsa -text' output
+
+ that was fixed in libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c r1.24.
+
+ ok dtucker inoguchi
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c260edfac177daa8fcce90141587cf04a95c4f5f
+
+commit 21377ec2a9378579ba4b44a681af7bbca77581f4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 10:23:36 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: redundant test
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38fa7806c528a590d91ae560e67bd8b246c2d7a3
+
+commit 664deef95a2e770812533439b8bdd3f3c291ae59
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:51 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: document the "no-touch-required" certificate extension;
+
+ ok markus, feedback deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47640122b13f825e9c404ea99803b2372246579d
+
+commit 26cb128b31efdd5395153f4943f5be3eddc07033
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:27 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Print a key touch reminder when generating a security
+
+ key. Most keys require a touch to authorize the operation.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe8b23edbf33e1bb81741b9f25e9a63be5f6b68
+
+commit daeaf4136927c2a82af1399022103d67ff03f74a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:55:58 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow "ssh-keygen -x no-touch-required" when generating a
+
+ security key keypair to request one that does not require a touch for each
+ authentication attempt. The default remains to require touch.
+
+ feedback deraadt; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 887e7084b2e89c0c62d1598ac378aad8e434bcbd
+
+commit 2e71263b80fec7ad977e098004fef7d122169d40
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:54:23 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and
+
+ a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default
+ requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their
+ key to authorize them.
+
+ feedback deraadt, ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e
+
+commit 0fddf2967ac51d518e300408a0d7e6adf4cd2634
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:52:46 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive
+
+ This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that
+ causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before
+ a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the
+ key).
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e434a49802d4ed82bc0aa38cb985c198c407de
+
+commit b7e74ea072919b31391bc0f5ff653f80b9f5e84f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:51:37 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add new structure for signature options
+
+ This is populated during signature verification with additional fields
+ that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is
+ only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags
+ field.
+
+ with and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49
+
+commit d2b0f88178ec9e3f11b606bf1004ac2fe541a2c3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:38:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: memleak in error path
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93488431bf02dde85a854429362695d2d43d9112
+
+commit e2c0a21ade5e0bd7f0aab08d7eb9457f086681e9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 22 06:50:30 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Wait for FD to be readable or writeable during a nonblocking
+
+ connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when the server doesn't
+ immediately send a banner (eg multiplexers like sslh) but is also slightly
+ quicker for other connections since, unlike ssh1, ssh2 doesn't specify
+ that the client should parse the server banner before sending its own.
+ Patch from mnissler@chromium.org, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba9cd8480d1d9dd31d0ca0422ea155c26c5df1d
+
+commit 2f95d43dc222ce194622b706682e8de07c9cfb42
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 20 16:34:11 2019 +1100
+
+ Include openssl compat header.
+
+ Fixes warning for ECDSA_SIG_set0 on OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.
+
+commit a70d92f236576c032a45c39e68ca0d71e958d19d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 22:23:19 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: adjust on-wire signature encoding for ecdsa-sk keys to
+
+ better match ec25519-sk keys. Discussed with markus@ and Sebastian Kinne
+
+ NB. if you are depending on security keys (already?) then make sure you
+ update both your clients and servers.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 53d88d8211f0dd02a7954d3af72017b1a79c0679
+
+commit 26369a5f7d9c4e4ef44a3e04910126e1bcea43d8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 22:21:15 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: a little more information from the monitor when signature
+
+ verification fails.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6a30071e0518cac512f9e10be3dc3500e2003f3
+
+commit 4402d6c9b5bf128dcfae2429f1d41cdaa8849b6b
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 16:02:32 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: revert previous: naddy pointed out what's meant to
+
+ happen. rethink needed...
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb0fede8123ea7f725fd65e00d49241c40bd3421
+
+commit 88056f881315233e990e4e04a815f8f96b4674e1
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 14:54:47 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: -c and -s do not make sense with -k; reshuffle -k into
+
+ the main synopsis/usage; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f881ba253da015398ae8758d973e3390754869bc
+
+commit 2cf262c21f35296c2ff718cfdb52e0473a1c3983
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 23:17:48 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: document '$' environment variable expansion for
+
+ SecurityKeyProvider; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76db507ebd336a573e1cd4146cc40019332c5799
+
+commit f0edda81c5ebccffcce52b182c3033531a1aab71
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 23:16:49 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: more missing mentions of ed25519-sk; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f242e53366f61697dffd53af881bc5daf78230ff
+
+commit 189550f5bc85148e85f4caa1f6b2fc623149a4ee
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 16:10:05 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: additional missing stdarg.h includes when built without
+
+ WITH_OPENSSL; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 881f9a2c4e2239849cee8bbf4faec9bab128f55b
+
+commit 723a5369864b338c48d22854bc2bb4ee5c083deb
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 16:08:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: add the missing WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs after the ED25519-SK
+
+ addition; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9545e1c273e506cf70e328cbb9d0129b6d62474
+
+commit 478f4f98e4e93ae4ed1a8911dec4e5b75ea10f30
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 08:52:24 2019 +1100
+
+ remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones
+
+ ok dtucker@
+
+commit 6a7ef310da100f876a257b7367e3b0766dac3994
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 22:22:04 2019 +1100
+
+ filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms
+
+ Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when
+ compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
+
+commit 64f56f1d1af3947a71a4c391f2c08747d19ee591
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 09:15:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: LibreSSL change the format for openssl rsa -text output from
+
+ "publicExponent" to "Exponent" so accept either. with djm.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b7e6c4bf700029a31c98be14600d4472fe0467e6
+
+commit 4bfc0503ad94a2a7190686a89649567c20b8534f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:58:00 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix a bug that prevented serialisation of ed25519-sk keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 066682b79333159cac04fcbe03ebd9c8dcc152a9
+
+commit d88205417084f523107fbe1bc92061635cd57fd2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:36 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix incorrect error message when key certification fails
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7771bd77ee73f7116df37c734c41192943a73cee
+
+commit 740c4bc9875cbb4b9fc03fd5eac19df080f20df5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:02 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix bug that prevented certification of ed25519-sk keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c8cc6f5de2cdd0ee3a81c3a9dee8d862645996
+
+commit 85409cbb505d8c463ab6e2284b4039764c7243de
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:24:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow *-sk key types to be turned into certificates
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd365ee343934862286d0b011aa77fa739d2a945
+
+commit e2e1283404e06a22ac6135d057199e70dcadb8dd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:55:02 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: mention ed25519-sk key/cert types here too; prompted by
+
+ jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e281977e4a4f121f3470517cbd5e483eee37b818
+
+commit 97dc5d1d82865a7d20f1eb193b5c62ce684024e5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:50:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: mention ed25519-sk in places where it is accepted;
+
+ prompted by jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 076d386739ebe7336c2137e583bc7a5c9538a442
+
+commit 130664344862a8c7afd3e24d8d36ce40af41a99f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:34:47 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: document ed25519-sk pubkey, private key and certificate
+
+ formats
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 795a7c1c80315412e701bef90e31e376ea2f3c88
+
+commit 71856e1142fc01628ce53098f8cfc74765464b35
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:29:50 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: correct order or ecdsa-sk private key fields
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d4a0c13226a79f0080ce6cbe74f73b03ed8092e
+
+commit 93fa2a6649ae3e0626cbff25c985a4573d63e3f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:16:53 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: correct description of fields in pub/private keys (was
+
+ missing curve name); spotted by Sebastian Kinne
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a11340dc7ed16200342d384fb45ecd4fcce26e7
+
+commit b497e920b409250309c4abe64229237b8f2730ba
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 15:05:04 2019 +1100
+
+ Teach the GTK2/3 ssh-askpass the new prompt hints
+
+ ssh/ssh-agent now sets a hint environment variable $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT
+ when running the askpass program. This is intended to allow the
+ askpass to vary its UI across the three cases it supports: asking for
+ a passphrase, confirming the use of a key and (recently) reminding
+ a user to touch their security key.
+
+ This adapts the gnome-ssh-askpass[23] to use these hints. Specifically,
+ for SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=confirm it will skip the text input box and show
+ only "yes"/"no" buttons. For SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none (used to remind
+ users to tap their security key), it shows only a "close" button.
+
+ Help wanted: adapt the other askpass programs in active use, including
+ x11-ssh-askpass, lxqt-openssh-askpass, etc.
+
+commit 857f49e91eeae6feb781ef5f5e26c38ca3d953ec
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 14:15:26 2019 +1100
+
+ Move ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+ Found by -Wimplicit-fallthrough: one ECC case was not inside the ifdef.
+ ok djm@
+
+commit 6cf1c40096a79e5eedcf897c7cdb46bb32d4a3ee
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 14:14:18 2019 +1100
+
+ Enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough if supported
+
+ Suggested by djm.
+
+commit 103c51fd5f5ddc01cd6b5c1132e711765b921bf5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 01:59:48 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: missing break in getopt switch; spotted by Sebastian Kinne
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f002dbf14dba5586e8407e90f0141148ade8e8fc
+
+commit 9a1225e8ca2ce1fe809910874935302234399a6d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 16 23:17:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak debug message
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf336d3be0b7e3dd97920d7e7471146a281d2b9
+
+commit 4103a3ec7c68493dbc4f0994a229507e943a86d3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 16 22:42:30 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: a little debug() in the security key interface
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c70300609a5c8b19707207bb7ad4109e963b0e8
+
+commit 05daa211de926f66f50b7380d637f84dc6341574
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 16 22:36:48 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: always use ssh-sk-helper, even for the internal USB HID
+
+ support. This avoid the need for a wpath pledge in ssh-agent.
+
+ reported by jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19f799c4d020b870741d221335dbfa5e76691c23
+
+commit d431778a561d90131814f986b646299f9af33c8c
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:41:01 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix typos in sk_enroll
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faa9bf779e008b3e64e2eb1344d9b7d83b3c4487
+
+commit af90aec0443ec51e6b2d804cb91771d3905f8a6f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:16:28 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: double word;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43d09bafa4ea9002078cb30ca9adc3dcc0b9c2b9
+
+commit fd1a96490cef7f945a1b3b5df4e90c8a1070f425
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 06:00:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove most uses of BN_CTX
+
+ We weren't following the rules re BN_CTX_start/BN_CTX_end and the places
+ we were using it didn't benefit from its use anyway. ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea9ba6c0d2e6f6adfe00b309a8f41842fe12fc7a
+
+commit 39b87104cdd47baf79ef77dc81de62cea07d119f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 18:56:54 2019 +1100
+
+ Add wrappers for other ultrix headers.
+
+ Wrappers protect against multiple inclusions for headers that don't do
+ it themselves.
+
+commit 134a74f4e0cf750931f1125beb2a3f40c54c8809
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 18:55:13 2019 +1100
+
+ Add SSIZE_MAX when we define ssize_t.
+
+commit 9c6d0a3a1ed77989d8c5436d8c3cc6c7045c0197
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 17:13:19 2019 +1100
+
+ Remove ultrix realpath hack.
+
+commit c63fba5e3472307167850bbd84187186af7fa9f0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:37:27 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: unshield security key privkey before attempting signature
+
+ in agent. spotted by dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb67d451665385b8a0a55371231c50aac67b91d2
+
+commit d165bb5396e3f718480e6039ca2cf77f5a2c2885
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:26:56 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: rewrite c99-ism
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c70cca29cfa7e6d9f7ec1d6d5dabea112499b3
+
+commit 03e06dd0e6e1c0a9f4b4b9de7def8a44dcbf93a7
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:25:52 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: only clang understands those new -W options
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0
+
+commit 5c0bc273cba53f822b7d777bbb6c35d160d3b505
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:08:00 2019 +1100
+
+ configure flag to built-in security key support
+
+ Require --with-security-key-builtin before enabling the built-in
+ security key support (and consequent dependency on libfido2).
+
+commit fbcb9a7fa55300b8bd4c18bee024c6104c5a25d7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:06:30 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.48
+ date: 2019/02/04 16:45:40; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +16 -17; commitid: cpNtVC7erojNyctw;
+ Make gl_pathc, gl_matchc and gl_offs size_t in glob_t to match POSIX.
+ This requires a libc major version bump. OK deraadt@
+
+commit 2cfb11abac85885de0cb888bbeb9a3e4303105ea
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:05:07 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.47
+ date: 2017/05/08 14:53:27; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +34 -21; commitid: sYfxfyUHAfarP8sE;
+ Fix exponential CPU use with repeated '*' operators by changing '*'
+ handling to be interative instead of recursive.
+ Fix by Yves Orton, ported to OpenBSD glob.c by Ray Lai. OK tb@
+
+commit 228dd595c7882bb9b161dbb7d4dca15c8a5f03f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:04:28 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.46
+ date: 2015/12/28 22:08:18; author: mmcc; state: Exp; lines: +5 -9; commitid: 0uXuF2O13NH9q2e1;
+ Remove NULL-checks before free() and a few related dead assignments.
+
+ ok and valuable input from millert@
+
+commit a16f748690139b9f452485d97511ad5e578f59b2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:43 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.44
+ date: 2015/09/14 16:09:13; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +3 -5; commitid: iWfSX2BIn0sLw62l;
+ remove null check before free. from Michael McConville
+ ok semarie
+
+commit fd37cdeafe25adfcdc752280f535d28de7997ff1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:27 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.43
+ date: 2015/06/13 16:57:04; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; commitid: zOUKuqWBdOPOz1SZ;
+ in glob() initialize the glob_t before the first failure check.
+ from j@pureftpd.org
+ ok millert stsp
+
+commit fd62769c3882adea118dccaff80a06009874a2d1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:01:20 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.42
+ date: 2015/02/05 12:59:57; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -1; commitid: DTQbfd4poqBW8iSJ;
+ Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@
+
+commit 2b6cba7ee2b8b36f393be739c860a9d2e5d8eb48
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:00:07 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.41
+ date: 2014/10/08 05:35:27; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: JwTGarRLHQKDgPh2;
+ obvious realloc -> reallocarray conversion
+
+commit ab3600665387ae34785498558c4409e27f495b0b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 04:12:32 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: don't consult dlopen whitelist for internal security key
+
+ provider; spotted by dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfe5fbd17e4ff95dd85b9212181652b54444192e
+
+commit 19f8ec428db835f68c1cfd63587e9880ccd6486c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:08:28 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.40
+ date: 2013/09/30 12:02:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +14 -15;
+ Use PATH_MAX, NAME_MAX and LOGIN_NAME_MAX not MAXPATHNAMELEN,
+ MAXNAMLEN or MAXLOGNAME where possible. OK deraadt@
+
+commit bb7413db98e418d4af791244660abf6c829783f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:07:30 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ revision 1.39
+ date: 2012/01/20 07:09:42; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4;
+ the glob stat limit is way too low. bump to 2048.
+ while here, failed stats should count against the limit too.
+ ok deraadt sthen stsp
+
+commit 01362cf7cb979525c014714e2bccf799a46e772e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 03:41:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: U2F tokens may return FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED when
+
+ probed to see if they own a key handle. Handle this case so the find_device()
+ look can work for them. Reported by Michael Forney
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ccd5b30a6ddfe4dba228b7159bf168601bd9166
+
+commit cf62307bc9758105913dcb91b418e4968ac2244d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 14:01:00 2019 +1100
+
+ Add libfido2 to INSTALL.
+
+commit 69fbda1894349d1f420c842dfcbcc883239d1aa7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 13:42:15 2019 +1100
+
+ libcrypto is now optional.
+
+commit 45ffa369886e37930776d7c15dd8b973242d6ecc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:38:07 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: show the "please touch your security key" notifier when
+
+ using the (default) build-in security key support.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4707643aaa7124501d14e92d1364b20f312a6428
+
+commit 49dc9fa928d77807c53bdc2898db7fb515fe5eb3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:37:24 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: close the "touch your security key" notifier on the error
+
+ path too
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7628bf80505c1aefbb1de7abc8bb5ee51826829
+
+commit 22a82712e89bf17c27427aeba15795fb4011a0c2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:20:06 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: correct function name in debug message
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2482c99d2ce448f39282493050f8a01e3ffc39ab
+
+commit 018e2902a65c22faded215a7c588492c948f108c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 00:32:40 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: follow existing askpass logic for security key notifier:
+
+ fall back to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT if no $SSH_ASKPASS environment
+ variable is set.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cda753726b13fb797bf7a9f7a0b3022d9ade4520
+
+commit 575d0042a94997c1eeb86a6dcfb30b3c7bdbcba3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 14 21:56:52 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove debugging goop that snuck in to last commit
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e
+
+commit 63a5b24f2dbdc9a4bf2182ac3db26731ddc617e8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:21:26 2019 +1100
+
+ don't fatal if libfido2 not found
+
+ spotted by dtucker@
+
+commit 129952a81c00c332721b4ba3ede868c720ad7f4e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:17:12 2019 +1100
+
+ correct object dependency
+
+commit 6bff9521ab9a9f7396d635755c342b72373bb4f9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 14 21:27:29 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: directly support U2F/FIDO2 security keys in OpenSSH by
+
+ linking against the (previously external) USB HID middleware. The dlopen()
+ capability still exists for alternate middlewares, e.g. for Bluetooth, NFC
+ and test/debugging.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14446cf170ac0351f0d4792ba0bca53024930069
+
+commit 4f5e331cb8e11face3025aa6578662dde489c3ad
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 22:00:21 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: in order to be able to figure out the number of
+
+ signatures left on a shielded key, we need to transfer the number of
+ signatures left from the private to the public key. ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a5d0d260aeace47d372695fdae383ce9b962574
+
+commit dffd02e297e6c2a4e86775f293eb1b0ff01fb3df
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 20:25:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix check for sig_s; noted by qsa at qualys.com
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34198084e4afb424a859f52c04bb2c9668a52867
+
+commit fc173aeb1526d4268db89ec5dfebaf8750dd26cd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:25:11 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: When clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a
+
+ noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section
+ 4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63
+
+commit bf219920b70cafbf29ebc9890ef67d0efa54e738
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 07:53:10 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix shield/unshield for xmss keys: - in ssh-agent we need
+
+ to delay the call to shield until we have received key specific options. -
+ when serializing xmss keys for shield we need to deal with all optional
+ components (e.g. state might not be loaded). ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc2db82524b209468eb176d6b4d6b9486422f41f
+
+commit 40598b85d72a509566b7b2a6d57676c7231fed34
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 05:42:26 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove size_t gl_pathc < 0 test, it is invalid. the
+
+ return value from glob() is sufficient. discussed with djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c91203322db9caaf7efaf5ae90c794a91070be3c
+
+commit 72687c8e7c38736e3e64e833ee7aa8f9cd9efed1
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 04:47:52 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: stdarg.h required more broadly; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5b15674cde1b54d6dbbae8faf30d47e6e5d6513
+
+commit 1e0b248d47c96be944868a735553af8482300a07
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Nov 14 16:08:17 2019 +1100
+
+ Put sshsk_sign call inside ifdef ENABLE_SK.
+
+ Fixes build against OpenSSL configured without ECC.
+
+commit 546274a6f89489d2e6be8a8b62f2bb63c87a61fd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 23:27:31 2019 +1100
+
+ Remove duplicate __NR_clock_nanosleep
+
+commit b1c82f4b8adf3f42476d8a1f292df33fb7aa1a56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 23:19:35 2019 +1100
+
+ seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox.
+
+ seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() to make OpenSSH working with latest
+ glibc. Patch from Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> via bz #3093.
+
+commit 2b523d23804c13cb68db135b919fcf312c42b580
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:56:56 2019 +1100
+
+ Include stdarg.h for va_list in xmalloc.h.
+
+commit 245dcbdca5374296bdb9c48be6e24bdf6b1c0af7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:19:26 2019 +1100
+
+ Put headers inside ifdef _AIX.
+
+ Prevents compile errors due to missing definitions (eg va_list) on
+ non-AIX platforms.
+
+commit a4cc579c6ad2b2e54bdd6cc0d5e12c2288113a56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 10:41:41 2019 +1100
+
+ Fix comment in match_usergroup_pattern_list.
+
+ Spotted by balu.gajjala@gmail.com via bz#3092.
+
+commit fccff339cab5aa66f2554e0188b83f980683490b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:38:19 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow an empty attestation certificate returned by a
+
+ security key enrollment - these are possible for tokens that only offer self-
+ attestation. This also needs support from the middleware.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 135eeeb937088ef6830a25ca0bbe678dfd2c57cc
+
+commit e44bb61824e36d0d181a08489c16c378c486a974
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:36:44 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: security keys typically need to be tapped/touched in
+
+ order to perform a signature operation. Notify the user when this is expected
+ via the TTY (if available) or $SSH_ASKPASS if we can.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef90a99a85d4a2a07217a58efb4df8444818609
+
+commit 4671211068441519011ac0e38c588317f4157ba1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:35:02 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: pass SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT hint to y/n key confirm too
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08d46712e5e5f1bad0aea68e7717b7bec1ab8959
+
+commit 5d1c1590d736694f41b03e686045f08fcae20d62
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:34:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: dd API for performing one-shot notifications via tty or
+
+ SSH_ASKPASS
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9484aea33aff5b62ce3642bf259546c7639f23f3
+
+commit 166927fd410823eec8a7b2472463db51e0e6fef5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:32:48 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: add xvasprintf()
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5e3671c05c121993b034db935bce1a7aa372247
+
+commit 782093ec6cf64cc6c4078410093359869ea9329f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 09:08:55 2019 +1100
+
+ Remove leftover if statement from sync.
+
+commit b556cc3cbf0c43f073bb41bba4e92ca709a1ec13
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:40 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove extra layer for ed25519 signature; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7672d9d0278b4bf656a12d3aab0c0bfe92a8ae47
+
+commit 3fcf69ace19e75cf9dcd7206f396adfcb29611a8
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:00 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: check sig_r and sig_s for ssh-sk keys; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a1e6a85b5f465d447a3800f739e35c5b74e0abc
+
+commit 2c55744a56de0ffc81fe445a1e7fc5cd308712b3
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:33:08 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e
+
+commit fd1a3b5e38721b1d69aae2d9de1a1d9155dfa5c7
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:32:30 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: update sk-api to version 2 for ed25519 support; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77aa4d5b6ab17987d8a600907b49573940a0044a
+
+commit 7c32b51edbed5bd57870249c0a45dffd06be0002
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_assemble(); ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af9ec838b9bc643786310b5caefc4ca4754e68c6
+
+commit fe05a36dc0ea884c8c2395d53d804fe4f4202b26
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:18 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_inner_sig(); ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f422d0052c6d948fe0e4b04bc961f37fdffa0910
+
+commit e03a29e6554cd0c9cdbac0dae53dd79e6eb4ea47
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:50 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: rename sshsk_ecdsa_sign() to sshsk_sign(); ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1524042e09d81e54c4470d7bfcc0194c5b46fe19
+
+commit bc7b5d6187de625c086b5f639b25bbad17bbabfc
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:21 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_inner_sig(); ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07e41997b542f670a15d7e2807143fe01efef584
+
+commit cef84a062db8cfeece26f067235dc440f6992c17
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:54 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(); ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2313761a3a84ccfe032874d638d3c363e0f14026
+
+commit 7c096c456f33f3d2682736d4735cc10e790276e9
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:24 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: implement ssh-ed25519-sk verification; ok djm@
- Fix memory leaks in match_filter_list() error paths.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37906d93948a1e3d237c20e713d6ca8fbf7d13f6
+
+commit ba5fb02bed1e556d0ce7b1740ae8a5f87b737491
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 08:48:30 2019 +1100
+
+ ignore ssh-sk-helper
+
+commit 78c96498947f711141f493a40d202c482cc59438
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 11 19:53:37 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: skip demanding -fstack-protector-all on hppa. we never
- ok dtucker@ markus@
+ wrote a stack protector for reverse-stack architectures, and i don't think
+ anyone else did either. a warning per compiled file is just annoying.
- Upstream-ID: c7f96ac0877f6dc9188bbc908100a8d246cc7f0e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada
-commit 6d5a41b38b55258213ecfaae9df7a758caa752a1
+commit aa1c9e37789f999979fe59df74ce5c8424861ac8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 15 01:46:47 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 8 03:54:02 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: duplicate 'x' character in getopt(3) optstring
- fix division by zero crash in "df" output when server
- returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes. Spotted by Guido Vranken; ok
- dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c81caa0cb5798de3621eca16b7dd22e5d0d8a7
+
+commit aa4c640dc362816d63584a16e786d5e314e24390
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 7 08:38:38 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fill in missing man page bits for U2F security key support:
+
+ Mention the new key types, the ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk file, ssh's
+ SecurityKeyProvider keyword, the SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable,
+ and ssh-keygen's new -w and -x options.
+
+ Copy the ssh-sk-helper man page from ssh-pkcs11-helper with minimal
+ substitutions.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef2e8f83d0c0ce11ad9b8c28945747e5ca337ac4
+
+commit b236b27d6dada7f0542214003632b4e9b7aa1380
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 3 00:10:43 2019 +1100
+
+ Put sftp-realpath in libssh.a
+
+ and remove it from the specific binary targets.
+
+commit 382c18c20cdcec45b5d21ff25b4a5e0df91a68c4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 3 00:09:21 2019 +1100
+
+ statfs might be defined in sys/mount.h.
- Upstream-ID: 6fb6c2ae6b289aa07b6232dbc0be54682ef5419f
+ eg on old NetBSDs.
+
+commit 03ffc0951c305c8e3b5fdc260d65312a57f8f7ea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 23:25:01 2019 +1100
+
+ Put stdint.h inside ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit 19cb64c4b42d4312ce12091fd9436dbd6898998c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 22:45:44 2019 +1100
+
+ Rebuild .depend.
+
+commit 3611bfe89b92ada5914526d8ff0919aeb967cfa7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 22:42:05 2019 +1100
+
+ Define __BSD_VISIBLE in fnmatch.h.
+
+ .. since we use symbols defined only when it is when using the compat
+ fnmatch.
+
+commit f5cc5816aaddb8eca3cba193f53e99d6a0b37d05
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 16:39:38 2019 +1100
+
+ Only enable U2F if OpenSSL supports ECC.
+
+ This requires moving the U2F bits to below the OpenSSL parts so we have
+ the required information. ok djm@
+
+commit ad38406fc95fa223b0ef2edf8ff50508f8ab1cb6
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 12:10:43 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix miscellaneous text problems; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0cbf411a14d8fa0b269b69cbb1b4fc0ca699fe9f
+
+commit 9cac151c2dc76b8e5b727b2fa216f572e372170f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:26:07 2019 +1100
+
+ Add flags needed to build and work on Ultrix.
+
+commit 0e3c5bc50907d2058407641b5a3581b7eda91b7e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:24:29 2019 +1100
+
+ Hook up fnmatch for platforms that don't have it.
+
+commit b56dbfd9d967e5b6ce7be9f81f206112e19e1030
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:17:42 2019 +1100
+
+ Add missing bracket in realpath macro.
+
+commit 59ccb56f15e5e530e7c1b5a0b361749d8c6217d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 17:32:47 2019 +1100
+
+ Import fnmatch.c from OpenBSD.
+
+commit 79d46de9fbea0f3c0e8ae7cf84effaba089071b0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 15:22:32 2019 +1100
-commit bd5d7d239525d595ecea92765334af33a45d9d63
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Sun Feb 12 15:45:15 2017 +1100
+ Use sftp_realpath if no native realpath.
- ifdef out EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
+commit bb4f003ed8c5f61ec74a66bcedc8ab19bf5b35c4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 15:06:16 2019 +1100
+
+ Configure flags for haiku from haikuports.
- EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 so ifdef out
- for the benefit of OpenSSL versions prior to that.
+ Should build with the default flags with ./configure
-commit 155d540d00ff55f063421ec182ec8ff2b7ab6cbe
+commit 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 10 04:34:50 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 03:54:33 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could turn
- bring back r1.34 that was backed out for problems loading
- public keys:
+ in to a kill(-1); bz3084, reported by Gao Rui, ok dtucker@
- translate OpenSSL error codes to something more
- meaninful; bz#2522 reported by Jakub Jelen, ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac2742e04a69d4c34223505b6a32f6d686e18896
+
+commit 03f9205f0fb49ea2507eacc143737a8511ae5a4e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 14:49:25 2019 +1100
+
+ conditionalise SK sign/verify on ENABLE_SK
- with additional fix from Jakub Jelen to solve the backout.
- bz#2525 bz#2523 re-ok dtucker@
+ Spotted by Darren and his faux-Vax
+
+commit 5eb7b9563ff818e17de24231bf2d347d9db302c5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 14:41:07 2019 +1100
+
+ Add prototype for localtime_r if needed.
+
+commit d500b59a825f6a58f2abf7b04eb1992d81e45d58
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 13:42:12 2019 +1100
+
+ Check if IP_TOS is defined before using.
+
+commit 764d51e04460ec0da12e05e4777bc90c116accb9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 13:34:49 2019 +1100
+
+ autoconf pieces for U2F support
- Upstream-ID: a9d5bc0306f4473d9b4f4484f880e95f3c1cc031
+ Mostly following existing logic for PKCS#11 - turning off support
+ when either libcrypto or dlopen(3) are unavailable.
-commit a287c5ad1e0bf9811c7b9221979b969255076019
+commit 45f17a159acfc5a8e450bfbcc2cffe72950ed7a3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 10 03:36:40 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:32:05 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: remove duplicate PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG on !WITH_OPENSSL path
- Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent to printf
- but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports it; bz#2520 ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95a7cafad2a4665d57cabacc28031fabc0bea9fc
+
+commit db8d13f7925da7337df87248995c533e111637ec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:06:52 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: more additional source files
- Upstream-ID: e8eed28712ba7b22d49be534237eed019875bd1e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8eaa25fb901594aee23b76eda99dca5b8db94c6f
-commit e40269be388972848aafcca7060111c70aab5b87
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 8 20:32:43 2017 +0000
+commit f89c5df65dd307739ff22319c2cf847d3b0c5ab4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:04:25 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: additional source files here too
- Avoid printf %s NULL. From semarie@, OK djm@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8809f8e1c8f7459e7096ab6b58d8e56cb2f483fd
+
+commit 02275afa1ecbfbd39f27d34c97090e76bec232ec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:03:27 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: additional source files here too
- Upstream-ID: 06beef7344da0208efa9275d504d60d2a5b9266c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 09297e484327f911fd353489518cceaa0c1b95ce
-commit 5b90709ab8704dafdb31e5651073b259d98352bc
+commit dfc8f01b9886c7999e6e20acf3f7492cb8c80796
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 6 09:22:51 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 01:57:59 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: adapt to extra sshkey_sign() argument and additional
- Restore \r\n newline sequence for server ident string. The CR
- got lost in the flensing of SSHv1. Pointed out by Stef Bon
+ dependencies
- Upstream-ID: 5333fd43ce5396bf5999496096fac5536e678fac
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7a25604968486c4d6f81d06e8fbc7d17519de50e
-commit 97c31c46ee2e6b46dfffdfc4f90bbbf188064cbc
+commit afa59e26eeb44a93f36f043f60b936eaddae77c4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:42 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 01:55:41 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: skip security-key key types for tests until we have a
+
+ dummy U2F middleware to use.
- unit test for match_filter_list() function; still want a
- better name for this...
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 37200462b44334a4ad45e6a1f7ad1bd717521a95
+
+commit de871e4daf346a712c78fa4ab8f18b231a47cb85
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 00:52:35 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: sort;
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 840ad6118552c35111f0a897af9c8d93ab8de92a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8264b0be01ec5a60602bd50fd49cc3c81162ea16
-commit f1a193464a7b77646f0d0cedc929068e4a413ab4
+commit 2aae149a34b1b5dfbef423d3b7999a96818969bb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 23:05:57 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:37:33 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: undo debugging bits that shouldn't have been committed
- use ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to include connection
- username in packet log messages, e.g.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf
+
+commit 3420e0464bd0e8fedcfa5fd20ad37bdc740ad5b4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 09:24:58 2019 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit b923a90abc7bccb11a513dc8b5c0f13a0ea9682c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:28:27 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix -Wshadow warning
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3441eb04f872a00c2483c11a5f1570dfe775103c
+
+commit 9a14c64c38fc14d0029f1c7bc70cf62cc7f0fdf9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:23:19 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Refactor signing - use sshkey_sign for everything,
+
+ including the new U2F signatures.
- Connection closed by invalid user foo 10.1.1.1 port 44056 [preauth]
+ Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
+ sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
+ we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
+ change is mechanically adding that.
- ok markus@ bz#113
+ Suggested by / ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 3591b88bdb5416d6066fb3d49d8fff2375bf1a15
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
-commit 07edd7e9537ab32aa52abb5fb2a915c350fcf441
+commit 07da39f71d36fb547749a5b16aa8892e621a7e4a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 23:03:33 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:22:01 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: ssh-agent support for U2F/FIDO keys
- add ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to allow inclusion of a
- preamble string in disconnect messages; ok markus@
+ feedback & ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 34cb41182cd76d414c214ccb01c01707849afead
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb544a44bc32e45d2ec8bf652db2046f38360acb
-commit 68bc8cfa7642d3ccbf2cd64281c16b8b9205be59
+commit eebec620c9519c4839d781c4d5b6082152998f82
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:19 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:20:38 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: ssh AddKeysToAgent support for U2F/FIDO keys
- support =- for removing methods from algorithms lists,
- e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc; suggested by Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn in bz#2671 "I like
- it" markus@
+ feedback & ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: c78c38f9f81a963b33d0eade559f6048add24a6d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac08e45c7f995fa71f8d661b3f582e38cc0a2f91
-commit c924b2ef941028a1f31e6e94f54dfeeeef462a4e
+commit 486164d060314a7f8bca2a00f53be9e900c5e74d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 05:05:56 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:56 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: ssh-add support for U2F/FIDO keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f88a5181c982687afedf3130c6ab2bba60f7644
+
+commit b9dd14d3091e31fb836f69873d3aa622eb7b4a1c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:14 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: add new agent key constraint for U2F/FIDO provider
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d880c380170704280b4003860a1744d286c7a172
+
+commit 884416bdb10468f1252e4d7c13d51b43dccba7f6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:18:28 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: ssh client support for U2F/FIDO keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb2cfa6cf7419a1895e06e398ea6d41516c5b0bc
+
+commit 01a0670f69c5b86e471e033b92145d6c7cc77c58
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:49 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types
+
+ U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need
+ a separate list for user keys.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
+
+commit 23f38c2d8cda3fad24e214e1f0133c42435b54ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:09 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: ssh-keygen support for generating U2F/FIDO keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce04f2b497ac9dd8c327f76f1e6c724fb1d1b37
+
+commit ed3467c1e16b7396ff7fcf12d2769261512935ec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:16:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: U2F/FIDO middleware interface
+
+ Supports enrolling (generating) keys and signatures.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
- allow form-feed characters at EOL; bz#2431 ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73d1dd5939454f9c7bd840f48236cba41e8ad592
+
+commit 02bb0768a937e50bbb236efc2bbdddb1991b1c85
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:15:14 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Initial infrastructure for U2F/FIDO support
+
+ Key library support: including allocation, marshalling public/private
+ keys and certificates, signature validation.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a17615ba15e0f7932ac4360cb18fc9a9544e68c7
+
+commit 57ecc10628b04c384cbba2fbc87d38b74cd1199d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:14:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Protocol documentation for U2F/FIDO keys in OpenSSH
- Upstream-ID: 1f453afaba6da2ae69d6afdf1ae79a917552f1a2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f3247317c2909870593aeb306dff848bc427915
-commit 523db8540b720c4d21ab0ff6f928476c70c38aab
+commit f4fdcd2b7a2bbf5d8770d44565173ca5158d4dcb
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 16:01:22 2017 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 1 08:36:16 2019 +1100
+
+ Missing unit test files
+
+commit 1bcd1169c5221688418fa38606e9c69055b72451
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 29 19:45:03 2019 +1100
- prefer to use ldns-config to find libldns
+ Add implementation of localtime_r.
+
+commit 2046ed16c1202431b0307674c33a123a113e8297
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 29 07:47:27 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Signal handler cleanup: remove leftover support for
+
+ unreliable signals and now-unneeded save and restore of errno. ok deraadt@
+ markus@
- Should fix bz#2603 - "Build with ldns and without kerberos support
- fails if ldns compiled with kerberos support" by including correct
- cflags/libs
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dd8a1ebdd991c8629ba1f5237283341a93cd88
+
+commit 70fc9a6ca4dd33cb2dd400a4dad5db9683a3d284
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 22 08:50:35 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fixes from lucas;
- ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c4bfd2806c5bbc753788ffe19c5ee13aaf418b2
-commit c998bf0afa1a01257a53793eba57941182e9e0b7
+commit 702368aa4381c3b482368257ac574a87b5a80938
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 02:56:00 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 22 07:06:35 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of
- seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time).
- This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison
- warning.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987
+
+commit 5fe81da22652f8caa63e9e3a1af519a85d36337e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 21:19:47 2019 +1100
+
+ Fix ifdefs to not mask needed bits.
+
+commit 7694e9d2fb5785bbdd0920dce7a160bd79feaf00
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 17:05:36 2019 +1100
+
+ Only use RLIMIT_NOFILE if it's defined.
+
+commit d561b0b2fa2531b4cc3bc70a7d657c6485c9fd0b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:09:04 2019 +1100
+
+ Make sure we have struct statfs before using.
+
+commit 2912596aecfcf48e5115c7a906d1e664f7717a4b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:06:59 2019 +1100
+
+ Define UINT32_MAX if needed.
+
+commit 7169e31121e8c8cc729b55154deb722ae495b316
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:00:45 2019 +1100
+
+ Move utimensat definition into timespec section.
+
+ Since utimensat uses struct timespec, move it to the section where we
+ define struct timespec when needed.
+
+commit 850ec1773d656cbff44d78a79e369dc262ce5853
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 15:57:22 2019 +1100
+
+ Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL.
+
+commit 6fc7e1c6fec3ba589869ae98e968c0e5e2e4695b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 15:53:25 2019 +1100
+
+ Wrap poll.h includes in HAVE_POLL_H.
+
+commit 9239a18f96905cc1a353e861e33af093652f24e7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Oct 24 14:39:49 2019 +1100
+
+ Add a function call stackprotector tests.
+
+ Including a function call in the test programs for the gcc stack
+ protector flag tests exercises more of the compiler and makes it more
+ likely it'll detect problems.
+
+commit b9705393be4612fd5e29d0cd8e7cf2b66ed19eb7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 22 18:09:22 2019 +1100
+
+ Import regenerated moduli file.
+
+commit 76ed2199491397e0f9902ade80d5271e4a9b2630
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 16 06:05:39 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: potential NULL dereference for revoked hostkeys; reported
- rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op
- on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on
- anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually
- wraps, anyway).
+ by krishnaiah bommu
- some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ff685e7cc9dd2e3fe2e3dfcdcb9bc5c79f6506
+
+commit 6500c3bc71bf4fe14972c1177e6b93f1164d07a4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 16 06:03:30 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: free buf before return; reported by krishnaiah bommu
- Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 091bb23a6e913af5d4f72c50030b53ce1cef4de1
-commit 3ec5fa4ba97d4c4853620daea26a33b9f1fe3422
-Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 2 10:54:25 2017 +0000
+commit d7d116b6d9e6cb79cc235e9801caa683d3db3181
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 14 06:00:02 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: memleak in error path; spotted by oss-fuzz, ok markus@
- In vasnmprintf() return an error if malloc fails and
- don't set a function argument to the address of free'd memory.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6ed260cbbc297ab157ad63931802fb1ef7a4266
+
+commit 9b9e3ca6945351eefb821ff783a4a8e6d9b98b9a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Oct 11 14:12:16 2019 +1100
+
+ Re-add SA_RESTART to mysignal.
- ok djm@
+ This makes mysignal implement reliable BSD semantics according to
+ Stevens' APUE. This was first attempted in 2001 but was reverted
+ due to problems with HP-UX 10.20 and select() and possibly grantpt().
+ Modern systems should be fine with it, but if any current platforms have
+ a problem with it now we can disable it just for those. ok djm@
+
+commit 0bd312a362168c1eae3cd6b3889395a78e6fd0f8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Oct 10 09:42:03 2019 +1100
+
+ Fix ifdef typo for declaration of memmem.
- Upstream-ID: 1efffffff2f51d53c9141f245b90ac23d33b9779
+ Fixes build on IRIX. bz#3081.
-commit 858252fb1d451ebb0969cf9749116c8f0ee42753
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 1 02:59:09 2017 +0000
+commit 01ce1cd402d5eecde2bba35b67e08f5b266b37fd
+Author: Abhishek Arya <inferno@chromium.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 20:19:18 2019 -0700
- upstream commit
+ Update README.md
+
+commit 1ba130ac8fb2884307f658126f04578f8aef409e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 13:49:35 2019 +1100
+
+ add a fuzzer for private key parsing
+
+commit cdf1d0a9f5d18535e0a18ff34860e81a6d83aa5c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 11:31:03 2019 +1100
+
+ prepare for 8.1 release
+
+commit 3b4e56d740b74324e2d7542957cad5a11518f455
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: openssh-8.1
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3356bb34e2aa287f0e6d6773c9ae659dc680147d
+
+commit 29e0ecd9b4eb3b9f305e2240351f0c59cad9ef81
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:42 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix an unreachable integer overflow similar to the XMSS
+
+ case, and some other NULL dereferences found by fuzzing.
+
+ fix with and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f81adbb95ef887ce586953e1cb225fa45c7a47b
+
+commit a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:02:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing.
+
+ Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program.
- Return true reason for port forwarding failures where
- feasible rather than always "administratively prohibited". bz#2674, ok djm@
+ Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default.
- Upstream-ID: d901d9887951774e604ca970e1827afaaef9e419
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1
-commit 6ba9f893838489add6ec4213c7a997b425e4a9e0
+commit c2cc25480ba36ab48c1a577bebb12493865aad87
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 23:27:39 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 8 22:40:39 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Correct type for end-of-list sentinel; fixes initializer
+
+ warnings on some platforms. ok deraadt.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a990dbc2dac25bdfa07e79321349c73fd991efa2
+
+commit e827aedf8818e75c0016b47ed8fc231427457c43
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 7 23:10:38 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: reversed test yielded incorrect debug message
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78bb512d04cfc238adb2c5b7504ac93eecf523b3
+
+commit 8ca491d29fbe26e5909ce22b344c0a848dc28d55
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 17:05:57 2019 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit 86a0323374cbd404629e75bb320b3fa1c16aaa6b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 09:36:06 2019 +1100
+
+ Make MAKE_CLONE no-op macro more correct.
+
+ Similar to the previous change to DEF_WEAK, some compilers don't like
+ the empty statement, so convert into a no-op function prototype.
+
+commit cfc1897a2002ec6c4dc879b24e8b3153c87ea2cf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 09:06:35 2019 +1100
+
+ wrap stdint.h include in HAVE_STDINT_H
- Small correction to the known_hosts section on when it is
- updated. Patch from lkppo at free.fr some time ago, pointed out by smallm at
- sdf.org
+ make the indenting a little more consistent too..
+
+ Fixes Solaris 2.6; reported by Tom G. Christensen
+
+commit 13b3369830a43b89a503915216a23816d1b25744
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 15:32:02 2019 +1100
+
+ avoid "return (value)" in void-declared function
+
+ spotted by Tim Rice; ok dtucker
+
+commit 0c7f8d2326d812b371f7afd63aff846973ec80a4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 14:44:50 2019 +1100
+
+ Make DEF_WEAK more likely to be correct.
- Upstream-ID: 1834d7af179dea1a12ad2137f84566664af225d5
+ Completely nop-ing out DEF_WEAK leaves an empty statemment which some
+ compilers don't like. Replace with a no-op function template. ok djm@
-commit c61d5ec3c11e7ff9779b6127421d9f166cf10915
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Feb 3 14:10:34 2017 +1100
+commit b1e79ea8fae9c252399677a28707661d85c7d00c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 6 11:49:50 2019 +0000
- Remove _XOPEN_SOURCE from wide char detection.
+ upstream: Instead of running sed over the whole log to remove CRs,
- Having _XOPEN_SOURCE unconditionally causes problems on some platforms
- and configurations, notably Solaris 64-bit binaries. It was there for
- the benefit of Linux put the required bits in the *-*linux* section.
+ remove them only where it's needed (and confuses test(1) on at least OS X in
+ portable).
- Patch from yvoinov at gmail.com.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a6ab9b4bd1d33770feaf01b2dfb96f9e4189d2d0
-commit f25ee13b3e81fd80efeb871dc150fe49d7fc8afd
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 05:22:14 2017 +0000
+commit 8dc7d6b75a7f746fdd056acd41dffc0a13557a4c
+Author: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue May 9 13:33:30 2017 -0300
- upstream commit
+ Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
- fully unbreak: some $SSH invocations did not have -F
- specified and could pick up the ~/.ssh/config of the user running the tests
+ The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+ specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: f362d1892c0d3e66212d5d3fc02d915c58ef6b89
+ Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-commit 6956e21fb26652887475fe77ea40d2efcf25908b
+commit 07f2c7f34951c04d2cd796ac6c80e47c56c4969e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 04:54:07 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 4 04:31:59 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix memory leak in error path; bz#3074 patch from
- partially unbreak: was not specifying hostname on some
- $SSH invocations
+ krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok dtucker
- Upstream-Regress-ID: bc8a5e98e57bad0a92ef4f34ed91c1d18294e2cc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d031853f3ecf47b35a0669588f4d9d8e3b307b3c
-commit 52763dd3fe0a4678dafdf7aeb32286e514130afc
+commit b7fbc75e119170f4d15c94a7fda4a1050e0871d6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 01:03:00 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 4 04:13:39 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- revise keys/principals command hang fix (bz#2655) to
- consume entire output, avoiding sending SIGPIPE to subprocesses early; ok
- dtucker@
+ upstream: space
- Upstream-ID: 7cb04b31a61f8c78c4e48ceededcd2fd5c4ee1bc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 350648bcf00a2454e7ef998b7d88e42552b348ac
-commit 381a2615a154a82c4c53b787f4a564ef894fe9ac
+commit 643ab68c79ac1644f4a31e36928c2bfc8a51db3c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 00:38:50 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 4 03:39:19 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: more sshsig regress tests: check key revocation, the
- small cleanup post SSHv1 removal:
+ check-novalidate signature test mode and signing keys in ssh-agent.
- remove SSHv1-isms in commented examples
+ From Sebastian Kinne (slightly tweaked)
- reorder token table to group deprecated and compile-time conditional tokens
- better
-
- fix config dumping code for some compile-time conditional options that
- weren't being correctly skipped (SSHv1 and PKCS#11)
-
- Upstream-ID: f2e96b3cb3158d857c5a91ad2e15925df3060105
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b39566f5cec70140674658cdcedf38752a52e2e2
-commit 4833d01591b7eb049489d9558b65f5553387ed43
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 00:34:01 2017 +0000
+commit 714031a10bbe378a395a93cf1040f4ee1451f45f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 4 03:26:58 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Check for gmtime failure in moduli generation. Based on
- some explicit NULL tests when dumping configured
- forwardings; from Karsten Weiss
+ patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 40957b8dea69672b0e50df6b4a91a94e3e37f72d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c6a4cde0022188ac83737de08da0e875704eeaa
-commit 326e2fae9f2e3e067b5651365eba86b35ee5a6b2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:28 2017 +0000
+commit 6918974405cc28ed977f802fd97a9c9a9b2e141b
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 3 17:07:50 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: use a more common options order in SYNOPSIS and sync
- misplaced braces in test; from Karsten Weiss
+ usage(); while here, no need for Bk/Ek;
- Upstream-ID: f7b794074d3aae8e35b69a91d211c599c94afaae
+ ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38715c3f10b166f599a2283eb7bc14860211bb90
-commit 3e032a95e46bfaea9f9e857678ac8fa5f63997fb
+commit feff96b7d4c0b99307f0459cbff128aede4a8984
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:03 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 09:50:50 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: thinko in previous; spotted by Mantas
- don't dereference authctxt before testing != NULL, it
- causes compilers to make assumptions; from Karsten Weiss
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- Upstream-ID: 794243aad1e976ebc717885b7a97a25e00c031b2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffa3f5a45e09752fc47d9041e2203ee2ec15b24d
-commit 01cfaa2b1cfb84f3cdd32d1bf82b120a8d30e057
+commit b5a89eec410967d6b712665f8cf0cb632928d74b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 02:51:16 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 08:07:13 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make signature format match PROTOCO
- use correct ssh-add program; bz#2654, from Colin Watson
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20a=20string,=20not=20raw=20bytes.=20Spotted=20by=20Manta?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?s=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 7042a36e1bdaec6562f6e57e9d047efe9c7a6030
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80fcc6d52893f80c6de2bedd65353cebfebcfa8f
-commit e5c7ec67cdc42ae2584085e0fc5cc5ee91133cf5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 02:26:10 2017 +0000
+commit dc6f81ee94995deb11bbf7e19801022c5f6fd90a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 08:05:50 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Account for timeouts in the integrity tests as failures.
+ upstream: ban empty namespace strings for s
- If the first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low
- bytes of a packet length, then ssh will time out and this will be
- interpreted as a test failure. Patch from cjwatson at debian.org via
- bz#2658.
+ =?UTF-8?q?shsig;=20spotted=20by=20Mantas=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- Upstream-Regress-ID: e7467613b0badedaa300bc6fc7495ec2f44e2fb9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c5bcf40bed8f4e826230176f4aa353c52aeb698
-commit dbaf599b61bd6e0f8469363a8c8e7f633b334018
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 02:09:25 2017 +0000
+commit fa5bd8107e0e2b3e1e184f55d0f9320c119f65f0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 14:30:55 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Make forwarding test less racy by using unix domain
- sockets instead of TCP ports where possible. Patch from cjwatson at
- debian.org via bz#2659.
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 4756375aac5916ef9d25452a1c1d5fa9e90299a9
+ Put ssherr.h back as it's actually needed.
-commit 9390b0031ebd6eb5488d3bc4d4333c528dffc0a6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 29 21:35:23 2017 +0000
+commit 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602
+Author: Lonnie Abelbeck <lonnie@abelbeck.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 1 09:05:09 2019 -0500
- upstream commit
+ Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child.
- Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward
- cancellation. bz#2672, from Brad Marshall via Colin Watson and Ubuntu's
- bugtracker.
-
- Upstream-ID: 0d4a7e5ead6cc59c9a44b4c1e5435ab3aada09af
+ New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt
+ in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox.
-commit 4ba15462ca38883b8a61a1eccc093c79462d5414
-Author: guenther@openbsd.org <guenther@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 21 11:32:04 2017 +0000
+commit edd1d3a6261aecbf9a55944fd7be1db83571b46e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 10:54:28 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- The POSIX APIs that that sockaddrs all ignore the s*_len
- field in the incoming socket, so userspace doesn't need to set it unless it
- has its own reasons for tracking the size along with the sockaddr.
+ remove duplicate #includes
- ok phessler@ deraadt@ florian@
-
- Upstream-ID: ca6e49e2f22f2b9e81d6d924b90ecd7e422e7437
+ Prompted by Jakub Jelen
-commit a1187bd3ef3e4940af849ca953a1b849dae78445
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 16:28:12 2017 +0000
+commit 13c508dfed9f25e6e54c984ad00a74ef08539e70
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 10:51:15 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- keep the tokens list sorted;
-
- Upstream-ID: b96239dae4fb3aa94146bb381afabcc7740a1638
+ typo in comment
-commit b64077f9767634715402014f509e58decf1e140d
+commit d0c3ac427f6c52b872d6617421421dd791664445
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 09:27:52 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 00:42:30 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: remove some duplicate #includes
- fix previous
-
- Upstream-ID: c107d6a69bc22325d79fbf78a2a62e04bcac6895
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed6827ab921eff8027669848ef4f70dc1da4098c
-commit 5e820e9ea2e949aeb93071fe31c80b0c42f2b2de
+commit 084682786d9275552ee93857cb36e43c446ce92c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 03:53:58 2017 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 1 10:22:53 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: revert unconditional forced login implemented in r1.41 of
- show a useful error message when included config files
- can't be opened; bz#2653, ok dtucker@
-
- Upstream-ID: f598b73b5dfe497344cec9efc9386b4e5a3cb95b
-
-commit 13bd2e2d622d01dc85d22b94520a5b243d006049
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 03:45:41 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ ssh-pkcs11.c; r1.45 added a forced login as a fallback for cases where the
+ token returns no objects and this is less disruptive for users of tokens
+ directly in ssh (rather than via ssh-agent) and in ssh-keygen
- sshd_config is documented to set
- GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes by default, so actually make it do this.
- bz#2637 ok dtucker
+ bz3006, patch from Jakub Jelen; ok markus
- Upstream-ID: 99ef8ac51f17f0f7aec166cb2e34228d4d72a665
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33d6df589b072094384631ff93b1030103b3d02e
-commit f89b928534c9e77f608806a217d39a2960cc7fd0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 03:41:58 2017 +0000
+commit 6c91d42cce3f055917dc3fd2c305dfc5b3b584b3
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 29 16:31:57 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: group and sort single letter options; ok deraadt
- Avoid confusing error message when attempting to use
- ssh-keyscan built without SSH protocol v.1 to scan for v.1 keys; bz#2583
-
- Upstream-ID: 5d214abd3a21337d67c6dcc5aa6f313298d0d165
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1480e760a2b582f79696cdcff70098e23fc603f
-commit 0999533014784579aa6f01c2d3a06e3e8804b680
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 6 02:34:54 2017 +0000
+commit 3b44bf39ff4d7ef5d50861e2e9dda62d2926d2fe
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 20:03:24 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix the DH-GEX text in -a; because this required a comma,
- Re-add '%k' token for AuthorizedKeysCommand which was
- lost during the re-org in rev 1.235. bz#2656, from jboning at gmail.com.
+ i added a comma to the first part, for balance...
- Upstream-ID: 2884e203c02764d7b3fe7472710d9c24bdc73e38
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3464e9e82a41e8cdfe8f0a16d94266e43dbb58
-commit 51045869fa084cdd016fdd721ea760417c0a3bf3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 4 05:37:40 2017 +0000
+commit 3e53ef28fab53094e3b19622ba0e9c3d5fe71273
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 24 12:50:46 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: identity_file[] should be PATH_MAX, not the arbitrary
- unbreak Unix domain socket forwarding for root; ok
- markus@
+ number 1024
- Upstream-ID: 6649c76eb7a3fa15409373295ca71badf56920a2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e775f94ad47ce9ab37bd1410d7cf3b7ea98b11b7
-commit 58fca12ba967ea5c768653535604e1522d177e44
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Jan 16 09:08:32 2017 +1100
+commit 90d4b2541e8c907793233d9cbd4963f7624f4174
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 20 18:50:58 2019 +0000
- Remove LOGIN_PROGRAM.
+ upstream: new sentence, new line;
- UseLogin is gone, remove leftover. bz#2665, from cjwatson at debian.org
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35ca5ec07be460e95e7406af12eee04a77b6698
-commit b108ce92aae0ca0376dce9513d953be60e449ae1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 4 02:21:43 2017 +0000
+commit fbec7dba01b70b49ac47f56031310865dff86200
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Sep 30 18:01:12 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Include stdio.h for snprintf.
- relax PKCS#11 whitelist a bit to allow libexec as well as
- lib directories.
-
- Upstream-ID: cf5617958e2e2d39f8285fd3bc63b557da484702
+ Patch from vapier@gentoo.org.
-commit c7995f296b9222df2846f56ecf61e5ae13d7a53d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 3 05:46:51 2017 +0000
+commit 0a403bfde71c4b82147473298d3a60b4171468bd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Sep 30 14:11:42 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- check number of entries in SSH2_FXP_NAME response; avoids
- unreachable overflow later. Reported by Jann Horn
-
- Upstream-ID: b6b2b434a6d6035b1644ca44f24cd8104057420f
+ Add SKIP_LTESTS for skipping specific tests.
-commit ddd3d34e5c7979ca6f4a3a98a7d219a4ed3d98c2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 30 22:08:02 2016 +0000
+commit 4d59f7a5169c451ebf559aedec031ac9da2bf80c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 05:25:12 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Test for empty result in expected bits. Remove CRs from log
- fix deadlock when keys/principals command produces a lot of
- output and a key is matched early; bz#2655, patch from jboning AT gmail.com
+ as they confuse tools on some platforms. Re-enable the 3des-cbc test.
- Upstream-ID: e19456429bf99087ea994432c16d00a642060afe
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: edf536d4f29fc1ba412889b37247a47f1b49d250
-commit 30eee7d1b2fec33c14870cc11910610be5d2aa6f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Dec 20 12:16:11 2016 +1100
+commit 7c817d129e2d48fc8a6f7965339313023ec45765
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 15:26:22 2019 +1000
- Re-add missing "Prerequisites" header and fix typo
+ Re-enable dhgex test.
- Patch from HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama at unixuser org>.
+ Since we've added larger fallback groups to dh.c this test will pass
+ even if there is no moduli file installed on the system.
-commit c8c60f3663165edd6a52632c6ddbfabfce1ca865
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 19 22:35:23 2016 +0000
+commit c1e0a32fa852de6d1c82ece4f76add0ab0ca0eae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Sep 24 21:17:20 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- use standard /bin/sh equality test; from Mike Frysinger
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 7b6f0b63525f399844c8ac211003acb8e4b0bec2
+ Add more ToS bits, currently only used by netcat.
-commit 4a354fc231174901f2629437c2a6e924a2dd6772
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 19 15:59:26 2016 +1100
+commit 5a273a33ca1410351cb484af7db7c13e8b4e8e4e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Sep 19 15:41:23 2019 +1000
- crank version numbers for release
+ Privsep is now required.
-commit 5f8d0bb8413d4d909cc7aa3c616fb0538224c3c9
+commit 8aa2aa3cd4d27d14e74b247c773696349472ef20
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:51 2016 +0000
+Date: Mon Sep 16 03:23:02 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Allow testing signature syntax and validity without verifying
- openssh-7.4
+ that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or
+ unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name
+ "check-novalidate"
- Upstream-ID: 1ee404adba6bbe10ae9277cbae3a94abe2867b79
+ from Sebastian Kinne
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b
-commit 3a8213ea0ed843523e34e55ab9c852332bab4c7b
+commit 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:18 2016 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:52:34 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default
- remove testcase that depends on exact output and
- behaviour of snprintf(..., "%s", NULL)
+ ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062
- Upstream-Regress-ID: cab4288531766bd9593cb556613b91a2eeefb56f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa
-commit eae735a82d759054f6ec7b4e887fb7a5692c66d7
+commit b36ee3fcb2f1601693b1b7fd60dd6bd96006ea75
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 19 03:32:57 2016 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:36:43 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Plug mem leaks on error paths, based in part on github
- Use LOGNAME to get current user and fall back to whoami if
- not set. Mainly to benefit -portable since some platforms don't have whoami.
+ pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: e3a16b7836a3ae24dc8f8a4e43fdf8127a60bdfa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e
-commit 0d2f88428487518eea60602bd593989013831dcf
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 16 03:51:19 2016 +0000
+commit 2aefdf1aef906cf7548a2e5927d35aacb55948d4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:31:19 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Add regression test for AllowUsers and DenyUsers. Patch from
- Zev Weiss <zev at bewilderbeest.net>
+ upstream: whitespace
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 8f1aac24d52728398871dac14ad26ea38b533fb9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700
-commit 3bc8180a008929f6fe98af4a56fb37d04444b417
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 16 15:02:24 2016 +1100
+commit fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:27:35 2019 +0000
- Add missing monitor.h include.
+ upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings
+
+ From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118
+ ok dtucker@
- Fixes warning pointed out by Zev Weiss <zev at bewilderbeest.net>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6
-commit 410681f9015d76cc7b137dd90dac897f673244a0
+commit 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 16 02:48:55 2016 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:07:42 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP
- revert to rev1.2; the new bits in this test depend on changes
- to ssh that aren't yet committed
+ connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via
+ Github PR140
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 828ffc2c7afcf65d50ff2cf3dfc47a073ad39123
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf
-commit 2f2ffa4fbe4b671bbffa0611f15ba44cff64d58e
+commit df780114278f406ef7cb2278802a2660092fff09
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 16 01:06:27 2016 +0000
+Date: Mon Sep 9 02:31:19 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Move the "stop sshd" code into its own helper function.
- Patch from Zev Weiss <zev at bewilderbeest.net>, ok djm@
+ upstream: Fix potential truncation warning. ok deraadt.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: a113dea77df5bd97fb4633ea31f3d72dbe356329
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d87b7e3a94ec935e8194e7fce41815e22804c3ff
-commit e15e7152331e3976b35475fd4e9c72897ad0f074
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 16 01:01:07 2016 +0000
+commit ec0e6243660bf2df30c620a6a0d83eded376c9c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 13:14:39 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- regression test for certificates along with private key
- with no public half. bz#2617, mostly from Adam Eijdenberg
+ memleak of buffer in sshpam_query
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 2e74dc2c726f4dc839609b3ce045466b69f01115
+ coverity report via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
-commit 9a70ec085faf6e55db311cd1a329f1a35ad2a500
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 15 23:50:37 2016 +0000
+commit c17e4638e5592688264fc0349f61bfc7b4425aa5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 13:12:42 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Use $SUDO to read pidfile in case root's umask is
- restricted. From portable.
+ explicitly test set[ug]id() return values
- Upstream-Regress-ID: f6b1c7ffbc5a0dfb7d430adb2883344899174a98
+ Legacy !_POSIX_SAVED_IDS path only; coverity report via Ed Maste
+ ok dtucker@
-commit fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 15 21:29:05 2016 +0000
+commit 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 14:45:34 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set
- Add missing braces in DenyUsers code. Patch from zev at
- bewilderbeest.net, ok deraadt@
+ by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g.
- Upstream-ID: d747ace338dcf943b077925f90f85f789714b54e
-
-commit dcc7d74242a574fd5c4afbb4224795b1644321e7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 15 21:20:41 2016 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519
+ Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- Fix text in error message. Patch from zev at
- bewilderbeest.net.
+ ok djm@ dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: deb0486e175e7282f98f9a15035d76c55c84f7f6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97
-commit b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4
+commit c8bdd2db77ac2369d5cdee237656f266c8f41552
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Dec 14 00:36:34 2016 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 07:53:40 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: key conversion should fail for !openssl builds, not fall
- disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is
- disabled
+ through to the key generation code
- Upstream-ID: ab61516ae0faadad407857808517efa900a0d6d0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b957436adc43c4941e61d61958a193a708bc83c9
-commit 08a1e7014d65c5b59416a0e138c1f73f417496eb
+commit 823f6c37eb2d8191d45539f7b6fa877a4cb4ed3d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 9 03:04:29 2016 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 06:08:11 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- log connections dropped in excess of MaxStartups at
- verbose LogLevel; bz#2613 based on diff from Tomas Kuthan; ok dtucker@
+ upstream: typo in previous
- Upstream-ID: 703ae690dbf9b56620a6018f8a3b2389ce76d92b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c3b94110864771a6b80a0d8acaca34037c3c96e
-commit 10e290ec00964b2bf70faab15a10a5574bb80527
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Dec 13 13:51:32 2016 +1100
+commit 6a710d3e06fd375e2c2ae02546b9541c488a2cdb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 8 14:48:11 2019 +1000
- Get default of TEST_SSH_UTF8 from environment.
+ needs time.h for --without-openssl
-commit b9b8ba3f9ed92c6220b58d70d1e6d8aa3eea1104
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Dec 13 12:56:40 2016 +1100
+commit f61f29afda6c71eda26effa54d3c2e5306fd0833
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Sep 7 19:25:00 2019 +1000
- Remove commented-out includes.
-
- These commented-out includes have "Still needed?" comments. Since
- they've been commented out for ~13 years I assert that they're not.
+ make unittests pass for no-openssl case
-commit 25275f1c9d5f01a0877d39444e8f90521a598ea0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Dec 13 12:54:23 2016 +1100
+commit 105e1c9218940eb53473f55a9177652d889ddbad
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 05:59:41 2019 +0000
- Add prototype for strcasestr in compat library.
+ upstream: avoid compiling certain files that deeply depend on
+
+ libcrypto when WITH_OPENSSL isn't set
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061
-commit afec07732aa2985142f3e0b9a01eb6391f523dec
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Dec 13 10:23:03 2016 +1100
+commit 670104b923dd97b1c06c0659aef7c3e52af571b2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 05:23:55 2019 +0000
- Add strcasestr to compat library.
+ upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@
- Fixes build on (at least) Solaris 10.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f
-commit dda78a03af32e7994f132d923c2046e98b7c56c8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 12 13:57:10 2016 +1100
+commit be02d7cbde3d211ec2ed2320a1f7d86b2339d758
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 04:53:27 2019 +0000
- Force Turkish locales back to C/POSIX; bz#2643
+ upstream: lots of things were relying on libcrypto headers to
- Turkish locales are unique in their handling of the letters 'i' and
- 'I' (yes, they are different letters) and OpenSSH isn't remotely
- prepared to deal with that. For now, the best we can do is to force
- OpenSSH to use the C/POSIX locale and try to preserve the UTF-8
- encoding if possible.
+ transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them
+ explicitly
- ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080
-commit c35995048f41239fc8895aadc3374c5f75180554
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 9 12:52:02 2016 +1100
-
- exit is in stdlib.h not unistd.h (that's _exit).
-
-commit d399a8b914aace62418c0cfa20341aa37a192f98
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 9 12:33:25 2016 +1100
+commit d05aaaaadcad592abfaa44540928e0c61ef72ebb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 03:30:42 2019 +0000
- Include <unistd.h> for exit in utf8 locale test.
+ upstream: remove leakmalloc reference; we used this early when
+
+ refactoring but not since
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb28ebda8f7c490b87b37954044a6cdd43a7eb2c
-commit 47b8c99ab3221188ad3926108dd9d36da3b528ec
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Thu Dec 8 15:48:34 2016 +1100
+commit 1268f0bcd8fc844ac6c27167888443c8350005eb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 04:24:06 2019 +0000
- Check for utf8 local support before testing it.
+ upstream: Check for RSA support before using it for the user key,
- Check for utf8 local support and if not found, do not attempt to run the
- utf8 tests. Suggested by djm@
+ otherwise use ed25519 which is supported when built without OpenSSL.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d23ddfe83c5062f00ac845d463f19a2ec78c0f7
-commit 4089fc1885b3a2822204effbb02b74e3da58240d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Thu Dec 8 12:57:24 2016 +1100
+commit fd7a2dec652b9efc8e97f03f118f935dce732c60
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 14:07:10 2019 +1000
- Use AC_PATH_TOOL for krb5-config.
+ Provide explicit path to configure-check.
- This will use the host-prefixed version when cross compiling; patch from
- david.michael at coreos.com.
+ On some platforms (at least OpenBSD) make won't search VPATH for target
+ files, so building out-of-tree will fail at configure-check. Provide
+ explicit path. ok djm@
-commit b4867e0712c89b93be905220c82f0a15e6865d1e
+commit 00865c29690003b4523cc09a0e104724b9f911a4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 6 07:48:01 2016 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 01:58:50 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- make IdentityFile successfully load and use certificates that
- have no corresponding bare public key. E.g. just a private id_rsa and
- certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub).
+ upstream: better error code for bad arguments; inspired by
- bz#2617 ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfc263b6041de7f0ed921a1de0b81ddebfab1e0a
+
+commit afdf27f5aceb4973b9f5308f4310c6e3fd8db1fb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 21:38:40 2019 +1000
+
+ revert config.h/config.h.in freshness checks
- Upstream-ID: c1e9699b8c0e3b63cc4189e6972e3522b6292604
+ turns out autoreconf and configure don't touch some files if their content
+ doesn't change, so the mtime can't be relied upon in a makefile rule
-commit c9792783a98881eb7ed295680013ca97a958f8ac
+commit a97609e850c57bd2cc2fe7e175fc35cb865bc834
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 25 14:04:21 2016 +1100
+Date: Thu Sep 5 20:54:39 2019 +1000
- Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 target for GTK+3 version
+ extend autoconf freshness test
- Based on patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640
+ make it cover config.h.in and config.h separately
-commit 7be85ae02b9de0993ce0a1d1e978e11329f6e763
+commit 182297c10edb21c4856c6a38326fd04d81de41a5
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 25 14:03:53 2016 +1100
+Date: Thu Sep 5 20:34:54 2019 +1000
- Make gnome-ssh-askpass2.c GTK+3-friendly
+ check that configure/config.h is up to date
- Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640
+ Ensure they are newer than the configure.ac / aclocal.m4 source
-commit b9844a45c7f0162fd1b5465683879793d4cc4aaa
+commit 7d6034bd020248e9fc0f8c39c71c858debd0d0c1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 4 23:54:02 2016 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 10:05:51 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and
- Fix public key authentication when multiple
- authentication is in use. Instead of deleting and re-preparing the entire
- keys list, just reset the 'used' flags; the keys list is already in a good
- order (with already- tried keys at the back)
+ refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 ok markus@
- Analysis and patch from Vincent Brillault on bz#2642; ok dtucker@
-
- Upstream-ID: 7123f12dc2f3bcaae715853035a97923d7300176
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab53bd6ddd54dd09e54a8bfbed1a984496f08b43
-commit f2398eb774075c687b13af5bc22009eb08889abe
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 4 22:27:25 2016 +0000
+commit 76f09bd95917862101b740afb19f4db5ccc752bf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 09:35:19 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: sprinkle in some explicit errors here, otherwise the
- Unlink PidFile on SIGHUP and always recreate it when the
- new sshd starts. Regression tests (and possibly other things) depend on the
- pidfile being recreated after SIGHUP, and unlinking it means it won't contain
- a stale pid if sshd fails to restart. ok djm@ markus@
+ percolate all the way up to dispatch_run_fatal() and lose all meaninful
+ context
- Upstream-ID: 132dd6dda0c77dd49d2f15b2573b5794f6160870
+ to help with bz#3063; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b2da83bb1c4a3471444b7910b2120ae36438a0a
-commit 85aa2efeba51a96bf6834f9accf2935d96150296
+commit 0ea332497b2b2fc3995f72f6bafe9d664c0195b3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 30 03:01:33 2016 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 09:25:13 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: only send ext_info for KEX_INITIAL; bz#2929 ok dtucker
- test new behaviour of cert force-command restriction vs.
- authorized_key/ principals
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 399efa7469d40c404c0b0a295064ce75d495387c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f5c6062f6863769f5447c6346f78c05d2e4a63
-commit 5d333131cd8519d022389cfd3236280818dae1bc
+commit f23d91f9fa7f6f42e70404e000fac88aebfe3076
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 30 06:54:26 2016 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 05:47:23 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: macro fix; ok djm
- tweak previous; while here fix up FILES and AUTHORS;
-
- Upstream-ID: 93f6e54086145a75df8d8ec7d8689bdadbbac8fa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e891dd6c7996114cb32f0924cb7898ab55efde6e
+
+commit 8b57337c1c1506df2bb9f039d0628a6de618566b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 15:46:39 2019 +1000
+
+ update fuzzing makefile to more recent clang
+
+commit ae631ad77daf8fd39723d15a687cd4b1482cbae8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 15:45:32 2019 +1000
-commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc
+ fuzzer for sshsig allowed_signers option parsing
+
+commit 69159afe24120c97e5ebaf81016c85968afb903e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 30 03:07:37 2016 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 05:42:59 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: memleak on error path; found by libfuzzer
- add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load
- (via ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
-
- Upstream-ID: fe79769469d9cd6d26fe0dc15751b83ef2a06e8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34d44cb0fb5bdb5fcbc6b02b804e71b20a7a5fc7
-commit 7844f357cdd90530eec81340847783f1f1da010b
+commit bab6feb01f9924758ca7129dba708298a53dde5f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 30 03:00:05 2016 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 04:55:32 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: expose allowed_signers options parsing code in header for
- Add a sshd_config DisableForwaring option that disables
- X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as
- anything else we might implement in the future.
+ fuzzing
- This, like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, is intended to be a
- simple and future-proof way of restricting an account. Suggested as
- a complement to 'restrict' by Jann Horn; ok markus@
+ rename to make more consistent with philosophically-similar auth
+ options parsing API.
- Upstream-ID: 203803f66e533a474086b38a59ceb4cf2410fcf7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c67600ef04187f98e2912ca57b60c22a8025b7c
-commit fd6dcef2030d23c43f986d26979f84619c10589d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 30 02:57:40 2016 +0000
+commit 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 4 20:31:15 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics.
- When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and
- an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the
- certificate unless they are identical.
+ Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
+ complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
+ character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively.
- The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-
- command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone.
+ Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
+ so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
+ all options supporting these semantics.
- Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@
+ Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@
- Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417
-commit 7fc4766ac78abae81ee75b22b7550720bfa28a33
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 30 00:28:31 2016 +0000
+commit db1e6f60f03641b2d17e0ab062242609f4ed4598
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 4 05:56:54 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- On startup, check to see if sshd is already daemonized
- and if so, skip the call to daemon() and do not rewrite the PidFile. This
- means that when sshd re-execs itself on SIGHUP the process ID will no longer
- change. Should address bz#2641. ok djm@ markus@.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0abd728aef6b5b35f6db43176aa83b7e3bf3ce27
+
+commit 0f44e5956c7c816f6600f2a47be4d7bb5a8d711d
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 20:51:49 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: repair typo and editing mishap
- Upstream-ID: 5ea0355580056fb3b25c1fd6364307d9638a37b9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d125ab720ca71ccf9baf83e08ddc8c12a328597e
-commit c9f880c195c65f1dddcbc4ce9d6bfea7747debcc
+commit f4846dfc6a79f84bbc6356ae3184f142bacedc24
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 30 13:51:49 2016 +1100
+Date: Thu Sep 5 11:09:28 2019 +1000
- factor out common PRNG reseed before privdrop
-
- Add a call to RAND_poll() to ensure than more than pid+time gets
- stirred into child processes states. Prompted by analysis from Jann
- Horn at Project Zero. ok dtucker@
+ Fuzzer harness for sshsig
-commit 79e4829ec81dead1b30999e1626eca589319a47f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 25 03:02:01 2016 +0000
+commit b08a6bc1cc7750c6f8a425d1cdbd86552fffc637
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 18:45:42 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Allow PuTTY interop tests to run unattended. bz#2639,
- patch from cjwatson at debian.org.
-
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 4345253558ac23b2082aebabccd48377433b6fe0
+ oops; missed including the actual file
-commit 504c3a9a1bf090f6b27260fc3e8ea7d984d163dc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 25 02:56:49 2016 +0000
+commit 1a72c0dd89f09754df443c9576dde624a17d7dd0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 18:44:10 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Reverse args to sshd-log-wrapper. Matches change in
- portable, where it allows sshd do be optionally run under Valgrind.
+ portability fixes for sshsig
+
+commit 6d6427d01304d967e58544cf1c71d2b4394c0522
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: regress test for sshsig; feedback and ok markus@
- Upstream-Regress-ID: b438d1c6726dc5caa2a45153e6103a0393faa906
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c0974f2cdae8d9599b9d76a09680bae55d8a8b
-commit bd13017736ec2f8f9ca498fe109fb0035f322733
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 25 02:49:18 2016 +0000
+commit 59650f0eaf65115afe04c39abfb93a4fc994ec55
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:06 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: only add plain keys to prevent any certs laying around
- Fix typo in trace message; from portable.
+ from confusing the test.
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 4c4a2ba0d37faf5fd230a91b4c7edb5699fbd73a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b8f1508f822bc560b98dea910e61ecd76f34100f
-commit 7da751d8b007c7f3e814fd5737c2351440d78b4c
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 1 13:43:27 2016 +0000
+commit d637c4aee6f9b5280c13c020d7653444ac1fcaa5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:35:27 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: sshsig tweaks and improvements from and suggested by
- Clean up MALLOC_OPTIONS. For the unittests, move
- MALLOC_OPTIONS and TEST_ENV to unittets/Makefile.inc.
+ Markus
- ok otto
+ ok markus/me
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 890d497e0a38eeddfebb11cc429098d76cf29f12
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea4f46ad5a16b27af96e08c4877423918c4253e9
-commit 36f58e68221bced35e06d1cca8d97c48807a8b71
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 31 23:45:08 2016 +0000
+commit 2a9c9f7272c1e8665155118fe6536bebdafb6166
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:34:19 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: sshsig: lightweight signature and verification ability
- Remove the obsolete A and P flags from MALLOC_OPTIONS.
+ for OpenSSH
- ok dtucker
+ This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH.
+ Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 6cc25024c8174a87e5734a0dc830194be216dd59
-
-commit b0899ee26a6630883c0f2350098b6a35e647f512
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 29 03:54:50 2016 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this
+ is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list
+ of allowed signers.
+
+ Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me
- Factor out code to disconnect from controlling terminal
- into its own function. ok djm@
+ ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 39fd9e8ebd7222615a837312face5cc7ae962885
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb
-commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d
+commit 5485f8d50a5bc46aeed829075ebf5d9c617027ea
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 25 23:24:45 2016 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:32:11 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: move authorized_keys option parsing helpsers to misc.c
- use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for
- loading keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
- might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This doesn't
- appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but was observed for
- novelty oversize ones.
+ and make them public; ok markus@
- Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
-
- Upstream-ID: d620e1d46a29fdea56aeadeda120879eddc60ab1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c18bcb2a687227b3478377c981c2d56af2638ea2
-commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e
+commit f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 25 23:22:04 2016 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:31:20 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: make get_sigtype public as sshkey_get_sigtype(); ok
- split allocation out of sshbuf_reserve() into a separate
- sshbuf_allocate() function; ok markus@
+ markus@
- Upstream-ID: 11b8a2795afeeb1418d508a2c8095b3355577ec2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8
-commit f0ddedee460486fa0e32fefb2950548009e5026e
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 23 23:14:15 2016 +0000
+commit dd8002fbe63d903ffea5be7b7f5fc2714acab4a0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:30:47 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: move advance_past_options to authfile.c and make it
- allow ClientAlive{Interval,CountMax} in Match; ok dtucker,
- djm
+ public; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 8beb4c1eadd588f1080b58932281983864979f55
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c
-commit 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a
+commit c72d78ccbe642e08591a626e5de18381489716e0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 8 22:04:34 2016 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:58 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: move skip_space() to misc.c and make it public; ok
- unbreak DenyUsers; reported by henning@
+ markus@
- Upstream-ID: 1c67d4148f5e953c35acdb62e7c08ae8e33f7cb2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caa77e8a3b210948e29ad3e28c5db00852961eae
-commit 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a
+commit 06af3583f46e2c327fdd44d8a95b8b4e8dfd8db5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Nov 6 05:46:37 2016 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:15 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: authfd: add function to check if key is in agent
- Validate address ranges for AllowUser/DenyUsers at
- configuration load time and refuse to accept bad ones. It was previously
- possible to specify invalid CIDR address ranges (e.g. djm@127.1.2.3/55) and
- these would always match.
+ This commit adds a helper function which allows the caller to
+ check if a given public key is present in ssh-agent.
- Thanks to Laurence Parry for a detailed bug report. ok markus (for
- a previous diff version)
+ work by Sebastian Kinne; ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 9dfcdd9672b06e65233ea4434c38226680d40bfb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d43c5826353e1fdc1af71eb42961b30782c7bd13
-commit efb494e81d1317209256b38b49f4280897c61e69
+commit 2ab5a8464870cc4b29ddbe849bbbc255729437bf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 28 03:33:52 2016 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:28:30 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Improve pkcs11_add_provider() logging: demote some
- excessively verbose error()s to debug()s, include PKCS#11 provider name and
- slot in log messages where possible. bz#2610, based on patch from Jakub Jelen
+ upstream: fix memleak in ssh_free_identitylist(); ok markus@
- Upstream-ID: 3223ef693cfcbff9079edfc7e89f55bf63e1973d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa51f77ae2c5330a1f61b2d22933f24a443f9abf
-commit 5ee3fb5affd7646f141749483205ade5fc54adaf
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Nov 1 08:12:33 2016 +1100
+commit 85443f165b4169b2a448b3e24bc1d4dc5b3156a4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:27:52 2019 +0000
- Use ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..) on OS X.
+ upstream: factor out confirm_overwrite(); ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 304e95381b39c774c8fced7e5328b106a3ff0400
-commit 315d2a4e674d0b7115574645cb51f968420ebb34
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 28 14:34:07 2016 +1100
+commit 9a396e33685633581c67d5ad9664570ef95281f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 23:46:46 2019 +0000
- Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8) OpenSSL
+ upstream: constify an argument
- ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 724bafc9f993746ad4303e95bede2c030de6233b
-commit a9ff3950b8e80ff971b4d44bbce96df27aed28af
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Oct 28 14:26:58 2016 +1100
+commit b52c0c2e64988277a35a955a474d944967059aeb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 00:19:25 2019 +0000
- Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat.
+ upstream: downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" warning
- Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat and add ifdefs to mac.c around the
- ripemd160 MACs.
+ from log level error to debug. This is common when attempting to enumerate
+ keys on smartcard readers with no cards plugged in. bz#3058 ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb8839ddeb77c271390488af1b771041d43e49c6
-commit bce58885160e5db2adda3054c3b81fe770f7285a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Oct 28 13:52:31 2016 +1100
+commit 0713322e18162463c5ab5ddfb9f935055ca775d8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 1 23:47:32 2019 +0000
- Check if RIPEMD160 is disabled in OpenSSL.
+ upstream: print comment when printing pubkey from private
+
+ bz#3052; ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a91b2a8d5f1053d34d7fce44523c53fb534ba914
-commit d924640d4c355d1b5eca1f4cc60146a9975dbbff
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Oct 28 13:38:19 2016 +1100
+commit 368f1cc2fbd6ad10c66bc1b67c2c04aebf8a04a8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 10:28:42 2019 +1000
- Skip ssh1 specfic ciphers.
+ fixed test in OSX closefrom() replacement
- cipher-3des1.c and cipher-bf1.c are specific to sshv1 so don't even try
- to compile them when Protocol 1 is not enabled.
+ from likan_999.student AT sina.com
-commit 79d078e7a49caef746516d9710ec369ba45feab6
-Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 25 04:08:13 2016 +0000
+commit 6b7c53498def19a14dd9587bf521ab6dbee8988f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 10:22:02 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
+ retain Solaris PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY in sftp-server
- Fix logic in add_local_forward() that inverted a test
- when code was refactored out into bind_permitted(). This broke ssh port
- forwarding for non-priv ports as a non root user.
+ Dropping this privilege removes the ability to create hard links to
+ files owned by other users. This is required for the legacy sftp rename
+ operation.
- ok dtucker@ 'looks good' deraadt@
-
- Upstream-ID: ddb8156ca03cc99997de284ce7777536ff9570c9
+ bz#3036; approach ok Alex Wilson (the original author of the Solaris
+ sandbox/pledge replacement code)
-commit a903e315dee483e555c8a3a02c2946937f9b4e5d
+commit e50f808712393e86d69e42e9847cdf8d473412d7
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 24 01:09:17 2016 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 30 05:08:28 2019 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Use ed25519 for most hostkey rotation tests since it's
- Remove dead breaks, found via opencoverage.net. ok
- deraadt@
+ supported even when built without OpenSSL. Use RSA for the secondary type
+ test if supported, otherwise skip it. Fixes this test for !OpenSSL builds.
- Upstream-ID: ad9cc655829d67fad219762810770787ba913069
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 101cb34a84fd974c623bdb2e496f25a6e91be109
-commit b4e96b4c9bea4182846e4942ba2048e6d708ee54
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Wed Oct 26 08:43:25 2016 +1100
+commit 5e4796c47dd8d6c38fb2ff0b3e817525fed6040d
+Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 22 21:47:27 2019 +0000
- Use !=NULL instead of >0 for getdefaultproj.
+ upstream: Test did not compile due to missing symbols. Add source
- getdefaultproj() returns a pointer so test it for NULL inequality
- instead of >0. Fixes compiler warning and is more correct. Patch from
- David Binderman.
+ sshbuf-misc.c to regress as it was done in ssh make file. from Moritz Buhl
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5
-commit 1c4ef0b808d3d38232aeeb1cebb7e9a43def42c5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 23 22:04:05 2016 +0000
+commit e0e7e3d0e26f2c30697e6d0cfc293414908963c7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 30 14:26:19 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
+ tweak warning flags
- Factor out "can bind to low ports" check into its own function. This will
- make it easier for Portable to support platforms with permissions models
- other than uid==0 (eg bz#2625). ok djm@, "doesn't offend me too much"
- deraadt@.
+ Enable -Wextra if compiler supports it
- Upstream-ID: 86213df4183e92b8f189a6d2dac858c994bfface
+ Set -Wno-error=format-truncation if available to prevent expected
+ string truncations in openbsd-compat from breaking -Werror builds
-commit 0b9ee623d57e5de7e83e66fd61a7ba9a5be98894
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 19 23:21:56 2016 +0000
+commit 28744182cf90e0073b76a9e98de58a47e688b2c4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 30 13:21:38 2019 +1000
- upstream commit
+ proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X
- When tearing down ControlMaster connecctions, don't
- pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet. Patch from Tim Kuijsten via tech@.
+ Refactor closefrom() to use a single brute-force close() loop fallback.
- Upstream-ID: d9b3a68b2a7c2f2fc7f74678e29a4618d55ceced
-
-commit 09e6a7d8354224933febc08ddcbc2010f542284e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Oct 24 09:06:18 2016 +1100
+ Based on patch from likan_999.student@sina.com in bz#3049. ok dtucker@
- Wrap stdint.h include in ifdef.
-
-commit 08d9e9516e587b25127545c029e5464b2e7f2919
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Oct 21 09:46:46 2016 +1100
+commit dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f
+Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 16 11:16:32 2019 +0000
- Fix formatting.
+ upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics
+
+ Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
+ complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
+ character to remove from or append to the default list respectively.
+
+ Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
+ so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
+ all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of
+ available elements via "ssh -Q ...").
+
+ Input and OK jmc
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57
-commit 461f50e7ab8751d3a55e9158c44c13031db7ba1d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Oct 21 06:55:58 2016 +1100
+commit c4736f39e66729ce2bf5b06ee6b391e092b48f47
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 16 06:35:27 2019 +0000
- Update links to https.
+ upstream: include sshbuf-misc.c in SRCS_BASE
- www.openssh.com now supports https and ftp.openbsd.org no longer
- supports ftp. Make all links to these https.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474
-commit dd4e7212a6141f37742de97795e79db51e4427ad
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Oct 21 06:48:46 2016 +1100
+commit d0e51810f332fe44ebdba41113aacf319d35f5a5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Aug 24 15:12:11 2019 +1000
- Update host key generation examples.
+ Fix pasto in fallback code.
- Remove ssh1 host key generation, add ssh-keygen -A
+ There is no parameter called "pathname", it should simply be "path".
+ bz#3059, patch from samuel at cendio.se.
-commit 6d49ae82634c67e9a4d4af882bee20b40bb8c639
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Oct 21 05:22:55 2016 +1100
+commit e83c989bfd9fc9838b7dfb711d1dc6da81814045
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 23 10:19:30 2019 +1000
- Update links.
+ use SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK to limit mmap protections
- Make links to openssh.com HTTPS now that it's supported, point release
- notes link to the HTML release notes page, and update a couple of other
- links and bits of text.
+ Restrict to PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE), i.e. exclude PROT_EXEC
-commit fe0d1ca6ace06376625084b004ee533f2c2ea9d6
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Thu Oct 20 03:42:09 2016 +1100
+commit f6906f9bf12c968debec3671bbf19926ff8a235b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 23 10:08:48 2019 +1000
- Remote channels .orig and .rej files.
+ allow mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only
- These files were incorrectly added during an OpenBSD sync.
+ Used by some hardened heap allocators. Requested by Yegor
+ Timoshenko in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/142
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
index 775eb6c05342..8ab8a403a4e2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
+++ b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
@@ -1,276 +1,301 @@
1. Prerequisites
----------------
A C compiler. Any C89 or better compiler should work. Where supported,
configure will attempt to enable the compiler's run-time integrity checking
options. Some notes about specific compilers:
- clang: -ftrapv and -sanitize=integer require the compiler-rt runtime
(CC=clang LDFLAGS=--rtlib=compiler-rt ./configure)
-You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL /
-OpenSSL)
+To support Privilege Separation (which is now required) you will need
+to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege
+separation. See README.privsep for details.
+
+The remaining items are optional.
+
+A working installation of zlib:
Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems):
http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
-libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 < 1.1.0)
-LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or
-OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/
+libcrypto from either of LibreSSL or OpenSSL. Building without libcrypto
+is supported but severely restricts the available ciphers and algorithms.
+ - LibreSSL (https://www.libressl.org/)
+ - OpenSSL (https://www.openssl.org) with any of the following versions:
+ - 1.0.x >= 1.0.1 or 1.1.0 >= 1.1.0g or any 1.1.1
+
+Note that due to a bug in EVP_CipherInit OpenSSL 1.1 versions prior to
+1.1.0g can't be used.
LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
-(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
-If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
-to configure OpenSSH --without-pie. Note that because of API changes,
-OpenSSL 1.1.x is not currently supported.
+(i.e. -fPIC, eg by configuring OpenSSL as "./config [options] -fPIC"
+or LibreSSL as "CFLAGS=-fPIC ./configure") otherwise OpenSSH will not
+be able to link with it. If you must use a non-position-independent
+libcrypto, then you may need to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.
-The remaining items are optional.
+If you build either from source, running the OpenSSL self-test ("make
+tests") or the LibreSSL equivalent ("make check") and ensuring that all
+tests pass is strongly recommended.
NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
-direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
+direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd.
PRNGD:
If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
-Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. It requires that libcrypto be configured
+to support it.
http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
EGD:
-If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is
-supported only if libcrypto supports it.
+The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) supports the same interface as prngd.
+It also supported only if libcrypto is configured to support it.
http://egd.sourceforge.net/
PAM:
OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
-HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
+HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD, NetBSD and Mac OS X.
Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/
If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
libraries and headers.
GNOME:
http://www.gnome.org/
Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
TCP Wrappers:
If you wish to use the TCP wrappers functionality you will need at least
tcpd.h and libwrap.a, either in the standard include and library paths,
or in the directory specified by --with-tcp-wrappers. Version 7.6 is
known to work.
http://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html
LibEdit:
sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform
has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
these multi-platform ports:
http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
LDNS:
LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
Autoconf:
If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
-the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 to rebuild
-the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier
-versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
+the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 and
+automake-1.16.1 to rebuild the automatically generated files by running
+"autoreconf". Earlier versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
+http://www.gnu.org/software/automake/
Basic Security Module (BSM):
Native BSM support is known to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
makedepend:
https://www.x.org/archive/individual/util/
If you are making significant changes to the code you may need to rebuild
the dependency (.depend) file using "make depend", which requires the
"makedepend" tool from the X11 distribution.
+libfido2:
+
+libfido2 allows the use of hardware security keys over USB. libfido2
+in turn depends on libcbor. libfido2 >= 1.5.0 is strongly recommended.
+Limited functionality is possible with earlier libfido2 versions.
+
+https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2
+https://github.com/pjk/libcbor
+
+
2. Building / Installation
--------------------------
To install OpenSSH with default options:
./configure
make
make install
This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
./configure --prefix=/opt
make
make install
Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
specific paths, for example:
./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
make
make install
This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
configuration files in /etc/ssh.
-If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
-then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
-sshd for privilege separation. See README.privsep for details.
-
If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd
executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a
valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
name).
There are a few other options to the configure script:
--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random.
--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random.
--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
--with-tcp-wrappers will enable TCP Wrappers (/etc/hosts.allow|deny)
support.
--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
some platforms.
--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
created.
--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
libraries are installed.
--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
+--without-openssl builds without using OpenSSL. Only a subset of ciphers
+and algorithms are supported in this configuration.
+
+--without-zlib builds without zlib. This disables the Compression option.
+
--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
For example:
CC="/usr/foo/cc" CFLAGS="-O" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" ./configure
3. Configuration
----------------
The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
manually using the following commands:
ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or
ssh-keygen -A
to generate keys for all supported types.
Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
-configuration)
+configuration).
-If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
-running and has collected some Entropy.
+If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD/prngd support, ensure that EGD or
+prngd is running and has collected some entropy first.
For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
4. (Optional) Send survey
-------------------------
$ make survey
[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
that you consider sensitive]
$ make send-survey
This will send configuration information for the currently configured
host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations
are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
summary data may be published.
5. Problems?
------------
-If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
-Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
+If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH,
+please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
https://www.openssh.com/
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
index 15248212a80d..5999c5e9d50d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
+++ b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
@@ -1,319 +1,381 @@
This file is part of the OpenSSH software.
The licences which components of this software fall under are as
follows. First, we will summarize and say that all components
are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that.
OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
1)
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
[Tatu continues]
* However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or
* copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that
* are not under my direct control. As far as I know, all included
* source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements
* and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most
* restrictive); see below for details.
[However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time. All of
these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about
have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e.,
- RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library
- IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated
- DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library
- GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL
- Zlib is now external, in a library
- The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included
- TSS has been removed
- MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library
- RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL
- Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library
[The licence continues]
Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this
software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major
bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide. More
information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto".
The legal status of this program is some combination of all these
permissions and restrictions. Use only at your own responsibility.
You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not
making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in
your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf.
NO WARRANTY
BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS
TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE
PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
3)
ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
license.
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
* Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
* permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
* OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
4)
The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers
and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed
with the following license:
* @version 3.0 (December 2000)
*
* Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
*
* @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
* @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
* @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
*
* This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
* OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
* WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
* OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
* EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
5)
One component of the ssh source code is under a 3-clause BSD license,
held by the University of California, since we pulled these parts from
original Berkeley code.
* Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
6)
Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard
2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders:
Markus Friedl
Theo de Raadt
Niels Provos
Dug Song
Aaron Campbell
Damien Miller
Kevin Steves
Daniel Kouril
Wesley Griffin
Per Allansson
Nils Nordman
Simon Wilkinson
Portable OpenSSH additionally includes code from the following copyright
holders, also under the 2-term BSD license:
Ben Lindstrom
Tim Rice
Andre Lucas
Chris Adams
Corinna Vinschen
Cray Inc.
Denis Parker
Gert Doering
Jakob Schlyter
Jason Downs
- Juha Yrjölä
+ Juha Yrjölä
Michael Stone
Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
Solar Designer
Todd C. Miller
Wayne Schroeder
William Jones
Darren Tucker
Sun Microsystems
The SCO Group
Daniel Walsh
Red Hat, Inc
Simon Vallet / Genoscope
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
8) Portable OpenSSH contains the following additional licenses:
a) md5crypt.c, md5crypt.h
* "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
* <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file. As long as you retain this
* notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet
* some day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a
* beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
b) snprintf replacement
* Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
* This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell
* (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this
* notice remains intact on all source code distributions
c) Compatibility code (openbsd-compat)
Apart from the previously mentioned licenses, various pieces of code
in the openbsd-compat/ subdirectory are licensed as follows:
Some code is licensed under a 3-term BSD license, to the following
copyright holders:
Todd C. Miller
Theo de Raadt
Damien Miller
Eric P. Allman
The Regents of the University of California
Constantin S. Svintsoff
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following
copyright holders:
Internet Software Consortium.
Todd C. Miller
Reyk Floeter
Chad Mynhier
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL
* WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
Some code is licensed under a MIT-style license to the following
copyright holders:
Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a *
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the *
* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including *
* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, *
* distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell *
* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is *
* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: *
* *
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included *
* in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. *
* *
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS *
* OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF *
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. *
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, *
* DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR *
* OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR *
* THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. *
* *
* Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright *
* holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the *
* sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written *
* authorization. *
****************************************************************************/
+ The Blowfish cipher implementation is licensed by Niels Provis under
+ a 4-clause BSD license:
+
+ * Blowfish - a fast block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier
+ *
+ * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+ Some replacement code is licensed by the NetBSD foundation under a
+ 2-clause BSD license:
+
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+ * by Todd Vierling.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
------
$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:26:16 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
index 126b2c742bd3..b0293841a4f2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
@@ -1,658 +1,778 @@
# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatible shell. Ie. csh
#SHELL = @SH@
AUTORECONF=autoreconf
prefix=@prefix@
exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
bindir=@bindir@
sbindir=@sbindir@
libexecdir=@libexecdir@
datadir=@datadir@
datarootdir=@datarootdir@
mandir=@mandir@
mansubdir=@mansubdir@
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
srcdir=@srcdir@
top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+abs_top_srcdir=@abs_top_srcdir@
DESTDIR=
VPATH=@srcdir@
SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$(SSH_SK_HELPER)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
-D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
CC=@CC@
LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
LIBS=@LIBS@
K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
-SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
AR=@AR@
AWK=@AWK@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
SED=@SED@
-ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+.SUFFIXES: .lo
+
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
XMSS_OBJS=\
ssh-xmss.o \
sshkey-xmss.o \
xmss_commons.o \
xmss_fast.o \
xmss_hash.o \
xmss_hash_address.o \
xmss_wots.o
LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
ssh_api.o \
ssherr.o \
sshbuf.o \
sshkey.o \
sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
sshbuf-misc.o \
sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
krl.o \
bitmap.o \
${XMSS_OBJS}
LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
authfd.o authfile.o \
canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
- compat.o crc32.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \
- readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
- atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+ log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+ readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \
+ atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o misc.o utf8.o \
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
+ ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
- ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \
- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
+ poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
+ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
+ hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
- kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
- kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
- platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o
+ kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
+ kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+ sshbuf-io.o
+
+SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS)
SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
- sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
+ sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-client.o sftp-glob.o
+
+SCP_OBJS= scp.o progressmeter.o $(SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS)
+
+SSHADD_OBJS= ssh-add.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHAGENT_OBJS= ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHKEYGEN_OBJS= ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS=ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+P11HELPER_OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS)
-MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
-MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+SKHELPER_OBJS= ssh-sk-helper.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o
+
+SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS=ssh-keyscan.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SFTPSERVER_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+
+SFTP_OBJS= sftp.o progressmeter.o $(SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS)
+
+MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-sk-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-sk-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
PATHSUBS = \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
-e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
@UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
-all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+all: configure-check $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+configure-check: $(srcdir)/configure
+
+$(srcdir)/configure: configure.ac $(srcdir)/m4/*.m4
+ @echo "ERROR: configure is out of date; please run ${AUTORECONF} (and configure)" 1>&2
+ @exit 1
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
$(LIBCOMPAT): always
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
always:
libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHAGENT_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
-ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
- $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
else \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \
fi; \
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \
$(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \
else \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \
fi
$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
moduli:
echo
clean: regressclean
- rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+ rm -f *.o *.lo *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
rm -f *.out core survey
rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT)
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/unittests/misc/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
- rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
- rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
distclean: regressclean
rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~
rm -rf autom4te.cache
rm -f regress/check-perm
rm -f regress/mkdtemp
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
- rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+ rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match
+ rm -f regress/unittests/misc/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/misc/test_misc
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o
+ rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
- rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
- rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
if test -d pkg ; then \
rm -fr pkg ; \
fi
veryclean: distclean
rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
cleandir: veryclean
mrproper: veryclean
realclean: veryclean
catman-do:
@for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \
base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \
echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \
$(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \
>$$base.0 ; \
done
depend: depend-rebuild
rm -f .depend.bak
depend-rebuild:
- rm -f config.h
- touch config.h
+ mv .depend .depend.old
+ rm -f config.h .depend
+ touch config.h .depend
makedepend -w1000 -Y. -f .depend *.c 2>/dev/null
+ (echo '# Automatically generated by makedepend.'; \
+ echo '# Run "make depend" to rebuild.'; sort .depend ) >.depend.tmp
+ mv .depend.tmp .depend
+ rm -f .depend.bak
+ mv .depend.old .depend.bak
rm -f config.h
depend-check: depend-rebuild
cmp .depend .depend.bak || (echo .depend stale && exit 1)
distprep: catman-do depend-check
$(AUTORECONF)
-rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak
install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf
install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
check-config:
-$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
install-files:
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
$(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-sk-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
install-sysconf:
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \
if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \
echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
else \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \
fi ; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
@if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
./ssh-keygen -A; \
fi
host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT)
./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N ""
if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \
./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \
fi
uninstallall: uninstall
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
uninstall:
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
-rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
regress-prep:
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
- $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
- $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/authopt
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/misc
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
- $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS}
$(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS=\
+ sshsig.o \
+ regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o
regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/authopt/tests.o \
+ auth-options.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT): \
+ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
- regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \
- regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o
+ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/match/tests.o
regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS=\
+ regress/unittests/misc/tests.o \
+ regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.o \
+ regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.o \
+ regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.o \
+ regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.o \
+ regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.o
+
+regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT): \
+ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS} \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS) \
+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o
regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\
- regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o
+# These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
+SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.lo \
+ ed25519.lo hash.lo ge25519.lo fe25519.lo sc25519.lo verify.lo
-regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a
- $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \
- -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=@SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY@
+
+.c.lo: Makefile.in config.h
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so: $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -fPIC -shared -o $@ $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) \
+ -L. -Lopenbsd-compat -lopenbsd-compat $(LDFLAGS_NOPIE) $(LIBS)
-regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
+regress-binaries: regress-prep $(LIBCOMPAT) \
+ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \
- regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+ $(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY)
+
+regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
+ regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
- regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
- regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
+ regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
+
+tests: file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
+ echo all tests passed
+
+unit: regress-unit-binaries
+ BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
+ cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
+ $(MAKE) \
+ .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
+ .CURDIR="`pwd`" \
+ OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
+ $@ && echo $@ tests passed
-tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
+interop-tests t-exec file-tests: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
- TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \
- TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \
- TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \
- TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \
- TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \
- TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \
- TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \
- TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" ; \
- TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \
cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
+ EGREP='@EGREP@' \
$(MAKE) \
.OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
.CURDIR="`pwd`" \
BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \
OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \
PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \
TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
- TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \
- TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \
- TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \
- TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \
- TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \
- TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \
- TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \
- TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \
- TEST_SSH_UTF8="$${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" \
- TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan" \
+ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp" \
+ TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \
+ TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-sk-helper" \
+ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server" \
+ TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE="$(abs_top_srcdir)/moduli" \
+ TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink" \
+ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen" \
+ TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch" \
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" \
+ TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" \
+ TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" \
TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \
EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
- $@ && echo all tests passed
+ $@ && echo all $@ passed
compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
(cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
regressclean:
if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
(cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
fi
survey: survey.sh ssh
@$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey
@echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the'
@echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with'
@echo '"make send-survey".'
send-survey: survey
mail portable-survey@mindrot.org <survey
package: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
if [ "@MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED@" = yes ]; then \
sh buildpkg.sh; \
fi
# @DEPEND@
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW b/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
index 515567f45b0c..cec7cd75b51c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
+++ b/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
@@ -1,161 +1,162 @@
[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE. It has been left in
the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
to developers.]
This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
code. This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
Updated 17 Nov 1995.
Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c
file with the same name.
There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
these programs.
Buffer manipulation routines
- These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily
throughout ssh. The buffer manipulation functions are in
sshbuf*.c (header sshbuf.h).
Compression Library
- Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
Encryption/Decryption
- Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all
accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is
- in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc.
+ in cipher.c, and the implementations are either in libc or
+ LibreSSL.
Multiple Precision Integer Library
- - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary.
+ - Uses the LibreSSL BIGNUM sublibrary.
Random Numbers
- Uses arc4random() and such.
RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
- Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
RSA key files
- RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to
read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally
encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases
are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
Binary packet protocol
- The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The
code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
packets.
- The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
(buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (zlib), and the
encryption routines.
X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
- Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
agent forwarding.
The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
Authentication agent
- Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
Authentication methods
- Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
(auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This
code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate
known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c
is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
Code in match.c is used to match host names.
- In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It
reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads
RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the
authentication agent using authfd.c.
The ssh client
- The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments
and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call
code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it
calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for
the session.
Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
- Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to
encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
- The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c.
Writing to the system log and terminal
- The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
in many places to write messages to system log or user's
terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in
log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other
programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h.
The sshd server (daemon)
- The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key,
starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
- When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
They first perform identification string exchange, then
negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real
work, calling functions in other modules.
- The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of
stuff, including:
- server main program
- waiting for connections
- processing new connection
- authentication
- preparatory operations
- building up the execution environment for the user program
- starting the user program.
Auxiliary files
- There are several other files in the distribution that contain
various auxiliary routines:
ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
uidswap.c uid-swapping
xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines
-$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.14 2018/07/27 03:55:22 dtucker Exp $
+$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.15 2018/10/23 05:56:35 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL
index f75c1c0ae5b0..3141cda6fa37 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL
@@ -1,499 +1,578 @@
This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
protocol.
Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
filexfer protocol described in:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
are individually implemented as extensions described below.
The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
PROTOCOL.agent
1. Transport protocol changes
1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
in:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
The method is documented in:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
"ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
generated.
1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
session plaintext.
Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
As such, the MAC covers:
mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
contains:
byte padding_length
byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length
1.6 transport: AES-GCM
OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as
an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
a matching MAC.
1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption
OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
described at:
http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
2. Connection protocol changes
2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
the peer.
This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
descriptor.
OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
uint32 recipient channel
string "eow@openssh.com"
boolean FALSE
On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
-Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
+Other SSH implementations may be listed to receive this message
upon request.
2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
"no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
will send the following global request:
byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
char want-reply
On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
connection.
Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
-whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
+listed to receive this message upon request.
2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
requested by the client with the following packet:
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "tun@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
uint32 tunnel mode
uint32 remote unit number
The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */
SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */
The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
-be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A
+be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically choose an interface. A
server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
uint32 recipient channel
string data
The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
uint32 packet length
uint32 address family
byte[packet length - 4] packet data
The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
It may be one of:
SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */
SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */
The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
without any link layer header.
The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
uint32 packet length
byte[packet length] frame
The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
header.
2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per
TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
string socket path
string reserved
uint32 reserved
Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
GLOBAL_REQUEST.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"
uint32 sender channel
uint32 initial window size
uint32 maximum packet size
string socket path
string reserved for future use
The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass
information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
boolean TRUE
string socket path
Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
boolean FALSE
string socket path
2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
has completed.
byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
+ char 0 /* want-reply */
string[] hostkeys
Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
supplied host keys are present in known_hosts.
Note that the server may send key types that the client does not
-support. The client should disgregard such keys if they are received.
+support. The client should disregard such keys if they are received.
If the client identifies any keys that are not present for the host,
it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message to request the
server prove ownership of the private half of the key.
byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
char 1 /* want-reply */
string[] hostkeys
When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
using each requested key over the following:
string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
string session identifier
string hostkey
These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
the hostkeys in the request:
byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
string[] signatures
When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
are no longer offered.
These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
removing the deprecated key from those offered.
2.6. connection: SIGINFO support for "signal" channel request
The SSH channels protocol (RFC4254 section 6.9) supports sending a
signal to a session attached to a channel. OpenSSH supports one
extension signal "INFO@openssh.com" that allows sending SIGINFO on
BSD-derived systems.
3. SFTP protocol changes
3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
uint32 id
string targetpath
string linkpath
3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
hello packet:
uint32 3 /* protocol version */
string ext1-name
string ext1-version
string ext2-name
string ext2-version
...
string extN-name
string extN-version
Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
uint32 id
string "posix-rename@openssh.com"
string oldpath
string newpath
On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
pathname, and is formatted as follows:
uint32 id
string "statvfs@openssh.com"
string path
The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
uint32 id
string "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
string handle
These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
uint32 id
uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */
uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */
uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */
uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */
uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */
uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */
uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */
uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */
uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */
uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */
The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */
#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */
Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
3.5. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com"
This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
following format:
uint32 id
string "hardlink@openssh.com"
string oldpath
string newpath
On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
3.6. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com"
This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
uint32 id
string "fsync@openssh.com"
string handle
One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
+3.7. sftp: Extension request "lsetstat@openssh.com"
+
+This request is like the "setstat" command, but sets file attributes on
+symlinks. It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
+following format:
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "lsetstat@openssh.com"
+ string path
+ ATTRS attrs
+
+See the "setstat" command for more details.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+3.8. sftp: Extension request "limits@openssh.com"
+
+This request is used to determine various limits the server might impose.
+Clients should not attempt to exceed these limits as the server might sever
+the connection immediately.
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "limits@openssh.com"
+
+The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
+
+ uint32 id
+ uint64 max-packet-length
+ uint64 max-read-length
+ uint64 max-write-length
+ uint64 max-open-handles
+
+The 'max-packet-length' applies to the total number of bytes in a
+single SFTP packet. Servers SHOULD set this at least to 34000.
+
+The 'max-read-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_READ packet.
+Even if the client requests a larger size, servers will usually respond
+with a shorter SSH_FXP_DATA packet. Servers SHOULD set this at least to
+32768.
+
+The 'max-write-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_WRITE packet
+the server will accept. Servers SHOULD set this at least to 32768.
+
+The 'max-open-handles' is the maximum number of active handles that the
+server allows (e.g. handles created by SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR
+packets). Servers MAY count internal file handles against this limit
+(e.g. system logging or stdout/stderr), so clients SHOULD NOT expect to
+open this many handles in practice.
+
+If the server doesn't enforce a specific limit, then the field may be
+set to 0. This implies the server relies on the OS to enforce limits
+(e.g. available memory or file handles), and such limits might be
+dynamic. The client SHOULD take care to not try to exceed reasonable
+limits.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+3.9. sftp: Extension request "expand-path@openssh.com"
+
+This request supports canonicalisation of relative paths and
+those that need tilde-expansion, i.e. "~", "~/..." and "~user/..."
+These paths are expanded using shell-like rules and the resultant
+path is canonicalised similarly to SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
+
+It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following
+format:
+
+ uint32 id
+ string "expand-path@openssh.com"
+ string path
+
+Its reply is the same format as that of SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
4. Miscellaneous changes
4.1 Public key format
OpenSSH public keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) and appearing in
authorized_keys files, are formatted as a single line of text consisting
of the public key algorithm name followed by a base64-encoded key blob.
The public key blob (before base64 encoding) is the same format used for
the encoding of public keys sent on the wire: as described in RFC4253
section 6.6 for RSA and DSA keys, RFC5656 section 3.1 for ECDSA keys
and the "New public key formats" section of PROTOCOL.certkeys for the
OpenSSH certificate formats.
4.2 Private key format
OpenSSH private keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) use the format
described in PROTOCOL.key by default. As a legacy option, PEM format
(RFC7468) private keys are also supported for RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys
and were the default format before OpenSSH 7.8.
4.3 KRL format
OpenSSH supports a compact format for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). This
format is described in the PROTOCOL.krl file.
4.4 Connection multiplexing
OpenSSH's connection multiplexing uses messages as described in
PROTOCOL.mux over a Unix domain socket for communications between a
master instance and later clients.
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.36 2018/10/02 12:51:58 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.42 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent
index da3381942e08..ed47146a30ee 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
This file used to contain a description of the SSH agent protocol
-implemented by OpenSSH. It has since been superseded by an Internet-
-draft that is available from:
+implemented by OpenSSH. It has since been superseded by
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-04
-https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-02
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.14 2020/10/06 07:12:04 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys
index 11363fdc370e..68622e60743c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys
@@ -1,306 +1,321 @@
This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication
system for use by SSH.
Background
----------
The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication
mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use
of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits
relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack
surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally
managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys.
These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The
certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous
options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a
key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed
with some other trusted key.
A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to
allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to
raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of
acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to
specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
All certificate types include certification information along with the
public key that is used to sign challenges. In OpenSSH, ssh-keygen
performs the CA signing operation.
Certified keys are represented using new key types:
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com
ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
Two additional types exist for RSA certificates to force use of
SHA-2 signatures (SHA-256 and SHA-512 respectively):
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com
These RSA/SHA-2 types should not appear in keys at rest or transmitted
-on their wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms
+on the wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms
field or in the "public key algorithm name" field of a "publickey"
SSH_USERAUTH_REQUEST to indicate that the signature will use the
specified algorithm.
Protocol extensions
-------------------
The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms.
These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key
algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without
breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the
extensions will simply ignore them.
Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds
using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described
in RFC4252 section 7.
New public key formats
----------------------
The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data
types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire
encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
RSA certificate
string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
mpint e
mpint n
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
DSA certificate
string "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
mpint p
mpint q
mpint g
mpint y
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
ECDSA certificate
string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
string curve
string public_key
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
ED25519 certificate
string "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
string pk
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q"
defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656.
-pk is the encoded Ed25519 public key as defined by
-draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03.
+pk is the encoded Ed25519 public key as defined by RFC8032.
serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
-If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this
+If a CA does not wish to number its certificates, it must set this
field to zero.
type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time
of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to
identify the identity principal in log messages.
"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as
strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this
certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and
usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a
zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for
any principal of the specified type.
"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the
certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
valid after <= current time < valid before
critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
not recognise may safely ignore it.
Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict
access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access.
This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not
inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be
enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards
compatibility.
The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
the protocol.
The signature key field contains the CA key used to sign the
certificate. The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa,
ssh-dss, ssh-ed25519 and the ECDSA types ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained" certificates, where
the signature key type is a certificate type itself are NOT supported.
Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to be signed by a
Ed25519 or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa.
signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string
up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA
-types), and draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03 for Ed25519.
+types, and RFC8032 for Ed25519).
Critical options
----------------
The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
-options on the certificates validity. The format of this field
+options on the certificate's validity. The format of this field
is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
string name
string data
Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the
sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate.
The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
option-specific information (see below). All options are
-"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option
+"critical"; if an implementation does not recognise a option,
then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's
domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com".
No critical options are defined for host certificates at present. The
supported user certificate options and the contents and structure of
their data fields are:
Name Format Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
force-command string Specifies a command that is executed
(replacing any the user specified on the
ssh command-line) whenever this key is
used for authentication.
source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses
from which this certificate is accepted
for authentication. Addresses are
specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
- If this option is not present then
+ If this option is not present, then
certificates may be presented from any
source address.
+verify-required empty Flag indicating that signatures made
+ with this certificate must assert FIDO
+ user verification (e.g. PIN or
+ biometric). This option only makes sense
+ for the U2F/FIDO security key types that
+ support this feature in their signature
+ formats.
+
Extensions
----------
The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more
non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of
extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options,
as is the requirement that each name appear only once.
If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should
ignore it.
Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's
domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com".
No extensions are defined for host certificates at present. The
supported user certificate extensions and the contents and structure of
their data fields are:
Name Format Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+no-touch-required empty Flag indicating that signatures made
+ with this certificate need not assert
+ FIDO user presence. This option only
+ makes sense for the U2F/FIDO security
+ key types that support this feature in
+ their signature formats.
+
permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
be refused if this option is absent.
permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding
should be allowed. Agent forwarding
must not be permitted unless this
option is present.
permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding
should be allowed. If this option is
- not present then no port forwarding will
+ not present, then no port forwarding will
be allowed.
permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation
should be permitted. In the absence of
this option PTY allocation will be
disabled.
permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
of this script will not be permitted if
this option is not present.
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.15 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.19 2021/06/05 13:47:00 naddy Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
index 9ce2a1e3a146..0bfff28d70ef 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
@@ -1,107 +1,107 @@
This document describes the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated
encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH.
Background
----------
ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described
in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output
is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC
that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
256 bit secret key.
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encryption of the packet
lengths.
Negotiation
-----------
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com offers both encryption and
authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange,
the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be
negotiated.
Detailed Construction
---------------------
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key
material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit
keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20.
-The first 256 bits consitute K_2 and the second 256 bits become
+The first 256 bits constitute K_2 and the second 256 bits become
K_1.
The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only
to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance,
keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD
(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt
and authenticate the entire packet.
Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet
lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload
cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking
the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the
length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling
as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or
its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure).
The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305
key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated
using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an
uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of
zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian
encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used
for encryption of the packet payload.
Packet Handling
---------------
When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4
bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted
using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number
encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block
counter to obtain the plaintext length.
Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked
before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described
above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the
ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated
MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the
packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with
K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of
1).
To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using
K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the
encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it.
Rekeying
--------
ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be
used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The
SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative
rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation
is followed, then chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com requires no special
handling in this area.
References
----------
[1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein
http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
[2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein
http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.5 2020/02/21 00:04:43 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.key b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.key
index 959bd7aeec22..38df268b6536 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.key
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.key
@@ -1,68 +1,71 @@
This document describes the private key format for OpenSSH.
1. Overall format
The key consists of a header, a list of public keys, and
an encrypted list of matching private keys.
#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
byte[] AUTH_MAGIC
string ciphername
string kdfname
string kdfoptions
int number of keys N
string publickey1
string publickey2
...
string publickeyN
string encrypted, padded list of private keys
2. KDF options for kdfname "bcrypt"
The options:
string salt
uint32 rounds
are concatenated and represented as a string.
3. Unencrypted list of N private keys
The list of privatekey/comment pairs is padded with the
bytes 1, 2, 3, ... until the total length is a multiple
of the cipher block size.
uint32 checkint
uint32 checkint
- string privatekey1
+ byte[] privatekey1
string comment1
- string privatekey2
+ byte[] privatekey2
string comment2
...
string privatekeyN
string commentN
char 1
char 2
char 3
...
char padlen % 255
+where each private key is encoded using the same rules as used for
+SSH agent.
+
Before the key is encrypted, a random integer is assigned
to both checkint fields so successful decryption can be
quickly checked by verifying that both checkint fields
hold the same value.
4. Encryption
The KDF is used to derive a key, IV (and other values required by
the cipher) from the passphrase. These values are then used to
encrypt the unencrypted list of private keys.
5. No encryption
For unencrypted keys the cipher "none" and the KDF "none"
are used with empty passphrases. The options if the KDF "none"
are the empty string.
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.key,v 1.1 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.key,v 1.2 2021/05/07 02:29:40 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.mux b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.mux
index 77a0780a5234..5fc4c06b9660 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.mux
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.mux
@@ -1,298 +1,298 @@
This document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s
ControlMaster connection-sharing.
Multiplexing starts with a ssh(1) configured to act as a multiplexing
master. This will cause ssh(1) to listen on a Unix domain socket for
requests from clients. Clients communicate over this socket using a
simple packetised protocol, where each message is proceeded with
a length and message type in SSH uint32 wire format:
uint32 packet length
uint32 packet type
... packet body
Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id"
field. This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to
facilitate matching of responses to requests.
Many muliplexing (mux) client requests yield immediate responses from
the mux process; requesting a forwarding, performing an alive check or
requesting the master terminate itself fall in to this category.
The most common use of multiplexing however is to maintain multiple
concurrent sessions. These are supported via two separate modes:
"Passenger" clients start by requesting a new session with a
MUX_C_NEW_SESSION message and passing stdio file descriptors over the
Unix domain control socket. The passenger client then waits until it is
signaled or the mux server closes the session. This mode is so named as
the client waits around while the mux server does all the driving.
Stdio forwarding (requested using MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD) is another
example of passenger mode; the client passes the stdio file descriptors
and passively waits for something to happen.
"Proxy" clients, requested using MUX_C_PROXY, work quite differently. In
this mode, the mux client/server connection socket will stop speaking
the multiplexing protocol and start proxying SSH connection protocol
messages between the client and server. The client therefore must
speak a significant subset of the SSH protocol, but in return is able
to access basically the full suite of connection protocol features.
Moreover, as no file descriptor passing is required, the connection
-supporting a proxy client may iteself be forwarded or relayed to another
+supporting a proxy client may itself be forwarded or relayed to another
host if necessary.
1. Connection setup
When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a
ControlMaster from a client ssh(1), the first action of each is send
a hello messages to its peer:
uint32 MUX_MSG_HELLO
uint32 protocol version
string extension name [optional]
string extension value [optional]
...
The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A client should refuse
to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version.
Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions represented
as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently defined.
2. Opening a passenger mode session
To open a new multiplexed session in passenger mode, a client sends the
following request:
uint32 MUX_C_NEW_SESSION
uint32 request id
string reserved
bool want tty flag
bool want X11 forwarding flag
bool want agent flag
bool subsystem flag
uint32 escape char
string terminal type
string command
string environment string 0 [optional]
...
To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set
to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of
$TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command.
The client then sends its standard input, output and error file
descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
uint32 MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
uint32 client request id
uint32 session id
Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or
MUX_S_FAILURE.
Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK
indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the
session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status
message:
uint32 MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
uint32 session id
uint32 exit value
The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a
non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the
client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the
server disconnecting without sending an exit message.
A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to
return its local tty to "cooked" mode.
uint32 MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL
uint32 session id
3. Requesting passenger-mode stdio forwarding
A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding:
uint32 MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD
uint32 request id
string reserved
string connect host
string connect port
The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors
(in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
4. Health checks
The client may request a health check/PID report from a server:
uint32 MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK
uint32 request id
The server replies with:
uint32 MUX_S_ALIVE
uint32 client request id
uint32 server pid
5. Remotely terminating a master
A client may request that a master terminate immediately:
uint32 MUX_C_TERMINATE
uint32 request id
The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED.
6. Requesting establishment of port forwards
A client may request the master to establish a port forward:
uint32 MUX_C_OPEN_FWD
uint32 request id
uint32 forwarding type
string listen host
uint32 listen port
string connect host
uint32 connect port
forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC.
If listen port is (unsigned int) -2, then the listen host is treated as
a unix socket path name.
If connect port is (unsigned int) -2, then the connect host is treated
as a unix socket path name.
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a
MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with
uint32 MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT
uint32 client request id
uint32 allocated remote listen port
7. Requesting closure of port forwards
Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE).
A client may request the master to close a port forward:
uint32 MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD
uint32 request id
uint32 forwarding type
string listen host
uint32 listen port
string connect host
uint32 connect port
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
MUX_S_FAILURE.
8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener
A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests
and remove its listener socket.
uint32 MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING
uint32 request id
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
MUX_S_FAILURE.
9. Requesting proxy mode
A client may request that the the control connection be placed in proxy
mode:
uint32 MUX_C_PROXY
uint32 request id
When a mux master receives this message, it will reply with a
confirmation:
uint32 MUX_S_PROXY
uint32 request id
And go into proxy mode. All subsequent data over the connection will
be formatted as unencrypted, unpadded, SSH transport messages:
uint32 packet length
byte 0 (padding length)
byte packet type
byte[packet length - 2] ...
The mux master will accept most connection messages and global requests,
and will translate channel identifiers to ensure that the proxy client has
globally unique channel numbers (i.e. a proxy client need not worry about
collisions with other clients).
10. Status messages
The MUX_S_OK message is empty:
uint32 MUX_S_OK
uint32 client request id
The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason:
uint32 MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
uint32 client request id
string reason
uint32 MUX_S_FAILURE
uint32 client request id
string reason
11. Protocol numbers
#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
XXX TODO
XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards)
XXX lock (maybe)
XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto)
XXX inject packet (what about replies)
XXX server->client error/warning notifications
XXX send signals via mux
XXX ^Z support in passengers
XXX extensions for multi-agent
XXX extensions for multi-X11
XXX session inspection via master
XXX signals via mux request
XXX list active connections via mux
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.11 2018/09/26 07:30:05 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.12 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.sshsig b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.sshsig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..78457ddfc653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.sshsig
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format
+that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.
+
+At present, only detached and armored signatures are supported.
+
+1. Armored format
+
+The Armored SSH signatures consist of a header, a base64
+encoded blob, and a footer.
+
+The header is the string "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----"
+followed by a newline. The footer is the string
+"-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" immediately after a newline.
+
+The header MUST be present at the start of every signature.
+Files containing the signature MUST start with the header.
+Likewise, the footer MUST be present at the end of every
+signature.
+
+The base64 encoded blob SHOULD be broken up by newlines
+every 76 characters.
+
+Example:
+
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgJKxoLBJBivUPNTUJUSslQTt2hD
+jozKvHarKeN8uYFqgAAAADZm9vAAAAAAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKNC4IEbt
+Tq0Fb56xhtuE1/lK9H9RZJfON4o6hE9R4ZGFX98gy0+fFJ/1d2/RxnZky0Y7GojwrZkrHT
+FgCqVWAQ==
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
+
+2. Blob format
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+#define SIG_VERSION 0x01
+
+ byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+ uint32 SIG_VERSION
+ string publickey
+ string namespace
+ string reserved
+ string hash_algorithm
+ string signature
+
+The publickey field MUST contain the serialisation of the
+public key used to make the signature using the usual SSH
+encoding rules, i.e RFC4253, RFC5656,
+draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448, etc.
+
+Verifiers MUST reject signatures with versions greater than those
+they support.
+
+The purpose of the namespace value is to specify a unambiguous
+interpretation domain for the signature, e.g. file signing.
+This prevents cross-protocol attacks caused by signatures
+intended for one intended domain being accepted in another.
+The namespace value MUST NOT be the empty string.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+Data to be signed is first hashed with the specified hash_algorithm.
+This is done to limit the amount of data presented to the signature
+operation, which may be of concern if the signing key is held in limited
+or slow hardware or on a remote ssh-agent. The supported hash algorithms
+are "sha256" and "sha512".
+
+The signature itself is made using the SSH signature algorithm and
+encoding rules for the chosen key type. For RSA signatures, the
+signature algorithm must be "rsa-sha2-512" or "rsa-sha2-256" (i.e.
+not the legacy RSA-SHA1 "ssh-rsa").
+
+This blob is encoded as a string using the RFC4253 encoding
+rules and base64 encoded to form the middle part of the
+armored signature.
+
+
+3. Signed Data, of which the signature goes into the blob above
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+
+ byte[6] MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+ string namespace
+ string reserved
+ string hash_algorithm
+ string H(message)
+
+The preamble is the six-byte sequence "SSHSIG". It is included to
+ensure that manual signatures can never be confused with any message
+signed during SSH user or host authentication.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+The data is concatenated and passed to the SSH signing
+function.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.sshsig,v 1.4 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f8ca56b11c8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+This document describes OpenSSH's support for U2F/FIDO security keys.
+
+Background
+----------
+
+U2F is an open standard for two-factor authentication hardware, widely
+used for user authentication to websites. U2F tokens are ubiquitous,
+available from a number of manufacturers and are currently by far the
+cheapest way for users to achieve hardware-backed credential storage.
+
+The U2F protocol however cannot be trivially used as an SSH protocol key
+type as both the inputs to the signature operation and the resultant
+signature differ from those specified for SSH. For similar reasons,
+integration of U2F devices cannot be achieved via the PKCS#11 API.
+
+U2F also offers a number of features that are attractive in the context
+of SSH authentication. They can be configured to require indication
+of "user presence" for each signature operation (typically achieved
+by requiring the user touch the key). They also offer an attestation
+mechanism at key enrollment time that can be used to prove that a
+given key is backed by hardware. Finally the signature format includes
+a monotonic signature counter that can be used (at scale) to detect
+concurrent use of a private key, should it be extracted from hardware.
+
+U2F private keys are generated through an enrollment operation,
+which takes an application ID - a URL-like string, typically "ssh:"
+in this case, but a HTTP origin for the case of web authentication,
+and a challenge string (typically randomly generated). The enrollment
+operation returns a public key, a key handle that must be used to invoke
+the hardware-backed private key, some flags and signed attestation
+information that may be used to verify that a private key is hosted on a
+particular hardware instance.
+
+It is common for U2F hardware to derive private keys from the key handle
+in conjunction with a small per-device secret that is unique to the
+hardware, thus requiring little on-device storage for an effectively
+unlimited number of supported keys. This drives the requirement that
+the key handle be supplied for each signature operation. U2F tokens
+primarily use ECDSA signatures in the NIST-P256 field, though the FIDO2
+standard specifies additional key types, including one based on Ed25519.
+
+Use of U2F security keys does not automatically imply multi-factor
+authentication. From sshd's perspective, a security key constitutes a
+single factor of authentication, even if protected by a PIN or biometric
+authentication. To enable multi-factor authentication in ssh, please
+refer to the AuthenticationMethods option in sshd_config(5).
+
+
+SSH U2F Key formats
+-------------------
+
+OpenSSH integrates U2F as new key and corresponding certificate types:
+
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+
+While each uses ecdsa-sha256-nistp256 as the underlying signature primitive,
+keys require extra information in the public and private keys, and in
+the signature object itself. As such they cannot be made compatible with
+the existing ecdsa-sha2-nistp* key types.
+
+The format of a sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com public key is:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string curve name
+ ec_point Q
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+
+The corresponding private key contains:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string curve name
+ ec_point Q
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+ uint8 flags
+ string key_handle
+ string reserved
+
+The format of a sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com public key is:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+ string public key
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+
+With a private half consisting of:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+ string public key
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+ uint8 flags
+ string key_handle
+ string reserved
+
+The certificate form for SSH U2F keys appends the usual certificate
+information to the public key:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ string curve name
+ ec_point Q
+ string application
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+and for security key ed25519 certificates:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ string public key
+ string application
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+Both security key certificates use the following encoding for private keys:
+
+ string type (e.g. "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com")
+ string pubkey (the above key/cert structure)
+ string application
+ uint8 flags
+ string key_handle
+ string reserved
+
+During key generation, the hardware also returns attestation information
+that may be used to cryptographically prove that a given key is
+hardware-backed. Unfortunately, the protocol required for this proof is
+not privacy-preserving and may be used to identify U2F tokens with at
+least manufacturer and batch number granularity. For this reason, we
+choose not to include this information in the public key or save it by
+default.
+
+Attestation information is useful for out-of-band key and certificate
+registration workflows, e.g. proving to a CA that a key is backed
+by trusted hardware before it will issue a certificate. To support this
+case, OpenSSH optionally allows retaining the attestation information
+at the time of key generation. It will take the following format:
+
+ string "ssh-sk-attest-v01"
+ string attestation certificate
+ string enrollment signature
+ string authenticator data (CBOR encoded)
+ uint32 reserved flags
+ string reserved string
+
+A previous version of this format, emitted prior to OpenSSH 8.4 omitted
+the authenticator data.
+
+ string "ssh-sk-attest-v00"
+ string attestation certificate
+ string enrollment signature
+ uint32 reserved flags
+ string reserved string
+
+OpenSSH treats the attestation certificate and enrollment signatures as
+opaque objects and does no interpretation of them itself.
+
+SSH U2F signatures
+------------------
+
+In addition to the message to be signed, the U2F signature operation
+requires the key handle and a few additional parameters. The signature
+is signed over a blob that consists of:
+
+ byte[32] SHA256(application)
+ byte flags (including "user present", extensions present)
+ uint32 counter
+ byte[] extensions
+ byte[32] SHA256(message)
+
+No extensions are yet defined for SSH use. If any are defined in the future,
+it will be possible to infer their presence from the contents of the "flags"
+value.
+
+The signature returned from U2F hardware takes the following format:
+
+ byte flags (including "user present")
+ uint32 counter
+ byte[] ecdsa_signature (in X9.62 format).
+
+For use in the SSH protocol, we wish to avoid server-side parsing of ASN.1
+format data in the pre-authentication attack surface. Therefore, the
+signature format used on the wire in SSH2_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets will
+be reformatted to better match the existing signature encoding:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string ecdsa_signature
+ byte flags
+ uint32 counter
+
+Where the "ecdsa_signature" field follows the RFC5656 ECDSA signature
+encoding:
+
+ mpint r
+ mpint s
+
+For Ed25519 keys the signature is encoded as:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+ string signature
+ byte flags
+ uint32 counter
+
+webauthn signatures
+-------------------
+
+The W3C/FIDO webauthn[1] standard defines a mechanism for a web browser to
+interact with FIDO authentication tokens. This standard builds upon the
+FIDO standards, but requires different signature contents to raw FIDO
+messages. OpenSSH supports ECDSA/p256 webauthn signatures through the
+"webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" signature algorithm.
+
+The wire encoding for a webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+signature is similar to the sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com format:
+
+ string "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string ecdsa_signature
+ byte flags
+ uint32 counter
+ string origin
+ string clientData
+ string extensions
+
+Where "origin" is the HTTP origin making the signature, "clientData" is
+the JSON-like structure signed by the browser and "extensions" are any
+extensions used in making the signature.
+
+[1] https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/
+
+ssh-agent protocol extensions
+-----------------------------
+
+ssh-agent requires a protocol extension to support U2F keys. At
+present the closest analogue to Security Keys in ssh-agent are PKCS#11
+tokens, insofar as they require a middleware library to communicate with
+the device that holds the keys. Unfortunately, the protocol message used
+to add PKCS#11 keys to ssh-agent does not include any way to send the
+key handle to the agent as U2F keys require.
+
+To avoid this, without having to add wholly new messages to the agent
+protocol, we will use the existing SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message
+with a new key constraint extension to encode a path to the middleware
+library for the key. The format of this constraint extension would be:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION
+ string sk-provider@openssh.com
+ string middleware path
+
+This constraint-based approach does not present any compatibility
+problems.
+
+OpenSSH integration
+-------------------
+
+U2F tokens may be attached via a number of means, including USB and NFC.
+The USB interface is standardised around a HID protocol, but we want to
+be able to support other transports as well as dummy implementations for
+regress testing. For this reason, OpenSSH shall support a dynamically-
+loaded middleware libraries to communicate with security keys, but offer
+support for the common case of USB HID security keys internally.
+
+The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions and
+numbers listed in sk-api.h. Included in the defined numbers is a
+SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR that should be incremented for each incompatible
+API change.
+
+miscellaneous options may be passed to the middleware as a NULL-
+terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware may
+ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "required" flag is set,
+in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is
+requested.
+
+At present the following options names are supported:
+
+ "device"
+
+ Specifies a specific FIDO device on which to perform the
+ operation. The value in this field is interpreted by the
+ middleware but it would be typical to specify a path to
+ a /dev node for the device in question.
+
+ "user"
+
+ Specifies the FIDO2 username used when enrolling a key,
+ overriding OpenSSH's default of using an all-zero username.
+
+In OpenSSH, the middleware will be invoked by using a similar mechanism to
+ssh-pkcs11-helper to provide address-space containment of the
+middleware from ssh-agent.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.u2f,v 1.26 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README b/crypto/openssh/README
index 05916459c08b..5c7f8647dc8e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README
@@ -1,62 +1,52 @@
-See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.9p1 for the release notes.
+See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.7p1 for the release notes.
Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
patch/pull-request management.
This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
Unices.
OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/
This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
-support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
+support, EGD/PRNGD support and replacements for OpenBSD library
functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris and UnixWare.
This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
all logins, not just when using password authentication.
-OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4], and optionally PAM[5] and
-libedit[6]
-
There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
-Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
-openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed
-users. Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD
-style guidelines[7].
+Please send bug reports and patches to https://bugzilla.mindrot.org or
+the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. To mitigate spam, the
+list only allows posting from subscribed addresses. Code contribution
+are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[1].
-Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
-OpenSSH on your system.
+Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on dependencies and
+how to install OpenSSH on your system.
Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Miscellania -
-This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
-CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
-implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
+This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS
+repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation
+released by Tatu Ylonen.
References -
[0] https://www.openssh.com/
-[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
-[2] http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
-[3] https://www.zlib.net/
-[4] https://www.openssl.org/
-[5] https://www.openpam.org
- https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
- (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
-[6] https://thrysoee.dk/editline/ (portable version)
-[7] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9
+[1] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.dns b/crypto/openssh/README.dns
index 97879183e396..29ecaee8da39 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README.dns
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.dns
@@ -1,47 +1,47 @@
How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS
---------------------------------------------
-OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in
-draft-ietf-secsh-dns-05.txt. The document contains very brief instructions
-on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this
-document.
+OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described
+in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4255. The document contains very brief
+instructions on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the
+scope of this document.
(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR
To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the
public host key, use the following command:
ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g
where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the
file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys,
you should generate one RR for each key.
In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a
generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server
implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR
you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR.
To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR
to your DNS zone file and sign your zone.
(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS
To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to
add the following option to the ssh configuration file
($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config):
VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR
using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches
the remote host key, the user will be notified.
Jakob Schlyter
Wesley Griffin
$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.md b/crypto/openssh/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..de4717737eac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# Portable OpenSSH
+
+[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml)
+[![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh)
+
+OpenSSH is a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``ssh`` and server ``sshd``, file transfer utilities ``scp`` and ``sftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``ssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``ssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs.
+
+This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM).
+
+## Documentation
+
+The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool:
+
+* [ssh(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1)
+* [sshd(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8)
+* [ssh-keygen(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1)
+* [ssh-agent(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1)
+* [scp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1)
+* [sftp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp.1)
+* [ssh-keyscan(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keyscan.8)
+* [sftp-server(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8)
+
+## Stable Releases
+
+Stable release tarballs are available from a number of [download mirrors](https://www.openssh.com/portable.html#downloads). We recommend the use of a stable release for most users. Please read the [release notes](https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html) for details of recent changes and potential incompatibilities.
+
+## Building Portable OpenSSH
+
+### Dependencies
+
+Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers.
+
+``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) may also be used, but OpenSSH may be built without it supporting a subset of crypto algorithms.
+
+[zlib](https://www.zlib.net/) is optional; without it transport compression is not supported.
+
+FIDO security token support needs [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its dependencies. Also, certain platforms and build-time options may require additional dependencies; see README.platform for details.
+
+### Building a release
+
+Releases include a pre-built copy of the ``configure`` script and may be built using:
+
+```
+tar zxvf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz
+cd openssh
+./configure # [options]
+make && make tests
+```
+
+See the [Build-time Customisation](#build-time-customisation) section below for configure options. If you plan on installing OpenSSH to your system, then you will usually want to specify destination paths.
+
+### Building from git
+
+If building from git, you'll need [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/) installed to build the ``configure`` script. The following commands will check out and build portable OpenSSH from git:
+
+```
+git clone https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable # or https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
+cd openssh-portable
+autoreconf
+./configure
+make && make tests
+```
+
+### Build-time Customisation
+
+There are many build-time customisation options available. All Autoconf destination path flags (e.g. ``--prefix``) are supported (and are usually required if you want to install OpenSSH).
+
+For a full list of available flags, run ``configure --help`` but a few of the more frequently-used ones are described below. Some of these flags will require additional libraries and/or headers be installed.
+
+Flag | Meaning
+--- | ---
+``--with-pam`` | Enable [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluggable_authentication_module) support. [OpenPAM](https://www.openpam.org/), [Linux PAM](http://www.linux-pam.org/) and Solaris PAM are supported.
+``--with-libedit`` | Enable [libedit](https://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/) support for sftp.
+``--with-kerberos5`` | Enable Kerberos/GSSAPI support. Both [Heimdal](https://www.h5l.org/) and [MIT](https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/) Kerberos implementations are supported.
+``--with-selinux`` | Enable [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) support.
+``--with-security-key-builtin`` | Include built-in support for U2F/FIDO2 security keys. This requires [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) be installed.
+
+## Development
+
+Portable OpenSSH development is discussed on the [openssh-unix-dev mailing list](https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev) ([archive mirror](https://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev)). Bugs and feature requests are tracked on our [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/).
+
+## Reporting bugs
+
+_Non-security_ bugs may be reported to the developers via [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/) or via the mailing list above. Security bugs should be reported to [openssh@openssh.com](mailto:openssh.openssh.com).
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.platform b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
index 9210e07c8c6e..7b754ba42a10 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README.platform
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
@@ -1,96 +1,96 @@
This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
AIX
----
-As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry
-settings, where previously it did not. Because of this, it's possible for
-sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which
-have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between
-password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired
-chuser attribute).
+
+Beginning with OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will honour an account's password
+expiry settings, where prior to that it did not. Because of this,
+it's possible for sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to
+have accounts which have passwords expired longer than the inactive time
+(ie the "Weeks between password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT
+or the maxexpired chuser attribute).
Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
administrator. As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
-As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
+As of OpenSSH 4.0p1, configure will attempt to detect if your version
and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
if found. This will enable IPv6 support. If for some reason configure
gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
--with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
"rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account,
instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
If you are using the IBM compiler you probably want to use CC=xlc rather
than the default of cc.
Cygwin
------
To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
Darwin and MacOS X
------------------
Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
using a third party driver. More information is available at:
http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
Linux
-----
Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
Solaris
-------
If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
for praudit(1m) to give sensible output. The following line needs to be
added to /etc/security/audit_event:
32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
32768 - 65535. Event number 32800 has been chosen for AUE_openssh.
There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
Platforms using PAM
-------------------
As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
PAM is enabled. To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
sessions. Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.privsep b/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
index 460e90565202..d658c46db11e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
@@ -1,54 +1,51 @@
Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which
operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate
privileged monitor process. Its purpose is to prevent privilege
escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process.
More information is available at:
http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
-Privilege separation is now enabled by default; see the
-UsePrivilegeSeparation option in sshd_config(5).
-
-When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will
-chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user
-and its primary group. sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be
-used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
+Privilege separation is now mandatory. During the pre-authentication
+phase sshd will chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the
+"sshd" user and its primary group. sshd is a pseudo-account that should
+not be used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
"nologin" or invalid shell.
You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep
preauth environment:
# mkdir /var/empty
# chown root:sys /var/empty
# chmod 755 /var/empty
# groupadd sshd
# useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd
/var/empty should not contain any files.
configure supports the following options to change the default
privsep user and chroot directory:
--with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot
--with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD,
HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris.
On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix and OpenServer only the pre-authentication part
of privsep is supported. Post-authentication privsep is disabled
automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below).
Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep
will require 1 additional process per login session.
Given the following process listing (from HP-UX):
UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME COMMAND
root 1005 1 0 10:45:17 ? 0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0
root 6917 1005 0 15:19:16 ? 0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv]
stevesk 6919 6917 0 15:19:17 ? 0:03 sshd: stevesk@2
stevesk 6921 6919 0 15:19:17 pts/2 0:00 -bash
process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections.
process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned
sshd process and 6921 is the shell process.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4 b/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4
index 25ecc49a2203..9d85d34d4772 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4
+++ b/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4
@@ -1,186 +1,15 @@
-dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
-dnl
+# generated automatically by aclocal 1.16.3 -*- Autoconf -*-
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag])
-dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
-dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
-dnl 'check_flag'.
-AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1])
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
- _define_flag="$2"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
- exit(0);
-}
- ]])],
- [
-if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
-then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
- )
-}])
+# Copyright (C) 1996-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
-dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
-dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
-dnl 'check_flag'.
-AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds])
- saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
- _define_flag="$2"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- long long int p = n * o;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
- exit(0);
-}
- ]])],
- [
-if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
-then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
- )
-}])
+# This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
+# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
-dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
-dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
-dnl 'check_flag'.
-AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1])
- saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1"
- _define_flag="$2"
- test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
- int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
- float l = i * 2.1;
- double m = l / 0.5;
- long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
- long long p = n * o;
- printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
- exit(0);
-}
- ]])],
- [
-if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
-then
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
-else
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
-fi ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ]
- )
-}])
-
-dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
-dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
-dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
-dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
-AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [
-# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
- dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
- ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
- dnl
- ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
- AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
- AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
- eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
- ], [ dnl
- eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
- ]) dnl
- ])
- ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
- if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
- AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
- if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
- AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2])
- fi
- else
- AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
- fi
-])
-
-dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
-dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
-dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we
-dnl have to test to find something that will work.
-AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
-[
- AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
- AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
- [
- # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
- # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
- curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
- for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
- for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
- AC_TRY_COMPILE([
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
-
- int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
- ],[
- $t len;
- getpeername(0,0,&len);
- ],[
- curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
- break
- ])
- done
- done
-
- if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
- fi
- ])
- AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
- [type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
- [#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>])
-])
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
+# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+m4_ifndef([AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [m4_defun([_AM_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [])m4_defun([AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [_AM_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS($@)])])
+m4_include([m4/openssh.m4])
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c b/crypto/openssh/addr.c
similarity index 55%
copy from crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c
copy to crypto/openssh/addr.c
index 5a402d065612..ba0fad4e9eb0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/addr.c
@@ -1,498 +1,423 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.14 2018/07/31 03:07:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: addr.c,v 1.1 2021/01/09 11:58:50 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "match.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-struct xaddr {
- sa_family_t af;
- union {
- struct in_addr v4;
- struct in6_addr v6;
- u_int8_t addr8[16];
- u_int32_t addr32[4];
- } xa; /* 128-bit address */
- u_int32_t scope_id; /* iface scope id for v6 */
-#define v4 xa.v4
-#define v6 xa.v6
-#define addr8 xa.addr8
-#define addr32 xa.addr32
-};
-
-static int
+
+#include "addr.h"
+
+#define _SA(x) ((struct sockaddr *)(x))
+
+int
addr_unicast_masklen(int af)
{
switch (af) {
case AF_INET:
return 32;
case AF_INET6:
return 128;
default:
return -1;
}
}
static inline int
masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen)
{
switch (af) {
case AF_INET:
return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1;
case AF_INET6:
return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1;
default:
return -1;
}
}
+int
+addr_xaddr_to_sa(const struct xaddr *xa, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t *len,
+ u_int16_t port)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+
+ if (xa == NULL || sa == NULL || len == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (xa->af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (*len < sizeof(*in4))
+ return -1;
+ memset(sa, '\0', sizeof(*in4));
+ *len = sizeof(*in4);
+#ifdef SOCK_HAS_LEN
+ in4->sin_len = sizeof(*in4);
+#endif
+ in4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+ in4->sin_port = htons(port);
+ memcpy(&in4->sin_addr, &xa->v4, sizeof(in4->sin_addr));
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (*len < sizeof(*in6))
+ return -1;
+ memset(sa, '\0', sizeof(*in6));
+ *len = sizeof(*in6);
+#ifdef SOCK_HAS_LEN
+ in6->sin6_len = sizeof(*in6);
+#endif
+ in6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ in6->sin6_port = htons(port);
+ memcpy(&in6->sin6_addr, &xa->v6, sizeof(in6->sin6_addr));
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+ in6->sin6_scope_id = xa->scope_id;
+#endif
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-static int
+int
addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
{
struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa));
switch (sa->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4))
return -1;
xa->af = AF_INET;
memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4));
break;
case AF_INET6:
if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6))
return -1;
xa->af = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
#endif
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
+int
+addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (n == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (n->af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
+ return 0;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
* store it in 'n'.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-static int
+int
addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
{
int i;
if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL)
return -1;
memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n));
switch (af) {
case AF_INET:
n->af = AF_INET;
if (l == 0)
return 0;
n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff);
return 0;
case AF_INET6:
n->af = AF_INET6;
for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32)
n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU;
if (i < 4 && l != 0)
n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) &
0xffffffff);
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
}
+int
+addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+ if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-static int
+int
addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
{
int i;
if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
return -1;
memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
switch (a->af) {
case AF_INET:
dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr;
return 0;
case AF_INET6:
dst->scope_id = a->scope_id;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i];
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
}
-/*
- * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b'
- * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b)
- */
-static int
+int
addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
{
int i;
if (a->af != b->af)
- return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1;
+ return (a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1);
switch (a->af) {
case AF_INET:
+ /*
+ * Can't just subtract here as 255.255.255.255 - 0.0.0.0 is
+ * too big to fit into a signed int
+ */
if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr)
return 0;
- return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1;
- case AF_INET6:
+ return (ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1);
+ case AF_INET6:;
+ /*
+ * Do this a byte at a time to avoid the above issue and
+ * any endian problems
+ */
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0)
- return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1;
+ return (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i]);
if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id)
- return 0;
- return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
-
- memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
-
- if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
- goto out;
- if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1)
- goto out;
- /* success */
- ret = 0;
- out:
- if (ai != NULL)
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform bitwise negation of address
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (n == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- switch (n->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
- return (0);
- case AF_INET6:
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
- return (0);
+ return (0);
+ return (a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1);
default:
return (-1);
}
}
-/*
- * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
- * store it in 'n'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::)
- * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
- */
-static int
+int
addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a)
{
int i;
switch (a->af) {
case AF_INET:
return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1);
case AF_INET6:;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
if (a->addr32[i] != 0)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
default:
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
}
/*
* Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen'
* is all zeros.
* Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros,
* -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
*/
-static int
+int
addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
{
struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result;
memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr));
if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return (-1);
- return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result));
+ return -1;
+ return addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+ memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+ if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ n) == -1) {
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *s, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+ memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+ if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (sa != NULL) {
+ if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ }
+
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+addr_ntop(const struct xaddr *n, char *p, size_t len)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+ socklen_t slen = sizeof(ss);
+
+ if (addr_xaddr_to_sa(n, _SA(&ss), &slen, 0) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (n == NULL || p == NULL || len == 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (getnameinfo(_SA(&ss), slen, p, len, NULL, 0,
+ NI_NUMERICHOST) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z).
* Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success.
*/
-static int
+int
addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l)
{
struct xaddr tmp;
long unsigned int masklen = 999;
char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp;
/* Don't modify argument */
if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf))
return -1;
if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) {
*mp = '\0';
mp++;
masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10);
if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128)
return -1;
}
if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1)
return -1;
if (mp == NULL)
masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af);
if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1)
return -2;
if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0)
return -2;
if (n != NULL)
memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n));
if (l != NULL)
*l = masklen;
return 0;
}
-static int
+int
addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen)
{
struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result;
if (host->af != net->af)
return -1;
if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
return -1;
if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1)
return -1;
return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net);
}
-
-/*
- * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a
- * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards.
- *
- * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed
- * and checked for well-formedness.
- *
- * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
- * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns -2 on invalid list entry.
- */
-int
-addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
-{
- char *list, *cp, *o;
- struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
- u_int masklen, neg;
- int ret = 0, r;
-
- if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
- neg = *cp == '!';
- if (neg)
- cp++;
- if (*cp == '\0') {
- ret = -2;
- break;
- }
- /* Prefer CIDR address matching */
- r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
- if (r == -2) {
- debug2("%s: inconsistent mask length for "
- "match network \"%.100s\"", __func__, cp);
- ret = -2;
- break;
- } else if (r == 0) {
- if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr,
- &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
- foundit:
- if (neg) {
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
- continue;
- } else {
- /* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */
- if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1)
- goto foundit;
- }
- }
- free(o);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and
- * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure
- * of "_list".
- *
- * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
- * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
- * Returns -1 on error
- */
-int
-addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
-{
- char *list, *cp, *o;
- struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
- u_int masklen;
- int ret = 0, r;
-
- if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
- if (*cp == '\0') {
- error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"",
- __func__, o);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data,
- * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via
- * addr_pton_cidr).
- */
-
- /* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */
- if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) {
- error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long",
- __func__, cp);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- }
-#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/"
- if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) {
- error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid "
- "characters", __func__, cp);
- ret = -1;
- }
-
- /* Prefer CIDR address matching */
- r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
- if (r == -1) {
- error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- } else if (r == -2) {
- error("Inconsistent mask length for "
- "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
- ret = -1;
- break;
- } else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) {
- if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr,
- masklen) == 0)
- ret = 1;
- continue;
- }
- }
- free(o);
-
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/addr.h b/crypto/openssh/addr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5eff02628592
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/addr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004,2005 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Address handling routines */
+
+#ifndef _ADDR_H
+#define _ADDR_H
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+struct xaddr {
+ sa_family_t af;
+ union {
+ struct in_addr v4;
+ struct in6_addr v6;
+ u_int8_t addr8[16];
+ u_int16_t addr16[8];
+ u_int32_t addr32[4];
+ } xa; /* 128-bit address */
+ u_int32_t scope_id; /* iface scope id for v6 */
+#define v4 xa.v4
+#define v6 xa.v6
+#define addr8 xa.addr8
+#define addr16 xa.addr16
+#define addr32 xa.addr32
+};
+
+int addr_unicast_masklen(int af);
+int addr_xaddr_to_sa(const struct xaddr *xa, struct sockaddr *sa,
+ socklen_t *len, u_int16_t port);
+int addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa);
+int addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_invert(struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *s, struct sockaddr *sa,
+ socklen_t slen);
+int addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l);
+int addr_ntop(const struct xaddr *n, char *p, size_t len);
+int addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b);
+int addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b);
+int addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *n, u_int masklen);
+int addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net,
+ u_int masklen);
+#endif /* _ADDR_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c b/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c
index 5a402d065612..b0dc096804db 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/addrmatch.c
@@ -1,498 +1,169 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.14 2018/07/31 03:07:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.17 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include "addr.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "log.h"
-struct xaddr {
- sa_family_t af;
- union {
- struct in_addr v4;
- struct in6_addr v6;
- u_int8_t addr8[16];
- u_int32_t addr32[4];
- } xa; /* 128-bit address */
- u_int32_t scope_id; /* iface scope id for v6 */
-#define v4 xa.v4
-#define v6 xa.v6
-#define addr8 xa.addr8
-#define addr32 xa.addr32
-};
-
-static int
-addr_unicast_masklen(int af)
-{
- switch (af) {
- case AF_INET:
- return 32;
- case AF_INET6:
- return 128;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-static inline int
-masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen)
-{
- switch (af) {
- case AF_INET:
- return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1;
- case AF_INET6:
- return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
-{
- struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
- struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
-
- memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa));
-
- switch (sa->sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4))
- return -1;
- xa->af = AF_INET;
- memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4));
- break;
- case AF_INET6:
- if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6))
- return -1;
- xa->af = AF_INET6;
- memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
- xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
-#endif
- break;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
- * store it in 'n'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n));
- switch (af) {
- case AF_INET:
- n->af = AF_INET;
- if (l == 0)
- return 0;
- n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff);
- return 0;
- case AF_INET6:
- n->af = AF_INET6;
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32)
- n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU;
- if (i < 4 && l != 0)
- n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) &
- 0xffffffff);
- return 0;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
- switch (a->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr;
- return 0;
- case AF_INET6:
- dst->scope_id = a->scope_id;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i];
- return 0;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b'
- * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b)
- */
-static int
-addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a->af != b->af)
- return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1;
-
- switch (a->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr)
- return 0;
- return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1;
- case AF_INET6:
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0)
- return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1;
- if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id)
- return 0;
- return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
-
- memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
-
- if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
- goto out;
- if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1)
- goto out;
- /* success */
- ret = 0;
- out:
- if (ai != NULL)
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform bitwise negation of address
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (n == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- switch (n->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
- return (0);
- case AF_INET6:
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
- return (0);
- default:
- return (-1);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
- * store it in 'n'.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
-{
- if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::)
- * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a)
-{
- int i;
-
- switch (a->af) {
- case AF_INET:
- return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1);
- case AF_INET6:;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- if (a->addr32[i] != 0)
- return (-1);
- return (0);
- default:
- return (-1);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen'
- * is all zeros.
- * Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros,
- * -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
- */
-static int
-addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
-{
- struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result;
-
- memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr));
- if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return (-1);
- if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return (-1);
- return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result));
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z).
- * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success.
- */
-static int
-addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l)
-{
- struct xaddr tmp;
- long unsigned int masklen = 999;
- char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp;
-
- /* Don't modify argument */
- if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf))
- return -1;
-
- if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) {
- *mp = '\0';
- mp++;
- masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10);
- if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128)
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1)
- return -1;
-
- if (mp == NULL)
- masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af);
- if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1)
- return -2;
- if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0)
- return -2;
-
- if (n != NULL)
- memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n));
- if (l != NULL)
- *l = masklen;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen)
-{
- struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result;
-
- if (host->af != net->af)
- return -1;
-
- if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return -1;
- if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1)
- return -1;
- return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net);
-}
-
/*
* Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a
* mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards.
*
* If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed
* and checked for well-formedness.
*
* Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
* Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
* Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
* Returns -2 on invalid list entry.
*/
int
addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
{
char *list, *cp, *o;
struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
u_int masklen, neg;
int ret = 0, r;
if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
+ debug2_f("couldn't parse address %.100s", addr);
return 0;
}
if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
return -1;
while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
neg = *cp == '!';
if (neg)
cp++;
if (*cp == '\0') {
ret = -2;
break;
}
/* Prefer CIDR address matching */
r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
if (r == -2) {
- debug2("%s: inconsistent mask length for "
- "match network \"%.100s\"", __func__, cp);
+ debug2_f("inconsistent mask length for "
+ "match network \"%.100s\"", cp);
ret = -2;
break;
} else if (r == 0) {
if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr,
- &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
+ &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
foundit:
if (neg) {
ret = -1;
break;
}
ret = 1;
}
continue;
} else {
/* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */
if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1)
goto foundit;
}
}
free(o);
return ret;
}
/*
* Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and
* negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure
* of "_list".
*
* Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
* Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
* Returns -1 on error
*/
int
addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
{
char *list, *cp, *o;
struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
u_int masklen;
int ret = 0, r;
if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr);
+ debug2_f("couldn't parse address %.100s", addr);
return 0;
}
if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
return -1;
while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*cp == '\0') {
- error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"",
- __func__, o);
+ error_f("empty entry in list \"%.100s\"", o);
ret = -1;
break;
}
/*
* NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data,
* so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via
* addr_pton_cidr).
*/
/* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */
if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) {
- error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long",
- __func__, cp);
+ error_f("list entry \"%.100s\" too long", cp);
ret = -1;
break;
}
#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/"
if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) {
- error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid "
- "characters", __func__, cp);
+ error_f("list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid "
+ "characters", cp);
ret = -1;
}
/* Prefer CIDR address matching */
r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
if (r == -1) {
error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp);
ret = -1;
break;
} else if (r == -2) {
error("Inconsistent mask length for "
"network \"%.100s\"", cp);
ret = -1;
break;
} else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) {
if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr,
masklen) == 0)
ret = 1;
continue;
}
}
free(o);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
index f854a06f5f50..e00c9f0d4e22 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
@@ -1,170 +1,180 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.28 2016/07/27 23:18:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.30 2019/01/24 02:42:23 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
/*
* ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
*/
size_t
atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
{
char *s = _s;
size_t pos = 0;
ssize_t res;
struct pollfd pfd;
-#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
pfd.fd = fd;
+#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+#else
+ pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLOUT;
#endif
while (n > pos) {
res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
switch (res) {
case -1:
- if (errno == EINTR)
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
+ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
+ errno = EINTR;
+ return pos;
+ }
continue;
- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
+ } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
-#endif
continue;
}
return 0;
case 0:
errno = EPIPE;
return pos;
default:
pos += (size_t)res;
if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
errno = EINTR;
return pos;
}
}
}
return pos;
}
size_t
atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
{
return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
*/
size_t
atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt,
int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
{
size_t pos = 0, rem;
ssize_t res;
struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
struct pollfd pfd;
if (iovcnt < 0 || iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
errno = EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
memcpy(iov, _iov, (size_t)iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
-#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
pfd.fd = fd;
+#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+#else
+ pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLOUT;
#endif
for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
switch (res) {
case -1:
- if (errno == EINTR)
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
+ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
+ errno = EINTR;
+ return pos;
+ }
continue;
- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+ } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
-#endif
continue;
}
return 0;
case 0:
errno = EPIPE;
return pos;
default:
rem = (size_t)res;
pos += rem;
/* skip completed iov entries */
while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
iov++;
iovcnt--;
}
/* This shouldn't happen... */
if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
errno = EFAULT;
return 0;
}
if (iovcnt == 0)
break;
/* update pointer in partially complete iov */
iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
}
if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
errno = EINTR;
return pos;
}
}
return pos;
}
size_t
atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
{
return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
index 0d728ac86ea9..8b3cc6e211bd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
@@ -1,51 +1,53 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.11 2010/09/22 22:58:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.12 2018/12/27 03:25:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _ATOMICIO_H
#define _ATOMICIO_H
+struct iovec;
+
/*
* Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
*/
size_t
atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
size_t atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
#define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
/*
* ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
*/
size_t
atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
size_t atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int),
int, const struct iovec *, int);
#endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c b/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
index 1409f69aeb90..ccfcf6f7fc68 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
@@ -1,454 +1,455 @@
/*
* TODO
*
* - deal with overlap between this and sys_auth_allowed_user
* sys_auth_record_login and record_failed_login.
*/
/*
* Copyright 1988-2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
/* #pragma ident "@(#)bsmaudit.c 1.1 01/09/17 SMI" */
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT)
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
#include <libscf.h>
#endif
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#ifndef AUE_openssh
# define AUE_openssh 32800
#endif
#include <bsm/audit.h>
#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
#include <bsm/audit_uevents.h>
#include <bsm/audit_record.h>
#include <locale.h>
#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
#define AuditInfoStruct auditinfo_addr
#define AuditInfoTermID au_tid_addr_t
#define SetAuditFunc(a,b) setaudit_addr((a),(b))
#define SetAuditFuncText "setaudit_addr"
#define AUToSubjectFunc au_to_subject_ex
#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b) au_to_return32((a), (int32_t)(b))
#else
#define AuditInfoStruct auditinfo
#define AuditInfoTermID au_tid_t
#define SetAuditFunc(a,b) setaudit(a)
#define SetAuditFuncText "setaudit"
#define AUToSubjectFunc au_to_subject
#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b) au_to_return((a), (u_int)(b))
#endif
#ifndef cannot_audit
extern int cannot_audit(int);
#endif
extern void aug_init(void);
extern void aug_save_auid(au_id_t);
extern void aug_save_uid(uid_t);
extern void aug_save_euid(uid_t);
extern void aug_save_gid(gid_t);
extern void aug_save_egid(gid_t);
extern void aug_save_pid(pid_t);
extern void aug_save_asid(au_asid_t);
extern void aug_save_tid(dev_t, unsigned int);
extern void aug_save_tid_ex(dev_t, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t);
extern int aug_save_me(void);
extern int aug_save_namask(void);
extern void aug_save_event(au_event_t);
extern void aug_save_sorf(int);
extern void aug_save_text(char *);
extern void aug_save_text1(char *);
extern void aug_save_text2(char *);
extern void aug_save_na(int);
extern void aug_save_user(char *);
extern void aug_save_path(char *);
extern int aug_save_policy(void);
extern void aug_save_afunc(int (*)(int));
extern int aug_audit(void);
extern int aug_na_selected(void);
extern int aug_selected(void);
extern int aug_daemon_session(void);
#ifndef HAVE_GETTEXT
# define gettext(a) (a)
#endif
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
static AuditInfoTermID ssh_bsm_tid;
#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
/* For some reason this constant is no longer defined
in Solaris 11. */
#define BSM_TEXTBUFSZ 256
#endif
/* Below is the low-level BSM interface code */
/*
* aug_get_machine is only required on IPv6 capable machines, we use a
* different mechanism in audit_connection_from() for IPv4-only machines.
* getaudit_addr() is only present on IPv6 capable machines.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
-extern int aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+extern int aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
#else
static int
aug_get_machine(char *host, u_int32_t *addr, u_int32_t *type)
{
struct addrinfo *ai;
struct sockaddr_in *in4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
int ret = 0, r;
if ((r = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0) {
error("BSM audit: getaddrinfo failed for %.100s: %.100s", host,
r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r));
return -1;
}
switch (ai->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr;
*type = AU_IPv4;
memcpy(addr, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
break;
#ifdef AU_IPv6
case AF_INET6:
in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr;
*type = AU_IPv6;
memcpy(addr, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
break;
#endif
default:
error("BSM audit: unknown address family for %.100s: %d",
host, ai->ai_family);
ret = -1;
}
freeaddrinfo(ai);
return ret;
}
#endif
#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
/*
In Solaris 11 the audit daemon has been moved to SMF. In the process
they simply dropped getacna() from the API, since it read from a now
non-existent config file. This function re-implements getacna() to
read from the SMF repository instead.
*/
int
getacna(char *auditstring, int len)
{
scf_handle_t *handle = NULL;
scf_property_t *property = NULL;
scf_value_t *value = NULL;
int ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * The man page for getacna on Solaris 10 states we should return -2
+ * in case of error and set errno to indicate the error. We don't
+ * bother with errno here, though, since the only use of this function
+ * below doesn't check for errors anyway.
+ */
handle = scf_handle_create(SCF_VERSION);
if (handle == NULL)
- return -2; /* The man page for getacna on Solaris 10 states
- we should return -2 in case of error and set
- errno to indicate the error. We don't bother
- with errno here, though, since the only use
- of this function below doesn't check for errors
- anyway.
- */
+ return -2;
ret = scf_handle_bind(handle);
if (ret == -1)
- return -2;
+ return -2;
property = scf_property_create(handle);
if (property == NULL)
- return -2;
+ return -2;
ret = scf_handle_decode_fmri(handle,
- "svc:/system/auditd:default/:properties/preselection/naflags",
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, property, 0);
+ "svc:/system/auditd:default/:properties/preselection/naflags",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, property, 0);
if (ret == -1)
- return -2;
+ return -2;
value = scf_value_create(handle);
if (value == NULL)
- return -2;
+ return -2;
ret = scf_property_get_value(property, value);
if (ret == -1)
- return -2;
+ return -2;
ret = scf_value_get_astring(value, auditstring, len);
if (ret == -1)
- return -2;
+ return -2;
scf_value_destroy(value);
scf_property_destroy(property);
scf_handle_destroy(handle);
return 0;
}
#endif
/*
* Check if the specified event is selected (enabled) for auditing.
* Returns 1 if the event is selected, 0 if not and -1 on failure.
*/
static int
selected(char *username, uid_t uid, au_event_t event, int sf)
{
int rc, sorf;
char naflags[512];
struct au_mask mask;
mask.am_success = mask.am_failure = 0;
if (uid < 0) {
/* get flags for non-attributable (to a real user) events */
rc = getacna(naflags, sizeof(naflags));
if (rc == 0)
(void) getauditflagsbin(naflags, &mask);
} else
rc = au_user_mask(username, &mask);
sorf = (sf == 0) ? AU_PRS_SUCCESS : AU_PRS_FAILURE;
return(au_preselect(event, &mask, sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD));
}
static void
bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string, au_event_t event_no)
{
int ad, rc, sel;
uid_t uid = -1;
gid_t gid = -1;
pid_t pid = getpid();
AuditInfoTermID tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
if (the_authctxt != NULL && the_authctxt->valid) {
uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
}
rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1;
sel = selected(the_authctxt->user, uid, event_no, rc);
debug3("BSM audit: typ %d rc %d \"%s\"", typ, rc, string);
if (!sel)
return; /* audit event does not match mask, do not write */
debug3("BSM audit: writing audit new record");
ad = au_open();
(void) au_write(ad, AUToSubjectFunc(uid, uid, gid, uid, gid,
pid, pid, &tid));
(void) au_write(ad, au_to_text(string));
(void) au_write(ad, AUToReturnFunc(typ, rc));
#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
- /* The last argument is the event modifier flags. For
- some seemingly undocumented reason it was added in
- Solaris 11. */
+ /*
+ * The last argument is the event modifier flags. For some seemingly
+ * undocumented reason it was added in Solaris 11.
+ */
rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no, 0);
#else
rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no);
#endif
if (rc < 0)
error("BSM audit: %s failed to write \"%s\" record: %s",
__func__, string, strerror(errno));
}
static void
bsm_audit_session_setup(void)
{
int rc;
struct AuditInfoStruct info;
au_mask_t mask;
if (the_authctxt == NULL) {
error("BSM audit: session setup internal error (NULL ctxt)");
return;
}
if (the_authctxt->valid)
info.ai_auid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
else
info.ai_auid = -1;
info.ai_asid = getpid();
mask.am_success = 0;
mask.am_failure = 0;
(void) au_user_mask(the_authctxt->user, &mask);
info.ai_mask.am_success = mask.am_success;
info.ai_mask.am_failure = mask.am_failure;
info.ai_termid = ssh_bsm_tid;
rc = SetAuditFunc(&info, sizeof(info));
if (rc < 0)
error("BSM audit: %s: %s failed: %s", __func__,
SetAuditFuncText, strerror(errno));
}
static void
bsm_audit_bad_login(const char *what)
{
char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
if (the_authctxt->valid) {
(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
gettext("invalid %s for user %s"),
what, the_authctxt->user);
bsm_audit_record(4, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
} else {
(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
gettext("invalid user name \"%s\""),
the_authctxt->user);
bsm_audit_record(3, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
}
}
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
AuditInfoTermID *tid = &ssh_bsm_tid;
char buf[1024];
if (cannot_audit(0))
return;
debug3("BSM audit: connection from %.100s port %d", host, port);
/* populate our terminal id structure */
#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
tid->at_port = (dev_t)port;
aug_get_machine((char *)host, &(tid->at_addr[0]), &(tid->at_type));
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x %08x %08x %08x", tid->at_addr[0],
tid->at_addr[1], tid->at_addr[2], tid->at_addr[3]);
debug3("BSM audit: iptype %d machine ID %s", (int)tid->at_type, buf);
#else
/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
tid->port = (dev_t)port;
tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
#endif
}
void
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
-audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
static int logged_in = 0;
const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
if (cannot_audit(0))
return;
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
logged_in = 1;
bsm_audit_session_setup();
snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
gettext("successful login %s"), user);
bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
break;
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
/*
* We can also get a close event if the user attempted auth
* but never succeeded.
*/
if (logged_in) {
snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
gettext("sshd logout %s"), the_authctxt->user);
bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_logout);
} else {
debug("%s: connection closed without authentication",
__func__);
}
break;
case SSH_NOLOGIN:
bsm_audit_record(1,
gettext("logins disabled by /etc/nologin"), AUE_openssh);
break;
case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
gettext("too many tries for user %s"), the_authctxt->user);
bsm_audit_record(1, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
break;
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
bsm_audit_record(2, gettext("not_console"), AUE_openssh);
break;
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
bsm_audit_bad_login("password");
break;
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
break;
default:
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
}
}
#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit-linux.c b/crypto/openssh/audit-linux.c
index 136ed76bbe4b..3fcbe5c53ef9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/audit-linux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit-linux.c
@@ -1,126 +1,124 @@
/*
* Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
#include <libaudit.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "packet.h"
const char *audit_username(void);
int
linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
{
int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
else
return 0; /* Must prevent login */
}
rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
close(audit_fd);
/*
* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
* root user.
*/
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
errno = saved_errno;
return rc >= 0;
}
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL,
li->line, 1) == 0)
fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
-audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
case SSH_NOLOGIN:
case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
break;
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0);
break;
default:
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
break;
}
}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit.c b/crypto/openssh/audit.c
index 33a04376dd6e..dd2f03558fe9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/audit.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit.c
@@ -1,184 +1,184 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
/*
* Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
* audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
* audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using.
*/
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
/* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
ssh_audit_event_t
audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
{
if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
else
return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
}
/* helper to return supplied username */
const char *
audit_username(void)
{
static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
return (unknownuser);
if (!the_authctxt->valid)
return (invaliduser);
return (the_authctxt->user);
}
const char *
audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
{
int i;
static struct event_lookup_struct {
ssh_audit_event_t event;
const char *name;
} event_lookup[] = {
{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, "LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED, "LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS, "AUTH_SUCCESS"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE, "AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD, "AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, "AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, "AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, "AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI, "AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
{SSH_INVALID_USER, "INVALID_USER"},
{SSH_NOLOGIN, "NOLOGIN"},
{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, "CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, "CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN, "AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
};
for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
break;
return(event_lookup[i].name);
}
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
* These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
*/
/*
* Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
* has been attempted.
*/
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port,
(int)geteuid());
}
/*
* Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible
* events and what they mean).
*/
void
-audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
}
/*
* Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
* Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
* within a single connection.
*/
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
audit_username(), t);
}
/*
* Called when a user session is closed. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
* Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
* within a single connection.
*/
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
audit_username(), t);
}
/*
* This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
* multiple sessions within a single connection.
*/
void
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit.h b/crypto/openssh/audit.h
index 0b593666d9e1..38cb5ad31d4a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/audit.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit.h
@@ -1,55 +1,57 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
#include "loginrec.h"
+struct ssh;
+
enum ssh_audit_event_type {
SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, /* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, /* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, /* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
SSH_INVALID_USER,
SSH_NOLOGIN, /* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, /* closed after attempting auth or session */
SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */
SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
};
typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
-void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
void audit_run_command(const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
index 4dc5045c2619..d124e994e776 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
@@ -1,145 +1,143 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.15 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
static void *
bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
return authctxt;
}
int
bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
char *challenge = NULL;
*infotxt = NULL;
*numprompts = 0;
*prompts = NULL;
*echo_on = NULL;
if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
if (challenge == NULL) {
auth_close(authctxt->as);
authctxt->as = NULL;
}
}
if (challenge == NULL) {
debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
challenge = NULL;
debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
}
if (challenge == NULL)
return -1;
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
return 0;
}
int
bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
int authok;
if (!authctxt->valid)
return -1;
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
if (numresponses != 1)
return -1;
authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
}
static void
bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
auth_close(authctxt->as);
authctxt->as = NULL;
}
}
KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
"bsdauth",
bsdauth_init_ctx,
bsdauth_query,
bsdauth_respond,
bsdauth_free_ctx
};
KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = {
"bsdauth",
bsdauth_init_ctx,
mm_bsdauth_query,
mm_bsdauth_respond,
bsdauth_free_ctx
};
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
index 3096f1c8ea4d..c99e4e430e73 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
@@ -1,272 +1,273 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.23 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.24 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
*
* From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef KRB5
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <krb5.h>
extern ServerOptions options;
static int
krb5_init(void *context)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
krb5_error_code problem;
if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
if (problem)
return (problem);
}
return (0);
}
int
auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
#ifndef HEIMDAL
krb5_creds creds;
krb5_principal server;
#endif
krb5_error_code problem;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
int len;
char *client, *platform_client;
const char *errmsg;
/* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */
platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name;
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client,
&authctxt->krb5_user);
if (problem)
goto out;
#ifdef HEIMDAL
# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
- krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache);
+ krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache);
# else
problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
# endif
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
authctxt->krb5_user);
if (problem)
goto out;
restore_uid();
problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
ccache, password, 1, NULL);
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
if (problem)
goto out;
# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
- krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
# else
problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
&authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
# endif
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
ccache = NULL;
if (problem)
goto out;
#else
problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
if (problem)
goto out;
restore_uid();
problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
if (problem)
goto out;
if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
problem = -1;
goto out;
}
- problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
if (problem)
goto out;
- problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- authctxt->krb5_user);
+ problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user);
if (problem)
goto out;
- problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- &creds);
+ problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &creds);
if (problem)
goto out;
#endif
authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
out:
restore_uid();
free(platform_client);
if (problem) {
if (ccache)
krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) {
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
problem);
- debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
+ debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
errmsg);
krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg);
} else
debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d",
problem);
krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
return (-1);
else
return (0);
}
return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0);
}
void
krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
}
if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
}
if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
}
}
#ifndef HEIMDAL
krb5_error_code
ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
char ccname[40];
mode_t old_umask;
ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
return ENOMEM;
old_umask = umask(0177);
tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
oerrno = errno;
umask(old_umask);
if (tmpfd == -1) {
logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
return oerrno;
}
if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
close(tmpfd);
return oerrno;
}
close(tmpfd);
return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
}
#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
#endif /* KRB5 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
index b05d6d6f3c8a..335f03238f28 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
@@ -1,935 +1,909 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.84 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.97 2021/07/24 01:55:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
-/*
- * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
- * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
- * if negated option matches.
- * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
- * point to the first character after the option.
- */
-static int
-opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp)
-{
- size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
- const char *opts = *optsp;
- int negate = 0;
-
- if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
- opts += 3;
- negate = 1;
- }
- if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
- *optsp = opts + opt_len;
- return negate ? 0 : 1;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-static char *
-opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp)
-{
- const char *s = *sp;
- char *ret;
- size_t i;
-
- *errstrp = NULL;
- if (*s != '"') {
- *errstrp = "missing start quote";
- return NULL;
- }
- s++;
- if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) {
- *errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
- return NULL;
- }
- for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) {
- if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"')
- s++;
- ret[i++] = *s++;
- }
- if (*s == '\0') {
- *errstrp = "missing end quote";
- free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret[i] = '\0';
- s++;
- *sp = s;
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term)
-{
- if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 &&
- (*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') {
- *opts += strlen(term) + 1;
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static int
dup_strings(char ***dstp, size_t *ndstp, char **src, size_t nsrc)
{
char **dst;
size_t i, j;
*dstp = NULL;
*ndstp = 0;
if (nsrc == 0)
return 0;
if ((dst = calloc(nsrc, sizeof(*src))) == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < nsrc; i++) {
if ((dst[i] = strdup(src[i])) == NULL) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
free(dst[j]);
free(dst);
return -1;
}
}
/* success */
*dstp = dst;
*ndstp = nsrc;
return 0;
}
#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
static int
cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob,
u_int which, int crit)
{
char *command, *allowed;
char *name = NULL;
struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
int r, ret = -1, found;
if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
goto out;
}
while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(data);
data = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
- error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s",
- ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Unable to parse certificate options");
goto out;
}
debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
name, sshbuf_len(data));
found = 0;
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+ opts->no_require_user_presence = 1;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
opts->permit_pty_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
opts->permit_user_rc = 1;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) {
+ opts->require_verify = 1;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
NULL)) != 0) {
- error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
- "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+ "section", name);
goto out;
}
if (opts->force_command != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"force-command options");
free(command);
goto out;
}
opts->force_command = command;
found = 1;
- }
- if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
NULL)) != 0) {
- error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
- "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+ "section", name);
goto out;
}
if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"source-address options");
free(allowed);
goto out;
}
/* Check syntax */
if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, allowed) == -1) {
error("Certificate source-address "
"contents invalid");
goto out;
}
opts->required_from_host_cert = allowed;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found) {
if (crit) {
error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
goto out;
} else {
logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
}
} else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
"(extra data)", name);
goto out;
}
free(name);
name = NULL;
}
/* successfully parsed all options */
ret = 0;
out:
free(name);
sshbuf_free(data);
sshbuf_free(c);
return ret;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_new(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->force_tun_device = -1;
return ret;
}
void
sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
size_t i;
if (opts == NULL)
return;
free(opts->cert_principals);
free(opts->force_command);
free(opts->required_from_host_cert);
free(opts->required_from_host_keys);
for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++)
free(opts->env[i]);
free(opts->env);
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++)
free(opts->permitopen[i]);
free(opts->permitopen);
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++)
free(opts->permitlisten[i]);
free(opts->permitlisten);
- explicit_bzero(opts, sizeof(*opts));
- free(opts);
+ freezero(opts, sizeof(*opts));
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Defaults for authorized_keys flags */
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 1;
ret->permit_user_rc = 1;
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse and record a permitopen/permitlisten directive.
* Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and sets *errstrp to error reason.
*/
static int
handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port,
char ***permitsp, size_t *npermitsp, const char **errstrp)
{
char *opt, *tmp, *cp, *host, **permits = *permitsp;
size_t npermits = *npermitsp;
const char *errstr = "unknown error";
- if (npermits > INT_MAX) {
+ if (npermits > SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX) {
*errstrp = "too many permission directives";
return -1;
}
if ((opt = opt_dequote(optsp, &errstr)) == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (allow_bare_port && strchr(opt, ':') == NULL) {
/*
* Allow a bare port number in permitlisten to indicate a
* listen_host wildcard.
*/
- if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) < 0) {
+ if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) == -1) {
+ free(opt);
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
free(opt);
opt = tmp;
}
if ((tmp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
free(opt);
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
cp = tmp;
/* validate syntax before recording it. */
host = hpdelim(&cp);
if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
free(tmp);
free(opt);
*errstrp = "invalid permission hostname";
return -1;
}
/*
* don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid
* dependency on channels.[ch] here.
*/
if (cp == NULL ||
(strcmp(cp, "*") != 0 && a2port(cp) <= 0)) {
free(tmp);
free(opt);
*errstrp = "invalid permission port";
return -1;
}
/* XXX - add streamlocal support */
free(tmp);
/* Record it */
if ((permits = recallocarray(permits, npermits, npermits + 1,
sizeof(*permits))) == NULL) {
free(opt);
/* NB. don't update *permitsp if alloc fails */
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
permits[npermits++] = opt;
*permitsp = permits;
*npermitsp = npermits;
return 0;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp)
{
char **oarray, *opt, *cp, *tmp;
int r;
struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
const char *errstr = "unknown error";
uint64_t valid_before;
+ size_t i, l;
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
if (opts == NULL)
return ret;
while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
/* flag options */
if ((r = opt_flag("restrict", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->restricted = 1;
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 0;
ret->permit_user_rc = 0;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->cert_authority = r;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
+ } else if ((r = opt_flag("touch-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+ ret->no_require_user_presence = r != 1; /* NB. flip */
+ } else if ((r = opt_flag("verify-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+ ret->require_verify = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_user_rc = r == 1;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "command")) {
if (ret->force_command != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"command\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->force_command = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->force_command == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "principals")) {
if (ret->cert_principals != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"principals\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->cert_principals = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->cert_principals == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "from")) {
if (ret->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"from\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->required_from_host_keys = opt_dequote(&opts,
&errstr);
if (ret->required_from_host_keys == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "expiry-time")) {
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &valid_before) != 0 ||
valid_before == 0) {
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid expires time";
goto fail;
}
free(opt);
if (ret->valid_before == 0 ||
valid_before < ret->valid_before)
ret->valid_before = valid_before;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "environment")) {
- if (ret->nenv > INT_MAX) {
+ if (ret->nenv > SSH_AUTHOPT_ENV_MAX) {
errstr = "too many environment strings";
goto fail;
}
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
/* env name must be alphanumeric and followed by '=' */
if ((tmp = strchr(opt, '=')) == NULL) {
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid environment string";
goto fail;
}
- if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL)
+ if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
+ free(opt);
goto alloc_fail;
- cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
+ }
+ l = (size_t)(tmp - opt);
+ cp[l] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
if (!valid_env_name(cp)) {
free(cp);
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid environment string";
goto fail;
}
+ /* Check for duplicates; XXX O(n*log(n)) */
+ for (i = 0; i < ret->nenv; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(ret->env[i], cp, l) == 0 &&
+ ret->env[i][l] == '=')
+ break;
+ }
free(cp);
- /* Append it. */
- oarray = ret->env;
- if ((ret->env = recallocarray(ret->env, ret->nenv,
- ret->nenv + 1, sizeof(*ret->env))) == NULL) {
- free(opt);
- ret->env = oarray; /* put it back for cleanup */
- goto alloc_fail;
+ /* First match wins */
+ if (i >= ret->nenv) {
+ /* Append it. */
+ oarray = ret->env;
+ if ((ret->env = recallocarray(ret->env,
+ ret->nenv, ret->nenv + 1,
+ sizeof(*ret->env))) == NULL) {
+ free(opt);
+ /* put it back for cleanup */
+ ret->env = oarray;
+ goto alloc_fail;
+ }
+ ret->env[ret->nenv++] = opt;
+ opt = NULL; /* transferred */
}
- ret->env[ret->nenv++] = opt;
+ free(opt);
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitopen")) {
if (handle_permit(&opts, 0, &ret->permitopen,
&ret->npermitopen, &errstr) != 0)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitlisten")) {
if (handle_permit(&opts, 1, &ret->permitlisten,
&ret->npermitlisten, &errstr) != 0)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "tunnel")) {
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
ret->force_tun_device = a2tun(opt, NULL);
free(opt);
if (ret->force_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
errstr = "invalid tun device";
goto fail;
}
}
/*
* Skip the comma, and move to the next option
* (or break out if there are no more).
*/
if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
break; /* End of options. */
/* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
if (*opts != ',') {
errstr = "unknown key option";
goto fail;
}
opts++;
if (*opts == '\0') {
errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
goto fail;
}
}
/* success */
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
return ret;
alloc_fail:
errstr = "memory allocation failed";
fail:
sshauthopt_free(ret);
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
return NULL;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if (k == NULL || !sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type) || k->cert == NULL ||
k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
return NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Handle options and critical extensions separately */
if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->critical,
OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1) == -1) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->extensions,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0) == -1) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* success */
return ret;
}
/*
* Merges "additional" options to "primary" and returns the result.
* NB. Some options from primary have primacy.
*/
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
const char *errstr = "internal error";
const char *tmp;
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
/* cert_authority and cert_principals are cleared in result */
/* Prefer access lists from primary. */
/* XXX err is both set and mismatch? */
tmp = primary->required_from_host_cert;
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = additional->required_from_host_cert;
if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_cert = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
tmp = primary->required_from_host_keys;
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = additional->required_from_host_keys;
if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_keys = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
/*
* force_tun_device, permitopen/permitlisten and environment all
* prefer the primary.
*/
ret->force_tun_device = primary->force_tun_device;
if (ret->force_tun_device == -1)
ret->force_tun_device = additional->force_tun_device;
if (primary->nenv > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
primary->env, primary->nenv) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->nenv) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
additional->env, additional->nenv) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
if (primary->npermitopen > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
primary->permitopen, primary->npermitopen) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->npermitopen > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
additional->permitopen, additional->npermitopen) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
if (primary->npermitlisten > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
primary->permitlisten, primary->npermitlisten) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->npermitlisten > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
additional->permitlisten, additional->npermitlisten) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
- /* Flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both for permission) */
-#define OPTFLAG(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
- OPTFLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_pty_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_user_rc);
-#undef OPTFLAG
+#define OPTFLAG_AND(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
+#define OPTFLAG_OR(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) || (additional->x == 1)
+ /* Permissive flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both) */
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+ /* Restrictive flags are logical-OR (i.e. must be set in either) */
+ OPTFLAG_OR(require_verify);
+#undef OPTFLAG_AND
/* Earliest expiry time should win */
if (primary->valid_before != 0)
ret->valid_before = primary->valid_before;
if (additional->valid_before != 0 &&
additional->valid_before < ret->valid_before)
ret->valid_before = additional->valid_before;
/*
* When both multiple forced-command are specified, only
* proceed if they are identical, otherwise fail.
*/
if (primary->force_command != NULL &&
additional->force_command != NULL) {
if (strcmp(primary->force_command,
additional->force_command) == 0) {
/* ok */
ret->force_command = strdup(primary->force_command);
if (ret->force_command == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
} else {
errstr = "forced command options do not match";
goto fail;
}
} else if (primary->force_command != NULL) {
if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
primary->force_command)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->force_command != NULL) {
if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
additional->force_command)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
}
/* success */
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
return ret;
alloc_fail:
errstr = "memory allocation failed";
fail:
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Copy options
*/
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
#define OPTSCALAR(x) ret->x = orig->x
OPTSCALAR(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_pty_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_user_rc);
OPTSCALAR(restricted);
OPTSCALAR(cert_authority);
OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device);
OPTSCALAR(valid_before);
+ OPTSCALAR(no_require_user_presence);
+ OPTSCALAR(require_verify);
#undef OPTSCALAR
#define OPTSTRING(x) \
do { \
if (orig->x != NULL && (ret->x = strdup(orig->x)) == NULL) { \
sshauthopt_free(ret); \
return NULL; \
} \
} while (0)
OPTSTRING(cert_principals);
OPTSTRING(force_command);
OPTSTRING(required_from_host_cert);
OPTSTRING(required_from_host_keys);
#undef OPTSTRING
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, orig->env, orig->nenv) != 0 ||
dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
orig->permitopen, orig->npermitopen) != 0 ||
dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
orig->permitlisten, orig->npermitlisten) != 0) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int
serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char **a, size_t n)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
size_t i;
int r;
if (n > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, a[i])) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* success */
return 0;
}
static int
deserialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char ***ap, size_t *np)
{
char **a = NULL;
size_t i, n = 0;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_int tmp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
if (tmp > INT_MAX) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
n = tmp;
if (n > 0 && (a = calloc(n, sizeof(*a))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &a[i], NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
*ap = a;
a = NULL;
*np = n;
n = 0;
out:
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
- free(a[i]);
- free(a);
+ if (a != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ free(a[i]);
+ free(a);
+ }
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
static int
serialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, const char *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, s == NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static int
deserialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, char **sp)
{
int r;
u_char flag;
*sp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, flag ? NULL : sp, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m,
int untrusted)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- /* Flag and simple integer options */
+ /* Flag options */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->require_verify)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Simple integer options */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
return r;
/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->force_tun_device == -1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, (opts->force_tun_device < 0) ?
0 : (u_int)opts->force_tun_device)) != 0)
return r;
/* String options; these may be NULL */
if ((r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? "yes" : opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? "true" : opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
- untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
+ untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
return r;
/* Array options */
if ((r = serialise_array(m, opts->env,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitopen,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitlisten,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
return r;
/* success */
return 0;
}
int
sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
{
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char f;
u_int tmp;
if ((opts = calloc(1, sizeof(*opts))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ /* Flag options */
#define OPT_FLAG(x) \
do { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0) \
goto out; \
opts->x = f; \
} while (0)
OPT_FLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_pty_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc);
OPT_FLAG(restricted);
OPT_FLAG(cert_authority);
+ OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence);
+ OPT_FLAG(require_verify);
#undef OPT_FLAG
+ /* Simple integer options */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &opts->valid_before)) != 0)
goto out;
/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0)
goto out;
opts->force_tun_device = f ? -1 : (int)tmp;
/* String options may be NULL */
if ((r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
&opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
&opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Array options */
if ((r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->env, &opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_array(m,
&opts->permitopen, &opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_array(m,
&opts->permitlisten, &opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
*optsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
out:
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return r;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
index 0462983b5d89..6e29b727c3d2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
@@ -1,95 +1,106 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.27 2018/06/06 18:23:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.31 2021/07/23 03:57:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
struct passwd;
struct sshkey;
+/* Maximum number of permitopen/permitlisten directives to accept */
+#define SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX 4096
+
+/* Maximum number of environment directives to accept */
+#define SSH_AUTHOPT_ENV_MAX 1024
+
/*
* sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or
* from certificate extensions/options.
*/
struct sshauthopt {
/* Feature flags */
int permit_port_forwarding_flag;
int permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
int permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
int permit_pty_flag;
int permit_user_rc;
/* "restrict" keyword was invoked */
int restricted;
/* key/principal expiry date */
uint64_t valid_before;
/* Certificate-related options */
int cert_authority;
char *cert_principals;
int force_tun_device;
char *force_command;
/* Custom environment */
size_t nenv;
char **env;
/* Permitted port forwardings */
size_t npermitopen;
char **permitopen;
/* Permitted listens (remote forwarding) */
size_t npermitlisten;
char **permitlisten;
/*
* Permitted host/addresses (comma-separated)
* Caller must check source address matches both lists (if present).
*/
char *required_from_host_cert;
char *required_from_host_keys;
+
+ /* Key requires user presence asserted */
+ int no_require_user_presence;
+ /* Key requires user verification (e.g. PIN) */
+ int require_verify;
};
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new(void);
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void);
void sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts);
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig);
int sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, int);
int sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **opts);
/*
* Parse authorized_keys options. Returns an options structure on success
* or NULL on failure. Will set errstr on failure.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_parse(const char *s, const char **errstr);
/*
* Parse certification options to a struct sshauthopt.
* Returns options on success or NULL on failure.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k);
/*
* Merge key options.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
index 51b4aafe0aca..7e6f972681e9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
@@ -1,1352 +1,1399 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
* NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
* under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
* DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef USE_PAM
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
extern char *__progname;
# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname
#endif
/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */
#else
# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */
#endif
/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
#else
# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "blacklist_client.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern u_int utmp_len;
/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
#endif
/*
* Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
* and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if
* this breaks.
*/
#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
#include <pthread.h>
/*
* Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
* pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
* (e.g. Linux)
*/
typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
#else
typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
#define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit
#define pthread_create fake_pthread_create
#define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel
#define pthread_join fake_pthread_join
#endif
struct pam_ctxt {
sp_pthread_t pam_thread;
int pam_psock;
int pam_csock;
int pam_done;
};
static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/*
* Simulate threads with processes.
*/
static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
-static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
+static sshsig_t sshpam_oldsig;
static void
sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
<= 0) {
/* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread,
&sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
return;
}
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */
if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
pthread_exit(void *value)
{
_exit(0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
{
pid_t pid;
struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
sshpam_thread_status = -1;
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
- return (-1);
+ return errno;
case 0:
close(ctx->pam_psock);
ctx->pam_psock = -1;
thread_start(arg);
_exit(1);
default:
*thread = pid;
close(ctx->pam_csock);
ctx->pam_csock = -1;
- sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
+ sshpam_oldsig = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
return (0);
}
}
static int
pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
{
- signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
{
int status;
if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
return (sshpam_thread_status);
- signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
return (status);
}
#endif
static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
static int sshpam_err = 0;
static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0;
static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL;
+static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL;
+static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL;
/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
static char **
pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
/*
- * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
+ * XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing
* for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
* env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
*/
return NULL;
}
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+static int
+pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value)
+{
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */
+
/*
* Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
* rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
* is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
* This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
* the right thing.
*/
#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
static int
sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
{
int result;
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return result;
}
# define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
#endif
-void
+static void
sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
{
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11;
debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
if (reqd) {
saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag;
saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
} else {
if (saved_port)
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port;
if (saved_agent)
auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent;
if (saved_x11)
auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11;
}
}
/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
static void
import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
{
char *env;
u_int n, i, num_env;
int r;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (n > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n);
sshpam_account_status = (int)n;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
/* Import environment from subprocess */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (num_env > 1024)
fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
__func__, num_env);
sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
/* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
/* Errors are not fatal here */
if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
}
-#endif
- /* XXX leak env? */
+ /*
+ * XXX this possibly leaks env because it is not documented
+ * what pam_putenv() does with it. Does it copy it? Does it
+ * take ownweship? We don't know, so it's safest just to leak.
+ */
}
#endif
}
/*
* Conversation function for authentication thread.
*/
static int
sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
u_char status;
debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (data == NULL) {
error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
ctxt = data;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
free(reply);
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK)
goto fail;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer,
&reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
sshbuf_reset(buffer);
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
/*
* Authentication thread.
*/
static void *
sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
extern char **environ;
char **env_from_pam;
u_int i;
const char *pam_user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
char *tz = getenv("TZ");
sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
(sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
environ[0] = NULL;
if (tz != NULL)
if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
strerror(errno));
if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
setproctitle("%s [pam]",
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
}
#endif
sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&sshpam_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
if (!do_pam_account()) {
sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
goto auth_fail;
}
if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
sshpam_password_change_required(0);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Export any environment strings set in child */
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Count */
if (i > INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: too many enviornment strings", __func__);
+ fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Count */
if (i > INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: too many PAM enviornment strings", __func__);
+ fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
pthread_exit(NULL);
auth_fail:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
else
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
pthread_exit(NULL);
return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
}
void
sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
close(ctxt->pam_psock);
close(ctxt->pam_csock);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
}
}
static int
sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
static int
sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
void
sshpam_cleanup(void)
{
if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
return;
debug("PAM: cleanup");
pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
if (sshpam_session_open) {
debug("PAM: closing session");
pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
sshpam_session_open = 0;
}
if (sshpam_cred_established) {
debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
sshpam_cred_established = 0;
}
sshpam_authenticated = 0;
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
}
static int
-sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt)
+sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
+ const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
+#if defined(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) && defined(PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
+ /* Protect buggy PAM implementations from excessively long usernames */
+ if (strlen(user) >= PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
+ fatal("Username too long from %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+#endif
+ if (sshpam_handle == NULL) {
+ if (ssh == NULL) {
+ fatal("%s: called initially with no "
+ "packet context", __func__);
+ }
+ } if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
return (0);
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
}
debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
sshpam_err =
pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
- pam_rhost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
- debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost);
- sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost);
- if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
- sshpam_handle = NULL;
- return (-1);
+
+ if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_rhost == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We need to cache these as we don't have packet context
+ * during the kbdint flow.
+ */
+ sshpam_rhost = xstrdup(auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
+ options.use_dns));
+ sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+ ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
}
+ if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
+ debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+ sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
+ sshpam_rhost);
+ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+ sshpam_handle = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ /* Put SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment too */
+ pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, sshpam_conninfo);
+ }
+
#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
/*
* Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
* sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
* may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
*/
debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
#endif
return (0);
}
static void
expose_authinfo(const char *caller)
{
char *auth_info;
/*
* Expose authentication information to PAM.
* The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the
* version suffix if the format of session_info changes.
*/
if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL)
auth_info = xstrdup("");
else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string(
sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller);
do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info);
free(auth_info);
}
static void *
sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
- int socks[2];
+ int result, socks[2];
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
/*
* Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
* has previously failed.
*/
if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
return NULL;
/* Initialize PAM */
- if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) {
+ if (sshpam_init(NULL, authctxt) == -1) {
error("PAM: initialization failed");
return (NULL);
}
expose_authinfo(__func__);
ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
/* Start the authentication thread */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
free(ctxt);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
- if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
+ result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt);
+ if (result != 0) {
error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
- strerror(errno));
+ strerror(result));
close(socks[0]);
close(socks[1]);
free(ctxt);
return (NULL);
}
cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
return (ctxt);
}
static int
sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
size_t plen;
u_char type;
char *msg;
size_t len, mlen;
int r;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
*name = xstrdup("");
*info = xstrdup("");
*prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
**prompts = NULL;
plen = 0;
*echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
*num = 1;
len = plen + mlen + 1;
**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
free(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (0);
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
/* accumulate messages */
len = plen + mlen + 2;
**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
plen++;
free(msg);
break;
case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
case PAM_MAXTRIES:
if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
sshpam_account_status = 0;
if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
*info = **prompts;
**prompts = NULL;
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
free(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_SUCCESS:
if (**prompts != NULL) {
/* drain any accumulated messages */
debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts,
strlen(**prompts))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(**prompts);
**prompts = NULL;
}
if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
"succeeded when it should have "
"failed");
import_environments(buffer);
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = 1;
free(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (0);
}
- BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_BAD_USER,
+ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(NULL, BLACKLIST_BAD_USER,
sshpam_authctxt->user);
error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
- sshpam_authctxt->user,
- auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns));
+ sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
free(msg);
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
}
+ sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
* Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
* vary processing time in proportion to password length.
*/
static char *
fake_password(const char *wire_password)
{
const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
char *ret = NULL;
size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
if (l >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
ret = malloc(l + 1);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
ret[i] = '\0';
return ret;
}
/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
static int
sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
char *fake;
int r;
debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
case 1:
sshpam_authenticated = 1;
return (0);
case 0:
break;
default:
return (-1);
}
if (num != 1) {
error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
return (-1);
}
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
fake = fake_password(*resp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(fake);
}
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) {
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (1);
}
static void
sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
sshpam_thread_cleanup();
free(ctxt);
/*
* We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
* handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's
* still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
* the server process terminates.
*/
}
KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
"pam",
sshpam_init_ctx,
sshpam_query,
sshpam_respond,
sshpam_free_ctx
};
KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
"pam",
mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
mm_sshpam_query,
mm_sshpam_respond,
mm_sshpam_free_ctx
};
/*
* This replaces auth-pam.c
*/
void
-start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
- if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1)
+ if (sshpam_init(ssh, authctxt) == -1)
fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
}
void
finish_pam(void)
{
sshpam_cleanup();
}
u_int
do_pam_account(void)
{
debug("%s: called", __func__);
if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
return (sshpam_account_status);
expose_authinfo(__func__);
sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
sshpam_account_status = 0;
return (sshpam_account_status);
}
if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
sshpam_password_change_required(1);
sshpam_account_status = 1;
return (sshpam_account_status);
}
void
do_pam_setcred(int init)
{
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&store_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
if (init) {
debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
} else {
debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
}
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
sshpam_cred_established = 1;
return;
}
if (sshpam_authenticated)
fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
else
debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
static int
sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct pam_response *reply;
int i;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
reply[i].resp =
read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
input[0] = '\0';
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
/*
* XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
* support that
*/
void
do_pam_chauthtok(void)
{
if (use_privsep)
fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&tty_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
debug("PAM: changing password");
sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
void
do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug3("PAM: opening session");
expose_authinfo(__func__);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&store_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
sshpam_session_open = 1;
else {
sshpam_session_open = 0;
auth_restrict_session(ssh);
error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
}
int
is_pam_session_open(void)
{
return sshpam_session_open;
}
/*
* Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
* modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
* during the ssh authentication process.
*/
int
do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
{
int ret = 1;
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
char *compound;
size_t len;
len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
compound = xmalloc(len);
snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
free(compound);
-#endif
return (ret);
}
char **
fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
{
return sshpam_env;
}
char **
fetch_pam_environment(void)
{
return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
}
void
free_pam_environment(char **env)
{
char **envp;
if (env == NULL)
return;
for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
free(*envp);
free(env);
}
/*
* "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that
* echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
* display.
*/
static int
sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
size_t len;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
if (sshpam_password == NULL)
goto fail;
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
if (len > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
/*
* Attempt password authentication via PAM
*/
int
sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
char *fake = NULL;
if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
"initialise.", __func__);
sshpam_password = password;
sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
/*
* If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
* by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
* information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
*/
if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&passwd_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
sshpam_password = NULL;
free(fake);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
authctxt->user);
return 1;
} else {
debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
return 0;
}
}
int
sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void)
{
return sshpam_maxtries_reached;
}
void
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached)
{
if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached)
return;
sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1;
options.password_authentication = 0;
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
- options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
index 4198607454fb..9fcea270faec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h
@@ -1,47 +1,47 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef USE_PAM
struct ssh;
-void start_pam(Authctxt *);
+void start_pam(struct ssh *);
void finish_pam(void);
u_int do_pam_account(void);
void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
void do_pam_setcred(int );
void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
void free_pam_environment(char **);
void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
void sshpam_cleanup(void);
int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void);
void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int);
int is_pam_session_open(void);
#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
index 24fcb67b2383..347d91e25192 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
@@ -1,223 +1,223 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.47 2018/07/09 21:26:02 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.48 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether
* the password is valid for the user.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024
/*
* Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if
* authentication succeeds.
*/
int
auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
static int expire_checked = 0;
#endif
if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
return 0;
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
ok = 0;
#endif
if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
return 0;
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
return ret && ok;
/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
{
HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return 0;
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
return ok;
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
#endif
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
if (!expire_checked) {
expire_checked = 1;
if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
}
#endif
result = sys_auth_passwd(ssh, password);
if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
auth_restrict_session(ssh);
return (result && ok);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
static void
warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
{
int r;
quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (authctxt->valid) {
pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
TWO_WEEKS);
acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
TWO_WEEKS);
}
#endif
if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg,
"Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg,
"Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
}
int
sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
auth_session_t *as;
static int expire_checked = 0;
as = auth_usercheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
(char *)password);
if (as == NULL)
return (0);
if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
auth_close(as);
auth_restrict_session(ssh);
authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
return (1);
} else {
if (!expire_checked) {
expire_checked = 1;
warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
}
return (auth_close(as));
}
}
#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
int
sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
if (pw_password == NULL)
return 0;
/* Check for users with no password. */
if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
return (1);
/*
* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
* NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
*/
if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
salt = pw_password;
encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
/*
* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
* are identical.
*/
return encrypted_password != NULL &&
strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
index 57296e1f6f06..0bc4d424c781 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -1,324 +1,325 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.49 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.53 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit
* the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes
* /etc/hosts.equiv.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
# include <netgroup.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
-#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern int use_privsep;
/*
* This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
* /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted
* based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
*/
static int
check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
const char *server_user)
{
FILE *f;
#define RBUFLN 1024
char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
int fd;
struct stat st;
/* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
return 0;
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file",
server_user, filename);
close(fd);
return 0;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
/* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */
char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN];
char *host, *user, *cp;
int negated;
for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
continue;
/*
* NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we
* don't ever support the plus syntax).
*/
if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
continue;
/*
* This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
* whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
*/
switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
dummy)) {
case 0:
auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
continue;
case 1:
/* Host name only. */
strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
break;
case 2:
/* Got both host and user name. */
break;
case 3:
auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
continue;
default:
/* Weird... */
continue;
}
host = hostbuf;
user = userbuf;
negated = 0;
/* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
if (host[0] == '-') {
negated = 1;
host++;
} else if (host[0] == '+')
host++;
if (user[0] == '-') {
negated = 1;
user++;
} else if (user[0] == '+')
user++;
/* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
/* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names "
"in %.100s.", filename);
continue;
}
/* Verify that host name matches. */
if (host[0] == '@') {
if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
!innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
continue;
} else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) &&
strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
continue; /* Different hostname. */
/* Verify that user name matches. */
if (user[0] == '@') {
if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
continue;
} else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
continue; /* Different username. */
/* Found the user and host. */
fclose(f);
/* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
if (negated) {
auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
filename);
return 0;
}
/* Accept authentication. */
return 1;
}
/* Authentication using this file denied. */
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
/*
* Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
* true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
* /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
*/
int
auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
const char *ipaddr)
{
char buf[1024];
struct stat st;
static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
u_int rhosts_file_index;
debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
/* Switch to the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/*
* Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and
* no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return
* failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
* servers.
*/
for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
rhosts_file_index++) {
/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
break;
}
/* Switch back to privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
/*
* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there
* are no system-wide files.
*/
if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
- stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
- stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) {
- debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__);
+ stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1 &&
+ stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1) {
+ debug3_f("no hosts access files exist");
return 0;
}
/*
* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and
* shosts.equiv.
*/
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
- debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__);
+ debug3_f("root user, ignoring system hosts files");
else {
if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
"/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr);
return 1;
}
if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
"%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
return 1;
}
}
/*
* Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
* not group or world writable.
*/
- if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
+ if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) == -1) {
logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
return 0;
}
if (options.strict_modes &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
return 0;
}
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
rhosts_file_index++) {
/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(buf, &st) == -1)
continue;
/*
* Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
* root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
* owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally
* allowing access to their account by anyone.
*/
if (options.strict_modes &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, buf);
auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
continue;
}
/*
* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts
* and .shosts files.
*/
- if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
+ if (options.ignore_rhosts == IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES ||
+ (options.ignore_rhosts == IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS &&
+ strcmp(rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index], ".shosts") != 0)) {
auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to "
"ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
continue;
}
/* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user "
"%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name);
return 1;
}
}
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b347527f6390..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.27 2007/01/21 01:41:54 stevesk Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <skey.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-static void *
-skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- return authctxt;
-}
-
-int
-skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
- u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
- char challenge[1024];
- struct skey skey;
-
- if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
- sizeof(challenge)) == -1)
- return -1;
-
- *name = xstrdup("");
- *infotxt = xstrdup("");
- *numprompts = 1;
- *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
- *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
-
- xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-
- if (authctxt->valid &&
- numresponses == 1 &&
- skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
- skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1)
- return 0;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static void
-skey_free_ctx(void *ctx)
-{
- /* we don't have a special context */
-}
-
-KbdintDevice skey_device = {
- "skey",
- skey_init_ctx,
- skey_query,
- skey_respond,
- skey_free_ctx
-};
-
-KbdintDevice mm_skey_device = {
- "skey",
- skey_init_ctx,
- mm_skey_query,
- mm_skey_respond,
- skey_free_ctx
-};
-#endif /* SKEY */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
index 65183d456490..581d8dce2792 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
@@ -1,1234 +1,1065 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.133 2018/09/12 01:19:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.153 2021/07/05 00:50:25 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
-#include <grp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "authfile.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "blacklist_client.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct include_list includes;
extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
/* Debugging messages */
static struct sshbuf *auth_debug;
/*
* Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
* in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
* will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
* there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
* listed there, false will be returned.
* If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
* Otherwise true is returned.
*/
int
-allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
u_int i;
int r;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (!options.use_pam)
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
return 0;
#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (spw != NULL)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif
/* check for locked account */
if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
int locked = 0;
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
free((void *) passwd);
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
pw->pw_name);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
* are chrooting.
*/
if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
_PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
- if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
+ if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
"does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
free(shell);
return 0;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
"is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
free(shell);
return 0;
}
free(shell);
}
if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
}
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.deny_users[i]);
if (r < 0) {
fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
options.deny_users[i]);
} else if (r != 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because listed in DenyUsers",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
}
/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.allow_users[i]);
if (r < 0) {
fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
options.allow_users[i]);
} else if (r == 1)
break;
}
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
options.num_deny_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/*
* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
* isn't listed there
*/
if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
options.num_allow_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because none of user's groups are listed "
"in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
ga_free();
}
#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
- if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
+ if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg))
return 0;
#endif
/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
}
/*
* Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in
* auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present.
*/
static char *
format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key;
const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info;
char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL;
if (key == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp,
methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
} else {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
free(fp);
}
return ret;
}
void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
+auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial,
const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
const char *authmsg;
char *extra = NULL;
if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
return;
/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (authctxt->postponed)
authmsg = "Postponed";
else if (partial)
authmsg = "Partial";
else {
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
if (authenticated)
- BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK, "ssh");
+ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK, "ssh");
}
if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) {
if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL)
extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info);
}
do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
authmsg,
method,
submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
extra != NULL ? extra : "");
free(extra);
-#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
- if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
- (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
- strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
- strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
- record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
- auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
-# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) || defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS)
+ if (authenticated == 0 && !(authctxt->postponed || partial)) {
+ /* Log failed login attempt */
+# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+ if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
+ strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
+ record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+# endif
+# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method));
+# endif
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) && defined(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)
if (authenticated)
sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh",
- &loginmsg);
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
- audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
+ loginmsg);
#endif
}
-
void
-auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
+auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
"%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh));
- packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures");
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
*/
int
auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
{
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
return 1;
break;
case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
return 1;
}
break;
}
logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return 0;
}
/*
* Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
* by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
* %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
*
* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
*/
char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX];
int i;
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
/*
* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
*/
- if (*file == '/')
+ if (path_absolute(file))
return (file);
i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
free(file);
return (xstrdup(ret));
}
char *
authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
return NULL;
return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
{
char *user_hostfile;
struct stat st;
HostStatus host_status;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile, 0);
if (userfile != NULL) {
user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
if (options.strict_modes &&
(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad owner or modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
user_hostfile);
} else {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile, 0);
restore_uid();
}
free(user_hostfile);
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
- found->host);
+ host);
else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
- debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
+ debug_f("key for %s found at %s:%ld",
found->host, found->file, found->line);
else
- debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
+ debug_f("key for host %s not found", host);
free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
return host_status;
}
static FILE *
auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
int log_missing, char *file_type)
{
char line[1024];
struct stat st;
int fd;
FILE *f;
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
- strerror(errno));
+ strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (strict_modes &&
safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
return NULL;
}
return f;
}
FILE *
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
}
FILE *
auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
"authorized principals");
}
struct passwd *
-getpwnamallow(const char *user)
+getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
const char *from_host, *from_ip;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
#endif
struct passwd *pw;
- struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
+ struct connection_info *ci;
+ u_int i;
+ ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
ci->user = user;
- parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
+ log_verbose_reset();
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+ log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
aix_setauthdb(user);
#endif
pw = getpwnam(user);
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
aix_restoreauthdb();
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- /*
- * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems
- * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
- * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
- * user database.
- */
- if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
- logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
- user, pw->pw_name);
- pw = NULL;
- }
#endif
if (pw == NULL) {
- BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, user);
+ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, user);
logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
- record_failed_login(user,
+ record_failed_login(ssh, user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+ audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
return (NULL);
}
- if (!allowed_user(pw))
+ if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
from_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
from_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
debug("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
return (NULL);
}
#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK */
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK
if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
debug("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME)", pw->pw_name);
return (NULL);
}
#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK */
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
pw = NULL;
}
if (as != NULL)
auth_close(as);
#endif
#endif
if (pw != NULL)
return (pwcopy(pw));
return (NULL);
}
/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
int
auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key)
{
char *fp = NULL;
int r;
if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
return 0;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "fingerprint key");
goto out;
}
r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break; /* not revoked */
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
goto out;
default:
- error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
- "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
- options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
+ "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ options.revoked_keys_file);
goto out;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
out:
free(fp);
return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
void
auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
if (auth_debug == NULL)
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_cstring: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_cstring");
}
void
-auth_debug_send(void)
+auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char *msg;
int r;
if (auth_debug == NULL)
return;
while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_get_cstring: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_cstring");
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg);
free(msg);
}
}
void
auth_debug_reset(void)
{
if (auth_debug != NULL)
sshbuf_reset(auth_debug);
else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
}
struct passwd *
fakepw(void)
{
static struct passwd fake;
memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_passwd =
"$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
#endif
fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
fake.pw_class = "";
#endif
fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
return (&fake);
}
/*
* Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
* be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
* called.
* This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+ * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
*/
static char *
remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
/* Get IP address of client. */
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
/* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/*
* if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
* someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
* 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
name, ntop);
freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
lowercase(name);
/*
* Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
* address actually is an address of this host. This is
* necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
* define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
* name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
* fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
* the domain).
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
"[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
(strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
if (ai == NULL) {
/* Address not found for the host name. */
logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
"map back to the address.", ntop, name);
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
- return strdup(name);
+ return xstrdup(name);
}
/*
* Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
* connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
* several times.
*/
const char *
auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
{
static char *dnsname;
if (!use_dns)
return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
else if (dnsname != NULL)
return dnsname;
else {
dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
return dnsname;
}
}
-/*
- * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
- * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
- * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
- * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
- * "tag" is prepended to log messages.
- * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
- * av[0].
- */
-pid_t
-subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
- int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
-{
- FILE *f = NULL;
- struct stat st;
- int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
- pid_t pid;
- char *cp, errmsg[512];
- u_int envsize;
- char **child_env;
-
- if (child != NULL)
- *child = NULL;
-
- debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", __func__,
- tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
-
- /* Check consistency */
- if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
- (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
- error("%s: inconsistent flags", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
- if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
- error("%s: inconsistent flags/output", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
- * and appears safe-ish to execute
- */
- if (*av[0] != '/') {
- error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
- return 0;
- }
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
- error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
- av[0], strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
- if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
- error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
- /* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
- if (pipe(p) != 0) {
- error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
- restore_uid();
-
- switch ((pid = fork())) {
- case -1: /* error */
- error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- close(p[0]);
- close(p[1]);
- return 0;
- case 0: /* child */
- /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
- envsize = 5;
- child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
- if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
-
- for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
- signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
- error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
- fd = -1;
- if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
- fd = p[1];
- else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
- fd = devnull;
- if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
- error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- if (geteuid() == 0 &&
- initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
- error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
- pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
- if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
- if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
- dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
- error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- _exit(127);
- default: /* parent */
- break;
- }
-
- close(p[1]);
- if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
- close(p[0]);
- else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
- error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- close(p[0]);
- /* Don't leave zombie child */
- kill(pid, SIGTERM);
- while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
- ;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Success */
- debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
- if (child != NULL)
- *child = f;
- return pid;
-}
-
/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
void
auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
{
int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0;
int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 &&
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0;
int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 &&
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0;
size_t i;
char msg[1024], buf[64];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
/* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
do_env ? " environment" : "",
opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires",
+ opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "",
do_permitopen ? " permitopen" : "",
do_permitlisten ? " permitlisten" : "",
opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "",
opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals",
opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "",
+ opts->require_verify ? " uv" : "",
opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf,
opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");
debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
if (do_remote)
auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg);
if (options.permit_user_env) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) {
debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]);
if (do_remote) {
auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s",
loc, opts->env[i]);
}
}
}
/* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */
if (opts->valid_before != 0) {
format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf);
}
if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) {
debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"",
loc, opts->cert_principals);
}
if (opts->force_command != NULL)
debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command);
if (do_permitopen) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) {
debug("%s: permitted open: %s",
loc, opts->permitopen[i]);
}
}
if (do_permitlisten) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
debug("%s: permitted listen: %s",
loc, opts->permitlisten[i]);
}
}
}
/* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */
int
auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts;
const char *emsg = NULL;
- debug("%s: setting new authentication options", __func__);
+ debug_f("setting new authentication options");
if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) {
error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */
void
auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshauthopt *restricted;
- debug("%s: restricting session", __func__);
+ debug_f("restricting session");
/* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */
restricted = sshauthopt_new();
restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1;
restricted->restricted = 1;
if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0)
- fatal("%s: failed to restrict session", __func__);
+ fatal_f("failed to restrict session");
sshauthopt_free(restricted);
}
int
auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *loc)
{
const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns);
time_t now = time(NULL);
char buf[64];
/*
* Check keys/principals file expiry time.
* NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere.
*/
if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 &&
opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) {
format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
return -1;
}
/* Consistency checks */
if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* Perform from= checks */
if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
case 1:
/* Host name matches. */
break;
case -1:
default:
debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
"correct key but not from a permitted "
"host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this key for login.",
loc, remote_host);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
}
/* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
case 1:
/* accepted */
break;
case -1:
default:
/* invalid */
- error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid",
- loc);
+ error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
"certificate but not from a permitted source "
"address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this certificate for login.",
loc, remote_ip);
return -1;
}
}
/*
*
* XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
* that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
* tests.
*/
auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
index 977562f0a6f3..43c7d3d4041d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
@@ -1,244 +1,234 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.96 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.101 2020/12/22 00:12:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#ifndef AUTH_H
#define AUTH_H
#include <signal.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
#include <login_cap.h>
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
#include <bsd_auth.h>
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
#include <krb5.h>
#endif
struct passwd;
struct ssh;
struct sshbuf;
struct sshkey;
struct sshauthopt;
typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
struct Authctxt {
sig_atomic_t success;
int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */
int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
int attempt;
int failures;
int server_caused_failure;
int force_pwchange;
char *user; /* username sent by the client */
char *service;
struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
char *style;
/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
u_int num_auth_methods;
/* Authentication method-specific data */
void *methoddata;
void *kbdintctxt;
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
krb5_context krb5_ctx;
krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache;
krb5_principal krb5_user;
char *krb5_ticket_file;
char *krb5_ccname;
#endif
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* Authentication keys already used; these will be refused henceforth */
struct sshkey **prev_keys;
u_int nprev_keys;
/* Last used key and ancillary information from active auth method */
struct sshkey *auth_method_key;
char *auth_method_info;
/* Information exposed to session */
struct sshbuf *session_info; /* Auth info for environment */
};
/*
* Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
* non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
* case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
* the client.
*/
struct Authmethod {
char *name;
int (*userauth)(struct ssh *);
int *enabled;
};
/*
* Keyboard interactive device:
* init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success
* query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
* respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
* otherwise - failure
*/
struct KbdintDevice
{
const char *name;
void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*);
int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on);
int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses);
void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
};
int
auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
int auth_password(struct ssh *, const char *);
-int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *,
- struct sshkey *);
+int hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *,
+ const char *, char *, struct sshkey *);
int user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
struct sshauthopt **);
int auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *, const struct sshkey *);
/*
* Handling auth method-specific information for logging and prevention
* of key reuse during multiple authentication.
*/
void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *);
void auth2_record_key(Authctxt *, int, const struct sshkey *);
void auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
__attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
void auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
#ifdef KRB5
int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
#endif /* KRB5 */
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
#include <shadow.h>
int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *);
int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
#endif
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "audit.h"
void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
-void do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
+void do_authentication2(struct ssh *);
-void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
-void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn));
+void auth_log(struct ssh *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
+void auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *) __attribute__((noreturn));
void userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *);
int auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *);
-void userauth_send_banner(const char *);
-
char *auth2_read_banner(void);
int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
void privsep_challenge_enable(void);
int auth2_challenge(struct ssh *, char *);
void auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *);
int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
-int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
-struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
+int allowed_user(struct ssh *, struct passwd *);
+struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *user);
char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
int auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *);
const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int);
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, const char *,
const char *, const char *);
/* hostkey handling */
struct sshkey *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
-int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **,
- size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+ u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
/* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
void auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *);
int auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *, struct passwd *pw,
struct sshauthopt *, int, const char *);
void auth_log_authopts(const char *, const struct sshauthopt *, int);
/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void auth_debug_send(void);
+void auth_debug_send(struct ssh *);
void auth_debug_reset(void);
struct passwd *fakepw(void);
-#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */
-#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */
-#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */
-pid_t subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
- const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
-
int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
-#include <krb5.h>
krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
#endif
-#endif
+
+#endif /* AUTH_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
index 2d5cff448abc..021df8291736 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
@@ -1,383 +1,382 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.50 2018/07/11 18:55:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.54 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
static int auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *);
static int send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
#endif
#endif
KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
&bsdauth_device,
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
&sshpam_device,
#endif
#endif
NULL
};
typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
struct KbdintAuthctxt
{
char *devices;
void *ctxt;
KbdintDevice *device;
u_int nreq;
u_int devices_done;
};
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
devices[j] = devices[j+1];
i--;
}
}
#endif
static KbdintAuthctxt *
kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
{
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
struct sshbuf *b;
int i, r;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (!options.use_pam)
remove_kbdint_device("pam");
#endif
kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s",
sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", devices[i]->name)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
if ((kbdintctxt->devices = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
} else {
kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
}
debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
return kbdintctxt;
}
static void
kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
}
kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
}
static void
kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
if (kbdintctxt->device)
kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
free(kbdintctxt->devices);
- explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
- free(kbdintctxt);
+ freezero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
}
/* get next device */
static int
kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
size_t len;
char *t;
int i;
if (kbdintctxt->device)
kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
do {
len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
if (len == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
"keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
continue;
if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
len) == 0) {
kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
}
}
t = kbdintctxt->devices;
kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
free(t);
debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
} while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
}
/*
* try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
* wait for the response.
*/
int
auth2_challenge(struct ssh *ssh, char *devs)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
return 0;
if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
return auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
}
/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
void
auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
/* unregister callback */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
}
}
/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
static int
auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
return 0;
}
debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
kbdintctxt->device->name);
if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
return 0;
}
if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 0) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
return 0;
}
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
&input_userauth_info_response);
authctxt->postponed = 1;
return 0;
}
static int
send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
char *name, *instr, **prompts;
u_int r, i, *echo_on;
kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
&name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, instr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language not used */
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kbdintctxt->nreq)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "start packet");
for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, echo_on[i])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble packet");
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
free(prompts[i]);
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
free(name);
free(instr);
return 1;
}
static int
input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
int authenticated = 0, res;
int r;
u_int i, nresp;
const char *devicename = NULL;
char **response = NULL;
if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
+ fatal_f("no authctxt");
kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
+ fatal_f("no kbdintctxt");
if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
+ fatal_f("no device");
authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nresp)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
+ fatal_f("wrong number of replies");
if (nresp > 100)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
+ fatal_f("too many replies");
if (nresp > 0) {
response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
- for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &response[i],
- NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &response[i], NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse response");
+ }
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
free(response[i]);
}
free(response);
switch (res) {
case 0:
/* Success! */
authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
break;
case 1:
/* Authentication needs further interaction */
if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 1)
authctxt->postponed = 1;
break;
default:
/* Failure! */
break;
}
devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
if (!authctxt->postponed) {
if (authenticated) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
} else {
/* start next device */
/* may set authctxt->postponed */
auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
}
}
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
devicename);
return 0;
}
void
privsep_challenge_enable(void)
{
#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM)
int n = 0;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
#endif
#endif
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
index 9351e042819f..60e36961ce0a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,335 +1,336 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "packet.h"
+#include "kex.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/*
* We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
* how to check local user kuserok and the like)
*/
static int
userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
int r, present;
u_int mechs;
OM_uint32 ms;
size_t len;
u_char *doid = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mechs)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
if (mechs == 0) {
debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
return (0);
}
do {
mechs--;
free(doid);
present = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &doid, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse oid");
if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
doid[1] == len - 2) {
goid.elements = doid + 2;
goid.length = len - 2;
ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
} else {
logit("Badly formed OID received");
}
} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
if (!present) {
free(doid);
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
- debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+ debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
free(doid);
return (0);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
if (ctxt != NULL)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
free(doid);
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
/* Return the OID that we received */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, doid, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
free(doid);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
authctxt->postponed = 1;
return (0);
}
static int
input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
u_char *p;
size_t len;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
&send_tok, &flags));
free(p);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send ERRTOK packet");
}
authctxt->postponed = 0;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
} else {
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send TOKEN packet");
}
if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
&input_gssapi_mic);
else
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
&input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
return 0;
}
static int
input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 maj_status;
int r;
u_char *p;
size_t len;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
&send_tok, NULL));
free(recv_tok.value);
/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
return 0;
}
/*
* This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
* It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
* which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
*/
static int
input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
int r, authenticated;
const char *displayname;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
/*
* We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
* the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
(displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
return 0;
}
static int
input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
int r, authenticated = 0;
struct sshbuf *b;
gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
const char *displayname;
u_char *p;
size_t len;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mic.value = p;
mic.length = len;
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
- "gssapi-with-mic");
+ "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
else
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
free(mic.value);
if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
(displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
return 0;
}
Authmethod method_gssapi = {
"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
&options.gss_authentication
};
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
index 764ceff74ee6..3a29126c37a6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -1,261 +1,260 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.38 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.47 2021/07/23 03:37:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
+#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
static int
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
size_t alen, blen, slen;
int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
- debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__,
+ debug_f("cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu",
cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
debug("signature:");
sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr);
#endif
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
- logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
- __func__, pkalg);
+ logit_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
+ pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
- error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "key_from_blob");
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
- error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
+ error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
- error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
- "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
+ error_f("type mismatch for decoded key "
+ "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
"signature format");
goto done;
}
- if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
- logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
- __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) {
+ logit_f("key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms",
+ sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
- logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
+ logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s",
(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
- "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
+ "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
goto done;
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
- debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+ debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
goto done;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/* reconstruct packet */
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct packet");
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+ if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ chost, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
sshbuf_free(b);
done:
- debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ debug2_f("authenticated %d", authenticated);
sshkey_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
int
-hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
- struct sshkey *key)
+hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
+ const char *cuser, char *chost, struct sshkey *key)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
HostStatus host_status;
int len;
char *fp;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__,
+ debug2_f("chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
chost[len - 1] = '\0';
}
if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
- "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)",
- __func__, cuser, chost);
+ debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused user \"%.100s\" "
+ "host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", cuser, chost);
return 0;
}
lookup = chost;
} else {
if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
"client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
+ debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused "
"user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
- __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
+ cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
return 0;
}
lookup = resolvedname;
}
- debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__);
+ debug2_f("access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
- sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
+ sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 1, 0, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
"%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
cuser, lookup);
} else {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
}
free(fp);
}
return (host_status == HOST_OK);
}
Authmethod method_hostbased = {
"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
&options.hostbased_authentication
};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
index a813b8f56710..037139d44949 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
@@ -1,69 +1,71 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.13 2021/07/02 05:11:20 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
static int
userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r, authenticated = 0;
char *lang, *devs;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &devs, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
authenticated = auth2_challenge(ssh, devs);
free(devs);
free(lang);
return authenticated;
}
Authmethod method_kbdint = {
"keyboard-interactive",
userauth_kbdint,
&options.kbd_interactive_authentication
};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
index dacb5fb839e2..02d6e341ca4c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
@@ -1,78 +1,78 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.22 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.23 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
/* "none" is allowed only one time */
static int none_enabled = 1;
static int
userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
none_enabled = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, "")));
return (0);
}
Authmethod method_none = {
"none",
userauth_none,
&none_enabled
};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
index 0395a69f4094..be4b8606a6c7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
@@ -1,76 +1,77 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.16 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.19 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
static int
userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *password;
int authenticated = 0, r;
u_char change;
size_t len;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &change)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &password, &len)) != 0 ||
(change && (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
if (change)
logit("password change not supported");
else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, password)) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
- explicit_bzero(password, len);
- free(password);
+ freezero(password, len);
return authenticated;
}
Authmethod method_passwd = {
"password",
userauth_passwd,
&options.password_authentication
};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
index 2fb5950ea608..9e32259a5ca3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,1045 +1,1067 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.86 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.109 2021/07/23 03:37:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
+#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
+#include "sk-api.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
static char *
format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
{
char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
return ret;
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
size_t blen, slen;
int r, pktype;
- int authenticated = 0;
+ int req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, authenticated = 0;
struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) {
+ char *keystring;
+ struct sshbuf *pkbuf;
+
+ if ((pkbuf = sshbuf_from(pkblob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_from failed");
+ if ((keystring = sshbuf_dtob64_string(pkbuf, 0)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64 failed");
+ debug2_f("%s user %s %s public key %s %s",
+ authctxt->valid ? "valid" : "invalid", authctxt->user,
+ have_sig ? "attempting" : "querying", pkalg, keystring);
+ sshbuf_free(pkbuf);
+ free(keystring);
+ }
+
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
- verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
- __func__, pkalg);
+ verbose_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
- error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse key");
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
- error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
+ error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
- error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
- "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
+ error_f("type mismatch for decoded key "
+ "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
- if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
- logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
- __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) {
+ logit_f("key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
- logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
+ logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s",
(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
- "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
+ "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
goto done;
}
key_s = format_key(key);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
if (have_sig) {
- debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s",
- __func__, pkalg, key_s,
- ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
- ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
+ debug3_f("have %s signature for %s%s%s", pkalg, key_s,
+ ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse signature packet");
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
- session_id2_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "put old session id");
} else {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
- session_id2_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b,
+ ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "put session id");
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
- debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
- __func__);
+ debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
goto done;
}
/* reconstruct packet */
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct packet");
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- ssh->compat)) == 0) {
+ ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
authenticated = 1;
}
+ if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) {
+ auth2_record_info(authctxt, "signature count = %u",
+ sig_details->sk_counter);
+ debug_f("sk_counter = %u, sk_flags = 0x%02x",
+ sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
+ req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+ !authopts->no_require_user_presence;
+ if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags &
+ SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
+ "%.128s port %d rejected: user presence "
+ "(authenticator touch) requirement "
+ "not met ", key_s,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ authenticated = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) ||
+ authopts->require_verify;
+ if (req_verify && (sig_details->sk_flags &
+ SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
+ "%.128s port %d rejected: user "
+ "verification requirement not met ", key_s,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ authenticated = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
} else {
- debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s",
- __func__, pkalg, key_s,
- ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
- ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
+ debug_f("test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", pkalg, key_s,
+ ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
- debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
- __func__);
+ debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
goto done;
}
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
done:
if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
- debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__);
+ debug_f("key options inconsistent with existing");
authenticated = 0;
}
- debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
+ debug2_f("authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshauthopt_free(authopts);
sshkey_free(key);
free(userstyle);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(key_s);
free(ca_s);
free(sig);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
return authenticated;
}
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
char *result;
u_int i;
/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
result);
free(result);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
* authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
* log preamble for file/line information.
*/
static int
check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
char *ep, *line_opts;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
*ep-- = '\0';
/*
* If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
* key options.
*/
line_opts = NULL;
if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
(ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
;
line_opts = cp;
cp = ep;
}
if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
return -1;
}
/* Check principals in cert against those on line */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
continue;
debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
loc, cert->principals[i]);
found = 1;
}
if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return found ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file,
const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
u_int found_principal = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire input */
if (found_principal)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
*ep = '\0';
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
continue;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_principals_line(ssh, cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_principal = 1;
}
free(line);
return found_principal;
}
/* XXX remove pw args here and elsewhere once ssh->authctxt is guaranteed */
static int
match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file,
struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
int success;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
success = process_principals(ssh, f, file, cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
restore_uid();
return success;
}
/*
* Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
* returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
- char serial_s[16], uidstr[32];
+ char serial_s[32], uidstr[32];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
"skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
- if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+ if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command,
+ &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
- "invalid quotes", command);
+ "invalid quotes", options.authorized_principals_command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
- command);
+ options.authorized_principals_command);
goto out;
}
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
goto out;
}
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
goto out;
}
snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)cert->serial);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
"f", key_fp,
"F", ca_fp,
"k", keytext,
"K", catext,
"i", cert->key_id,
"s", serial_s,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
- fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
- if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
ac, av, &f,
- SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_principal = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(ca_fp);
free(key_fp);
free(catext);
free(keytext);
return found_principal;
}
-static void
-skip_space(char **cpp)
-{
- char *cp;
-
- for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- *cpp = cp;
-}
-
-/*
- * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
- * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
- * unterminated quotes).
- */
-static int
-advance_past_options(char **cpp)
-{
- char *cp = *cpp;
- int quoted = 0;
-
- for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
- if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
- cp++; /* Skip both */
- else if (*cp == '"')
- quoted = !quoted;
- }
- *cpp = cp;
- /* return failure for unterminated quotes */
- return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
-}
-
/*
* Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
* matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
* on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
*/
static int
check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
struct sshkey *found = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *reason = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
- debug3("%s: keytype %d failed", __func__, want_keytype);
+ debug3_f("keytype %d failed", want_keytype);
goto out;
}
/* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* no key? check for options */
debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
key_options = cp;
- if (advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
+ if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
reason = "invalid key option string";
goto fail_reason;
}
skip_space(&cp);
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* still no key? advance to next line*/
debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
goto out;
}
}
/* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
goto out;
}
/* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
/* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
!keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
} else {
/* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
}
/* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, keyopts,
sshkey_is_cert(key), loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by key options";
goto fail_reason;
}
/* That's all we need for plain keys. */
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
finalopts = keyopts;
keyopts = NULL;
goto success;
}
/*
* Additional authorisation for certificates.
*/
/* Parse and check options present in certificate */
if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, certopts, 0, loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
goto fail_reason;
/*
* If the user has specified a list of principals as
* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
* their username in the certificate principals list.
*/
if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
!match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
goto fail_reason;
}
- if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
- keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
+ if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 0, 0,
+ keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
+ &reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
"signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
success:
if (finalopts == NULL)
- fatal("%s: internal error: missing options", __func__);
+ fatal_f("internal error: missing options");
if (authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = finalopts;
finalopts = NULL;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
goto out;
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
out:
free(fp);
sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
sshauthopt_free(certopts);
sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
sshkey_free(found);
return ret;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
size_t linesize = 0;
int found_key = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire file */
if (found_key)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
cp = line;
skip_space(&cp);
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
continue;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_key = 1;
}
free(line);
return found_key;
}
/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
static int
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
const char *reason;
struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL;
int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
return 0;
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
return 0;
if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__,
+ debug2_fr(r, "CA %s %s is not listed in %s",
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
- options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r));
+ options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
goto out;
}
/*
* If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
* principals against the names in that file rather than matching
* against the username.
*/
if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
if (match_principals_file(ssh, pw, principals_file,
key->cert, &principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
}
/* Try querying command if specified */
if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(ssh, pw, key,
&principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
- options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
+ options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL)
- fatal("%s: internal error: missing principals_opts", __func__);
- if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
+ fatal_f("internal error: missing principals_opts");
+ if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 1, 0,
use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
/* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */
if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, cert_opts, 0, "cert") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (principals_opts == NULL) {
final_opts = cert_opts;
cert_opts = NULL;
} else {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, principals_opts, 0,
"principals") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate principals options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts,
cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
"%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
if (authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = final_opts;
final_opts = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
out:
sshauthopt_free(principals_opts);
sshauthopt_free(cert_opts);
sshauthopt_free(final_opts);
free(principals_file);
free(ca_fp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in file.
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *file, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
int found_key = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
debug("trying public key file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
found_key = check_authkeys_file(ssh, pw, f, file,
key, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
}
restore_uid();
return found_key;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_key = 0;
int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
- if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+ if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
- command);
+ options.authorized_keys_command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
- command);
+ options.authorized_keys_command);
goto out;
}
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"f", key_fp,
"k", keytext,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
- fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
/*
* If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
* then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
* target username as a single argument.
*/
if (ac == 1) {
av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
av[2] = NULL;
/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
free(command);
xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
}
- if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
ac, av, &f,
- SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = check_authkeys_file(ssh, user_pw, f,
options.authorized_keys_command, key, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_key = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(key_fp);
free(keytext);
return found_key;
}
/*
* Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
*/
int
user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
- u_int success, i;
+ u_int success = 0, i;
char *file;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
return 0;
+ for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ file = expand_authorized_keys(
+ options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
+ success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts);
+ free(file);
+ if (!success) {
+ sshauthopt_free(opts);
+ opts = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (success)
+ goto out;
+
if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
- for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
- if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
- continue;
- file = expand_authorized_keys(
- options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
- success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts);
- free(file);
- }
-
out:
if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return success;
}
Authmethod method_pubkey = {
"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
&options.pubkey_authentication
};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
index d6eb067245b7..ff1228513d1e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@@ -1,798 +1,819 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.149 2018/07/11 18:53:29 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.161 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "stdlib.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "blacklist_client.h"
-
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* methods */
extern Authmethod method_none;
extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
extern Authmethod method_passwd;
extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
#ifdef GSSAPI
extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
#endif
Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
&method_none,
&method_pubkey,
#ifdef GSSAPI
&method_gssapi,
#endif
&method_passwd,
&method_kbdint,
&method_hostbased,
NULL
};
/* protocol */
static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* helper */
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
#define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */
#define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */
#define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */
#define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
char *
auth2_read_banner(void)
{
struct stat st;
char *banner = NULL;
size_t len, n;
int fd;
if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return (NULL);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return (NULL);
}
if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
close(fd);
return (NULL);
}
len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */
banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
close(fd);
if (n != len) {
free(banner);
return (NULL);
}
banner[n] = '\0';
return (banner);
}
-void
-userauth_send_banner(const char *msg)
+static void
+userauth_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *msg)
{
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
- packet_put_cstring(msg);
- packet_put_cstring(""); /* language, unused */
- packet_send();
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, msg)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language, unused */
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
debug("%s: sent", __func__);
}
static void
-userauth_banner(void)
+userauth_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *banner = NULL;
if (options.banner == NULL)
return;
if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
goto done;
- userauth_send_banner(banner);
+ userauth_send_banner(ssh, banner);
done:
free(banner);
}
/*
* loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
*/
void
-do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+do_authentication2(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- ssh->authctxt = authctxt; /* XXX move to caller */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- u_int len;
- int acceptit = 0;
- char *service = packet_get_cstring(&len);
- packet_check_eom();
+ char *service = NULL;
+ int r, acceptit = 0;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
if (!authctxt->success) {
acceptit = 1;
/* now we can handle user-auth requests */
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
+ &input_userauth_request);
}
}
/* XXX all other service requests are denied */
if (acceptit) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
- packet_put_cstring(service);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
} else {
debug("bad service request %s", service);
- packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service);
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "bad service request %s", service);
}
+ r = 0;
+ out:
free(service);
- return 0;
+ return r;
}
#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
static double
user_specific_delay(const char *user)
{
char b[512];
size_t len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
u_char *hash = xmalloc(len);
double delay;
(void)snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%llu%s",
- (unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user);
+ (unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user);
if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, b, strlen(b), hash, len) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_memory", __func__);
+ fatal_f("ssh_digest_memory");
/* 0-4.2 ms of delay */
delay = (double)PEEK_U32(hash) / 1000 / 1000 / 1000 / 1000;
freezero(hash, len);
- debug3("%s: user specific delay %0.3lfms", __func__, delay/1000);
+ debug3_f("user specific delay %0.3lfms", delay/1000);
return MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS + delay;
}
static void
ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds)
{
struct timespec ts;
double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
seconds *= 2;
ts.tv_sec = remain;
ts.tv_nsec = (remain - ts.tv_sec) * 1000000000;
- debug3("%s: elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)",
- __func__, elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000);
+ debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)",
+ elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000);
nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Authmethod *m = NULL;
- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
- int authenticated = 0;
+ char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+ int r, authenticated = 0;
double tstart = monotime_double();
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
- user = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
- service = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
- method = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &user, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = 0;
if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
/* setup auth context */
- authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
+ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
- debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s",
- __func__, user);
+ debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
} else {
/* Invalid user, fake password information */
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
- PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt));
+ PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
#endif
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
if (use_privsep)
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
- userauth_banner();
+ userauth_banner(ssh);
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ "no authentication methods enabled");
} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
- packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
- "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service "
+ "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
}
/* reset state */
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
#endif
auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
/* try to authenticate user */
m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
authenticated = m->userauth(ssh);
}
if (!authctxt->authenticated)
ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
-
+ r = 0;
+ out:
free(service);
free(user);
free(method);
- return 0;
+ return r;
}
void
userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *methods;
- int partial = 0;
+ int r, partial = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
authctxt->user);
if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) {
authenticated = 0;
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
#endif
}
if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) {
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
}
/* Log before sending the reply */
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
+ auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
/* Update information exposed to session */
if (authenticated || partial)
auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod);
if (authctxt->postponed)
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
- int r;
-
- if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
- /* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */
- if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- userauth_send_banner(sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
- packet_write_wait();
+ int r, success = PRIVSEP(do_pam_account());
+
+ /* If PAM returned a message, send it to the user. */
+ if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ userauth_send_banner(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+ "%s: send PAM banner", __func__);
}
+ }
+ if (!success) {
fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
"configuration", authctxt->user);
}
}
#endif
if (authenticated == 1) {
/* turn off userauth */
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
+ &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send success packet");
/* now we can break out */
authctxt->success = 1;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
} else {
/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
(authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) {
authctxt->failures++;
- BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
+ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
}
if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
#endif
- auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt);
+ auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
}
methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
- debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
+ debug3_f("failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"",
partial, methods);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
- packet_put_cstring(methods);
- packet_put_char(partial);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, methods)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, partial)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send failure packet");
free(methods);
}
}
/*
* Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
* methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
u_int i;
/*
* NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
* auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method,
submethod) != MATCH_NONE)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static char *
authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
char *list;
int i, r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
continue;
if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
continue;
if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
NULL))
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "",
authmethods[i]->name)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
return list;
}
static Authmethod *
authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
{
int i;
if (name != NULL)
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
authmethods[i]->name, NULL))
return authmethods[i];
debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
name ? name : "NULL");
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
* non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
* Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
*/
int
auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
{
char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
u_int i, found;
int ret = -1;
if (*_methods == '\0') {
error("empty authentication method list");
return -1;
}
omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
continue;
if (need_enable) {
if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
"AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
method, _methods);
goto out;
}
}
found = 1;
break;
}
if (!found) {
error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
method);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(omethods);
return ret;
}
/*
* Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
* any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
* leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
* has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
* enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
*/
int
auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int i;
+ /* First, normalise away the "any" pseudo-method */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods == 1 &&
+ strcmp(options.auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
+ free(options.auth_methods[0]);
+ options.auth_methods[0] = NULL;
+ options.num_auth_methods = 0;
+ }
+
if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
return 0;
- debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
+ debug3_f("checking methods");
authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
"disabled method, skipping",
options.auth_methods[i]);
continue;
}
debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
}
if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
"disabled methods");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
size_t l = strlen(method);
int match;
const char *p;
if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
return MATCH_NONE;
p = methods + l;
match = MATCH_METHOD;
if (*p == ':') {
if (!submethod)
return MATCH_PARTIAL;
l = strlen(submethod);
p += 1;
if (strncmp(submethod, p, l))
return MATCH_NONE;
p += l;
match = MATCH_BOTH;
}
if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0')
return MATCH_NONE;
return match;
}
/*
* Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
* Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
* if it did.
*/
static int
remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
char *omethods = *methods, *p;
size_t l = strlen(method);
int match;
match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod);
if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH)
return 0;
p = omethods + l;
if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH)
p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */
if (*p == ',')
p++;
*methods = xstrdup(p);
free(omethods);
return 1;
}
/*
* Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
* from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
* in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
* Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
- debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
+ debug3_f("updating methods list after \"%s\"", method);
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method,
submethod))
continue;
found = 1;
if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
return 1;
}
debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
}
/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
if (!found)
- fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
+ fatal_f("method not in AuthenticationMethods");
return 0;
}
/* Reset method-specific information */
void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL;
authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
}
/* Record auth method-specific information for logs */
void
auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
- int i;
+ int i;
free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
va_start(ap, fmt);
i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
- if (i < 0 || authctxt->auth_method_info == NULL)
- fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+ if (i == -1)
+ fatal_f("vasprintf failed");
}
/*
* Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging
* and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for
* multiple authentication.
*/
void
auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated,
const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshkey **tmp, *dup;
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
authctxt->auth_method_key = dup;
if (!authenticated)
return;
/* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX ||
(tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys,
authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("reallocarray failed");
authctxt->prev_keys = tmp;
authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup;
authctxt->nprev_keys++;
}
/* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */
int
auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key)
{
u_int i;
char *fp;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
- debug3("%s: key already used: %s %s", __func__,
+ debug3_f("key already used: %s %s",
sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]),
fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp);
free(fp);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be
* whenever an authentication method succeeds.
*/
void
auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
int r;
if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) {
if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
}
/* Append method[/submethod] */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s",
method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/",
submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: append method: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "append method");
/* Append key if present */
if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key,
authctxt->session_info)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: append key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "append key");
}
if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) {
/* Ensure no ambiguity here */
if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL)
- fatal("%s: auth_method_info contains \\n", __func__);
+ fatal_f("auth_method_info contains \\n");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s",
authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: append method info: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "append method info");
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0)
- fatal("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "append");
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
index ecdd869abf01..9f092f7cf955 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
@@ -1,580 +1,652 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.111 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.127 2021/01/26 00:46:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation,
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */
-#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */
+#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */
/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
#define agent_failed(x) \
((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \
(x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
(x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */
static int
decode_reply(u_char type)
{
if (agent_failed(type))
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
return 0;
else
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
-/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
+/*
+ * Opens an authentication socket at the provided path and stores the file
+ * descriptor in fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
+ */
int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
+ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp)
{
- const char *authsocket;
int sock, oerrno;
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
- if (fdp != NULL)
- *fdp = -1;
-
- authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
- if (!authsocket)
- return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
-
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
- if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+ if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/* close on exec */
if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 ||
- connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
close(sock);
errno = oerrno;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (fdp != NULL)
*fdp = sock;
else
close(sock);
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Opens the default authentication socket and stores the file descriptor in
+ * fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
+{
+ const char *authsocket;
+
+ if (fdp != NULL)
+ *fdp = -1;
+
+ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ if (authsocket == NULL || *authsocket == '\0')
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
+
+ return ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(authsocket, fdp);
+}
+
/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */
static int
ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
size_t l, len;
char buf[1024];
/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
len = sshbuf_len(request);
POKE_U32(buf, len);
/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 ||
atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(request),
sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request))
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/*
* Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
* response packet.
*/
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4)
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
sshbuf_reset(reply);
while (len > 0) {
l = len;
if (l > sizeof(buf))
l = sizeof(buf);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l)
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0)
return r;
len -= l;
}
return 0;
}
+/* Communicate with agent: sent request, read and decode status reply */
+static int
+ssh_request_reply_decode(int sock, struct sshbuf *request)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *reply;
+ int r;
+ u_char type;
+
+ if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, request, reply)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(reply, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = decode_reply(type)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(reply);
+ return r;
+}
+
/*
* Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
* obtained). The argument must have been returned by
* ssh_get_authentication_socket().
*/
void
ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
{
if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
close(sock);
}
/* Lock/unlock agent */
int
ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password)
{
int r;
u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK;
struct sshbuf *msg;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
- r = decode_reply(type);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
static int
deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int r;
char *comment = NULL;
const u_char *blob;
size_t blen;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (commentp != NULL) {
*commentp = comment;
comment = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(comment);
return r;
}
/*
* Fetch list of identities held by the agent.
*/
int
ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp)
{
u_char type;
u_int32_t num, i;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL;
int r;
/*
* Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
* identities it can represent.
*/
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0)
goto out;
if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (num == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES;
goto out;
}
/* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */
if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL ||
(idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL ||
(idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < num;) {
if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]),
&(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
/* Gracefully skip unknown key types */
num--;
continue;
} else
goto out;
}
i++;
}
idl->nkeys = num;
*idlp = idl;
idl = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
if (idl != NULL)
ssh_free_identitylist(idl);
return r;
}
void
ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
{
size_t i;
if (idl == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) {
if (idl->keys != NULL)
sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]);
if (idl->comments != NULL)
free(idl->comments[i]);
}
+ free(idl->keys);
+ free(idl->comments);
free(idl);
}
+/*
+ * Check if the ssh agent has a given key.
+ * Returns 0 if found, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ int r, ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ size_t i;
+ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(sock, &idlist)) != 0) {
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], key)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent,
* and waits for a response from the agent.
* Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero
* otherwise.
*/
/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
static u_int
agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
{
- if (alg != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA) {
- if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0)
+ if (alg != NULL && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+ if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
- else if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0)
+ if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
}
return 0;
}
/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
int
ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0;
size_t len = 0;
u_int flags = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */
if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
*sigp = sig;
*lenp = len;
sig = NULL;
len = 0;
r = 0;
out:
freezero(sig, len);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
static int
-encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign)
+encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+ const char *provider)
{
int r;
if (life != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (confirm != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (maxsign != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, maxsign)) != 0)
goto out;
}
+ if (provider != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m,
+ SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+ "sk-provider@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, provider)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/*
* Adds an identity to the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
-ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
- const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign)
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+ const char *provider)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
- int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign);
+ int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign || provider);
u_char type;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
#endif
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
type = constrained ?
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(key, msg, maxsign,
- NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, comment)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (constrained &&
- (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign)) != 0)
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign,
+ provider)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
- goto out;
- r = decode_reply(type);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Removes an identity from the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
-ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
+ssh_remove_identity(int sock, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
- u_char type, *blob = NULL;
+ u_char *blob = NULL;
size_t blen;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
- goto out;
- r = decode_reply(type);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
out:
- if (blob != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
- free(blob);
- }
+ if (blob != NULL)
+ freezero(blob, blen);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin,
u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
u_char type;
if (add) {
type = constrained ?
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
} else
type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
goto out;
if (constrained &&
- (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0)) != 0)
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
- r = decode_reply(type);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Removes all identities from the agent.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*
* This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all
* keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2
* keys.
*/
int
ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char type = (version == 1) ?
SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
- r = decode_reply(type);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.h b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
index a032fd5428fb..4fbf82f8c008 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
@@ -1,90 +1,94 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.44 2018/07/12 04:35:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.49 2020/06/26 05:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef AUTHFD_H
#define AUTHFD_H
/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
struct ssh_identitylist {
size_t nkeys;
struct sshkey **keys;
char **comments;
};
int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
+int ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp);
void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
-int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
- const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign);
-int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+ const char *provider);
+int ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, const struct sshkey *key);
int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm);
int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat);
/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
/* smartcard */
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
/* lock/unlock the agent */
#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
/* add key with constraints */
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN 3
+#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION 255
/* extended failure messages */
#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30
/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102
#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04
#endif /* AUTHFD_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
index b1c92f4ad621..946f50ca8114 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
@@ -1,538 +1,521 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.131 2018/09/21 12:20:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.141 2020/06/18 23:33:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "cipher.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "krl.h"
#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
/* Save a key blob to a file */
static int
sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
{
- int fd, oerrno;
+ int r;
+ mode_t omask;
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0)
- return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(keybuf),
- sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) {
- oerrno = errno;
- close(fd);
- unlink(filename);
- errno = oerrno;
- return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- }
- close(fd);
- return 0;
+ omask = umask(077);
+ r = sshbuf_write_file(filename, keybuf);
+ umask(omask);
+ return r;
}
int
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
- int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
- force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
+ format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return r;
}
-/* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
-int
-sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
-{
- u_char buf[1024];
- size_t len;
- struct stat st;
- int r;
-
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
- return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
- st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- for (;;) {
- if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
- break;
- r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto out;
- }
- }
- if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
- st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
- goto out;
- }
- r = 0;
-
- out:
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (r != 0)
- sshbuf_reset(blob);
- return r;
-}
-
-
/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
int
sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
{
struct stat st;
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/*
* if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
* permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
* then we don't care.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(filename))
#endif
if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
(u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
error("This private key will be ignored.");
return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
}
return 0;
}
-/* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */
int
sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int fd, r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 0;
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- }
- if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 0;
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+
+ r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename);
+ if (r != 0)
goto out;
- }
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 1;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp)
r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename);
out:
close(fd);
return r;
}
+int
+sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ return sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, passphrase,
+ keyp, commentp);
+}
+
int
sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
- if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return r;
}
-/* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */
-int
-sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+/* Load a pubkey from the unencrypted envelope of a new-format private key */
+static int
+sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(const char *filename, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
int r, fd;
- if (keyp != NULL)
- *keyp = NULL;
- if (commentp != NULL)
- *commentp = NULL;
+ if (pubkeyp != NULL)
+ *pubkeyp = NULL;
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(buffer,
+ KEY_UNSPEC, &pubkey)) != 0)
goto out;
- }
-
- if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(pubkey, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
+ /* success */
+ if (pubkeyp != NULL) {
+ *pubkeyp = pubkey;
+ pubkey = NULL;
}
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, keyp,
- commentp)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (keyp && *keyp &&
- (r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename)) != 0)
- goto out;
r = 0;
out:
close(fd);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
return r;
}
static int
-sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey **kp, const char *filename,
+ char **commentp)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ *kp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
cp = line;
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
/* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 ||
strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0)
break;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
if (*cp) {
if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) {
cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
if (commentp) {
*commentp = strdup(*cp ?
cp : filename);
if (*commentp == NULL)
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
+ /* success */
+ *kp = k;
free(line);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
}
}
+ free(k);
free(line);
fclose(f);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/* load public key from any pubkey file */
int
sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
- struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
- char *file = NULL;
- int r;
+ char *pubfile = NULL;
+ int r, oerrno;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
- if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) {
- if (keyp != NULL) {
- *keyp = pub;
- pub = NULL;
- }
- r = 0;
+ if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, filename, commentp)) == 0)
goto out;
- }
- sshkey_free(pub);
/* try .pub suffix */
- if (asprintf(&file, "%s.pub", filename) == -1)
+ if (asprintf(&pubfile, "%s.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, pubfile, commentp)) == 0)
goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) {
- if (keyp != NULL) {
- *keyp = pub;
- pub = NULL;
- }
- r = 0;
- }
+
+ /* finally, try to extract public key from private key file */
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(filename, keyp)) == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Pretend we couldn't find the key */
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ errno = ENOENT;
+
out:
- free(file);
- sshkey_free(pub);
+ oerrno = errno;
+ free(pubfile);
+ errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
int
sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
char *file = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0)
- goto out;
- /* success */
- if (keyp != NULL) {
- *keyp = pub;
- pub = NULL;
- }
- r = 0;
- out:
+ r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, file, NULL);
free(file);
sshkey_free(pub);
return r;
}
/* Load private key and certificate */
int
sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok)
+ struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
- passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 ||
+ passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
}
out:
sshkey_free(key);
sshkey_free(cert);
return r;
}
/*
* Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
* SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
* If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
* otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed.
* If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
* also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
*/
int
sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
int check_ca)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r = 0;
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
sshkey_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
cp = line;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
/* Skip comments and empty lines */
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
continue;
default:
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
(check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
}
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
out:
free(line);
sshkey_free(pub);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
/*
* Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
* SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
* unexpected happened.
* This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
* "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
*/
int
sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
{
int r;
r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
return r;
/*
* If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
* parse the file as a flat list of keys.
*/
switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
case 0:
/* Key found => revoked */
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
/* Key not found => not revoked */
return 0;
default:
/* Some other error occurred */
return r;
}
}
+/*
+ * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
+ * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
+ * unterminated quotes).
+ */
+int
+sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp)
+{
+ char *cp = *cpp;
+ int quoted = 0;
+
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ *cpp = cp;
+ /* return failure for unterminated quotes */
+ return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Save a public key */
+int
+sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
+ const char *comment)
+{
+ int fd, oerrno;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+ if (ferror(f) || fclose(f) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ fail:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ if (f != NULL)
+ fclose(f);
+ else
+ close(fd);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.h b/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
index 624d269f1bdb..1db067a813a1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
@@ -1,52 +1,54 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.21 2015/01/08 10:14:08 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.25 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
#define AUTHFILE_H
struct sshbuf;
struct sshkey;
/* XXX document these */
/* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */
int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *,
const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int);
-int sshkey_load_file(int, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *,
- struct sshkey **, int *);
+ struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *,
- struct sshkey **, char **, int *);
+ struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *);
int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int);
int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file);
+int sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp);
+int sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
+ const char *comment);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/blacklist.c b/crypto/openssh/blacklist.c
index b4f5d3e128c1..f118edab40cf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/blacklist.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/blacklist.c
@@ -1,97 +1,97 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2015 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2016 The FreeBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by Kurt Lidl
* under sponsorship from the FreeBSD Foundation.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Christos Zoulas.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "ssh.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include <blacklist.h>
#include "blacklist_client.h"
static struct blacklist *blstate = NULL;
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
/* internal definition from bl.h */
struct blacklist *bl_create(bool, char *, void (*)(int, const char *, va_list));
/* impedence match vsyslog() to sshd's internal logging levels */
void
im_log(int priority, const char *message, va_list args)
{
LogLevel imlevel;
switch (priority) {
case LOG_ERR:
imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
break;
case LOG_DEBUG:
imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
break;
case LOG_INFO:
imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
break;
default:
imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2;
}
- do_log(imlevel, message, args);
+ do_log2(imlevel, message, args);
}
void
blacklist_init(void)
{
if (options.use_blacklist)
blstate = bl_create(false, NULL, im_log);
}
void
-blacklist_notify(int action, const char *msg)
+blacklist_notify(struct ssh *ssh, int action, const char *msg)
{
- if (blstate != NULL && packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+ if (blstate != NULL && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
(void)blacklist_r(blstate, action,
- packet_get_connection_in(), msg);
+ ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), msg);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/blacklist_client.h b/crypto/openssh/blacklist_client.h
index af5a2a6d3c1d..236884092010 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/blacklist_client.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/blacklist_client.h
@@ -1,61 +1,61 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2015 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2016 The FreeBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by Kurt Lidl
* under sponsorship from the FreeBSD Foundation.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Christos Zoulas.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef BLACKLIST_CLIENT_H
#define BLACKLIST_CLIENT_H
#ifndef BLACKLIST_API_ENUM
enum {
BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK = 0,
BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL,
BLACKLIST_ABUSIVE_BEHAVIOR,
BLACKLIST_BAD_USER
};
#endif
#ifdef USE_BLACKLIST
void blacklist_init(void);
-void blacklist_notify(int, const char *);
+void blacklist_notify(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
#define BLACKLIST_INIT() blacklist_init()
-#define BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(x,msg) blacklist_notify(x,msg)
+#define BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh,x,msg) blacklist_notify(ssh,x,msg)
#else
#define BLACKLIST_INIT()
-#define BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(x,msg)
+#define BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh,x,msg)
#endif
#endif /* BLACKLIST_CLIENT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in b/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in
index 4ccc5f8d1419..15555cd7ed7e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in
@@ -1,677 +1,677 @@
#!/bin/sh
#
# Fake Root Solaris/SVR4/SVR5 Build System - Prototype
#
# The following code has been provide under Public Domain License. I really
# don't care what you use it for. Just as long as you don't complain to me
# nor my employer if you break it. - Ben Lindstrom (mouring@eviladmin.org)
#
umask 022
#
# Options for building the package
# You can create a openssh-config.local with your customized options
#
REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE=yes
#
# uncommenting TEST_DIR and using
# configure --prefix=/var/tmp --with-privsep-path=/var/tmp/empty
# and
# PKGNAME=tOpenSSH should allow testing a package without interfering
# with a real OpenSSH package on a system. This is not needed on systems
# that support the -R option to pkgadd.
#TEST_DIR=/var/tmp # leave commented out for production build
PKGNAME=OpenSSH
# revisions within the same version (REV=a)
#REV=
SYSVINIT_NAME=opensshd
AWK=${AWK:="nawk"}
MAKE=${MAKE:="make"}
SSHDUID=67 # Default privsep uid
SSHDGID=67 # Default privsep gid
# uncomment these next three as needed
#PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no
#X11_FORWARDING=yes
#USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK=yes
# System V init run levels
SYSVINITSTART=S98
SYSVINITSTOPT=K30
# We will source these if they exist
POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES=./pkg-post-make-install-fixes.sh
POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS=./pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh
# We'll be one level deeper looking for these
PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-preinstall.local
PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-postinstall.local
PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-preremove.local
PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-postremove.local
PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL=../pkg-request.local
# end of sourced files
#
OPENSSHD=opensshd.init
OPENSSH_MANIFEST=openssh.xml
OPENSSH_FMRI=svc:/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}:default
SMF_METHOD_DIR=/lib/svc/method/site
SMF_MANIFEST_DIR=/var/svc/manifest/site
PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=@PATH_GROUPADD_PROG@
PATH_USERADD_PROG=@PATH_USERADD_PROG@
PATH_PASSWD_PROG=@PATH_PASSWD_PROG@
#
# list of system directories we do NOT want to change owner/group/perms
# when installing our package
SYSTEM_DIR="/etc \
/etc/init.d \
/etc/rcS.d \
/etc/rc0.d \
/etc/rc1.d \
/etc/rc2.d \
/etc/opt \
/lib \
/lib/svc \
/lib/svc/method \
/lib/svc/method/site \
/opt \
/opt/bin \
/usr \
/usr/bin \
/usr/lib \
/usr/sbin \
/usr/share \
/usr/share/man \
/usr/share/man/man1 \
/usr/share/man/man8 \
/usr/local \
/usr/local/bin \
/usr/local/etc \
/usr/local/libexec \
/usr/local/man \
/usr/local/man/man1 \
/usr/local/man/man8 \
/usr/local/sbin \
/usr/local/share \
/var \
/var/opt \
/var/run \
/var/svc \
/var/svc/manifest \
/var/svc/manifest/site \
/var/tmp \
/tmp"
# We may need to build as root so we make sure PATH is set up
# only set the path if it's not set already
[ -d /opt/bin ] && {
echo $PATH | grep ":/opt/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1
[ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/opt/bin
}
[ -d /usr/local/bin ] && {
echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/local/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1
[ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
}
[ -d /usr/ccs/bin ] && {
echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/ccs/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1
[ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/ccs/bin
}
export PATH
#
[ -f Makefile ] || {
echo "Please run this script from your build directory"
exit 1
}
# we will look for openssh-config.local to override the above options
[ -s ./openssh-config.local ] && . ./openssh-config.local
START=`pwd`
FAKE_ROOT=$START/pkg
## Fill in some details, like prefix and sysconfdir
for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir sysconfdir piddir srcdir
do
eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2`
done
## Are we using Solaris' SMF?
DO_SMF=0
if egrep "^#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS" config.h > /dev/null 2>&1
then
DO_SMF=1
fi
## Collect value of privsep user
for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
do
eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' config.h`
done
## Set privsep defaults if not defined
if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ]
then
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
fi
## Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package.
VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | sed -e 's/,.*//'`
ARCH=`uname -m`
DEF_MSG="\n"
OS_VER=`uname -v`
SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh
UNAME_R=`uname -r`
UNAME_S=`uname -s`
case ${UNAME_S} in
SunOS) UNAME_S=Solaris
OS_VER=${UNAME_R}
ARCH=`uname -p`
RCS_D=yes
DEF_MSG="(default: n)"
;;
SCO_SV) case ${UNAME_R} in
3.2) UNAME_S=OpenServer5
OS_VER=`uname -X | grep Release | sed -e 's/^Rel.*3.2v//'`
;;
5) UNAME_S=OpenServer6
;;
esac
SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh
RC1_D=no
DEF_MSG="(default: n)"
;;
esac
case `basename $0` in
buildpkg.sh)
## Start by faking root install
echo "Faking root install..."
[ -d $FAKE_ROOT ] && rm -fr $FAKE_ROOT
mkdir $FAKE_ROOT
${MAKE} install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT
if [ $? -gt 0 ]
then
echo "Fake root install failed, stopping."
exit 1
fi
## Setup our run level stuff while we are at it.
if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
# For Solaris' SMF, /lib/svc/method/site is the preferred place
# for start/stop scripts that aren't supplied with the OS, and
# similarly /var/svc/manifest/site for manifests.
mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}
mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}
cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
cat ${OPENSSH_MANIFEST} | \
sed -e "s|__SYSVINIT_NAME__|${SYSVINIT_NAME}|" \
-e "s|__SMF_METHOD_DIR__|${SMF_METHOD_DIR}|" \
> $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
chmod 644 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
else
mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d
cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
fi
[ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ] && \
perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \
$FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
[ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ] && \
perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \
$FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
# fix PrintMotd
perl -p -i -e "s/#PrintMotd yes/PrintMotd no/" \
$FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
# We don't want to overwrite config files on multiple installs
mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default
mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default
# local tweeks here
[ -s "${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}" ] && . ${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}
cd $FAKE_ROOT
## Ok, this is outright wrong, but it will work. I'm tired of pkgmk
## whining.
for i in *; do
PROTO_ARGS="$PROTO_ARGS $i=/$i";
done
## Build info file
echo "Building pkginfo file..."
cat > pkginfo << _EOF
PKG=$PKGNAME
NAME="OpenSSH Portable for ${UNAME_S}"
DESC="Secure Shell remote access utility; replaces telnet and rlogin/rsh."
VENDOR="OpenSSH Portable Team - https://www.openssh.com/portable.html"
ARCH=$ARCH
VERSION=$VERSION$REV
CATEGORY="Security,application"
BASEDIR=/
CLASSES="none"
PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`"
_EOF
## Build empty depend file that may get updated by $POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS
echo "Building depend file..."
touch depend
## Build space file
echo "Building space file..."
if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
# XXX Is this necessary? If not, remove space line from mk-proto.awk.
touch space
else
cat > space << _EOF
-# extra space required by start/stop links added by installf
+# extra space required by start/stop links added by installf
# in postinstall
$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1
$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1
_EOF
[ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \
echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
[ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \
echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
fi
## Build preinstall file
echo "Building preinstall file..."
cat > preinstall << _EOF
#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
#
_EOF
# local preinstall changes here
[ -s "${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL}
cat >> preinstall << _EOF
#
if [ "\${PRE_INS_STOP}" = "yes" ]
then
- if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+ if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI
else
${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
fi
fi
exit 0
_EOF
## Build postinstall file
echo "Building postinstall file..."
cat > postinstall << _EOF
#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
#
[ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config ] || \\
cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default \\
\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config
[ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config ] || \\
cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default \\
\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
# make rc?.d dirs only if we are doing a test install
[ -n "${TEST_DIR}" ] && [ $DO_SMF -ne 1 ] && {
[ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rcS.d
mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc0.d
[ "$RC1_D" = no ] || mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc1.d
mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc2.d
}
if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
- # Delete the existing service, if it exists, then import the
+ # Delete the existing service, if it exists, then import the
# new one.
if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1
then
svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI
fi
# NOTE, The manifest disables sshd by default.
svccfg import ${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
else
if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ]
then
[ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \\
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
[ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \\
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
else
[ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \\
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
[ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \\
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
fi
fi
# If piddir doesn't exist we add it. (Ie. --with-pid-dir=/var/opt/ssh)
[ -d $piddir ] || installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR$piddir d 0755 root sys
_EOF
# local postinstall changes here
[ -s "${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL}
cat >> postinstall << _EOF
installf -f ${PKGNAME}
# Use chroot to handle PKG_INSTALL_ROOT
if [ ! -z "\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}" ]
then
chroot="chroot \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}"
fi
# If this is a test build, we will skip the groupadd/useradd/passwd commands
if [ ! -z "${TEST_DIR}" ]
then
chroot=echo
fi
echo "PrivilegeSeparation user always required."
if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null
then
echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep "^$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | awk -F: '{print \$4}'\`
SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep ":\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | awk -F: '{print \$1}'\`
else
DO_PASSWD=yes
fi
[ -z "\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP" ] && SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
# group required?
if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP'\$' >/dev/null
then
echo "PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP already exists."
else
DO_GROUP=yes
fi
# create group if required
[ "\$DO_GROUP" = yes ] && {
# Use gid of 67 if possible
if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'$SSHDGID'\$' >/dev/null
then
:
else
sshdgid="-g $SSHDGID"
fi
echo "Creating PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP."
\$chroot ${PATH_GROUPADD_PROG} \$sshdgid \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP
}
# Create user if required
[ "\$DO_PASSWD" = yes ] && {
# Use uid of 67 if possible
if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSHDUID'\$' >/dev/null
then
:
else
sshduid="-u $SSHDUID"
fi
echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
\$chroot ${PATH_USERADD_PROG} -c 'SSHD PrivSep User' -s /bin/false -g $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER \$sshduid $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
\$chroot ${PATH_PASSWD_PROG} -l $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
}
if [ "\${POST_INS_START}" = "yes" ]
then
if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
svcadm enable $OPENSSH_FMRI
else
${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} start
fi
fi
exit 0
_EOF
## Build preremove file
echo "Building preremove file..."
cat > preremove << _EOF
#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
#
-if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI
else
${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
fi
_EOF
# local preremove changes here
[ -s "${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL}
cat >> preremove << _EOF
exit 0
_EOF
## Build postremove file
echo "Building postremove file..."
cat > postremove << _EOF
#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
#
if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1
then
svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI
fi
fi
_EOF
# local postremove changes here
[ -s "${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL}
cat >> postremove << _EOF
exit 0
_EOF
## Build request file
echo "Building request file..."
cat > request << _EOF
trap 'exit 3' 15
_EOF
[ -x /usr/bin/ckyorn ] || cat >> request << _EOF
ckyorn() {
# for some strange reason OpenServer5 has no ckyorn
# We build a striped down version here
DEFAULT=n
PROMPT="Yes or No [yes,no,?,quit]"
HELP_PROMPT=" Enter y or yes if your answer is yes; n or no if your answer is no."
USAGE="usage: ckyorn [options]
where options may include:
-d default
-h help
-p prompt
"
if [ \$# != 0 ]
then
while getopts d:p:h: c
do
case \$c in
h) HELP_PROMPT="\$OPTARG" ;;
d) DEFAULT=\$OPTARG ;;
p) PROMPT=\$OPTARG ;;
\\?) echo "\$USAGE" 1>&2
exit 1 ;;
esac
done
shift \`expr \$OPTIND - 1\`
fi
while true
do
echo "\${PROMPT}\\c " 1>&2
read key
[ -z "\$key" ] && key=\$DEFAULT
case \$key in
[n,N]|[n,N][o,O]|[y,Y]|[y,Y][e,E][s,S]) echo "\${key}\\c"
exit 0 ;;
\\?) echo \$HELP_PROMPT 1>&2 ;;
q|quit) echo "q\\c" 1>&2
exit 3 ;;
esac
done
}
_EOF
if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
then
# This could get hairy, as the running sshd may not be under SMF.
# We'll assume an earlier version of OpenSSH started via SMF.
cat >> request << _EOF
PRE_INS_STOP=no
POST_INS_START=no
# determine if should restart the daemon
if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid ] && \\
/usr/bin/svcs -H $OPENSSH_FMRI 2>&1 | egrep "^online" > /dev/null 2>&1
then
ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
-p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
case \$ans in
[y,Y]*) PRE_INS_STOP=yes
POST_INS_START=yes
;;
esac
else
# determine if we should start sshd
ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
-p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
case \$ans in
[y,Y]*) POST_INS_START=yes ;;
esac
fi
# make parameters available to installation service,
# and so to any other packaging scripts
cat >\$1 <<!
PRE_INS_STOP='\$PRE_INS_STOP'
POST_INS_START='\$POST_INS_START'
!
_EOF
else
cat >> request << _EOF
USE_SYM_LINKS=no
PRE_INS_STOP=no
POST_INS_START=no
# Use symbolic links?
ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
-p "Do you want symbolic links for the start/stop scripts? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
case \$ans in
[y,Y]*) USE_SYM_LINKS=yes ;;
esac
# determine if should restart the daemon
if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid -a -f ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} ]
then
ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
-p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
case \$ans in
[y,Y]*) PRE_INS_STOP=yes
POST_INS_START=yes
;;
esac
else
# determine if we should start sshd
ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
-p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
case \$ans in
[y,Y]*) POST_INS_START=yes ;;
esac
fi
# make parameters available to installation service,
# and so to any other packaging scripts
cat >\$1 <<!
USE_SYM_LINKS='\$USE_SYM_LINKS'
PRE_INS_STOP='\$PRE_INS_STOP'
POST_INS_START='\$POST_INS_START'
!
_EOF
fi
# local request changes here
[ -s "${PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL}
cat >> request << _EOF
exit 0
_EOF
## Next Build our prototype
echo "Building prototype file..."
cat >mk-proto.awk << _EOF
BEGIN { print "i pkginfo"; print "i depend"; \\
print "i preinstall"; print "i postinstall"; \\
print "i preremove"; print "i postremove"; \\
print "i request"; print "i space"; \\
split("$SYSTEM_DIR",sys_files); }
{
for (dir in sys_files) { if ( \$3 != sys_files[dir] )
{ if ( \$1 == "s" )
{ \$5=""; \$6=""; }
else
{ \$5="root"; \$6="sys"; }
}
else
{ \$4="?"; \$5="?"; \$6="?"; break;}
} }
{ print; }
_EOF
find . | egrep -v "prototype|pkginfo|mk-proto.awk" | sort | \
pkgproto $PROTO_ARGS | ${AWK} -f mk-proto.awk > prototype
# /usr/local is a symlink on some systems
[ "${USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK}" = yes ] && {
grep -v "^d none /usr/local ? ? ?$" prototype > prototype.new
mv prototype.new prototype
}
## Step back a directory and now build the package.
cd ..
# local prototype tweeks here
[ -s "${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS}" ] && . ${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS}
echo "Building package.."
pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o
echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg
;;
justpkg.sh)
rm -fr ${FAKE_ROOT}/${PKGNAME}
grep -v "^PSTAMP=" $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo > $$tmp
mv $$tmp $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo
cat >> $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo << _EOF
PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`"
_EOF
pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o
echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg
;;
esac
[ "${REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE}" = yes ] && rm -rf $FAKE_ROOT
exit 0
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
index f71a08568ed9..a810da0eeb73 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
@@ -1,204 +1,204 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.73 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.75 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
void
ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
struct in_addr inaddr;
u_int16_t port;
if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
!IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr))
return;
debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address");
memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr));
port = a6->sin6_port;
memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4));
a4->sin_family = AF_INET;
*len = sizeof(*a4);
memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr));
a4->sin_port = port;
}
/*
* Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string.
* The returned string must be freed.
*/
static char *
get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
int r;
/* Get IP address of client. */
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
if (remote) {
if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
return NULL;
} else {
if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
return NULL;
}
/* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
}
switch (addr.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
case AF_INET6:
/* Get the address in ascii. */
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
- error("%s: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", __func__,
+ error_f("getnameinfo %d failed: %s",
flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r));
return NULL;
}
return xstrdup(ntop);
case AF_UNIX:
/* Get the Unix domain socket path. */
return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path);
default:
/* We can't look up remote Unix domain sockets. */
return NULL;
}
}
char *
get_peer_ipaddr(int sock)
{
char *p;
if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
return p;
return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
}
char *
get_local_ipaddr(int sock)
{
char *p;
if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
return p;
return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
}
char *
get_local_name(int fd)
{
char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
/* Assume we were passed a socket */
if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL)
return host;
/* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */
if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
- verbose("%s: gethostname: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ verbose_f("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
host = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
} else {
host = xstrdup(myname);
}
return host;
}
/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
static int
get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
{
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int r;
/* Get IP address of client. */
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (local) {
- if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
} else {
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
/* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
/* Non-inet sockets don't have a port number. */
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
return 0;
/* Return port number. */
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s", __func__,
+ fatal_f("getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s",
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
return atoi(strport);
}
int
get_peer_port(int sock)
{
return get_sock_port(sock, 0);
}
int
get_local_port(int sock)
{
return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/chacha.h b/crypto/openssh/chacha.h
index 762052565d5c..19a61e294230 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/chacha.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/chacha.h
@@ -1,36 +1,36 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.4 2016/08/27 04:04:56 guenther Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.5 2021/04/03 05:54:14 djm Exp $ */
/*
chacha-merged.c version 20080118
D. J. Bernstein
Public domain.
*/
#ifndef CHACHA_H
#define CHACHA_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
struct chacha_ctx {
u_int input[16];
};
-#define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16
+#define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16
#define CHACHA_NONCELEN 8
#define CHACHA_CTRLEN 8
#define CHACHA_STATELEN (CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN)
#define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN 64
void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_MINKEYLEN)));
void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_NONCELEN)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CHACHA_CTRLEN)));
void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m,
u_char *c, u_int bytes)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 4)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
#endif /* CHACHA_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
index c85d46abd762..fd72f371df98 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@@ -1,4876 +1,4891 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.386 2018/10/04 01:04:52 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.407 2021/05/19 01:24:05 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
* There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
* arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
- #include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "match.h"
/* -- agent forwarding */
#define NUM_SOCKS 10
/* -- tcp forwarding */
/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
/* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
/*
* Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
* The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
* a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
* network (which might be behind a firewall).
*/
/* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */
/* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */
/* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */
struct permission {
char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */
int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */
char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */
char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */
int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */
Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/
};
/*
* Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or
* remote).
*/
struct permission_set {
/*
* List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the
* user.
*/
u_int num_permitted_user;
struct permission *permitted_user;
/*
* List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin.
*/
u_int num_permitted_admin;
struct permission *permitted_admin;
/*
* If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted. This is the
* case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway,
* and the user could do anything after logging in.
*/
int all_permitted;
};
/* Master structure for channels state */
struct ssh_channels {
/*
* Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array
* is dynamically extended as needed.
*/
Channel **channels;
/*
* Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be
* initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
*/
u_int channels_alloc;
/*
* Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is
* updated in channel_new.
*/
int channel_max_fd;
/*
* 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits
* relevant to channels in the select bitmasks.
*
* 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for
* channels which have events pending.
*/
chan_fn **channel_pre;
chan_fn **channel_post;
/* -- tcp forwarding */
struct permission_set local_perms;
struct permission_set remote_perms;
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
char *x11_saved_display;
/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
char *x11_saved_proto;
/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */
char *x11_saved_data;
u_int x11_saved_data_len;
/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
u_int x11_refuse_time;
/*
* Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be
* sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the
* real data.
*/
u_char *x11_fake_data;
u_int x11_fake_data_len;
/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
int IPv4or6;
};
/* helper */
static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype);
static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host);
/* non-blocking connect helpers */
static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *);
static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *);
/* Setup helper */
static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
/* -- channel core */
void
channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc;
- if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL ||
- (sc->channel_pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE,
- sizeof(*sc->channel_pre))) == NULL ||
- (sc->channel_post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE,
- sizeof(*sc->channel_post))) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
+ if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("allocation failed");
sc->channels_alloc = 10;
sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels));
sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
channel_handler_init(sc);
ssh->chanctxt = sc;
}
Channel *
channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) {
- logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
return NULL;
}
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id];
if (c == NULL) {
- logit("%s: %d: bad id: channel free", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: bad id: channel free", id);
return NULL;
}
return c;
}
Channel *
channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id)
{
Channel *c;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id)
return c;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages.
* Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages.
*/
Channel *
channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
return NULL;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
return c;
}
logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
* when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
*/
static void
channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
/* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, rfd);
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, wfd);
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, efd);
if (rfd != -1)
fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
c->rfd = rfd;
c->wfd = wfd;
c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
c->efd = efd;
c->extended_usage = extusage;
if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0)
debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
#ifdef _AIX
/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd);
#endif
/* enable nonblocking mode */
- if (nonblock) {
+ c->restore_block = 0;
+ if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) {
+ /*
+ * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set
+ * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to
+ * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
+ * with other programs that follow.
+ */
+ if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
+ set_nonblock(rfd);
+ }
+ if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
+ set_nonblock(wfd);
+ }
+ if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
+ set_nonblock(efd);
+ }
+ } else if (nonblock) {
if (rfd != -1)
set_nonblock(rfd);
if (wfd != -1)
set_nonblock(wfd);
if (efd != -1)
set_nonblock(efd);
}
}
/*
* Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
* remote_name to be freed.
*/
Channel *
channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_int i, found;
Channel *c;
+ int r;
/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) {
/* Found a free slot. */
found = i;
break;
}
}
if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) {
/*
* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand
* the array.
*/
found = sc->channels_alloc;
if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS)
- fatal("%s: internal error: channels_alloc %d too big",
- __func__, sc->channels_alloc);
+ fatal_f("internal error: channels_alloc %d too big",
+ sc->channels_alloc);
sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc,
sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels));
sc->channels_alloc += 10;
debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc);
}
/* Initialize and return new channel. */
c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_set_max_size");
c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
c->self = found;
c->type = type;
c->ctype = ctype;
c->local_window = window;
c->local_window_max = window;
c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
c->ctl_chan = -1;
c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */
TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
return c;
}
static void
channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc)
{
u_int i;
int max = 0;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c != NULL) {
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->rfd);
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->wfd);
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->efd);
}
}
sc->channel_max_fd = max;
}
int
-channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
+channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
- int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
+ int ret, fd = *fdp;
- if (fd != -1) {
- ret = close(fd);
- *fdp = -1;
- if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
- channel_find_maxfd(sc);
- }
+ if (fd == -1)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) ||
+ (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) ||
+ (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0))
+ (void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0); /* restore blocking */
+
+ ret = close(fd);
+ *fdp = -1;
+ if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
+ channel_find_maxfd(sc);
return ret;
}
/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
static void
channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
if (rfd != sock)
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd);
if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd);
if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
}
static void
fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm)
{
free(perm->host_to_connect);
free(perm->listen_host);
free(perm->listen_path);
- bzero(perm, sizeof(*perm));
+ memset(perm, 0, sizeof(*perm));
}
/* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */
static const char *
fwd_ident(int who, int where)
{
if (who == FORWARD_ADM) {
if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
return "admin local";
else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
return "admin remote";
} else if (who == FORWARD_USER) {
if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
return "user local";
else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
return "user remote";
}
fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where);
}
/* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */
static struct permission_set *
permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
switch (where) {
case FORWARD_LOCAL:
return &sc->local_perms;
break;
case FORWARD_REMOTE:
return &sc->remote_perms;
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: invalid forwarding direction %d", __func__, where);
+ fatal_f("invalid forwarding direction %d", where);
}
}
-/* Reutrns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */
+/* Returns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */
static void
permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp)
{
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
switch (who) {
case FORWARD_USER:
*permpp = &pset->permitted_user;
*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user;
break;
case FORWARD_ADM:
*permpp = &pset->permitted_admin;
*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin;
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: invalid forwarding client %d", __func__, who);
+ fatal_f("invalid forwarding client %d", who);
}
}
/* Adds an entry to the spcified forwarding list */
static int
permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect,
const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port,
Channel *downstream)
{
struct permission **permp;
u_int n, *npermp;
permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
if (*npermp >= INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: %s overflow", __func__, fwd_ident(who, where));
+ fatal_f("%s overflow", fwd_ident(who, where));
*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp));
n = (*npermp)++;
#define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s))
(*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect);
(*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
(*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host);
(*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path);
(*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port;
(*permp)[n].downstream = downstream;
#undef MAYBE_DUP
return (int)n;
}
static void
mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
struct permission *perm;
int r;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (perm->downstream != c)
continue;
/* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */
debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u",
c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
}
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
}
}
/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
void
channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
char *s;
u_int i, n;
Channel *other;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL)
continue;
n++;
/* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT &&
other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY &&
other->mux_ctx == c) {
other->mux_ctx = NULL;
other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
}
}
debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT)
mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c);
+ else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER) {
+ free(c->mux_ctx);
+ c->mux_ctx = NULL;
+ }
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
s = channel_open_message(ssh);
debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
free(s);
}
channel_close_fds(ssh, c);
sshbuf_free(c->input);
sshbuf_free(c->output);
sshbuf_free(c->extended);
c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL;
free(c->remote_name);
c->remote_name = NULL;
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
free(c->listening_addr);
c->listening_addr = NULL;
while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
- explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
- free(cc);
+ freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
}
if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx);
sc->channels[c->self] = NULL;
- explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
- free(c);
+ freezero(c, sizeof(*c));
}
void
channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
+ struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
- for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++)
- if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL)
- channel_free(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (sc->channels[i] != NULL)
+ channel_free(ssh, sc->channels[i]);
+
+ free(sc->channels);
+ sc->channels = NULL;
+ sc->channels_alloc = 0;
+ sc->channel_max_fd = 0;
+
+ free(sc->x11_saved_display);
+ sc->x11_saved_display = NULL;
+
+ free(sc->x11_saved_proto);
+ sc->x11_saved_proto = NULL;
+
+ free(sc->x11_saved_data);
+ sc->x11_saved_data = NULL;
+ sc->x11_saved_data_len = 0;
+
+ free(sc->x11_fake_data);
+ sc->x11_fake_data = NULL;
+ sc->x11_fake_data_len = 0;
}
/*
* Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file
* descriptors after a fork.
*/
void
channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++)
if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL)
channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]);
}
/*
* Stop listening to channels.
*/
void
channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c != NULL) {
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
channel_free(ssh, c);
break;
}
}
}
}
/*
* Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
* more channel is overfull.
*/
int
channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh);
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) {
debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u",
c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
int
channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
return 1;
default:
- fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
+ fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
int
channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
return i;
default:
- fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
+ fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
return -1;
}
/* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */
const char *
channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c)
{
if (c->efd == -1)
return "closed";
switch (c->extended_usage) {
case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE:
return "write";
case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ:
return "read";
case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE:
return "ignore";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
static char *
channel_format_status(const Channel *c)
{
char *ret = NULL;
xasprintf(&ret, "t%d %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu "
"fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d",
c->type,
c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id,
c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input),
c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output),
channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended),
c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan);
return ret;
}
/*
* Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
* suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for
* newlines.
*/
char *
channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
Channel *c;
u_int i;
int r;
char *cp, *ret;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf,
"The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
cp = channel_format_status(c);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n",
c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) {
free(cp);
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
free(cp);
continue;
default:
- fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
+ fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string");
sshbuf_free(buf);
return ret;
}
static void
open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: open: %s", where, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: channel %i: open", where, c->self);
}
}
void
channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
}
void
channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL) {
- logit("%s: %d: unknown channel id", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: unknown channel id", id);
return;
}
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
}
}
void
channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx)
{
struct channel_confirm *cc;
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
+ fatal_f("%d: bad id", id);
cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc));
cc->cb = cb;
cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb;
cc->ctx = ctx;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
}
void
channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
- logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->open_confirm = fn;
c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx;
}
void
channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
- logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = fn;
c->detach_close = do_close;
}
void
channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
- logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = NULL;
c->detach_close = 0;
}
void
channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
- logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->input_filter = ifn;
c->output_filter = ofn;
c->filter_ctx = ctx;
c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
}
void
channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
}
static void
channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
}
static void
channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
}
static void
channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
c->remote_window > 0 &&
sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window &&
sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) {
FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
} else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
debug2("channel %d: "
"obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self,
c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
else
chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
}
/** XXX check close conditions, too */
if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED &&
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) {
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)
FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window)
FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
}
/* XXX: What about efd? races? */
}
/*
* This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11
* connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
* state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication
* data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
* fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
* XXX All this happens at the client side.
* Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
*/
static int
x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
/* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 &&
(u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) {
verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
"expired");
return -1;
}
/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12)
return 0;
/* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b);
if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */
proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
} else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */
proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
} else {
debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
ucp[0]);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
if (sshbuf_len(b) <
12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
return 0;
/* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) ||
memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
return -1;
}
/* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len ||
timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
return -1;
}
/* Check fake data length */
if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) {
error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
return -1;
}
/*
* Received authentication protocol and data match
* our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
* data.
*/
memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
return 1;
}
static void
channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output);
/* c->force_drain = 1; */
if (ret == 1) {
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
channel_pre_open(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
} else if (ret == -1) {
logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d",
c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->output);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
}
}
static void
channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh,
Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause &&
sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
/* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
/* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
}
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0)
FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
}
/* try to decode a socks4 header */
static int
channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
{
const u_char *p;
char *host;
u_int len, have, i, found, need;
char username[256];
struct {
u_int8_t version;
u_int8_t command;
u_int16_t dest_port;
struct in_addr dest_addr;
} s4_req, s4_rsp;
int r;
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
have = sshbuf_len(input);
len = sizeof(s4_req);
if (have < len)
return 0;
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
need = 1;
/* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
/* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
need = 2;
}
/* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
if (p[i] == '\0') {
found++;
if (found == need)
break;
}
if (i > 1024) {
/* the peer is probably sending garbage */
debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
c->self);
return -1;
}
}
if (found < need)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) {
- debug("channels %d: decode socks4: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_r(r, "channels %d: decode socks4", c->self);
return -1;
}
have = sshbuf_len(input);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
- error("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated",
- c->self);
+ error("channel %d: decode socks4: unterminated user", c->self);
return -1;
}
len = strlen(p);
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
len++; /* trailing '\0' */
strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */
host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
c->path = xstrdup(host);
} else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */
have = sshbuf_len(input);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul "
"terminated", c->self);
return -1;
}
len = strlen(p);
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
c->self, p, len);
len++; /* trailing '\0' */
if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
c->self, p);
return -1;
}
c->path = xstrdup(p);
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
}
c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
if (s4_req.command != 1) {
debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
return -1;
}
s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */
s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */
s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self);
return 1;
}
/* try to decode a socks5 header */
#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000
#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00
#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01
#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03
#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04
#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01
#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00
static int
channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
{
/* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */
struct {
u_int8_t version;
u_int8_t command;
u_int8_t reserved;
u_int8_t atyp;
} s5_req, s5_rsp;
u_int16_t dest_port;
char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
const u_char *p;
u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
int r;
debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (p[0] != 0x05)
return -1;
have = sshbuf_len(input);
if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) {
/* format: ver | nmethods | methods */
if (have < 2)
return 0;
nmethods = p[1];
if (have < nmethods + 2)
return 0;
/* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found",
c->self);
return -1;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
/* version, method */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self);
c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE;
debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self);
return 0; /* need more */
}
debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
return 0; /* need more */
memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
return -1;
}
switch (s5_req.atyp){
case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
addrlen = 4;
af = AF_INET;
break;
case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN:
addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)];
af = -1;
break;
case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6:
addrlen = 16;
af = AF_INET6;
break;
default:
debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
return -1;
}
need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
need++;
if (have < need)
return 0;
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
/* host string length */
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) {
- debug("channel %d: parse addr/port: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_r(r, "channel %d: parse addr/port", c->self);
return -1;
}
dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
"\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
return -1;
}
c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
} else {
if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
return -1;
c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
}
c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command);
s5_rsp.version = 0x05;
s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS;
s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */
s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4;
dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self);
return 1;
}
Channel *
channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
- const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
+ const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
+ int in, int out, int nonblock)
{
Channel *c;
- debug("%s %s:%d", __func__, host_to_connect, port_to_connect);
+ debug_f("%s:%d", host_to_connect, port_to_connect);
c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
-1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
+ 0, "stdio-forward", nonblock);
c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
c->host_port = port_to_connect;
c->listening_port = 0;
c->force_drain = 1;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0);
port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
return c;
}
/* dynamic port forwarding */
static void
channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
const u_char *p;
u_int have;
int ret;
have = sshbuf_len(c->input);
debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
/* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */
/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (have < 3) {
/* need more */
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
return;
}
/* try to guess the protocol */
p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input);
/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */
switch (p[0]) {
case 0x04:
ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output);
break;
case 0x05:
ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
if (ret < 0) {
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
} else if (ret == 0) {
debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
/* need more */
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
if (sshbuf_len(c->output))
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
} else {
/* switch to the next state */
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
}
}
/* simulate read-error */
static void
rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->output);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
/* reverse dynamic port forwarding */
static void
channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
const u_char *p;
u_int have, len;
int r, ret;
have = sshbuf_len(c->output);
debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
/* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */
/* EOF received */
if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
return;
}
/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (have < 3)
return;
/* try to guess the protocol */
p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output);
switch (p[0]) {
case 0x04:
/* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */
ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input);
break;
case 0x05:
ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
if (ret < 0) {
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
} else if (ret == 0) {
debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self);
/* send socks request to peer */
len = sshbuf_len(c->input);
if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: rdynamic: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: rdynamic", c->self);
}
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
c->remote_window -= len;
}
} else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) {
/* the connect failed */
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
}
}
/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
static void
channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port;
socklen_t addrlen;
char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("X11 connection requested.");
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
if (c->single_connection) {
oerrno = errno;
debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
errno = oerrno;
}
- if (newsock < 0) {
+ if (newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED)
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
set_nodelay(newsock);
remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted x11 socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11");
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self);
free(remote_ipaddr);
}
static void
port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype)
{
char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock);
char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
int r;
if (remote_port == -1) {
/* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */
free(remote_ipaddr);
remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1");
remote_port = 65535;
}
free(c->remote_name);
xasprintf(&c->remote_name,
"%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
"connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d",
rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype);
if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
/* target host, port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* target path */
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* listen path */
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
} else {
/* listen address, port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
}
if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* reserved for future owner/mode info */
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
} else {
/* originator host and port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self);
free(remote_ipaddr);
free(local_ipaddr);
}
void
channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time)
{
ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
}
/*
* This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
*/
static void
channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
int newsock, nextstate;
socklen_t addrlen;
char *rtype;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.",
c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
} else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com";
} else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com";
} else if (c->host_port == 0) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
} else {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "direct-tcpip";
}
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
- if (newsock < 0) {
+ if (newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED)
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
set_nodelay(newsock);
nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
nc->host_port = c->host_port;
if (c->path != NULL)
nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC)
port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype);
}
/*
* This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
* clients.
*/
static void
channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
int r, newsock;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
- if (newsock < 0) {
+ if (newsock == -1) {
error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted auth socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
0, "accepted auth socket", 1);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com");
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
}
static void
channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int err = 0, sock, isopen, r;
socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset))
return;
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
/* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */
isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH);
- if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) {
+ if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) == -1) {
err = errno;
error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
}
if (err == 0) {
debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d",
c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
if (isopen) {
/* no message necessary */
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket))
- != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self,
- ssh_err(r));
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i open confirm", c->self);
}
} else {
debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
c->self, strerror(err));
/* Try next address, if any */
if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
close(c->sock);
c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
return;
}
/* Exhausted all addresses */
error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.",
c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
if (isopen) {
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh,
SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: failure: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self,
- ssh_err(r));
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: failure", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
}
}
}
static int
channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
int r, force;
force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
if (c->rfd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)))
return 1;
errno = 0;
len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR ||
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR ||
((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
return 1;
#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
- if (len <= 0) {
+ if (len <= 0) {
#else
if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
(c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
#endif
debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd",
c->self, c->rfd, len);
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return -1;
} else {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
}
return -1;
}
if (c->input_filter != NULL) {
if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) {
debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
}
} else if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: put datagram: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: put data: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put datagram", c->self);
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put data", c->self);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct termios tio;
u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */
size_t dlen, olen = 0;
int r, len;
if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) ||
sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
return 1;
/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
olen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
else
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
return -1;
}
} else if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self);
buf = data;
} else {
buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output);
dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
}
if (c->datagram) {
/* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
free(data);
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0)
goto write_fail;
goto out;
}
#ifdef _AIX
/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
if (c->wfd_isatty)
dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024);
#endif
len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
- if (len < 0 &&
+ if (len == -1 &&
(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
write_fail:
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return -1;
} else {
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
return -1;
}
#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
!(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
/*
* Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
* traffic analysis. We need to match the
* size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
* (4 byte channel id + buf)
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: ignore: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: ignore", c->self);
}
}
#endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
out:
c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int r;
ssize_t len;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0)
return 1;
len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended),
sshbuf_len(c->extended));
debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
} else {
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
c->local_consumed += len;
}
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
- int r;
ssize_t len;
+ int r, force;
+
+ force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
- if (!c->detach_close && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))
+ if (c->efd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset)))
return 1;
len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
- errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close)))
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
- debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
- c->self, c->efd);
- channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
- } else {
- if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
- debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
- c->self);
- } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
- }
+ debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
+ } else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
+ debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self);
+ else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->efd == -1)
return 1;
/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int r;
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
c->local_consumed > 0) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id",
- __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
}
- debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d",
- c->self, c->local_window,
- c->local_consumed);
+ debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self,
+ c->local_window, c->local_consumed);
c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
c->local_consumed = 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void
channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_handle_efd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_check_window(ssh, c);
}
static u_int
read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
u_int rlen;
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) {
rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input);
len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
return sshbuf_len(c->input);
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd",
c->self, c->rfd, len);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
return 0;
- } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self);
}
return sshbuf_len(c->input);
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
u_int need;
if (c->rfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))
return;
if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
return;
if (c->mux_pause)
return;
/*
* Don't not read past the precise end of packets to
* avoid disrupting fd passing.
*/
if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */
return;
/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */
need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input));
#define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024)
if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) {
debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u",
c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need);
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
return;
}
if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */
return;
if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) {
debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return;
}
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
ssize_t len;
int r;
if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) ||
sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
return;
len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
return;
if (len <= 0) {
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
}
static void
channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
int newsock;
uid_t euid;
gid_t egid;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("multiplexing control connection");
/*
* Accept connection on control socket
*/
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr,
&addrlen)) == -1) {
- error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("accept: %s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
- if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
- error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
+ error_f("getpeereid failed: %s", strerror(errno));
close(newsock);
return;
}
if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
(u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid());
close(newsock);
return;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT,
newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max,
c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1);
nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb;
- debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock);
+ debug3_f("new mux channel %d fd %d", nc->self, nc->sock);
/* establish state */
nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc);
/* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */
nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL;
}
static void
channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc)
{
chan_fn **pre, **post;
if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL ||
- (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
+ (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("allocation failed");
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client;
sc->channel_pre = pre;
sc->channel_post = post;
}
/* gc dead channels */
static void
channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
if (c == NULL)
return;
if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close))
return;
debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL);
/* if we still have a callback */
if (c->detach_user != NULL)
return;
debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
}
if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1))
return;
debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
channel_free(ssh, c);
}
enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST };
static void
channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post;
u_int i, oalloc;
Channel *c;
time_t now;
now = monotime();
if (unpause_secs != NULL)
*unpause_secs = 0;
for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
if (c->delayed) {
if (table == CHAN_PRE)
c->delayed = 0;
else
continue;
}
if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) {
/*
* Run handlers that are not paused.
*/
if (c->notbefore <= now)
(*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
else if (unpause_secs != NULL) {
/*
* Collect the time that the earliest
* channel comes off pause.
*/
- debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds",
- __func__, c->self,
+ debug3_f("chan %d: skip for %d more "
+ "seconds", c->self,
(int)(c->notbefore - now));
if (*unpause_secs == 0 ||
(c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs)
*unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now;
}
}
channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c);
}
if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0)
- debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds",
- __func__, (int)*unpause_secs);
+ debug3_f("first channel unpauses in %d seconds",
+ (int)*unpause_secs);
}
/*
* Create sockets before allocating the select bitmasks.
* This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading
* the network-input but before channel_prepare_select().
*/
static void
channel_before_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
Channel *c;
u_int i, oalloc;
for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN)
channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(ssh, c);
}
}
/*
* Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in
* select bitmasks.
*/
void
channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs)
{
u_int n, sz, nfdset;
channel_before_prepare_select(ssh); /* might update channel_max_fd */
n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, ssh->chanctxt->channel_max_fd);
nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
/* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
/* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
*readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
*writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
*nallocp = sz;
}
*maxfdp = n;
memset(*readsetp, 0, sz);
memset(*writesetp, 0, sz);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, *readsetp, *writesetp,
minwait_secs);
}
/*
* After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
* events pending.
*/
void
channel_after_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, readset, writeset, NULL);
}
/*
* Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input.
*/
static void
channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
size_t len, plen;
const u_char *pkt;
int r;
if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) {
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
/*
* input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
* tell peer, that we will not send more data:
* send IEOF.
* hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still
* in use.
*/
if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
debug2("channel %d: "
"ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)",
c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
else
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
return;
}
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
if (c->datagram) {
/* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self);
/*
* XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is
* usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have
* backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard)
*/
if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) {
debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self);
return;
}
/* Enqueue it */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: datagram: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send datagram", c->self);
c->remote_window -= plen;
return;
}
/* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */
if (len > c->remote_window)
len = c->remote_window;
if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
len = c->remote_maxpacket;
if (len == 0)
return;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send data", c->self);
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
c->remote_window -= len;
}
/*
* Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode.
*/
static void
channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
size_t len;
int r;
if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0)
return;
debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self,
c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage);
if (len > c->remote_window)
len = c->remote_window;
if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
len = c->remote_maxpacket;
if (len == 0)
return;
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: data", c->self);
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
c->remote_window -= len;
debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len);
}
/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
void
channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
Channel *c;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
/*
* We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
* incoming data.
*/
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
/* XXX is this true? */
debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close",
c->self);
continue;
}
/* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c);
/* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ)
channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c);
}
}
/* -- mux proxy support */
/*
* When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal
* with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages
* from the ssh server:
* 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens
* in channel_proxy_downstream():
* - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server.
* - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct
* downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the
* mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might
* use conflicting channel IDs.
* - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and
* SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID
* with the newly allocated channel ID.
* 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY
* channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
* is then translated back to the original mux client ID.
* 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
* messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels.
* 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the
* downstream mux client are removed.
* 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server
* requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific
* channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure
* out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a
* specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port.
* 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently
* not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified
* easily.
*/
/*
* receive packets from downstream mux clients:
* channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs
* on channel creation.
*/
int
channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL;
const u_char *cp;
char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL;
u_char type;
size_t have;
int ret = -1, r;
u_int id, remote_id, listen_port;
/* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have))
!= 0) {
- error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
return -1;
}
if (have < 2) {
- error("%s: short message", __func__);
+ error_f("short message");
return -1;
}
type = cp[1];
/* skip padlen + type */
cp += 2;
have -= 2;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
- debug3("%s: channel %u: down->up: type %u", __func__,
+ debug3_f("channel %u: down->up: type %u",
downstream->self, type);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN:
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
(modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: alloc", __func__);
+ error_f("alloc");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto out;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
- -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1);
+ -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1);
c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */
c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
- error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
channel_free(ssh, c);
goto out;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
/*
* Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we
* need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'.
*/
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
(modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: alloc", __func__);
+ error_f("alloc");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto out;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
- -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1);
+ -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1);
c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */
c->mux_downstream_id = id;
c->remote_id = remote_id;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
- error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
channel_free(ssh, c);
goto out;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST:
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: alloc", __func__);
+ error_f("alloc");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) {
- error("%s: unsupported request %s", __func__, ctype);
+ error_f("unsupported request %s", ctype);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto out;
}
if (listen_port > 65535) {
- error("%s: tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u",
- __func__, listen_host, listen_port);
+ error_f("tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u",
+ listen_host, listen_port);
goto out;
}
/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "<mux>", -1,
listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream);
listen_host = NULL;
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
if (have < 4)
break;
remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) {
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
channel_free(ssh, c);
else
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
}
break;
}
if (modified) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "send");
goto out;
}
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "send");
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(ctype);
free(listen_host);
sshbuf_free(original);
sshbuf_free(modified);
return ret;
}
/*
* receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets
* to correct downstream:
* implemented as a helper for channel input handlers,
* replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID.
*/
int
channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
Channel *downstream;
const u_char *cp = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
/*
* When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we
* need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we
* restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
* so we can cleanup the channel.
*/
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY)
return 0;
if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL)
return 0;
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST:
break;
default:
- debug2("%s: channel %u: unsupported type %u", __func__,
- c->self, type);
+ debug2_f("channel %u: unsupported type %u", c->self, type);
return 0;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: alloc reply", __func__);
+ error_f("alloc reply");
goto out;
}
/* get remaining payload (after id) */
cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len);
if (cp == NULL) {
- error("%s: no packet", __func__);
+ error_f("no packet");
goto out;
}
/* translate id and send to muxclient */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) {
- error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "compose muxclient");
goto out;
}
/* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
- debug3("%s: channel %u: up->down: type %u", __func__, c->self,
- type);
+ debug3_f("channel %u: up->down: type %u", c->self, type);
out:
/* update state */
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
/* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */
if (cp && len > 4) {
c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
c->have_remote_id = 1;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)
channel_free(ssh, c);
else
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
break;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
return 1;
}
/* -- protocol input */
/* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */
static int
channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
{
u_int32_t id;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse id: %s", where, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "%s: parse id", where);
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what);
}
if (id > INT_MAX) {
- error("%s: bad channel id %u: %s", where, id, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "%s: bad channel id %u", where, id);
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what);
}
return (int)id;
}
/* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */
static Channel *
channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what);
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
"%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id);
}
return c;
}
int
channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *data;
size_t data_len, win_len;
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
/* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
return 0;
/* Get the data. */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: get data: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get data", c->self);
win_len = data_len;
if (c->datagram)
win_len += 4; /* string length header */
/*
* The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we
* must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window
* updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock.
*/
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
c->local_window -= win_len;
c->local_consumed += win_len;
return 0;
}
if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u",
c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket);
return 0;
}
if (win_len > c->local_window) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u",
c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
return 0;
}
c->local_window -= win_len;
if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: append datagram: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append datagram", c->self);
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: append data: %s",
- __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append data", c->self);
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *data;
size_t data_len;
u_int32_t tcode;
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self);
return 0;
}
if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof",
c->self);
else
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data "
"after EOF on channel %d.", c->self);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse tcode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse tcode");
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
}
if (c->efd == -1 ||
c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
return 0;
}
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse data");
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
}
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
if (data_len > c->local_window) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u",
c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
return 0;
}
debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len);
/* XXX sshpkt_getb? */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0)
- error("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "append");
c->local_window -= data_len;
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof");
+ int r;
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse data");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ieof message");
+ }
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c);
/* XXX force input close */
if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0)
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose");
+ int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse data");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid oclose message");
+ }
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation");
u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket;
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
- packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for "
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open confirmation for "
"non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
/*
* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel
* is now open.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0) {
- error("%s: window/maxpacket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- packet_disconnect("Invalid open confirmation message");
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "window/maxpacket");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open confirmation message");
}
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = remote_window;
c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket;
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
if (c->open_confirm) {
- debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self);
c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx);
- debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self);
}
debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
return 0;
}
static char *
reason2txt(int reason)
{
switch (reason) {
case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
return "administratively prohibited";
case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
return "connect failed";
case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
return "unknown channel type";
case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
return "resource shortage";
}
return "unknown reason";
}
int
channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure");
u_int32_t reason;
char *msg = NULL;
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
- packet_disconnect("Received open failure for "
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open failure for "
"non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) {
- error("%s: reason: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- packet_disconnect("Invalid open failure message");
+ error_fr(r, "parse reason");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
}
/* skip language */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
- error("%s: message/lang: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- packet_disconnect("Invalid open failure message");
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse msg/lang");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
}
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self,
reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
free(msg);
if (c->open_confirm) {
- debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self);
c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx);
- debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self);
}
/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust");
Channel *c;
u_int32_t adjust;
u_int new_rwin;
int r;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
return 0;
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0) {
- error("%s: adjust: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- packet_disconnect("Invalid window adjust message");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse adjust");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message");
}
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust);
if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) {
fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u",
c->self, adjust, c->remote_window);
}
c->remote_window = new_rwin;
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm");
Channel *c;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
/* Reset keepalive timeout */
- packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
- debug2("%s: type %d id %d", __func__, type, id);
+ debug2_f("type %d id %d", type, id);
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
- logit("%s: %d: unknown", __func__, id);
+ logit_f("%d: unknown", id);
return 0;
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
+ if (sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid status confirm message");
if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
return 0;
cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
- explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
- free(cc);
+ freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
return 0;
}
/* -- tcp forwarding */
void
channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af)
{
ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af;
}
/*
* Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the
* specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
* address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
* gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification
* and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'')
* will bind to whatever address the client asked for.
*
* Special-case listen_addrs are:
*
* "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
* "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6
* "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6
* "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set
*/
static const char *
-channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp,
+channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp,
int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
const char *addr = NULL;
int wildcard = 0;
if (listen_addr == NULL) {
/* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports)
wildcard = 1;
} else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) {
- if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
+ if (((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) ||
*listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
(!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) {
wildcard = 1;
/*
* Notify client if they requested a specific listen
* address and it was overridden.
*/
if (*listen_addr != '\0' &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) {
- packet_send_debug("Forwarding listen address "
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
+ "Forwarding listen address "
"\"%s\" overridden by server "
"GatewayPorts", listen_addr);
}
} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
- /* Accept localhost address when GatewayPorts=yes */
+ /*
+ * Accept explicit localhost address when
+ * GatewayPorts=yes. The "localhost" hostname is
+ * deliberately skipped here so it will listen on all
+ * available local address families.
+ */
addr = listen_addr;
}
} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
/*
* If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been
* requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in
* effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6.
*/
addr = listen_addr;
}
if (wildcardp != NULL)
*wildcardp = wildcard;
return addr;
}
static int
channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
Channel *c;
int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
const char *host, *addr;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
in_port_t *lport_p;
is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
host = fwd->connect_path;
} else {
host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host;
if (host == NULL) {
error("No forward host name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("Forward host name too long.");
return 0;
}
}
/* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */
- addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(fwd->listen_host, &wildcard,
+ addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, fwd->listen_host, &wildcard,
is_client, fwd_opts);
- debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__,
- type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
+ debug3_f("type %d wildcard %d addr %s", type, wildcard,
+ (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
/*
* getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
* set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port);
if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
if (addr == NULL) {
/* This really shouldn't happen */
- packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
} else {
- error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr,
+ error_f("getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
}
return 0;
}
if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
*allocated_listen_port = 0;
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
switch (ai->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
sin_port;
break;
case AF_INET6:
lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
sin6_port;
break;
default:
continue;
}
/*
* If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
* same port for all address families.
*/
if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
*allocated_listen_port > 0)
*lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
- error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
+ error_f("getnameinfo failed");
continue;
}
/* Create a port to listen for the host. */
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
+ if (sock == -1) {
/* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
continue;
}
set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
ntop, strport);
/* Bind the socket to the address. */
- if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
/*
* address can be in if use ipv6 address is
* already bound
*/
if (!ai->ai_next)
error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
else
verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
- if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
- error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/*
* fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
* record what we got.
*/
if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
fwd->listen_port == 0 &&
allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
*allocated_listen_port == 0) {
*allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock);
debug("Allocated listen port %d",
*allocated_listen_port);
}
/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "port listener", 1);
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr);
if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
- !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT))
+ !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT))
c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port;
else
c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port;
success = 1;
}
if (success == 0)
- error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__,
- fwd->listen_port);
+ error_f("cannot listen to port: %d", fwd->listen_port);
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return success;
}
static int
channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
const char *path;
Channel *c;
int port, sock;
mode_t omask;
switch (type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("Local connecting path too long: %s",
fwd->connect_path);
return 0;
}
path = fwd->connect_path;
port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) {
error("No forward host name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("Forward host name too long.");
return 0;
}
path = fwd->connect_host;
port = fwd->connect_port;
}
break;
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
path = fwd->listen_path;
port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
break;
default:
- error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type);
+ error_f("unexpected channel type %d", type);
return 0;
}
if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) {
error("No forward path name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path);
return 0;
}
- debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path);
+ debug3_f("type %d path %s", type, fwd->listen_path);
/* Start a Unix domain listener. */
omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask);
sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG,
fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink);
umask(omask);
if (sock < 0)
return 0;
debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path);
/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
c = channel_new(ssh, "unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "unix listener", 1);
c->path = xstrdup(path);
c->host_port = port;
c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host, u_short port)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
- debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
static int
channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->path == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
int
channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
}
}
static int
channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport,
struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
- const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts);
+ const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts);
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->listening_port != lport)
continue;
if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) {
/* skip dynamic forwardings */
if (c->host_port == 0)
continue;
} else {
if (c->host_port != cport)
continue;
}
if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) ||
(c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL))
continue;
if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
static int
channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
if (path == NULL) {
- error("%s: no path specified.", __func__);
+ error_f("no path specified.");
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->listening_addr == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
+ debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
int
channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts);
}
}
/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */
int
channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
} else {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts);
}
}
/* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */
static int
remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd)
{
int ret;
char *lhost;
/* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
return 1;
if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port)
return 0;
/* Match hostnames case-insensitively */
lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host);
lowercase(lhost);
ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host);
free(lhost);
return ret;
}
/* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */
static int
check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
struct permission *perm;
/* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
return permit && permit_adm;
}
/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
int
channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd,
int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) {
- packet_send_debug("port forwarding refused");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "port forwarding refused");
+ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
+ /* XXX always allowed, see remote_open_match() */
+ logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
+ "remote forward to path \"%.100s\", "
+ "but the request was denied.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ fwd->listen_path);
+ else if(fwd->listen_host != NULL)
+ logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
+ "remote forward to host %.100s port %d, "
+ "but the request was denied.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port );
+ else
+ logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to remote "
+ "forward, but the request was denied.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return 0;
}
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
} else {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port,
fwd_opts);
}
}
/*
* Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for
* this server.
*/
static const char *
channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host)
{
if (listen_host == NULL) {
return "localhost";
} else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) {
return "";
} else
return listen_host;
}
/*
* Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
* the secure channel to host:port from local side.
* Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with
* channel_update_permission().
*/
int
channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
int port_to_connect, listen_port;
/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request streamlocal: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request streamlocal");
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request tcpip-forward: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request tcpip-forward");
}
/* Assume that server accepts the request */
success = 1;
if (success) {
/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host);
port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port;
}
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
if (fwd->listen_host != NULL)
listen_host = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host);
listen_port = fwd->listen_port;
}
idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL,
host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
}
return idx;
}
static int
open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost,
int requestedport)
{
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport)
return 0;
if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 &&
strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Note that in the listen host/port case
* we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and
* need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host)
* and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host)
*/
static int
open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open,
const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate)
{
const char *allowed_host;
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport)
return 0;
if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL &&
requestedhost == NULL)
return 1;
allowed_host = translate ?
channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) :
allowed_open->listen_host;
if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL ||
strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open,
const char *requestedpath)
{
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL ||
strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from
* local side.
*/
static int
channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host, u_short port)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
int r;
u_int i;
- struct permission *perm;
+ struct permission *perm = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0))
break;
perm = NULL;
}
if (perm == NULL) {
- debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
+ debug_f("requested forward not found");
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send cancel");
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
return 0;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket
* path from local side.
*/
static int
channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
int r;
u_int i;
- struct permission *perm;
+ struct permission *perm = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path))
break;
perm = NULL;
}
if (perm == NULL) {
- debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
+ debug_f("requested forward not found");
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send cancel");
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
return 0;
}
-
+
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side.
*/
int
channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host,
fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port);
}
}
/*
* Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty. This is
* usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
* anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
*/
void
channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0)
pset->all_permitted = 1;
}
/*
* Permit the specified host/port for forwarding.
*/
void
channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
char *host, int port)
{
int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL;
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d",
fwd_ident(who, where), host, port);
/*
* Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set
* host/port_to_connect.
*/
permission_set_add(ssh, who, where,
local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0,
local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL);
pset->all_permitted = 0;
}
/*
* Administratively disable forwarding.
*/
void
channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
/*
* Clear a list of permitted opens.
*/
void
channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where)
{
struct permission **permp;
u_int *npermp;
permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp));
*npermp = 0;
}
/*
* Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after
* the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is
* passed then they entry will be invalidated.
*/
void
channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport)
{
struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms;
if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) {
- debug("%s: index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d",
- __func__, idx, pset->num_permitted_user);
+ debug_f("index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d",
+ idx, pset->num_permitted_user);
return;
}
debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d",
newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing",
newport,
pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect,
pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect);
if (newport <= 0)
fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]);
else {
pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port =
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport;
+ (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport;
}
}
/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
int
permitopen_port(const char *p)
{
int port;
if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
return port;
return -1;
}
/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
static int
connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
{
int sock, saved_errno;
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))];
for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) {
switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) {
case AF_UNIX:
/* unix:pathname instead of host:port */
sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr;
strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop));
strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport));
break;
case AF_INET:
case AF_INET6:
if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed");
continue;
}
break;
default:
continue;
}
if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype,
cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1)
- fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock);
+ fatal_f("set_nonblock(%d)", sock);
if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr,
cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): "
"%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
saved_errno = errno;
close(sock);
errno = saved_errno;
continue; /* fail -- try next */
}
if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX)
set_nodelay(sock);
debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) "
"in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock);
cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next;
return sock;
}
return -1;
}
static void
channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
{
free(cctx->host);
if (cctx->aitop) {
if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
free(cctx->aitop);
else
freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
}
memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
}
/*
* Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path,
* passing back the failure reason if appropriate.
*/
static int
connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype,
char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx,
int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
struct addrinfo hints;
int gaierr;
int sock = -1;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
struct addrinfo *ai;
if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) {
error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG));
return -1;
}
/*
* Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections.
* channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family
* and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX.
*/
ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr);
ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX;
ai->ai_socktype = socktype;
ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC;
sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr;
sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path));
cctx->aitop = ai;
} else {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = socktype;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop))
!= 0) {
if (errmsg != NULL)
*errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
}
cctx->host = xstrdup(name);
cctx->port = port;
cctx->ai = cctx->aitop;
if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) {
error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s",
name, port, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return sock;
}
/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
static Channel *
connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct channel_connect cctx;
Channel *c;
int sock;
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
&cctx, NULL, NULL);
if (sock == -1) {
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = port;
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
return c;
}
/*
* returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel
* that needs to deal with this connection.
*/
Channel *
channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host,
u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm,
listen_host, listen_port, 1)) {
if (perm->downstream)
return perm->downstream;
if (perm->port_to_connect == 0)
return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh,
ctype, rname);
return connect_to(ssh,
perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
ctype, rname);
}
}
error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
listen_port);
return NULL;
}
Channel *
channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) {
return connect_to(ssh,
perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
ctype, rname);
}
}
error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s",
path);
return NULL;
}
/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
Channel *
channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
struct channel_connect cctx;
Channel *c;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
int sock;
struct permission *perm;
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
- logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
- "but the request was denied.", host, port);
+ logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to connect to "
+ "host %.100s port %d, but the request was denied.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), host, port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
return NULL;
}
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
&cctx, reason, errmsg);
if (sock == -1) {
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = port;
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
return c;
}
/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
Channel *
channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
struct permission *perm;
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, "
"but the request was denied.", path);
return NULL;
}
return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname);
}
void
channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct winsize ws;
int r;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty ||
sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
- if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
continue;
channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: channel %u: send window-change: %s",
- __func__, i, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %u; send window-change", i);
}
}
/* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */
static Channel *
rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname)
{
Channel *c;
int r;
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = 0;
c->path = NULL;
/*
* We need to open the channel before we have a FD,
* so that we can get SOCKS header from peer.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__,
- c->self, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "channel %i; confirm", c->self);
return c;
}
/* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */
static int
rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
+ struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+ struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+ struct permission *perm;
struct channel_connect cctx;
+ u_int i, permit_adm = 1;
int sock;
+ if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
+ permit_adm = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
+ perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
+ if (open_match(perm, c->path, c->host_port)) {
+ permit_adm = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!permit_adm) {
+ debug_f("requested forward not permitted");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL,
NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL);
if (sock == -1)
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
else {
/* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH;
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0);
}
return sock;
}
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/*
* Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
* Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
* stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
*/
int
x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
{
Channel *nc = NULL;
int display_number, sock;
u_short port;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
if (chanids == NULL)
return -1;
for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
display_number++) {
port = 6000 + display_number;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport,
&hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
+ if (sock == -1) {
if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT
&& (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT)
#endif
) {
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return -1;
} else {
debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
ai->ai_family);
continue;
}
}
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
if (x11_use_localhost)
set_reuseaddr(sock);
- if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
- port, strerror(errno));
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
+ strerror(errno));
close(sock);
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
close(socks[n]);
num_socks = 0;
break;
}
socks[num_socks++] = sock;
if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (num_socks > 0)
break;
}
if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
return -1;
}
/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
sock = socks[n];
- if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
+ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sock);
return -1;
}
}
/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
*chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
sock = socks[n];
nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener",
SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
nc->single_connection = single_connection;
(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
}
(*chanids)[n] = -1;
/* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
*display_numberp = display_number;
return 0;
}
static int
connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
{
int sock;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0)
+ if (sock == -1)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
return sock;
close(sock);
error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
static int
connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
{
char buf[1024];
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
}
#ifdef __APPLE__
static int
is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen)
{
struct stat sbuf;
if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) {
error("%s: display path too long", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (display[0] != '/')
return 0;
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
} else {
char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
if (dot != NULL) {
*dot = '\0';
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
#endif
int
x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int display_number;
const char *display;
char buf[1024], *cp;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, sock = 0;
/* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (!display) {
error("DISPLAY not set.");
return -1;
}
/*
* Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
* connection to the real X server.
*/
#ifdef __APPLE__
/* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) {
debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd");
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
}
#endif
/*
* Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
* one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
*/
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
display[0] == ':') {
/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u",
&display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: "
"%.100s", display);
return -1;
}
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
/*
* Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly
* hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
*/
strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
cp = strchr(buf, ':');
if (!cp) {
error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
return -1;
}
*cp = 0;
/*
* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the
* display number.
*/
if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
display);
return -1;
}
/* Look up the host address */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
/* Create a socket. */
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
+ if (sock == -1) {
debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
/* Connect it to the display. */
- if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/* Success */
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (!ai) {
error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
set_nodelay(sock);
return sock;
}
/*
* Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
* data, and enables authentication spoofing.
* This should be called in the client only.
*/
void
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id,
const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
u_int i, value;
const char *cp;
char *new_data;
int r, screen_number;
if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL)
sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) {
error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
"$DISPLAY already forwarded");
return;
}
cp = strchr(disp, ':');
if (cp)
cp = strchr(cp, '.');
if (cp)
screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
else
screen_number = 0;
if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
/* Save protocol name. */
sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
/* Extract real authentication data. */
sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
- if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
+ if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) {
fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
"authentication data: %.100s", data);
+ }
sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value;
}
sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
/* Generate fake data of the same length. */
sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
}
/* Convert the fake data into hex. */
new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
/* Send the request packet. */
channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: send x11-req: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send x11-req");
free(new_data);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
index aa2a87c10edf..6bf86b003e53 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
@@ -1,344 +1,366 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.132 2018/10/04 00:10:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.138 2021/05/19 01:24:05 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef CHANNEL_H
#define CHANNEL_H
/* Definitions for channel types. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12
#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13
#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux client */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-slave */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-client */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN 21 /* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH 22 /* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 23
#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1
+/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE 0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET 1 /* set non-blocking state */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO 2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */
+
+/* c->restore_block mask flags */
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD 0x01
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD 0x02
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD 0x04
+
/* TCP forwarding */
#define FORWARD_DENY 0
#define FORWARD_REMOTE (1)
#define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1)
#define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
#define FORWARD_ADM 0x100
#define FORWARD_USER 0x101
struct ssh;
struct Channel;
typedef struct Channel Channel;
struct fwd_perm_list;
typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *);
typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int);
typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *);
typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *,
u_char **, size_t *);
/* Channel success/failure callbacks */
typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *);
typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *);
struct channel_confirm {
TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry;
channel_confirm_cb *cb;
channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb;
void *ctx;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm);
/* Context for non-blocking connects */
struct channel_connect {
char *host;
int port;
struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop;
};
/* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */
typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *);
+/*
+ * NB. channel IDs on the wire and in c->remote_id are uint32, but local
+ * channel IDs (e.g. c->self) only ever use the int32 subset of this range,
+ * because we use local channel ID -1 for housekeeping. Remote channels have
+ * a dedicated "have_remote_id" flag to indicate their validity.
+ */
+
struct Channel {
int type; /* channel type/state */
+
int self; /* my own channel identifier */
uint32_t remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */
int have_remote_id; /* non-zero if remote_id is valid */
u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */
u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */
int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */
int rfd; /* read fd */
int wfd; /* write fd */
int efd; /* extended fd */
int sock; /* sock fd */
int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */
int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */
#ifdef _AIX
int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */
#endif
int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */
int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */
time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */
int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created
* channels are delayed until the first call
* to a matching pre-select handler.
* this way post-select handlers are not
* accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
+ int restore_block; /* fd mask to restore blocking status */
struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over
* encrypted connection */
struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for
* send on socket */
struct sshbuf *extended;
char *path;
/* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */
char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */
int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */
char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */
u_int remote_window;
u_int remote_maxpacket;
u_int local_window;
u_int local_window_max;
u_int local_consumed;
u_int local_maxpacket;
int extended_usage;
int single_connection;
char *ctype; /* type */
/* callback */
channel_open_fn *open_confirm;
void *open_confirm_ctx;
channel_callback_fn *detach_user;
int detach_close;
struct channel_confirms status_confirms;
/* filter */
channel_infilter_fn *input_filter;
channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter;
void *filter_ctx;
channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup;
/* keep boundaries */
- int datagram;
+ int datagram;
/* non-blocking connect */
/* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */
struct channel_connect connect_ctx;
/* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */
mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb;
void *mux_ctx;
int mux_pause;
- int mux_downstream_id;
+ int mux_downstream_id;
};
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2
/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024)
#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
/* possible input states */
#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0
#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2
#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3
/* possible output states */
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3
#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01
#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02
#define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04
#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08
#define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10
/* Read buffer size */
#define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024)
+/* Maximum channel input buffer size */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_MAX (16*1024*1024)
+
/* Hard limit on number of channels */
#define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024)
/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
(c->efd != -1 || \
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
/* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */
void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh);
/* channel management */
Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int);
Channel *channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int);
Channel *channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int);
Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int,
u_int, u_int, int, char *, int);
void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int,
int, int, u_int);
void channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void channel_free_all(struct ssh *);
void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *);
void channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int,
channel_callback_fn *, int);
void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
channel_open_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *,
channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
-int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
+int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *);
void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
/* mux proxy support */
int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc);
int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* protocol handler */
int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *, fd_set **, fd_set **, int *,
- u_int*, time_t*);
+ u_int*, time_t*);
void channel_after_select(struct ssh *, fd_set *, fd_set *);
void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *);
int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *);
void channel_close_all(struct ssh *);
int channel_still_open(struct ssh *);
const char *channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *);
char *channel_open_message(struct ssh *);
int channel_find_open(struct ssh *);
/* tcp forwarding */
struct Forward;
struct ForwardOptions;
void channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af);
void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *, int, int, char *, int);
void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short,
char *, char *, int *, const char **);
Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
- u_short, int, int);
+ u_short, int, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
u_short, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
char *, char *);
int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
int *, struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
int, struct ForwardOptions *);
int permitopen_port(const char *);
/* x11 forwarding */
void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
/* channel close */
int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int);
void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *);
/* channel events */
void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c
similarity index 57%
copy from crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
copy to crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c
index 0899c5ad5b79..719f9c843d63 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c
@@ -1,119 +1,166 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.8 2016/08/03 05:41:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c,v 1.1 2020/04/03 04:32:21 djm Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20)
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h> /* needed for log.h */
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h> /* needed for misc.h */
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
-int
-chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
- const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+struct chachapoly_ctx {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *main_evp, *header_evp;
+};
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx *
+chachapoly_new(const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
{
+ struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx;
+
if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256);
- chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256);
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ctx->main_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+ (ctx->header_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->main_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key, NULL, 1))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->header_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key + 32, NULL, 1))
+ goto fail;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx->header_evp) != 16)
+ goto fail;
+ return ctx;
+ fail:
+ chachapoly_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+chachapoly_free(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx)
+{
+ if (cpctx == NULL)
+ return;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->main_evp);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->header_evp);
+ freezero(cpctx, sizeof(*cpctx));
}
/*
* chachapoly_crypt() operates as following:
* En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result
* to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated
* data for MAC calculation.
* En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use
* POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication
* tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
*/
int
chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt)
{
- u_char seqbuf[8];
- const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */
- u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
+ u_char seqbuf[16]; /* layout: u64 counter || u64 seqno */
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
/*
* Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
* packet sequence number.
*/
+ memset(seqbuf, 0, sizeof(seqbuf));
+ POKE_U64(seqbuf + 8, seqnr);
memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
- POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx,
- poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->main_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 1) ||
+ EVP_Cipher(ctx->main_evp, poly_key,
+ poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */
if (!do_encrypt) {
const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
goto out;
}
}
/* Crypt additional data */
if (aadlen) {
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen);
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->header_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 1) ||
+ EVP_Cipher(ctx->header_evp, dest, src, aadlen) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
/* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one);
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen,
- dest + aadlen, len);
+ seqbuf[0] = 1;
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->main_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 1) ||
+ EVP_Cipher(ctx->main_evp, dest + aadlen, src + aadlen, len) < 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
if (do_encrypt) {
poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
poly_key);
}
r = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
return r;
}
/* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */
int
chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
{
- u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8];
+ u_char buf[4], seqbuf[16];
if (len < 4)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
- chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
- chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4);
+ memset(seqbuf, 0, sizeof(seqbuf));
+ POKE_U64(seqbuf + 8, seqnr);
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->header_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 0))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if (EVP_Cipher(ctx->header_evp, buf, (u_char *)cp, sizeof(buf)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
*plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
return 0;
}
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
index 0899c5ad5b79..716f8d426a06 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.c
@@ -1,119 +1,139 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.8 2016/08/03 05:41:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.9 2020/04/03 04:27:03 djm Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) || defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20)
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h> /* needed for log.h */
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h> /* needed for misc.h */
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
-int
-chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
- const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+struct chachapoly_ctx {
+ struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx;
+};
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx *
+chachapoly_new(const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
{
+ struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx;
+
if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256);
chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256);
- return 0;
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+void
+chachapoly_free(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx)
+{
+ freezero(cpctx, sizeof(*cpctx));
}
/*
* chachapoly_crypt() operates as following:
* En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result
* to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated
* data for MAC calculation.
* En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use
* POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication
* tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
*/
int
chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt)
{
u_char seqbuf[8];
const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */
u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/*
* Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
* packet sequence number.
*/
memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx,
poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
/* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */
if (!do_encrypt) {
const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
goto out;
}
}
/* Crypt additional data */
if (aadlen) {
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen);
}
/* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen,
dest + aadlen, len);
/* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
if (do_encrypt) {
poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
poly_key);
}
r = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
return r;
}
/* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */
int
chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
{
u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8];
if (len < 4)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4);
*plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
return 0;
}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) || defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.h b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.h
index b7072be7d9d6..026d2de93a3a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-chachapoly.h
@@ -1,41 +1,40 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.5 2020/04/03 04:27:03 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
#define CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "chacha.h"
#include "poly1305.h"
#define CHACHA_KEYLEN 32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */
-struct chachapoly_ctx {
- struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx;
-};
+struct chachapoly_ctx;
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx *chachapoly_new(const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 1, 2)));
+void chachapoly_free(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx);
-int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
- const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr,
u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen,
int do_encrypt);
int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
#endif /* CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
index 12c5988816cf..5b3a86d69219 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
@@ -1,527 +1,539 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.111 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.119 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cipher.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
+#endif
struct sshcipher_ctx {
int plaintext;
int encrypt;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;
- struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+ struct chachapoly_ctx *cp_ctx;
struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
};
struct sshcipher {
char *name;
u_int block_size;
u_int key_len;
u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
u_int auth_len;
u_int flags;
#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
#else
void *ignored;
#endif
};
static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
{ "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
#endif
{ "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
{ "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
{ "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
- { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
- 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
{ "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
{ "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
{ "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */
#else
{ "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
#endif
{ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com",
8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
{ "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
{ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
};
/*--*/
/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
char *
cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
{
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0)
continue;
if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
continue;
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(c->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
+const char *
+compression_alg_list(int compression)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+ return compression ? "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none" :
+ "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
+#else
+ return "none";
+#endif
+}
+
u_int
cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->block_size);
}
u_int
cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->key_len);
}
u_int
cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0)
return 14;
return cipher_keylen(c);
}
u_int
cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->auth_len);
}
u_int
cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
/*
* Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that
* needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default?
*/
return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ?
c->iv_len : c->block_size;
}
u_int
cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0;
}
u_int
cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
return cc->plaintext;
}
const struct sshcipher *
cipher_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
return c;
return NULL;
}
#define CIPHER_SEP ","
int
ciphers_valid(const char *names)
{
const struct sshcipher *c;
char *cipher_list, *cp;
char *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
c = cipher_by_name(p);
if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
free(cipher_list);
return 0;
}
}
free(cipher_list);
return 1;
}
const char *
cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
return NULL;
/* XXX repurpose for CBC warning */
return NULL;
}
int
cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
int do_encrypt)
{
struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const EVP_CIPHER *type;
int klen;
#endif
*ccp = NULL;
if ((cc = calloc(sizeof(*cc), 1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0;
cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
if (keylen < cipher->key_len ||
(iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
cc->cipher = cipher;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
- ret = chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen);
+ cc->cp_ctx = chachapoly_new(key, keylen);
+ ret = cc->cp_ctx != NULL ? 0 : SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen);
aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
type = (*cipher->evptype)();
if ((cc->evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
(do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-1, (u_char *)iv)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(cc->evp);
if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(cc->evp, keylen) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
out:
if (ret == 0) {
/* success */
*ccp = cc;
} else {
if (cc != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
- free(cc);
+ freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* cipher_crypt() operates as following:
* Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'.
- * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
+ * These bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
* authenticated encryption modes.
* En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
* Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
* This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
* Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
*/
int
cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
- return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
+ return chachapoly_crypt(cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len);
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (aadlen)
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen,
dest + aadlen, len);
return 0;
}
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#else
if (authlen) {
u_char lastiv[1];
if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* increment IV */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
1, lastiv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
/* set tag on decyption */
if (!cc->encrypt &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
if (aadlen) {
if (authlen &&
EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
}
if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
len) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (authlen) {
/* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
return cc->encrypt ?
SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
if (cc->encrypt &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
return 0;
#endif
}
/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */
int
cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
const u_char *cp, u_int len)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
- return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
+ return chachapoly_get_length(cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
cp, len);
if (len < 4)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
*plenp = PEEK_U32(cp);
return 0;
}
void
cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL)
return;
- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
- explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx));
- else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+ chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
+ cc->cp_ctx = NULL;
+ } else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
cc->evp = NULL;
#endif
- explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
- free(cc);
+ freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
}
/*
* Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key
* state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
* process.
*/
int
cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return 0;
else if ((c->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
return sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
int
cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, size_t len)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
if (len != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len);
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
if (evplen == 0)
return 0;
else if (evplen < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if ((size_t)evplen != len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
- len, iv))
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ len, iv))
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(cc->evp, iv, len))
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
#endif
return 0;
}
int
cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv, size_t len)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen = 0;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return 0;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
if (evplen <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if ((size_t)evplen != len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
/* XXX iv arg is const, but ssh_aes_ctr_iv isn't */
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, evplen);
else
#endif
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
/* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp,
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(cc->evp, iv, evplen))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
#endif
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.h b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
index dc1571d2eca9..1a591cd7fd46 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
@@ -1,75 +1,78 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.52 2017/05/07 23:12:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.55 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef CIPHER_H
#define CIPHER_H
#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
struct sshcipher;
struct sshcipher_ctx;
const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
int ciphers_valid(const char *);
char *cipher_alg_list(char, int);
+const char *compression_alg_list(int);
int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *,
const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
u_int, u_int, u_int);
int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int,
const u_char *, u_int);
void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, size_t);
int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t);
int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
#endif /* CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
index 8d312cdaa755..bfcd50c263fd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
@@ -1,2358 +1,2598 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.318 2018/09/21 12:46:22 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.369 2021/07/23 04:04:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*
* SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
/* import options */
extern Options options;
-/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
-extern int stdin_null_flag;
-
-/* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */
-extern int no_shell_flag;
-
-/* Flag indicating that ssh should daemonise after authentication is complete */
-extern int fork_after_authentication_flag;
-
/* Control socket */
extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */
/*
* Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
- * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
* configuration file.
*/
extern char *host;
+/*
+ * If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different
+ * instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK.
+ */
+extern char *forward_agent_sock_path;
+
/*
* Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
* not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
* window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
* because this is updated in a signal handler.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
-/* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */
-static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
-
/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
/* Common data for the client loop code. */
volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */
static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */
static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */
static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */
static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
+static time_t server_alive_time; /* Time to do server_alive_check */
-static void client_init_dispatch(void);
+static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh);
int session_ident = -1;
/* Track escape per proto2 channel */
struct escape_filter_ctx {
int escape_pending;
int escape_char;
};
/* Context for channel confirmation replies */
struct channel_reply_ctx {
const char *request_type;
int id;
enum confirm_action action;
};
/* Global request success/failure callbacks */
/* XXX move to struct ssh? */
struct global_confirm {
TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
global_confirm_cb *cb;
void *ctx;
int ref_count;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *);
-/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */
-
-static void
-leave_non_blocking(void)
-{
- if (in_non_blocking_mode) {
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
- in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
- }
-}
-
/*
* Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a
* flag indicating that the window has changed.
*/
/*ARGSUSED */
static void
window_change_handler(int sig)
{
received_window_change_signal = 1;
}
/*
* Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These
* signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
*/
/*ARGSUSED */
static void
signal_handler(int sig)
{
received_signal = sig;
quit_pending = 1;
}
/*
* Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
* backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
* ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
* control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
*/
static void
set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
|| options.control_persist_timeout == 0) {
/* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
} else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) {
/* some client connections are still open */
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
- debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__);
+ debug2_f("cancel scheduled exit");
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
} else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
/* a client connection has recently closed */
control_persist_exit_time = monotime() +
(time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
- debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__,
+ debug2_f("schedule exit in %d seconds",
options.control_persist_timeout);
}
/* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
}
#define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_"
static int
client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
{
size_t i, dlen;
if (display == NULL)
return 0;
dlen = strlen(display);
for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) {
debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60
int
client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display,
const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout,
char **_proto, char **_data)
{
char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512];
char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
static char proto[512], data[512];
FILE *f;
int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r;
struct stat st;
u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
*_proto = proto;
*_data = data;
proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
if (display != NULL)
logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
display);
return -1;
}
if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
debug("No xauth program.");
xauth_path = NULL;
}
if (xauth_path != NULL) {
/*
* Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
* not match an authorization entry. For this we
* just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
* XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
* is not perfect.
*/
if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
display + 10)) < 0 ||
(size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
- error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
+ error_f("display name too long");
return -1;
}
display = xdisplay;
}
if (trusted == 0) {
/*
* Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
*
* The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
* ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
* avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
*/
mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
- error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("mkdtemp: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
do_unlink = 1;
if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
"%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
(size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
- error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
- unlink(xauthfile);
+ error_f("xauthfile path too long");
rmdir(xauthdir);
return -1;
}
if (timeout == 0) {
/* auth doesn't time out */
xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
"untrusted 2>%s",
xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL);
} else {
/* Add some slack to requested expiry */
if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
x11_timeout_real = timeout +
X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
else {
/* Don't overflow on long timeouts */
x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
}
xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
"untrusted timeout %u 2>%s",
xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real,
_PATH_DEVNULL);
}
- debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd);
+ debug2_f("xauth command: %s", cmd);
if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) {
now = monotime() + 1;
if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
else
x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh,
x11_refuse_time);
}
if (system(cmd) == 0)
generated = 1;
free(cmd);
}
/*
* When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
* successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
* above.
*/
if (trusted || generated) {
xasprintf(&cmd,
"%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
xauth_path,
generated ? "-f " : "" ,
generated ? xauthfile : "",
display);
debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
f = popen(cmd, "r");
if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
got_data = 1;
if (f)
pclose(f);
free(cmd);
}
}
if (do_unlink) {
unlink(xauthfile);
rmdir(xauthdir);
}
/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
if (!trusted && !got_data) {
error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
"xauth key data not generated");
return -1;
}
/*
* If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
* data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
* response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
* server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
* whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
* for the local connection.
*/
if (!got_data) {
u_int8_t rnd[16];
u_int i;
logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
"using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) {
snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
rnd[i]);
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
* the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
* interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
* appropriate.
*/
static void
client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (!received_window_change_signal)
return;
- /** XXX race */
received_window_change_signal = 0;
-
- debug2("%s: changed", __func__);
-
+ debug2_f("changed");
channel_send_window_changes(ssh);
}
static int
client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct global_confirm *gc;
if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (gc->cb != NULL)
gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx);
if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
- explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
- free(gc);
+ freezero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
}
- packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
return 0;
}
static void
-server_alive_check(void)
+schedule_server_alive_check(void)
{
- if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0)
+ server_alive_time = monotime() + options.server_alive_interval;
+}
+
+static void
+server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) {
logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
- packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* boolean: want reply */
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
/* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
+ schedule_server_alive_check();
}
/*
* Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
* one of the file descriptors).
*/
static void
client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int timeout_secs;
- time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime();
+ time_t minwait_secs = 0, now = monotime();
int r, ret;
/* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
- channel_prepare_select(active_state, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
+ channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
nallocp, &minwait_secs);
/* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) &&
- !packet_have_data_to_write()) {
+ !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
/* clear mask since we did not call select() */
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
return;
}
FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
/* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
- if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+ if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh))
FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
/*
* Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until
* some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
* event pending, or a timeout expires.
*/
timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
- if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) {
- timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
- server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
- }
+ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0)
+ timeout_secs = MAXIMUM(server_alive_time - now, 0);
if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying)
- timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout());
+ timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
+ ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh));
set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh);
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
control_persist_exit_time - now);
if (timeout_secs < 0)
timeout_secs = 0;
}
if (minwait_secs != 0)
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs);
if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX)
tvp = NULL;
else {
tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
tvp = &tv;
}
ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -1) {
/*
* We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
* We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
* set by the signal handlers.
*/
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
-
if (errno == EINTR)
return;
/* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
quit_pending = 1;
- } else if (ret == 0) {
+ } else if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && !FD_ISSET(connection_in,
+ *readsetp) && monotime() >= server_alive_time)
/*
- * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying.
- * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop.
+ * ServerAlive check is needed. We can't rely on the select
+ * timing out since traffic on the client side such as port
+ * forwards can keep waking it up.
*/
- if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime())
- server_alive_check();
- }
-
+ server_alive_check(ssh);
}
static void
client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr)
{
/* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0)
atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout),
sshbuf_len(bout));
if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0)
atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr),
sshbuf_len(berr));
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
sshbuf_reset(bin);
sshbuf_reset(bout);
sshbuf_reset(berr);
/* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
/* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
received_window_change_signal = 1;
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
}
static void
-client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
+client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset)
{
char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
int r, len;
/*
* Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
* the packet subsystem.
*/
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+ schedule_server_alive_check();
/* Read as much as possible. */
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
/*
* Received EOF. The remote host has closed the
* connection.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
host)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
quit_pending = 1;
return;
}
/*
* There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
* sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
*/
- if (len < 0 &&
+ if (len == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
len = 0;
- if (len < 0) {
+ if (len == -1) {
/*
* An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a
* network problem.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
host, strerror(errno))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
quit_pending = 1;
return;
}
- packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+ ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len);
}
}
static void
client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
{
struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
char errmsg[256];
int r, tochan;
/*
* If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate
* one is fatal.
*/
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY &&
(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE ||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
/* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */
tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
cr->request_type, c->self);
} else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
if (tochan) {
snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
"%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
} else {
snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
"%s request failed on channel %d",
cr->request_type, c->self);
}
/* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident)
fatal("%s", errmsg);
/*
* If error occurred on mux client, append to
* their stderr.
*/
if (tochan) {
+ debug3_f("channel %d: mux request: %s", c->self,
+ cr->request_type);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg,
strlen(errmsg))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error %s", __func__,
- ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
} else
error("%s", errmsg);
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) {
/*
* If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange
* for the correct TTY to leave raw mode.
*/
if (c->self == session_ident)
leave_raw_mode(0);
else
mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c);
} else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
}
free(cr);
}
static void
client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx)
{
free(ctx);
}
void
client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request,
enum confirm_action action)
{
struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr));
cr->request_type = request;
cr->action = action;
channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm,
client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
}
void
client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
{
struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
/* Coalesce identical callbacks */
last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d",
- __func__, last_gc->ref_count);
+ fatal_f("last_gc->ref_count = %d",
+ last_gc->ref_count);
return;
}
gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc));
gc->cb = cb;
gc->ctx = ctx;
gc->ref_count = 1;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
}
static void
process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh)
{
void (*handler)(int);
char *s, *cmd;
int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
if (s == NULL)
goto out;
while (isspace((u_char)*s))
s++;
if (*s == '-')
s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
if (*s == '\0')
goto out;
if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
logit("Commands:");
logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
"Request local forward");
logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
"Request remote forward");
logit(" -D[bind_address:]port "
"Request dynamic forward");
logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel local forward");
logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel remote forward");
logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel dynamic forward");
if (!options.permit_local_command)
goto out;
logit(" !args "
"Execute local command");
goto out;
}
if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
s++;
ssh_local_cmd(s);
goto out;
}
if (*s == 'K') {
delete = 1;
s++;
}
if (*s == 'L')
local = 1;
else if (*s == 'R')
remote = 1;
else if (*s == 'D')
dynamic = 1;
else {
logit("Invalid command.");
goto out;
}
while (isspace((u_char)*++s))
;
/* XXX update list of forwards in options */
if (delete) {
/* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */
if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) {
logit("Bad forwarding close specification.");
goto out;
}
if (remote)
ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0;
else if (dynamic)
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
else
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
&options.fwd_opts) > 0;
if (!ok) {
logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
goto out;
}
logit("Canceled forwarding.");
} else {
if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
goto out;
}
if (local || dynamic) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
} else {
if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
}
logit("Forwarding port.");
}
out:
- signal(SIGINT, handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler);
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
free(cmd);
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
#define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */
#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */
#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */
#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */
struct escape_help_text {
const char *cmd;
const char *text;
unsigned int flags;
};
static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
{".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
{".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
};
static void
print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client,
int using_stderr)
{
unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
"%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
suppress_flags =
(mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
(mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
(using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
" %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
"(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
"newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
/*
* Process the characters one by one.
*/
static int
process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr,
char *buf, int len)
{
pid_t pid;
int r, bytes = 0;
u_int i;
u_char ch;
char *s;
struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ?
NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (len <= 0)
return (0);
for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
/* Get one character at a time. */
ch = buf[i];
if (efc->escape_pending) {
/* We have previously seen an escape character. */
/* Clear the flag now. */
efc->escape_pending = 0;
/* Process the escaped character. */
switch (ch) {
case '.':
/* Terminate the connection. */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
if (c->detach_user) {
c->detach_user(ssh,
c->self, NULL);
}
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED;
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
return 0;
} else
quit_pending = 1;
return -1;
case 'Z' - 64:
/* XXX support this for mux clients */
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
char b[16];
noescape:
if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
else
snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%s escape not available to "
"multiplexed sessions\r\n",
efc->escape_char, b)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
continue;
}
/* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
/* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
/* We have been continued. */
continue;
case 'B':
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__,
- ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
continue;
case 'R':
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
logit("Server does not "
"support re-keying");
else
need_rekeying = 1;
continue;
case 'V':
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'v':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
continue;
}
if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
log_change_level(--options.log_level);
if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_change_level(++options.log_level);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n",
efc->escape_char, ch,
log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
continue;
case '&':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
/*
* Detach the program (continue to serve
* connections, but put in background and no
* more new connections).
*/
/* Restore tty modes. */
leave_raw_mode(
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/* Stop listening for new connections. */
channel_stop_listening(ssh);
- if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
- "%c& [backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char))
- != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c& "
+ "[backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
/* Fork into background. */
pid = fork();
- if (pid < 0) {
+ if (pid == -1) {
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */
/* The parent just exits. */
exit(0);
}
/* The child continues serving connections. */
/* fake EOF on stdin */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
return -1;
case '?':
print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char,
(c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
log_is_on_stderr());
continue;
case '#':
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
s = channel_open_message(ssh);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
free(s);
continue;
case 'C':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
process_cmdline(ssh);
continue;
default:
if (ch != efc->escape_char) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin,
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
bytes++;
}
/* Escaped characters fall through here */
break;
}
} else {
/*
* The previous character was not an escape char.
* Check if this is an escape.
*/
if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) {
/*
* It is. Set the flag and continue to
* next character.
*/
efc->escape_pending = 1;
continue;
}
}
/*
* Normal character. Record whether it was a newline,
* and append it to the buffer.
*/
last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
bytes++;
}
return bytes;
}
/*
* Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
* there are packets available.
*
* Any unknown packets received during the actual
* session cause the session to terminate. This is
* intended to make debugging easier since no
* confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol
* extensions must be negotiated during the
* preparatory phase.
*/
static void
-client_process_buffered_input_packets(void)
+client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending);
+ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending);
}
/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
void *
client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
{
struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->escape_pending = 0;
ret->escape_char = escape_char;
return (void *)ret;
}
/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
void
client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx)
{
free(ctx);
}
int
client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
{
if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
return 0;
return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended,
buf, len);
}
static void
client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
session_closed = 1;
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
}
/*
* Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after
* the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
* remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
* used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
*/
int
client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
int ssh2_chan_id)
{
fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
double start_time, total_time;
int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
u_int nalloc = 0;
- char buf[100];
debug("Entering interactive session.");
if (options.control_master &&
!option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) {
debug("pledge: id");
- if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd proc exec id tty",
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty",
NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
} else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) {
debug("pledge: exec");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty",
NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
} else if (options.update_hostkeys) {
debug("pledge: filesystem full");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty",
NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
} else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
- fork_after_authentication_flag) {
+ options.fork_after_authentication) {
debug("pledge: proc");
if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
} else {
debug("pledge: network");
if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
}
start_time = monotime_double();
/* Initialize variables. */
last_was_cr = 1;
exit_status = -1;
- connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+ connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+ connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out);
quit_pending = 0;
/* Initialize buffer. */
if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- client_init_dispatch();
+ client_init_dispatch(ssh);
/*
* Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
* but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
*/
- if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
if (have_pty)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
if (session_ident != -1) {
if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident,
client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
client_filter_cleanup,
client_new_escape_filter_ctx(
escape_char_arg));
}
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident,
client_channel_closed, 0);
}
+ schedule_server_alive_check();
+
/* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
while (!quit_pending) {
/* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
- client_process_buffered_input_packets();
+ client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh))
break;
if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
debug("rekeying in progress");
} else if (need_rekeying) {
/* manual rekey request */
debug("need rekeying");
if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__,
- ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "kex_start_rekex");
need_rekeying = 0;
} else {
/*
* Make packets from buffered channel data, and
* enqueue them for sending to the server.
*/
- if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
channel_output_poll(ssh);
/*
* Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
* message about it to the server if so.
*/
client_check_window_change(ssh);
if (quit_pending)
break;
}
/*
* Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
* available on one of the descriptors).
*/
max_fd2 = max_fd;
client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset,
&max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh));
if (quit_pending)
break;
/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
/* Buffer input from the connection. */
- client_process_net_input(readset);
+ client_process_net_input(ssh, readset);
if (quit_pending)
break;
+ /* A timeout may have triggered rekeying */
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "cannot start rekeying");
+
/*
* Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
* sender.
*/
- if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
- packet_write_poll();
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+ "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__);
+ }
+ }
/*
* If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
* timeout has expired without any active client
* connections, then quit.
*/
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) {
debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
break;
}
}
}
free(readset);
free(writeset);
/* Terminate the session. */
/* Stop watching for window change. */
- signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION);
- packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user");
- packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language tag */
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send disconnect");
channel_free_all(ssh);
if (have_pty)
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- /* restore blocking io */
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
- if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
- unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
-
/*
* If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
* exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the
* connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
*/
- if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
+ if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
received_signal = 0;
exit_status = 0;
}
if (received_signal) {
verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
- cleanup_exit(0);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
* that the connection has been closed.
*/
if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
/* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) {
len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr),
(u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer),
sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer));
if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer))
error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_consume");
}
/* Clear and free any buffers. */
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer);
/* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
total_time = monotime_double() - start_time;
- packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
+ ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
if (total_time > 0)
verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
/* Return the exit status of the program. */
debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
return exit_status;
}
/*********/
static Channel *
client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type,
int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *listen_address, *originator_address;
- u_short listen_port, originator_port;
+ u_int listen_port, originator_port;
int r;
/* Get rest of the packet */
- listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
- listen_port = packet_get_int();
- originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
- originator_port = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
- debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__,
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+ debug_f("listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d",
listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
- c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh, listen_address, listen_port,
- "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address);
+ if (listen_port > 0xffff)
+ error_f("invalid listen port");
+ else if (originator_port > 0xffff)
+ error_f("invalid originator port");
+ else {
+ c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh,
+ listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip",
+ originator_address);
+ }
if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: alloc reply", __func__);
+ error_f("alloc reply");
goto out;
}
/* reconstruct and send to muxclient */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) {
- error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__,
- ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "compose for muxclient");
goto out;
}
}
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(originator_address);
free(listen_address);
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *listen_path;
+ int r;
/* Get the remote path. */
- listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
- /* XXX: Skip reserved field for now. */
- if (packet_get_string_ptr(NULL) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: packet_get_string_ptr failed", __func__);
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
- debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path);
+ debug_f("request: %s", listen_path);
c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path,
"forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal");
free(listen_path);
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *originator;
- u_short originator_port;
- int sock;
+ u_int originator_port;
+ int r, sock;
if (!options.forward_x11) {
error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
"expired");
return NULL;
}
- originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
- originator_port = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
/* XXX check permission */
- debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator,
+ /* XXX range check originator port? */
+ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator,
originator_port);
free(originator);
sock = x11_connect_display(ssh);
if (sock < 0)
return NULL;
c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
c->force_drain = 1;
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
int r, sock;
if (!options.forward_agent) {
error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
- if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) {
+ if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) {
+ r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock);
+ } else {
+ r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock);
+ }
+ if (r != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
- debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_fr(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket");
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
"authentication agent connection", 1);
c->force_drain = 1;
return c;
}
char *
client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode,
- int local_tun, int remote_tun)
+ int local_tun, int remote_tun, channel_open_fn *cb, void *cbctx)
{
Channel *c;
- int fd;
+ int r, fd;
char *ifname = NULL;
if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
return 0;
debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
/* Open local tunnel device */
if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) {
error("Tunnel device open failed.");
return NULL;
}
debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
c->datagram = 1;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
#endif
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com");
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_put_int(tun_mode);
- packet_put_int(remote_tun);
- packet_send();
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, cb, cbctx);
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
return ifname;
}
/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
static int
client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- char *ctype;
- int rchan;
- u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
-
- ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
- rchan = packet_get_int();
- rwindow = packet_get_int();
- rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
+ char *ctype = NULL;
+ int r;
+ u_int rchan;
+ size_t len;
+ u_int rmaxpack, rwindow;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
+ goto out;
debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow,
rmaxpack);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan);
}
if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype);
} else if (c != NULL) {
debug("confirm %s", ctype);
c->remote_id = rchan;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = rwindow;
c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
} else {
debug("failure %s", ctype);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(rchan);
- packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
- packet_put_cstring("open failed");
- packet_put_cstring("");
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
}
+ r = 0;
+ out:
free(ctype);
- return 0;
+ return r;
}
static int
client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- int exitval, id, reply, success = 0;
- char *rtype;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
+ char *rtype = NULL;
+ u_char reply;
+ u_int id, exitval;
+ int r, success = 0;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (id <= INT_MAX)
+ c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- reply = packet_get_char();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0)
+ goto out;
- debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d",
+ debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d",
id, rtype, reply);
- if (id == -1) {
- error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1");
- } else if (c == NULL) {
+ if (c == NULL) {
error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
"unknown channel", id);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) {
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
- exitval = packet_get_int();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0)
+ goto out;
if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval);
success = 1;
- } else if (id == session_ident) {
+ } else if ((int)id == session_ident) {
/* Record exit value of local session */
success = 1;
exit_status = exitval;
} else {
/* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */
- debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
- __func__, id);
+ debug_f("no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
+ id);
}
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
}
if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
- __func__, c->self);
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_send();
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
}
+ r = 0;
+ out:
free(rtype);
- return 0;
+ return r;
}
struct hostkeys_update_ctx {
/* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */
char *host_str, *ip_str;
/*
* Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating
* whether they already exist in known_hosts.
- * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
+ * keys_match is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
* keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm().
*/
struct sshkey **keys;
- int *keys_seen;
- size_t nkeys, nnew;
+ u_int *keys_match; /* mask of HKF_MATCH_* from hostfile.h */
+ int *keys_verified; /* flag for new keys verified by server */
+ size_t nkeys, nnew, nincomplete; /* total, new keys, incomplete match */
/*
* Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update
* from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted).
* Filled in by hostkeys_find().
*/
struct sshkey **old_keys;
size_t nold;
+
+ /* Various special cases. */
+ int complex_hostspec; /* wildcard or manual pattern-list host name */
+ int ca_available; /* saw CA key for this host */
+ int old_key_seen; /* saw old key with other name/addr */
+ int other_name_seen; /* saw key with other name/addr */
};
static void
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
{
size_t i;
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++)
sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
free(ctx->keys);
- free(ctx->keys_seen);
+ free(ctx->keys_match);
+ free(ctx->keys_verified);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++)
sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]);
free(ctx->old_keys);
free(ctx->host_str);
free(ctx->ip_str);
free(ctx);
}
+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if a known_hosts hostname list is not of a form that
+ * can be handled by UpdateHostkeys. These include wildcard hostnames and
+ * hostnames lists that do not follow the form host[,ip].
+ */
+static int
+hostspec_is_complex(const char *hosts)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ /* wildcard */
+ if (strchr(hosts, '*') != NULL || strchr(hosts, '?') != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ /* single host/ip = ok */
+ if ((cp = strchr(hosts, ',')) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* more than two entries on the line */
+ if (strchr(cp + 1, ',') != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ /* XXX maybe parse cp+1 and ensure it is an IP? */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* callback to search for ctx->keys in known_hosts */
static int
hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
size_t i;
struct sshkey **tmp;
- if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL)
+ if (l->key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
+ /* Record if one of the keys appears on a non-matching line */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
+ ctx->other_name_seen = 1;
+ debug3_f("found %s key under different "
+ "name/addr at %s:%ld",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]),
+ l->path, l->linenum);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
return 0;
+ }
+ /* Don't proceed if revocation or CA markers are present */
+ /* XXX relax this */
+ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+ debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld has CA/revocation marker",
+ l->path, l->linenum);
+ ctx->complex_hostspec = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
- if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
- debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
- sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
- ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1;
+ /* If CheckHostIP is enabled, then check for mismatched hostname/addr */
+ if (ctx->ip_str != NULL && strchr(l->hosts, ',') != NULL) {
+ if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST) == 0) {
+ /* Record if address matched a different hostname. */
+ ctx->other_name_seen = 1;
+ debug3_f("found address %s against different hostname "
+ "at %s:%ld", ctx->ip_str, l->path, l->linenum);
return 0;
+ } else if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_IP) == 0) {
+ /* Record if hostname matched a different address. */
+ ctx->other_name_seen = 1;
+ debug3_f("found hostname %s against different address "
+ "at %s:%ld", ctx->host_str, l->path, l->linenum);
}
}
+
+ /*
+ * UpdateHostkeys is skipped for wildcard host names and hostnames
+ * that contain more than two entries (ssh never writes these).
+ */
+ if (hostspec_is_complex(l->hosts)) {
+ debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld complex host specification",
+ l->path, l->linenum);
+ ctx->complex_hostspec = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i]))
+ continue;
+ debug3_f("found %s key at %s:%ld",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
+ ctx->keys_match[i] |= l->match;
+ return 0;
+ }
/* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */
- debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
- sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+ debug3_f("deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(l->key),
+ l->path, l->linenum);
if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1,
sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nold = %zu",
- __func__, ctx->nold);
+ fatal_f("recallocarray failed nold = %zu", ctx->nold);
ctx->old_keys = tmp;
ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key;
l->key = NULL;
return 0;
}
+/* callback to search for ctx->old_keys in known_hosts under other names */
+static int
+hostkeys_check_old(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+ size_t i;
+ int hashed;
+
+ /* only care about lines that *don't* match the active host spec */
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ hashed = l->match & (HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED);
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+ if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->old_keys[i]))
+ continue;
+ debug3_f("found deprecated %s key at %s:%ld as %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->old_keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum,
+ hashed ? "[HASHED]" : l->hosts);
+ ctx->old_key_seen = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check known_hosts files for deprecated keys under other names. Returns 0
+ * on success or -1 on failure. Updates ctx->old_key_seen if deprecated keys
+ * exist under names other than the active hostname/IP.
+ */
+static int
+check_old_keys_othernames(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ int r;
+
+ debug2_f("checking for %zu deprecated keys", ctx->nold);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+ debug3_f("searching %s for %s / %s",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str,
+ ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)");
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+ hostkeys_check_old, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+ HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel)
+{
+ do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys.");
+ do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's "
+ "existing trusted key.");
+}
+
static void
update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
{
- int r, was_raw = 0;
- int loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ?
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+ int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1;
+ int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK;
+ LogLevel loglevel = asking ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
char *fp, *response;
size_t i;
+ struct stat sb;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
- if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
+ if (!ctx->keys_verified[i])
continue;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ if (first && asking)
+ hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+ first = 0;
free(fp);
}
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ if (first && asking)
+ hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+ first = 0;
free(fp);
}
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) {
leave_raw_mode(1);
was_raw = 1;
}
response = NULL;
for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) {
free(response);
response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
"(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
break;
else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
break;
} else {
do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter "
"\"yes\" or \"no\"");
}
}
if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL)
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
free(response);
if (was_raw)
enter_raw_mode(1);
}
-
+ if (options.update_hostkeys == 0)
+ return;
/*
* Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace
* them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't
* cancel the operation).
*/
- if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 &&
- (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0],
- ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys,
- options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
- options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0)
- error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+ /*
+ * NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we
+ * just delete the hostname entries.
+ */
+ if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug_f("known hosts file %s does not "
+ "exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ } else {
+ error_f("known hosts file %s "
+ "inaccessible: %s",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i], strerror(errno));
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+ ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+ i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0,
+ options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+ options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ }
+ }
}
static void
client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
{
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
size_t i, ndone;
struct sshbuf *signdata;
int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
const u_char *sig;
size_t siglen;
if (ctx->nnew == 0)
- fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */
+ fatal_f("ctx->nnew == 0"); /* sanity */
if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
error("Server failed to confirm ownership of "
"private host keys");
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
return;
}
kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- /* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */
- if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/*
* Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we
* haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the
- * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0.
+ * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_match[i] == 0.
*/
for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
- if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
+ if (ctx->keys_match[i])
continue;
/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
sshbuf_reset(signdata);
if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id,
- ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(signdata,
+ ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose signdata");
/* Extract and verify signature */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
- error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse sig");
goto out;
}
/*
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
+ debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using %s sigalg",
+ sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i,
+ use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : "default");
if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
- use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0)) != 0) {
- error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
- __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+ use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
+ NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
+ sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
goto out;
}
/* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */
- ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2;
+ ctx->keys_verified[i] = 1;
ndone++;
}
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
if (ndone != ctx->nnew)
- fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__,
- ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */
- ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh);
+ fatal_f("ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", ndone, ctx->nnew);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_f("protocol error");
+ goto out;
+ }
/* Make the edits to known_hosts */
update_known_hosts(ctx);
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
}
/*
* Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
* Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
*/
static int
key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
- const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
- options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
+ const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms;
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
return 0;
if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
(match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
return 1;
return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
}
/*
* Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
* the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
* HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted.
*/
static int
-client_input_hostkeys(void)
+client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
const u_char *blob = NULL;
size_t i, len = 0;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
int r;
char *fp;
static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ u_int want;
if (hostkeys_seen)
- fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__);
+ fatal_f("server already sent hostkeys");
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
options.batch_mode)
return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
return 1;
ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
- error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse key");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto out;
+ do_log2_fr(r, r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ "convert key");
+ continue;
}
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
- debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
- sshkey_type(key), fp);
+ debug3_f("received %s key %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
- debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
- __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ debug3_f("%s key not permitted by "
+ "HostkeyAlgorithms", sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;
}
/* Skip certs */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
- debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping",
- __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ debug3_f("%s key is a certificate; skipping",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;
}
/* Ensure keys are unique */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) {
- error("%s: received duplicated %s host key",
- __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ error_f("received duplicated %s host key",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto out;
}
}
/* Key is good, record it */
if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1,
sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
- __func__, ctx->nkeys);
+ fatal_f("recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
+ ctx->nkeys);
ctx->keys = tmp;
ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key;
key = NULL;
}
if (ctx->nkeys == 0) {
- debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__);
+ debug_f("server sent no hostkeys");
goto out;
}
- if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
- sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
+ if ((ctx->keys_match = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
+ sizeof(*ctx->keys_match))) == NULL ||
+ (ctx->keys_verified = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
+ sizeof(*ctx->keys_verified))) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("calloc failed");
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host,
options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL,
options.port, &ctx->host_str,
options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL);
/* Find which keys we already know about. */
- if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find,
- ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
- HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) {
- error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+ debug_f("searching %s for %s / %s",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str,
+ ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)");
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+ hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+ HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s",
+ options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
/* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */
- ctx->nnew = 0;
+ ctx->nnew = ctx->nincomplete = 0;
+ want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | ( options.check_host_ip ? HKF_MATCH_IP : 0);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
- if (!ctx->keys_seen[i])
+ if (ctx->keys_match[i] == 0)
ctx->nnew++;
+ if ((ctx->keys_match[i] & want) != want)
+ ctx->nincomplete++;
}
- debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove",
- __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold);
+ debug3_f("%zu server keys: %zu new, %zu retained, "
+ "%zu incomplete match. %zu to remove", ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew,
+ ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew - ctx->nincomplete,
+ ctx->nincomplete, ctx->nold);
- if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) {
- /* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */
- update_known_hosts(ctx);
- } else if (ctx->nnew != 0) {
+ if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold == 0) {
+ debug_f("no new or deprecated keys from server");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Various reasons why we cannot proceed with the update */
+ if (ctx->complex_hostspec) {
+ debug_f("CA/revocation marker, manual host list or wildcard "
+ "host pattern found, skipping UserKnownHostsFile update");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ctx->other_name_seen) {
+ debug_f("host key found matching a different name/address, "
+ "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If removing keys, check whether they appear under different
+ * names/addresses and refuse to proceed if they do. This avoids
+ * cases such as hosts with multiple names becoming inconsistent
+ * with regards to CheckHostIP entries.
+ * XXX UpdateHostkeys=force to override this (and other) checks?
+ */
+ if (ctx->nold != 0) {
+ if (check_old_keys_othernames(ctx) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if (ctx->old_key_seen) {
+ debug_f("key(s) for %s%s%s exist under other names; "
+ "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update",
+ ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ",",
+ ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ctx->ip_str);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->nnew == 0) {
/*
- * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server.
- * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
+ * We have some keys to remove or fix matching for.
+ * We can proceed to do this without requiring a fresh proof
+ * from the server.
*/
- debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys",
- __func__, ctx->nnew);
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
- "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
- fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
- if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
- continue;
- sshbuf_reset(buf);
- if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- client_register_global_confirm(
- client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx);
- ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */
+ update_known_hosts(ctx);
+ goto out;
}
+ /*
+ * We have received previously-unseen keys from the server.
+ * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
+ */
+ debug3_f("asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", ctx->nnew);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+ "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
+ fatal_fr(r, "prepare hostkeys-prove");
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ if (ctx->keys_match[i])
+ continue;
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble hostkeys-prove");
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send hostkeys-prove");
+ client_register_global_confirm(
+ client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx);
+ ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */
/* Success */
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(buf);
/*
* NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
* what the client does with its hosts file.
*/
return 1;
}
static int
client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *rtype;
- int want_reply;
- int success = 0;
+ u_char want_reply;
+ int r, success = 0;
- rtype = packet_get_cstring(NULL);
- want_reply = packet_get_char();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
+ goto out;
debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
rtype, want_reply);
if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0)
- success = client_input_hostkeys();
+ success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh);
if (want_reply) {
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
}
+ r = 0;
+ out:
free(rtype);
- return 0;
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void
+client_send_env(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *name, const char *val)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ debug("channel %d: setting env %s = \"%s\"", id, name, val);
+ channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send setenv");
}
void
client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd,
char **env)
{
- int i, j, matched, len;
+ int i, j, matched, len, r;
char *name, *val;
Channel *c = NULL;
- debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
+ debug2_f("id %d", id);
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: unknown channel", __func__, id);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: unknown channel", id);
- packet_set_interactive(want_tty,
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
if (want_tty) {
struct winsize ws;
/* Store window size in the packet. */
- if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY);
- packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : "");
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : ""))
+ != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "build pty-req");
if (tiop == NULL)
tiop = get_saved_tio();
ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop);
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send pty-req");
/* XXX wait for reply */
c->client_tty = 1;
}
/* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
debug("Sending environment.");
for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Split */
name = xstrdup(env[i]);
if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
free(name);
continue;
}
*val++ = '\0';
matched = 0;
for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
matched = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!matched) {
debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
free(name);
continue;
}
-
- debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val);
- channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
- packet_put_cstring(name);
- packet_put_cstring(val);
- packet_send();
+ client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val);
free(name);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
/* Split */
name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
free(name);
continue;
}
*val++ = '\0';
-
- debug("Setting env %s = %s", name, val);
- channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
- packet_put_cstring(name);
- packet_put_cstring(val);
- packet_send();
+ client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val);
free(name);
}
len = sshbuf_len(cmd);
if (len > 0) {
if (len > 900)
len = 900;
if (want_subsystem) {
debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem",
CONFIRM_CLOSE);
} else {
debug("Sending command: %.*s",
len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
}
- packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(cmd), sshbuf_len(cmd));
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send command");
} else {
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send shell");
}
}
static void
-client_init_dispatch(void)
+client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
-
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
+ ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
+
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
/* rekeying */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
/* global request reply messages */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
}
void
client_stop_mux(void)
{
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
/*
* If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
* should close when all active channels are closed.
*/
- if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) {
+ if (options.control_persist || options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE) {
session_closed = 1;
setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
}
}
/* client specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- leave_non_blocking();
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
ssh_kill_proxy_command();
_exit(i);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
index bf79c87bf89d..31630551b23c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
@@ -1,83 +1,84 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.36 2018/07/09 21:03:30 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.37 2020/04/03 02:40:32 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <termios.h>
struct ssh;
/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
int client_loop(struct ssh *, int, int, int);
int client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
u_int, u_int, char **, char **);
void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
void client_session2_setup(struct ssh *, int, int, int,
const char *, struct termios *, int, struct sshbuf *, char **);
-char *client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *, int, int, int);
+char *client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *, int, int, int,
+ channel_open_fn *, void *);
void client_stop_mux(void);
/* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */
void *client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int);
void client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, void *);
int client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *, Channel *, char *, int);
/* Global request confirmation callbacks */
typedef void global_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, u_int32_t, void *);
void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *);
/* Channel request confirmation callbacks */
enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY };
void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *, int, const char *,
enum confirm_action);
/* Multiplexing protocol version */
#define SSHMUX_VER 4
/* Multiplexing control protocol flags */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN 1 /* Open new connection */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK 2 /* Check master is alive */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE 3 /* Ask master to exit */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD 4 /* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD 5 /* Forward only, no command */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP 6 /* Disable mux but not conn */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD 7 /* Cancel forwarding(s) */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY 8 /* Open new connection */
void muxserver_listen(struct ssh *);
int muxclient(const char *);
void mux_exit_message(struct ssh *, Channel *, int);
void mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
index 0624dc6de13f..3f153bd424f8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
@@ -1,235 +1,209 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.113 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.118 2021/06/06 03:40:39 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "kex.h"
-int datafellows = 0;
-
-/* datafellows bug compatibility */
-u_int
-compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+/* determine bug flags from SSH protocol banner */
+void
+compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
{
int i;
static struct {
char *pat;
int bugs;
} check[] = {
{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
"OpenSSH_3.0*,"
"OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE },
{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_2*,"
"OpenSSH_3*,"
"OpenSSH_4*", SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE },
{ "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
"OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+ { "OpenSSH_7.4*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE|
+ SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74},
{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
"OpenSSH_7.1*,"
"OpenSSH_7.2*,"
"OpenSSH_7.3*,"
"OpenSSH_7.4*,"
"OpenSSH_7.5*,"
"OpenSSH_7.6*,"
"OpenSSH_7.7*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
{ "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
{ "*MindTerm*", 0 },
{ "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
{ "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
{ "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
{ "1.2.18*,"
"1.2.19*,"
"1.2.20*,"
"1.2.21*,"
"1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
{ "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */
SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
{ "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE|
SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
{ "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */
SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
{ "*OSU_0*,"
"OSU_1.0*,"
"OSU_1.1*,"
"OSU_1.2*,"
"OSU_1.3*,"
"OSU_1.4*,"
"OSU_1.5alpha1*,"
"OSU_1.5alpha2*,"
"OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
{ "*SSH_Version_Mapper*",
SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
{ "PuTTY_Local:*," /* dev versions < Sep 2014 */
"PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */
"PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */
"PuTTY_Release_0.60*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.61*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.62*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.63*,"
"PuTTY_Release_0.64*",
SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
{ "FuTTY*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */
{ "Probe-*",
SSH_BUG_PROBE },
{ "TeraTerm SSH*,"
"TTSSH/1.5.*,"
"TTSSH/2.1*,"
"TTSSH/2.2*,"
"TTSSH/2.3*,"
"TTSSH/2.4*,"
"TTSSH/2.5*,"
"TTSSH/2.6*,"
"TTSSH/2.70*,"
"TTSSH/2.71*,"
"TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
{ "WinSCP_release_4*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.0*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.1,"
"WinSCP_release_5.1.*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.5,"
"WinSCP_release_5.5.*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.6,"
"WinSCP_release_5.6.*,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.1,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.2,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.3,"
"WinSCP_release_5.7.4",
SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
{ "ConfD-*",
SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE },
{ "Twisted_*", 0 },
{ "Twisted*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
{ NULL, 0 }
};
/* process table, return first match */
+ ssh->compat = 0;
for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
- debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
- datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */
- return check[i].bugs;
- }
- }
- debug("no match: %s", version);
- return 0;
-}
-
-#define SEP ","
-int
-proto_spec(const char *spec)
-{
- char *s, *p, *q;
- int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
-
- if (spec == NULL)
- return ret;
- q = s = strdup(spec);
- if (s == NULL)
- return ret;
- for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
- switch (atoi(p)) {
- case 2:
- ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
- break;
- default:
- logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
- break;
+ ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
+ return;
}
}
- free(s);
- return ret;
+ debug_f("no match: %s", version);
}
char *
-compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
+compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop)
{
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
+ if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
return cipher_prop;
- debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
- if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_blacklist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
- debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
+ debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
+ if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ debug2_f("compat cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported ciphers found");
return cipher_prop;
}
char *
-compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
+compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
{
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
+ if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
return pkalg_prop;
- debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
- if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_blacklist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
- debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
+ debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
+ if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ debug2_f("compat public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
return pkalg_prop;
}
char *
-compat_kex_proposal(char *p)
+compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
{
- if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+ if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
return p;
- debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
- if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p,
+ debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+ if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
- if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
- if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p,
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
+ if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
- fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed");
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
}
- debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p);
+ debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
if (*p == '\0')
fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
return p;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
index d611d33e7363..167409b2bd33 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
@@ -1,73 +1,67 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.54 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.57 2021/06/06 03:40:39 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef COMPAT_H
#define COMPAT_H
-#define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00
-#define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01
-#define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02
-#define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04
-
#define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001
#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002
-/* #define unused 0x00000004 */
+#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74 0x00000004
/* #define unused 0x00000008 */
#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010
/* #define unused 0x00000020 */
#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040
/* #define unused 0x00000080 */
#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100
/* #define unused 0x00000200 */
#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400
#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800
#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000
#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000
#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000
#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000
/* #define unused 0x00010000 */
/* #define unused 0x00020000 */
/* #define unused 0x00040000 */
/* #define unused 0x00100000 */
#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000
#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000
/* #define unused 0x00800000 */
#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000
/* #define unused 0x02000000 */
#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000
#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000
-u_int compat_datafellows(const char *);
-int proto_spec(const char *);
-char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
-char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
-char *compat_kex_proposal(char *);
+struct ssh;
-extern int datafellows;
+void compat_banner(struct ssh *, const char *);
+char *compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *, char *);
+char *compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *, char *);
+char *compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *, char *);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.guess b/crypto/openssh/config.guess
index c4bd827a7bed..11fda528bc7b 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.guess
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.guess
@@ -1,1456 +1,1674 @@
#! /bin/sh
# Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
-# Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright 1992-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-timestamp='2016-05-15'
+timestamp='2020-04-26'
# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+# along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that
# program. This Exception is an additional permission under section 7
# of the GNU General Public License, version 3 ("GPLv3").
#
# Originally written by Per Bothner; maintained since 2000 by Ben Elliston.
#
# You can get the latest version of this script from:
-# http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess
+# https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess
#
# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>.
me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
usage="\
Usage: $0 [OPTION]
Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on.
-Operation modes:
+Options:
-h, --help print this help, then exit
-t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit
-v, --version print version number, then exit
Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
version="\
GNU config.guess ($timestamp)
Originally written by Per Bothner.
-Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+Copyright 1992-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
help="
Try \`$me --help' for more information."
# Parse command line
while test $# -gt 0 ; do
case $1 in
--time-stamp | --time* | -t )
echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;;
--version | -v )
echo "$version" ; exit ;;
--help | --h* | -h )
echo "$usage"; exit ;;
-- ) # Stop option processing
shift; break ;;
- ) # Use stdin as input.
break ;;
-* )
echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
exit 1 ;;
* )
break ;;
esac
done
if test $# != 0; then
echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
exit 1
fi
-trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15
-
# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a
# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires
# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a
# headache to deal with in a portable fashion.
# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still
# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated.
# Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team.
-set_cc_for_build='
-trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ;
-trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ;
-: ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ;
- { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
- { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } ||
- { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } ||
- { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ;
-dummy=$tmp/dummy ;
-tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ;
-case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in
- ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ;
- for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do
- if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ;
- fi ;
- done ;
- if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then
- CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ;
- fi
- ;;
- ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
- ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
-esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;'
+tmp=
+# shellcheck disable=SC2172
+trap 'test -z "$tmp" || rm -fr "$tmp"' 0 1 2 13 15
+
+set_cc_for_build() {
+ # prevent multiple calls if $tmp is already set
+ test "$tmp" && return 0
+ : "${TMPDIR=/tmp}"
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2039
+ { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
+ { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp" 2>/dev/null) ; } ||
+ { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp" 2>/dev/null) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } ||
+ { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; }
+ dummy=$tmp/dummy
+ case ${CC_FOR_BUILD-},${HOST_CC-},${CC-} in
+ ,,) echo "int x;" > "$dummy.c"
+ for driver in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do
+ if ($driver -c -o "$dummy.o" "$dummy.c") >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ CC_FOR_BUILD="$driver"
+ break
+ fi
+ done
+ if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then
+ CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found
+ fi
+ ;;
+ ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
+ ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
+ esac
+}
# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe.
# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24)
-if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+if test -f /.attbin/uname ; then
PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH
fi
UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown
UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown
UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown
UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown
-case "${UNAME_SYSTEM}" in
+case "$UNAME_SYSTEM" in
Linux|GNU|GNU/*)
# If the system lacks a compiler, then just pick glibc.
# We could probably try harder.
LIBC=gnu
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- cat <<-EOF > $dummy.c
+ set_cc_for_build
+ cat <<-EOF > "$dummy.c"
#include <features.h>
#if defined(__UCLIBC__)
LIBC=uclibc
#elif defined(__dietlibc__)
LIBC=dietlibc
#else
LIBC=gnu
#endif
EOF
- eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC' | sed 's, ,,g'`
+ eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC' | sed 's, ,,g'`"
+
+ # If ldd exists, use it to detect musl libc.
+ if command -v ldd >/dev/null && \
+ ldd --version 2>&1 | grep -q ^musl
+ then
+ LIBC=musl
+ fi
;;
esac
# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive.
-case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
+case "$UNAME_MACHINE:$UNAME_SYSTEM:$UNAME_RELEASE:$UNAME_VERSION" in
*:NetBSD:*:*)
# NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or
# more of the tuples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*,
# *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently
# switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old
# object file format. This provides both forward
# compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the
# object file format.
#
# Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor
# portion of the name. We always set it to "unknown".
sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch"
UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(uname -p 2>/dev/null || \
- /sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \
- /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \
+ "/sbin/$sysctl" 2>/dev/null || \
+ "/usr/sbin/$sysctl" 2>/dev/null || \
echo unknown)`
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
+ case "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" in
armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;;
arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;;
sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;;
sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;;
sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;;
earmv*)
- arch=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -e 's,^e\(armv[0-9]\).*$,\1,'`
- endian=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -ne 's,^.*\(eb\)$,\1,p'`
- machine=${arch}${endian}-unknown
+ arch=`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" | sed -e 's,^e\(armv[0-9]\).*$,\1,'`
+ endian=`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" | sed -ne 's,^.*\(eb\)$,\1,p'`
+ machine="${arch}${endian}"-unknown
;;
- *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;;
+ *) machine="$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH"-unknown ;;
esac
# The Operating System including object format, if it has switched
# to ELF recently (or will in the future) and ABI.
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
+ case "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" in
earm*)
os=netbsdelf
;;
arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
+ set_cc_for_build
if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
| grep -q __ELF__
then
# Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout).
# Return netbsd for either. FIX?
os=netbsd
else
os=netbsdelf
fi
;;
*)
os=netbsd
;;
esac
# Determine ABI tags.
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in
+ case "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" in
earm*)
expr='s/^earmv[0-9]/-eabi/;s/eb$//'
- abi=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -e "$expr"`
+ abi=`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" | sed -e "$expr"`
;;
esac
# The OS release
# Debian GNU/NetBSD machines have a different userland, and
# thus, need a distinct triplet. However, they do not need
# kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a
# suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu.
- case "${UNAME_VERSION}" in
+ case "$UNAME_VERSION" in
Debian*)
release='-gnu'
;;
*)
- release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/[-_].*//' | cut -d. -f1,2`
+ release=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[-_].*//' | cut -d. -f1,2`
;;
esac
# Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM:
# contains redundant information, the shorter form:
# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used.
- echo "${machine}-${os}${release}${abi}"
+ echo "$machine-${os}${release}${abi-}"
exit ;;
*:Bitrig:*:*)
UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/Bitrig.//'`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-bitrig${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH"-unknown-bitrig"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:OpenBSD:*:*)
UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH"-unknown-openbsd"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:LibertyBSD:*:*)
UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/^.*BSD\.//'`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-libertybsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH"-unknown-libertybsd"$UNAME_RELEASE"
+ exit ;;
+ *:MidnightBSD:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-midnightbsd"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:ekkoBSD:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-ekkobsd"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:SolidBSD:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-solidbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-solidbsd"$UNAME_RELEASE"
+ exit ;;
+ *:OS108:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-os108_"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
macppc:MirBSD:*:*)
- echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:MirBSD:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-mirbsd"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:Sortix:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sortix
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-sortix
+ exit ;;
+ *:Twizzler:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-twizzler
+ exit ;;
+ *:Redox:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-redox
+ exit ;;
+ mips:OSF1:*.*)
+ echo mips-dec-osf1
exit ;;
alpha:OSF1:*:*)
case $UNAME_RELEASE in
*4.0)
UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'`
;;
*5.*)
UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'`
;;
esac
# According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on
# OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995. I hope that
# covers most systems running today. This code pipes the CPU
# types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0.
ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^ The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1`
case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in
"EV4 (21064)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;;
"EV4.5 (21064)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;;
"LCA4 (21066/21068)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;;
"EV5 (21164)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;;
"EV5.6 (21164A)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;;
"EV5.6 (21164PC)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
"EV5.7 (21164PC)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca57 ;;
"EV6 (21264)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;;
"EV6.7 (21264A)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
"EV6.8CB (21264C)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
"EV6.8AL (21264B)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
"EV6.8CX (21264D)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
"EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev69 ;;
"EV7 (21364)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev7 ;;
"EV7.9 (21364A)")
UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev79 ;;
esac
# A Pn.n version is a patched version.
# A Vn.n version is a released version.
# A Tn.n version is a released field test version.
# A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel.
# 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz`
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-dec-osf"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz`"
# Reset EXIT trap before exiting to avoid spurious non-zero exit code.
exitcode=$?
trap '' 0
exit $exitcode ;;
- Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*)
- # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
- # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead
- # of the specific Alpha model?
- echo alpha-pc-interix
- exit ;;
- 21064:Windows_NT:50:3)
- echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5
- exit ;;
Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*)
echo m68k-unknown-sysv4
exit ;;
*:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-amigaos
exit ;;
*:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-morphos
exit ;;
*:OS/390:*:*)
echo i370-ibm-openedition
exit ;;
*:z/VM:*:*)
echo s390-ibm-zvmoe
exit ;;
*:OS400:*:*)
echo powerpc-ibm-os400
exit ;;
arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*)
- echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo arm-acorn-riscix"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
arm*:riscos:*:*|arm*:RISCOS:*:*)
echo arm-unknown-riscos
exit ;;
SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*)
echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp
exit ;;
Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*)
# akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE.
if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then
echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3
else
echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd
fi
exit ;;
NILE*:*:*:dcosx)
echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4
exit ;;
DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*)
echo sparc-icl-nx6
exit ;;
DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*)
case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in
sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;;
esac ;;
s390x:SunOS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-ibm-solaris2"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`"
exit ;;
sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*)
- echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ echo sparc-hal-solaris2"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`"
exit ;;
sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*)
- echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ echo sparc-sun-solaris2"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`"
exit ;;
i86pc:AuroraUX:5.*:* | i86xen:AuroraUX:5.*:*)
- echo i386-pc-auroraux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo i386-pc-auroraux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
+ set_cc_for_build
SUN_ARCH=i386
# If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects.
# Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does.
# This test works for both compilers.
if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found ]; then
if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
(CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
then
SUN_ARCH=x86_64
fi
fi
- echo ${SUN_ARCH}-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ echo "$SUN_ARCH"-pc-solaris2"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`"
exit ;;
sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
# According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize
# SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but
# it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4.
- echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ echo sparc-sun-solaris3"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`"
exit ;;
sun4*:SunOS:*:*)
case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in
Series*|S4*)
UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v`
;;
esac
# Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'.
- echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'`
+ echo sparc-sun-sunos"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/-/_/'`"
exit ;;
sun3*:SunOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-sun-sunos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
sun*:*:4.2BSD:*)
UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null`
- test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = x && UNAME_RELEASE=3
+ test "x$UNAME_RELEASE" = x && UNAME_RELEASE=3
case "`/bin/arch`" in
sun3)
- echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-sun-sunos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
;;
sun4)
- echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sparc-sun-sunos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
;;
esac
exit ;;
aushp:SunOS:*:*)
- echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sparc-auspex-sunos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
# The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name
# can be virtually everything (everything which is not
# "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor
# > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT"
# to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally
# the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not
# MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should
# be no problem.
atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-atari-mint"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-atari-mint"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-atari-mint"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-milan-mint"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-hades-mint"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*)
- echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-unknown-mint"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
m68k:machten:*:*)
- echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-apple-machten"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
powerpc:machten:*:*)
- echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo powerpc-apple-machten"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
RISC*:Mach:*:*)
echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3
exit ;;
RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*)
- echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo mips-dec-ultrix"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*)
- echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo vax-dec-ultrix"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*)
- echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo clipper-intergraph-clix"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
#ifdef __cplusplus
#include <stdio.h> /* for printf() prototype */
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
#else
int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
#endif
#if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB)
#if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV)
- printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
#endif
#if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4)
- printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
#endif
#if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD)
- printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
#endif
#endif
exit (-1);
}
EOF
- $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c &&
- dummyarg=`echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` &&
- SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy $dummyarg` &&
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" &&
+ dummyarg=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` &&
+ SYSTEM_NAME=`"$dummy" "$dummyarg"` &&
{ echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
- echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo mips-mips-riscos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
echo powerpc-motorola-powermax
exit ;;
Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*)
echo powerpc-harris-powermax
exit ;;
Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
echo powerpc-harris-powermax
exit ;;
Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*)
echo powerpc-harris-powerunix
exit ;;
m88k:CX/UX:7*:*)
echo m88k-harris-cxux7
exit ;;
m88k:*:4*:R4*)
echo m88k-motorola-sysv4
exit ;;
m88k:*:3*:R3*)
echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
exit ;;
AViiON:dgux:*:*)
# DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures
UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
- if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ]
+ if [ "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = mc88100 ] || [ "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = mc88110 ]
then
- if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \
- [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ]
+ if [ "$TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE"x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \
+ [ "$TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE"x = x ]
then
- echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m88k-dg-dgux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
else
- echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs"$UNAME_RELEASE"
fi
else
- echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo i586-dg-dgux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
fi
exit ;;
M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3)
echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3
exit ;;
M88*:*:R3*:*)
# Delta 88k system running SVR3
echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
exit ;;
XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3)
echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3
exit ;;
Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD)
echo m68k-tektronix-bsd
exit ;;
*:IRIX*:*:*)
- echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'`
+ echo mips-sgi-irix"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/-/_/g'`"
exit ;;
????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX.
echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id
exit ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX '
i*86:AIX:*:*)
echo i386-ibm-aix
exit ;;
ia64:AIX:*:*)
if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
else
- IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ IBM_REV="$UNAME_VERSION.$UNAME_RELEASE"
fi
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-ibm-aix"$IBM_REV"
exit ;;
*:AIX:2:3)
if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
#include <sys/systemcfg.h>
main()
{
if (!__power_pc())
exit(1);
puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5");
exit(0);
}
EOF
- if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy`
+ if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" && SYSTEM_NAME=`"$dummy"`
then
echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"
else
echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5
fi
elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4
else
echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2
fi
exit ;;
*:AIX:*:[4567])
IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'`
- if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El "$IBM_CPU_ID" | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
IBM_ARCH=rs6000
else
IBM_ARCH=powerpc
fi
if [ -x /usr/bin/lslpp ] ; then
IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/lslpp -Lqc bos.rte.libc |
awk -F: '{ print $3 }' | sed s/[0-9]*$/0/`
else
- IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ IBM_REV="$UNAME_VERSION.$UNAME_RELEASE"
fi
- echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+ echo "$IBM_ARCH"-ibm-aix"$IBM_REV"
exit ;;
*:AIX:*:*)
echo rs6000-ibm-aix
exit ;;
- ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*)
+ ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:4.4BSD:*)
echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4
exit ;;
ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and
- echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to
+ echo romp-ibm-bsd"$UNAME_RELEASE" # 4.3 with uname added to
exit ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3
*:BOSX:*:*)
echo rs6000-bull-bosx
exit ;;
DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*)
echo m68k-bull-sysv3
exit ;;
9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*)
echo m68k-hp-bsd
exit ;;
hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*)
echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4
exit ;;
9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*)
- HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
- 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;;
- 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;;
+ HPUX_REV=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+ case "$UNAME_MACHINE" in
+ 9000/31?) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;;
+ 9000/[34]??) HP_ARCH=m68k ;;
9000/[678][0-9][0-9])
if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then
sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null`
sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null`
- case "${sc_cpu_version}" in
+ case "$sc_cpu_version" in
523) HP_ARCH=hppa1.0 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0
528) HP_ARCH=hppa1.1 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1
532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0
- case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in
+ case "$sc_kernel_bits" in
32) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0n ;;
64) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w ;;
'') HP_ARCH=hppa2.0 ;; # HP-UX 10.20
esac ;;
esac
fi
- if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ if [ "$HP_ARCH" = "" ]; then
+ set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
#define _HPUX_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main ()
{
#if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS);
#endif
long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
switch (cpu)
{
case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break;
case CPU_PA_RISC2_0:
#if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
switch (bits)
{
case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break;
case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break;
default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
} break;
#else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */
puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
#endif
default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
}
exit (0);
}
EOF
- (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy`
+ (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`"$dummy"`
test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa
fi ;;
esac
- if [ ${HP_ARCH} = hppa2.0w ]
+ if [ "$HP_ARCH" = hppa2.0w ]
then
- eval $set_cc_for_build
+ set_cc_for_build
# hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating
# 32-bit code. hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler
# generating 64-bit code. GNU and HP use different nomenclature:
#
# $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess
# => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23
# $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess
# => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23
if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) |
grep -q __LP64__
then
HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w
else
HP_ARCH=hppa64
fi
fi
- echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+ echo "$HP_ARCH"-hp-hpux"$HPUX_REV"
exit ;;
ia64:HP-UX:*:*)
- HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
- echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+ HPUX_REV=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+ echo ia64-hp-hpux"$HPUX_REV"
exit ;;
3050*:HI-UX:*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ set_cc_for_build
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
#include <unistd.h>
int
main ()
{
long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
/* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns
true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct
results, however. */
if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu))
{
switch (cpu)
{
case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
}
}
else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu))
puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
exit (0);
}
EOF
- $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" && SYSTEM_NAME=`"$dummy"` &&
{ echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2
exit ;;
- 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* )
+ 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:*)
echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd
exit ;;
9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*)
echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd
exit ;;
*9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*)
echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix
exit ;;
- hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* )
+ hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:*)
echo hppa1.1-hp-osf
exit ;;
hp8??:OSF1:*:*)
echo hppa1.0-hp-osf
exit ;;
i*86:OSF1:*:*)
if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-osf1mk
else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-osf1
fi
exit ;;
parisc*:Lites*:*:*)
echo hppa1.1-hp-lites
exit ;;
C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*)
echo c1-convex-bsd
exit ;;
C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*)
if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
then echo c32-convex-bsd
else echo c2-convex-bsd
fi
exit ;;
C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*)
echo c34-convex-bsd
exit ;;
C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*)
echo c38-convex-bsd
exit ;;
C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*)
echo c4-convex-bsd
exit ;;
CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*)
- echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ echo ymp-cray-unicos"$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
exit ;;
CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-cray-unicos"$UNAME_RELEASE" \
| sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \
-e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \
-e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
exit ;;
CRAY*TS:*:*:*)
- echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ echo t90-cray-unicos"$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
exit ;;
CRAY*T3E:*:*:*)
- echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk"$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
exit ;;
CRAY*SV1:*:*:*)
- echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ echo sv1-cray-unicos"$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
exit ;;
*:UNICOS/mp:*:*)
- echo craynv-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ echo craynv-cray-unicosmp"$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
exit ;;
F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz`
FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'`
- FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+ FUJITSU_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
exit ;;
5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'`
- FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+ FUJITSU_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
exit ;;
i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-bsdi"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*)
- echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sparc-unknown-bsdi"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:BSD/OS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-bsdi"$UNAME_RELEASE"
+ exit ;;
+ arm:FreeBSD:*:*)
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
+ set_cc_for_build
+ if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+ | grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP
+ then
+ echo "${UNAME_PROCESSOR}"-unknown-freebsd"`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`"-gnueabi
+ else
+ echo "${UNAME_PROCESSOR}"-unknown-freebsd"`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`"-gnueabihf
+ fi
exit ;;
*:FreeBSD:*:*)
UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
- case ${UNAME_PROCESSOR} in
+ case "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" in
amd64)
- echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
- *)
- echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;;
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 ;;
+ i386)
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=i586 ;;
esac
+ echo "$UNAME_PROCESSOR"-unknown-freebsd"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`"
exit ;;
i*:CYGWIN*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-cygwin
exit ;;
*:MINGW64*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw64
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-mingw64
exit ;;
*:MINGW*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-mingw32
exit ;;
*:MSYS*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msys
- exit ;;
- i*:windows32*:*)
- # uname -m includes "-pc" on this system.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-mingw32
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-msys
exit ;;
i*:PW*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-pw32
exit ;;
*:Interix*:*)
- case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in
+ case "$UNAME_MACHINE" in
x86)
- echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo i586-pc-interix"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
authenticamd | genuineintel | EM64T)
- echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo x86_64-unknown-interix"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
IA64)
- echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo ia64-unknown-interix"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
esac ;;
- [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*)
- echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks
- exit ;;
- 8664:Windows_NT:*)
- echo x86_64-pc-mks
- exit ;;
- i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*)
- # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
- # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we
- # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386?
- echo i586-pc-interix
- exit ;;
i*:UWIN*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-uwin
exit ;;
amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*)
- echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin
- exit ;;
- p*:CYGWIN*:*)
- echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin
+ echo x86_64-pc-cygwin
exit ;;
prep*:SunOS:5.*:*)
- echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`"
exit ;;
*:GNU:*:*)
# the GNU system
- echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-${LIBC}`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'`
+ echo "`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-$LIBC`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'`"
exit ;;
*:GNU/*:*:*)
# other systems with GNU libc and userland
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]"``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-`echo "$UNAME_SYSTEM" | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]"``echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-$LIBC"
exit ;;
- i*86:Minix:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix
+ *:Minix:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-minix
exit ;;
aarch64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
aarch64_be:Linux:*:*)
UNAME_MACHINE=aarch64_be
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
alpha:Linux:*:*)
- case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in
+ case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null` in
EV5) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;;
EV56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;;
PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
EV6) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;;
EV67) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
esac
objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1
if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC=gnulibc1 ; fi
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
arc:Linux:*:* | arceb:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
arm*:Linux:*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
+ set_cc_for_build
if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
| grep -q __ARM_EABI__
then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
else
if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
| grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP
then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabi
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"eabi
else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabihf
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"eabihf
fi
fi
exit ;;
avr32*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
cris:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-axis-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
crisv32:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-axis-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
e2k:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
frv:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
hexagon:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
i*86:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
ia64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
k1om:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
m32r*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
m68*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*)
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ set_cc_for_build
+ IS_GLIBC=0
+ test x"${LIBC}" = xgnu && IS_GLIBC=1
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
#undef CPU
- #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}
- #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}el
+ #undef mips
+ #undef mipsel
+ #undef mips64
+ #undef mips64el
+ #if ${IS_GLIBC} && defined(_ABI64)
+ LIBCABI=gnuabi64
+ #else
+ #if ${IS_GLIBC} && defined(_ABIN32)
+ LIBCABI=gnuabin32
+ #else
+ LIBCABI=${LIBC}
+ #endif
+ #endif
+
+ #if ${IS_GLIBC} && defined(__mips64) && defined(__mips_isa_rev) && __mips_isa_rev>=6
+ CPU=mipsisa64r6
+ #else
+ #if ${IS_GLIBC} && !defined(__mips64) && defined(__mips_isa_rev) && __mips_isa_rev>=6
+ CPU=mipsisa32r6
+ #else
+ #if defined(__mips64)
+ CPU=mips64
+ #else
+ CPU=mips
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ #endif
+
#if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
- CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}el
+ MIPS_ENDIAN=el
#else
#if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
- CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}
+ MIPS_ENDIAN=
#else
- CPU=
+ MIPS_ENDIAN=
#endif
#endif
EOF
- eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU'`
- test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}"; exit; }
+ eval "`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU\|^MIPS_ENDIAN\|^LIBCABI'`"
+ test "x$CPU" != x && { echo "$CPU${MIPS_ENDIAN}-unknown-linux-$LIBCABI"; exit; }
;;
+ mips64el:Linux:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
+ exit ;;
openrisc*:Linux:*:*)
- echo or1k-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo or1k-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
or32:Linux:*:* | or1k*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
padre:Linux:*:*)
- echo sparc-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo sparc-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*)
- echo hppa64-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo hppa64-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*)
# Look for CPU level
case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in
- PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-${LIBC} ;;
- PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-${LIBC} ;;
- *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-${LIBC} ;;
+ PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-"$LIBC" ;;
+ PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-"$LIBC" ;;
+ *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-"$LIBC" ;;
esac
exit ;;
ppc64:Linux:*:*)
- echo powerpc64-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo powerpc64-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
ppc:Linux:*:*)
- echo powerpc-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo powerpc-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
ppc64le:Linux:*:*)
- echo powerpc64le-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo powerpc64le-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
ppcle:Linux:*:*)
- echo powerpcle-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo powerpcle-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
+ exit ;;
+ riscv32:Linux:*:* | riscv64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-ibm-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
sh64*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
sh*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
tile*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
vax:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-dec-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
x86_64:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
xtensa*:Linux:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-linux-"$LIBC"
exit ;;
i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*)
# ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there.
# earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both
# sysname and nodename.
echo i386-sequent-sysv4
exit ;;
i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*)
# Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version
# number series starting with 2...
# I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this,
# I just have to hope. -- rms.
# Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-sysv4.2uw"$UNAME_VERSION"
exit ;;
i*86:OS/2:*:*)
# If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility
# is probably installed.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-os2-emx
exit ;;
i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-stop
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-stop
exit ;;
i*86:atheos:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-atheos
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-atheos
exit ;;
i*86:syllable:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-syllable
exit ;;
i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
- echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo i386-unknown-lynxos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
i*86:*DOS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-msdosdjgpp
exit ;;
- i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*)
- UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'`
+ i*86:*:4.*:*)
+ UNAME_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed 's/\/MP$//'`
if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-univel-sysv"$UNAME_REL"
else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-sysv"$UNAME_REL"
fi
exit ;;
i*86:*:5:[678]*)
# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX and OpenServer 6.
case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in
*486*) UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;;
*Pentium) UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;;
*Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;;
esac
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION}"
exit ;;
i*86:*:3.2:*)
if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then
UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' </usr/options/cb.name`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-isc$UNAME_REL
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-isc"$UNAME_REL"
elif /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')`
(/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486
(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \
&& UNAME_MACHINE=i586
(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \
&& UNAME_MACHINE=i686
(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \
&& UNAME_MACHINE=i686
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-sco"$UNAME_REL"
else
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-sysv32
fi
exit ;;
pc:*:*:*)
# Left here for compatibility:
# uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about
# the processor, so we play safe by assuming i586.
# Note: whatever this is, it MUST be the same as what config.sub
# prints for the "djgpp" host, or else GDB configure will decide that
# this is a cross-build.
echo i586-pc-msdosdjgpp
exit ;;
Intel:Mach:3*:*)
echo i386-pc-mach3
exit ;;
paragon:*:*:*)
echo i860-intel-osf1
exit ;;
i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4
if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4
+ echo i860-stardent-sysv"$UNAME_RELEASE" # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4
else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered.
- echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4
+ echo i860-unknown-sysv"$UNAME_RELEASE" # Unknown i860-SVR4
fi
exit ;;
mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*)
# "miniframe"
echo m68010-convergent-sysv
exit ;;
mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m)
echo m68k-convergent-sysv
exit ;;
M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*)
echo m68k-diab-dnix
exit ;;
M68*:*:R3V[5678]*:*)
test -r /sysV68 && { echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv'; exit; } ;;
3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0 | S7501*:*:4.0:3.0)
OS_REL=''
test -r /etc/.relid \
&& OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
- && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; }
/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
- && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
+ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; } ;;
3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*)
/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
&& { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;;
NCR*:*:4.2:* | MPRAS*:*:4.2:*)
OS_REL='.3'
test -r /etc/.relid \
&& OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
- && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; }
/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
- && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; }
+ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; }
/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \
- && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;;
+ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; } ;;
m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*)
- echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-unknown-lynxos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
echo m68k-atari-sysv4
exit ;;
TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*)
- echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sparc-unknown-lynxos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*)
- echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
- echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*)
- echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo mips-dde-sysv"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*)
echo mips-sni-sysv4
exit ;;
RM*:SINIX-*:*:*)
echo mips-sni-sysv4
exit ;;
*:SINIX-*:*:*)
if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-sni-sysv4
else
echo ns32k-sni-sysv
fi
exit ;;
PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort
# says <Richard.M.Bartel@ccMail.Census.GOV>
echo i586-unisys-sysv4
exit ;;
*:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*)
# From Gerald Hewes <hewes@openmarket.com>.
# How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm
echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4
exit ;;
*:*:*:FTX*)
# From seanf@swdc.stratus.com.
echo i860-stratus-sysv4
exit ;;
i*86:VOS:*:*)
# From Paul.Green@stratus.com.
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-stratus-vos
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-stratus-vos
exit ;;
*:VOS:*:*)
# From Paul.Green@stratus.com.
echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos
exit ;;
mc68*:A/UX:*:*)
- echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo m68k-apple-aux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*)
echo mips-sony-newsos6
exit ;;
R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*)
if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then
- echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo mips-nec-sysv"$UNAME_RELEASE"
else
- echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo mips-unknown-sysv"$UNAME_RELEASE"
fi
exit ;;
BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only.
echo powerpc-be-beos
exit ;;
BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only.
echo powerpc-apple-beos
exit ;;
BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible.
echo i586-pc-beos
exit ;;
BePC:Haiku:*:*) # Haiku running on Intel PC compatible.
echo i586-pc-haiku
exit ;;
x86_64:Haiku:*:*)
echo x86_64-unknown-haiku
exit ;;
SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sx4-nec-superux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sx5-nec-superux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sx6-nec-superux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sx7-nec-superux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sx8-nec-superux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sx8r-nec-superux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
SX-ACE:SUPER-UX:*:*)
- echo sxace-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo sxace-nec-superux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
Power*:Rhapsody:*:*)
- echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:Rhapsody:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-apple-rhapsody"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:Darwin:*:*)
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown
- eval $set_cc_for_build
- if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = unknown ; then
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
+ case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
+ unknown) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;;
+ esac
+ if command -v xcode-select > /dev/null 2> /dev/null && \
+ ! xcode-select --print-path > /dev/null 2> /dev/null ; then
+ # Avoid executing cc if there is no toolchain installed as
+ # cc will be a stub that puts up a graphical alert
+ # prompting the user to install developer tools.
+ CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found
+ else
+ set_cc_for_build
fi
- if test `echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\..*//'` -le 10 ; then
- if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found ]; then
- if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
- (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
- grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
- then
- case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
- i386) UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 ;;
- powerpc) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc64 ;;
- esac
- fi
+ if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found ]; then
+ if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
+ (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+ grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
+ then
+ case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
+ i386) UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 ;;
+ powerpc) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc64 ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ # On 10.4-10.6 one might compile for PowerPC via gcc -arch ppc
+ if (echo '#ifdef __POWERPC__'; echo IS_PPC; echo '#endif') | \
+ (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+ grep IS_PPC >/dev/null
+ then
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc
fi
elif test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = i386 ; then
- # Avoid executing cc on OS X 10.9, as it ships with a stub
- # that puts up a graphical alert prompting to install
- # developer tools. Any system running Mac OS X 10.7 or
- # later (Darwin 11 and later) is required to have a 64-bit
- # processor. This is not true of the ARM version of Darwin
- # that Apple uses in portable devices.
- UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64
+ # uname -m returns i386 or x86_64
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=$UNAME_MACHINE
fi
- echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_PROCESSOR"-apple-darwin"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*)
UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = x86; then
UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386
UNAME_MACHINE=pc
fi
- echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_PROCESSOR"-"$UNAME_MACHINE"-nto-qnx"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:QNX:*:4*)
echo i386-pc-qnx
exit ;;
- NEO-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
- echo neo-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ NEO-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo neo-tandem-nsk"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
NSE-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
- echo nse-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo nse-tandem-nsk"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
- NSR-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
- echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ NSR-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo nsr-tandem-nsk"$UNAME_RELEASE"
+ exit ;;
+ NSV-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo nsv-tandem-nsk"$UNAME_RELEASE"
+ exit ;;
+ NSX-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo nsx-tandem-nsk"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:NonStop-UX:*:*)
echo mips-compaq-nonstopux
exit ;;
BS2000:POSIX*:*:*)
echo bs2000-siemens-sysv
exit ;;
DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-"$UNAME_SYSTEM"-"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:Plan9:*:*)
# "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386
# is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86
# operating systems.
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2154
if test "$cputype" = 386; then
UNAME_MACHINE=i386
else
UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype"
fi
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-plan9
exit ;;
*:TOPS-10:*:*)
echo pdp10-unknown-tops10
exit ;;
*:TENEX:*:*)
echo pdp10-unknown-tenex
exit ;;
KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*)
echo pdp10-dec-tops20
exit ;;
XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*)
echo pdp10-xkl-tops20
exit ;;
*:TOPS-20:*:*)
echo pdp10-unknown-tops20
exit ;;
*:ITS:*:*)
echo pdp10-unknown-its
exit ;;
SEI:*:*:SEIUX)
- echo mips-sei-seiux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ echo mips-sei-seiux"$UNAME_RELEASE"
exit ;;
*:DragonFly:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-dragonfly`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-dragonfly"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE"|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`"
exit ;;
*:*VMS:*:*)
UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
- case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+ case "$UNAME_MACHINE" in
A*) echo alpha-dec-vms ; exit ;;
I*) echo ia64-dec-vms ; exit ;;
V*) echo vax-dec-vms ; exit ;;
esac ;;
*:XENIX:*:SysV)
echo i386-pc-xenix
exit ;;
i*86:skyos:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-skyos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ .*$//'`
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-skyos"`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/ .*$//'`"
exit ;;
i*86:rdos:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-rdos
exit ;;
i*86:AROS:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-aros
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-pc-aros
exit ;;
x86_64:VMkernel:*:*)
- echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-esx
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-esx
exit ;;
amd64:Isilon\ OneFS:*:*)
echo x86_64-unknown-onefs
exit ;;
+ *:Unleashed:*:*)
+ echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-unknown-unleashed"$UNAME_RELEASE"
+ exit ;;
+esac
+
+# No uname command or uname output not recognized.
+set_cc_for_build
+cat > "$dummy.c" <<EOF
+#ifdef _SEQUENT_
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(ultrix) || defined(_ultrix) || defined(__ultrix) || defined(__ultrix__)
+#if defined (vax) || defined (__vax) || defined (__vax__) || defined(mips) || defined(__mips) || defined(__mips__) || defined(MIPS) || defined(__MIPS__)
+#include <signal.h>
+#if defined(_SIZE_T_) || defined(SIGLOST)
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+main ()
+{
+#if defined (sony)
+#if defined (MIPSEB)
+ /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". Perhaps BFD should be changed,
+ I don't know.... */
+ printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#include <sys/param.h>
+ printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n",
+#ifdef NEWSOS4
+ "4"
+#else
+ ""
+#endif
+ ); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (NeXT)
+#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__)
+#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k"
+#endif
+ int version;
+ version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`;
+ if (version < 4)
+ printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+ else
+ printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+ exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16)
+#if defined (UMAXV)
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#if defined (CMU)
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__386BSD__)
+ printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (sequent)
+#if defined (i386)
+ printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#if defined (ns32000)
+ printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (_SEQUENT_)
+ struct utsname un;
+
+ uname(&un);
+ if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) {
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0);
+ }
+ if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0);
+ }
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (vax)
+#if !defined (ultrix)
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#if defined (BSD)
+#if BSD == 43
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#if BSD == 199006
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#else
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#else
+#if defined(_SIZE_T_) || defined(SIGLOST)
+ struct utsname un;
+ uname (&un);
+ printf ("vax-dec-ultrix%s\n", un.release); exit (0);
+#else
+ printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(ultrix) || defined(_ultrix) || defined(__ultrix) || defined(__ultrix__)
+#if defined(mips) || defined(__mips) || defined(__mips__) || defined(MIPS) || defined(__MIPS__)
+#if defined(_SIZE_T_) || defined(SIGLOST)
+ struct utsname *un;
+ uname (&un);
+ printf ("mips-dec-ultrix%s\n", un.release); exit (0);
+#else
+ printf ("mips-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860)
+ printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+ exit (1);
+}
+EOF
+
+$CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` &&
+ { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+
+# Apollos put the system type in the environment.
+test -d /usr/apollo && { echo "$ISP-apollo-$SYSTYPE"; exit; }
+
+echo "$0: unable to guess system type" >&2
+
+case "$UNAME_MACHINE:$UNAME_SYSTEM" in
+ mips:Linux | mips64:Linux)
+ # If we got here on MIPS GNU/Linux, output extra information.
+ cat >&2 <<EOF
+
+NOTE: MIPS GNU/Linux systems require a C compiler to fully recognize
+the system type. Please install a C compiler and try again.
+EOF
+ ;;
esac
cat >&2 <<EOF
-$0: unable to guess system type
This script (version $timestamp), has failed to recognize the
-operating system you are using. If your script is old, overwrite
-config.guess and config.sub with the latest versions from:
+operating system you are using. If your script is old, overwrite *all*
+copies of config.guess and config.sub with the latest versions from:
- http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess
+ https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess
and
- http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub
+ https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub
+EOF
+
+year=`echo $timestamp | sed 's,-.*,,'`
+# shellcheck disable=SC2003
+if test "`expr "\`date +%Y\`" - "$year"`" -lt 3 ; then
+ cat >&2 <<EOF
If $0 has already been updated, send the following data and any
information you think might be pertinent to config-patches@gnu.org to
provide the necessary information to handle your system.
config.guess timestamp = $timestamp
uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null`
hostinfo = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null`
/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`
/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null`
/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null`
/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null`
/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null`
-UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE}
-UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE}
-UNAME_SYSTEM = ${UNAME_SYSTEM}
-UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION}
+UNAME_MACHINE = "$UNAME_MACHINE"
+UNAME_RELEASE = "$UNAME_RELEASE"
+UNAME_SYSTEM = "$UNAME_SYSTEM"
+UNAME_VERSION = "$UNAME_VERSION"
EOF
+fi
exit 1
# Local variables:
-# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
+# eval: (add-hook 'before-save-hook 'time-stamp)
# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
# time-stamp-end: "'"
# End:
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h b/crypto/openssh/config.h
index dbdad4faaca1..e0ad8dc1ecca 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h
@@ -1,1961 +1,2084 @@
/* config.h. Generated from config.h.in by configure. */
/* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */
/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */
/* #undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD */
/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
*/
/* #undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
/* #undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG */
/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
/* #undef AU_IPv4 */
/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
/* #undef BIND_8_COMPAT */
/* The system has incomplete BSM API */
/* #undef BROKEN_BSM_API */
/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
/* #undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE */
/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
/* #undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO */
/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
/* #undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS */
/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
#define BROKEN_GLOB 1
/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
/* #undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA */
/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
*/
/* #undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME */
/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
/* #undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON */
/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons
against it */
/* #undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON */
-/* realpath does not work with nonexistent files */
-#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
-
/* Needed for NeXT */
/* #undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS */
/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
/* #undef BROKEN_SETREGID */
/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
/* #undef BROKEN_SETRESGID */
/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
/* #undef BROKEN_SETRESUID */
/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
/* #undef BROKEN_SETREUID */
/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
/* #undef BROKEN_SETVBUF */
/* QNX shadow support is broken */
/* #undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
/* #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF */
/* strndup broken, see APAR IY61211 */
/* #undef BROKEN_STRNDUP */
/* strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551 */
/* #undef BROKEN_STRNLEN */
/* strnvis detected broken */
#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1
/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
/* #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
/* #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX */
/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
/* #undef BSD_AUTH */
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
/* #undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE */
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
/* #undef CONF_UTMP_FILE */
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
/* #undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE */
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
/* #undef CONF_WTMP_FILE */
-/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
+/* Need to call setpgrp as root */
/* #undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING */
/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1
/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
/* #undef DISABLE_LOGIN */
/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
/* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE */
/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
/* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE */
/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
/* #undef DISABLE_SHADOW */
/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
#define DISABLE_UTMP 1
/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
/* #undef DISABLE_UTMPX */
/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
#define DISABLE_WTMP 1
/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1
/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */
#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/
+/* Enable for U2F/FIDO support */
+#define ENABLE_SK /**/
+
+/* Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support */
+/* #undef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL */
+
/* define if fflush(NULL) does not work */
/* #undef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG */
/* File names may not contain backslash characters */
/* #undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH */
/* fsid_t has member val */
/* #undef FSID_HAS_VAL */
/* fsid_t has member __val */
/* #undef FSID_HAS___VAL */
/* getpgrp takes one arg */
#define GETPGRP_VOID 1
/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
/* #undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS */
/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1
/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1
/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */
/* #undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV */
/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
/* #undef GSSAPI */
/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
/* #undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
/* #undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR */
/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP */
/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX */
/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP */
/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
/* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
#define HAVE_ASPRINTF 1
/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
/* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ */
/* Have attribute nonnull */
#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1
/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
/* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `auth_hostok' function. */
#define HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `auth_timeok' function. */
#define HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_B64_NTOP */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_B64_PTON */
/* Define if you have the basename function. */
#define HAVE_BASENAME 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
#define HAVE_BCOPY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
#define HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_BLF_ENC */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <blf.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_BLF_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */
#define HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsd/libutil.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_BSTRING_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bzero' function. */
#define HAVE_BZERO 1
/* calloc(0, x) returns NULL */
#define HAVE_CALLOC 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */
#define HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
#define HAVE_CLOCK 1
/* Have clock_gettime */
#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1
/* define if you have clock_t data type */
#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
#define HAVE_CLOSEFROM 1
/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1
/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */
#define HAVE_CRYPT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_CRYPT_H */
/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
/* #undef HAVE_CYGWIN */
/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
#define HAVE_DAEMON 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
you don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
don't. */
/* #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `bzero', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#define HAVE_DECL_BZERO 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `getpeereid', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE',
and to 0 if you don't. */
/* #undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
don't. */
/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED */
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
you don't. */
/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS */
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
don't. */
/* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS */
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `memmem', and to 0 if you don't.
+ */
+#define HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
don't. */
/* #undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED */
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `readv', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#define HAVE_DECL_READV 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
don't. */
/* #undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB */
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `UINT32_MAX', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#define HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG 0
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT 0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */
#define HAVE_DES_CRYPT 1
/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
/* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX */
/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
/* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */
-/* Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_key */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_key' function. */
#define HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_pqg */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_pqg' function. */
#define HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_key */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_key' function. */
#define HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_pqg */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_pqg' function. */
#define HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DH_set_length */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set_length' function. */
#define HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_DIRENT_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
#define HAVE_DIRFD 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dlopen' function. */
+#define HAVE_DLOPEN 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */
#define HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_key */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_key' function. */
#define HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_pqg */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_pqg' function. */
#define HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_key */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_key' function. */
#define HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_pqg */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_pqg' function. */
#define HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_get0 */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_get0' function. */
#define HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_set0 */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_set0' function. */
#define HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_get0 */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_get0' function. */
#define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_set0 */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_set0' function. */
#define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EC_KEY_METHOD_new' function. */
+#define HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the <elf.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_ELF_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */
#define HAVE_ENDGRENT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_ENDUTENT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
#define HAVE_ENDUTXENT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */
#define HAVE_ERR 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */
#define HAVE_ERRX 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <err.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_ERR_H 1
/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
/* #undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_chacha20' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_free */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_free' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT */
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_new */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_new' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA 1
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */
-#define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1
-
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
#define HAVE_EVP_SHA256 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha384' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_SHA384 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha512' function. */
+#define HAVE_EVP_SHA512 1
+
/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
#define HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_memset' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_MEMSET */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
#define HAVE_FCHMOD 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmodat' function. */
+#define HAVE_FCHMODAT 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
#define HAVE_FCHOWN 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchownat' function. */
+#define HAVE_FCHOWNAT 1
+
/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
/* #undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_FCNTL_H 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */
#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_FEATURES_H */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_prot' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_set_prot' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_begin' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_status' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_supports_cred_prot' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `flock' function. */
#define HAVE_FLOCK 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fnmatch' function. */
+#define HAVE_FNMATCH 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fnmatch.h> header file. */
+#define HAVE_FNMATCH_H 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
#define HAVE_FREEADDRINFO 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_FREEZERO */
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */
#define HAVE_FSTATFS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
#define HAVE_FSTATVFS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
#define HAVE_FUTIMES 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
#define HAVE_GETADDRINFO 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
#define HAVE_GETCWD 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
#define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETGRSET */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getline' function. */
#define HAVE_GETLINE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETLUID */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
#define HAVE_GETNAMEINFO 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
#define HAVE_GETOPT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_GETOPT_H 1
/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1
/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
#define HAVE_GETPEEREID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */
#define HAVE_GETPGID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */
#define HAVE_GETPGRP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETPWANAM */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */
#define HAVE_GETRANDOM 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
#define HAVE_GETRLIMIT 1
/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
/* #undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getsid' function. */
#define HAVE_GETSID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
#define HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
#define HAVE_GETTTYENT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETUTENT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETUTID */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GETUTLINE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
#define HAVE_GETUTXENT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
#define HAVE_GETUTXID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
#define HAVE_GETUTXLINE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */
#define HAVE_GETUTXUSER 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
#define HAVE_GLOB 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_GLOB_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */
#define HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */
/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT */
/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP */
/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_IAF_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_IA_H */
/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP */
/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ifaddrs.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_IFADDRS_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
#define HAVE_INET_ATON 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
#define HAVE_INET_NTOA 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
#define HAVE_INET_NTOP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
#define HAVE_INNETGR 1
/* define if you have int64_t data type */
#define HAVE_INT64_T 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_INTTYPES_H 1
/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */
#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <langinfo.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_LANGINFO_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H */
/* Define if you want ldns support */
/* #undef HAVE_LDNS */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libaudit.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
/* #undef HAVE_LIBBSM */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
/* #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
-/* #undef HAVE_LIBDL */
+#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
/* #undef HAVE_LIBIAF */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */
/* #undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libproc.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_LIBPROC_H */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
/* #undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_LIBUTIL_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
/* #undef HAVE_LIBXNET */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_LIMITS_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/audit.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/filter.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */
#define HAVE_LLABS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_LOCALE_H 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `localtime_r' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOCALTIME_R 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_LOGIN */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
#define HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getpwclass' function. */
+#define HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_LOGIN_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_LOGOUT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_LOGWTMP */
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H */
/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and
to 0 otherwise. */
#define HAVE_MALLOC 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */
#define HAVE_MBLEN 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */
#define HAVE_MBTOWC 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT */
/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
/* #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmem' function. */
+#define HAVE_MEMMEM 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
#define HAVE_MEMMOVE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
#define HAVE_MEMSET_S 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
#define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1
/* define if you have mode_t data type */
#define HAVE_MODE_T 1
/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_NDIR_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_NETDB_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/route.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H 1
/* Define if you are on NeXT */
/* #undef HAVE_NEXT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */
#define HAVE_NL_LANGINFO 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_NSLEEP */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO */
/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
pam_strerror */
/* #undef HAVE_OLD_PAM */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
#define HAVE_OPENPTY 1
-/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include <openssl/header.h> */
-#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1
+/* as a macro */
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `OPENSSL_init_crypto' function. */
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version' function. */
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION 1
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version_num' function. */
+#define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM 1
/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
/* #undef HAVE_OSF_SIA */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
#define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
#define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_PATHS_H 1
/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP */
/* define if you have pid_t data type */
#define HAVE_PID_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_PLEDGE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
#define HAVE_POLL 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_POLL_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_PRCTL */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <priv.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_PRIV_H */
/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
/* #undef HAVE_PROC_PID */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `proc_pidinfo' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pselect' function. */
+#define HAVE_PSELECT 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_PSTAT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_PTY_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
#define HAVE_PUTUTXLINE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `raise' function. */
#define HAVE_RAISE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
#define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H 1
/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function,
and to 0 otherwise. */
#define HAVE_REALLOC 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
#define HAVE_REALLOCARRAY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
#define HAVE_REALPATH 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
#define HAVE_RECVMSG 1
/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */
#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/
/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
#define HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_crt_params */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_crt_params' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_factors */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_factors' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_key */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_key' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_dup */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_dup' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_free */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_free' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_get_finish */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_get_finish' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set1_name */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set1_name' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_finish */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_finish' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_dec */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_dec' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_enc */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_enc' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_srt_params */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_crt_params' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_factors */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_factors' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS 1
-/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_key */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_key' function. */
#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sandbox.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT */
/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED */
/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
/* #undef HAVE_SECUREWARE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
#define HAVE_SENDMSG 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
#define HAVE_SETEGID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
#define HAVE_SETENV 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
#define HAVE_SETEUID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */
#define HAVE_SETGROUPENT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
#define HAVE_SETGROUPS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */
#define HAVE_SETLINEBUF 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
#define HAVE_SETLOGIN 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SETLUID */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */
#define HAVE_SETPASSENT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SETPCRED */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SETPPRIV */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
#define HAVE_SETPROCTITLE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
#define HAVE_SETREGID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
#define HAVE_SETRESUID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
#define HAVE_SETREUID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
#define HAVE_SETRLIMIT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
#define HAVE_SETSID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SETUTENT */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */
#define HAVE_SETUTXDB 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
#define HAVE_SETUTXENT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
#define HAVE_SETVBUF 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SET_ID */
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */
-#define HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE 1
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256Update' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SHA2_H */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA384Update' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE */
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA512Update' function. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SHADOW_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
#define HAVE_SIGACTION 1
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sighandler_t'. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SIGHANDLER_T */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
#define HAVE_SIGVEC 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1
/* define if you have size_t data type */
#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
#define HAVE_SNPRINTF 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
#define HAVE_SOCKETPAIR 1
/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
/* #undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED */
/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1
/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1
+/* Define if you have ut_ss in utmpx.h */
+/* #undef HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
#define HAVE_STATFS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
#define HAVE_STATVFS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_STDDEF_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_STDINT_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasestr' function. */
#define HAVE_STRCASESTR 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
#define HAVE_STRDUP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
#define HAVE_STRERROR 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1
-/* Silly mkstemp() */
-/* #undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP */
-
/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_STRINGS_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_STRING_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
#define HAVE_STRLCAT 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
#define HAVE_STRLCPY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
#define HAVE_STRMODE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strndup' function. */
#define HAVE_STRNDUP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */
#define HAVE_STRNLEN 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
#define HAVE_STRNVIS 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
#define HAVE_STRPTIME 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
#define HAVE_STRSEP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */
#define HAVE_STRSIGNAL 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
#define HAVE_STRTOLL 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
#define HAVE_STRTONUM 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
#define HAVE_STRTOUL 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */
#define HAVE_STRTOULL 1
/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1
/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1
/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1
/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1
/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1
/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1
/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1
/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1
+/* Define to 1 if `f_files' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES 1
+
/* Define to 1 if `f_flags' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
-/* #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS */
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS 1
/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1
/* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM 1
/* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME 1
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */
+/* define if you have struct timespec */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1
/* define if you have struct timeval */
#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_SWAP32 */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
#define HAVE_SYSCONF 1
/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
/* #undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/byteorder.h> header file. */
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H */
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capsicum.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_DIR_H 1
/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/file.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_FILE_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/label.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H */
/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
-#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1
+/* #undef HAVE_SYS_NERR */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_POLL_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptrace.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/random.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysctl.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H 1
/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_TIME_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/vfs.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
#define HAVE_TCGETPGRP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
#define HAVE_TIME 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_TIME_H 1
/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP */
/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
/* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */
#define HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
#define HAVE_TRUNCATE 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_TTYENT_H 1
/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP */
/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1
/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
/* #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP */
/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_UCRED_H */
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */
#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1
/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
#define HAVE_UNSETENV 1
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMP */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_USERSEC_H */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */
#define HAVE_USER_FROM_UID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */
#define HAVE_USLEEP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_UTIL_H */
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimensat' function. */
+#define HAVE_UTIMENSAT 1
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
#define HAVE_UTIMES 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_UTIME_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_UTMPNAME */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
/* #undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_UTMPX_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
/* #undef HAVE_UTMP_H */
/* define if you have u_char data type */
#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1
/* define if you have u_int data type */
#define HAVE_U_INT 1
/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
#define HAVE_VASPRINTF 1
/* Define if va_copy exists */
#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_VIS_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
#define HAVE_VSNPRINTF 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
#define HAVE_WAITPID 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */
#define HAVE_WARN 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the <wchar.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_WCHAR_H 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */
#define HAVE_WCWIDTH 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
#define HAVE__GETLONG 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
/* #undef HAVE__GETPTY */
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
#define HAVE__GETSHORT 1
/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
#define HAVE___B64_NTOP 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
#define HAVE___B64_PTON 1
/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1
/* Define if libc defines __progname */
#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1
/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
/* #undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS */
/* Define if __va_copy exists */
#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1
/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
#define HAVE___func__ 1
/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
/* #undef HEIMDAL */
/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
/* #undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */
/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
/* #undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 */
/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
/* #undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
/* #undef KRB5 */
/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
/* #undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
/* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */
/* #undef LIBWRAP */
/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
EOPNOTSUPP. */
/* #undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO */
/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
/* #undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
/* #undef LLONG_MAX */
/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
/* #undef LLONG_MIN */
/* Account locked with pw(1) */
#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "*LOCKED*"
/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
/* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING */
/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
/* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR */
/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
/* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX */
/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */
/* #undef MAIL_DIRECTORY */
-/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */
+/* Need setpgrp to for controlling tty */
/* #undef NEED_SETPGRP */
/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args */
/* #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS */
/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */
/* #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE */
+/* SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select */
+/* #undef NO_SA_RESTART */
+
/* Define to disable UID restoration test */
/* #undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST */
/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
/* #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS */
/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
/* #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID */
/* OpenSSL has ECC */
#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1
/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */
#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1
/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */
#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1
/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */
#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1
/* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */
#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1
/* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */
#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1
/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
/* #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES */
/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1
/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org"
/* Define to the full name of this package. */
#define PACKAGE_NAME "OpenSSH"
/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
#define PACKAGE_STRING "OpenSSH Portable"
/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
#define PACKAGE_TARNAME "openssh"
/* Define to the home page for this package. */
#define PACKAGE_URL ""
/* Define to the version of this package. */
#define PACKAGE_VERSION "Portable"
/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
/* #undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE */
/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
/* #undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */
/* must supply username to passwd */
/* #undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME */
/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */
/* #undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID */
/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
/* #undef PRNGD_PORT */
/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
/* #undef PRNGD_SOCKET */
/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
/* #undef PTY_ZEROREAD */
/* Sandbox using capsicum */
#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1
/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */
/* #undef SANDBOX_DARWIN */
/* no privsep sandboxing */
/* #undef SANDBOX_NULL */
/* Sandbox using pledge(2) */
/* #undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE */
/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */
/* #undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT */
/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */
/* #undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */
/* #undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE */
/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */
#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1
/* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */
/* #undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS */
/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */
/* #undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
/* Specify the system call convention in use */
/* #undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH */
/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
/* #undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID */
/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
#define SIZEOF_INT 4
/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT 8
/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT 8
/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT 2
+/* The size of `time_t', as computed by sizeof. */
+#define SIZEOF_TIME_T 8
+
/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
#define SNPRINTF_CONST const
/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
bsd-setproctitle.c */
/* #undef SPT_TYPE */
/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
/* #undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY */
/* sshd PAM service name */
/* #undef SSHD_PAM_SERVICE */
/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
/* #undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID */
/* Use audit debugging module */
/* #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
/* #undef SSH_IOBUFSZ */
/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
/* #undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF */
/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1
/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
/* #undef SSH_TUN_LINUX */
/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
/* #undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 */
/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
/* #undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD */
/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
/* #undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF */
/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
#define STDC_HEADERS 1
/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
/* #undef SUPERUSER_PATH */
/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
/* #undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND */
/* Support routing domains using Linux VRF */
/* #undef SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX */
/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
/* #undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
/* Specify default $PATH */
/* #undef USER_PATH */
/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
/* #undef USE_AFS */
/* Use BSM audit module */
/* #undef USE_BSM_AUDIT */
/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
/* #undef USE_BTMP */
/* Use libedit for sftp */
#define USE_LIBEDIT 1
/* Use Linux audit module */
/* #undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1
/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
#define USE_PAM 1
/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
/* #undef USE_PIPES */
/* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
/* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */
/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
/* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS */
/* Define if you have Solaris projects */
/* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */
+/* compiler variable declarations after code */
+#define VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE 1
+
+/* compiler supports variable length arrays */
+#define VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS 1
+
/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
/* #undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY */
/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
/* #undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C
arrays) */
/* #undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
/* #undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
/* #undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
/* #undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
#define WITH_OPENSSL 1
/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
/* #undef WITH_SELINUX */
+/* Enable zlib */
+#define WITH_ZLIB 1
+
/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
# endif
#else
# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
/* # undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
# endif
#endif
/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
-/* #undef XAUTH_PATH */
+#define XAUTH_PATH "/usr/local/bin/xauth"
/* Enable large inode numbers on Mac OS X 10.5. */
#ifndef _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE
# define _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE 1
#endif
/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
/* #undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS */
/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
/* #undef _LARGE_FILES */
/* log for bad login attempts */
/* #undef _PATH_BTMP */
/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd"
/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
/* #undef __res_state */
/* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */
/* #undef calloc */
/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */
#ifndef __cplusplus
/* #undef inline */
#endif
/* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */
/* #undef malloc */
/* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */
/* #undef realloc */
/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
/* #undef socklen_t */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.sub b/crypto/openssh/config.sub
index 9feb73bf088f..973a2980ac3a 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/config.sub
+++ b/crypto/openssh/config.sub
@@ -1,1823 +1,1793 @@
#! /bin/sh
# Configuration validation subroutine script.
-# Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright 1992-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-timestamp='2016-06-20'
+timestamp='2020-05-04'
# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+# along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that
# program. This Exception is an additional permission under section 7
# of the GNU General Public License, version 3 ("GPLv3").
# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>.
#
# Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type.
# Supply the specified configuration type as an argument.
# If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1.
# Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed.
# You can get the latest version of this script from:
-# http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub
+# https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub
# This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages
# and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases
# that are meaningful with *any* GNU software.
# Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations
# it does not support. The user should be able to distinguish
# a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless
# configuration.
# The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given
# machine specification into a single specification in the form:
# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM
# or in some cases, the newer four-part form:
# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM
# It is wrong to echo any other type of specification.
me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
usage="\
Usage: $0 [OPTION] CPU-MFR-OPSYS or ALIAS
Canonicalize a configuration name.
-Operation modes:
+Options:
-h, --help print this help, then exit
-t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit
-v, --version print version number, then exit
Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
version="\
GNU config.sub ($timestamp)
-Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+Copyright 1992-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
help="
Try \`$me --help' for more information."
# Parse command line
while test $# -gt 0 ; do
case $1 in
--time-stamp | --time* | -t )
echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;;
--version | -v )
echo "$version" ; exit ;;
--help | --h* | -h )
echo "$usage"; exit ;;
-- ) # Stop option processing
shift; break ;;
- ) # Use stdin as input.
break ;;
-* )
- echo "$me: invalid option $1$help"
+ echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
exit 1 ;;
*local*)
# First pass through any local machine types.
- echo $1
+ echo "$1"
exit ;;
* )
break ;;
esac
done
case $# in
0) echo "$me: missing argument$help" >&2
exit 1;;
1) ;;
*) echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
exit 1;;
esac
-# Separate what the user gave into CPU-COMPANY and OS or KERNEL-OS (if any).
-# Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations.
-maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'`
-case $maybe_os in
- nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | linux-android* | linux-dietlibc | linux-newlib* | \
- linux-musl* | linux-uclibc* | uclinux-uclibc* | uclinux-gnu* | kfreebsd*-gnu* | \
- knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-eabi* | \
- kopensolaris*-gnu* | \
- storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova*)
- os=-$maybe_os
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'`
- ;;
- android-linux)
- os=-linux-android
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'`-unknown
- ;;
- *)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/-[^-]*$//'`
- if [ $basic_machine != $1 ]
- then os=`echo $1 | sed 's/.*-/-/'`
- else os=; fi
- ;;
-esac
+# Split fields of configuration type
+# shellcheck disable=SC2162
+IFS="-" read field1 field2 field3 field4 <<EOF
+$1
+EOF
-### Let's recognize common machines as not being operating systems so
-### that things like config.sub decstation-3100 work. We also
-### recognize some manufacturers as not being operating systems, so we
-### can provide default operating systems below.
-case $os in
- -sun*os*)
- # Prevent following clause from handling this invalid input.
- ;;
- -dec* | -mips* | -sequent* | -encore* | -pc532* | -sgi* | -sony* | \
- -att* | -7300* | -3300* | -delta* | -motorola* | -sun[234]* | \
- -unicom* | -ibm* | -next | -hp | -isi* | -apollo | -altos* | \
- -convergent* | -ncr* | -news | -32* | -3600* | -3100* | -hitachi* |\
- -c[123]* | -convex* | -sun | -crds | -omron* | -dg | -ultra | -tti* | \
- -harris | -dolphin | -highlevel | -gould | -cbm | -ns | -masscomp | \
- -apple | -axis | -knuth | -cray | -microblaze*)
- os=
- basic_machine=$1
- ;;
- -bluegene*)
- os=-cnk
- ;;
- -sim | -cisco | -oki | -wec | -winbond)
- os=
- basic_machine=$1
- ;;
- -scout)
- ;;
- -wrs)
- os=-vxworks
- basic_machine=$1
- ;;
- -chorusos*)
- os=-chorusos
- basic_machine=$1
- ;;
- -chorusrdb)
- os=-chorusrdb
- basic_machine=$1
- ;;
- -hiux*)
- os=-hiuxwe2
- ;;
- -sco6)
- os=-sco5v6
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -sco5)
- os=-sco3.2v5
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -sco4)
- os=-sco3.2v4
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -sco3.2.[4-9]*)
- os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'`
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -sco3.2v[4-9]*)
- # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer.
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -sco5v6*)
- # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer.
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -sco*)
- os=-sco3.2v2
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -udk*)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -isc)
- os=-isc2.2
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -clix*)
- basic_machine=clipper-intergraph
- ;;
- -isc*)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
- ;;
- -lynx*178)
- os=-lynxos178
- ;;
- -lynx*5)
- os=-lynxos5
- ;;
- -lynx*)
- os=-lynxos
+# Separate into logical components for further validation
+case $1 in
+ *-*-*-*-*)
+ echo Invalid configuration \`"$1"\': more than four components >&2
+ exit 1
;;
- -ptx*)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-sequent/'`
+ *-*-*-*)
+ basic_machine=$field1-$field2
+ os=$field3-$field4
;;
- -windowsnt*)
- os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/windowsnt/winnt/'`
+ *-*-*)
+ # Ambiguous whether COMPANY is present, or skipped and KERNEL-OS is two
+ # parts
+ maybe_os=$field2-$field3
+ case $maybe_os in
+ nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | linux-android* | linux-dietlibc \
+ | linux-newlib* | linux-musl* | linux-uclibc* | uclinux-uclibc* \
+ | uclinux-gnu* | kfreebsd*-gnu* | knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* \
+ | netbsd*-eabi* | kopensolaris*-gnu* | cloudabi*-eabi* \
+ | storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova*)
+ basic_machine=$field1
+ os=$maybe_os
+ ;;
+ android-linux)
+ basic_machine=$field1-unknown
+ os=linux-android
+ ;;
+ *)
+ basic_machine=$field1-$field2
+ os=$field3
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
- -psos*)
- os=-psos
+ *-*)
+ # A lone config we happen to match not fitting any pattern
+ case $field1-$field2 in
+ decstation-3100)
+ basic_machine=mips-dec
+ os=
+ ;;
+ *-*)
+ # Second component is usually, but not always the OS
+ case $field2 in
+ # Prevent following clause from handling this valid os
+ sun*os*)
+ basic_machine=$field1
+ os=$field2
+ ;;
+ # Manufacturers
+ dec* | mips* | sequent* | encore* | pc533* | sgi* | sony* \
+ | att* | 7300* | 3300* | delta* | motorola* | sun[234]* \
+ | unicom* | ibm* | next | hp | isi* | apollo | altos* \
+ | convergent* | ncr* | news | 32* | 3600* | 3100* \
+ | hitachi* | c[123]* | convex* | sun | crds | omron* | dg \
+ | ultra | tti* | harris | dolphin | highlevel | gould \
+ | cbm | ns | masscomp | apple | axis | knuth | cray \
+ | microblaze* | sim | cisco \
+ | oki | wec | wrs | winbond)
+ basic_machine=$field1-$field2
+ os=
+ ;;
+ *)
+ basic_machine=$field1
+ os=$field2
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
- -mint | -mint[0-9]*)
- basic_machine=m68k-atari
- os=-mint
+ *)
+ # Convert single-component short-hands not valid as part of
+ # multi-component configurations.
+ case $field1 in
+ 386bsd)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ a29khif)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=udi
+ ;;
+ adobe68k)
+ basic_machine=m68010-adobe
+ os=scout
+ ;;
+ alliant)
+ basic_machine=fx80-alliant
+ os=
+ ;;
+ altos | altos3068)
+ basic_machine=m68k-altos
+ os=
+ ;;
+ am29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-none
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ amdahl)
+ basic_machine=580-amdahl
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ amiga)
+ basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+ os=
+ ;;
+ amigaos | amigados)
+ basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+ os=amigaos
+ ;;
+ amigaunix | amix)
+ basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+ os=sysv4
+ ;;
+ apollo68)
+ basic_machine=m68k-apollo
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ apollo68bsd)
+ basic_machine=m68k-apollo
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ aros)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=aros
+ ;;
+ aux)
+ basic_machine=m68k-apple
+ os=aux
+ ;;
+ balance)
+ basic_machine=ns32k-sequent
+ os=dynix
+ ;;
+ blackfin)
+ basic_machine=bfin-unknown
+ os=linux
+ ;;
+ cegcc)
+ basic_machine=arm-unknown
+ os=cegcc
+ ;;
+ convex-c1)
+ basic_machine=c1-convex
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c2)
+ basic_machine=c2-convex
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c32)
+ basic_machine=c32-convex
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c34)
+ basic_machine=c34-convex
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c38)
+ basic_machine=c38-convex
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ cray)
+ basic_machine=j90-cray
+ os=unicos
+ ;;
+ crds | unos)
+ basic_machine=m68k-crds
+ os=
+ ;;
+ da30)
+ basic_machine=m68k-da30
+ os=
+ ;;
+ decstation | pmax | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn)
+ basic_machine=mips-dec
+ os=
+ ;;
+ delta88)
+ basic_machine=m88k-motorola
+ os=sysv3
+ ;;
+ dicos)
+ basic_machine=i686-pc
+ os=dicos
+ ;;
+ djgpp)
+ basic_machine=i586-pc
+ os=msdosdjgpp
+ ;;
+ ebmon29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=ebmon
+ ;;
+ es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE)
+ basic_machine=m68k-ericsson
+ os=ose
+ ;;
+ gmicro)
+ basic_machine=tron-gmicro
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ go32)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=go32
+ ;;
+ h8300hms)
+ basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
+ os=hms
+ ;;
+ h8300xray)
+ basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
+ os=xray
+ ;;
+ h8500hms)
+ basic_machine=h8500-hitachi
+ os=hms
+ ;;
+ harris)
+ basic_machine=m88k-harris
+ os=sysv3
+ ;;
+ hp300 | hp300hpux)
+ basic_machine=m68k-hp
+ os=hpux
+ ;;
+ hp300bsd)
+ basic_machine=m68k-hp
+ os=bsd
+ ;;
+ hppaosf)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ os=osf
+ ;;
+ hppro)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ os=proelf
+ ;;
+ i386mach)
+ basic_machine=i386-mach
+ os=mach
+ ;;
+ isi68 | isi)
+ basic_machine=m68k-isi
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ m68knommu)
+ basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+ os=linux
+ ;;
+ magnum | m3230)
+ basic_machine=mips-mips
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ merlin)
+ basic_machine=ns32k-utek
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ mingw64)
+ basic_machine=x86_64-pc
+ os=mingw64
+ ;;
+ mingw32)
+ basic_machine=i686-pc
+ os=mingw32
+ ;;
+ mingw32ce)
+ basic_machine=arm-unknown
+ os=mingw32ce
+ ;;
+ monitor)
+ basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
+ os=coff
+ ;;
+ morphos)
+ basic_machine=powerpc-unknown
+ os=morphos
+ ;;
+ moxiebox)
+ basic_machine=moxie-unknown
+ os=moxiebox
+ ;;
+ msdos)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=msdos
+ ;;
+ msys)
+ basic_machine=i686-pc
+ os=msys
+ ;;
+ mvs)
+ basic_machine=i370-ibm
+ os=mvs
+ ;;
+ nacl)
+ basic_machine=le32-unknown
+ os=nacl
+ ;;
+ ncr3000)
+ basic_machine=i486-ncr
+ os=sysv4
+ ;;
+ netbsd386)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=netbsd
+ ;;
+ netwinder)
+ basic_machine=armv4l-rebel
+ os=linux
+ ;;
+ news | news700 | news800 | news900)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sony
+ os=newsos
+ ;;
+ news1000)
+ basic_machine=m68030-sony
+ os=newsos
+ ;;
+ necv70)
+ basic_machine=v70-nec
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ nh3000)
+ basic_machine=m68k-harris
+ os=cxux
+ ;;
+ nh[45]000)
+ basic_machine=m88k-harris
+ os=cxux
+ ;;
+ nindy960)
+ basic_machine=i960-intel
+ os=nindy
+ ;;
+ mon960)
+ basic_machine=i960-intel
+ os=mon960
+ ;;
+ nonstopux)
+ basic_machine=mips-compaq
+ os=nonstopux
+ ;;
+ os400)
+ basic_machine=powerpc-ibm
+ os=os400
+ ;;
+ OSE68000 | ose68000)
+ basic_machine=m68000-ericsson
+ os=ose
+ ;;
+ os68k)
+ basic_machine=m68k-none
+ os=os68k
+ ;;
+ paragon)
+ basic_machine=i860-intel
+ os=osf
+ ;;
+ parisc)
+ basic_machine=hppa-unknown
+ os=linux
+ ;;
+ pw32)
+ basic_machine=i586-unknown
+ os=pw32
+ ;;
+ rdos | rdos64)
+ basic_machine=x86_64-pc
+ os=rdos
+ ;;
+ rdos32)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=rdos
+ ;;
+ rom68k)
+ basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
+ os=coff
+ ;;
+ sa29200)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=udi
+ ;;
+ sei)
+ basic_machine=mips-sei
+ os=seiux
+ ;;
+ sequent)
+ basic_machine=i386-sequent
+ os=
+ ;;
+ sps7)
+ basic_machine=m68k-bull
+ os=sysv2
+ ;;
+ st2000)
+ basic_machine=m68k-tandem
+ os=
+ ;;
+ stratus)
+ basic_machine=i860-stratus
+ os=sysv4
+ ;;
+ sun2)
+ basic_machine=m68000-sun
+ os=
+ ;;
+ sun2os3)
+ basic_machine=m68000-sun
+ os=sunos3
+ ;;
+ sun2os4)
+ basic_machine=m68000-sun
+ os=sunos4
+ ;;
+ sun3)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sun
+ os=
+ ;;
+ sun3os3)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sun
+ os=sunos3
+ ;;
+ sun3os4)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sun
+ os=sunos4
+ ;;
+ sun4)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ os=
+ ;;
+ sun4os3)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ os=sunos3
+ ;;
+ sun4os4)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ os=sunos4
+ ;;
+ sun4sol2)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ os=solaris2
+ ;;
+ sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner)
+ basic_machine=i386-sun
+ os=
+ ;;
+ sv1)
+ basic_machine=sv1-cray
+ os=unicos
+ ;;
+ symmetry)
+ basic_machine=i386-sequent
+ os=dynix
+ ;;
+ t3e)
+ basic_machine=alphaev5-cray
+ os=unicos
+ ;;
+ t90)
+ basic_machine=t90-cray
+ os=unicos
+ ;;
+ toad1)
+ basic_machine=pdp10-xkl
+ os=tops20
+ ;;
+ tpf)
+ basic_machine=s390x-ibm
+ os=tpf
+ ;;
+ udi29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=udi
+ ;;
+ ultra3)
+ basic_machine=a29k-nyu
+ os=sym1
+ ;;
+ v810 | necv810)
+ basic_machine=v810-nec
+ os=none
+ ;;
+ vaxv)
+ basic_machine=vax-dec
+ os=sysv
+ ;;
+ vms)
+ basic_machine=vax-dec
+ os=vms
+ ;;
+ vsta)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=vsta
+ ;;
+ vxworks960)
+ basic_machine=i960-wrs
+ os=vxworks
+ ;;
+ vxworks68)
+ basic_machine=m68k-wrs
+ os=vxworks
+ ;;
+ vxworks29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-wrs
+ os=vxworks
+ ;;
+ xbox)
+ basic_machine=i686-pc
+ os=mingw32
+ ;;
+ ymp)
+ basic_machine=ymp-cray
+ os=unicos
+ ;;
+ *)
+ basic_machine=$1
+ os=
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
esac
-# Decode aliases for certain CPU-COMPANY combinations.
+# Decode 1-component or ad-hoc basic machines
case $basic_machine in
- # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name.
- # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below.
- 1750a | 580 \
- | a29k \
- | aarch64 | aarch64_be \
- | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] | alphapca5[67] \
- | alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] | alpha64pca5[67] \
- | am33_2.0 \
- | arc | arceb \
- | arm | arm[bl]e | arme[lb] | armv[2-8] | armv[3-8][lb] | armv7[arm] \
- | avr | avr32 \
- | ba \
- | be32 | be64 \
- | bfin \
- | c4x | c8051 | clipper \
- | d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \
- | e2k | epiphany \
- | fido | fr30 | frv | ft32 \
- | h8300 | h8500 | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \
- | hexagon \
- | i370 | i860 | i960 | ia64 \
- | ip2k | iq2000 \
- | k1om \
- | le32 | le64 \
- | lm32 \
- | m32c | m32r | m32rle | m68000 | m68k | m88k \
- | maxq | mb | microblaze | microblazeel | mcore | mep | metag \
- | mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \
- | mips16 \
- | mips64 | mips64el \
- | mips64octeon | mips64octeonel \
- | mips64orion | mips64orionel \
- | mips64r5900 | mips64r5900el \
- | mips64vr | mips64vrel \
- | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \
- | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \
- | mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \
- | mips64vr5900 | mips64vr5900el \
- | mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \
- | mipsisa32r2 | mipsisa32r2el \
- | mipsisa32r6 | mipsisa32r6el \
- | mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \
- | mipsisa64r2 | mipsisa64r2el \
- | mipsisa64r6 | mipsisa64r6el \
- | mipsisa64sb1 | mipsisa64sb1el \
- | mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \
- | mipsr5900 | mipsr5900el \
- | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \
- | mn10200 | mn10300 \
- | moxie \
- | mt \
- | msp430 \
- | nds32 | nds32le | nds32be \
- | nios | nios2 | nios2eb | nios2el \
- | ns16k | ns32k \
- | open8 | or1k | or1knd | or32 \
- | pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl \
- | powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle \
- | pyramid \
- | riscv32 | riscv64 \
- | rl78 | rx \
- | score \
- | sh | sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[23]e | sh[234]eb | sheb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \
- | sh64 | sh64le \
- | sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc64v | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite \
- | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v \
- | spu \
- | tahoe | tic4x | tic54x | tic55x | tic6x | tic80 | tron \
- | ubicom32 \
- | v850 | v850e | v850e1 | v850e2 | v850es | v850e2v3 \
- | visium \
- | we32k \
- | x86 | xc16x | xstormy16 | xtensa \
- | z8k | z80)
- basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
- ;;
- c54x)
- basic_machine=tic54x-unknown
- ;;
- c55x)
- basic_machine=tic55x-unknown
- ;;
- c6x)
- basic_machine=tic6x-unknown
- ;;
- leon|leon[3-9])
- basic_machine=sparc-$basic_machine
- ;;
- m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12 | m68hcs12x | nvptx | picochip)
- basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
- os=-none
+ # Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in
+ # some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular.
+ w89k)
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=winbond
;;
- m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | v70 | w65 | z8k)
+ op50n)
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=oki
;;
- ms1)
- basic_machine=mt-unknown
+ op60c)
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=oki
;;
-
- strongarm | thumb | xscale)
- basic_machine=arm-unknown
+ ibm*)
+ cpu=i370
+ vendor=ibm
;;
- xgate)
- basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
- os=-none
+ orion105)
+ cpu=clipper
+ vendor=highlevel
;;
- xscaleeb)
- basic_machine=armeb-unknown
+ mac | mpw | mac-mpw)
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=apple
;;
-
- xscaleel)
- basic_machine=armel-unknown
+ pmac | pmac-mpw)
+ cpu=powerpc
+ vendor=apple
;;
- # We use `pc' rather than `unknown'
- # because (1) that's what they normally are, and
- # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users.
- i*86 | x86_64)
- basic_machine=$basic_machine-pc
- ;;
- # Object if more than one company name word.
- *-*-*)
- echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2
- exit 1
- ;;
- # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name.
- 580-* \
- | a29k-* \
- | aarch64-* | aarch64_be-* \
- | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphaev6[78]-* \
- | alpha64-* | alpha64ev[4-8]-* | alpha64ev56-* | alpha64ev6[78]-* \
- | alphapca5[67]-* | alpha64pca5[67]-* | arc-* | arceb-* \
- | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armeb-* | armv*-* \
- | avr-* | avr32-* \
- | ba-* \
- | be32-* | be64-* \
- | bfin-* | bs2000-* \
- | c[123]* | c30-* | [cjt]90-* | c4x-* \
- | c8051-* | clipper-* | craynv-* | cydra-* \
- | d10v-* | d30v-* | dlx-* \
- | e2k-* | elxsi-* \
- | f30[01]-* | f700-* | fido-* | fr30-* | frv-* | fx80-* \
- | h8300-* | h8500-* \
- | hppa-* | hppa1.[01]-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0[nw]-* | hppa64-* \
- | hexagon-* \
- | i*86-* | i860-* | i960-* | ia64-* \
- | ip2k-* | iq2000-* \
- | k1om-* \
- | le32-* | le64-* \
- | lm32-* \
- | m32c-* | m32r-* | m32rle-* \
- | m68000-* | m680[012346]0-* | m68360-* | m683?2-* | m68k-* \
- | m88110-* | m88k-* | maxq-* | mcore-* | metag-* \
- | microblaze-* | microblazeel-* \
- | mips-* | mipsbe-* | mipseb-* | mipsel-* | mipsle-* \
- | mips16-* \
- | mips64-* | mips64el-* \
- | mips64octeon-* | mips64octeonel-* \
- | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \
- | mips64r5900-* | mips64r5900el-* \
- | mips64vr-* | mips64vrel-* \
- | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* \
- | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \
- | mips64vr5000-* | mips64vr5000el-* \
- | mips64vr5900-* | mips64vr5900el-* \
- | mipsisa32-* | mipsisa32el-* \
- | mipsisa32r2-* | mipsisa32r2el-* \
- | mipsisa32r6-* | mipsisa32r6el-* \
- | mipsisa64-* | mipsisa64el-* \
- | mipsisa64r2-* | mipsisa64r2el-* \
- | mipsisa64r6-* | mipsisa64r6el-* \
- | mipsisa64sb1-* | mipsisa64sb1el-* \
- | mipsisa64sr71k-* | mipsisa64sr71kel-* \
- | mipsr5900-* | mipsr5900el-* \
- | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* \
- | mmix-* \
- | mt-* \
- | msp430-* \
- | nds32-* | nds32le-* | nds32be-* \
- | nios-* | nios2-* | nios2eb-* | nios2el-* \
- | none-* | np1-* | ns16k-* | ns32k-* \
- | open8-* \
- | or1k*-* \
- | orion-* \
- | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | pj-* | pjl-* | pn-* | power-* \
- | powerpc-* | powerpc64-* | powerpc64le-* | powerpcle-* \
- | pyramid-* \
- | riscv32-* | riscv64-* \
- | rl78-* | romp-* | rs6000-* | rx-* \
- | sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[24]a-* | sh[24]aeb-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | sheb-* | shbe-* \
- | shle-* | sh[1234]le-* | sh3ele-* | sh64-* | sh64le-* \
- | sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc64b-* | sparc64v-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* \
- | sparclite-* \
- | sparcv8-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | sparcv9v-* | sv1-* | sx*-* \
- | tahoe-* \
- | tic30-* | tic4x-* | tic54x-* | tic55x-* | tic6x-* | tic80-* \
- | tile*-* \
- | tron-* \
- | ubicom32-* \
- | v850-* | v850e-* | v850e1-* | v850es-* | v850e2-* | v850e2v3-* \
- | vax-* \
- | visium-* \
- | we32k-* \
- | x86-* | x86_64-* | xc16x-* | xps100-* \
- | xstormy16-* | xtensa*-* \
- | ymp-* \
- | z8k-* | z80-*)
- ;;
- # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name, with glob match.
- xtensa*)
- basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
- ;;
# Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand
# for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS.
- 386bsd)
- basic_machine=i386-unknown
- os=-bsd
- ;;
3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc)
- basic_machine=m68000-att
+ cpu=m68000
+ vendor=att
;;
3b*)
- basic_machine=we32k-att
- ;;
- a29khif)
- basic_machine=a29k-amd
- os=-udi
- ;;
- abacus)
- basic_machine=abacus-unknown
- ;;
- adobe68k)
- basic_machine=m68010-adobe
- os=-scout
- ;;
- alliant | fx80)
- basic_machine=fx80-alliant
- ;;
- altos | altos3068)
- basic_machine=m68k-altos
- ;;
- am29k)
- basic_machine=a29k-none
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- amd64)
- basic_machine=x86_64-pc
- ;;
- amd64-*)
- basic_machine=x86_64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- amdahl)
- basic_machine=580-amdahl
- os=-sysv
- ;;
- amiga | amiga-*)
- basic_machine=m68k-unknown
- ;;
- amigaos | amigados)
- basic_machine=m68k-unknown
- os=-amigaos
- ;;
- amigaunix | amix)
- basic_machine=m68k-unknown
- os=-sysv4
- ;;
- apollo68)
- basic_machine=m68k-apollo
- os=-sysv
- ;;
- apollo68bsd)
- basic_machine=m68k-apollo
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- aros)
- basic_machine=i386-pc
- os=-aros
- ;;
- asmjs)
- basic_machine=asmjs-unknown
- ;;
- aux)
- basic_machine=m68k-apple
- os=-aux
- ;;
- balance)
- basic_machine=ns32k-sequent
- os=-dynix
- ;;
- blackfin)
- basic_machine=bfin-unknown
- os=-linux
- ;;
- blackfin-*)
- basic_machine=bfin-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- os=-linux
+ cpu=we32k
+ vendor=att
;;
bluegene*)
- basic_machine=powerpc-ibm
- os=-cnk
- ;;
- c54x-*)
- basic_machine=tic54x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- c55x-*)
- basic_machine=tic55x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- c6x-*)
- basic_machine=tic6x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- c90)
- basic_machine=c90-cray
- os=-unicos
- ;;
- cegcc)
- basic_machine=arm-unknown
- os=-cegcc
- ;;
- convex-c1)
- basic_machine=c1-convex
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- convex-c2)
- basic_machine=c2-convex
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- convex-c32)
- basic_machine=c32-convex
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- convex-c34)
- basic_machine=c34-convex
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- convex-c38)
- basic_machine=c38-convex
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- cray | j90)
- basic_machine=j90-cray
- os=-unicos
- ;;
- craynv)
- basic_machine=craynv-cray
- os=-unicosmp
- ;;
- cr16 | cr16-*)
- basic_machine=cr16-unknown
- os=-elf
- ;;
- crds | unos)
- basic_machine=m68k-crds
- ;;
- crisv32 | crisv32-* | etraxfs*)
- basic_machine=crisv32-axis
- ;;
- cris | cris-* | etrax*)
- basic_machine=cris-axis
- ;;
- crx)
- basic_machine=crx-unknown
- os=-elf
- ;;
- da30 | da30-*)
- basic_machine=m68k-da30
- ;;
- decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn)
- basic_machine=mips-dec
+ cpu=powerpc
+ vendor=ibm
+ os=cnk
;;
decsystem10* | dec10*)
- basic_machine=pdp10-dec
- os=-tops10
+ cpu=pdp10
+ vendor=dec
+ os=tops10
;;
decsystem20* | dec20*)
- basic_machine=pdp10-dec
- os=-tops20
+ cpu=pdp10
+ vendor=dec
+ os=tops20
;;
delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \
| 3300-motorola | delta-motorola)
- basic_machine=m68k-motorola
- ;;
- delta88)
- basic_machine=m88k-motorola
- os=-sysv3
- ;;
- dicos)
- basic_machine=i686-pc
- os=-dicos
- ;;
- djgpp)
- basic_machine=i586-pc
- os=-msdosdjgpp
- ;;
- dpx20 | dpx20-*)
- basic_machine=rs6000-bull
- os=-bosx
- ;;
- dpx2* | dpx2*-bull)
- basic_machine=m68k-bull
- os=-sysv3
- ;;
- e500v[12])
- basic_machine=powerpc-unknown
- os=$os"spe"
- ;;
- e500v[12]-*)
- basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- os=$os"spe"
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=motorola
;;
- ebmon29k)
- basic_machine=a29k-amd
- os=-ebmon
- ;;
- elxsi)
- basic_machine=elxsi-elxsi
- os=-bsd
+ dpx2*)
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=bull
+ os=sysv3
;;
encore | umax | mmax)
- basic_machine=ns32k-encore
+ cpu=ns32k
+ vendor=encore
;;
- es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE)
- basic_machine=m68k-ericsson
- os=-ose
+ elxsi)
+ cpu=elxsi
+ vendor=elxsi
+ os=${os:-bsd}
;;
fx2800)
- basic_machine=i860-alliant
+ cpu=i860
+ vendor=alliant
;;
genix)
- basic_machine=ns32k-ns
- ;;
- gmicro)
- basic_machine=tron-gmicro
- os=-sysv
- ;;
- go32)
- basic_machine=i386-pc
- os=-go32
+ cpu=ns32k
+ vendor=ns
;;
h3050r* | hiux*)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi
- os=-hiuxwe2
- ;;
- h8300hms)
- basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
- os=-hms
- ;;
- h8300xray)
- basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
- os=-xray
- ;;
- h8500hms)
- basic_machine=h8500-hitachi
- os=-hms
- ;;
- harris)
- basic_machine=m88k-harris
- os=-sysv3
- ;;
- hp300-*)
- basic_machine=m68k-hp
- ;;
- hp300bsd)
- basic_machine=m68k-hp
- os=-bsd
- ;;
- hp300hpux)
- basic_machine=m68k-hp
- os=-hpux
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=hitachi
+ os=hiuxwe2
;;
hp3k9[0-9][0-9] | hp9[0-9][0-9])
- basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp
+ cpu=hppa1.0
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9])
- basic_machine=m68000-hp
+ cpu=m68000
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k3[2-9][0-9])
- basic_machine=m68k-hp
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k6[0-9][0-9] | hp6[0-9][0-9])
- basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp
+ cpu=hppa1.0
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k7[0-79][0-9] | hp7[0-79][0-9])
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k78[0-9] | hp78[0-9])
# FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k8[67]1 | hp8[67]1 | hp9k80[24] | hp80[24] | hp9k8[78]9 | hp8[78]9 | hp9k893 | hp893)
# FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k8[0-9][13679] | hp8[0-9][13679])
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=hp
;;
hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9])
- basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp
- ;;
- hppa-next)
- os=-nextstep3
- ;;
- hppaosf)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
- os=-osf
- ;;
- hppro)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
- os=-proelf
- ;;
- i370-ibm* | ibm*)
- basic_machine=i370-ibm
+ cpu=hppa1.0
+ vendor=hp
;;
i*86v32)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
- os=-sysv32
+ cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+ vendor=pc
+ os=sysv32
;;
i*86v4*)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
- os=-sysv4
+ cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+ vendor=pc
+ os=sysv4
;;
i*86v)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
- os=-sysv
+ cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+ vendor=pc
+ os=sysv
;;
i*86sol2)
- basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
- os=-solaris2
+ cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+ vendor=pc
+ os=solaris2
;;
- i386mach)
- basic_machine=i386-mach
- os=-mach
- ;;
- i386-vsta | vsta)
- basic_machine=i386-unknown
- os=-vsta
+ j90 | j90-cray)
+ cpu=j90
+ vendor=cray
+ os=${os:-unicos}
;;
iris | iris4d)
- basic_machine=mips-sgi
+ cpu=mips
+ vendor=sgi
case $os in
- -irix*)
+ irix*)
;;
*)
- os=-irix4
+ os=irix4
;;
esac
;;
- isi68 | isi)
- basic_machine=m68k-isi
- os=-sysv
- ;;
- leon-*|leon[3-9]-*)
- basic_machine=sparc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/-.*//'`
- ;;
- m68knommu)
- basic_machine=m68k-unknown
- os=-linux
- ;;
- m68knommu-*)
- basic_machine=m68k-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- os=-linux
- ;;
- m88k-omron*)
- basic_machine=m88k-omron
- ;;
- magnum | m3230)
- basic_machine=mips-mips
- os=-sysv
- ;;
- merlin)
- basic_machine=ns32k-utek
- os=-sysv
- ;;
- microblaze*)
- basic_machine=microblaze-xilinx
- ;;
- mingw64)
- basic_machine=x86_64-pc
- os=-mingw64
- ;;
- mingw32)
- basic_machine=i686-pc
- os=-mingw32
- ;;
- mingw32ce)
- basic_machine=arm-unknown
- os=-mingw32ce
- ;;
miniframe)
- basic_machine=m68000-convergent
- ;;
- *mint | -mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*)
- basic_machine=m68k-atari
- os=-mint
- ;;
- mips3*-*)
- basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`
- ;;
- mips3*)
- basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`-unknown
- ;;
- monitor)
- basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
- os=-coff
- ;;
- morphos)
- basic_machine=powerpc-unknown
- os=-morphos
- ;;
- moxiebox)
- basic_machine=moxie-unknown
- os=-moxiebox
- ;;
- msdos)
- basic_machine=i386-pc
- os=-msdos
- ;;
- ms1-*)
- basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/ms1-/mt-/'`
- ;;
- msys)
- basic_machine=i686-pc
- os=-msys
- ;;
- mvs)
- basic_machine=i370-ibm
- os=-mvs
+ cpu=m68000
+ vendor=convergent
;;
- nacl)
- basic_machine=le32-unknown
- os=-nacl
- ;;
- ncr3000)
- basic_machine=i486-ncr
- os=-sysv4
- ;;
- netbsd386)
- basic_machine=i386-unknown
- os=-netbsd
- ;;
- netwinder)
- basic_machine=armv4l-rebel
- os=-linux
- ;;
- news | news700 | news800 | news900)
- basic_machine=m68k-sony
- os=-newsos
- ;;
- news1000)
- basic_machine=m68030-sony
- os=-newsos
+ *mint | mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*)
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=atari
+ os=mint
;;
news-3600 | risc-news)
- basic_machine=mips-sony
- os=-newsos
- ;;
- necv70)
- basic_machine=v70-nec
- os=-sysv
+ cpu=mips
+ vendor=sony
+ os=newsos
;;
- next | m*-next )
- basic_machine=m68k-next
+ next | m*-next)
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=next
case $os in
- -nextstep* )
+ openstep*)
+ ;;
+ nextstep*)
;;
- -ns2*)
- os=-nextstep2
+ ns2*)
+ os=nextstep2
;;
*)
- os=-nextstep3
+ os=nextstep3
;;
esac
;;
- nh3000)
- basic_machine=m68k-harris
- os=-cxux
- ;;
- nh[45]000)
- basic_machine=m88k-harris
- os=-cxux
- ;;
- nindy960)
- basic_machine=i960-intel
- os=-nindy
- ;;
- mon960)
- basic_machine=i960-intel
- os=-mon960
- ;;
- nonstopux)
- basic_machine=mips-compaq
- os=-nonstopux
- ;;
np1)
- basic_machine=np1-gould
- ;;
- neo-tandem)
- basic_machine=neo-tandem
- ;;
- nse-tandem)
- basic_machine=nse-tandem
- ;;
- nsr-tandem)
- basic_machine=nsr-tandem
+ cpu=np1
+ vendor=gould
;;
op50n-* | op60c-*)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki
- os=-proelf
- ;;
- openrisc | openrisc-*)
- basic_machine=or32-unknown
- ;;
- os400)
- basic_machine=powerpc-ibm
- os=-os400
- ;;
- OSE68000 | ose68000)
- basic_machine=m68000-ericsson
- os=-ose
- ;;
- os68k)
- basic_machine=m68k-none
- os=-os68k
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=oki
+ os=proelf
;;
pa-hitachi)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi
- os=-hiuxwe2
- ;;
- paragon)
- basic_machine=i860-intel
- os=-osf
- ;;
- parisc)
- basic_machine=hppa-unknown
- os=-linux
- ;;
- parisc-*)
- basic_machine=hppa-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- os=-linux
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=hitachi
+ os=hiuxwe2
;;
pbd)
- basic_machine=sparc-tti
+ cpu=sparc
+ vendor=tti
;;
pbb)
- basic_machine=m68k-tti
- ;;
- pc532 | pc532-*)
- basic_machine=ns32k-pc532
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=tti
;;
- pc98)
- basic_machine=i386-pc
- ;;
- pc98-*)
- basic_machine=i386-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen | viac3)
- basic_machine=i586-pc
- ;;
- pentiumpro | p6 | 6x86 | athlon | athlon_*)
- basic_machine=i686-pc
- ;;
- pentiumii | pentium2 | pentiumiii | pentium3)
- basic_machine=i686-pc
- ;;
- pentium4)
- basic_machine=i786-pc
- ;;
- pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-* | viac3-*)
- basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-*)
- basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- pentiumii-* | pentium2-* | pentiumiii-* | pentium3-*)
- basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- pentium4-*)
- basic_machine=i786-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ pc532)
+ cpu=ns32k
+ vendor=pc532
;;
pn)
- basic_machine=pn-gould
+ cpu=pn
+ vendor=gould
;;
- power) basic_machine=power-ibm
- ;;
- ppc | ppcbe) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown
- ;;
- ppc-* | ppcbe-*)
- basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- ppcle | powerpclittle | ppc-le | powerpc-little)
- basic_machine=powerpcle-unknown
- ;;
- ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*)
- basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- ppc64) basic_machine=powerpc64-unknown
- ;;
- ppc64-*) basic_machine=powerpc64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
- ;;
- ppc64le | powerpc64little | ppc64-le | powerpc64-little)
- basic_machine=powerpc64le-unknown
- ;;
- ppc64le-* | powerpc64little-*)
- basic_machine=powerpc64le-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ power)
+ cpu=power
+ vendor=ibm
;;
ps2)
- basic_machine=i386-ibm
- ;;
- pw32)
- basic_machine=i586-unknown
- os=-pw32
- ;;
- rdos | rdos64)
- basic_machine=x86_64-pc
- os=-rdos
- ;;
- rdos32)
- basic_machine=i386-pc
- os=-rdos
- ;;
- rom68k)
- basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
- os=-coff
+ cpu=i386
+ vendor=ibm
;;
rm[46]00)
- basic_machine=mips-siemens
+ cpu=mips
+ vendor=siemens
;;
rtpc | rtpc-*)
- basic_machine=romp-ibm
- ;;
- s390 | s390-*)
- basic_machine=s390-ibm
- ;;
- s390x | s390x-*)
- basic_machine=s390x-ibm
+ cpu=romp
+ vendor=ibm
;;
- sa29200)
- basic_machine=a29k-amd
- os=-udi
- ;;
- sb1)
- basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1-unknown
+ sde)
+ cpu=mipsisa32
+ vendor=sde
+ os=${os:-elf}
;;
- sb1el)
- basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1el-unknown
+ simso-wrs)
+ cpu=sparclite
+ vendor=wrs
+ os=vxworks
;;
- sde)
- basic_machine=mipsisa32-sde
- os=-elf
+ tower | tower-32)
+ cpu=m68k
+ vendor=ncr
;;
- sei)
- basic_machine=mips-sei
- os=-seiux
+ vpp*|vx|vx-*)
+ cpu=f301
+ vendor=fujitsu
;;
- sequent)
- basic_machine=i386-sequent
+ w65)
+ cpu=w65
+ vendor=wdc
;;
- sh)
- basic_machine=sh-hitachi
- os=-hms
+ w89k-*)
+ cpu=hppa1.1
+ vendor=winbond
+ os=proelf
;;
- sh5el)
- basic_machine=sh5le-unknown
+ none)
+ cpu=none
+ vendor=none
;;
- sh64)
- basic_machine=sh64-unknown
+ leon|leon[3-9])
+ cpu=sparc
+ vendor=$basic_machine
;;
- sparclite-wrs | simso-wrs)
- basic_machine=sparclite-wrs
- os=-vxworks
+ leon-*|leon[3-9]-*)
+ cpu=sparc
+ vendor=`echo "$basic_machine" | sed 's/-.*//'`
;;
- sps7)
- basic_machine=m68k-bull
- os=-sysv2
+
+ *-*)
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2162
+ IFS="-" read cpu vendor <<EOF
+$basic_machine
+EOF
;;
- spur)
- basic_machine=spur-unknown
+ # We use `pc' rather than `unknown'
+ # because (1) that's what they normally are, and
+ # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users.
+ i*86 | x86_64)
+ cpu=$basic_machine
+ vendor=pc
;;
- st2000)
- basic_machine=m68k-tandem
+ # These rules are duplicated from below for sake of the special case above;
+ # i.e. things that normalized to x86 arches should also default to "pc"
+ pc98)
+ cpu=i386
+ vendor=pc
;;
- stratus)
- basic_machine=i860-stratus
- os=-sysv4
+ x64 | amd64)
+ cpu=x86_64
+ vendor=pc
;;
- strongarm-* | thumb-*)
- basic_machine=arm-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name.
+ *)
+ cpu=$basic_machine
+ vendor=unknown
;;
- sun2)
- basic_machine=m68000-sun
+esac
+
+unset -v basic_machine
+
+# Decode basic machines in the full and proper CPU-Company form.
+case $cpu-$vendor in
+ # Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types in canonical form. It is in
+ # some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular.
+ craynv-unknown)
+ vendor=cray
+ os=${os:-unicosmp}
;;
- sun2os3)
- basic_machine=m68000-sun
- os=-sunos3
+ c90-unknown | c90-cray)
+ vendor=cray
+ os=${os:-unicos}
;;
- sun2os4)
- basic_machine=m68000-sun
- os=-sunos4
+ fx80-unknown)
+ vendor=alliant
;;
- sun3os3)
- basic_machine=m68k-sun
- os=-sunos3
+ romp-unknown)
+ vendor=ibm
;;
- sun3os4)
- basic_machine=m68k-sun
- os=-sunos4
+ mmix-unknown)
+ vendor=knuth
;;
- sun4os3)
- basic_machine=sparc-sun
- os=-sunos3
+ microblaze-unknown | microblazeel-unknown)
+ vendor=xilinx
;;
- sun4os4)
- basic_machine=sparc-sun
- os=-sunos4
+ rs6000-unknown)
+ vendor=ibm
;;
- sun4sol2)
- basic_machine=sparc-sun
- os=-solaris2
+ vax-unknown)
+ vendor=dec
;;
- sun3 | sun3-*)
- basic_machine=m68k-sun
+ pdp11-unknown)
+ vendor=dec
;;
- sun4)
- basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ we32k-unknown)
+ vendor=att
;;
- sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner)
- basic_machine=i386-sun
+ cydra-unknown)
+ vendor=cydrome
;;
- sv1)
- basic_machine=sv1-cray
- os=-unicos
+ i370-ibm*)
+ vendor=ibm
;;
- symmetry)
- basic_machine=i386-sequent
- os=-dynix
+ orion-unknown)
+ vendor=highlevel
;;
- t3e)
- basic_machine=alphaev5-cray
- os=-unicos
+ xps-unknown | xps100-unknown)
+ cpu=xps100
+ vendor=honeywell
;;
- t90)
- basic_machine=t90-cray
- os=-unicos
+
+ # Here we normalize CPU types with a missing or matching vendor
+ dpx20-unknown | dpx20-bull)
+ cpu=rs6000
+ vendor=bull
+ os=${os:-bosx}
;;
- tile*)
- basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
- os=-linux-gnu
+
+ # Here we normalize CPU types irrespective of the vendor
+ amd64-*)
+ cpu=x86_64
;;
- tx39)
- basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown
+ blackfin-*)
+ cpu=bfin
+ os=linux
;;
- tx39el)
- basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown
+ c54x-*)
+ cpu=tic54x
;;
- toad1)
- basic_machine=pdp10-xkl
- os=-tops20
+ c55x-*)
+ cpu=tic55x
;;
- tower | tower-32)
- basic_machine=m68k-ncr
+ c6x-*)
+ cpu=tic6x
;;
- tpf)
- basic_machine=s390x-ibm
- os=-tpf
+ e500v[12]-*)
+ cpu=powerpc
+ os=$os"spe"
;;
- udi29k)
- basic_machine=a29k-amd
- os=-udi
+ mips3*-*)
+ cpu=mips64
;;
- ultra3)
- basic_machine=a29k-nyu
- os=-sym1
+ ms1-*)
+ cpu=mt
;;
- v810 | necv810)
- basic_machine=v810-nec
- os=-none
+ m68knommu-*)
+ cpu=m68k
+ os=linux
;;
- vaxv)
- basic_machine=vax-dec
- os=-sysv
+ m9s12z-* | m68hcs12z-* | hcs12z-* | s12z-*)
+ cpu=s12z
;;
- vms)
- basic_machine=vax-dec
- os=-vms
+ openrisc-*)
+ cpu=or32
;;
- vpp*|vx|vx-*)
- basic_machine=f301-fujitsu
+ parisc-*)
+ cpu=hppa
+ os=linux
;;
- vxworks960)
- basic_machine=i960-wrs
- os=-vxworks
+ pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-* | viac3-*)
+ cpu=i586
;;
- vxworks68)
- basic_machine=m68k-wrs
- os=-vxworks
+ pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-* | athalon_*-*)
+ cpu=i686
;;
- vxworks29k)
- basic_machine=a29k-wrs
- os=-vxworks
+ pentiumii-* | pentium2-* | pentiumiii-* | pentium3-*)
+ cpu=i686
;;
- w65*)
- basic_machine=w65-wdc
- os=-none
+ pentium4-*)
+ cpu=i786
;;
- w89k-*)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond
- os=-proelf
+ pc98-*)
+ cpu=i386
;;
- xbox)
- basic_machine=i686-pc
- os=-mingw32
+ ppc-* | ppcbe-*)
+ cpu=powerpc
;;
- xps | xps100)
- basic_machine=xps100-honeywell
+ ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*)
+ cpu=powerpcle
;;
- xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-*)
- basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^xscale/arm/'`
+ ppc64-*)
+ cpu=powerpc64
;;
- ymp)
- basic_machine=ymp-cray
- os=-unicos
+ ppc64le-* | powerpc64little-*)
+ cpu=powerpc64le
;;
- z8k-*-coff)
- basic_machine=z8k-unknown
- os=-sim
+ sb1-*)
+ cpu=mipsisa64sb1
;;
- z80-*-coff)
- basic_machine=z80-unknown
- os=-sim
+ sb1el-*)
+ cpu=mipsisa64sb1el
;;
- none)
- basic_machine=none-none
- os=-none
+ sh5e[lb]-*)
+ cpu=`echo "$cpu" | sed 's/^\(sh.\)e\(.\)$/\1\2e/'`
;;
-
-# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in
-# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular.
- w89k)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond
+ spur-*)
+ cpu=spur
;;
- op50n)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki
+ strongarm-* | thumb-*)
+ cpu=arm
;;
- op60c)
- basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki
+ tx39-*)
+ cpu=mipstx39
;;
- romp)
- basic_machine=romp-ibm
+ tx39el-*)
+ cpu=mipstx39el
;;
- mmix)
- basic_machine=mmix-knuth
+ x64-*)
+ cpu=x86_64
;;
- rs6000)
- basic_machine=rs6000-ibm
+ xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-*)
+ cpu=`echo "$cpu" | sed 's/^xscale/arm/'`
;;
- vax)
- basic_machine=vax-dec
+
+ # Recognize the canonical CPU Types that limit and/or modify the
+ # company names they are paired with.
+ cr16-*)
+ os=${os:-elf}
;;
- pdp10)
- # there are many clones, so DEC is not a safe bet
- basic_machine=pdp10-unknown
+ crisv32-* | etraxfs*-*)
+ cpu=crisv32
+ vendor=axis
;;
- pdp11)
- basic_machine=pdp11-dec
+ cris-* | etrax*-*)
+ cpu=cris
+ vendor=axis
;;
- we32k)
- basic_machine=we32k-att
+ crx-*)
+ os=${os:-elf}
;;
- sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele)
- basic_machine=sh-unknown
+ neo-tandem)
+ cpu=neo
+ vendor=tandem
;;
- sparc | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v)
- basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ nse-tandem)
+ cpu=nse
+ vendor=tandem
;;
- cydra)
- basic_machine=cydra-cydrome
+ nsr-tandem)
+ cpu=nsr
+ vendor=tandem
;;
- orion)
- basic_machine=orion-highlevel
+ nsv-tandem)
+ cpu=nsv
+ vendor=tandem
;;
- orion105)
- basic_machine=clipper-highlevel
+ nsx-tandem)
+ cpu=nsx
+ vendor=tandem
;;
- mac | mpw | mac-mpw)
- basic_machine=m68k-apple
+ s390-*)
+ cpu=s390
+ vendor=ibm
;;
- pmac | pmac-mpw)
- basic_machine=powerpc-apple
+ s390x-*)
+ cpu=s390x
+ vendor=ibm
;;
- *-unknown)
- # Make sure to match an already-canonicalized machine name.
+ tile*-*)
+ os=${os:-linux-gnu}
;;
+
*)
- echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2
- exit 1
+ # Recognize the canonical CPU types that are allowed with any
+ # company name.
+ case $cpu in
+ 1750a | 580 \
+ | a29k \
+ | aarch64 | aarch64_be \
+ | abacus \
+ | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] \
+ | alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] \
+ | alphapca5[67] | alpha64pca5[67] \
+ | am33_2.0 \
+ | amdgcn \
+ | arc | arceb \
+ | arm | arm[lb]e | arme[lb] | armv* \
+ | avr | avr32 \
+ | asmjs \
+ | ba \
+ | be32 | be64 \
+ | bfin | bpf | bs2000 \
+ | c[123]* | c30 | [cjt]90 | c4x \
+ | c8051 | clipper | craynv | csky | cydra \
+ | d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \
+ | e2k | elxsi | epiphany \
+ | f30[01] | f700 | fido | fr30 | frv | ft32 | fx80 \
+ | h8300 | h8500 \
+ | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \
+ | hexagon \
+ | i370 | i*86 | i860 | i960 | ia16 | ia64 \
+ | ip2k | iq2000 \
+ | k1om \
+ | le32 | le64 \
+ | lm32 \
+ | m32c | m32r | m32rle \
+ | m5200 | m68000 | m680[012346]0 | m68360 | m683?2 | m68k \
+ | m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12 | m68hcs12x \
+ | m88110 | m88k | maxq | mb | mcore | mep | metag \
+ | microblaze | microblazeel \
+ | mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \
+ | mips16 \
+ | mips64 | mips64eb | mips64el \
+ | mips64octeon | mips64octeonel \
+ | mips64orion | mips64orionel \
+ | mips64r5900 | mips64r5900el \
+ | mips64vr | mips64vrel \
+ | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \
+ | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \
+ | mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \
+ | mips64vr5900 | mips64vr5900el \
+ | mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \
+ | mipsisa32r2 | mipsisa32r2el \
+ | mipsisa32r6 | mipsisa32r6el \
+ | mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \
+ | mipsisa64r2 | mipsisa64r2el \
+ | mipsisa64r6 | mipsisa64r6el \
+ | mipsisa64sb1 | mipsisa64sb1el \
+ | mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \
+ | mipsr5900 | mipsr5900el \
+ | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \
+ | mmix \
+ | mn10200 | mn10300 \
+ | moxie \
+ | mt \
+ | msp430 \
+ | nds32 | nds32le | nds32be \
+ | nfp \
+ | nios | nios2 | nios2eb | nios2el \
+ | none | np1 | ns16k | ns32k | nvptx \
+ | open8 \
+ | or1k* \
+ | or32 \
+ | orion \
+ | picochip \
+ | pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl | pn | power \
+ | powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle | powerpcspe \
+ | pru \
+ | pyramid \
+ | riscv | riscv32 | riscv64 \
+ | rl78 | romp | rs6000 | rx \
+ | score \
+ | sh | shl \
+ | sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]ae[lb] | sh[23]e | she[lb] | sh[lb]e \
+ | sh[1234]e[lb] | sh[12345][lb]e | sh[23]ele | sh64 | sh64le \
+ | sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc64v | sparc86x | sparclet \
+ | sparclite \
+ | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v | sv1 | sx* \
+ | spu \
+ | tahoe \
+ | tic30 | tic4x | tic54x | tic55x | tic6x | tic80 \
+ | tron \
+ | ubicom32 \
+ | v70 | v850 | v850e | v850e1 | v850es | v850e2 | v850e2v3 \
+ | vax \
+ | visium \
+ | w65 \
+ | wasm32 | wasm64 \
+ | we32k \
+ | x86 | x86_64 | xc16x | xgate | xps100 \
+ | xstormy16 | xtensa* \
+ | ymp \
+ | z8k | z80)
+ ;;
+
+ *)
+ echo Invalid configuration \`"$1"\': machine \`"$cpu-$vendor"\' not recognized 1>&2
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
esac
# Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers.
-case $basic_machine in
- *-digital*)
- basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/digital.*/dec/'`
+case $vendor in
+ digital*)
+ vendor=dec
;;
- *-commodore*)
- basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/commodore.*/cbm/'`
+ commodore*)
+ vendor=cbm
;;
*)
;;
esac
# Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems.
-if [ x"$os" != x"" ]
+if [ x$os != x ]
then
case $os in
- # First match some system type aliases
- # that might get confused with valid system types.
- # -solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception.
- -auroraux)
- os=-auroraux
+ # First match some system type aliases that might get confused
+ # with valid system types.
+ # solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception.
+ auroraux)
+ os=auroraux
;;
- -solaris1 | -solaris1.*)
- os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'`
+ bluegene*)
+ os=cnk
;;
- -solaris)
- os=-solaris2
+ solaris1 | solaris1.*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'`
;;
- -svr4*)
- os=-sysv4
+ solaris)
+ os=solaris2
;;
- -unixware*)
- os=-sysv4.2uw
+ unixware*)
+ os=sysv4.2uw
;;
- -gnu/linux*)
+ gnu/linux*)
os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|linux-gnu|'`
;;
- # First accept the basic system types.
+ # es1800 is here to avoid being matched by es* (a different OS)
+ es1800*)
+ os=ose
+ ;;
+ # Some version numbers need modification
+ chorusos*)
+ os=chorusos
+ ;;
+ isc)
+ os=isc2.2
+ ;;
+ sco6)
+ os=sco5v6
+ ;;
+ sco5)
+ os=sco3.2v5
+ ;;
+ sco4)
+ os=sco3.2v4
+ ;;
+ sco3.2.[4-9]*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'`
+ ;;
+ sco3.2v[4-9]* | sco5v6*)
+ # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer.
+ ;;
+ scout)
+ # Don't match below
+ ;;
+ sco*)
+ os=sco3.2v2
+ ;;
+ psos*)
+ os=psos
+ ;;
+ # Now accept the basic system types.
# The portable systems comes first.
- # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number.
- # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4.
- -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \
- | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -cnk* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\
- | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -auroraux* | -solaris* \
- | -sym* | -kopensolaris* | -plan9* \
- | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \
- | -aos* | -aros* | -cloudabi* | -sortix* \
- | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \
- | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \
- | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -knetbsd* | -mirbsd* | -netbsd* \
- | -bitrig* | -openbsd* | -solidbsd* | -libertybsd* \
- | -ekkobsd* | -kfreebsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* | -lynxos* \
- | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \
- | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \
- | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \
- | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* | -cegcc* \
- | -cygwin* | -msys* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \
- | -midipix* | -mingw32* | -mingw64* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-android* \
- | -linux-newlib* | -linux-musl* | -linux-uclibc* \
- | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* | -moxiebox* \
- | -interix* | -uwin* | -mks* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \
- | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \
- | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* \
- | -os2* | -vos* | -palmos* | -uclinux* | -nucleus* \
- | -morphos* | -superux* | -rtmk* | -rtmk-nova* | -windiss* \
- | -powermax* | -dnix* | -nx6 | -nx7 | -sei* | -dragonfly* \
- | -skyos* | -haiku* | -rdos* | -toppers* | -drops* | -es* \
- | -onefs* | -tirtos* | -phoenix*)
+ # Each alternative MUST end in a * to match a version number.
+ # sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4.
+ gnu* | bsd* | mach* | minix* | genix* | ultrix* | irix* \
+ | *vms* | esix* | aix* | cnk* | sunos | sunos[34]*\
+ | hpux* | unos* | osf* | luna* | dgux* | auroraux* | solaris* \
+ | sym* | kopensolaris* | plan9* \
+ | amigaos* | amigados* | msdos* | newsos* | unicos* | aof* \
+ | aos* | aros* | cloudabi* | sortix* | twizzler* \
+ | nindy* | vxsim* | vxworks* | ebmon* | hms* | mvs* \
+ | clix* | riscos* | uniplus* | iris* | isc* | rtu* | xenix* \
+ | knetbsd* | mirbsd* | netbsd* \
+ | bitrig* | openbsd* | solidbsd* | libertybsd* | os108* \
+ | ekkobsd* | kfreebsd* | freebsd* | riscix* | lynxos* \
+ | bosx* | nextstep* | cxux* | aout* | elf* | oabi* \
+ | ptx* | coff* | ecoff* | winnt* | domain* | vsta* \
+ | udi* | eabi* | lites* | ieee* | go32* | aux* | hcos* \
+ | chorusrdb* | cegcc* | glidix* \
+ | cygwin* | msys* | pe* | moss* | proelf* | rtems* \
+ | midipix* | mingw32* | mingw64* | linux-gnu* | linux-android* \
+ | linux-newlib* | linux-musl* | linux-uclibc* \
+ | uxpv* | beos* | mpeix* | udk* | moxiebox* \
+ | interix* | uwin* | mks* | rhapsody* | darwin* \
+ | openstep* | oskit* | conix* | pw32* | nonstopux* \
+ | storm-chaos* | tops10* | tenex* | tops20* | its* \
+ | os2* | vos* | palmos* | uclinux* | nucleus* \
+ | morphos* | superux* | rtmk* | windiss* \
+ | powermax* | dnix* | nx6 | nx7 | sei* | dragonfly* \
+ | skyos* | haiku* | rdos* | toppers* | drops* | es* \
+ | onefs* | tirtos* | phoenix* | fuchsia* | redox* | bme* \
+ | midnightbsd* | amdhsa* | unleashed* | emscripten* | wasi* \
+ | nsk* | powerunix* | genode*)
# Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number.
;;
- -qnx*)
- case $basic_machine in
- x86-* | i*86-*)
+ qnx*)
+ case $cpu in
+ x86 | i*86)
;;
*)
- os=-nto$os
+ os=nto-$os
;;
esac
;;
- -nto-qnx*)
+ hiux*)
+ os=hiuxwe2
;;
- -nto*)
- os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|nto|nto-qnx|'`
+ nto-qnx*)
;;
- -sim | -es1800* | -hms* | -xray | -os68k* | -none* | -v88r* \
- | -windows* | -osx | -abug | -netware* | -os9* | -beos* | -haiku* \
- | -macos* | -mpw* | -magic* | -mmixware* | -mon960* | -lnews*)
+ nto*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|nto|nto-qnx|'`
;;
- -mac*)
- os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|mac|macos|'`
+ sim | xray | os68k* | v88r* \
+ | windows* | osx | abug | netware* | os9* \
+ | macos* | mpw* | magic* | mmixware* | mon960* | lnews*)
;;
- -linux-dietlibc)
- os=-linux-dietlibc
+ linux-dietlibc)
+ os=linux-dietlibc
;;
- -linux*)
+ linux*)
os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|linux|linux-gnu|'`
;;
- -sunos5*)
- os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'`
+ lynx*178)
+ os=lynxos178
+ ;;
+ lynx*5)
+ os=lynxos5
;;
- -sunos6*)
- os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'`
+ lynx*)
+ os=lynxos
;;
- -opened*)
- os=-openedition
+ mac*)
+ os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|mac|macos|'`
;;
- -os400*)
- os=-os400
+ opened*)
+ os=openedition
;;
- -wince*)
- os=-wince
+ os400*)
+ os=os400
;;
- -osfrose*)
- os=-osfrose
+ sunos5*)
+ os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'`
;;
- -osf*)
- os=-osf
+ sunos6*)
+ os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'`
;;
- -utek*)
- os=-bsd
+ wince*)
+ os=wince
;;
- -dynix*)
- os=-bsd
+ utek*)
+ os=bsd
;;
- -acis*)
- os=-aos
+ dynix*)
+ os=bsd
;;
- -atheos*)
- os=-atheos
+ acis*)
+ os=aos
;;
- -syllable*)
- os=-syllable
+ atheos*)
+ os=atheos
;;
- -386bsd)
- os=-bsd
+ syllable*)
+ os=syllable
;;
- -ctix* | -uts*)
- os=-sysv
+ 386bsd)
+ os=bsd
;;
- -nova*)
- os=-rtmk-nova
+ ctix* | uts*)
+ os=sysv
;;
- -ns2 )
- os=-nextstep2
+ nova*)
+ os=rtmk-nova
;;
- -nsk*)
- os=-nsk
+ ns2)
+ os=nextstep2
;;
# Preserve the version number of sinix5.
- -sinix5.*)
+ sinix5.*)
os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sinix|sysv|'`
;;
- -sinix*)
- os=-sysv4
+ sinix*)
+ os=sysv4
;;
- -tpf*)
- os=-tpf
+ tpf*)
+ os=tpf
;;
- -triton*)
- os=-sysv3
+ triton*)
+ os=sysv3
;;
- -oss*)
- os=-sysv3
+ oss*)
+ os=sysv3
;;
- -svr4)
- os=-sysv4
+ svr4*)
+ os=sysv4
;;
- -svr3)
- os=-sysv3
+ svr3)
+ os=sysv3
;;
- -sysvr4)
- os=-sysv4
+ sysvr4)
+ os=sysv4
;;
- # This must come after -sysvr4.
- -sysv*)
+ # This must come after sysvr4.
+ sysv*)
;;
- -ose*)
- os=-ose
+ ose*)
+ os=ose
;;
- -es1800*)
- os=-ose
+ *mint | mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | MiNT[0-9]*)
+ os=mint
;;
- -xenix)
- os=-xenix
+ zvmoe)
+ os=zvmoe
;;
- -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*)
- os=-mint
+ dicos*)
+ os=dicos
;;
- -aros*)
- os=-aros
- ;;
- -zvmoe)
- os=-zvmoe
+ pikeos*)
+ # Until real need of OS specific support for
+ # particular features comes up, bare metal
+ # configurations are quite functional.
+ case $cpu in
+ arm*)
+ os=eabi
+ ;;
+ *)
+ os=elf
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
- -dicos*)
- os=-dicos
+ nacl*)
;;
- -nacl*)
+ ios)
;;
- -ios)
+ none)
;;
- -none)
+ *-eabi)
;;
*)
- # Get rid of the `-' at the beginning of $os.
- os=`echo $os | sed 's/[^-]*-//'`
- echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': system \`$os\' not recognized 1>&2
+ echo Invalid configuration \`"$1"\': system \`"$os"\' not recognized 1>&2
exit 1
;;
esac
else
# Here we handle the default operating systems that come with various machines.
# The value should be what the vendor currently ships out the door with their
# machine or put another way, the most popular os provided with the machine.
# Note that if you're going to try to match "-MANUFACTURER" here (say,
# "-sun"), then you have to tell the case statement up towards the top
# that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating system. Otherwise, code above
# will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating
# system, and we'll never get to this point.
-case $basic_machine in
+case $cpu-$vendor in
score-*)
- os=-elf
+ os=elf
;;
spu-*)
- os=-elf
+ os=elf
;;
*-acorn)
- os=-riscix1.2
+ os=riscix1.2
;;
arm*-rebel)
- os=-linux
+ os=linux
;;
arm*-semi)
- os=-aout
+ os=aout
;;
c4x-* | tic4x-*)
- os=-coff
+ os=coff
;;
c8051-*)
- os=-elf
+ os=elf
+ ;;
+ clipper-intergraph)
+ os=clix
;;
hexagon-*)
- os=-elf
+ os=elf
;;
tic54x-*)
- os=-coff
+ os=coff
;;
tic55x-*)
- os=-coff
+ os=coff
;;
tic6x-*)
- os=-coff
+ os=coff
;;
# This must come before the *-dec entry.
pdp10-*)
- os=-tops20
+ os=tops20
;;
pdp11-*)
- os=-none
+ os=none
;;
*-dec | vax-*)
- os=-ultrix4.2
+ os=ultrix4.2
;;
m68*-apollo)
- os=-domain
+ os=domain
;;
i386-sun)
- os=-sunos4.0.2
+ os=sunos4.0.2
;;
m68000-sun)
- os=-sunos3
+ os=sunos3
;;
m68*-cisco)
- os=-aout
+ os=aout
;;
mep-*)
- os=-elf
+ os=elf
;;
mips*-cisco)
- os=-elf
+ os=elf
;;
mips*-*)
- os=-elf
+ os=elf
;;
or32-*)
- os=-coff
+ os=coff
;;
*-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os.
- os=-sysv3
+ os=sysv3
;;
sparc-* | *-sun)
- os=-sunos4.1.1
+ os=sunos4.1.1
;;
- *-be)
- os=-beos
+ pru-*)
+ os=elf
;;
- *-haiku)
- os=-haiku
+ *-be)
+ os=beos
;;
*-ibm)
- os=-aix
+ os=aix
;;
*-knuth)
- os=-mmixware
+ os=mmixware
;;
*-wec)
- os=-proelf
+ os=proelf
;;
*-winbond)
- os=-proelf
+ os=proelf
;;
*-oki)
- os=-proelf
+ os=proelf
;;
*-hp)
- os=-hpux
+ os=hpux
;;
*-hitachi)
- os=-hiux
+ os=hiux
;;
i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent)
- os=-sysv
+ os=sysv
;;
*-cbm)
- os=-amigaos
+ os=amigaos
;;
*-dg)
- os=-dgux
+ os=dgux
;;
*-dolphin)
- os=-sysv3
+ os=sysv3
;;
m68k-ccur)
- os=-rtu
+ os=rtu
;;
m88k-omron*)
- os=-luna
+ os=luna
;;
- *-next )
- os=-nextstep
+ *-next)
+ os=nextstep
;;
*-sequent)
- os=-ptx
+ os=ptx
;;
*-crds)
- os=-unos
+ os=unos
;;
*-ns)
- os=-genix
+ os=genix
;;
i370-*)
- os=-mvs
- ;;
- *-next)
- os=-nextstep3
+ os=mvs
;;
*-gould)
- os=-sysv
+ os=sysv
;;
*-highlevel)
- os=-bsd
+ os=bsd
;;
*-encore)
- os=-bsd
+ os=bsd
;;
*-sgi)
- os=-irix
+ os=irix
;;
*-siemens)
- os=-sysv4
+ os=sysv4
;;
*-masscomp)
- os=-rtu
+ os=rtu
;;
f30[01]-fujitsu | f700-fujitsu)
- os=-uxpv
+ os=uxpv
;;
*-rom68k)
- os=-coff
+ os=coff
;;
*-*bug)
- os=-coff
+ os=coff
;;
*-apple)
- os=-macos
+ os=macos
;;
*-atari*)
- os=-mint
+ os=mint
+ ;;
+ *-wrs)
+ os=vxworks
;;
*)
- os=-none
+ os=none
;;
esac
fi
# Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the
# manufacturer. We pick the logical manufacturer.
-vendor=unknown
-case $basic_machine in
- *-unknown)
+case $vendor in
+ unknown)
case $os in
- -riscix*)
+ riscix*)
vendor=acorn
;;
- -sunos*)
+ sunos*)
vendor=sun
;;
- -cnk*|-aix*)
+ cnk*|-aix*)
vendor=ibm
;;
- -beos*)
+ beos*)
vendor=be
;;
- -hpux*)
+ hpux*)
vendor=hp
;;
- -mpeix*)
+ mpeix*)
vendor=hp
;;
- -hiux*)
+ hiux*)
vendor=hitachi
;;
- -unos*)
+ unos*)
vendor=crds
;;
- -dgux*)
+ dgux*)
vendor=dg
;;
- -luna*)
+ luna*)
vendor=omron
;;
- -genix*)
+ genix*)
vendor=ns
;;
- -mvs* | -opened*)
+ clix*)
+ vendor=intergraph
+ ;;
+ mvs* | opened*)
vendor=ibm
;;
- -os400*)
+ os400*)
vendor=ibm
;;
- -ptx*)
+ ptx*)
vendor=sequent
;;
- -tpf*)
+ tpf*)
vendor=ibm
;;
- -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -windiss*)
+ vxsim* | vxworks* | windiss*)
vendor=wrs
;;
- -aux*)
+ aux*)
vendor=apple
;;
- -hms*)
+ hms*)
vendor=hitachi
;;
- -mpw* | -macos*)
+ mpw* | macos*)
vendor=apple
;;
- -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*)
+ *mint | mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | MiNT[0-9]*)
vendor=atari
;;
- -vos*)
+ vos*)
vendor=stratus
;;
esac
- basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"`
;;
esac
-echo $basic_machine$os
+echo "$cpu-$vendor-$os"
exit
# Local variables:
-# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
+# eval: (add-hook 'before-save-hook 'time-stamp)
# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
# time-stamp-end: "'"
# End:
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
index 538f389c6da3..dfcef796a3f1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
+++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
@@ -1,5421 +1,5675 @@
#
# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
#
# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $)
+AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
AC_LANG([C])
-AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
-AC_PROG_CC
+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
+AC_PROG_CC([cc gcc])
+
+# XXX relax this after reimplementing logit() etc.
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports C99-style variadic macros])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+int f(int a, int b, int c) { return a + b + c; }
+#define F(a, ...) f(a, __VA_ARGS__)
+]], [[return F(1, 2, -3);]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSH requires support for C99-style variadic macros]) ]
+)
+
AC_CANONICAL_HOST
AC_C_BIGENDIAN
# Checks for programs.
AC_PROG_AWK
AC_PROG_CPP
AC_PROG_RANLIB
AC_PROG_INSTALL
AC_PROG_EGREP
AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar])
AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat])
AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill])
AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed])
-AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent])
-AC_SUBST([ENT])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh])
AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh])
AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff])
-AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff])
+AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff awf])
AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
-dnl select manpage formatter
+dnl select manpage formatter to be used to build "cat" format pages.
if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$MANDOC"
elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
else
- AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatted found])
+ AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatter found])
MANFMT="false"
fi
AC_SUBST([MANFMT])
dnl for buildpkg.sh
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd],
[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd],
[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no])
if test -x /sbin/sh; then
AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh])
else
AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh])
fi
# System features
AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
if test -z "$AR" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***])
fi
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd])
if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"],
[Full path of your "passwd" program])
fi
dnl Since autoconf doesn't support it very well, we no longer allow users to
dnl override LD, however keeping the hook here for now in case there's a use
dnl use case we overlooked and someone needs to re-enable it. Unless a good
dnl reason is found we'll be removing this in future.
LD="$CC"
AC_SUBST([LD])
AC_C_INLINE
AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([LONG_LONG_MAX], [have_long_long_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
])
openssl=yes
AC_ARG_WITH([openssl],
[ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl=no
fi
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography])
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
use_stack_protector=1
use_toolchain_hardening=1
AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
[ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_stack_protector=0
fi ])
AC_ARG_WITH([hardening],
[ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_toolchain_hardening=0
fi ])
# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
WERROR="-Werror"],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
WERROR="" ]
)
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe])
- OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-error=format-truncation])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wextra])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-parameter], [-Wno-unused-parameter])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wimplicit-fallthrough])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing])
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-mretpoline]) # clang
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,retpolineplt])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack])
# NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
# the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
# that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
# actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
# of integer operations that should exercise this.
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version])
GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
case $GCC_VER in
1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
2.8* | 2.9*)
no_attrib_nonnull=1
;;
2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
*) ;;
esac
AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <string.h> ]],
[[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
# and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
-fstack-protector; do
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+ ]],
[[
char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+ ]],
[[
char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
break ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test])
break ]
)
],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
done
fi
if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
# retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX],
[have_llong_max=1],
[CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"],
[#include <limits.h>]
)
fi
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1,
[compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS, 1,
[compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args]) ]
)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler supports variable length arrays])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <stdlib.h>]],
+ [[ int i; for (i=0; i<3; i++){int a[i]; a[i-1]=0;} exit(0); ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE(VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS, [1],
+ [compiler supports variable length arrays]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler accepts variable declarations after code])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <stdlib.h>]],
+ [[ int a; a = 1; int b = 1; exit(a-b); ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE(VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE, [1],
+ [compiler variable declarations after code]) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+)
+
if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull])
fi
AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
[ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=""
- fi
- if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
+ rpath_opt=""
+ elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ rpath_opt="-R"
+ else
+ rpath_opt="$withval"
fi
]
)
# Allow user to specify flags
AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
[ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after],
[ --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags],
[ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] ,
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags],
[ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after],
[ --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([libs],
[ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([Werror],
[ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
werror_flags="-Werror"
if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
werror_flags="$withval"
fi
fi
]
)
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
blf.h \
bstring.h \
crypt.h \
crypto/sha2.h \
dirent.h \
endian.h \
elf.h \
err.h \
features.h \
fcntl.h \
floatingpoint.h \
+ fnmatch.h \
getopt.h \
glob.h \
ia.h \
iaf.h \
ifaddrs.h \
inttypes.h \
langinfo.h \
limits.h \
locale.h \
login.h \
maillock.h \
ndir.h \
net/if_tun.h \
netdb.h \
netgroup.h \
pam/pam_appl.h \
paths.h \
poll.h \
pty.h \
readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h \
security/pam_appl.h \
sha2.h \
shadow.h \
stddef.h \
stdint.h \
string.h \
strings.h \
sys/bitypes.h \
+ sys/byteorder.h \
sys/bsdtty.h \
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/file.h \
sys/mman.h \
sys/label.h \
sys/ndir.h \
sys/poll.h \
sys/prctl.h \
sys/pstat.h \
sys/ptrace.h \
sys/random.h \
sys/select.h \
sys/stat.h \
sys/stream.h \
sys/stropts.h \
sys/strtio.h \
sys/statvfs.h \
sys/sysmacros.h \
sys/time.h \
sys/timers.h \
sys/vfs.h \
time.h \
tmpdir.h \
ttyent.h \
ucred.h \
unistd.h \
usersec.h \
util.h \
utime.h \
utmp.h \
utmpx.h \
vis.h \
wchar.h \
])
# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h]
# to be included first.
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/audit.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
# include <sys/label.h>
#endif
])
# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
])
# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h.
# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([net/route.h sys/sysctl.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
])
# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
])
# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
# include <sys/stream.h>
#endif
])
# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/types.h>
])
# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/param.h>
])
# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
])
# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
SIA_MSG="no"
SPC_MSG="no"
SP_MSG="no"
SPP_MSG="no"
# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
# Check for some target-specific stuff
case "$host" in
*-*-aix*)
# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
# It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are
# not fatal.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#define testmacro foo
#define testmacro bar]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
fi
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
else
flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
fi
for tryflags in $flags ;do
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])],
[blibflags=$tryflags], [])
fi
done
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags])
fi
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes
AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1],
[Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate],
[ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE])
LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
])
])
dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers.
AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess,
passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include <usersec.h>])
dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed],
[AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <usersec.h> ]],
[[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1],
[Define if your AIX loginfailed() function
takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])],
[],
[#include <usersec.h>]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb])
AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM],
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
[],
[ #include <limits.h>
#include <fcntl.h> ]
)
check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [Define if you have a broken realpath.])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1],
[Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken])
dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1],
[Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
[AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNDUP], 1, [strndup broken, see APAR IY61211])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNLEN], 1, [strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551])
;;
*-*-android*)
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
;;
*-*-cygwin*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
[Define to disable UID restoration test])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1],
[Define if you want to disable shadow passwords])
AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1],
[Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1],
[Define if your platform needs to skip post auth
file descriptor passing])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size])
AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters])
# Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
# reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes])
;;
*-*-dgux*)
AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1],
[Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-*-darwin*)
use_pie=auto
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
exit(0);
else
exit(1);
}
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([working])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1],
[getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1],
[Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
[#include <bsm/audit.h>]
AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
[Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
)
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h])
AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
])
+ # proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement.
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libproc.h])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([proc_pidinfo])
;;
*-*-dragonfly*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-haiku*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE"
AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
MANTYPE=man
;;
*-*-hpux*)
# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT])
AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
maildir="/var/mail"
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], ,
[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])])
# next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
fi
;;
*-*-hpux11*)
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1],
[Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which
passes pam_messages to the conversation function
with an extra level of indirection])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use utmp])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
;;
esac
# lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10.26)
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1],
[Define if you have SecureWare-based
protected password database])
disable_ptmx_check=yes
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
;;
esac
;;
*-*-irix5*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1],
[Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted
(e.g. Irix gcc issue)])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1],
[Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your
ttyname in [uw]tmp])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
*-*-irix6*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1],
[Define if you have/want arrays
(cluster-wide session management, not C arrays)])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX project management])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX audit trails])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
;;
*-*-linux*)
no_dev_ptmx=1
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics.
dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP])
AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer])
inet6_default_4in6=yes
case `uname -r` in
1.*|2.0.*)
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1],
[Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly])
;;
esac
# tun(4) forwarding compat code
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h])
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1],
[Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADER([linux/if.h],
AC_DEFINE([SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX], [1],
[Support routing domains using Linux VRF]), [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.H>
+# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [],
[], [#include <linux/types.h>])
# Obtain MIPS ABI
case "$host" in
mips*)
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="o32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="n32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="n64"],[AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown MIPS ABI])
])
])
])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture])
seccomp_audit_arch=
case "$host" in
x86_64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
;;
i*86-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
;;
arm*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
;;
aarch64*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
;;
s390x-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
;;
s390-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
;;
powerpc64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
;;
powerpc64le-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
;;
mips-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
;;
mipsel-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
;;
mips64-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
;;
esac
;;
mips64el-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
;;
esac
;;
+ riscv64-*)
+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
+ ;;
esac
if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
[Specify the system call convention in use])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
fi
;;
mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
SONY=1
;;
*-*-netbsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_before=1
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
+ rpath_opt="-R"
fi
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1],
[NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it])
;;
*-*-freebsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1],
[define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])
;;
*-*-bsdi*)
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-next-*)
conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
maildir=/usr/spool/mail
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT])
- AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT])
;;
*-*-openbsd*)
use_pie=auto
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1],
[syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-solaris*)
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- need_dash_r=1
+ rpath_opt="-R"
fi
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
[Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set
to the unpriv'ed user])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1],
[Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
after setsid()])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd
in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x])
sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'`
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h])
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts],
[ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
[
AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
],
)
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects],
[ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)],
[
AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris projects])
LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
SP_MSG="yes" ], )
],
)
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs],
[ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)],
[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support])
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
"x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT([found])
AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
[Define to disable UID restoration test])
AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris privileges])
SPP_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs])
fi
],
)
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
*-*-sunos4*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
;;
*-ncr-sysv*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-sni-sysv*)
# /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,)
# -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ])
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
;;
# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
*-*-sysv4.2*)
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
*-*-sysv5*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON])
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
case "$host" in
*-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
maildir=/var/spool/mail
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot])
], , )
;;
*) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
esac
;;
*-*-sysv*)
;;
# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
*-*-sco3.2v4*)
AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.")
;;
# SCO OpenServer 5.x
*-*-sco3.2v5*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
fi
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
no_dev_ptmx=1
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid])
MANTYPE=man
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
;;
*-dec-osf*)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA])
no_osfsia=""
AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia],
[ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled])
no_osfsia=1
fi
],
)
if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1],
[Define if you have Digital Unix Security
Integration Architecture])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use your
system's login() call])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
SIA_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
fi
fi
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv])
;;
*-*-nto-qnx*)
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken])
enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
case "$host" in
*-*-nto-qnx6*)
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
;;
esac
;;
*-*-ultrix*)
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
- AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP])
+ AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to for controlling tty])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Disable utmpx])
+ # DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we
+ # don't get a controlling tty.
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Need to call setpgrp as root])
+ # On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes,
+ # so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it.
+ AC_MSG_WARN([creating compat wrappers for headers])
+ mkdir -p netinet
+ for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do
+ name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'`
+ cat >$header <<EOD
+#ifndef _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#define _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#include "/usr/include/${header}"
+#endif
+EOD
+ done
;;
*-*-lynxos)
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1],
[LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
+AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdlib.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ]
)
dnl Checks for header files.
# Checks for libraries.
AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])])
dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [
AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <libgen.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *s, buf[32];
strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
s = dirname(buf);
if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
exit(1);
} else {
exit(0);
}
}
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
)
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])
fi
])
])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], ,
[AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1],
[Define if you have the basename function.])])
-dnl zlib is required
+dnl zlib defaults to enabled
+zlib=yes
AC_ARG_WITH([zlib],
[ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***])
+ zlib=no
elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi ]
)
-AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
-AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], ,
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for zlib])
+if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_ZLIB], [1], [Enable zlib])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], ,
[
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
dnl Check default zlib install dir
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
fi
CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])],
[
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***])
]
)
]
-)
+ )
-AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
+ AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
[ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
zlib_check_nonfatal=1
fi
]
-)
+ )
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <zlib.h>
]],
[[
int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
if (n != 3 && n != 4)
exit(1);
v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
/* 1.1.4 is OK */
if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
exit(0);
/* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
if (v >= 1020300)
exit(0);
exit(2);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([no]),
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
"./configure --without-zlib-version-check".
If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems])
fi
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ]
-)
+ )
+fi
dnl UnixWare 2.x
AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp],
[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes],
[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES])
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ]
)
dnl Checks for libutil functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp])
# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
# or libnsl.
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl])
+# Some Linux distribtions ship the BSD libc hashing functions in
+# separate libraries.
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([SHA256Update], [md bsd])
+
# "Particular Function Checks"
# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html
AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
AC_FUNC_MALLOC
AC_FUNC_REALLOC
# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL;
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if calloc(0, N) returns non-null])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
[[ #include <stdlib.h> ]],
[[ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); ]]
)],
[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes ],
[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=no ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming same as malloc])
func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"]
)
AC_MSG_RESULT([$func_calloc_0_nonnull])
if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 1, [calloc(0, x) returns non-null])
else
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(0, x) returns NULL])
AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc,
[Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.])
fi
# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support])
AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT],
[
#include <glob.h>
#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
FOUNDIT
#endif
],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
]
)
# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]],
[[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
gl_matchc options in glob_t])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]], [[
#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
#endif
glob_t g;
g.gl_statv = NULL;
]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
gl_statv options in glob_t])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include <glob.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], ,
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include <vis.h>])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <dirent.h>]],
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[
struct dirent d;
exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1],
[Define if your struct dirent expects you to
allocate extra space for d_name])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory])
if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
TCPW_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
[ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
if test -n "${withval}" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <tcpd.h>
int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
]], [[
hosts_access(0);
]])], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
[Define if you want
TCP Wrappers support])
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
TCPW_MSG="yes"
], [
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
]
)
# Check whether user wants to use ldns
LDNS_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
[ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
[
ldns=""
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no])
if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
else
LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
ldns=yes
fi
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
fi
# Verify that it works.
if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
LDNS_MSG="yes"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <ldns/ldns.h>
int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
]])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
])
fi
])
# Check whether user wants libedit support
LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([libedit],
[ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit])
if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
fi
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
else
LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
fi
OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp])
LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT])
],
[ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ],
[ $OTHERLIBS ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <histedit.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <histedit.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[
int i = H_SETSIZE;
el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
exit(0);
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ]
)
fi ]
)
AUDIT_MODULE=none
AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
[ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)],
[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module])
case "$withval" in
bsm)
AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm])
AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])],
[
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
# include <time.h>
#endif
]
)
AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])])
# These are optional
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module])
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1],
[The system has incomplete BSM API])
fi
;;
linux)
AC_MSG_RESULT([linux])
AUDIT_MODULE=linux
dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h])
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module])
;;
debug)
AUDIT_MODULE=debug
AC_MSG_RESULT([debug])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module])
;;
no)
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval])
;;
esac ]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([pie],
[ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
use_pie=yes
fi
]
)
if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
#error gcc is too old
#endif
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
use_pie=no ]
)
fi
if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie])
# We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported])
if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
fi
fi
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether -fPIC is accepted])
+SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include <stdlib.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]] )],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ PICFLAG="-fPIC"; ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ PICFLAG=""; ])
+CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+AC_SUBST([PICFLAG])
+
dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
auth_hostok \
auth_timeok \
Blowfish_initstate \
Blowfish_expandstate \
Blowfish_expand0state \
Blowfish_stream2word \
+ SHA256Update \
+ SHA384Update \
+ SHA512Update \
asprintf \
b64_ntop \
__b64_ntop \
b64_pton \
__b64_pton \
bcopy \
bcrypt_pbkdf \
bindresvport_sa \
blf_enc \
bzero \
cap_rights_limit \
clock \
closefrom \
dirfd \
endgrent \
err \
errx \
explicit_bzero \
+ explicit_memset \
fchmod \
+ fchmodat \
fchown \
+ fchownat \
flock \
+ fnmatch \
freeaddrinfo \
freezero \
fstatfs \
fstatvfs \
futimes \
getaddrinfo \
getcwd \
getgrouplist \
getline \
getnameinfo \
getopt \
getpagesize \
getpeereid \
getpeerucred \
getpgid \
_getpty \
getrlimit \
getrandom \
getsid \
getttyent \
glob \
group_from_gid \
inet_aton \
inet_ntoa \
inet_ntop \
innetgr \
llabs \
+ localtime_r \
login_getcapbool \
+ login_getpwclass \
md5_crypt \
+ memmem \
memmove \
memset_s \
mkdtemp \
ngetaddrinfo \
nsleep \
ogetaddrinfo \
openlog_r \
pledge \
poll \
prctl \
+ pselect \
pstat \
raise \
readpassphrase \
reallocarray \
+ realpath \
recvmsg \
recallocarray \
rresvport_af \
sendmsg \
setdtablesize \
setegid \
setenv \
seteuid \
setgroupent \
setgroups \
setlinebuf \
setlogin \
setpassent\
setpcred \
setproctitle \
setregid \
setreuid \
setrlimit \
setsid \
setvbuf \
sigaction \
sigvec \
snprintf \
socketpair \
statfs \
statvfs \
strcasestr \
strdup \
strerror \
strlcat \
strlcpy \
strmode \
strndup \
strnlen \
strnvis \
strptime \
strsignal \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
strtoull \
swap32 \
sysconf \
tcgetpgrp \
timingsafe_bcmp \
truncate \
unsetenv \
updwtmpx \
+ utimensat \
user_from_uid \
usleep \
vasprintf \
vsnprintf \
waitpid \
warn \
])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero, memmem])
dnl Wide character support.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <locale.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
if (loc != NULL)
exit(0);
exit(1);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes),
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
TEST_SSH_UTF8=no],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
)
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
[[ #include <ctype.h> ]],
[[ return (isblank('a')); ]])],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
])
disable_pkcs11=
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11],
[ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
disable_pkcs11=1
fi
]
)
-# PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL.
-if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then
- # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl],
- AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW],
- AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support]),
- [], [#include <dlfcn.h>]
- )
- )
-fi
+disable_sk=
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([security-key],
+ [ --disable-security-key disable U2F/FIDO support code [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ disable_sk=1
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+enable_sk_internal=
+AC_ARG_WITH([security-key-builtin],
+ [ --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ enable_sk_internal=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+test "x$disable_sk" != "x" && enable_sk_internal=""
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
const char *gai_strerror(int);
]], [[
char *str;
str = gai_strerror(0);
]])], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1],
[Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1],
[Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])])
+dnl check if we need -D_REENTRANT for localtime_r declaration.
+AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [],
+ [ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT"
+ unset ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [],
+ [ CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS" ],
+ [ #include <time.h> ]
+ )
+ ],
+ [ #include <time.h> ]
+)
+
dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep],
[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])],
[],
[
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# include <string.h>
#endif
])
dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])],
[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])],
[#include <termios.h>]
)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , ,
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD, getpeereid], , ,
[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , ,
[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([readv, writev], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [
#include <sys/param.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [
#include <stddef.h>
])
# extra bits for select(2)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [
dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
]], [[
errno=0;
setresuid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1],
[Define if your setresuid() is broken])
AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
)
])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [
dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
]], [[
errno=0;
setresgid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1],
[Define if your setresgid() is broken])
AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
)
])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([realpath], [
- dnl the sftp v3 spec says SSH_FXP_REALPATH will "canonicalize any given
- dnl path name", however some implementations of realpath (and some
- dnl versions of the POSIX spec) do not work on non-existent files,
- dnl so we use the OpenBSD implementation on those platforms.
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if realpath works with non-existent files])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <errno.h>
- ]], [[
- char buf[PATH_MAX];
- if (realpath("/opensshnonexistentfilename1234", buf) == NULL)
- if (errno == ENOENT)
- exit(1);
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
- [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1],
- [realpath does not work with nonexistent files])
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])],
- [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])]
- )
-])
-
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working fflush(NULL)])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <stdio.h>]], [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
+ [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([FFLUSH_NULL_BUG], [1],
[define if fflush(NULL) does not work])],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])
)
dnl Checks for time functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time])
dnl Checks for utmp functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname])
dnl Checks for utmpx functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname])
dnl Checks for lastlog functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon],
[LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1],
[Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize],
[LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])]
)
# Check for broken snprintf
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[
char b[5];
snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
exit(b[4]!='\0');
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[Define if your snprintf is busted])
AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf understands %zu])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
]],
[[
size_t a = 1, b = 2;
char z[128];
snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b);
exit(strcmp(z, "12"));
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[snprintf does not understand %zu])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
)
fi
# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
]], [[
char x[1];
if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
return 0;
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[Define if your snprintf is busted])
AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ]
)
fi
# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
]], [[
snprintf(0, 0, 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const],
[Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])])
# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
NO_PEERCHECK=""
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option])
], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
NO_PEERCHECK=1
])
fi
-dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-#include <stdlib.h>
- ]], [[
- char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
- if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
- exit(1);
- unlink(template);
- exit(0);
- ]])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()])
- ],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP])
- ]
-)
-fi
-
dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal
if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
]], [[
pid_t pid;
int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
exit(1);
} else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
if (WIFEXITED(status))
exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
else
exit(2);
} else { /* child */
close(0); close(1); close(2);
setsid();
openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0)
exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
else
exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
}
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
]], [[
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (err != 0) {
if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
else
fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
gai_strerror(err));
exit(2);
}
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0)
perror("socket");
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
if (errno == EBADF)
exit(3);
}
}
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
]], [[
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
perror("getnameinfo");
exit(2);
}
}
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1],
[Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails
for the all-zeros IPv6 address])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>])
fi
if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <shadow.h> ]],
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+ ]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1],
[Conflicting defs for getspnam])
]
)
fi
dnl NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the
dnl existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed
dnl for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during
dnl development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it.
dnl Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible
dnl implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option
dnl if we're cross compiling.
dnl
dnl OpenBSD, 2001: strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag);
dnl NetBSD: 2012, strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag);
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working strnvis])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <vis.h>
static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); }
]], [[
char dst[16];
signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler);
if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0)
exit(0);
exit(1)
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis detected broken])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming broken])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis assumed broken])]
)
fi
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+static void sighandler(int sig) { }
+ ]], [[
+ int r;
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct sigaction sa;
+
+ sa.sa_handler = sighandler;
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+ (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* child */
+ pid = getppid();
+ sleep(1);
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ sleep(1);
+ if (getppid() == pid) /* if parent did not exit, shoot it */
+ kill(pid, SIGKILL);
+ exit(0);
+ } else { /* parent */
+ r = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ exit(r == -1 ? 0 : 1);
+ ]])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ AC_DEFINE([NO_SA_RESTART], [1],
+ [SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select])],
+ [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
+)
+
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpgrp],[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getpgrp accepts zero args])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[$ac_includes_default]], [[ getpgrp(); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [1], [getpgrp takes zero args])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [0], [getpgrp takes one arg])]
)
])
# Search for OpenSSL
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir],
[ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ],
[
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled])
fi
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
case "$withval" in
# Relative paths
./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
esac
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check],
[ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl_check_nonfatal=1
fi
]
)
openssl_engine=no
AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine],
[ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled])
fi
openssl_engine=yes
fi
]
)
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
- AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], [1],
- [Define if your ssl headers are included
- with #include <openssl/header.h>])],
- [
- dnl Check default openssl install dir
- if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- else
- LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
- fi
- CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
- [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
- AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL])],
- [
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***])
- ]
- )
- ]
- )
+ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], ,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
# Determine OpenSSL header version
AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[
ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
+ # Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent.
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num])
+
# Determine OpenSSL library version
AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
-
- if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)SSLeay(),
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) < 0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
+#endif
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
+ (unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(),
+ OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
10000*|0*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
100*) ;; # 1.0.x
- 101000[0123456]*)
+ 101000[[0123456]]*)
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
101*) ;; # 1.1.x
200*) ;; # LibreSSL
+ 300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
*)
- AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL > 1.1.x is not yet supported (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
]], [[
- exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
+#endif
+ exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check".
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
fi
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/evp.h> ]],
- [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
+ [[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/evp.h> ]],
- [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
+ [[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
]
)
]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
BN_is_prime_ex \
DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
- EVP_DigestInit_ex \
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \
EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
- EVP_MD_CTX_init \
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init \
HMAC_CTX_init \
RSA_generate_key_ex \
RSA_get_default_method \
])
+ # OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a function]),
+ AC_CHECK_DECL(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a macro]), ,
+ [[#include <openssl/evp.h>]]
+ )
+ )
+
+ # LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto \
+ DH_get0_key \
+ DH_get0_pqg \
+ DH_set0_key \
+ DH_set_length \
+ DH_set0_pqg \
+ DSA_get0_key \
+ DSA_get0_pqg \
+ DSA_set0_key \
+ DSA_set0_pqg \
+ DSA_SIG_get0 \
+ DSA_SIG_set0 \
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0 \
+ ECDSA_SIG_set0 \
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv \
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \
+ RSA_get0_crt_params \
+ RSA_get0_factors \
+ RSA_get0_key \
+ RSA_set0_crt_params \
+ RSA_set0_factors \
+ RSA_set0_key \
+ RSA_meth_free \
+ RSA_meth_dup \
+ RSA_meth_set1_name \
+ RSA_meth_get_finish \
+ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \
+ RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \
+ RSA_meth_set_finish \
+ EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_new \
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free \
+ EVP_chacha20 \
+ ])
+
if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/engine.h>
]], [[
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1],
[Enable OpenSSL engine support])
], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found])
])
fi
# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1],
[libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions])
]
)
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1],
[libcrypto has EVP AES CTR])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
]
)
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1],
[libcrypto has EVP AES GCM])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
aes128-gcm@openssh.com \
aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
]
)
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])])
-
- # LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_get0_key], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_key])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_get0_pqg], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_pqg])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_set0_key], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_key])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_set_length], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DH_set_length])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_set0_pqg], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_pqg])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_get0_key], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_key])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_get0_pqg], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_pqg])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_set0_key], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_key])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_set0_pqg], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_pqg])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_SIG_get0], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_get0])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_SIG_set0], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_set0])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([ECDSA_SIG_get0], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_get0])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([ECDSA_SIG_set0], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_set0])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_get0_crt_params], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_crt_params])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_get0_factors], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_factors])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_get0_key], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_key])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_set0_crt_params], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_srt_params])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_set0_factors], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_factors])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_set0_key], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_key])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_free], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_free])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_dup], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_dup])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set1_name], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set1_name])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_get_finish], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_get_finish])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set_priv_enc], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_enc])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set_priv_dec], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_dec])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set_finish], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_finish])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA])])
-
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_MD_CTX_new], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_new])])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_MD_CTX_free], [crypto],
- [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE], [1],
- [Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_free])])
-
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1],
[Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void])
]
)
# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt])
fi
# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
# version in OpenSSL.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt])
- # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], ,
- [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
- hmac-sha2-256 \
- hmac-sha2-512 \
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \
- hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com \
- hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
- ]
- )
- # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], ,
- [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
- hmac-ripemd160 \
- hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com \
- hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com"
- ]
- )
+ # Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512])
# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp256=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp384=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]],[[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp521=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes])
enable_nistp521=1 ]
)],
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
)
COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
TEST_SSH_ECC=no
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC])
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EC_KEY_METHOD_new])
+ openssl_ecc=yes
+ else
+ openssl_ecc=no
fi
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1],
[libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC])
AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC])
else
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt])
fi
+# PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen().
+enable_pkcs11=yes
+enable_sk=yes
+if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+fi
+if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled by user"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then
+ enable_sk="disabled by user"
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable PKCS11])
+if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])
+fi
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_pkcs11])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable U2F])
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK], [], [Enable for U2F/FIDO support])
+ AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so])
+else
+ # Do not try to build sk-dummy library.
+ AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [""])
+fi
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_sk])
+
+# Now check for built-in security key support.
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=
+ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2])
+ if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then
+ LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2`
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`"
+ else
+ LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor"
+ fi
+ OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'`
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([fido2], [fido_init],
+ [
+ AC_SUBST([LIBFIDO2])
+ AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL], [],
+ [Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support])
+ enable_sk="built-in"
+ ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([no usable libfido2 found]) ],
+ [ $OTHERLIBS ]
+ )
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS $LIBFIDO2"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+ fido_cred_prot \
+ fido_cred_set_prot \
+ fido_dev_get_touch_begin \
+ fido_dev_get_touch_status \
+ fido_dev_supports_cred_prot \
+ ])
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido.h], [],
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([missing fido.h from libfido2]))
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido/credman.h], [],
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([missing fido/credman.h from libfido2]),
+ [#include <fido.h>]
+ )
+fi
+
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [
LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1],
[Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id])
])
])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
### Configure cryptographic random number support
# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
]], [[
exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
]])],
[
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
# This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
# OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
]
)
fi
# PRNGD TCP socket
AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port],
[ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT],
[
case "$withval" in
no)
withval=""
;;
[[0-9]]*)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port])
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT],
[Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
fi
]
)
# PRNGD Unix domain socket
AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket],
[ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)],
[
case "$withval" in
yes)
withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
;;
no)
withval=""
;;
/*)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket])
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket])
fi
if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable])
fi
PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"],
[Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
fi
],
[
# Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket])
# Insert other locations here
for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"])
break;
fi
done
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
fi
fi
]
)
# Which randomness source do we use?
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1],
[Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only])
RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options])
fi
# Check for PAM libs
PAM_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
[ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
fi
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , )
AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
PAM_MSG="yes"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
case "$LIBS" in
*-ldl*)
# libdl already in LIBS
;;
*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
;;
esac
fi
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([pam-service],
[ --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSHD_PAM_SERVICE],
["$withval"], [sshd PAM service name])
fi
]
)
# Check for older PAM
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
]], [[
(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1],
[Define if you have an old version of PAM
which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
])
fi
case "$host" in
*-*-cygwin*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
;;
*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
;;
esac
AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
[ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
fi
]
)
if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER],
[Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation])
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
fi
AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
])
fi
if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <errno.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
]],
[[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
errno = 0;
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
# Disable seccomp filter as a target
have_seccomp_filter=0
]
)
fi
# Decide which sandbox style to use
sandbox_arg=""
AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
[ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
sandbox_arg=""
else
sandbox_arg="$withval"
fi
]
)
# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int fd, r;
fd_set fds;
struct timeval tv;
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd, &fds);
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
select_works_with_rlimit=no],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
select_works_with_rlimit=yes]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
- int fd, r;
- fd_set fds;
+ int r;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1,
[setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
)
if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support])
SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support])
SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
"x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host])
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS])
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers])
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header])
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit])
SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges])
elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox])
fi
# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
fi
-# Check for long long datatypes
+# Check for long long datatypes
AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double])
# Check datatype sizes
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int], [2])
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int], [4])
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int], [4])
-AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int], [8])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([time_t], [], [[
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+ # include <time.h>
+ #endif
+ ]]
+)
# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
fi
# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
-if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+if test -z "$have_llong_max" && test -z "$have_long_long_max"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
/* Why is this so damn hard? */
#ifdef __GNUC__
# undef __GNUC__
#endif
#define __USE_ISOC99
#include <limits.h>
#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
/*
* printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
* we do this the hard way.
*/
static int
fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
{
unsigned int i;
int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
if (n < 0)
if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
n /= 10;
}
do {
if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
return -1;
} while (i != 0);
if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
]], [[
FILE *f;
long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
llmin = LLONG_MIN;
llmax = LLONG_MAX;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
/* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
llmax = i;
llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
#endif
/* Sanity check */
if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
|| llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
|| llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
exit(2);
}
if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
exit(3);
if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
exit(4);
if (fclose(f) < 0)
exit(5);
exit(0);
]])],
[
llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL],
[max value of long long calculated by configure])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long])
AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL],
[min value of long long calculated by configure])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
fi
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([UINT32_MAX], , , [[
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H
+# include <sys/limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+]])
# More checks for data types
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int a; a = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type])
have_u_int=1
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type])
have_intxx_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
# include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
]], [[
int64_t a; a = 1;
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type])
have_u_intxx_t=1
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/socket.h> ]],
[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type])
have_u_int64_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/bitypes.h> ]],
[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
]], [[
uint8_t a;
uint16_t b;
uint32_t c;
a = b = c = 1;
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1],
[define if you have uintxx_t data type])
fi
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <inttypes.h> ]],
[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
]], [[
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type])
fi
AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
])
TYPE_SOCKLEN_T
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include <signal.h>])
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t, sighandler_t], , , [#include <signal.h>])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
])
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_files, struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <time.h> ]],
[[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
[ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ]
)
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1],
[define if you have sa_family_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1],
[define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1],
[define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1],
[define if you have struct in6_addr data type])
dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , ,
[
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1],
[define if you have struct addrinfo data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/time.h> ]],
[[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval])
have_struct_timeval=1
fi
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec])
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timespec], ac_cv_have_struct_timespec, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+ # include <time.h>
+ #endif
+ ]],
+ [[ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC], [1], [define if you have struct timespec])
+ have_struct_timespec=1
+fi
# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail.
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
echo ""
exit 1;
else
dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
main()
{
char buf[50];
char expected_out[50];
int mazsize = 50 ;
#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
#else
long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
#endif
strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
}
#else
main() { exit(0); }
#endif
]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
)
fi
dnl Checks for structure members
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_ss], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class,
struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire],
[], [], [[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
]])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state],
[Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])],
[[
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1],
[Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
fi
dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
#ifdef msg_accrights
#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_accrights = 0;
exit(0);
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ]
)
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
[Define if your system uses access rights style
file descriptor passing])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
#ifdef msg_control
#error "msg_control is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_control = 0;
exit(0);
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ]
)
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
[Define if your system uses ancillary data style
file descriptor passing])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1],
[Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support],
ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <getopt.h> ]],
[[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1],
[Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1],
[Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
- AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr])
fi
# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1],
[Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])],
[
# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]], [[
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]], [[
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1],
[Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], ,
[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
extern struct __res_state _res;
]], [[
struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */
return 0;
]],)],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1],
[Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
# Check whether user wants SELinux support
SELINUX_MSG="no"
LIBSELINUX=""
AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
[ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1],
[Define if you want SELinux support.])
SELINUX_MSG="yes"
AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header]))
AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon],
[ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
],
AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
- SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
- LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
fi ]
)
-AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
[ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
else
KRB5ROOT=${withval}
fi
AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support])
KRB5_MSG="yes"
- AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config],
- [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
- [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
- if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
- K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
- K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+ use_pkgconfig_for_krb5=
+ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about kerberos5])
+ if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ use_pkgconfig_for_krb5=yes
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_krb5" = "xyes"; then
+ K5CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5`
+ K5LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
- if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
+ if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5-gssapi; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
[Define this if you want GSSAPI
support in the version 2 protocol])
- GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
- GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
+ GSSCFLAGS="`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5-gssapi`"
+ GSSLIBS="`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5-gssapi`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
[Define this if you are using the Heimdal
version of Kerberos V5]) ],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
else
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
- ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
+ AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config],
+ [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
+ [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
+ if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
+ K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
+ K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
+ if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
+ [Define this if you want GSSAPI
+ support in the version 2 protocol])
+ GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
+ GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
+ ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
- AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL])
- K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
- K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
- AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write],
- [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"])
- AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt],
- [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"])
- ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
- K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
- ])
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
+ AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
+ [Define this if you are using the Heimdal
+ version of Kerberos V5]) ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ ])
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
+ ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL])
+ K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
+ K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write],
+ [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt],
+ [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"])
+ ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
+ ])
+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
- AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
- [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
- GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
- [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
- GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
- [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
+ GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
+ [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
- GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
- AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
+ GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
+ [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
+ [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+ GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
+ ])
])
- ])
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
- [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
- AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], ,
- AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
- )
- ]
- )
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
+ [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], ,
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
+ )
+ ]
+ )
- oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
- AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
- [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
+ oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
+ [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
+ fi
fi
- if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+ if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
# include <gssapi.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
# include <gssapi_generic.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
#endif
]])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
# Looking for programs, paths and files
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path],
[ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH])
AC_ARG_WITH([xauth],
[ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
xauth_path=$withval
fi
],
[
TestPath="$PATH"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath])
if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
fi
]
)
STRIP_OPT=-s
AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip],
[ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
STRIP_OPT=
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT])
if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"],
[Define if xauth is found in your path])
XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
fi
dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority.
dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that.
dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers.
dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL
dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what
dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found
dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program
dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail.
# Check for mail directory
AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
[ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory],
[
if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"],
[Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR])
fi
],[
if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
else
AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
#include <maillock.h>
#endif
#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
exit(1);
#else
exit (2);
#endif
exit(0);
]])],
[
maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
| sed 's|/$||'`
AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what])
if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
fi
],
[
if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***])
fi
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail])
]
)
fi
]
) # maildir
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
disable_ptmx_check=yes
fi
if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"],
[
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1],
[Define if you have /dev/ptmx])
have_dev_ptmx=1
]
)
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"],
[
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1],
[Define if you have /dev/ptc])
have_dev_ptc=1
]
)
else
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test])
fi
# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
AC_ARG_WITH([mantype],
[ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type],
[
case "$withval" in
man|cat|doc)
MANTYPE=$withval
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval])
;;
esac
]
)
if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
- TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb"
- AC_PATH_PROGS([NROFF], [nroff awf], [/bin/false], [$TestPath])
- if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ MANTYPE=doc
+ elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=man
else
MANTYPE=cat
fi
fi
AC_SUBST([MANTYPE])
if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
mansubdir=man;
else
mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
fi
AC_SUBST([mansubdir])
# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
MD5_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords],
[ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1],
[Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords])
MD5_MSG="yes"
fi
]
)
# Whether to disable shadow password support
AC_ARG_WITH([shadow],
[ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
disable_shadow=yes
fi
]
)
if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <shadow.h>
struct spwd sp;
]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])],
[ sp_expire_available=yes ], [
])
if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1],
[Define if you want to use shadow password expire field])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
fi
# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1],
[Define if you need to use IP address
instead of hostname in $DISPLAY])
else
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display],
[ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY])
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
fi
]
)
fi
# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login],
[ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]],
[ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled])
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi ],
[ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
then
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login])
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi ]
)
if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"],
[ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ])
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1],
[Define if your system has /etc/default/login])
fi
fi
dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect
if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
fi
# Whether to mess with the default path
SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
AC_ARG_WITH([default-path],
[ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server],
[
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
Edit /etc/login.conf instead.])
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
$external_path_file .])
fi
user_path="$withval"
SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
fi
],
[ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
else
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
otherwise scp will not work.])
fi
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
/* find out what STDPATH is */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
# else
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
# endif
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ],
[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ],
[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ]
)
# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
t_bindir="${bindir}"
while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
esac
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
done
echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work])
fi
fi
fi ]
)
if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH])
AC_SUBST([user_path])
fi
# Set superuser path separately to user path
AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path],
[ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"],
[Define if you want a different $PATH
for the superuser])
superuser_path=$withval
fi
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
[ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1],
[Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
and treat as IPv4])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
], [
if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)])
AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)])
fi
]
)
# Whether to enable BSD auth support
BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
[ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
[Define if you have BSD auth support])
BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
fi
]
)
# Where to place sshd.pid
piddir=/var/run
# make sure the directory exists
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
case $piddir in
NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
fi
AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir],
[ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
piddir=$withval
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **])
fi
fi
]
)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"],
[Specify location of ssh.pid])
AC_SUBST([piddir])
dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog],
[ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp],
[ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx],
[ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use utmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp],
[ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx],
[ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use wtmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil],
[ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline],
[ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use pututline()
etc. to write [uw]tmp])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline],
[ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use pututxline()
etc. to write [uw]tmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
[ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
conf_lastlog_location=$withval
fi
]
)
dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
dnl need for command-line parameters
dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails
dnl lastlog detection
dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
# include <login.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_lastlog_path=no
])
])
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
conf_lastlog_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **])
dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file])
fi
dnl utmp detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_utmp_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_utmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file])
fi
dnl wtmp detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_wtmp_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_wtmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file])
fi
dnl wtmpx detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_wtmpx_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX])
fi
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
fi
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
fi
], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
])
dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
dnl Add now.
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
else
TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
fi
AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8])
AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS])
AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms])
AC_SUBST([DEPEND], [$(cat $srcdir/.depend)])
CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}"
LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}"
+# Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options.
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'`
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'`
+AC_SUBST([LDFLAGS_NOPIE])
+AC_SUBST([CFLAGS_NOPIE])
+
AC_EXEEXT
AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
survey.sh])
AC_OUTPUT
# Print summary of options
# Someone please show me a better way :)
A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
echo ""
echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
echo " User binaries: $B"
echo " System binaries: $C"
echo " Configuration files: $D"
echo " Askpass program: $E"
echo " Manual pages: $F"
echo " PID file: $G"
echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
else
echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
fi
echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
+echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
echo ""
echo " Host: ${host}"
echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
fi
-if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
-echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
-fi
echo ""
if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
echo ""
fi
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
echo "subdirectory"
echo ""
fi
if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
echo "user can connect to your agent."
echo ""
fi
if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/contrib/Makefile
index 3a36387b3222..45d878bdcf22 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/Makefile
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config
all:
- @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
+ @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssk-askpass3"
gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
-gnome-ssh-askpass3: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+gnome-ssh-askpass3: gnome-ssh-askpass3.c
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-3.0` \
- gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass3 \
+ gnome-ssh-askpass3.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass3 \
`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-3.0 x11`
clean:
rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass gnome-ssh-askpass[123]
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README b/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README
index a73a0f657ec4..3745051f5981 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/README
@@ -1,91 +1,91 @@
This package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH.
The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might
not run on older versions. Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information
about current Cygwin releases.
==================
Host configuration
==================
If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config
files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running
/usr/bin/ssh-host-config
Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc.
That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started.
To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got
some options:
usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]...
Options:
--debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
--yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
--no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
--cygwin -c <options> Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var.
--name -N <name> sshd windows service name.
--port -p <n> sshd listens on port n.
--user -u <account> privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'.
--pwd -w <passwd> Use "pwd" as password for privileged user.
--privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user
instead of LocalSystem for sshd service.
Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended.
Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils
package installed. Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked
to install sshd as service. The ssh-host-config script also adds the
required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services.
==================
User configuration
==================
Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running
/usr/bin/ssh-user-config
To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got
some options as well:
usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]...
Options:
--debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
--yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
--no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
--passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically.
Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to
search for the users configuration files! It always uses the
value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory.
-If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory
+If no home directory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory
is used instead!
================
Building OpenSSH
================
Building from source is easy. Just unpack the source archive, cd to that
directory, and call cygport:
cygport openssh.cygport all
You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH
with the aforementioned cygport script:
zlib
crypt
- openssl-devel
+ libssl-devel
libedit-devel
libkrb5-devel
Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com.
Have fun,
Corinna Vinschen
Cygwin Developer
Red Hat Inc.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config b/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
index 261020af33e8..a8572e2ac879 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
@@ -1,693 +1,714 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
#
# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
#
# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR
# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
# ======================================================================
# Initialization
# ======================================================================
CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
# List of apps used. This is checkad for existence in csih_sanity_check
# Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script,
# otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited.
declare -a csih_required_commands=(
/usr/bin/basename coreutils
/usr/bin/cat coreutils
/usr/bin/chmod coreutils
/usr/bin/dirname coreutils
/usr/bin/id coreutils
/usr/bin/mv coreutils
/usr/bin/rm coreutils
/usr/bin/cygpath cygwin
/usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin
/usr/bin/mount cygwin
/usr/bin/ps cygwin
/usr/bin/umount cygwin
/usr/bin/cmp diffutils
/usr/bin/grep grep
/usr/bin/awk gawk
/usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh
/usr/sbin/sshd openssh
/usr/bin/sed sed
)
csih_sanity_check_server=yes
source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0)
_tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0)
PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
PREFIX=/usr
# Directory where the config files are stored
SYSCONFDIR=/etc
LOCALSTATEDIR=/var
sshd_config_configured=no
port_number=22
-service_name=sshd
+service_name=cygsshd
strictmodes=yes
cygwin_value=""
user_account=
password_value=
opt_force=no
# ======================================================================
# Routine: update_services_file
# ======================================================================
update_services_file() {
local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$"
local _win_etcdir
local _services
local _spaces
local _serv_tmp
local _wservices
local ret=0
_win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc"
_services="${_my_etcdir}/services"
_spaces=" #"
_serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$"
/usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}"
# Depends on the above mount
_wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"`
# Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
then
if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
then
if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
then
csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}"
else
csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
/usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
else
csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
/usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}"
return $ret
} # --- End of update_services_file --- #
# ======================================================================
# Routine: sshd_strictmodes
# MODIFIES: strictmodes
# ======================================================================
sshd_strictmodes() {
if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
then
echo
csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default."
csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX"
csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh"
csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that"
csih_inform "only the user has write permissions."
csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default"
csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the"
csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home"
csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition."
if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?"
then
strictmodes=no
fi
fi
return 0
}
# ======================================================================
# Routine: sshd_privsep
# Try to create ssshd user account
# ======================================================================
sshd_privsep() {
local ret=0
if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
then
if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
then
csih_error_recoverable "Could not create user 'sshd'!"
csih_error_recoverable "You will not be able to run an sshd service"
csih_error_recoverable "under a privileged account successfully."
csih_error_recoverable "Make sure to create a non-privileged user 'sshd'"
csih_error_recoverable "manually before trying to run the service!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
return $ret
} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- #
# ======================================================================
# Routine: sshd_config_tweak
# ======================================================================
sshd_config_tweak() {
local ret=0
# Modify sshd_config
csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ]
then
/usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \
${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ]
then
/usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \
${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
if [ $? -ne 0 ]
then
csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!"
csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
return $ret
} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #
# ======================================================================
# Routine: update_inetd_conf
# ======================================================================
update_inetd_conf() {
local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf"
local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$"
local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d"
local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd"
local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$"
local _with_comment=1
local ret=0
if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ]
then
# we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support
if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
# check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
# will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
then
if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
then
csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}"
else
csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
/usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
else
csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
fi
csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults"
if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
then
/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
else
/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
fi
if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
then
csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
else
csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
# check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
# will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
then
/usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
then
if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
then
csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}"
else
csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
/usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
else
csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
# Add ssh line to inetd.conf
if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
then
if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
then
echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
else
echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
fi
if [ $? -eq 0 ]
then
csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}"
else
csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
fi
return $ret
} # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- #
# ======================================================================
# Routine: check_service_files_ownership
# Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner
# ======================================================================
check_service_files_ownership() {
local run_service_as=$1
local ret=0
if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
then
- accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd |
+ accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ "${service_name}" |
/usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp')
if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ]
then
# Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name
run_service_as="SYSTEM"
else
dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}"
accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}"
if [ "${dom}" = '.' ]
then
# Check local account
run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" |
/usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
else
# Check domain
run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" |
/usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
fi
fi
if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
then
- csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from account database!"
+ csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running ${service_name} service from account database!"
csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used"
- csih_warning "by the sshd service belong to the user running the service."
+ csih_warning "by the ${service_name} service belong to the user running the service."
return 1
fi
fi
for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub
do
if [ -f "$i" ]
then
if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
done
if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
let ++ret
fi
if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
let ++ret
fi
if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ]
then
if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!"
let ++ret
fi
fi
if [ $ret -ne 0 ]
then
csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!"
- csih_warning "This may cause the sshd service to fail! Please make sure that"
- csih_warning "you have suufficient permissions to change the ownership of files"
+ csih_warning "This may cause the ${service_name} service to fail! Please make sure that"
+ csih_warning "you have sufficient permissions to change the ownership of files"
csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again."
fi
return $ret
} # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- #
# ======================================================================
# Routine: install_service
# Install sshd as a service
# ======================================================================
install_service() {
local run_service_as
local password
local ret=0
echo
if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed."
check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$?
else
echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?"
if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)"
then
csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}"
- if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
+ if ( [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" != "yes" ] )
then
- csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the"
- csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability"
- csih_inform "sshd requires. You need to have or to create a privileged"
- csih_inform "account. This script will help you do so."
- echo
+ # Enforce using privileged user on 64 bit Vista or W7 under WOW64
+ is_wow64=$(/usr/bin/uname | /usr/bin/grep -q 'WOW' && echo 1 || echo 0)
+ if ( csih_is_nt2003 && ! csih_is_windows8 && [ "${is_wow64}" = "1" ] )
+ then
+ csih_inform "Running 32 bit Cygwin on 64 bit Windows Vista or Windows 7"
+ csih_inform "the SYSTEM account is not sufficient to setuid to a local"
+ csih_inform "user account. You need to have or to create a privileged"
+ csih_inform "account. This script will help you do so."
+ echo
+ csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ if ( [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
+ then
[ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f
[ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}"""
csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd
if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}"
then
csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user."
csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1
let ++ret
fi
+ # Never returns empty if NT or above
+ run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
+ else
+ run_service_as="SYSTEM"
fi
- # Never returns empty if NT or above
- run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
-
if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ]
then
password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}"
if [ -z "${password}" ]
then
csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s"
password="${csih_value}"
fi
fi
# At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and
# $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and
# (hopefully) $password contains the correct password. So, from here
# out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases.
csih_check_user "${run_service_as}"
if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ]
then
cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" )
fi
if [ -z "${password}" ]
then
if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
-a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}"
then
echo
csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem"
csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call"
- csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'. Otherwise, it"
+ csih_inform "\`net start ${service_name}' or \`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'. Otherwise, it"
csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
fi
else
if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
-a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \
-u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
then
/usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight
echo
csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'"
csih_inform "account. To start the service now, call \`net start ${service_name}' or"
csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'. Otherwise, it will start automatically"
csih_inform "after the next reboot."
fi
fi
if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
then
check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$?
else
csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!"
let ++ret
fi
fi # user allowed us to install as service
fi # service not yet installed
return $ret
} # --- End of install_service --- #
# ======================================================================
# Main Entry Point
# ======================================================================
# Check how the script has been started. If
# (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
# that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
# (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
# SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
# then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic
# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
# them if they already exist. In both cases, color
# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
# cluttering setup's logfiles.
if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
then
csih_auto_answer="no"
csih_disable_color
opt_force=yes
fi
if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
then
csih_auto_answer="no"
csih_disable_color
opt_force=yes
fi
# ======================================================================
# Parse options
# ======================================================================
while :
do
case $# in
0)
break
;;
esac
option=$1
shift
case "${option}" in
-d | --debug )
set -x
csih_trace_on
;;
-y | --yes )
csih_auto_answer=yes
opt_force=yes
;;
-n | --no )
csih_auto_answer=no
opt_force=yes
;;
-c | --cygwin )
cygwin_value="$1"
shift
;;
-N | --name )
service_name=$1
shift
;;
-p | --port )
port_number=$1
shift
;;
-u | --user )
user_account="$1"
shift
;;
-w | --pwd )
password_value="$1"
shift
;;
--privileged )
csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes
;;
*)
echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..."
echo
echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration."
echo
echo "Options:"
echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output."
echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
echo " --cygwin -c <options> Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var."
echo " --name -N <name> sshd windows service name."
echo " --port -p <n> sshd listens on port n."
echo " --user -u <account> privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'."
echo " --pwd -w <passwd> Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user."
echo " --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user"
echo " instead of LocalSystem for sshd service."
echo
exit 1
;;
esac
done
# ======================================================================
# Action!
# ======================================================================
# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while
# some ssh processes are still running
if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$'
then
echo
csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first."
fi
# Make sure the user is running in an administrative context
admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no)
if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ]
then
echo
csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!"
csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges."
csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:"
echo
/usr/bin/id -Gnz | xargs -0n1 echo " "
echo
csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin"
csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control."
echo
csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now,"
csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!"
echo
echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue? (Say \"no\" if you're not sure"
if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)"
then
echo
csih_inform "Ok. Exiting. Make sure to switch to an administrative account"
csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell."
exit 1
fi
fi
echo
warning_cnt=0
# Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists
if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
then
echo
csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \
"Cannot create ssh host configuration."
fi
if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
then
/usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog
if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
fi
# Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation
csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory."
if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
let ++warning_cnt
fi
# generate missing host keys
csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys"
/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$?
# handle ssh_config
csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ]
then
csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port"
echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
echo " Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
fi
fi
# handle sshd_config
+# make sure not to change the existing file
+mod_before=""
+if [ -e "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ]
+then
+ mod_before=$(stat "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" | grep '^Modify:')
+fi
csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
+mod_now=$(stat "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" | grep '^Modify:')
if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
sshd_config_configured=yes
fi
-sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$?
-sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$?
-sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$?
+if [ "${mod_before}" != "${mod_now}" ]
+then
+ sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$?
+ sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$?
+fi
+#sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$?
update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$?
update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$?
install_service || let warning_cnt+=$?
echo
if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ]
then
csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!"
else
csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!"
csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed,"
csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config."
fi
exit $warning_cnt
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/findssl.sh b/crypto/openssh/contrib/findssl.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c b/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
index 4d51032d1d36..4c92c177b5d2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
@@ -1,171 +1,172 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
* environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
* gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
*
* There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
* "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
* the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
* pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
* you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
*/
/*
* Compile with:
*
* cc `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
* gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
* `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
*
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <gnome.h>
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
void
report_failed_grab (void)
{
GtkWidget *err;
err = gnome_message_box_new("Could not grab keyboard or mouse.\n"
"A malicious client may be eavesdropping on your session.",
GNOME_MESSAGE_BOX_ERROR, "EXIT", NULL);
gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(err), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
gnome_dialog_run_and_close(GNOME_DIALOG(err));
}
int
passphrase_dialog(char *message)
{
char *passphrase;
char **messages;
int result, i, grab_server, grab_pointer;
GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label;
grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
dialog = gnome_dialog_new("OpenSSH", GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_OK,
GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_CANCEL, NULL);
messages = g_strsplit(message, "\\n", 0);
if (messages)
for(i = 0; messages[i]; i++) {
label = gtk_label_new(messages[i]);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
entry = gtk_entry_new();
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
FALSE, 0);
gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
/* Center window and prepare for grab */
gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(dialog), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
gnome_dialog_set_default(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), 0);
gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_window_set_policy(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), FALSE, FALSE, TRUE);
gnome_dialog_close_hides(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), TRUE);
gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
GNOME_PAD);
gtk_widget_show_all(dialog);
/* Grab focus */
if (grab_server)
XGrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
if (grab_pointer && gdk_pointer_grab(dialog->window, TRUE, 0,
NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
goto nograb;
if (gdk_keyboard_grab(dialog->window, FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
goto nograbkb;
/* Make <enter> close dialog */
gnome_dialog_editable_enters(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_EDITABLE(entry));
/* Run dialog */
result = gnome_dialog_run(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
/* Ungrab */
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
if (grab_pointer)
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_flush();
/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
passphrase = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry));
if (result == 0)
puts(passphrase);
/* Zero passphrase in memory */
memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
return (result == 0 ? 0 : -1);
- /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
- the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot
- fail. */
+ /*
+ * At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report the
+ * failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot fail.
+ */
nograbkb:
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
nograb:
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
report_failed_grab();
return (-1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *message;
int result;
gnome_init("GNOME ssh-askpass", "0.1", argc, argv);
if (argc == 2)
message = argv[1];
else
message = "Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:";
setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
result = passphrase_dialog(message);
return (result);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
index 535a692749e9..a62f98152950 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
@@ -1,225 +1,341 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> */
/*
* This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
* environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
* gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
*
* There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
* "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
* the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
* pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
* you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
*/
#define GRAB_TRIES 16
#define GRAB_WAIT 250 /* milliseconds */
+#define PROMPT_ENTRY 0
+#define PROMPT_CONFIRM 1
+#define PROMPT_NONE 2
+
/*
* Compile with:
*
* cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
* gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
* `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
*
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
#include <gtk/gtk.h>
#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
static void
report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
{
GtkWidget *err;
err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
- GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
- "Could not grab %s. "
- "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
- "on your session.", what);
+ GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+ "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+ "on your session.", what);
gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
gtk_widget_destroy(err);
}
static void
ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog)
{
g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog));
gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
}
+static gboolean
+check_none(GtkWidget *widget, GdkEventKey *event, gpointer dialog)
+{
+ switch (event->keyval) {
+ case GDK_KEY_Escape:
+ /* esc -> close dialog */
+ gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
+ return TRUE;
+ case GDK_KEY_Tab:
+ /* tab -> focus close button */
+ gtk_widget_grab_focus(gtk_dialog_get_widget_for_response(
+ dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE));
+ return TRUE;
+ default:
+ /* eat all other key events */
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
static int
-passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
+{
+ const char *s;
+ unsigned long ul;
+ char *ep;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if ((s = getenv(env)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+
+ /* Permit hex rgb or rrggbb optionally prefixed by '#' or '0x' */
+ if (*s == '#')
+ s++;
+ else if (strncmp(s, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ s += 2;
+ n = strlen(s);
+ if (n != 3 && n != 6)
+ goto bad;
+ ul = strtoul(s, &ep, 16);
+ if (*ep != '\0' || ul > 0xffffff) {
+ bad:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid $%s - invalid hex color code\n", env);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Valid hex sequence; expand into a GdkColor */
+ if (n == 3) {
+ /* 4-bit RGB */
+ c->red = ((ul >> 8) & 0xf) << 12;
+ c->green = ((ul >> 4) & 0xf) << 12;
+ c->blue = (ul & 0xf) << 12;
+ } else {
+ /* 8-bit RGB */
+ c->red = ((ul >> 16) & 0xff) << 8;
+ c->green = ((ul >> 8) & 0xff) << 8;
+ c->blue = (ul & 0xff) << 8;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
{
const char *failed;
char *passphrase, *local;
int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ int buttons, default_response;
GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
GdkGrabStatus status;
+ GdkColor fg, bg;
+ int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
grab_tries = 0;
+ fg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR", &fg);
+ bg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR", &bg);
+
/* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't
* complain. */
parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
+ switch (prompt_type) {
+ case PROMPT_CONFIRM:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_YES;
+ break;
+ case PROMPT_NONE:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_OK;
+ break;
+ }
+
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION,
- GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL,
- "%s",
- message);
-
- entry = gtk_entry_new();
- gtk_box_pack_start(
- GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
- FALSE, FALSE, 0);
- gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, buttons, "%s", message);
gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), default_response);
+ gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
- /* Make <enter> close dialog */
- gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
- G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ if (fg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_fg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ if (bg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
- gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
+ entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ if (fg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ if (bg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ gtk_box_pack_start(
+ GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+ entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ /* Make <enter> close dialog */
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Ensure the 'close' button is not focused by default
+ * but is still reachable via tab. This is a bit of a
+ * hack - it uses a hidden entry that responds to a
+ * couple of keypress events (escape and tab only).
+ */
+ gtk_widget_realize(entry);
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ }
+ }
/* Grab focus */
gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
if (grab_pointer) {
for(;;) {
status = gdk_pointer_grab(
(gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog))), TRUE,
0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
break;
usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
failed = "mouse";
goto nograb;
}
}
}
for(;;) {
status = gdk_keyboard_grab(
gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog)), FALSE,
GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
break;
usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
failed = "keyboard";
goto nograbkb;
}
}
if (grab_server) {
gdk_x11_grab_server();
}
result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
/* Ungrab */
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
if (grab_pointer)
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_flush();
/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
- passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
- if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
- local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (local != NULL) {
- puts(local);
- memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
- g_free(local);
- } else {
- puts(passphrase);
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
+ if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
+ local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase,
+ strlen(passphrase), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (local != NULL) {
+ puts(local);
+ memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
+ g_free(local);
+ } else {
+ puts(passphrase);
+ }
}
+ /* Zero passphrase in memory */
+ memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
+ gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+ memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+ g_free(passphrase);
}
-
- /* Zero passphrase in memory */
- memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
- gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
- memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
- g_free(passphrase);
-
+
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
- return (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK ? 0 : -1);
+ if (result != GTK_RESPONSE_OK && result != GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
- /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
- the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot
- fail. */
nograbkb:
+ /*
+ * At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
+ * the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot
+ * fail.
+ */
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
nograb:
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
report_failed_grab(parent_window, failed);
return (-1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char *message;
- int result;
+ char *message, *prompt_mode;
+ int result, prompt_type = PROMPT_ENTRY;
gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
if (argc > 1) {
message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
} else {
message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:");
}
+ if ((prompt_mode = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT")) != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "confirm") == 0)
+ prompt_type = PROMPT_CONFIRM;
+ else if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "none") == 0)
+ prompt_type = PROMPT_NONE;
+ }
+
setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
- result = passphrase_dialog(message);
+ result = passphrase_dialog(message, prompt_type);
g_free(message);
return (result);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3.c b/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e1a0533ef624
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> */
+
+/*
+ * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
+ * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
+ *
+ * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
+ * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
+ * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
+ * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
+ * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
+ */
+
+#define GRAB_TRIES 16
+#define GRAB_WAIT 250 /* milliseconds */
+
+#define PROMPT_ENTRY 0
+#define PROMPT_CONFIRM 1
+#define PROMPT_NONE 2
+
+/*
+ * Compile with:
+ *
+ * cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ * `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <gtk/gtk.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
+
+static void
+ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog)
+{
+ g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog));
+ gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+}
+
+static gboolean
+check_none(GtkWidget *widget, GdkEventKey *event, gpointer dialog)
+{
+ switch (event->keyval) {
+ case GDK_KEY_Escape:
+ /* esc -> close dialog */
+ gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
+ return TRUE;
+ case GDK_KEY_Tab:
+ /* tab -> focus close button */
+ gtk_widget_grab_focus(gtk_dialog_get_widget_for_response(
+ dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE));
+ return TRUE;
+ default:
+ /* eat all other key events */
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
+{
+ const char *s;
+ unsigned long ul;
+ char *ep;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if ((s = getenv(env)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+
+ /* Permit hex rgb or rrggbb optionally prefixed by '#' or '0x' */
+ if (*s == '#')
+ s++;
+ else if (strncmp(s, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ s += 2;
+ n = strlen(s);
+ if (n != 3 && n != 6)
+ goto bad;
+ ul = strtoul(s, &ep, 16);
+ if (*ep != '\0' || ul > 0xffffff) {
+ bad:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid $%s - invalid hex color code\n", env);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Valid hex sequence; expand into a GdkColor */
+ if (n == 3) {
+ /* 4-bit RGB */
+ c->red = ((ul >> 8) & 0xf) << 12;
+ c->green = ((ul >> 4) & 0xf) << 12;
+ c->blue = (ul & 0xf) << 12;
+ } else {
+ /* 8-bit RGB */
+ c->red = ((ul >> 16) & 0xff) << 8;
+ c->green = ((ul >> 8) & 0xff) << 8;
+ c->blue = (ul & 0xff) << 8;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+{
+ const char *failed;
+ char *passphrase, *local;
+ int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ int buttons, default_response;
+ GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *err;
+ GdkGrabStatus status;
+ GdkColor fg, bg;
+ GdkSeat *seat;
+ GdkDisplay *display;
+ GdkSeatCapabilities caps;
+ int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+
+ grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+ grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
+ grab_tries = 0;
+
+ fg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR", &fg);
+ bg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR", &bg);
+
+ /* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't
+ * complain. */
+ parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
+
+ switch (prompt_type) {
+ case PROMPT_CONFIRM:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_YES;
+ break;
+ case PROMPT_NONE:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_OK;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+ GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, buttons, "%s", message);
+
+ gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+ gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), default_response);
+ gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+
+ if (fg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_fg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ if (bg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
+ entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ if (fg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ if (bg_set)
+ gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ gtk_box_pack_start(
+ GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+ entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ /* Make <enter> close dialog */
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Ensure the 'close' button is not focused by default
+ * but is still reachable via tab. This is a bit of a
+ * hack - it uses a hidden entry that responds to a
+ * couple of keypress events (escape and tab only).
+ */
+ gtk_widget_realize(entry);
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Grab focus */
+ gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
+ display = gtk_widget_get_display(GTK_WIDGET(dialog));
+ seat = gdk_display_get_default_seat(display);
+ caps = GDK_SEAT_CAPABILITY_KEYBOARD;
+ if (grab_pointer)
+ caps |= GDK_SEAT_CAPABILITY_ALL_POINTING;
+ if (grab_server)
+ caps = GDK_SEAT_CAPABILITY_ALL;
+ for (;;) {
+ status = gdk_seat_grab(seat, gtk_widget_get_window(dialog),
+ caps, TRUE, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+ break;
+ usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+ if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES)
+ goto nograb;
+ }
+
+ result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+ /* Ungrab */
+ gdk_seat_ungrab(seat);
+ gdk_display_flush(display);
+
+ /* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
+ if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
+ local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase,
+ strlen(passphrase), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (local != NULL) {
+ puts(local);
+ memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
+ g_free(local);
+ } else {
+ puts(passphrase);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Zero passphrase in memory */
+ memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
+ gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+ memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+ g_free(passphrase);
+ }
+
+ gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+ if (result != GTK_RESPONSE_OK && result != GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+
+ nograb:
+ gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+ err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+ GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+ "Could not grab input. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+ "on your session.");
+ gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+ gtk_widget_destroy(err);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *message, *prompt_mode;
+ int result, prompt_type = PROMPT_ENTRY;
+
+ gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
+
+ if (argc > 1) {
+ message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
+ } else {
+ message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:");
+ }
+
+ if ((prompt_mode = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT")) != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "confirm") == 0)
+ prompt_type = PROMPT_CONFIRM;
+ else if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "none") == 0)
+ prompt_type = PROMPT_NONE;
+ }
+
+ setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
+ result = passphrase_dialog(message, prompt_type);
+ g_free(message);
+
+ return (result);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
index d7823483d10d..5fb81ce31491 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@@ -1,843 +1,848 @@
-%define ver 7.9p1
-%define rel 1%{?dist}
+%global ver 8.7p1
+%global rel 1%{?dist}
# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
-%define sshd_uid 74
-%define sshd_gid 74
+%global sshd_uid 74
+%global sshd_gid 74
# Version of ssh-askpass
-%define aversion 1.2.4.1
+%global aversion 1.2.4.1
# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define no_x11_askpass 0
+%global no_x11_askpass 0
# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define no_gnome_askpass 0
+%global no_gnome_askpass 0
# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define static_libcrypto 0
+%global static_libcrypto 0
# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
-%define scard 0
+%global scard 0
# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass
-%define gtk2 1
+%global gtk2 1
# Use build6x options for older RHEL builds
# RHEL 7 not yet supported
%if 0%{?rhel} > 6
-%define build6x 0
+%global build6x 0
%else
-%define build6x 1
+%global build6x 1
%endif
%if 0%{?fedora} >= 26
-%define compat_openssl 1
+%global compat_openssl 1
%else
-%define compat_openssl 0
+%global compat_openssl 0
%endif
# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
-%define kerberos5 1
+%global kerberos5 1
# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
-%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1}
-%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1}
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%global no_x11_askpass 1}
+%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1}
# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+.
# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples.
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1'
-%{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0}
+%{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0}
# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier?
-%{?build_6x:%define build6x 1}
+%{?build_6x:%global build6x 1}
# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc.
%if %{build6x}
-%define _sysconfdir /etc
+%global _sysconfdir /etc
%endif
# Options for static OpenSSL link:
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
-%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1}
+%{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
-%{?smartcard:%define scard 1}
+%{?smartcard:%global scard 1}
# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no)
-%define rescue 0
-%{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1}
+%global rescue 0
+%{?build_rescue:%global rescue 1}
# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
%if %{rescue}
-%define kerberos5 0
+%global kerberos5 0
%endif
Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2.
Name: openssh
Version: %{ver}
%if %{rescue}
Release: %{rel}rescue
%else
Release: %{rel}
%endif
URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html
Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
License: BSD
Group: Applications/Internet
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
Obsoletes: ssh
%if %{build6x}
PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
%else
Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
%endif
BuildRequires: perl
%if %{compat_openssl}
BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel
%else
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1
BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1
%endif
BuildRequires: /bin/login
%if ! %{build6x}
BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam
%else
BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
%endif
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h
# Xt development tools
BuildRequires: libXt-devel
# Provides xmkmf
BuildRequires: imake
# Rely on relatively recent gtk
BuildRequires: gtk2-devel
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
BuildRequires: pkgconfig
%endif
%if %{kerberos5}
BuildRequires: krb5-devel
BuildRequires: krb5-libs
%endif
%package clients
Summary: OpenSSH clients.
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Group: Applications/Internet
Obsoletes: ssh-clients
%package server
Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
Group: System Environment/Daemons
Obsoletes: ssh-server
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
%if ! %{build6x}
Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
%endif
%package askpass
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
Group: Applications/Internet
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
%package askpass-gnome
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
Group: Applications/Internet
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
%description
SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two
untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing
it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing
all patented algorithms to separate libraries.
This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
%description clients
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
%description server
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh
package installed.
%description askpass
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
%description askpass-gnome
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop
environment.
%prep
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
%setup -q -a 1
%else
%setup -q
%endif
%build
%if %{rescue}
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS
%endif
%configure \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
--with-md5-passwords \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \
--with-mantype=man \
--disable-strip \
%if %{scard}
--with-smartcard \
%endif
%if %{rescue}
--without-pam \
%else
--with-pam \
%endif
%if %{kerberos5}
--with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \
%endif
%if %{static_libcrypto}
perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
%endif
make
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
xmkmf -a
make
popd
%endif
# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary
# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements.
%if %{gtk2}
gtk2=yes
%else
gtk2=no
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
pushd contrib
if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then
make gnome-ssh-askpass2
mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
else
make gnome-ssh-askpass1
mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass
fi
popd
%endif
%install
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
%if %{build6x}
install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
%else
install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
%endif
install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{scard}
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
%endif
perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
%clean
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%triggerun server -- ssh-server
if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then
touch /var/run/sshd.restart
fi
%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1
# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have.
gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1}
/^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1}
END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default
# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't
# specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying
# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both.
if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then
echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
fi
%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server
if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then
/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then
rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart
/sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
fi
fi
%pre server
%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
-g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || :
%post server
/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
%postun server
/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
%preun server
if [ "$1" = 0 ]
then
/sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
/sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
fi
%files
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
%if ! %{rescue}
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-sk-helper
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
%endif
%if %{scard}
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
%endif
%files clients
%defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
%if ! %{rescue}
%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
%endif
%if ! %{rescue}
%files server
%defattr(-,root,root)
%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
%endif
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
%files askpass
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
%files askpass-gnome
%defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
%endif
%changelog
+* Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller <djm@mindrto.org>
+- Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page.
+
* Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
- Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements.
- Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs.
- Remove SSH1 from description.
- Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be
created.
* Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia <nakdel@gmail.com>
- Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility
- Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time
- Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM
- Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel
- Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility
- Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option
- Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf
* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
file using new AddressFamily directive
* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass
(patch from bet@rahul.net)
* Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks
* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs
* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client
* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little
- Add Privsep user, group and directory
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-2
- bump and grind (through the build system)
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-1
- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137)
- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't
work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck
- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again
- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from
http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're
building for 6.x
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-0
- update to 3.1p1
* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020305
- update to SNAP-20020305
- drop debug patch, fixed upstream
* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020220
- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's
anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind)
* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-3
- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key
exchange, authentication, and named key support
* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-2
- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole
by gnome-libs-devel
* Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix
from Hugo van der Kooij)
* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-1
- update to 3.0.2p1
* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.1p1-1
- update to 3.0.1p1
* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution)
* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0p1-1
- merge some of Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> changes from the upstream
3.0p1 spec file and init script
* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 3.0p1
- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1
- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package
- replace primes with moduli
* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-9
- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs
* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 2.9p2-8
- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd
* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-7
- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper
preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc.
(sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827)
- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247)
- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298)
- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337)
- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug
- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751)
- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611)
- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221)
* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-6
- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke)
* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2
* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions
- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly
- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263)
* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci)
* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151)
* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2
* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- rebuild in new environment
* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- disable the gssapi patch
* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.9p2
- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch
* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD
- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem
so that we can verify it
- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch)
- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate
- clear supplemental groups list at startup
* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config
- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not
dealing with comments right
* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house,
to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure
from the upstream version
* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- finish marking strings in the init script for translation
- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd
at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by
Pekka Savola)
- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed
* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.9
- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS
* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer)
* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com>
- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue
- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid
races in condrestart
* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't
limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378)
- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly,
because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like
open connections)
- require the version of openssl we had when we were built
* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and
when to reinitialize them
- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata
* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.5.2p2
- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually
be group memberships
* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation)
- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not
have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to
three password attempts as it is)
- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely
* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise
* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- rebuild in new environment
* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session.
- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750)
- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540)
* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Chuck the closing patch.
- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that
configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we
specify any other HostKey values, which we do.
* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user.
- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf.
* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update for 2.5.1p1.
- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola.
- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely.
- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try
adding id_rsa.
* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update for 2.5.0p1.
- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass
- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including
update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0.
- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init
script now.
* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690).
- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which
host the user is attempting a login from.
- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS.
- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS).
- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS).
* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg@redhat.com>
- i18n-tweak to initscript.
* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- More gettextizing.
- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing).
- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client).
- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness.
* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Finish with the gettextizing.
* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877)
- Gettextize the init script.
* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case.
* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs.
* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has
succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none"
authentication. (#21268)
* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301)
- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290)
* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when
doing keyboard-interactive authentication.
* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM.
- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and
enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client
will try it when the server disallows password authentication.
- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway.
* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall.
- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch.
* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884).
- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984).
- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself.
* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata.
- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh.
* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1.
- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0.
- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication.
* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3.
- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966).
* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files
it generates.
* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always
build PAM authentication in.
- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed.
- Clean out no-longer-used patches.
- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only
when neither exists.
* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835)
- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will
always find them in the right place. (#17909)
- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but
add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909)
- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names
are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865)
* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835)
- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023)
* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 20000823 snapshot.
- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release}
- Back out the pipe patch.
* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems.
- Move the init script back.
- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness.
* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok().
* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Move condrestart to server postun.
- Move key generation to init script.
- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script.
- Clean up the init script a bit.
* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard.
* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p2.
- Use of strtok() considered harmful.
* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Get the build root out of the man pages.
* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add and use condrestart support in the init script.
- Add newer initscripts as a prereq.
* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Build in new environment (release 2)
- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group
* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.2.1p1
* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref.
- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks.
- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages.
* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Updated for new location
- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble@pobox.com> askpass
* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use make install
- Subpackages
* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Added links for slogin
- Fixed perms on manpages
* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Renamed init script
* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Back to old binary names
* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use autoconf
- New binary names
* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/solaris/README b/crypto/openssh/contrib/solaris/README
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id
index b83b83619896..cd122def30a1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id
@@ -1,324 +1,377 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2020 Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+# 2020 Matthias Blümel <blaimi@blaimi.de>
+# 2017 Sebastien Boyron <seb@boyron.eu>
# 2013 Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
# 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= <asp16@alu.ua.es>
# 2010 Eric Moret <eric.moret@gmail.com>
# 2009 Xr <xr@i-jeuxvideo.com>
# 2007 Justin Pryzby <justinpryzby@users.sourceforge.net>
# 2004 Reini Urban <rurban@x-ray.at>
# 2003 Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
# All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine
# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details
+# shellcheck shell=dash
+
# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better
if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0"
then
SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh}
if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH"
then
- printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH"
+ printf "'%s' seems viable.\\n" "$SANE_SH"
exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@"
else
cat <<-EOF
oh dear.
If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc.
please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that
shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report
a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work.
EOF
- printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0"
+ printf '%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n' "$0"
exit 1
fi
fi
-most_recent_id="$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)"
-DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="${most_recent_id:+$HOME/}$most_recent_id"
+# shellcheck disable=SC2010
+DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE=$(ls -t "${HOME}"/.ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)
+SSH="ssh -a -x"
+umask 0177
usage () {
- printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
+ printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n|-s] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [-F alternative ssh_config file] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
printf '\t-f: force mode -- copy keys without trying to check if they are already installed\n' >&2
printf '\t-n: dry run -- no keys are actually copied\n' >&2
+ printf '\t-s: use sftp -- use sftp instead of executing remote-commands. Can be useful if the remote only allows sftp\n' >&2
printf '\t-h|-?: print this help\n' >&2
exit 1
}
# escape any single quotes in an argument
quote() {
- printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
+ printf '%s\n' "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
}
use_id_file() {
- local L_ID_FILE="$1"
+ L_ID_FILE="$1"
if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
- printf "%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n" "$0"
+ printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
exit 1
fi
- if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then
+ if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : '.*\.pub$' >/dev/null ; then
PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE"
else
PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
fi
[ "$FORCED" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
# check that the files are readable
for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
- local L_PRIVMSG=""
+ L_PRIVMSG=""
[ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG=" (to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n%s\n" "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+ printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
exit 1
}
done
printf '%s: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "%s"\n' "$0" "$PUB_ID_FILE" >&2
GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\""
}
if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
fi
-while test "$#" -gt 0
+while getopts "i:o:p:F:fnsh?" OPT
do
- [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0"
+ case "$OPT" in
+ i)
+ [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && {
+ printf '\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n' "$0"
usage
- }
-
- OPT= OPTARG=
- # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
- case "$1" in
- -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
- OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)"
- OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)"
- shift
- ;;
- -o|-p)
- OPT="$1"
- OPTARG="$2"
- shift 2
- ;;
- -i)
- OPT="$1"
- test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || {
- OPTARG="$2"
- shift
}
- shift
- ;;
- -f|-n|-h|-\?)
- OPT="$1"
- OPTARG=
- shift
- ;;
- --)
- shift
- while test "$#" -gt 0
- do
- SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
- shift
- done
- break
- ;;
- -*)
- printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1"
- usage
- ;;
- *)
- SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'"
- shift
- continue
- ;;
- esac
-
- case "$OPT" in
- -i)
SEEN_OPT_I="yes"
use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}"
;;
- -o|-p)
- SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'"
+ o|p|F)
+ SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }-$OPT '$(quote "${OPTARG}")'"
;;
- -f)
+ f)
FORCED=1
;;
- -n)
+ n)
DRY_RUN=1
;;
- -h|-\?)
+ s)
+ SFTP=sftp
+ ;;
+ h|\?)
usage
;;
esac
done
-
-eval set -- "$SAVEARGS"
+#shift all args to keep only USER_HOST
+shift $((OPTIND-1))
if [ $# = 0 ] ; then
usage
fi
if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments. Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2
usage
fi
# drop trailing colon
-USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
+USER_HOST="$*"
# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then
use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE"
fi
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then
printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2
exit 1
fi
+# filter_ids()
+# tries to log in using the keys piped to it, and filters out any that work
+filter_ids() {
+ L_SUCCESS="$1"
+ L_TMP_ID_FILE="$SCRATCH_DIR"/popids_tmp_id
+ L_OUTPUT_FILE="$SCRATCH_DIR"/popids_output
+
+ # repopulate "$@" inside this function
+ eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+ while read -r ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do
+ printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+
+ # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
+ # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
+ # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
+ # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
+ $SSH -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
+ -o ControlPath=none \
+ -o LogLevel=INFO \
+ -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
+ -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit >"$L_OUTPUT_FILE" 2>&1 </dev/null
+ if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] || {
+ [ "$SFTP" ] && grep 'allows sftp connections only' "$L_OUTPUT_FILE" >/dev/null
+ # this error counts as a success if we're setting up an sftp connection
+ }
+ then
+ : > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+ else
+ grep 'Permission denied' "$L_OUTPUT_FILE" >/dev/null || {
+ sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <"$L_OUTPUT_FILE" >"$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+ cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
+ }
+ fi
+
+ cat "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+ done
+}
+
# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
populate_new_ids() {
- local L_SUCCESS="$1"
-
if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2086
NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID)
return
fi
- # repopulate "$@" inside this function
- eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
-
- umask 0177
- local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
- if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
- printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
- exit 1
- fi
- local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
- trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
- NEW_IDS=$(
- eval $GET_ID | {
- while read ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do
- printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
-
- # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
- # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
- # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
- # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
- ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
- -o ControlPath=none \
- -o LogLevel=INFO \
- -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
- -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" </dev/null
- if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] ; then
- : > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
- else
- grep 'Permission denied' "$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >/dev/null || {
- sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >"$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
- cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
- }
- fi
-
- cat "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
- done
- }
- )
- eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+ # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+ NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID | filter_ids $1)
if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then
printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
- printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2
+ printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' >&2
exit 0
fi
printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
}
-REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 |
+# installkey_sh [target_path]
+# produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
+# optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
+installkeys_sh() {
+ AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
+ AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
+
+ # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
+ # the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
+ # (hence the excessive use of semi-colons (;) )
+ # then in the command:
+ # cd to be at $HOME, just in case;
+ # the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
+ # the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
+ # and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
+ INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
+ cd;
+ umask 077;
+ mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
+ { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] ||
+ echo >> "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}" || exit 1; } &&
+ cat >> "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}" || exit 1;
+ if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ restorecon -F "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}";
+ fi
+ EOF
+ )
+
+ # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
+ printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
+}
+
+#shellcheck disable=SC2120 # the 'eval set' confuses this
+installkeys_via_sftp() {
+
+ # repopulate "$@" inside this function
+ eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+ L_KEYS=$SCRATCH_DIR/authorized_keys
+ L_SHARED_CON=$SCRATCH_DIR/master-conn
+ $SSH -f -N -M -S "$L_SHARED_CON" "$@"
+ L_CLEANUP="$SSH -S $L_SHARED_CON -O exit 'ignored' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; $SCRATCH_CLEANUP"
+ #shellcheck disable=SC2064
+ trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+ sftp -b - -o "ControlPath=$L_SHARED_CON" "ignored" <<-EOF || return 1
+ -get .ssh/authorized_keys $L_KEYS
+ EOF
+ # add a newline or create file if it's missing, same like above
+ [ -z "$(tail -1c "$L_KEYS" 2>/dev/null)" ] || echo >> "$L_KEYS"
+ # append the keys being piped in here
+ cat >> "$L_KEYS"
+ sftp -b - -o "ControlPath=$L_SHARED_CON" "ignored" <<-EOF || return 1
+ -mkdir .ssh
+ chmod 700 .ssh
+ put $L_KEYS .ssh/authorized_keys
+ chmod 600 .ssh/authorized_keys
+ EOF
+ #shellcheck disable=SC2064
+ eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap "$SCRATCH_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+}
+
+
+# create a scratch dir for any temporary files needed
+if SCRATCH_DIR=$(mktemp -d ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id.XXXXXXXXXX) &&
+ [ "$SCRATCH_DIR" ] && [ -d "$SCRATCH_DIR" ]
+then
+ chmod 0700 "$SCRATCH_DIR"
+ SCRATCH_CLEANUP="rm -rf \"$SCRATCH_DIR\""
+ #shellcheck disable=SC2064
+ trap "$SCRATCH_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+else
+ printf '%s: ERROR: failed to create required temporary directory under ~/.ssh\n' "$0" >&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+REMOTE_VERSION=$($SSH -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 |
sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
+# shellcheck disable=SC2029
case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
NetScreen*)
populate_new_ids 1
for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do
- KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1))
- printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
+ KEY_NO=$((KEY_NO + 1))
+ printf '%s\n' "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
continue
}
- [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
+ [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | $SSH -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? = 255 ] ; then
printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
else
- ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1))
+ ADDED=$((ADDED + 1))
fi
done
if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then
exit 1
fi
;;
- *)
- # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
+ dropbear*)
populate_new_ids 0
- # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
- # 'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh.
[ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
- ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
+ $SSH "$@" "$(installkeys_sh /etc/dropbear/authorized_keys)" \
|| exit 1
ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
;;
+ *)
+ # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
+ populate_new_ids 0
+ if ! [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
+ printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
+ if [ "$SFTP" ] ; then
+ #shellcheck disable=SC2119
+ installkeys_via_sftp
+ else
+ $SSH "$@" "$(installkeys_sh)"
+ fi || exit 1
+ fi
+ ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+ ;;
esac
if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
cat <<-EOF
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Would have added the following key(s):
$NEW_IDS
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
EOF
else
cat <<-EOF
Number of key(s) added: $ADDED
- Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh $SSH_OPTS"
+ Now try logging into the machine, with: "${SFTP:-ssh} $SSH_OPTS"
and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
EOF
fi
# =-=-=-=
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 b/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
index 8850cceda0a9..c141a296f77a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
@@ -1,191 +1,198 @@
.ig \" -*- nroff -*-
-Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
+Copyright (c) 1999-2020 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
..
.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-copy-id
.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Op Fl f
.Op Fl n
+.Op Fl s
.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
.Ar hostname
.Nm
.Fl h | Fl ?
.br
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a script that uses
.Xr ssh 1
to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more
fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
.Xr ssh-agent 1
this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds
the keys by appending them to the remote user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
(creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable
of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
command instead.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Use only the key(s) contained in
.Ar identity_file
(rather than looking for identities via
.Xr ssh-add 1
or in the
.Ic default_ID_file ) .
If the filename does not end in
.Pa .pub
this is added. If the filename is omitted, the
.Ic default_ID_file
is used.
.Pp
Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
.It Fl f
Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server.
This means that it does not need the private key. Of course, this can result
in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system.
.It Fl n
do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
+.It Fl s
+SFTP mode: usually the public keys are installed by executing commands on the remote side.
+With this option the user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+file will be downloaded, modified locally and uploaded with sftp.
+This option is useful if the server has restrictions on commands which can be used on the remote side.
.It Fl h , Fl ?
Print Usage summary
.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
argument, to allow one to set the port or other
.Xr ssh 1
options, respectively.
.Pp
Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
configuration file:
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.El
.Pp
Default behaviour without
.Fl i ,
is to check if
.Ql ssh-add -L
provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in
the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
.Xr ssh-add 1
when the key was loaded into your
.Xr ssh-agent 1
rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
Otherwise, if
.Xr ssh-add 1
provides no keys contents of the
.Ic default_ID_file
will be used.
.Pp
The
.Ic default_ID_file
is the most recent file that matches:
.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
(excluding those that match
.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
so if you create a key that is not the one you want
.Nm
to use, just use
.Xr touch 1
on your preferred key's
.Pa .pub
file to reinstate it as the most recent.
.Pp
.Sh EXAMPLES
If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both
the new key and old key(s) into your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
Load the new key first, without the
.Fl c
option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
.Fl A
option to allow agent forwarding:
.Pp
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client
.D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c
.D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
.D1 user@old$ logoff
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver
.Pp
now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
.Pp
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
.Pp
The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
.Pa .pub
-file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent.
+file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into your agent.
It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
all the keys that you have in your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
.Xr ssh-agent 1
as you prefer.
.Pp
Having mentioned
.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
.Fl c
option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
.Ar ProxyCommand
and
.Fl W
option,
to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
A web search for
.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
.Fl W
option, rather than
.Xr nc 1 ) .
.Sh "SEE ALSO"
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
index b43d8985abaf..6cd222e5a424 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
+++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@@ -1,241 +1,245 @@
# Default values for additional components
%define build_x11_askpass 1
# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation
%define sshd_gid 65
%define sshd_uid 71
# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use
%define xversion 1.2.4.1
# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1
%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0}
Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
Name: openssh
-Version: 7.9p1
+Version: 8.7p1
URL: https://www.openssh.com/
Release: 1
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz
License: BSD
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
PreReq: openssl
Obsoletes: ssh
Provides: ssh
#
# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
# building prerequisites -- stuff for
# OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
#
BuildPrereq: openssl
BuildPrereq: zlib-devel
#BuildPrereq: glibdev
#BuildPrereq: gtkdev
#BuildPrereq: gnlibsd
%package askpass
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System.
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Requires: openssh = %{version}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel
%endif
%description
Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
client and server.
%description askpass
Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
%changelog
+* Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller <djm@mindrto.org>
+- Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page.
* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check
* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH
* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Updated for new location
- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
/var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
his released tarfile
- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
message if an SSH host key is already in place
- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Made this package correct for SuSE.
- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use make install
- Subpackages
* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Added links for slogin
- Fixed perms on manpages
* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Renamed init script
* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Back to old binary names
* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use autoconf
- New binary names
* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
%prep
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
%setup -q -a 1
%else
%setup -q
%endif
%build
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
%configure --prefix=/usr \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \
--with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
--with-pam \
--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
make
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
%configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \
--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
xmkmf -a
make
cd ..
%endif
%install
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd
install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \
$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin
%endif
%clean
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%pre
/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || :
/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
%post
/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd}
%run_permissions
%verifyscript
%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh
%preun
%stop_on_removal sshd
%postun
%restart_on_update sshd
%{insserv_cleanup}
%files
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server
%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-sk-helper
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
%files askpass
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x*
%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass
%endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/crc32.c b/crypto/openssh/crc32.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c192eb4d66da..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/crc32.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.11 2006/04/22 18:29:33 stevesk Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "crc32.h"
-
-static const u_int32_t crc32tab[] = {
- 0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xee0e612cL, 0x990951baL,
- 0x076dc419L, 0x706af48fL, 0xe963a535L, 0x9e6495a3L,
- 0x0edb8832L, 0x79dcb8a4L, 0xe0d5e91eL, 0x97d2d988L,
- 0x09b64c2bL, 0x7eb17cbdL, 0xe7b82d07L, 0x90bf1d91L,
- 0x1db71064L, 0x6ab020f2L, 0xf3b97148L, 0x84be41deL,
- 0x1adad47dL, 0x6ddde4ebL, 0xf4d4b551L, 0x83d385c7L,
- 0x136c9856L, 0x646ba8c0L, 0xfd62f97aL, 0x8a65c9ecL,
- 0x14015c4fL, 0x63066cd9L, 0xfa0f3d63L, 0x8d080df5L,
- 0x3b6e20c8L, 0x4c69105eL, 0xd56041e4L, 0xa2677172L,
- 0x3c03e4d1L, 0x4b04d447L, 0xd20d85fdL, 0xa50ab56bL,
- 0x35b5a8faL, 0x42b2986cL, 0xdbbbc9d6L, 0xacbcf940L,
- 0x32d86ce3L, 0x45df5c75L, 0xdcd60dcfL, 0xabd13d59L,
- 0x26d930acL, 0x51de003aL, 0xc8d75180L, 0xbfd06116L,
- 0x21b4f4b5L, 0x56b3c423L, 0xcfba9599L, 0xb8bda50fL,
- 0x2802b89eL, 0x5f058808L, 0xc60cd9b2L, 0xb10be924L,
- 0x2f6f7c87L, 0x58684c11L, 0xc1611dabL, 0xb6662d3dL,
- 0x76dc4190L, 0x01db7106L, 0x98d220bcL, 0xefd5102aL,
- 0x71b18589L, 0x06b6b51fL, 0x9fbfe4a5L, 0xe8b8d433L,
- 0x7807c9a2L, 0x0f00f934L, 0x9609a88eL, 0xe10e9818L,
- 0x7f6a0dbbL, 0x086d3d2dL, 0x91646c97L, 0xe6635c01L,
- 0x6b6b51f4L, 0x1c6c6162L, 0x856530d8L, 0xf262004eL,
- 0x6c0695edL, 0x1b01a57bL, 0x8208f4c1L, 0xf50fc457L,
- 0x65b0d9c6L, 0x12b7e950L, 0x8bbeb8eaL, 0xfcb9887cL,
- 0x62dd1ddfL, 0x15da2d49L, 0x8cd37cf3L, 0xfbd44c65L,
- 0x4db26158L, 0x3ab551ceL, 0xa3bc0074L, 0xd4bb30e2L,
- 0x4adfa541L, 0x3dd895d7L, 0xa4d1c46dL, 0xd3d6f4fbL,
- 0x4369e96aL, 0x346ed9fcL, 0xad678846L, 0xda60b8d0L,
- 0x44042d73L, 0x33031de5L, 0xaa0a4c5fL, 0xdd0d7cc9L,
- 0x5005713cL, 0x270241aaL, 0xbe0b1010L, 0xc90c2086L,
- 0x5768b525L, 0x206f85b3L, 0xb966d409L, 0xce61e49fL,
- 0x5edef90eL, 0x29d9c998L, 0xb0d09822L, 0xc7d7a8b4L,
- 0x59b33d17L, 0x2eb40d81L, 0xb7bd5c3bL, 0xc0ba6cadL,
- 0xedb88320L, 0x9abfb3b6L, 0x03b6e20cL, 0x74b1d29aL,
- 0xead54739L, 0x9dd277afL, 0x04db2615L, 0x73dc1683L,
- 0xe3630b12L, 0x94643b84L, 0x0d6d6a3eL, 0x7a6a5aa8L,
- 0xe40ecf0bL, 0x9309ff9dL, 0x0a00ae27L, 0x7d079eb1L,
- 0xf00f9344L, 0x8708a3d2L, 0x1e01f268L, 0x6906c2feL,
- 0xf762575dL, 0x806567cbL, 0x196c3671L, 0x6e6b06e7L,
- 0xfed41b76L, 0x89d32be0L, 0x10da7a5aL, 0x67dd4accL,
- 0xf9b9df6fL, 0x8ebeeff9L, 0x17b7be43L, 0x60b08ed5L,
- 0xd6d6a3e8L, 0xa1d1937eL, 0x38d8c2c4L, 0x4fdff252L,
- 0xd1bb67f1L, 0xa6bc5767L, 0x3fb506ddL, 0x48b2364bL,
- 0xd80d2bdaL, 0xaf0a1b4cL, 0x36034af6L, 0x41047a60L,
- 0xdf60efc3L, 0xa867df55L, 0x316e8eefL, 0x4669be79L,
- 0xcb61b38cL, 0xbc66831aL, 0x256fd2a0L, 0x5268e236L,
- 0xcc0c7795L, 0xbb0b4703L, 0x220216b9L, 0x5505262fL,
- 0xc5ba3bbeL, 0xb2bd0b28L, 0x2bb45a92L, 0x5cb36a04L,
- 0xc2d7ffa7L, 0xb5d0cf31L, 0x2cd99e8bL, 0x5bdeae1dL,
- 0x9b64c2b0L, 0xec63f226L, 0x756aa39cL, 0x026d930aL,
- 0x9c0906a9L, 0xeb0e363fL, 0x72076785L, 0x05005713L,
- 0x95bf4a82L, 0xe2b87a14L, 0x7bb12baeL, 0x0cb61b38L,
- 0x92d28e9bL, 0xe5d5be0dL, 0x7cdcefb7L, 0x0bdbdf21L,
- 0x86d3d2d4L, 0xf1d4e242L, 0x68ddb3f8L, 0x1fda836eL,
- 0x81be16cdL, 0xf6b9265bL, 0x6fb077e1L, 0x18b74777L,
- 0x88085ae6L, 0xff0f6a70L, 0x66063bcaL, 0x11010b5cL,
- 0x8f659effL, 0xf862ae69L, 0x616bffd3L, 0x166ccf45L,
- 0xa00ae278L, 0xd70dd2eeL, 0x4e048354L, 0x3903b3c2L,
- 0xa7672661L, 0xd06016f7L, 0x4969474dL, 0x3e6e77dbL,
- 0xaed16a4aL, 0xd9d65adcL, 0x40df0b66L, 0x37d83bf0L,
- 0xa9bcae53L, 0xdebb9ec5L, 0x47b2cf7fL, 0x30b5ffe9L,
- 0xbdbdf21cL, 0xcabac28aL, 0x53b39330L, 0x24b4a3a6L,
- 0xbad03605L, 0xcdd70693L, 0x54de5729L, 0x23d967bfL,
- 0xb3667a2eL, 0xc4614ab8L, 0x5d681b02L, 0x2a6f2b94L,
- 0xb40bbe37L, 0xc30c8ea1L, 0x5a05df1bL, 0x2d02ef8dL
-};
-
-u_int32_t
-ssh_crc32(const u_char *buf, u_int32_t size)
-{
- u_int32_t i, crc;
-
- crc = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
- crc = crc32tab[(crc ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8);
- return crc;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/crc32.h b/crypto/openssh/crc32.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d7131aff2cb..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/crc32.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.15 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#ifndef SSH_CRC32_H
-#define SSH_CRC32_H
-u_int32_t ssh_crc32(const u_char *, u_int32_t);
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/crypto_api.h b/crypto/openssh/crypto_api.h
index 7f45bbd69e77..5c3d97eaa401 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/crypto_api.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/crypto_api.h
@@ -1,40 +1,58 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: crypto_api.h,v 1.4 2017/12/14 21:07:39 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: crypto_api.h,v 1.7 2021/01/08 02:33:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Assembled from generated headers and source files by Markus Friedl.
* Placed in the public domain.
*/
#ifndef crypto_api_h
#define crypto_api_h
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
+typedef int8_t crypto_int8;
+typedef uint8_t crypto_uint8;
+typedef int16_t crypto_int16;
+typedef uint16_t crypto_uint16;
typedef int32_t crypto_int32;
typedef uint32_t crypto_uint32;
+typedef int64_t crypto_int64;
+typedef uint64_t crypto_uint64;
#define randombytes(buf, buf_len) arc4random_buf((buf), (buf_len))
+#define small_random32() arc4random()
#define crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES 64U
int crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *,
unsigned long long);
int crypto_verify_32(const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *);
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES 64U
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32U
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES 64U
int crypto_sign_ed25519(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *,
const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *);
int crypto_sign_ed25519_open(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *,
const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *);
int crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(unsigned char *, unsigned char *);
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES 1158
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_SECRETKEYBYTES 1763
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 1039
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES 32
+
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc(unsigned char *cstr, unsigned char *k,
+ const unsigned char *pk);
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec(unsigned char *k,
+ const unsigned char *cstr, const unsigned char *sk);
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk);
+
#endif /* crypto_api_h */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/defines.h b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
index 8f4213062a9c..857abb8b1d6f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/defines.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
@@ -1,876 +1,910 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _DEFINES_H
#define _DEFINES_H
/* Constants */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
enum
{
SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */
SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */
SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */
};
# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD
# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR
# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
#endif
/*
* Cygwin doesn't really have a notion of reserved ports. It is still
* is useful on the client side so for compatibility it defines as 1024 via
* netinet/in.h inside an enum. We * don't actually want that restriction
* so we want to set that to zero, but we can't do it direct in config.h
* because it'll cause a conflicting definition the first time we include
* netinet/in.h.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
#define IPPORT_RESERVED 0
#endif
/*
* Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos)
*/
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10
# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08
# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04
# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02
# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST
#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
/*
* Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474
*/
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98
# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF
# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_LE
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_LE 0x01
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_LE */
+#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP
+# define IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP 0xa0
+#endif
+#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL
+# define IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL 0xc0
+#endif
+#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL
+# define IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL 0xe0
+#endif
#ifndef PATH_MAX
# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
# endif
#endif
#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
# ifdef PATH_MAX
# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
# else /* PATH_MAX */
# define MAXPATHLEN 64
-/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */
-# ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH
-# define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
-# endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */
# endif /* PATH_MAX */
#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX)
# define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
# define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN
# else
# define HOST_NAME_MAX 255
# endif
#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
#endif
#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
# define STDIN_FILENO 0
#endif
#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
# define STDOUT_FILENO 1
#endif
#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
# define STDERR_FILENO 2
#endif
#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
#ifdef NGROUPS
#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
#else
#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
#endif
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */
#endif
#ifndef S_IFSOCK
# define S_IFSOCK 0
#endif /* S_IFSOCK */
#ifndef S_ISDIR
# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
#endif /* S_ISDIR */
#ifndef S_ISREG
# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
#endif /* S_ISREG */
#ifndef S_ISLNK
# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
#endif /* S_ISLNK */
#ifndef S_IXUSR
# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */
# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */
# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */
# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */
# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */
# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */
# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */
# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */
# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */
# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */
# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */
# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */
# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */
#endif /* S_IXUSR */
#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
#endif
#ifndef MAP_FAILED
# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
#endif
/*
SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
*/
#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
#endif
/* Types */
/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
/* (or die trying) */
#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
typedef unsigned int u_int;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
typedef signed char int8_t;
# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
typedef short int int16_t;
# else
# error "16 bit int type not found."
# endif
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
typedef int int32_t;
# else
# error "32 bit int type not found."
# endif
#endif
/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
# else
typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
# else
# error "16 bit int type not found."
# endif
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
# else
# error "32 bit int type not found."
# endif
# endif
#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
#endif
+#if !defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LONG_LONG_MIN)
+#define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN
+#endif
+#if !defined(LLONG_MAX) && defined(LONG_LONG_MAX)
+#define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UINT32_MAX
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX) && (HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX == 0)
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+# define UINT32_MAX UINT_MAX
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
/* 64-bit types */
#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef long int int64_t;
# else
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef long long int int64_t;
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
# else
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T
typedef u_int8_t uint8_t;
typedef u_int16_t uint16_t;
typedef u_int32_t uint32_t;
typedef u_int64_t uint64_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T
typedef long long intmax_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t;
#endif
+#if SIZEOF_TIME_T == SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
+# define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX
+#else
+# define SSH_TIME_T_MAX INT_MAX
+#endif
+
#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
typedef unsigned char u_char;
# define HAVE_U_CHAR
#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
#endif
#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
typedef unsigned int size_t;
# define HAVE_SIZE_T
# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
#ifndef SIZE_MAX
#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX
#endif
#ifndef INT32_MAX
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
# define INT32_MAX INT_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 4)
# define INT32_MAX LONG_MAX
# else
# error "need INT32_MAX"
# endif
#endif
#ifndef INT64_MAX
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 8)
# define INT64_MAX INT_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 8)
# define INT64_MAX LONG_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
# define INT64_MAX LLONG_MAX
# else
# error "need INT64_MAX"
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
typedef int ssize_t;
+#define SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX
# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
typedef long clock_t;
# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
typedef int sa_family_t;
# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
typedef int pid_t;
# define HAVE_PID_T
#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
typedef int sig_atomic_t;
# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
typedef int mode_t;
# define HAVE_MODE_T
#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
# define ss_family __ss_family
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
struct sockaddr_un {
short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
};
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
typedef u_int16_t in_port_t;
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
struct winsize {
unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */
unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */
unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */
unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */
};
#endif
/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */
#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK
typedef unsigned long int fd_mask;
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0
# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0
# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
#endif
/* Paths */
#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
#endif
#ifdef USER_PATH
# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
# undef _PATH_STDPATH
# endif
# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
#endif
#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
# define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
#endif
/* user may have set a different path */
#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
# undef _PATH_MAILDIR
#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
#endif
/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
# ifdef __hpux
# define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
# else
# define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
# endif
#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
#ifndef _PATH_TTY
# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
#endif
/* Macros */
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
#endif
#ifndef MAX
# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
#endif
#ifndef roundup
# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
#endif
#ifndef timersub
#define timersub(a, b, result) \
do { \
(result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \
(result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \
if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \
--(result)->tv_sec; \
(result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \
} \
} while (0)
#endif
#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \
(ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \
(ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \
}
#endif
#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \
(tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \
(tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \
}
#endif
#ifndef timespeccmp
#define timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp) \
(((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ? \
((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) : \
((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec))
#endif
#ifndef __P
# define __P(x) x
#endif
#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
(((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
# define __attribute__(x)
#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
# define __sentinel__
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
# define __nonnull__(x)
#endif
#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
#endif
#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
#define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
#endif
/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
#ifndef CMSG_LEN
#define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
#endif
/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
#define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
#endif
/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
#ifndef CMSG_DATA
#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
/*
* RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
* an empty list for some reasons.
*/
#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
(struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
(struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
#endif
/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
# define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
# define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
# undef getopt
# undef opterr
# undef optind
# undef optopt
# undef optreset
# undef optarg
# define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
# define opterr BSDopterr
# define optind BSDoptind
# define optopt BSDoptopt
# define optreset BSDoptreset
# define optarg BSDoptarg
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0
# define AI_NUMERICSERV 0
# endif
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
# include <unistd.h>
# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
#endif
#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#endif
#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
# define __func__ __FUNCTION__
#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
# define __func__ ""
#endif
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
# define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
#endif
/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
#else
# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
#endif
#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */
#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
#else
# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
#endif
#if defined(__Lynx__)
/*
* LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
* it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
*/
# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
/* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
int mkstemp (char *);
char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
int seteuid (uid_t);
int setegid (gid_t);
char *mkdtemp (char *);
int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
#endif
/*
* Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
* client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
*
* configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
* but you may need to set it yourself
*/
/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
/**
** login recorder definitions
**/
/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
#ifndef UTMP_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_UTMP
# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
# else
# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef WTMP_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_WTMP
# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
# else
# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
# else
# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
# define USE_SHADOW
#endif
/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
# define USE_LOGIN
#else
/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
# if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
# define USE_UTMPX
# endif
# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
# define USE_UTMP
# endif
# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
# define USE_WTMPX
# endif
# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
# define USE_WTMP
# endif
#endif
#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
# define UT_LINESIZE 8
#endif
/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
# define USE_LASTLOG
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
# ifdef USE_SHADOW
# undef USE_SHADOW
# endif
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
# define USE_LIBIAF
#endif
/* HP-UX 11.11 */
#ifdef BTMP_FILE
# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
#endif
#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
#endif
/** end of login recorder definitions */
#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
-# undef HAVE_MMAP
-#endif
-
#ifndef IOV_MAX
# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
# define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX
# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
# define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX
# else
# define IOV_MAX 16
# endif
#endif
#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
#endif
#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */
#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
#endif
#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
#endif
/*
* We want functions in openbsd-compat, if enabled, to override system ones.
* We no-op out the weak symbol definition rather than remove it to reduce
- * future sync problems.
+ * future sync problems. Some compilers (eg Unixware) do not allow an
+ * empty statement, so we use a bogus function declaration.
*/
-#define DEF_WEAK(x)
+#define DEF_WEAK(x) void __ssh_compat_weak_##x(void)
/*
* Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
* shouldn't need the latter.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
!defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
# define arc4random_stir()
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
# define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
# endif
#endif
#ifndef __predict_true
# if defined(__GNUC__) && \
((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96)))
# define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1)
# define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0)
# else
# define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# endif /* gcc version */
#endif /* __predict_true */
#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \
defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
!defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
# define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
#endif
+/*
+ * sntrup761 uses variable length arrays and c99-style declarations after code,
+ * so only enable if the compiler supports them.
+ */
+#if defined(VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS) && defined(VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE)
+# define USE_SNTRUP761X25519 1
+#endif
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.c b/crypto/openssh/dh.c
index 657b32da3d98..ce2eb4725e65 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.c
@@ -1,492 +1,505 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.68 2018/09/17 15:40:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.74 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
#include "dh.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+static const char *moduli_filename;
+
+void dh_set_moduli_file(const char *filename)
+{
+ moduli_filename = filename;
+}
+
+static const char * get_moduli_filename(void)
+{
+ return moduli_filename ? moduli_filename : _PATH_DH_MODULI;
+}
+
static int
parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
{
char *cp, *arg;
char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
const char *errstr = NULL;
long long n;
dhg->p = dhg->g = NULL;
cp = line;
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace */
if (*arg == '\0')
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
return 0;
/* time */
if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
goto truncated;
arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */
if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
goto truncated;
/* Ensure this is a safe prime */
n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE) {
error("moduli:%d: type is not %d", linenum, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE);
goto fail;
}
arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */
if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
goto truncated;
/* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */
n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL ||
(n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE)) {
error("moduli:%d: invalid moduli tests flag", linenum);
goto fail;
}
arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */
if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
goto truncated;
n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL || n == 0) {
error("moduli:%d: invalid primality trial count", linenum);
goto fail;
}
strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */
if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' ||
(dhg->size = (int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 ||
errstr) {
error("moduli:%d: invalid prime length", linenum);
goto fail;
}
/* The whole group is one bit larger */
dhg->size++;
gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */
if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0')
goto truncated;
prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */
if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') {
truncated:
error("moduli:%d: truncated", linenum);
goto fail;
}
if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
error("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
goto fail;
}
if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) {
error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum);
goto fail;
}
if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) {
error("moduli:%d: could not parse prime value", linenum);
goto fail;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) {
error("moduli:%d: prime has wrong size: actual %d listed %d",
linenum, BN_num_bits(dhg->p), dhg->size - 1);
goto fail;
}
if (BN_cmp(dhg->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum);
goto fail;
}
return 1;
fail:
BN_clear_free(dhg->g);
BN_clear_free(dhg->p);
dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL;
return 0;
}
DH *
choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
struct dhgroup dhg;
- if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
+ if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
+ get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
}
linenum = 0;
best = bestcount = 0;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
continue;
BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min)
continue;
if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) ||
(dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) {
best = dhg.size;
bestcount = 0;
}
if (dhg.size == best)
bestcount++;
}
free(line);
line = NULL;
linesize = 0;
rewind(f);
if (bestcount == 0) {
fclose(f);
- logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_MODULI);
+ logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s",
+ get_moduli_filename());
return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
}
which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
linenum = 0;
bestcount = 0;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
continue;
if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
dhg.size != best ||
bestcount++ != which) {
BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
continue;
}
break;
}
free(line);
line = NULL;
fclose(f);
if (bestcount != which + 1) {
logit("WARNING: selected prime disappeared in %s, giving up",
- _PATH_DH_MODULI);
+ get_moduli_filename());
return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
}
return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
}
/* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
int
dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
{
int i;
int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
int bits_set = 0;
BIGNUM *tmp;
const BIGNUM *dh_p;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) {
logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
return 0;
}
if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) { /* pub_exp <= 1 */
logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1");
return 0;
}
if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ error_f("BN_new failed");
return 0;
}
if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh_p, BN_value_one()) ||
BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */
BN_clear_free(tmp);
logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
return 0;
}
BN_clear_free(tmp);
for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
bits_set++;
debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p));
/*
* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial
*/
if (bits_set < 4) {
logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)",
- bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p));
+ bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p));
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int
dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
{
int pbits;
const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
(pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (need < 256)
need = 256;
/*
* Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
* so double requested need here.
*/
if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return 0;
}
DH *
dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
{
DH *dh;
BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (BN_hex2bn(&dh_p, modulus) == 0 ||
BN_hex2bn(&dh_g, gen) == 0)
goto fail;
if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g))
goto fail;
return dh;
fail:
DH_free(dh);
BN_clear_free(dh_p);
BN_clear_free(dh_g);
return NULL;
}
/*
* This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange
* value.
*/
DH *
dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
{
DH *dh;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen)) {
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
return dh;
}
/* rfc2409 "Second Oakley Group" (1024 bits) */
DH *
dh_new_group1(void)
{
static char *gen = "2", *group1 =
"FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
"29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
"EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
"E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
"EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381"
"FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1));
}
/* rfc3526 group 14 "2048-bit MODP Group" */
DH *
dh_new_group14(void)
{
static char *gen = "2", *group14 =
"FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
"29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
"EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
"E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
"EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
"C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
"83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
"670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
"E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
"DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
"15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14));
}
/* rfc3526 group 16 "4096-bit MODP Group" */
DH *
dh_new_group16(void)
{
static char *gen = "2", *group16 =
"FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
"29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
"EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
"E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
"EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
"C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
"83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
"670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
"E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
"DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
"15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64"
"ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7"
"ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B"
"F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C"
"BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31"
"43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7"
"88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA"
"2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6"
"287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED"
"1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9"
"93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199"
"FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16));
}
/* rfc3526 group 18 "8192-bit MODP Group" */
DH *
dh_new_group18(void)
{
- static char *gen = "2", *group16 =
+ static char *gen = "2", *group18 =
"FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
"29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
"EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
"E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
"EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
"C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
"83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
"670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
"E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
"DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
"15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64"
"ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7"
"ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B"
"F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C"
"BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31"
"43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7"
"88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA"
"2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6"
"287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED"
"1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9"
"93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34028492"
"36C3FAB4" "D27C7026" "C1D4DCB2" "602646DE" "C9751E76" "3DBA37BD"
"F8FF9406" "AD9E530E" "E5DB382F" "413001AE" "B06A53ED" "9027D831"
"179727B0" "865A8918" "DA3EDBEB" "CF9B14ED" "44CE6CBA" "CED4BB1B"
"DB7F1447" "E6CC254B" "33205151" "2BD7AF42" "6FB8F401" "378CD2BF"
"5983CA01" "C64B92EC" "F032EA15" "D1721D03" "F482D7CE" "6E74FEF6"
"D55E702F" "46980C82" "B5A84031" "900B1C9E" "59E7C97F" "BEC7E8F3"
"23A97A7E" "36CC88BE" "0F1D45B7" "FF585AC5" "4BD407B2" "2B4154AA"
"CC8F6D7E" "BF48E1D8" "14CC5ED2" "0F8037E0" "A79715EE" "F29BE328"
"06A1D58B" "B7C5DA76" "F550AA3D" "8A1FBFF0" "EB19CCB1" "A313D55C"
"DA56C9EC" "2EF29632" "387FE8D7" "6E3C0468" "043E8F66" "3F4860EE"
"12BF2D5B" "0B7474D6" "E694F91E" "6DBE1159" "74A3926F" "12FEE5E4"
"38777CB6" "A932DF8C" "D8BEC4D0" "73B931BA" "3BC832B6" "8D9DD300"
"741FA7BF" "8AFC47ED" "2576F693" "6BA42466" "3AAB639C" "5AE4F568"
"3423B474" "2BF1C978" "238F16CB" "E39D652D" "E3FDB8BE" "FC848AD9"
"22222E04" "A4037C07" "13EB57A8" "1A23F0C7" "3473FC64" "6CEA306B"
"4BCBC886" "2F8385DD" "FA9D4B7F" "A2C087E8" "79683303" "ED5BDD3A"
"062B3CF5" "B3A278A6" "6D2A13F8" "3F44F82D" "DF310EE0" "74AB6A36"
"4597E899" "A0255DC1" "64F31CC5" "0846851D" "F9AB4819" "5DED7EA1"
"B1D510BD" "7EE74D73" "FAF36BC3" "1ECFA268" "359046F4" "EB879F92"
"4009438B" "481C6CD7" "889A002E" "D5EE382B" "C9190DA6" "FC026E47"
"9558E447" "5677E9AA" "9E3050E2" "765694DF" "C81F56E8" "80B96E71"
"60C980DD" "98EDD3DF" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
- return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16));
+ return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group18));
}
/* Select fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read. */
DH *
dh_new_group_fallback(int max)
{
- debug3("%s: requested max size %d", __func__, max);
+ debug3_f("requested max size %d", max);
if (max < 3072) {
debug3("using 2k bit group 14");
return dh_new_group14();
} else if (max < 6144) {
debug3("using 4k bit group 16");
return dh_new_group16();
}
debug3("using 8k bit group 18");
return dh_new_group18();
}
/*
* Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
* attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).
* Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
* Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value
* from RFC4419 section 3.
*/
u_int
dh_estimate(int bits)
{
if (bits <= 112)
return 2048;
if (bits <= 128)
return 3072;
if (bits <= 192)
return 7680;
return 8192;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.h b/crypto/openssh/dh.h
index 344b29e356ce..c6326a39d532 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.h
@@ -1,80 +1,84 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.15 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.19 2021/03/12 04:08:19 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef DH_H
#define DH_H
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
struct dhgroup {
int size;
BIGNUM *g;
BIGNUM *p;
};
DH *choose_dh(int, int, int);
DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
DH *dh_new_group1(void);
DH *dh_new_group14(void);
DH *dh_new_group16(void);
DH *dh_new_group18(void);
DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int);
int dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
u_int dh_estimate(int);
+void dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
/*
* Max value from RFC4419.
- * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+ * Min value from RFC8270.
*/
#define DH_GRP_MIN 2048
#define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
/*
* Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
* Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
*/
#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0)
#define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1)
#define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE (2)
#define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR (3)
#define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN (4)
#define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG (5)
/*
* Values for "tests" field of moduli(5)
* Specifies the methods used in checking for primality.
* Usually, more than one test is used.
*/
#define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED (0x00)
#define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE (0x01)
#define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE (0x02)
#define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN (0x04)
#define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI (0x08)
#define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC (0x10)
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-#endif
+#endif /* DH_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c b/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c
index c2b0b2403d11..86a1dbf291a8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c
@@ -1,254 +1,257 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.6 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.7 2020/02/26 13:40:09 jsg Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
* Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if 0
#include <md5.h>
#include <rmd160.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA1_H
#include <sha1.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
#include <sha2.h>
#endif
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx);
typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen);
typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx);
struct ssh_digest_ctx {
int alg;
void *mdctx;
};
struct ssh_digest {
int id;
const char *name;
size_t block_len;
size_t digest_len;
size_t ctx_len;
md_init_fn *md_init;
md_update_fn *md_update;
md_final_fn *md_final;
};
/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = {
{
SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
"MD5",
MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
sizeof(MD5_CTX),
(md_init_fn *) MD5Init,
(md_update_fn *) MD5Update,
(md_final_fn *) MD5Final
},
{
SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
"SHA1",
SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH,
SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH,
sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
(md_init_fn *) SHA1Init,
(md_update_fn *) SHA1Update,
(md_final_fn *) SHA1Final
},
{
SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
"SHA256",
SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH,
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) SHA256_Init,
- (md_update_fn *) SHA256_Update,
- (md_final_fn *) SHA256_Final
+ sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) SHA256Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) SHA256Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) SHA256Final
},
{
SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,
"SHA384",
SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH,
SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(SHA384_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) SHA384_Init,
- (md_update_fn *) SHA384_Update,
- (md_final_fn *) SHA384_Final
+ sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) SHA384Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) SHA384Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) SHA384Final
},
{
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,
"SHA512",
SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH,
SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
- (md_init_fn *) SHA512_Init,
- (md_update_fn *) SHA512_Update,
- (md_final_fn *) SHA512_Final
+ sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+ (md_init_fn *) SHA512Init,
+ (md_update_fn *) SHA512Update,
+ (md_final_fn *) SHA512Final
}
};
static const struct ssh_digest *
ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
{
if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
return NULL;
if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
return NULL;
return &(digests[alg]);
}
int
ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
int alg;
for (alg = 0; alg < SSH_DIGEST_MAX; alg++) {
if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
return digests[alg].id;
}
return -1;
}
const char *
ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
}
size_t
ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
}
size_t
ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len;
}
struct ssh_digest_ctx *
ssh_digest_start(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret->alg = alg;
digest->md_init(ret->mdctx);
return ret;
}
int
ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg);
if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
if (digest == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen);
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
}
int
ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
if (digest == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx);
return 0;
}
void
ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest;
if (ctx != NULL) {
digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
if (digest) {
explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
free(ctx->mdctx);
- explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
- free(ctx);
+ freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
}
}
}
int
ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
if (ctx == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
}
#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c b/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
index da7ed72bccbb..e073a807b148 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/digest-openssl.c
@@ -1,206 +1,207 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.7 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.9 2020/10/29 02:52:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
-# define EVP_ripemd160 NULL
-#endif /* HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
# define EVP_sha256 NULL
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA384
# define EVP_sha384 NULL
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA512
# define EVP_sha512 NULL
-#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
+#endif
struct ssh_digest_ctx {
int alg;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
};
struct ssh_digest {
int id;
const char *name;
size_t digest_len;
const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void);
};
/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 },
- { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 },
- { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 },
- { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 },
+ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 },
{ -1, NULL, 0, NULL },
};
static const struct ssh_digest *
ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
{
if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
return NULL;
if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
return NULL;
if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL)
return NULL;
return &(digests[alg]);
}
int
ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
int alg;
for (alg = 0; digests[alg].id != -1; alg++) {
if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
return digests[alg].id;
}
return -1;
}
const char *
ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
}
size_t
ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
}
size_t
ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx);
}
struct ssh_digest_ctx *
ssh_digest_start(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
return NULL;
ret->alg = alg;
if ((ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
ssh_digest_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int
ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
{
if (from->alg != to->alg)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
{
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
}
int
ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
u_int l = dlen;
if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
void
ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
}
int
ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
u_int mdlen;
if (digest == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
mdlen = dlen;
if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
index 0b3ea614e150..6e4c501e0573 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
@@ -1,135 +1,135 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.31 2017/05/31 07:00:13 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.32 2019/01/19 21:33:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
int
dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
return 0;
}
int
dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
return 0;
}
void
ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++)
ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt;
}
void
ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn)
{
u_int i;
for (i = from; i <= to; i++) {
if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX)
break;
ssh->dispatch[i] = fn;
}
}
void
ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
{
ssh->dispatch[type] = fn;
}
int
ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done)
{
int r;
u_char type;
u_int32_t seqnr;
for (;;) {
if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) {
r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
if (r != 0)
return r;
} else {
r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE)
return 0;
}
if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) {
debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type);
ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--;
continue;
}
r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh);
if (r != 0)
return r;
} else {
r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
if (r != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
}
if (done != NULL && *done)
return 0;
}
}
void
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done)
{
int r;
if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
index 17a6f3db6338..a22d7749febb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
@@ -1,56 +1,49 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.14 2017/05/31 07:00:13 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.15 2019/01/19 21:45:31 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef DISPATCH_H
#define DISPATCH_H
#define DISPATCH_MAX 255
enum {
DISPATCH_BLOCK,
DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
};
struct ssh;
typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *, dispatch_fn *);
void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *, int, dispatch_fn *);
void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *, u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *);
void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *);
-#define dispatch_init(dflt) \
- ssh_dispatch_init(active_state, (dflt))
-#define dispatch_range(from, to, fn) \
- ssh_dispatch_range(active_state, (from), (to), (fn))
-#define dispatch_set(type, fn) \
- ssh_dispatch_set(active_state, (type), (fn))
-
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.c b/crypto/openssh/dns.c
index ff1a2c41c29d..1cfc38e7cc43 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dns.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.c
@@ -1,356 +1,340 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.38 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.41 2021/07/19 03:13:28 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "digest.h"
static const char *errset_text[] = {
"success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */
"out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */
"general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */
"invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */
"name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */
"data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */
};
static const char *
dns_result_totext(unsigned int res)
{
switch (res) {
case ERRSET_SUCCESS:
return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS];
case ERRSET_NOMEMORY:
return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY];
case ERRSET_FAIL:
return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL];
case ERRSET_INVAL:
return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL];
case ERRSET_NONAME:
return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME];
case ERRSET_NODATA:
return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA];
default:
return "unknown error";
}
}
/*
* Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer.
+ * Caller must free digest which is allocated by sshkey_fingerprint_raw().
*/
static int
dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key)
{
int r, success = 0;
int fp_alg = -1;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
break;
case KEY_XMSS:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_XMSS;
- if (!*digest_type)
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256;
break;
default:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */
- *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
}
switch (*digest_type) {
case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1:
fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
break;
case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256:
fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
break;
default:
*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
}
if (*algorithm && *digest_type) {
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest,
digest_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint_raw: %s", __func__,
- ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_fingerprint_raw");
success = 1;
} else {
*digest = NULL;
*digest_len = 0;
- success = 0;
}
return success;
}
/*
* Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer.
*/
static int
dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len)
{
int success = 0;
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED;
*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
if (rdata_len >= 2) {
*algorithm = rdata[0];
*digest_type = rdata[1];
*digest_len = rdata_len - 2;
if (*digest_len > 0) {
*digest = xmalloc(*digest_len);
memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len);
} else {
*digest = (u_char *)xstrdup("");
}
success = 1;
}
return success;
}
/*
* Check if hostname is numerical.
* Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise
*/
static int
is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
/*
* We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error
* and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing.
*/
if (hostname == NULL) {
error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname");
return -1;
}
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
freeaddrinfo(ai);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS.
* Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise
*/
int
verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags)
{
u_int counter;
int result;
struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
- u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
u_char *hostkey_digest;
size_t hostkey_digest_len;
u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm;
u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type;
u_char *dnskey_digest;
size_t dnskey_digest_len;
*flags = 0;
debug3("verify_host_key_dns");
if (hostkey == NULL)
fatal("No key to look up!");
if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) {
debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname");
return -1;
}
result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
if (result) {
verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
return -1;
}
if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) {
*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE;
debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS",
fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
} else {
debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS",
fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
}
- /* Initialize default host key parameters */
- if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type,
- &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
- error("Error calculating host key fingerprint.");
- freerrset(fingerprints);
- return -1;
- }
-
if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas)
*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND;
for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) {
/*
* Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly
* formatted fingerprints.
*/
if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type,
&dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len,
fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data,
fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) {
verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS.");
continue;
}
-
- if (hostkey_digest_type != dnskey_digest_type) {
- hostkey_digest_type = dnskey_digest_type;
- free(hostkey_digest);
-
- /* Initialize host key parameters */
- if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm,
- &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest,
- &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
- error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
- freerrset(fingerprints);
- return -1;
- }
+ debug3_f("checking SSHFP type %d fptype %d", dnskey_algorithm,
+ dnskey_digest_type);
+
+ /* Calculate host key fingerprint. */
+ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type,
+ &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+ error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+ freerrset(fingerprints);
+ return -1;
}
/* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */
if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm &&
- hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) {
- if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len &&
- timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest,
- hostkey_digest_len) == 0)
+ hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len) {
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest,
+ hostkey_digest_len) == 0) {
+ debug_f("matched SSHFP type %d fptype %d",
+ dnskey_algorithm, dnskey_digest_type);
*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH;
+ } else {
+ debug_f("failed SSHFP type %d fptype %d",
+ dnskey_algorithm, dnskey_digest_type);
+ *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
}
free(dnskey_digest);
+ free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
}
- free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
freerrset(fingerprints);
+ /* If any fingerprint failed to validate, return failure. */
+ if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FAILED)
+ *flags &= ~DNS_VERIFY_MATCH;
+
if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND)
if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH)
debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
else
debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
else
debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS");
return 0;
}
/*
* Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record
*/
int
export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic)
{
u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0;
u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
u_int8_t dtype;
u_char *rdata_digest;
size_t i, rdata_digest_len;
int success = 0;
for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) {
rdata_digest_type = dtype;
if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
&rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) {
if (generic) {
fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ",
hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP,
2 + rdata_digest_len,
rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
} else {
fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname,
rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
}
for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++)
fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]);
fprintf(f, "\n");
free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
success = 1;
}
}
/* No SSHFP record was generated at all */
if (success == 0) {
- error("%s: unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type", __func__);
+ error_f("unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type");
}
return success;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.h b/crypto/openssh/dns.h
index 91f3c632dd1b..c9b61c4f28f8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dns.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.h
@@ -1,58 +1,59 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.18 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.19 2021/07/19 03:13:28 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef DNS_H
#define DNS_H
enum sshfp_types {
SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0,
SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1,
SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2,
SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3,
SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4,
SSHFP_KEY_XMSS = 5
};
enum sshfp_hashes {
SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0,
SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1,
SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2,
SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3
};
#define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1
#define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44
#define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001
#define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002
#define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004
+#define DNS_VERIFY_FAILED 0x00000008
int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *,
struct sshkey *, int *);
int export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int);
#endif /* DNS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/entropy.c b/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
index c178c00cf61c..a4088e43cdf8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
@@ -1,250 +1,143 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
+
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-# include <sys/un.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
* If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
* /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
* PRNGd.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
-
-/*
- * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
- * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
- * 'socket_path'.
- * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
- * supplied.
- * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
- */
-int
-get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
- unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
-{
- int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
- u_char msg[2];
- struct sockaddr_storage addr;
- struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
- struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
- mysig_t old_sigpipe;
-
- /* Sanity checks */
- if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
- fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
- if (socket_path != NULL &&
- strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
- fatal("Random pool path is too long");
- if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
- fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
-
- memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
-
- if (tcp_port != 0) {
- addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
- addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
- addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
- addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
- } else {
- addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
- sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
- addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
- strlen(socket_path) + 1;
- }
-
- old_sigpipe = signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-
- errors = 0;
- rval = -1;
-reopen:
- fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (fd == -1) {
- error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
- if (tcp_port != 0) {
- error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
- tcp_port, strerror(errno));
- } else {
- error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
- addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
- }
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
- msg[0] = 0x02;
- msg[1] = len;
-
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
- if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
- close(fd);
- errors++;
- goto reopen;
- }
- error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
- if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
- close(fd);
- errors++;
- goto reopen;
- }
- error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- goto done;
- }
-
- rval = 0;
-done:
- signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
- if (fd != -1)
- close(fd);
- return rval;
-}
-
-static int
-seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
-{
-#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
- debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
- if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
- return 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
- debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
- if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
- return 0;
-#endif
- return -1;
-}
-
void
rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
size_t len = sizeof(buf);
int r;
if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) {
error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
ERR_get_error());
len = 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, buf, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
void
rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m)
{
- u_char *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *buf = NULL;
size_t len = 0;
int r;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &buf, &len)) != 0
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &buf, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len);
+ debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %lu bytes",
+ (unsigned long)len);
RAND_add(buf, len, len);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
void
seed_rng(void)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
-#endif
- if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
+
+ /* Initialise libcrypto */
+ ssh_libcrypto_init();
+
+ if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+ OpenSSL_version_num()))
fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+ "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+ OpenSSL_version_num());
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ if (RAND_status() == 1)
debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
- return;
+ else {
+ if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+ fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
+ RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
}
-
- if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
- fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
- memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
-
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+
if (RAND_status() != 1)
fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+
+ /* Ensure arc4random() is primed */
+ arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-/* Handled in arc4random() */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Actual initialisation is handled in arc4random() */
void
seed_rng(void)
{
+ unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+
+ /* Ensure arc4random() is primed */
+ arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/fatal.c b/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
index 5e5aa3fe18df..16fbd320467a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
@@ -1,45 +1,46 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.11 2020/10/19 08:07:08 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "log.h"
/* Fatal messages. This function never returns. */
void
-fatal(const char *fmt,...)
+sshfatal(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+ LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+ sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/freebsd-configure.sh b/crypto/openssh/freebsd-configure.sh
index d89d536bfd6a..8df468e5eb1c 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/freebsd-configure.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/freebsd-configure.sh
@@ -1,43 +1,44 @@
#!/bin/sh
#
# $FreeBSD$
#
configure_args="
--prefix=/usr
--sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
--with-pam
--with-ssl-dir=/usr
--without-tcp-wrappers
--with-libedit
--with-ssl-engine
--without-xauth
+ --without-security-key-internal
"
set -e
openssh=$(dirname $(realpath $0))
cd $openssh
# Run autotools before we drop LOCALBASE out of PATH
(cd $openssh && libtoolize --copy && autoheader && autoconf)
# Ensure we use the correct toolchain and clean our environment
export CC=$(echo ".include <bsd.lib.mk>" | make -f /dev/stdin -VCC)
export CPP=$(echo ".include <bsd.lib.mk>" | make -f /dev/stdin -VCPP)
unset CFLAGS CPPFLAGS LDFLAGS LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBS
export PATH=/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
# Generate config.h with krb5 and stash it
sh configure $configure_args --with-kerberos5=/usr
mv config.log config.log.kerberos5
mv config.h config.h.kerberos5
# Generate config.h without krb5
sh configure $configure_args --without-kerberos5
# Extract the difference
echo '/* $Free''BSD$ */' > krb5_config.h
diff -u config.h.kerberos5 config.h |
sed -n '/^-#define/s/^-//p' |
grep -Ff /dev/stdin config.h.kerberos5 >> krb5_config.h
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
index 9e4d25521647..80d3019152c2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
@@ -1,133 +1,134 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.17 2019/03/06 22:14:23 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "log.h"
static int ngroups;
static char **groups_byname;
/*
* Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and
* supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list.
*/
int
ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
{
gid_t *groups_bygid;
int i, j, retry = 0;
struct group *gr;
if (ngroups > 0)
ga_free();
ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX;
#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)
ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX));
#endif
groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
while (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1) {
if (retry++ > 0)
fatal("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
groups_bygid = xreallocarray(groups_bygid, ngroups,
sizeof(*groups_bygid));
}
groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname));
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
free(groups_bygid);
return (ngroups = j);
}
/*
* Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
* Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
*/
int
ga_match(char * const *groups, int n)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j]))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list.
* Return 0 on negated or no match.
*/
int
ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern)
{
int i, found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
- switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], group_pattern, 0)) {
+ switch (match_usergroup_pattern_list(groups_byname[i],
+ group_pattern)) {
case -1:
return 0; /* Negated match wins */
case 0:
continue;
case 1:
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
/*
* Free memory allocated for group access list.
*/
void
ga_free(void)
{
int i;
if (ngroups > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
free(groups_byname[i]);
ngroups = 0;
free(groups_byname);
groups_byname = NULL;
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
index d56257b4a9f7..6852805171a8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
@@ -1,305 +1,302 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
/* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
int
ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
{
int r;
u_char *p;
size_t len;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
return r;
g->value = p;
g->length = len;
return 0;
}
/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
int
ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
{
return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
ctx->oid->length == len &&
memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0);
}
/* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */
void
ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
{
if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
free(ctx->oid->elements);
free(ctx->oid);
}
ctx->oid = xcalloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_desc));
ctx->oid->length = len;
ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len);
memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len);
}
/* Set the contexts OID */
void
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid)
{
ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length);
}
/* All this effort to report an error ... */
void
ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
{
char *s;
s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL);
debug("%s", s);
free(s);
}
char *
ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
OM_uint32 *minor_status)
{
OM_uint32 lmin;
gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 ctx;
struct sshbuf *b;
char *ret;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if (major_status != NULL)
*major_status = ctxt->major;
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = ctxt->minor;
ctx = 0;
/* The GSSAPI error */
do {
gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major,
GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble GSS_CODE");
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
} while (ctx != 0);
/* The mechanism specific error */
do {
gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor,
GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble MECH_CODE");
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
} while (ctx != 0);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble newline");
ret = xstrdup((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(b));
sshbuf_free(b);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all
* of the data which both the client and server need to persist across
* {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth
* stuff life is a little easier
*/
void
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
{
*ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt));
(*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
(*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
(*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
(*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
(*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
}
/* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
void
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
{
OM_uint32 ms;
if ((*ctx) == NULL)
return;
if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name);
if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
free((*ctx)->oid->elements);
free((*ctx)->oid);
(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
}
if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds);
if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
free(*ctx);
*ctx = NULL;
}
/*
* Wrapper to init_sec_context
* Requires that the context contains:
* oid
* server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name)
*/
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
{
int deleg_flag = 0;
if (deleg_creds) {
deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
debug("Delegating credentials");
}
ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
return (ctx->major);
}
/* Create a service name for the given host */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
char *val;
xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
gssbuf.value = val;
gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor,
&gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
free(gssbuf.value);
return (ctx->major);
}
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
{
if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
return (ctx->major);
}
void
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
+ const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
{
int r;
sshbuf_reset(b);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, session_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, context)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble buildmic");
}
int
ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
{
gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
(memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0))
return 0; /* false */
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
NULL);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
index ab3a15f0f1dd..b5d4bb2d18b2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
@@ -1,404 +1,404 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.31 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
{ GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
{ NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
#ifdef KRB5
extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
#endif
ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
#ifdef KRB5
&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
#endif
&gssapi_null_mech,
};
/*
* ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
* list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
*/
static gss_OID_set supported_oids;
void
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void)
{
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids);
}
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present)
{
if (supported_oids == NULL)
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present);
}
/*
* Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
* Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
*/
/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */
static OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
{
OM_uint32 status;
char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
gss_OID_set oidset;
if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (-1);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (ctx->major);
}
if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
NULL, NULL)))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (ctx->major);
} else {
ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
}
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Privileged */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
{
if (*ctx)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
}
/* Unprivileged */
void
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
{
int i = 0;
OM_uint32 min_status;
int present;
gss_OID_set supported;
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
&supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present)))
present = 0;
if (present)
gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status,
&supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
i++;
}
gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
}
/* Wrapper around accept_sec_context
* Requires that the context contains:
* oid
* credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred)
*/
/* Privileged */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_OID mech;
ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
&ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech,
send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds);
if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
if (ctx->client_creds)
debug("Received some client credentials");
else
debug("Got no client credentials");
status = ctx->major;
/* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
* we flag the user as also having been authenticated
*/
if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
(*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
}
return (status);
}
/*
* This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion
* to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism
* originally selected.
*/
static OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
{
u_char *tok;
OM_uint32 offset;
OM_uint32 oidl;
tok = ename->value;
/*
* Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
* header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
*/
if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
/*
* Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition
* and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things
* there are two lengths - the first including these, and the
* second without.
*/
oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
/*
* Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the
* string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context
*/
if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
ename->length < oidl+6 ||
!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
offset = oidl+6;
if (ename->length < offset+4)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
offset += 4;
if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
* be called once for a context */
/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
{
int i = 0;
gss_buffer_desc ename;
client->mech = NULL;
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length &&
(memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements,
ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0))
client->mech = supported_mechs[i];
i++;
}
if (client->mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
&client->displayname, NULL))) {
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
return (ctx->major);
}
if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
&ename))) {
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
return (ctx->major);
}
if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
&client->exportedname))) {
return (ctx->major);
}
/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
return (ctx->major);
}
/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
void
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
{
if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
gssapi_client.store.filename);
unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
}
}
/* As user */
void
ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
{
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
} else
debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
}
-/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
+/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
* on the passed authentication process and credentials.
*/
/* As user */
void
ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
{
if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL &&
gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) {
debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
gssapi_client.store.envval);
child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
gssapi_client.store.envval);
}
}
/* Privileged */
int
ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
OM_uint32 lmin;
if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
debug("No suitable client data");
return 0;
}
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
return 1;
else {
/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
return 0;
}
else
debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
return (0);
}
/* Privileged */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
return (ctx->major);
}
/* Privileged */
const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void)
{
if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 ||
gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL)
return NULL;
return (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value;
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hash.c b/crypto/openssh/hash.c
index 5875d41fafa7..b4f8f6c50d5e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hash.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hash.c
@@ -1,27 +1,43 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.4 2017/12/14 21:07:39 naddy Exp $ */
-
-/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.5 2018/01/13 00:24:09 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.6 2019/11/29 00:11:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Public domain. Author: Christian Weisgerber <naddy@openbsd.org>
* API compatible reimplementation of function from nacl
*/
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned long long inlen)
+{
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest(in, inlen, out, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL))
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+# include <sha2.h>
+# endif
int
crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
unsigned long long inlen)
{
- int r;
- if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, in, inlen, out,
- crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ SHA2_CTX ctx;
+
+ SHA512Init(&ctx);
+ SHA512Update(&ctx, in, inlen);
+ SHA512Final(out, &ctx);
return 0;
}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hmac.c b/crypto/openssh/hmac.c
index 1c879640cb3c..7b588019e74b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hmac.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hmac.c
@@ -1,197 +1,198 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.12 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.14 2020/02/26 13:40:09 jsg Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "hmac.h"
struct ssh_hmac_ctx {
int alg;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ictx;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *octx;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *digest;
u_char *buf;
size_t buf_len;
};
size_t
ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg)
{
return ssh_digest_bytes(alg);
}
struct ssh_hmac_ctx *
ssh_hmac_start(int alg)
{
struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ret;
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->alg = alg;
if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
(ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
(ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL)
goto fail;
ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx);
if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL)
goto fail;
return ret;
fail:
ssh_hmac_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int
ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
{
size_t i;
/* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */
if (key != NULL) {
/* truncate long keys */
if (klen <= ctx->buf_len)
memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen);
else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf,
ctx->buf_len) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36;
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c;
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
return -1;
explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
}
/* start with ictx */
if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
{
return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen);
}
int
ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b);
}
int
ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
size_t len;
len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg);
if (dlen < len ||
ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len))
return -1;
/* switch to octx */
if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
void
ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL) {
ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx);
ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx);
ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest);
if (ctx->buf) {
explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
free(ctx->buf);
}
- explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
- free(ctx);
+ freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
}
}
#ifdef TEST
/* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */
static void
hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen)
{
struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
size_t i;
u_char digest[16];
if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
printf("ssh_hmac_start failed");
if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed");
ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) {
for (i = 0; i < elen; i++)
printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]);
printf("mismatch\n");
} else
printf("ok\n");
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
/* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */
u_char key1[16] = {
0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb,
0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb };
u_char *data1 = "Hi There";
u_char dig1[16] = {
0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c,
0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d };
u_char *key2 = "Jefe";
u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?";
u_char dig2[16] = {
0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03,
0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 };
u_char key3[16];
u_char data3[50];
u_char dig3[16] = {
0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88,
0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 };
memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3));
memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3));
hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1));
hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2));
hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3));
return 0;
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
index e1f826bddc9e..ce00cd713549 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
@@ -1,834 +1,935 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.73 2018/07/16 03:09:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.91 2021/07/05 01:16:46 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "hmac.h"
-
-struct hostkeys {
- struct hostkey_entry *entries;
- u_int num_entries;
-};
+#include "sshbuf.h"
/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
static int
extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
{
char *p, *b64salt;
u_int b64len;
int ret;
if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
return (-1);
}
if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
return (-1);
}
s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
return (-1);
}
b64len = p - s;
/* Sanity check */
if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
return (-1);
}
b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
free(b64salt);
if (ret == -1) {
debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
return (-1);
}
if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) {
debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d",
ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
char *
host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
{
struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
u_char salt[256], result[256];
char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
static char encoded[1024];
u_int len;
len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
/* Create new salt */
arc4random_buf(salt, len);
} else {
/* Extract salt from known host entry */
if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
sizeof(salt)) == -1)
return (NULL);
}
if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result)))
- fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("ssh_hmac failed");
ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
__b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("__b64_ntop failed");
snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
return (encoded);
}
/*
* Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the
* pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
*/
int
hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret)
{
char *cp;
- int r;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
- if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, &cp)) != 0)
+ if (sshkey_read(ret, &cp) != 0)
return 0;
/* Skip trailing whitespace. */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Return results. */
*cpp = cp;
if (bitsp != NULL)
*bitsp = sshkey_size(ret);
return 1;
}
static HostkeyMarker
check_markers(char **cpp)
{
char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp;
int ret = MRK_NONE;
while (*cp == '@') {
/* Only one marker is allowed */
if (ret != MRK_NONE)
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Markers are terminated by whitespace */
if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL &&
(sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL)
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Extract marker for comparison */
if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker))
return MRK_ERROR;
memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp);
marker[sp - cp] = '\0';
if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0)
ret = MRK_CA;
else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0)
ret = MRK_REVOKE;
else
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */
cp = sp;
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
}
*cpp = cp;
return ret;
}
struct hostkeys *
init_hostkeys(void)
{
struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->entries = NULL;
return ret;
}
struct load_callback_ctx {
const char *host;
u_long num_loaded;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
};
static int
record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
l->path, l->linenum);
return 0;
}
- debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
+ debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
(l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries,
hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
hostkeys->entries = tmp;
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host);
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path);
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum;
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key;
l->key = NULL; /* steal it */
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker;
+ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].note = l->note;
hostkeys->num_entries++;
ctx->num_loaded++;
return 0;
}
void
-load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
+load_hostkeys_file(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host,
+ const char *path, FILE *f, u_int note)
{
int r;
struct load_callback_ctx ctx;
ctx.host = host;
ctx.num_loaded = 0;
ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys;
- if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL,
- HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach_file(path, f, record_hostkey, &ctx, host,
+ NULL, HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, note)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT)
- debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
- __func__, path, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", path);
}
if (ctx.num_loaded != 0)
- debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__,
- ctx.num_loaded, host);
+ debug3_f("loaded %lu keys from %s", ctx.num_loaded, host);
+}
+
+void
+load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path,
+ u_int note)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+ debug_f("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, host, path, f, note);
+ fclose(f);
}
void
free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
}
free(hostkeys->entries);
- explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
- free(hostkeys);
+ freezero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
}
static int
check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k)
{
int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
return -1;
- if (is_cert &&
+ if (is_cert && k != NULL &&
sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
hostkeys->entries[i].key))
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type.
*
* If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return
* HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW.
*
* If looking for a key (key != NULL):
* 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK
* 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK
* 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then
* return HOST_CHANGED
* 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW.
*
* Finally, check any found key is not revoked.
*/
static HostStatus
check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
- struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+ struct sshkey *k, int keytype, int nid, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
u_int i;
HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
if (found != NULL)
*found = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker)
continue;
if (k == NULL) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype)
continue;
+ if (nid != -1 &&
+ sshkey_type_plain(keytype) == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ hostkeys->entries[i].key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
+ continue;
end_return = HOST_FOUND;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
k = hostkeys->entries[i].key;
break;
}
if (want_cert) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
/* A matching CA exists */
end_return = HOST_OK;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
break;
}
} else {
if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
end_return = HOST_OK;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
break;
}
- /* A non-maching key exists */
+ /* A non-matching key exists */
end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
}
}
if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) {
end_return = HOST_REVOKED;
if (found != NULL)
*found = NULL;
}
return end_return;
}
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key,
const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
if (key == NULL)
fatal("no key to look up");
- return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found);
+ return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, -1, found);
}
int
-lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype,
+lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype, int nid,
const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
- return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype,
+ return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype, nid,
found) == HOST_FOUND);
}
+int
+lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+ if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int
write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
{
int r, success = 0;
char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost;
lhost = xstrdup(host);
lowercase(lhost);
if (store_hash) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
+ error_f("host_hash failed");
free(lhost);
return 0;
}
fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
} else if (ip != NULL)
fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip);
else {
fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost);
}
free(lhost);
if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
success = 1;
else
- error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_write");
fputc('\n', f);
+ /* If hashing is enabled, the IP address needs to go on its own line */
+ if (success && store_hash && ip != NULL)
+ success = write_host_entry(f, ip, NULL, key, 1);
return success;
}
+/*
+ * Create user ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't exist and we want to write to it.
+ * If notify is set, a message will be emitted if the directory is created.
+ */
+void
+hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *filename, int notify)
+{
+ char *dotsshdir = NULL, *p;
+ size_t len;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if ((p = strrchr(filename, '/')) == NULL)
+ return;
+ len = p - filename;
+ dotsshdir = tilde_expand_filename("~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR, getuid());
+ if (strlen(dotsshdir) > len || strncmp(filename, dotsshdir, len) != 0)
+ goto out; /* not ~/.ssh prefixed */
+ if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) == 0)
+ goto out; /* dir already exists */
+ else if (errno != ENOENT)
+ error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
+ else {
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(dotsshdir);
+#endif
+ if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) == -1)
+ error("Could not create directory '%.200s' (%s).",
+ dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
+ else if (notify)
+ logit("Created directory '%s'.", dotsshdir);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+ out:
+ free(dotsshdir);
+}
+
/*
* Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not
* be appended.
*/
int
add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
{
FILE *f;
int success;
if (key == NULL)
return 1; /* XXX ? */
+ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(filename, 0);
f = fopen(filename, "a");
if (!f)
return 0;
success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash);
fclose(f);
return success;
}
struct host_delete_ctx {
FILE *out;
int quiet;
- const char *host;
- int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */
+ const char *host, *ip;
+ u_int *match_keys; /* mask of HKF_MATCH_* for this key */
struct sshkey * const *keys;
size_t nkeys;
int modified;
};
static int
host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx;
int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
size_t i;
- if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
- if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
- /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
- fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
- return 0;
- }
-
+ /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
+ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED && l->marker == MRK_NONE) {
/*
* If this line contains one of the keys that we will be
* adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for
* skipping.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
- if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) {
- ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1;
- fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
- debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__,
- sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key))
+ continue;
+ ctx->match_keys[i] |= l->match;
+ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+ debug3_f("%s key already at %s:%ld",
+ sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it
* by *not* writing the line to ctx->out.
*/
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s",
ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host);
ctx->modified = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry",
ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
l->path, l->linenum);
}
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
int
hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg)
{
int r, fd, oerrno = 0;
int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
struct host_delete_ctx ctx;
char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL;
+ const char *what;
mode_t omask;
size_t i;
+ u_int want;
omask = umask(077);
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.host = host;
+ ctx.ip = ip;
ctx.quiet = quiet;
- if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL)
+
+ if ((ctx.match_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.match_keys))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
ctx.keys = keys;
ctx.nkeys = nkeys;
ctx.modified = 0;
/*
* Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion.
*/
- if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) < 0 ||
- (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) < 0) {
+ if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) == -1 ||
+ (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
- error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
+ error_f("mkstemp: %s", strerror(oerrno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
close(fd);
- error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
+ error_f("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
- /* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */
+ /* Remove stale/mismatching entries for the specified host */
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip,
- HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
- error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach");
goto fail;
}
- /* Add the requested keys */
+ /* Re-add the requested keys */
+ want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | (ip == NULL ? 0 : HKF_MATCH_IP);
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- if (ctx.skip_keys[i])
+ if ((want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
continue;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
- do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s",
- quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename,
+ /* write host/ip */
+ what = "";
+ if (ctx.match_keys[i] == 0) {
+ what = "Adding new key";
+ if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip,
+ keys[i], store_hash)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else if ((want & ~ctx.match_keys[i]) == HKF_MATCH_HOST) {
+ what = "Fixing match (hostname)";
+ if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, NULL,
+ keys[i], store_hash)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else if ((want & ~ctx.match_keys[i]) == HKF_MATCH_IP) {
+ what = "Fixing match (address)";
+ if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, ip, NULL,
+ keys[i], store_hash)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s for %s%s%s to %s: %s %s",
+ quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", what,
+ host, ip == NULL ? "" : ",", ip == NULL ? "" : ip, filename,
sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp);
free(fp);
- if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto fail;
- }
ctx.modified = 1;
}
fclose(ctx.out);
ctx.out = NULL;
if (ctx.modified) {
/* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */
if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) {
oerrno = errno;
- error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__,
- back, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("unlink %.100s: %s", back, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (link(filename, back) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
- error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__,
- filename, back, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", filename,
+ back, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
- error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__,
- temp, filename, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", temp,
+ filename, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
} else {
/* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */
if (unlink(temp) != 0)
- error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__,
- temp, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("unlink \"%s\": %s", temp, strerror(errno));
}
/* success */
r = 0;
fail:
if (temp != NULL && r != 0)
unlink(temp);
free(temp);
free(back);
if (ctx.out != NULL)
fclose(ctx.out);
- free(ctx.skip_keys);
+ free(ctx.match_keys);
umask(omask);
if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
static int
match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed)
{
int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM;
const char *hashed_host;
size_t nlen = strlen(names);
if (was_hashed != NULL)
*was_hashed = hashed;
if (hashed) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) &&
strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0;
}
return match_hostname(host, names) == 1;
}
int
-hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
- const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options)
+hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback,
+ void *ctx, const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note)
{
- FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, ktype[128];
u_long linenum = 0;
char *cp, *cp2;
u_int kbits;
int hashed;
int s, r = 0;
struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo;
size_t linesize = 0, l;
memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path);
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
free(lineinfo.line);
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
lineinfo.path = path;
lineinfo.linenum = linenum;
lineinfo.line = xstrdup(line);
lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE;
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK;
lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+ lineinfo.note = note;
/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') {
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT;
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
}
continue;
}
if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
- verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
- __func__, path, linenum);
+ verbose_f("invalid marker at %s:%lu", path, linenum);
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0)
goto bad;
continue;
}
/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
;
lineinfo.hosts = cp;
*cp2++ = '\0';
/* Check if the host name matches. */
if (host != NULL) {
if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts,
&hashed)) == -1) {
- debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"",
- __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
+ debug2_f("%s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"",
+ path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
goto bad;
}
if (s == 1) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST |
(hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0);
}
/* Try matching IP address if supplied */
if (ip != NULL) {
if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts,
&hashed)) == -1) {
- debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash "
- "\"%.32s\"", __func__, path,
- linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
+ debug2_f("%s:%ld: bad ip hash "
+ "\"%.32s\"", path, linenum,
+ lineinfo.hosts);
goto bad;
}
if (s == 1) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP |
(hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0);
}
}
/*
* Skip this line if host matching requested and
* neither host nor address matched.
*/
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 &&
lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED)
continue;
}
/* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */
for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
;
if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type",
path, linenum);
goto bad;
}
lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2;
if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) {
/*
* Extract the key from the line. This will skip
* any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted
* lines.
*/
if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshkey_new failed");
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
}
if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) {
goto bad;
}
lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type;
lineinfo.comment = cp;
} else {
/* Extract and parse key type */
l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t");
if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) ||
lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0')
goto bad;
memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l);
ktype[l] = '\0';
lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
/*
* Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short
* decimal number.
*/
if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 &&
strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l)
goto bad;
/*
* Check that something other than whitespace follows
* the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but
* it does catch trivial truncation.
*/
cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */
for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
;
if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type",
path, linenum);
lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
}
if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
bad:
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
lineinfo.key = NULL;
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
continue;
}
}
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
}
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
free(lineinfo.line);
free(line);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+ const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ int r, oerrno;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+ debug3_f("reading file \"%s\"", path);
+ r = hostkeys_foreach_file(path, f, callback, ctx, host, ip,
+ options, note);
+ oerrno = errno;
fclose(f);
+ errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
index bd2104373f82..a24a4e329059 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
@@ -1,108 +1,123 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.24 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.29 2021/01/26 00:51:30 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef HOSTFILE_H
#define HOSTFILE_H
typedef enum {
HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND
} HostStatus;
typedef enum {
MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA
} HostkeyMarker;
struct hostkey_entry {
char *host;
char *file;
u_long line;
struct sshkey *key;
HostkeyMarker marker;
+ u_int note; /* caller-specific note/flag */
+};
+struct hostkeys {
+ struct hostkey_entry *entries;
+ u_int num_entries;
};
-struct hostkeys;
struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void);
-void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *);
+void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *,
+ const char *, u_int);
+void load_hostkeys_file(struct hostkeys *, const char *,
+ const char *, FILE *, u_int note);
void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *);
HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *,
const struct hostkey_entry **);
-int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
+int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int, int,
const struct hostkey_entry **);
+int lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, int);
int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
const struct sshkey *, int);
int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename,
const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys,
int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg);
#define HASH_MAGIC "|1|"
#define HASH_DELIM '|'
#define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority"
#define REVOKE_MARKER "@revoked"
char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int);
/*
* Iterate through a hostkeys file, optionally parsing keys and matching
* hostnames. Allows access to the raw keyfile lines to allow
* streaming edits to the file to take place.
*/
#define HKF_WANT_MATCH (1) /* return only matching hosts/addrs */
#define HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY (1<<1) /* need key parsed */
#define HKF_STATUS_OK 0 /* Line parsed, didn't match host */
#define HKF_STATUS_INVALID 1 /* line had parse error */
#define HKF_STATUS_COMMENT 2 /* valid line contained no key */
#define HKF_STATUS_MATCHED 3 /* hostname or IP matched */
#define HKF_MATCH_HOST (1) /* hostname matched */
#define HKF_MATCH_IP (1<<1) /* address matched */
#define HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED (1<<2) /* hostname was hashed */
#define HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED (1<<3) /* address was hashed */
/* XXX HKF_MATCH_KEY_TYPE? */
/*
* The callback function receives this as an argument for each matching
* hostkey line. The callback may "steal" the 'key' field by setting it to NULL.
* If a parse error occurred, then "hosts" and subsequent options may be NULL.
*/
struct hostkey_foreach_line {
const char *path; /* Path of file */
u_long linenum; /* Line number */
u_int status; /* One of HKF_STATUS_* */
u_int match; /* Zero or more of HKF_MATCH_* OR'd together */
char *line; /* Entire key line; mutable by callback */
int marker; /* CA/revocation markers; indicated by MRK_* value */
const char *hosts; /* Raw hosts text, may be hashed or list multiple */
const char *rawkey; /* Text of key and any comment following it */
int keytype; /* Type of key; KEY_UNSPEC for invalid/comment lines */
struct sshkey *key; /* Key, if parsed ok and HKF_WANT_MATCH_HOST set */
const char *comment; /* Any comment following the key */
+ u_int note; /* caller-specified note copied from arguments */
};
/*
* Callback fires for each line (or matching line if a HKF_WANT_* option
* is set). The foreach loop will terminate if the callback returns a non-
* zero exit status.
*/
typedef int hostkeys_foreach_fn(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *ctx);
/* Iterate over a hostkeys file */
-int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
- const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options);
+int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path,
+ hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+ const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
+ hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+ const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+
+void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/int32_minmax.inc b/crypto/openssh/int32_minmax.inc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e69de29bb2d1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
index 25f9f66f69af..709a0ec63aa0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
@@ -1,1043 +1,1379 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.141 2018/07/09 13:37:10 sf Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.168 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
+#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "version.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* prototype */
static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
"KEX algorithms",
"host key algorithms",
"ciphers ctos",
"ciphers stoc",
"MACs ctos",
"MACs stoc",
"compression ctos",
"compression stoc",
"languages ctos",
"languages stoc",
};
struct kexalg {
char *name;
u_int type;
int ec_nid;
int hash_alg;
};
static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+#ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+ { KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, 0,
+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+#endif
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
- { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ { NULL, 0, -1, -1},
};
char *
kex_alg_list(char sep)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
static const struct kexalg *
kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
return k;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Validate KEX method name list */
int
kex_names_valid(const char *names)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
free(s);
return 1;
}
/*
* Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
return strdup(b);
if (b == NULL || *b == '\0')
return strdup(a);
if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024)
return NULL;
len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2;
if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL ||
(ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
free(m);
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
}
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
free(ret);
return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
}
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
* configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
- * indicate that it should be appended to the default or '-' that the
- * specified names should be removed.
+ * indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the
+ * specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed
+ * at the head.
*/
int
kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
{
char *cp, *tmp, *patterns;
char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if (listp == NULL || *listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') {
+ if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') {
if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
list = *listp;
*listp = NULL;
if (*list == '+') {
/* Append names to default list */
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
list = tmp;
} else if (*list == '-') {
/* Remove names from default list */
- if ((*listp = match_filter_blacklist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
+ if ((*listp = match_filter_denylist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
/* filtering has already been done */
return 0;
+ } else if (*list == '^') {
+ /* Place names at head of default list */
+ if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ free(list);
+ list = tmp;
} else {
/* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */
}
/*
* The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case,
* the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list
* cases we need to do it now.
*/
ret = NULL;
if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
/* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */
while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*cp == '!') {
/* negated matches are not supported here */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
free(matching);
- if ((matching = match_filter_whitelist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
+ if ((matching = match_filter_allowlist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(ret);
ret = tmp;
}
if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') {
/* An empty name-list is an error */
/* XXX better error code? */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
/* success */
*listp = ret;
ret = NULL;
r = 0;
fail:
free(matching);
free(opatterns);
free(list);
free(ret);
return r;
}
/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
int
kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
u_int i;
int r;
sshbuf_reset(b);
/*
* add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
* kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
*/
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0)
return r;
}
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */
return r;
return 0;
}
/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
int
kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char v;
u_int i;
char **proposal = NULL;
int r;
*propp = NULL;
if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) /* skip cookie */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) { /* skip cookie */
+ error_fr(r, "consume cookie");
goto out;
+ }
/* extract kex init proposal strings */
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse proposal %u", i);
goto out;
+ }
debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]);
}
/* first kex follows / reserved */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
- (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) /* reserved */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) { /* reserved */
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto out;
+ }
if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
*first_kex_follows = v;
debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v);
debug2("reserved %u ", i);
r = 0;
*propp = proposal;
out:
if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL)
kex_prop_free(proposal);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
void
kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
{
u_int i;
if (proposal == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
free(proposal[i]);
free(proposal);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
+int
kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static void
kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
}
static int
kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
char *algs;
+ debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
goto out;
+ }
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(algs);
return r;
}
int
kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
- if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c)
+ if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0)
if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
return 0;
}
int
kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_int32_t i, ninfo;
char *name;
u_char *val;
size_t vlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) {
free(name);
return r;
}
if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
/* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
- error("%s: nul byte in %s", __func__, name);
+ error_f("nul byte in %s", name);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
- debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val);
+ debug_f("%s=<%s>", name, val);
kex->server_sig_algs = val;
val = NULL;
} else
- debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name);
+ debug_f("%s (unrecognised)", name);
free(name);
free(val);
}
return sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
}
static int
kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
+ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
free(kex->name);
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
int
kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_char *cookie;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
- if (kex == NULL)
+ if (kex == NULL) {
+ error_f("no kex");
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)
return 0;
kex->done = 0;
/* generate a random cookie */
- if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN)
+ if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) {
+ error_f("bad kex length: %zu < %d",
+ sshbuf_len(kex->my), KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL)
+ }
+ if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("buffer error");
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose reply");
return r;
+ }
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
- if (kex == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-
+ if (kex == NULL) {
+ error_f("no kex");
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
- for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "discard cookie");
return r;
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "discard proposal");
return r;
+ }
+ }
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
+ error_f("unknown kex type %u", kex->kex_type);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-int
-kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp)
+struct kex *
+kex_new(void)
{
struct kex *kex;
- int r;
- *kexp = NULL;
- if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
- (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
- goto out;
- kex->done = 0;
- kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
- r = 0;
- *kexp = kex;
- out:
- if (r != 0)
+ if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL ||
+ (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kex->client_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kex->server_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kex->session_id = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
kex_free(kex);
- return r;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return kex;
}
void
kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
{
if (newkeys == NULL)
return;
if (newkeys->enc.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
free(newkeys->enc.key);
newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
}
if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
free(newkeys->enc.iv);
newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->enc.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
free(newkeys->comp.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
if (newkeys->mac.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
free(newkeys->mac.key);
newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->mac.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
- explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
- free(newkeys);
+ freezero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
}
void
kex_free(struct kex *kex)
{
u_int mode;
+ if (kex == NULL)
+ return;
+
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH_free(kex->dh);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
sshbuf_free(kex->my);
- free(kex->session_id);
- free(kex->client_version_string);
- free(kex->server_version_string);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->client_version);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
free(kex->failed_choice);
free(kex->hostkey_alg);
free(kex->name);
free(kex);
}
+int
+kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL;
+ kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
- if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0)
+ if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */
kex_free(ssh->kex);
ssh->kex = NULL;
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error
* code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress.
*/
int
kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->kex == NULL) {
- error("%s: no kex", __func__);
+ error_f("no kex");
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (ssh->kex->done == 0) {
- error("%s: requested twice", __func__);
+ error_f("requested twice");
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssh->kex->done = 0;
return kex_send_kexinit(ssh);
}
static int
choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
enc->name = name;
enc->enabled = 0;
enc->iv = NULL;
enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
enc->key = NULL;
enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
return 0;
}
static int
choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
+ error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
mac->name = name;
mac->key = NULL;
mac->enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ } else
+#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
+ if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
+ error_f("unsupported compression scheme %s", name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
comp->name = name;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
const struct kexalg *kexalg;
k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)");
if (k->name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
- if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL)
+ if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("unsupported KEX method %s", k->name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
+ free(k->hostkey_alg);
k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s",
k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)");
if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH;
k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
- if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ error_f("unsupported hostkey algorithm %s", k->hostkey_alg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
return 0;
}
static int
proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
static int check[] = {
PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
};
int *idx;
char *p;
for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
return (0);
}
}
debug2("proposals match");
return (1);
}
static int
kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct newkeys *newkeys;
char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL;
char **cprop, **sprop;
int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
int r, first_kex_follows;
debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
goto out;
if (kex->server) {
cprop=peer;
sprop=my;
} else {
cprop=my;
sprop=peer;
}
/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
- if (kex->server) {
+ if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
char *ext;
ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
free(ext);
}
/* Algorithm Negotiation */
if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
peer[nenc] = NULL;
goto out;
}
authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
if (authlen == 0 &&
(r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac],
sprop[nmac])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac];
peer[nmac] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
peer[ncomp] = NULL;
goto out;
}
debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
newkeys->enc.name,
authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
newkeys->comp.name);
}
need = dh_need = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
}
/* XXX need runden? */
kex->we_need = need;
kex->dh_need = dh_need;
/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer))
ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1;
r = 0;
out:
kex_prop_free(my);
kex_prop_free(peer);
return r;
}
static int
derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
char c = id;
u_int have;
size_t mdsz;
u_char *digest;
int r;
if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id,
- kex->session_id_len) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, kex->session_id) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ error_f("KEX hash failed");
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
/*
* expand key:
* Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
* Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
*/
for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) {
+ error_f("KDF failed");
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
dump_digest("key", digest, need);
#endif
*keyp = digest;
digest = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(digest);
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
return r;
}
#define NKEYS 6
int
kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_char *keys[NKEYS];
u_int i, j, mode, ctos;
int r;
+ /* save initial hash as session id */
+ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ if (sshbuf_len(kex->session_id) != 0) {
+ error_f("already have session ID at kex");
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->session_id, hash, hashlen)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(kex->session_id) == 0) {
+ error_f("no session ID in rekex");
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
free(keys[j]);
return r;
}
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
}
return 0;
}
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
-kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- const BIGNUM *secret)
+kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey **prvp, struct sshkey **pubp)
{
- struct sshbuf *shared_secret;
- int r;
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(shared_secret, secret)) == 0)
- r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
- return r;
+ *pubp = NULL;
+ *prvp = NULL;
+ if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+ kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+ error_f("missing hostkey loader");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ *pubp = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ *prvp = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+ kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+ if (*pubp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
+int
+kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *server_host_key)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+ error_f("missing hostkey verifier");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+ (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid))
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ return 0;
+}
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void
-dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
+dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
}
#endif
+
+/*
+ * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
+ * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
+ */
+static void
+send_error(struct ssh *ssh, char *msg)
+{
+ char *crnl = "\r\n";
+
+ if (!ssh->kex->server)
+ return;
+
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
+ msg, strlen(msg)) != strlen(msg) ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
+ crnl, strlen(crnl)) != strlen(crnl))
+ error_f("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends our identification string and waits for the peer's. Will block for
+ * up to timeout_ms (or indefinitely if timeout_ms <= 0).
+ * Returns on 0 success or a ssherr.h code on failure.
+ */
+int
+kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
+ const char *version_addendum)
+{
+ int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch, oerrno = 0;
+ size_t len, i, n;
+ int r, expect_nl;
+ u_char c;
+ struct sshbuf *our_version = ssh->kex->server ?
+ ssh->kex->server_version : ssh->kex->client_version;
+ struct sshbuf *peer_version = ssh->kex->server ?
+ ssh->kex->client_version : ssh->kex->server_version;
+ char *our_version_string = NULL, *peer_version_string = NULL;
+ char *cp, *remote_version = NULL;
+
+ /* Prepare and send our banner */
+ sshbuf_reset(our_version);
+ if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
+ version_addendum = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+ version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
+ version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
+ sshbuf_mutable_ptr(our_version),
+ sshbuf_len(our_version)) != sshbuf_len(our_version)) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ debug_f("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(our_version, 2)) != 0) { /* trim \r\n */
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_consume_end");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ our_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(our_version);
+ if (our_version_string == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("Local version string %.100s", our_version_string);
+
+ /* Read other side's version identification. */
+ for (n = 0; ; n++) {
+ if (n >= SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
+ send_error(ssh, "No SSH identification string "
+ "received.");
+ error_f("No SSH version received in first %u lines "
+ "from server", SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(peer_version);
+ expect_nl = 0;
+ for (i = 0; ; i++) {
+ if (timeout_ms > 0) {
+ r = waitrfd(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ &timeout_ms);
+ if (r == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
+ send_error(ssh, "Timed out waiting "
+ "for SSH identification string.");
+ error("Connection timed out during "
+ "banner exchange");
+ r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (r == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_f("%s", strerror(errno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ len = atomicio(read, ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ &c, 1);
+ if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) {
+ error_f("Connection closed by remote host");
+ r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (len != 1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_f("read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (c == '\r') {
+ expect_nl = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (c == '\n')
+ break;
+ if (c == '\0' || expect_nl) {
+ error_f("banner line contains invalid "
+ "characters");
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(peer_version, c)) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) {
+ error_f("banner line too long");
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Is this an actual protocol banner? */
+ if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > 4 &&
+ memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(peer_version), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+ break;
+ /* If not, then just log the line and continue */
+ if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Do not accept lines before the SSH ident from a client */
+ if (ssh->kex->server) {
+ error_f("client sent invalid protocol identifier "
+ "\"%.256s\"", cp);
+ free(cp);
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+ debug_f("banner line %zu: %s", n, cp);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+ peer_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version);
+ if (peer_version_string == NULL)
+ error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+ /* XXX must be same size for sscanf */
+ if ((remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(peer_version))) == NULL) {
+ error_f("calloc failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
+ if (sscanf(peer_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
+ error("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'",
+ peer_version_string);
+ invalid:
+ send_error(ssh, "Invalid SSH identification string.");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+ compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
+
+ mismatch = 0;
+ switch (remote_major) {
+ case 2:
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor != 99)
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (mismatch) {
+ error("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major);
+ send_error(ssh, "Protocol major versions differ.");
+ r = SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
+ logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ peer_version_string);
+ r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
+ logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ peer_version_string);
+ r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+ logit("Remote version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
+ "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(our_version_string);
+ free(peer_version_string);
+ free(remote_version);
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
index 593de120836e..9605ed528ea4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
@@ -1,239 +1,259 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.91 2018/07/11 18:53:29 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.114 2021/01/31 22:55:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef KEX_H
#define KEX_H
#include "mac.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_LEAKMALLOC
-#include "leakmalloc.h"
-#endif
+#include "crypto_api.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
# define DH void
# define BIGNUM void
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
#define KEX_DH14_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
#define KEX_DH14_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
#define KEX_DH16_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512"
#define KEX_DH18_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512"
#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
#define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256"
#define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
+#define KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512 "sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com"
#define COMP_NONE 0
/* pre-auth compression (COMP_ZLIB) is only supported in the client */
#define COMP_ZLIB 1
#define COMP_DELAYED 2
#define CURVE25519_SIZE 32
enum kex_init_proposals {
PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS,
PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC,
PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS,
PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC,
PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS,
PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC,
PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS,
PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC,
PROPOSAL_MAX
};
enum kex_modes {
MODE_IN,
MODE_OUT,
MODE_MAX
};
enum kex_exchange {
KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256,
KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512,
KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512,
KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
KEX_C25519_SHA256,
+ KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
KEX_MAX
};
#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
+#define KEX_INITIAL 0x0002
struct sshenc {
char *name;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
int enabled;
u_int key_len;
u_int iv_len;
u_int block_size;
u_char *key;
u_char *iv;
};
struct sshcomp {
u_int type;
int enabled;
char *name;
};
struct newkeys {
struct sshenc enc;
struct sshmac mac;
struct sshcomp comp;
};
struct ssh;
struct kex {
- u_char *session_id;
- size_t session_id_len;
struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
u_int we_need;
u_int dh_need;
int server;
char *name;
char *hostkey_alg;
int hostkey_type;
int hostkey_nid;
u_int kex_type;
char *server_sig_algs;
int ext_info_c;
struct sshbuf *my;
struct sshbuf *peer;
+ struct sshbuf *client_version;
+ struct sshbuf *server_version;
+ struct sshbuf *session_id;
sig_atomic_t done;
u_int flags;
int hash_alg;
int ec_nid;
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
char *failed_choice;
int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
- int (*sign)(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ int (*sign)(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+ u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
int (*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *);
/* kex specific state */
DH *dh; /* DH */
u_int min, max, nbits; /* GEX */
EC_KEY *ec_client_key; /* ECDH */
const EC_GROUP *ec_group; /* ECDH */
- u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */
+ u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 + KEM */
u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */
+ u_char sntrup761_client_key[crypto_kem_sntrup761_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */
+ struct sshbuf *client_pub;
};
int kex_names_valid(const char *);
char *kex_alg_list(char);
char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
-int kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **);
+int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+
+struct kex *kex_new(void);
+int kex_ready(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *);
void kex_free(struct kex *);
int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***);
int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
void kex_prop_free(char **);
+int kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *, struct sshkey **, struct sshkey **);
+int kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *);
int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *);
int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int kex_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *);
-int kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *);
int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *);
int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *);
-int kexdh_client(struct ssh *);
-int kexdh_server(struct ssh *);
int kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
int kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
-int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *);
-int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
-int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
-int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
+int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
+int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
+
+int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
+int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+ struct sshbuf **);
+int kex_dh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **);
+
+int kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *);
+int kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+ struct sshbuf **);
+int kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **);
+
+int kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *);
+int kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+ struct sshbuf **);
+int kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **);
-int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
- const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+int kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(struct kex *);
+int kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
+int kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ struct sshbuf **);
-int kexgex_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+int kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *);
+int kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *, BIGNUM *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
int, int, int,
const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
- const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+ const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
u_char *, size_t *);
-int kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, const char *, const char *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
- const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
-
-int kex_c25519_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
- const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, const u_char *,
- const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *);
-
void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+int kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
-void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
+void dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
#endif
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c
index 0897b8c5190a..f13d766d7247 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c
@@ -1,133 +1,199 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.10 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.17 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE],
const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE])
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
void
kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
{
static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9};
arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint);
}
int
-kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
+kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int raw)
{
u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+ u_char zero[CURVE25519_SIZE];
int r;
- /* Check for all-zero public key */
- explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(pub, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
+ crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
+
+ /* Check for all-zero shared secret */
+ explicit_bzero(zero, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(zero, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
- crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
#endif
- sshbuf_reset(out);
- r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ if (raw)
+ r = sshbuf_put(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ else
+ r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
return r;
}
int
-kex_c25519_hash(
- int hash_alg,
- const char *client_version_string,
- const char *server_version_string,
- const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
- const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
- const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
- const u_char client_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char server_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE],
- const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen,
- u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+ const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ return kexc25519_shared_key_ext(key, pub, out, 0);
+}
+
+int
+kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
- struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ u_char *cp = NULL;
int r;
- if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) < 0 ||
- /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) < 0) {
- sshbuf_free(b);
- return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, CURVE25519_SIZE, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ kex->client_pub = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *client_pub;
+ u_char *server_pub;
+ u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+ int r;
+
+ *server_blobp = NULL;
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
}
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+ client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key 25519:", client_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
#endif
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
- sshbuf_free(b);
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ /* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
+ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
}
- sshbuf_free(b);
- *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, CURVE25519_SIZE, &server_pub)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
+ /* allocate shared secret */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 0)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
#endif
- return 0;
+ *server_blobp = server_blob;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ server_blob = NULL;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *server_pub;
+ int r;
+
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ server_pub = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ /* shared secret */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
+ buf, 0)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519c.c b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519c.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a8d92149c3fd..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519c.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.9 2017/12/18 02:25:15 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-
-static int
-input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
-
-int
-kexc25519_client(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- int r;
-
- kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, kex->c25519_client_pubkey);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("client private key:", kex->c25519_client_key,
- sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
-#endif
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, kex->c25519_client_pubkey,
- sizeof(kex->c25519_client_pubkey))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- return r;
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_c25519_reply);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
- struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
- u_char *server_pubkey = NULL;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- int r;
-
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* hostkey */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- &server_host_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
- (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
- server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
- goto out;
- }
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Q_S, server public key */
- /* signed H */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- goto out;
- }
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("server public key:", server_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-#endif
-
- if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pubkey,
- shared_secret)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* calc and verify H */
- hashlen = sizeof(hash);
- if ((r = kex_c25519_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- kex->c25519_client_pubkey,
- server_pubkey,
- sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
- hash, &hashlen)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
- kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
- r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-out:
- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
- explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- free(server_pubkey);
- free(signature);
- sshkey_free(server_host_key);
- sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
- return r;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c b/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 0800a7a4bcf4..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.11 2017/05/31 04:19:28 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved.
- *
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-
-static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-
-int
-kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_c25519_init);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
- struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
- u_char *client_pubkey = NULL;
- u_char server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE];
- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- int r;
-
- /* generate private key */
- kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key));
-#endif
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- if (server_host_public == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &client_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- goto out;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("client public key:", client_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-#endif
-
- if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey,
- shared_secret)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* calc H */
- if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0)
- goto out;
- hashlen = sizeof(hash);
- if ((r = kex_c25519_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- client_pubkey,
- server_pubkey,
- sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
- hash, &hashlen)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- /* sign H */
- if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
- &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
- r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-out:
- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
- explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- free(signature);
- free(client_pubkey);
- sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
- return r;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
index e6925b186d82..c1084f2146e1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
@@ -1,96 +1,203 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.26 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.34 2020/12/04 02:29:25 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "log.h"
int
-kex_dh_hash(
- int hash_alg,
- const char *client_version_string,
- const char *server_version_string,
- const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
- const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
- const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
- const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
- const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
- const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
- u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
{
- struct sshbuf *b;
- int r;
-
- if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+ case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+ kex->dh = dh_new_group18();
+ break;
+ default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
- /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
- sshbuf_free(b);
- return r;
}
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+ if (kex->dh == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ return (dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8));
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ size_t klen = 0;
+ int kout, r;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_pub));
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
- sshbuf_free(b);
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_pub)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
}
- sshbuf_free(b);
- *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
#endif
- return 0;
+ r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+ out:
+ freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+ kex->client_pub = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *server_blobp = NULL;
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(server_blob, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(server_blob, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = kex_dh_dec(kex, client_blob, shared_secretp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ *server_blobp = server_blob;
+ server_blob = NULL;
+ out:
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *dh_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dh_pub = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, dh_blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_pub)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_pub, buf)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ BN_free(dh_pub);
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8b56377ad09d..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,224 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.22 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-
-static int input_kex_dh(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-
-int
-kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- int r;
- const BIGNUM *pub_key;
-
- /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
- switch (kex->kex_type) {
- case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
- case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group18();
- break;
- default:
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- if (kex->dh == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
- goto out;
- DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
- fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh);
- r = 0;
- out:
- return r;
-}
-
-static int
-input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *pub_key;
- struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- int kout, r;
-
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- /* key, cert */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- &server_host_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
- (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
- server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
- goto out;
- }
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- goto out;
- }
- /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
- if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- /* signed H */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) {
- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value");
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- goto out;
- }
-
- klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
-
- /* calc and verify H */
- DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
- hashlen = sizeof(hash);
- if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- pub_key,
- dh_server_pub,
- shared_secret,
- hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
- kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
- r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
- out:
- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
- DH_free(kex->dh);
- kex->dh = NULL;
- BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
- if (kbuf) {
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
- }
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- sshkey_free(server_host_key);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- free(signature);
- return r;
-}
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 337aab5beb41..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.27 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-
-static int input_kex_dh_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-
-int
-kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- int r;
-
- /* generate server DH public key */
- switch (kex->kex_type) {
- case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
- case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
- break;
- case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
- kex->dh = dh_new_group18();
- break;
- default:
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- if (kex->dh == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init);
- r = 0;
- out:
- return r;
-}
-
-int
-input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *pub_key;
- struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t sbloblen, slen;
- size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
- int kout, r;
-
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- if (server_host_public == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* key, cert */
- if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
- fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) {
- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value");
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- goto out;
- }
-
- klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
- if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0)
- goto out;
- /* calc H */
- hashlen = sizeof(hash);
- if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- dh_client_pub,
- pub_key,
- shared_secret,
- hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- /* sign H */
- if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
- &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-
- /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
- r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
- out:
- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
- DH_free(kex->dh);
- kex->dh = NULL;
- BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
- if (kbuf) {
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
- }
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- free(signature);
- return r;
-}
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexecdh.c b/crypto/openssh/kexecdh.c
index 2a4fec6b124c..efb2e55a6d42 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexecdh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexecdh.c
@@ -1,100 +1,239 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.6 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.10 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+static int
+kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+ const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+
int
-kex_ecdh_hash(
- int hash_alg,
- const EC_GROUP *ec_group,
- const char *client_version_string,
- const char *server_version_string,
- const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
- const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
- const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
- const EC_POINT *client_dh_pub,
- const EC_POINT *server_dh_pub,
- const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
- u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
- struct sshbuf *b;
+ EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const EC_POINT *public_key;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
int r;
- if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
- /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, client_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, server_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
- sshbuf_free(b);
- return r;
+ if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
}
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
+ public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key);
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_ec(buf, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(client_key);
#endif
- if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
- sshbuf_free(b);
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ kex->ec_client_key = client_key;
+ kex->ec_group = group;
+ client_key = NULL; /* owned by the kex */
+ kex->client_pub = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ EC_KEY_free(client_key);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const EC_POINT *pub_key;
+ EC_KEY *server_key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *server_blobp = NULL;
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
}
- sshbuf_free(b);
- *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
- dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("server private key:\n", stderr);
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key);
+#endif
+ pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key);
+ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_ec(server_blob, pub_key, group)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(server_blob, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(kex, client_blob, server_key, group,
+ shared_secretp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ *server_blobp = server_blob;
+ server_blob = NULL;
+ out:
+ EC_KEY_free(server_key);
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ size_t klen = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+ sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
#endif
- return 0;
+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(kex, server_blob, kex->ec_client_key,
+ kex->ec_group, shared_secretp);
+ EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+ kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
+ return r;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+struct kex;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
}
#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ac146a362ee0..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.13 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-
-static int input_kex_ecdh_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-
-int
-kexecdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const EC_POINT *public_key;
- int r;
-
- if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
- public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key);
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
- debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
- sshkey_dump_ec_key(client_key);
-#endif
- kex->ec_client_key = client_key;
- kex->ec_group = group;
- client_key = NULL; /* owned by the kex */
-
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_ecdh_reply);
- r = 0;
- out:
- EC_KEY_free(client_key);
- return r;
-}
-
-static int
-input_kex_ecdh_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- EC_POINT *server_public = NULL;
- EC_KEY *client_key;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
- struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t slen, sbloblen;
- size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
- int r;
-
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- group = kex->ec_group;
- client_key = kex->ec_client_key;
-
- /* hostkey */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- &server_host_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
- (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
- server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
- goto out;
- }
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Q_S, server public key */
- /* signed H */
- if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, server_public, group)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
- sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
-#endif
- if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0) {
- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid server public key");
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- goto out;
- }
-
- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
- client_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
-#endif
- /* calc and verify H */
- hashlen = sizeof(hash);
- if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- group,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
- server_public,
- shared_secret,
- hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
- hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
- r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
- out:
- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
- EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
- kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
- EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
- if (kbuf) {
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
- }
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- sshkey_free(server_host_key);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- free(signature);
- return r;
-}
-#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c
deleted file mode 100644
index af4f30309971..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexecdhs.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.17 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-
-#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-
-#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-
-static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-
-int
-kexecdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_ecdh_init);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-input_kex_ecdh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- EC_POINT *client_public;
- EC_KEY *server_key = NULL;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const EC_POINT *public_key;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
- struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t slen, sbloblen;
- size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
- int r;
-
- if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("server private key:\n", stderr);
- sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key);
-#endif
-
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- if (server_host_public == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, client_public, group)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- fputs("client public key:\n", stderr);
- sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, client_public);
-#endif
- if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0) {
- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid client public key");
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Calculate shared_secret */
- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public,
- server_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
-#endif
- /* calc H */
- if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0)
- goto out;
- hashlen = sizeof(hash);
- if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
- kex->hash_alg,
- group,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- client_public,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key),
- shared_secret,
- hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- /* sign H */
- if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
- &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-
- public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key);
- /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- goto out;
-
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
- r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
- out:
- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
- EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
- kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(server_key);
- if (kbuf) {
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
- }
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
- free(signature);
- return r;
-}
-#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgen.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgen.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bde28053ddf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgen.c,v 1.7 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
+
+static int
+kex_gen_hash(
+ int hash_alg,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_version,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_version,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_pub,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_pub,
+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret,
+ u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ int r;
+
+ if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_version)) != 0 ||
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(client_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(b, client_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(server_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(b, server_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ int r;
+
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+ r = kex_dh_keypair(kex);
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
+ r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+ r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
+ break;
+ case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_gen_reply);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_char *signature = NULL;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t slen, hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+ /* hostkey */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */
+ if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Q_S, server public key */
+ /* signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* compute shared secret */
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+ r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
+ r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+ &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r !=0 )
+ goto out;
+
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->my,
+ kex->peer,
+ server_host_key_blob,
+ kex->client_pub,
+ server_blob,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
+ kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
+ explicit_bzero(kex->sntrup761_client_key,
+ sizeof(kex->sntrup761_client_key));
+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ sshbuf_free(tmp);
+ sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
+ kex->client_pub = NULL;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_gen_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_gen_init);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_char *signature = NULL, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t slen, hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+ if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private,
+ &server_host_public)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* compute shared secret */
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+ case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+ r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+ &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
+ r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+ &shared_secret);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+ &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r !=0 )
+ goto out;
+
+ /* calc H */
+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->peer,
+ kex->my,
+ server_host_key_blob,
+ client_pubkey,
+ server_pubkey,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* sign H */
+ if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public,
+ &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+ free(signature);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
+ sshbuf_free(server_pubkey);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
index 3ca4bd37000b..8040a13202fc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
@@ -1,104 +1,104 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.29 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.32 2019/01/23 00:30:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
int
kexgex_hash(
int hash_alg,
- const char *client_version_string,
- const char *server_version_string,
- const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen,
- const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen,
- const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_version,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_version,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
int min, int wantbits, int max,
const BIGNUM *prime,
const BIGNUM *gen,
const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
- const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+ const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen,
u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_version)) < 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_version)) < 0 ||
/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(client_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(b, client_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(server_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(b, server_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
(min != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, min)) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, wantbits)) != 0 ||
(max != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, max)) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, prime)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, gen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+ (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
#endif
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
index 0d07f73c794c..4a2e741d8458 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
@@ -1,270 +1,223 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.27 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.37 2021/01/31 22:55:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int
kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
u_int nbits;
nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
kex->nbits = nbits;
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
kex->nbits = MINIMUM(kex->nbits, 4096);
/* New GEX request */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
#endif
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP,
&input_kex_dh_gex_group);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
static int
input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
int r, bits;
- debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, &kex_protocol_error);
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (g = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
(u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
goto out;
}
if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
goto out;
DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL);
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
r = 0;
out:
BN_clear_free(p);
BN_clear_free(g);
return r;
}
static int
input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_char *signature = NULL;
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
- int kout, r;
+ size_t slen, hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &kex_protocol_error);
- debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
- if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
/* key, cert */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- &server_host_key)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
- (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
- server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
- goto out;
- }
- if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
goto out;
- }
- /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
- if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ /* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */
+ if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- /* signed H */
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* DH parameter f, server public DH key, signed H */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) {
- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value");
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- goto out;
- }
-
- klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
goto out;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
kex->min = kex->max = -1;
/* calc and verify H */
DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
if ((r = kexgex_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->my,
+ kex->peer,
+ server_host_key_blob,
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
dh_p, dh_g,
pub_key,
dh_server_pub,
- shared_secret,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
- hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0)
+ hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
- /* save session id */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
out:
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
DH_free(kex->dh);
kex->dh = NULL;
BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
- if (kbuf) {
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
- }
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
sshkey_free(server_host_key);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(tmp);
+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
free(signature);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
index dc9c0bc6024d..f0fbcb912543 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
@@ -1,256 +1,209 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.35 2018/10/04 00:04:41 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.43 2021/01/31 22:55:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int
kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
&input_kex_dh_gex_request);
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST");
return 0;
}
static int
input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &kex_protocol_error);
+
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
kex->nbits = nbits;
kex->min = min;
kex->max = max;
min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) {
r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
goto out;
}
/* Contact privileged parent */
kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
if (kex->dh == NULL) {
sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
static int
input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_char *signature = NULL;
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t sbloblen, slen;
- size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
- int kout, r;
+ size_t slen, hashlen;
+ int r;
- if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
- kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto out;
- }
- server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
- kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
- if (server_host_public == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT received");
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+ if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private,
+ &server_host_public)) != 0)
goto out;
- }
/* key, cert */
- if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
-
- DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
- DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
- fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) {
- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value");
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- goto out;
- }
-
- klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-#endif
- if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob,
- &sbloblen)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
goto out;
+
/* calc H */
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
if ((r = kexgex_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
- kex->client_version_string,
- kex->server_version_string,
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
- sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->peer,
+ kex->my,
+ server_host_key_blob,
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
dh_p, dh_g,
dh_client_pub,
pub_key,
- shared_secret,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
- /* save session id := H */
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
- kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
- if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
- }
-
/* sign H */
- if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature,
- &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0)
+ if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public,
+ &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) < 0)
goto out;
- /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
out:
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
DH_free(kex->dh);
kex->dh = NULL;
BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
- if (kbuf) {
- explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
- free(kbuf);
- }
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- free(server_host_key_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
free(signature);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexsntrup761x25519.c b/crypto/openssh/kexsntrup761x25519.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e3007fa29125
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexsntrup761x25519.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexsntrup761x25519.c,v 1.1 2020/12/29 00:59:15 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ u_char *cp = NULL;
+ size_t need;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(cp, kex->sntrup761_client_key);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key sntrup761:", cp,
+ crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+#endif
+ cp += crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ kex->client_pub = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *client_pub;
+ u_char *kem_key, *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+ u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t need;
+ int r;
+
+ *server_blobp = NULL;
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ /* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
+ need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+ if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key sntrup761:", client_pub,
+ crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+ dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
+ client_pub + crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
+ CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ /* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+ /* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES,
+ &kem_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
+ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, need, &ciphertext)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* generate and encrypt KEM key with client key */
+ crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc(ciphertext, kem_key, client_pub);
+ /* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
+ server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+ kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
+ /* append ECDH shared key */
+ client_pub += crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext,
+ crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+ dump_digest("server kem key:", kem_key, sizeof(kem_key));
+ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ /* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ *server_blobp = server_blob;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ server_blob = NULL;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ u_char *kem_key = NULL;
+ const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t need;
+ int r, decoded;
+
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
+ server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext,
+ crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+ dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ /* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES,
+ &kem_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ decoded = crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec(kem_key, ciphertext,
+ kex->sntrup761_client_key);
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
+ buf, 1)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client kem key:", kem_key, crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES);
+ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ if (decoded != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+struct kex;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+ struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#endif /* USE_SNTRUP761X25519 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/krl.c b/crypto/openssh/krl.c
index 8e2d5d5df9f8..17b88edde777 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/krl.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/krl.c
@@ -1,1366 +1,1447 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.42 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.53 2021/06/04 06:19:07 djm Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "bitmap.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
#include "krl.h"
/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
-# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x
+# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3_f x
#else
# define KRL_DBG(x)
#endif
/*
* Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
* quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
*/
/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
struct revoked_serial {
u_int64_t lo, hi;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
};
static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
-RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp)
/* Tree of key IDs */
struct revoked_key_id {
char *key_id;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
};
static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
-RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp)
/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
struct revoked_blob {
u_char *blob;
size_t len;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
};
static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
-RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp)
/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
struct revoked_certs {
struct sshkey *ca_key;
struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
struct ssh_krl {
u_int64_t krl_version;
u_int64_t generated_date;
u_int64_t flags;
char *comment;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s;
struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
};
/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
static int
serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
{
if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
return 0;
return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
}
static int
key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
{
return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
}
static int
blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
{
int r;
if (a->len != b->len) {
if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
return r;
return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
} else
return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
}
struct ssh_krl *
ssh_krl_init(void)
{
struct ssh_krl *krl;
if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
return NULL;
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s);
TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
return krl;
}
static void
revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
{
struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
free(rs);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
free(rki->key_id);
free(rki);
}
sshkey_free(rc->ca_key);
}
void
ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
if (krl == NULL)
return;
free(krl->comment);
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
revoked_certs_free(rc);
}
}
void
ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
{
krl->krl_version = version;
}
int
ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
{
free(krl->comment);
if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
* create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
*/
static int
revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
{
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
*rcp = NULL;
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) ||
sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
*rcp = rc;
return 0;
}
}
if (!allow_create)
return 0;
/* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (ca_key == NULL)
rc->ca_key = NULL;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) {
free(rc);
return r;
}
RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
- KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__,
- ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
+ KRL_DBG(("new CA %s", ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
*rcp = rc;
return 0;
}
static int
insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
{
struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
+ KRL_DBG(("insert %llu:%llu", lo, hi));
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
rs.lo = lo;
rs.hi = hi;
ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
/* No entry matches. Just insert */
if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
if (ers != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("bad: ers != NULL"));
/* Shouldn't happen */
free(irs);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ers = irs;
} else {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__,
- ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ KRL_DBG(("overlap found %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
/*
* The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
* existing entry.
*/
if (ers->lo > lo)
ers->lo = lo;
if (ers->hi < hi)
ers->hi = hi;
}
/*
* The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
* coalesce as necessary.
*/
/* Check predecessors */
while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
+ KRL_DBG(("pred %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi));
if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
break;
/* This entry overlaps. */
if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
ers->lo = crs->lo;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
- ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ KRL_DBG(("pred extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
}
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
free(crs);
}
/* Check successors */
while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
+ KRL_DBG(("succ %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi));
if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
break;
/* This entry overlaps. */
if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
ers->hi = crs->hi;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
- ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ KRL_DBG(("succ extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
}
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
free(crs);
}
- KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi));
+ KRL_DBG(("done, final %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
u_int64_t serial)
{
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
{
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
return r;
return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
const char *key_id)
{
struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
return r;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id));
+ KRL_DBG(("revoke %s", key_id));
if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
(rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
free(rki);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
if (erki != NULL) {
free(rki->key_id);
free(rki);
}
return 0;
}
/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
static int
plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen)
{
struct sshkey *kcopy;
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) {
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) {
sshkey_free(kcopy);
return r;
}
}
r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
sshkey_free(kcopy);
return r;
}
/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
static int
revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len)
{
struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
rb->blob = blob;
rb->len = len;
erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
if (erb != NULL) {
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
u_char *blob;
size_t len;
int r;
- debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ debug3_f("revoke type %s", sshkey_type(key));
if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0)
return r;
return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
}
static int
revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
u_char *blob;
int r;
/* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */
if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
memcpy(blob, p, len);
if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) {
free(blob);
return r;
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
- debug3("%s: revoke by sha1", __func__);
+ debug3_f("revoke by sha1");
if (len != 20)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
- debug3("%s: revoke by sha256", __func__);
+ debug3_f("revoke by sha256");
if (len != 32)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
/* XXX replace with SHA256? */
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
if (key->cert->serial == 0) {
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
key->cert->signature_key,
key->cert->key_id);
} else {
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
key->cert->signature_key,
key->cert->serial);
}
}
/*
* Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on
* the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
* numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
* Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
* that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
*/
static int
choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
{
int new_state;
u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
/*
* Avoid unsigned overflows.
* The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
*/
contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31);
last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
/*
* Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
* NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
* switching cost is independent of the current_state.
*/
cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
cost_range = 8;
switch (current_state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
cost_list = 8;
cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
case 0:
cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
cost_list = 8;
}
/* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
/* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
/* Now pick the best choice */
*force_new_section = 0;
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
cost = cost_bitmap;
if (cost_range < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
cost = cost_range;
}
if (cost_list < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
cost = cost_list;
}
if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
*force_new_section = 1;
cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
}
- KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
+ KRL_DBG(("contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
"list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
- "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig,
+ "selected 0x%02x%s", (long long unsigned)contig,
(long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
(long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
*force_new_section ? " restart" : ""));
return new_state;
}
static int
put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
{
size_t len;
u_char *blob;
int r;
len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
free(blob);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
free(blob);
return r;
}
/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
static int
revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
{
int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
struct revoked_key_id *rki;
int next_state, state = 0;
struct sshbuf *sect;
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */
if (rc->ca_key == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Store the revoked serials. */
for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
rs != NULL;
rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
+ KRL_DBG(("serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x",
(long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
state));
/* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
final = nrs == NULL;
gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
/* Choose next state based on these */
next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
/*
* If the current section is a range section or has a different
* type to the next section, then finish it off now.
*/
if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state));
+ KRL_DBG(("finish state 0x%02x", state));
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(sect);
}
/* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__,
+ KRL_DBG(("start state 0x%02x",
next_state));
state = next_state;
sshbuf_reset(sect);
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
bitmap_start = rs->lo;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect,
bitmap_start)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
}
}
/* Perform section-specific processing */
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
- error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
+ error_f("insane bitmap gap");
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
}
break;
}
last = rs->hi;
}
/* Flush the remaining section, if any */
if (state != 0) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
- __func__, state));
+ KRL_DBG(("serial final flush for state 0x%02x", state));
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
- KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("serial done "));
/* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id));
+ KRL_DBG(("key ID %s", rki->key_id));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
bitmap_free(bitmap);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
int
ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
- const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
+ struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
struct revoked_blob *rb;
struct sshbuf *sect;
u_char *sblob = NULL;
size_t slen, i;
if (krl->generated_date == 0)
krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Store the header */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Store sections for revoked certificates */
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
sshbuf_reset(sect);
if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
+ KRL_DBG(("key len %zu ", rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
+ KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
+ KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__,
- sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
+ KRL_DBG(("sig key %s", sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0)
goto out;
-
+ /* XXX support sk-* keys */
if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen));
+ KRL_DBG(("signature sig len %zu", slen));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(sblob);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
static void
format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
{
time_t t;
struct tm *tm;
t = timestamp;
tm = localtime(&t);
if (tm == NULL)
strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts);
else {
*ts = '\0';
strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
}
}
static int
parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
size_t blen, nbits;
struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
char *key_id = NULL;
struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Header: key, reserved */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
goto out;
if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0)
goto out;
while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(subsect);
subsect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0)
goto out;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type));
+ KRL_DBG(("subsection type 0x%02x", type));
/* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */
switch (type) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
ca_key, serial)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
&blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
- error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
+ error_f("bitmap wraps u64");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
continue;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
goto out;
}
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect,
&key_id, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
ca_key, key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
free(key_id);
key_id = NULL;
}
break;
default:
error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
r = 0;
out:
if (bitmap != NULL)
bitmap_free(bitmap);
free(key_id);
sshkey_free(ca_key);
sshbuf_free(subsect);
return r;
}
static int
blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree,
size_t expected_len)
{
u_char *rdata = NULL;
size_t rlen = 0;
int r;
while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) {
- error("%s: bad length", __func__);
+ error_f("bad length");
free(rdata);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) {
free(rdata);
return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
int
ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys)
{
struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL;
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
char timestamp[64];
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used;
u_int format_version;
nca_used = 0;
*krlp = NULL;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
- debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
+ debug3_f("not a KRL");
return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC;
}
/* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
+ error_f("alloc failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0)
goto out;
if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
(long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp,
*krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
/*
* 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
* detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
*/
sig_seen = 0;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
+ KRL_DBG(("first pass, section 0x%02x", type));
if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
if (sig_seen) {
error("KRL contains non-signature section "
"after signature");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Not interested for now. */
continue;
}
sig_seen = 1;
/* First string component is the signing key */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
/* Second string component is the signature itself */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen,
- sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
error("KRL signed more than once with "
"the same key");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1,
sizeof(*ca_used));
if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
ca_used = tmp_ca_used;
ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
key = NULL;
}
if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/*
* 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
* where the section start.
*/
sshbuf_free(copy);
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0)
goto out;
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(sect);
sect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(copy, &sect)) != 0)
goto out;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
+ KRL_DBG(("second pass, section 0x%02x", type));
switch (type) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
sshbuf_free(sect);
sect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
sig_seen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
sig_seen = 1;
else {
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
ca_used[i] = NULL;
}
}
if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
goto out;
}
/* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
sig_seen = 0;
for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
sig_seen = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!sig_seen) {
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
goto out;
}
}
*krlp = krl;
r = 0;
out:
if (r != 0)
ssh_krl_free(krl);
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++)
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
free(ca_used);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */
static int
is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc)
{
struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
/* Check revocation by cert key ID */
memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
if (erki != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("revoked by key ID"));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
/*
* Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the
* CA doesn't specify one).
*/
if (key->cert->serial == 0)
return 0;
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
if (ers != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
+ KRL_DBG(("revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu",
key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
return 0;
}
/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
static int
is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
/* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
&rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
&rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA256", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
/* Next, explicit keys */
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
- KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
return 0;
/* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
&rc, 0)) != 0)
return r;
if (rc != NULL) {
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
return r;
}
/* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0)
return r;
if (rc != NULL) {
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
return r;
}
- KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
+ KRL_DBG(("%llu no match", key->cert->serial));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
int r;
- KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("checking key"));
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
- debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
+ debug2_f("checking CA key");
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
return r;
}
- KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__));
+ KRL_DBG(("key okay"));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL;
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
- int oerrno = 0, r, fd;
+ int oerrno = 0, r;
if (path == NULL)
return 0;
-
- if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- oerrno = errno;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
- debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
+ debug2_f("checking KRL %s", path);
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
out:
- if (fd != -1)
- close(fd);
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
ssh_krl_free(krl);
if (r != 0)
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
+
+int
+krl_dump(struct ssh_krl *krl, FILE *f)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct revoked_blob *rb;
+ struct revoked_certs *rc;
+ struct revoked_serial *rs;
+ struct revoked_key_id *rki;
+ int r, ret = 0;
+ char *fp, timestamp[64];
+
+ /* Try to print in a KRL spec-compatible format */
+ format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
+ fprintf(f, "# KRL version %llu\n",
+ (unsigned long long)krl->krl_version);
+ fprintf(f, "# Generated at %s\n", timestamp);
+ if (krl->comment != NULL && *krl->comment != '\0') {
+ r = INT_MAX;
+ asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", krl->comment);
+ fprintf(f, "# Comment: %s\n", fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ fputc('\n', f);
+
+ RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(rb->blob, rb->len, &key)) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ error_r(r, "parse KRL key");
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ error("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ fprintf(f, "hash: SHA256:%s # %s\n", fp, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ free(fp);
+ free(key);
+ }
+ RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) {
+ fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len);
+ fprintf(f, "hash: SHA256:%s\n", fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
+ /*
+ * There is not KRL spec keyword for raw SHA1 hashes, so
+ * print them as comments.
+ */
+ fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len);
+ fprintf(f, "# hash SHA1:%s\n", fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+ fputc('\n', f);
+ if (rc->ca_key == NULL)
+ fprintf(f, "# Wildcard CA\n");
+ else {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(rc->ca_key,
+ SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ error("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ fprintf(f, "# CA key %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(rc->ca_key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ RB_FOREACH(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials) {
+ if (rs->lo == rs->hi) {
+ fprintf(f, "serial: %llu\n",
+ (unsigned long long)rs->lo);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(f, "serial: %llu-%llu\n",
+ (unsigned long long)rs->lo,
+ (unsigned long long)rs->hi);
+ }
+ }
+ RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
+ /*
+ * We don't want key IDs with embedded newlines to
+ * mess up the display.
+ */
+ r = INT_MAX;
+ asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", rki->key_id);
+ fprintf(f, "id: %s\n", fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/krl.h b/crypto/openssh/krl.h
index 815a1df4ebab..ca6d3f2843fd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/krl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/krl.h
@@ -1,66 +1,67 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.6 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.8 2020/04/03 02:26:56 djm Exp $ */
#ifndef _KRL_H
#define _KRL_H
/* Functions to manage key revocation lists */
#define KRL_MAGIC "SSHKRL\n\0"
#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1
/* KRL section types */
#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1
#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2
#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3
#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4
#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256 5
/* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23
struct sshkey;
struct sshbuf;
struct ssh_krl;
struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void);
void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl);
void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version);
int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment);
int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl,
const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial);
int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi);
int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl,
const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id);
int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len);
int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len);
int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
- const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys);
+ struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys);
int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys);
int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key);
+int krl_dump(struct ssh_krl *krl, FILE *f);
#endif /* _KRL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.c b/crypto/openssh/log.c
index d9c2d136cc68..42c6f9a60d3e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/log.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.c
@@ -1,480 +1,497 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.51 2018/07/27 12:03:17 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.59 2021/05/07 04:11:51 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "log.h"
+#include "match.h"
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
static int log_on_stderr = 1;
static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
-static char *argv0;
+static const char *argv0;
static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
static void *log_handler_ctx;
+static char **log_verbose;
+static size_t nlog_verbose;
extern char *__progname;
#define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
#define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */
static struct {
const char *name;
SyslogFacility val;
} log_facilities[] = {
{ "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON },
{ "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER },
{ "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH },
#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
{ "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV },
#endif
{ "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 },
{ "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 },
{ "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 },
{ "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 },
{ "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 },
{ "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 },
{ "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 },
{ "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 },
{ NULL, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET }
};
static struct {
const char *name;
LogLevel val;
} log_levels[] =
{
{ "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
{ "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
{ "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
{ "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO },
{ "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE },
{ "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
{ "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
{ "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 },
{ "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 },
{ NULL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET }
};
LogLevel
log_level_get(void)
{
return log_level;
}
SyslogFacility
log_facility_number(char *name)
{
int i;
if (name != NULL)
for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0)
return log_facilities[i].val;
return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
}
const char *
log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
if (log_facilities[i].val == facility)
return log_facilities[i].name;
return NULL;
}
LogLevel
log_level_number(char *name)
{
int i;
if (name != NULL)
for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++)
if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0)
return log_levels[i].val;
return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
}
const char *
log_level_name(LogLevel level)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (log_levels[i].val == level)
return log_levels[i].name;
return NULL;
}
-/* Error messages that should be logged. */
-
-void
-error(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-void
-sigdie(const char *fmt,...)
-{
-#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-#endif
- _exit(1);
-}
-
void
-logdie(const char *fmt,...)
+log_verbose_add(const char *s)
{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
- cleanup_exit(255);
-}
-
-/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
-
-void
-logit(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */
-
-void
-verbose(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */
-
-void
-debug(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-void
-debug2(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
+ char **tmp;
+
+ /* Ignore failures here */
+ if ((tmp = recallocarray(log_verbose, nlog_verbose, nlog_verbose + 1,
+ sizeof(*log_verbose))) != NULL) {
+ log_verbose = tmp;
+ if ((log_verbose[nlog_verbose] = strdup(s)) != NULL)
+ nlog_verbose++;
+ }
}
void
-debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+log_verbose_reset(void)
{
- va_list args;
+ size_t i;
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
+ for (i = 0; i < nlog_verbose; i++)
+ free(log_verbose[i]);
+ free(log_verbose);
+ log_verbose = NULL;
+ nlog_verbose = 0;
}
/*
* Initialize the log.
*/
void
-log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+ int on_stderr)
{
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
#endif
argv0 = av0;
if (log_change_level(level) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n",
(int) level);
exit(1);
}
log_handler = NULL;
log_handler_ctx = NULL;
log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
if (on_stderr)
return;
switch (facility) {
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON:
log_facility = LOG_DAEMON;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER:
log_facility = LOG_USER;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH:
log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
break;
#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV:
log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV;
break;
#endif
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
break;
case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7:
log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr,
"Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n",
(int) facility);
exit(1);
}
/*
* If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
* immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
* facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
closelog_r(&sdata);
#else
openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
closelog();
#endif
}
int
log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level)
{
/* no-op if log_init has not been called */
if (argv0 == NULL)
return 0;
switch (new_log_level) {
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
log_level = new_log_level;
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
}
int
log_is_on_stderr(void)
{
return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO;
}
/* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */
void
log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile)
{
int fd;
+ if (logfile == NULL) {
+ if (log_stderr_fd != STDERR_FILENO) {
+ close(log_stderr_fd);
+ log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile,
- strerror(errno));
+ strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
log_stderr_fd = fd;
}
#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
void
set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx)
{
log_handler = handler;
log_handler_ctx = ctx;
}
-void
-do_log2(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,...)
-{
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(level, fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-void
-do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+static void
+do_log(LogLevel level, int force, const char *suffix, const char *fmt,
+ va_list args)
{
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
#endif
char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
char *txt = NULL;
int pri = LOG_INFO;
int saved_errno = errno;
log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
- if (level > log_level)
+ if (!force && level > log_level)
return;
switch (level) {
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
if (!log_on_stderr)
txt = "fatal";
pri = LOG_CRIT;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
if (!log_on_stderr)
txt = "error";
pri = LOG_ERR;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
pri = LOG_INFO;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
pri = LOG_INFO;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
txt = "debug1";
pri = LOG_DEBUG;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
txt = "debug2";
pri = LOG_DEBUG;
break;
case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
txt = "debug3";
pri = LOG_DEBUG;
break;
default:
txt = "internal error";
pri = LOG_ERR;
break;
}
if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) {
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt);
vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args);
} else {
vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
}
+ if (suffix != NULL) {
+ snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", msgbuf, suffix);
+ strlcpy(msgbuf, fmtbuf, sizeof(msgbuf));
+ }
strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS);
if (log_handler != NULL) {
/* Avoid recursion */
tmp_handler = log_handler;
log_handler = NULL;
- tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
+ tmp_handler(level, force, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
log_handler = tmp_handler;
} else if (log_on_stderr) {
snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n",
(int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
} else {
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
closelog_r(&sdata);
#else
openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
closelog();
#endif
}
errno = saved_errno;
}
+
+void
+sshlog(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+ LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+sshlogdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+ LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+ suffix, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+void
+sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+ LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ suffix, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ _exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+sshlogv(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+ LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+ char tag[128], fmt2[MSGBUFSIZ + 128];
+ int forced = 0;
+ const char *cp;
+ size_t i;
+
+ snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "%.48s:%.48s():%d (pid=%ld)",
+ (cp = strrchr(file, '/')) == NULL ? file : cp + 1, func, line,
+ (long)getpid());
+ for (i = 0; i < nlog_verbose; i++) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(tag, log_verbose[i], 0) == 1) {
+ forced = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (forced)
+ snprintf(fmt2, sizeof(fmt2), "%s: %s", tag, fmt);
+ else if (showfunc)
+ snprintf(fmt2, sizeof(fmt2), "%s: %s", func, fmt);
+ else
+ strlcpy(fmt2, fmt, sizeof(fmt2));
+
+ do_log(level, forced, suffix, fmt2, args);
+}
+
+void
+sshlogdirect(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(level, forced, NULL, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.h b/crypto/openssh/log.h
index ef7bea7e1aa2..6218b4177a6f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/log.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.h
@@ -1,81 +1,132 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.23 2018/07/27 12:03:17 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.33 2021/04/15 16:24:31 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef SSH_LOG_H
#define SSH_LOG_H
+#include <stdarg.h> /* va_list */
+#include "ssherr.h" /* ssh_err() */
+
/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */
typedef enum {
SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH,
#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
#endif
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET = -1
} SyslogFacility;
typedef enum {
SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1
} LogLevel;
-typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
-void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+void log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
LogLevel log_level_get(void);
int log_change_level(LogLevel);
int log_is_on_stderr(void);
void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
+void log_verbose_add(const char *);
+void log_verbose_reset(void);
SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *);
-const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility);
+const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility);
LogLevel log_level_number(char *);
const char * log_level_name(LogLevel);
-void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void sigdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void logdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-
-
void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
-void do_log2(LogLevel, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
-void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
void cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+
+void sshlog(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+ LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void sshlogv(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+ LogLevel, const char *, const char *, va_list);
+void sshsigdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+ LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void sshlogdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+ LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void sshfatal(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+ LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void sshlogdirect(LogLevel, int, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+
+#define do_log2(level, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, level, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal(...) sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie(...) sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie(...) sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/* Variants that prepend the caller's function */
+#define do_log2_f(level, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, level, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3_f(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2_f(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug_f(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose_f(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit_f(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error_f(...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal_f(...) sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie_f(...) sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie_f(...) sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/* Variants that appends a ssh_err message */
+#define do_log2_r(r, level, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, level, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3_r(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2_r(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug_r(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose_r(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit_r(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error_r(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal_r(r, ...) sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie_r(r, ...) sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie_r(r, ...) sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define do_log2_fr(r, level, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, level, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3_fr(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2_fr(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug_fr(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose_fr(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit_fr(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error_fr(r, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal_fr(r, ...) sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie_fr(r, ...) sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie_fr(r, ...) sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
index 9a427dec4125..ea058fd6fa75 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
@@ -1,1724 +1,1729 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
* Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
* Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
* Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
* the the following license:
*
* Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
* provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
* duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
* advertising materials, and other materials related to such
* distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
* by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the
* University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
*/
/**
** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
**/
/*
* The new login code explained
* ============================
*
* This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
* (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
*
* Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
* union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
* system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
*
* We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
* used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
* on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
* gets compiled here.
*
* The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
* recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
* many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
* the old code.
*
* For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
* these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
* this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
* in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
* to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
* requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
* information. These files and their access methods are very system
* specific indeed.
*
* For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
* setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
* these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
* a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
* code should suffice.
*
* Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
* more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
* simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
* relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
* a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
* information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
* we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
* for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
* incur a significant performance penalty.
*
* Calling the new code
* --------------------
*
* In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
* login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
* program there are more examples.
*
* Internal handler calling method
* -------------------------------
*
* When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
* routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
* or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
* calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
* selects for the local system.
*
* The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
* struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
* construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
* that introduce new features to either structure.
*
* While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
* code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
* write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
* support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
* a difficult and time-consuming task.
*
* Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
* (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
* getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
* login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
* otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
* meaning "tilt".
*
* Maintenance
* -----------
*
* In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
* methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
* code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
* symbols for the platform.
*
* Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
* configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
* with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
*
* Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
/**
** prototypes for helper functions in this file
**/
#if HAVE_UTMP_H
void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
#endif
int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* pick the shortest string */
#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
/**
** platform-independent login functions
**/
/*
* login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login
*
* Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
* login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
*
* Returns:
* >0 if successful
* 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
*/
int
login_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
return (login_write(li));
}
/*
* login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
*
* Call as with login_login()
*
* Returns:
* >0 if successful
* 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
*/
int
login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
return (login_write(li));
}
/*
* login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
*
* Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
* system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
* to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
*
* Returns:
* 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
* Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
*
* Useful preprocessor symbols:
* DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
* info
* USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
* facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
* try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
*/
unsigned int
login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid)
{
struct logininfo li;
if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
return (li.tv_sec);
else
return (0);
}
/*
* login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry
*
* Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
* information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
* system lastlog information exists.
*
* Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
*
* Returns:
* >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
* 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
*/
struct logininfo *
login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid)
{
struct passwd *pw;
memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
li->uid = uid;
/*
* If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
* reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
* wtmp_get_entry().)
*/
pw = getpwuid(uid);
if (pw == NULL)
fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__,
(long)uid);
if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >=
sizeof(li->username)) {
error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__,
(unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name),
(unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1);
return NULL;
}
if (getlast_entry(li))
return (li);
else
return (NULL);
}
/*
* login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise
* a logininfo structure
*
* This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
* meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
*
* Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
* allocation fails, the program halts.
*/
struct
logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
const char *hostname, const char *line)
{
struct logininfo *newli;
newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli));
login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
return (newli);
}
/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */
void
login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
free(li);
}
/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
* - initialise a struct logininfo
*
* Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
* the information required to portably record login info.
*
* Returns: 1
*/
int
login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
const char *hostname, const char *line)
{
struct passwd *pw;
memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
li->pid = pid;
/* set the line information */
if (line)
line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
if (username) {
strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
pw = getpwnam(li->username);
if (pw == NULL) {
fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
li->username);
}
li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
}
if (hostname)
strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
return (1);
}
/*
* login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time
*
* Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
* meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
* time handling.
*/
void
login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
}
/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
void
login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
const unsigned int sa_size)
{
unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
/* make sure we don't overrun our union */
if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize);
}
/**
** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
** results
**/
int
login_write(struct logininfo *li)
{
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (geteuid() != 0) {
logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
return (1);
}
#endif
/* set the timestamp */
login_set_current_time(li);
#ifdef USE_LOGIN
syslogin_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
lastlog_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_UTMP
utmp_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_WTMP
wtmp_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_UTMPX
utmpx_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef USE_WTMPX
wtmpx_write_entry(li);
#endif
#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
!sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
- &loginmsg))
+ loginmsg))
logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
audit_session_open(li);
else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
audit_session_close(li);
#endif
return (0);
}
#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
int
login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
{
li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
login_set_current_time(li);
# ifdef USE_UTMP
utmp_write_entry(li);
# endif
# ifdef USE_WTMP
wtmp_write_entry(li);
# endif
# ifdef USE_UTMPX
utmpx_write_entry(li);
# endif
# ifdef USE_WTMPX
wtmpx_write_entry(li);
# endif
return (0);
}
#endif
/**
** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
** time.
**/
/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
int
getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
return (utmpx_get_entry(li));
#endif
#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
/* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
* time, e.g. AIX */
return (0);
# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \
(defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
/* retrieve last login time from utmp */
return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \
(defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
/* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
# else
/* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
return (0);
# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
}
/*
* 'line' string utility functions
*
* These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
*
* 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
* 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
* 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
* /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 )
*
* Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
* attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
* performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
* uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
*/
/*
* line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
* sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
*/
char *
line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
{
memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
else {
strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
}
return (dst);
}
/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
char *
line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
{
memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
else
strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
return (dst);
}
/*
* line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
* form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
* full name.)
*
* NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
* termination
*/
char *
line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
{
size_t len;
memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
/* Always skip prefix if present */
if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
src += 5;
#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
src += 3;
#endif
len = strlen(src);
if (len > 0) {
if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
src += ((int)len - dstsize);
/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
}
return (dst);
}
/**
** utmp utility functions
**
** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
** into account.
**/
#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
/* build the utmp structure */
void
set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
# endif
}
void
construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
struct utmp *ut)
{
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
# endif
memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
/* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
/* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
switch (li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
break;
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
break;
}
# endif
set_utmp_time(li, ut);
line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
# endif
/* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
return;
/*
* These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
* for logouts.
*/
/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
}
}
# endif
}
#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
/**
** utmpx utility functions
**
** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
** variations.
**/
#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
/* build the utmpx structure */
void
set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
# endif
}
void
construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
# endif
memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
# endif
/* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
switch (li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
break;
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
break;
}
line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
/* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username,
MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username));
if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
return;
/*
* These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
* for logouts.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname,
MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX
+ utx->ut_ss = li->hostaddr.sa_storage;
+# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3];
utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
}
}
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
/* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
# endif
}
#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
/**
** Low-level utmp functions
**/
/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
#ifdef USE_UTMP
/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
# define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
# endif
/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
static int
utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
setutent();
pututline(ut);
# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
endutent();
# endif
return (1);
}
# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
/*
* Write a utmp entry direct to the file
* This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
*/
static int
utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
struct utmp old_ut;
register int fd;
int tty;
/* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
struct ttyent *ty;
tty=0;
setttyent();
while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) {
tty++;
if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
break;
}
endttyent();
if (NULL == ty) {
logit("%s: tty not found", __func__);
return (0);
}
#else /* FIXME */
tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
off_t pos, ret;
pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp);
if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
if (ret != pos) {
logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
__func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
close(fd);
return (0);
}
/*
* Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
* If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
* and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
*/
if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
(ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
(strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
(strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0))
memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
if (ret != pos) {
logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
__func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
close(fd);
return (0);
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__,
UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
close(fd);
return (1);
} else {
return (0);
}
}
# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
static int
utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# else
if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif
return (1);
}
static int
utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# else
if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif
return (1);
}
int
utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (utmp_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (utmp_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* USE_UTMP */
/**
** Low-level utmpx functions
**/
/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
#ifdef USE_UTMPX
/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
# define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
# endif
/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
static int
utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
setutxent();
pututxline(utx);
# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
endutxent();
# endif
return (1);
}
# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
static int
utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
static int
utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# else
if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
return (0);
}
# endif
return (1);
}
static int
utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
# endif
# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
# else
utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
# endif
return (1);
}
int
utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (utmpx_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (utmpx_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
/**
** Low-level wtmp functions
**/
#ifdef USE_WTMP
/*
* Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
*/
static int
wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
struct stat buf;
int fd, ret = 1;
if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
ret = 0;
}
close(fd);
return (ret);
}
static int
wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
}
static int
wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp ut;
construct_utmp(li, &ut);
return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
}
int
wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (wtmp_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (wtmp_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
/*
* Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
*
* Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
* username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
* leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
*
* Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
* must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
* ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
*
* Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
* to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
* it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
* place and not have ut_type.
*/
/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
static int
wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
{
if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
return (1);
# else
return (1);
# endif
}
return (0);
}
int
wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct stat st;
struct utmp ut;
int fd, found = 0;
/* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
/* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
close(fd);
return (0);
}
while (!found) {
if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
close (fd);
return (0);
}
if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
found = 1;
/*
* We've already checked for a time in struct
* utmp, in login_getlast()
*/
# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
# else
# if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
# endif
# endif
line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
# endif
continue;
}
/* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
/* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
close(fd);
return (0);
}
}
/* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
close(fd);
return (1);
}
# endif /* USE_WTMP */
/**
** Low-level wtmpx functions
**/
#ifdef USE_WTMPX
/*
* Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file
* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
*/
static int
wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
struct stat buf;
int fd, ret = 1;
if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
ret = 0;
}
close(fd);
return (ret);
#else
updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx);
return (1);
#endif
}
static int
wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
}
static int
wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx utx;
construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
}
int
wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (wtmpx_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
next two functions */
/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
static int
wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
{
if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) {
# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
return (1);
# else
return (1);
# endif
}
return (0);
}
int
wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct stat st;
struct utmpx utx;
int fd, found=0;
/* Clear the time entries */
li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return (0);
}
/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
/* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
close(fd);
return (0);
}
while (!found) {
if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
close (fd);
return (0);
}
/*
* Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
* line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
*/
if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
found = 1;
# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
# endif
line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
# endif
continue;
}
if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
close(fd);
return (0);
}
}
close(fd);
return (1);
}
#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
/**
** Low-level libutil login() functions
**/
#ifdef USE_LOGIN
static int
syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmp *ut;
ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut));
construct_utmp(li, ut);
login(ut);
free(ut);
return (1);
}
static int
syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
{
# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
char line[UT_LINESIZE];
(void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
if (!logout(line))
logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__);
# ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
else
logwtmp(line, "", "");
# endif
/* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
* login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All
* routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
* but... */
# endif
return (1);
}
int
syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch (li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return (syslogin_perform_login(li));
case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
return (syslogin_perform_logout(li));
default:
logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
/**
** Low-level lastlog functions
**/
#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
static int
lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
{
off_t offset;
char lastlog_file[1024];
struct stat st;
if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
} else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
} else {
logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE);
return (0);
}
*fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
if (*fd < 0) {
debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__,
lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
/* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) {
logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__,
lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
close(*fd);
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
int
lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
default:
logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
return 0;
}
}
#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
int
lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct lastlog last;
int fd;
switch(li->type) {
case LTYPE_LOGIN:
/* create our struct lastlog */
memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
return (0);
/* write the entry */
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
close(fd);
logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
close(fd);
return (1);
default:
logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
int
lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct lastlogx l, *ll;
if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
ll = &l;
}
line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
return (1);
}
#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
int
lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct lastlog last;
int fd, ret;
if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
return (0);
ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last));
close(fd);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
/* FALLTHRU */
case sizeof(last):
line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
return (1);
case -1:
error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
return (0);
default:
error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d",
__func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret);
return (0);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
int
utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
{
struct utmpx *utx;
if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0)
return (0);
utx = getutxuser(li->username);
if (utx == NULL) {
endutxent();
return (0);
}
line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line));
strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host,
MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host));
li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec;
li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec;
endutxent();
return (1);
}
#endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */
#ifdef USE_BTMP
/*
* Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
* The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
* So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
* only root can read it.
*/
void
-record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname,
+record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username, const char *hostname,
const char *ttyn)
{
int fd;
struct utmp ut;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
struct sockaddr_in *a4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
time_t t;
struct stat fst;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
_PATH_BTMP);
goto out;
}
memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
time(&t);
ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
ut.ut_pid = getpid();
/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
- getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+ getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
}
#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
}
#endif
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
strerror(errno));
out:
close(fd);
}
#endif /* USE_BTMP */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
index 28923e7812e5..02bceb604c7f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
@@ -1,131 +1,134 @@
#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
#define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/**
** loginrec.h: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
**/
#include "includes.h"
+struct ssh;
+
/**
** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
**/
/*
* login_netinfo structure
*/
union login_netinfo {
struct sockaddr sa;
struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage;
};
/*
* * logininfo structure *
*/
/* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */
/* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */
#define LTYPE_LOGIN 7
#define LTYPE_LOGOUT 8
/* string lengths - set very long */
#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64
#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64
#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 512
#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256
struct logininfo {
char progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE]; /* name of program (for PAM) */
int progname_null;
short int type; /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */
pid_t pid; /* PID of login process */
uid_t uid; /* UID of this user */
char line[LINFO_LINESIZE]; /* tty/pty name */
char username[LINFO_NAMESIZE]; /* login username */
char hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE]; /* remote hostname */
/* 'exit_status' structure components */
int exit; /* process exit status */
int termination; /* process termination status */
/* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll
* use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0
*/
unsigned int tv_sec;
unsigned int tv_usec;
union login_netinfo hostaddr; /* caller's host address(es) */
}; /* struct logininfo */
/*
* login recording functions
*/
/** 'public' functions */
/* construct a new login entry */
struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
const char *hostname, const char *line);
/* free a structure */
void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li);
/* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */
int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
- const char *hostname, const char *line);
+ const char *hostname, const char *line);
/* place the current time in a logininfo struct */
void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li);
/* record the entry */
int login_login (struct logininfo *li);
int login_logout(struct logininfo *li);
#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li);
#endif
/** End of public functions */
/* record the entry */
int login_write (struct logininfo *li);
int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li);
/* set the network address based on network address type */
void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
const unsigned int sa_size);
/*
* lastlog retrieval functions
*/
/* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */
struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid);
/* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */
unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid);
/* produce various forms of the line filename */
char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize);
char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
-void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+void record_failed_login(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
+ const char *);
#endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/logintest.c b/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
index 4897ae0f9e11..6ee1cdc23645 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
@@ -1,308 +1,308 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/**
** logintest.c: simple test driver for platform-independent login recording
** and lastlog retrieval
**/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
#include <time.h>
#endif
#include "loginrec.h"
extern char *__progname;
#define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3
int nologtest = 0;
int compile_opts_only = 0;
int be_verbose = 0;
/* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */
void
dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname)
{
/* yes I know how nasty this is */
printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t"
- "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t"
- "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t"
- "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t"
- "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t"
- "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t"
- "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t"
- "struct sockaddr sa {\n"
- "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n"
- "\t}\n"
- "}\n",
- descname, li->progname, li->type,
- li->pid, li->uid, li->line,
- li->username, li->hostname, li->exit,
- li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec,
- li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family);
+ "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t"
+ "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t"
+ "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t"
+ "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t"
+ "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t"
+ "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t"
+ "struct sockaddr sa {\n"
+ "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n"
+ "\t}\n"
+ "}\n",
+ descname, li->progname, li->type,
+ li->pid, li->uid, li->line,
+ li->username, li->hostname, li->exit,
+ li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec,
+ li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family);
}
int
testAPI()
{
struct logininfo *li1;
struct passwd *pw;
struct hostent *he;
struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
char cmdstring[256], stripline[8];
char username[32];
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime;
char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64];
char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */
#endif
printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n");
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
/* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */
printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n");
/* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */
li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0));
strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname));
if (be_verbose)
dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n");
if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) {
printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n");
} else {
/* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set
* any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */
memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]),
- sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ sizeof(struct in_addr));
login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4));
strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname));
}
if (be_verbose)
dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n");
return 1;
}
if (nologtest)
return 1;
line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline));
printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n");
login_write(li1);
printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n");
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
(void)time(&t0);
strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0));
t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1));
printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t"
- "lastlog time is %d - %s\n",
- (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1);
+ "lastlog time is %d - %s\n",
+ (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1);
#endif
printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline);
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
(void)time(&logintime);
strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime));
printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime);
#endif
printf("--\n");
login_login(li1);
snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '",
stripline);
system(cmdstring);
printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
printf("Performing a logout ");
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
(void)time(&logouttime);
strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime));
printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime);
#endif
printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n"
- "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n"
- "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n"
- "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n"
- "-- ('who' output follows)\n");
+ "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n"
+ "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n"
+ "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n"
+ "-- ('who' output follows)\n");
login_logout(li1);
system(cmdstring);
printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n");
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2));
printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2);
if (t1 == t2)
printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the "
- "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING "
- "CORRECTLY **\n");
+ "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING "
+ "CORRECTLY **\n");
else if (t0 != t2)
/* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine.
* I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */
printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n"
- "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the "
- "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n"
- "If it's off by less than %d second(s) "
- "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+ "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the "
+ "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n"
+ "If it's off by less than %d second(s) "
+ "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
else
printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n");
#endif
printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have "
- "an entry for root \n on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n",
- stripline);
+ "an entry for root \n on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n",
+ stripline);
snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3",
stripline);
system(cmdstring);
printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n");
login_free_entry(li1);
return 1;
} /* testAPI() */
void
testLineName(char *line)
{
/* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for
* structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/
char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5];
memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full));
memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip));
memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev));
line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1);
line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1);
line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1);
printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev);
} /* testLineName() */
int
testOutput()
{
printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n");
testLineName("/dev/pts/1");
testLineName("pts/1");
testLineName("pts/999");
testLineName("/dev/ttyp00");
testLineName("ttyp00");
return 1;
} /* testOutput() */
/* show which options got compiled in */
void
showOptions(void)
{
printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n");
printf("login recording methods selected:\n");
#ifdef USE_LOGIN
printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n");
#endif
#ifdef USE_UTMP
printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE);
#endif
#ifdef USE_UTMPX
printf("\tUSE_UTMPX\n");
#endif
#ifdef USE_WTMP
printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE);
#endif
#ifdef USE_WTMPX
printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE);
#endif
#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE);
#endif
printf("\n");
} /* showOptions() */
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n");
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
if (argc == 2) {
if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0)
compile_opts_only = 1;
else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0)
be_verbose=1;
}
if (!compile_opts_only) {
if (be_verbose && !testOutput())
return 1;
if (!testAPI())
return 1;
}
showOptions();
return 0;
} /* main() */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4 b/crypto/openssh/m4/openssh.m4
similarity index 90%
copy from crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4
copy to crypto/openssh/m4/openssh.m4
index 25ecc49a2203..4f9c3792dc17 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/aclocal.m4
+++ b/crypto/openssh/m4/openssh.m4
@@ -1,186 +1,200 @@
dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
dnl
dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ /*
+ * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+ * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+ * that it's looking for.
+ */
+ switch(i){
+ case 0: j += i;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default: j += k;
+ }
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long int p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1])
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ (void)argv;
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
-AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [
+AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD], [
# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
dnl
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
], [ dnl
eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
]) dnl
])
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2])
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
])
dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we
dnl have to test to find something that will work.
AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
[
AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
[
# Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
# "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
- AC_TRY_COMPILE([
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
-
- int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
- ],[
- $t len;
- getpeername(0,0,&len);
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([
+ AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
+ ]], [[
+ $t len;
+ getpeername(0,0,&len);
+ ]])
],[
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
break
])
done
done
if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
fi
])
AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
[type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>])
])
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mac.c b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
index 51dc11d76b92..f3dda6692866 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/mac.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
@@ -1,265 +1,262 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.34 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.35 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "digest.h"
#include "hmac.h"
#include "umac.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */
#define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
#define SSH_UMAC128 3
struct macalg {
char *name;
int type;
int alg;
int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */
int key_len; /* just for UMAC */
int len; /* just for UMAC */
int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
};
static const struct macalg macs[] = {
/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
{ "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-#endif
{ "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
{ "umac-128@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
/* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-#endif
{ "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
{ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
{ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
/* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
char *
mac_alg_list(char sep)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct macalg *m;
for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(m->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
static int
mac_setup_by_alg(struct sshmac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
{
mac->type = macalg->type;
if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) {
if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg);
} else {
mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8;
mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8;
mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
}
if (macalg->truncatebits != 0)
mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8;
mac->etm = macalg->etm;
return 0;
}
int
mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name)
{
const struct macalg *m;
for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
continue;
if (mac != NULL)
return mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m);
return 0;
}
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
int
mac_init(struct sshmac *mac)
{
if (mac->key == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
switch (mac->type) {
case SSH_DIGEST:
if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL ||
ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
case SSH_UMAC:
if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
case SSH_UMAC128:
if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
}
int
mac_compute(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno,
const u_char *data, int datalen,
u_char *digest, size_t dlen)
{
static union {
u_char m[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
u_int64_t for_align;
} u;
u_char b[4];
u_char nonce[8];
if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u))
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
switch (mac->type) {
case SSH_DIGEST:
put_u32(b, seqno);
/* reset HMAC context */
if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
break;
case SSH_UMAC:
POKE_U64(nonce, seqno);
umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
break;
case SSH_UMAC128:
put_u64(nonce, seqno);
umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (digest != NULL) {
if (dlen > mac->mac_len)
dlen = mac->mac_len;
memcpy(digest, u.m, dlen);
}
return 0;
}
int
mac_check(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
const u_char *theirmac, size_t mlen)
{
u_char ourmac[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
int r;
if (mac->mac_len > mlen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, seqno, data, dlen,
ourmac, sizeof(ourmac))) != 0)
return r;
if (timingsafe_bcmp(ourmac, theirmac, mac->mac_len) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
return 0;
}
void
mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
{
if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
} else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) {
if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
} else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL)
ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx);
mac->hmac_ctx = NULL;
mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
}
/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
#define MAC_SEP ","
int
mac_valid(const char *names)
{
char *maclist, *cp, *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((maclist = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
free(maclist);
return 0;
}
}
free(maclist);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.c b/crypto/openssh/match.c
index bb3e95f678ca..3ac854d38f00 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/match.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.c
@@ -1,350 +1,364 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.38 2018/07/04 13:49:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.43 2020/11/03 22:53:12 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
/*
* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
* and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
*/
-
int
match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
{
for (;;) {
/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
if (!*pattern)
return !*s;
if (*pattern == '*') {
- /* Skip the asterisk. */
- pattern++;
+ /* Skip this and any consecutive asterisks. */
+ while (*pattern == '*')
+ pattern++;
/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
if (!*pattern)
return 1;
/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
/*
* Look instances of the next character in
* pattern, and try to match starting from
* those.
*/
for (; *s; s++)
if (*s == *pattern &&
match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
return 1;
/* Failed. */
return 0;
}
/*
* Move ahead one character at a time and try to
* match at each position.
*/
for (; *s; s++)
if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
return 1;
/* Failed. */
return 0;
}
/*
* There must be at least one more character in the string.
* If we are at the end, fail.
*/
if (!*s)
return 0;
/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
return 0;
/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
s++;
pattern++;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Tries to match the string against the
* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
*/
int
match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
{
char sub[1024];
int negated;
int got_positive;
u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
got_positive = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len;) {
/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
if (pattern[i] == '!') {
negated = 1;
i++;
} else
negated = 0;
/*
* Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
* subpattern to lowercase.
*/
for (subi = 0;
i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
subi++, i++)
sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ?
tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
return 0;
/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
i++;
/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
sub[subi] = '\0';
/* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
if (negated)
return -1; /* Negative */
else
got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
}
}
/*
* Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
* match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
*/
return got_positive;
}
+/* Match a list representing users or groups. */
+int
+match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /* Windows usernames may be Unicode and are not case sensitive */
+ return cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(string, pattern);
+#else
+ /* Case sensitive match */
+ return match_pattern_list(string, pattern, 0);
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
*/
int
match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
{
char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
int r;
lowercase(hostcopy);
r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
free(hostcopy);
return r;
}
/*
* returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
* or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on
* successful match.
*/
int
match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *patterns)
{
int mhost, mip;
if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
/* negative hostname match */
if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
return 0;
/* no match at all */
if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
* If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
* Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
*/
int
match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *pattern)
{
char *p, *pat;
int ret;
/* test mode */
if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
- if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
+ if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) == NULL)
return match_pattern(user, pattern);
pat = xstrdup(pattern);
p = strchr(pat, '@');
*p++ = '\0';
if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
free(pat);
return ret;
}
/*
* Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
* caller must free the returned string.
*/
#define MAX_PROP 40
#define SEP ","
char *
match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
{
char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
int i, j, nproposals;
c = cp = xstrdup(client);
s = sp = xstrdup(server);
for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
if (i < MAX_PROP)
sproposals[i] = p;
else
break;
}
nproposals = i;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
ret = xstrdup(p);
if (next != NULL)
*next = (cp == NULL) ?
strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
free(c);
free(s);
return ret;
}
}
}
if (next != NULL)
*next = strlen(c);
free(c);
free(s);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Filter proposal using pattern-list filter.
- * "blacklist" determines sense of filter:
+ * "denylist" determines sense of filter:
* non-zero indicates that items matching filter should be excluded.
* zero indicates that only items matching filter should be included.
* returns NULL on allocation error, otherwise caller must free result.
*/
static char *
-filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int blacklist)
+filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int denylist)
{
size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
char *cp, *tmp;
int r;
if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
free(orig_prop);
free(fix_prop);
return NULL;
}
tmp = orig_prop;
*fix_prop = '\0';
while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
r = match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0);
- if ((blacklist && r != 1) || (!blacklist && r == 1)) {
+ if ((denylist && r != 1) || (!denylist && r == 1)) {
if (*fix_prop != '\0')
strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
}
}
free(orig_prop);
return fix_prop;
}
/*
* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
-match_filter_blacklist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+match_filter_denylist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
return filter_list(proposal, filter, 1);
}
/*
* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, including only entries matching
* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
-match_filter_whitelist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+match_filter_allowlist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
return filter_list(proposal, filter, 0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.h b/crypto/openssh/match.h
index 852b1a5cb164..312ca6e1679c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/match.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.h
@@ -1,29 +1,30 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.18 2018/07/04 13:49:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.20 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef MATCH_H
#define MATCH_H
int match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int);
+int match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *, const char *);
int match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
-char *match_filter_blacklist(const char *, const char *);
-char *match_filter_whitelist(const char *, const char *);
+char *match_filter_denylist(const char *, const char *);
+char *match_filter_allowlist(const char *, const char *);
/* addrmatch.c */
int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.c b/crypto/openssh/misc.c
index bdc06fdb3332..0134d69492e4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.c
@@ -1,2039 +1,2764 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.133 2018/10/05 14:26:09 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.170 2021/09/26 14:01:03 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Henning Brauer <henning@openbsd.org>
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
# include <libgen.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#endif
#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
#include <net/if.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "platform.h"
/* remove newline at end of string */
char *
chop(char *s)
{
char *t = s;
while (*t) {
if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
*t = '\0';
return s;
}
t++;
}
return s;
}
+/* remove whitespace from end of string */
+void
+rtrim(char *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if ((i = strlen(s)) == 0)
+ return;
+ for (i--; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (isspace((int)s[i]))
+ s[i] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
int
set_nonblock(int fd)
{
int val;
val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
- if (val < 0) {
+ if (val == -1) {
error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
return (0);
}
debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
val |= O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd,
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
int
unset_nonblock(int fd)
{
int val;
val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
- if (val < 0) {
+ if (val == -1) {
error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
return (0);
}
debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s",
fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
const char *
ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
{
if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0)
return strerror(errno);
return gai_strerror(gaierr);
}
/* disable nagle on socket */
void
set_nodelay(int fd)
{
int opt;
socklen_t optlen;
optlen = sizeof opt;
if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) {
debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (opt == 1) {
debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd);
return;
}
opt = 1;
debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd);
if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1)
error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT */
int
set_reuseaddr(int fd)
{
int on = 1;
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) {
error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Get/set routing domain */
char *
get_rdomain(int fd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN)
return sys_get_rdomain(fd);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable;
char *ret;
socklen_t len = sizeof(rtable);
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, &len) == -1) {
error("Failed to get routing domain for fd %d: %s",
fd, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
xasprintf(&ret, "%d", rtable);
return ret;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
return NULL;
#endif
}
int
set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN)
return sys_set_rdomain(fd, name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable;
const char *errstr;
if (name == NULL)
return 0; /* default table */
rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
error("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtable, sizeof(rtable)) == -1) {
error("Failed to set routing domain %d on fd %d: %s",
rtable, fd, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
error("Setting routing domain is not supported on this platform");
return -1;
#endif
}
+int
+get_sock_af(int fd)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage to;
+ socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
+
+ memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+ if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) == -1)
+ return -1;
+#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+ if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
+ IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
+ return AF_INET;
+#endif
+ return to.ss_family;
+}
+
+void
+set_sock_tos(int fd, int tos)
+{
+#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
+ int af;
+
+ switch ((af = get_sock_af(fd))) {
+ case -1:
+ /* assume not a socket */
+ break;
+ case AF_INET:
+# ifdef IP_TOS
+ debug3_f("set socket %d IP_TOS 0x%02x", fd, tos);
+ if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
+ &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) {
+ error("setsockopt socket %d IP_TOS %d: %s:",
+ fd, tos, strerror(errno));
+ }
+# endif /* IP_TOS */
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS
+ debug3_f("set socket %d IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", fd, tos);
+ if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS,
+ &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) {
+ error("setsockopt socket %d IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
+ fd, tos, strerror(errno));
+ }
+# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug2_f("unsupported socket family %d", af);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for events on fd. Updates
+ * *timeoutp with time remaining.
+ * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
+ */
+static int
+waitfd(int fd, int *timeoutp, short events)
+{
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+ struct timeval t_start;
+ int oerrno, r;
+
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = events;
+ for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) {
+ monotime_tv(&t_start);
+ r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp);
+ oerrno = errno;
+ ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ if (r > 0)
+ return 0;
+ else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)
+ return -1;
+ else if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ /* timeout */
+ errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates
+ * *timeoutp with time remaining.
+ * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
+ */
+int
+waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) {
+ return waitfd(fd, timeoutp, POLLIN);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt a non-blocking connect(2) to the specified address, waiting up to
+ * *timeoutp milliseconds for the connection to complete. If the timeout is
+ * <=0, then wait indefinitely.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
+ socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
+{
+ int optval = 0;
+ socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval);
+
+ /* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */
+ if (timeoutp == NULL || *timeoutp <= 0)
+ return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+
+ set_nonblock(sockfd);
+ for (;;) {
+ if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) {
+ /* Succeeded already? */
+ unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ else if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (waitfd(sockfd, timeoutp, POLLIN | POLLOUT) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Completed or failed */
+ if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) {
+ debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (optval != 0) {
+ errno = optval;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
#define QUOTE "\""
/* return next token in configuration line */
static char *
strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals)
{
char *old;
int wspace = 0;
if (*s == NULL)
return NULL;
old = *s;
*s = strpbrk(*s,
split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE);
if (*s == NULL)
return (old);
if (*s[0] == '\"') {
memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
/* Find matching quote */
if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
return (NULL); /* no matching quote */
} else {
*s[0] = '\0';
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
return (old);
}
}
/* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=')
wspace = 1;
*s[0] = '\0';
/* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
return (old);
}
/*
* Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace or a
* single '=' character.
*/
char *
strdelim(char **s)
{
return strdelim_internal(s, 1);
}
/*
* Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace only.
*/
char *
strdelimw(char **s)
{
return strdelim_internal(s, 0);
}
struct passwd *
pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
+ copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd == NULL ? "*" : pw->pw_passwd);
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
#endif
copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
#endif
copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
return copy;
}
/*
* Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
* Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
* Return -1 if invalid.
*/
int
a2port(const char *s)
{
struct servent *se;
long long port;
const char *errstr;
port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
if (errstr == NULL)
return (int)port;
if ((se = getservbyname(s, "tcp")) != NULL)
return ntohs(se->s_port);
return -1;
}
int
a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
{
const char *errstr = NULL;
char *sp, *ep;
int tun;
if (remote != NULL) {
*remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
sp = xstrdup(s);
if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
free(sp);
return (a2tun(s, NULL));
}
ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
*remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
free(sp);
return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
}
if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0)
return (SSH_TUNID_ANY);
tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
return (SSH_TUNID_ERR);
return (tun);
}
#define SECONDS 1
#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60)
#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60)
#define DAYS (HOURS * 24)
#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7)
/*
* Convert a time string into seconds; format is
* a sequence of:
* time[qualifier]
*
* Valid time qualifiers are:
* <none> seconds
* s|S seconds
* m|M minutes
* h|H hours
* d|D days
* w|W weeks
*
* Examples:
* 90m 90 minutes
* 1h30m 90 minutes
* 2d 2 days
* 1w 1 week
*
* Return -1 if time string is invalid.
*/
-long
+int
convtime(const char *s)
{
- long total, secs, multiplier = 1;
+ long total, secs, multiplier;
const char *p;
char *endp;
errno = 0;
total = 0;
p = s;
if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
return -1;
while (*p) {
secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
if (p == endp ||
- (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) ||
+ (errno == ERANGE && (secs == INT_MIN || secs == INT_MAX)) ||
secs < 0)
return -1;
+ multiplier = 1;
switch (*endp++) {
case '\0':
endp--;
break;
case 's':
case 'S':
break;
case 'm':
case 'M':
multiplier = MINUTES;
break;
case 'h':
case 'H':
multiplier = HOURS;
break;
case 'd':
case 'D':
multiplier = DAYS;
break;
case 'w':
case 'W':
multiplier = WEEKS;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
- if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier)
+ if (secs > INT_MAX / multiplier)
return -1;
secs *= multiplier;
- if (total >= LONG_MAX - secs)
+ if (total > INT_MAX - secs)
return -1;
total += secs;
if (total < 0)
return -1;
p = endp;
}
return total;
}
+#define TF_BUFS 8
+#define TF_LEN 9
+
+const char *
+fmt_timeframe(time_t t)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ static char tfbuf[TF_BUFS][TF_LEN]; /* ring buffer */
+ static int idx = 0;
+ unsigned int sec, min, hrs, day;
+ unsigned long long week;
+
+ buf = tfbuf[idx++];
+ if (idx == TF_BUFS)
+ idx = 0;
+
+ week = t;
+
+ sec = week % 60;
+ week /= 60;
+ min = week % 60;
+ week /= 60;
+ hrs = week % 24;
+ week /= 24;
+ day = week % 7;
+ week /= 7;
+
+ if (week > 0)
+ snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02lluw%01ud%02uh", week, day, hrs);
+ else if (day > 0)
+ snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%01ud%02uh%02um", day, hrs, min);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02u:%02u:%02u", hrs, min, sec);
+
+ return (buf);
+}
+
/*
* Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
{
char *hoststr;
if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
return(xstrdup(host));
- if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0)
+ if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) == -1)
fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
return hoststr;
}
/*
* Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
* Argument may be modified (for termination).
* Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
* *cp is set to the start of the next field, if one was found.
* The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim.
* If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL.
*/
-static char *
+char *
hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim)
{
char *s, *old;
if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL)
return NULL;
old = s = *cp;
if (*s == '[') {
if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL)
return NULL;
else
s++;
} else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL)
s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */
switch (*s) {
case '\0':
*cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/
break;
case ':':
case '/':
if (delim != NULL)
*delim = *s;
*s = '\0'; /* terminate */
*cp = s + 1;
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
return old;
}
char *
hpdelim(char **cp)
{
return hpdelim2(cp, NULL);
}
char *
cleanhostname(char *host)
{
if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
return (host + 1);
} else
return host;
}
char *
colon(char *cp)
{
int flag = 0;
if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
return NULL;
if (*cp == '[')
flag = 1;
for (; *cp; ++cp) {
if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
flag = 1;
if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
return (cp+1);
if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
return (cp);
if (*cp == '/')
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Parse a [user@]host:[path] string.
* Caller must free returned user, host and path.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If host was not specified then *hostp will be set to NULL.
* If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to ".".
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
parse_user_host_path(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, char **pathp)
{
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
char *sdup, *tmp;
int ret = -1;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (pathp != NULL)
*pathp = NULL;
sdup = xstrdup(s);
/* Check for remote syntax: [user@]host:[path] */
if ((tmp = colon(sdup)) == NULL)
goto out;
/* Extract optional path */
*tmp++ = '\0';
if (*tmp == '\0')
tmp = ".";
path = xstrdup(tmp);
/* Extract optional user and mandatory host */
tmp = strrchr(sdup, '@');
if (tmp != NULL) {
*tmp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(tmp));
if (*sdup != '\0')
user = xstrdup(sdup);
} else {
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(sdup));
user = NULL;
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (pathp != NULL) {
*pathp = path;
path = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(sdup);
free(user);
free(host);
free(path);
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse a [user@]host[:port] string.
* Caller must free returned user and host.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
{
char *sdup, *cp, *tmp;
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL;
int port = -1, ret = -1;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = -1;
if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Extract optional username */
if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
*cp = '\0';
if (*tmp == '\0')
goto out;
if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
tmp = cp + 1;
}
/* Extract mandatory hostname */
if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
goto out;
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
/* Convert and verify optional port */
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
goto out;
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = port;
ret = 0;
out:
free(sdup);
free(user);
free(host);
return ret;
}
/*
* Converts a two-byte hex string to decimal.
* Returns the decimal value or -1 for invalid input.
*/
static int
hexchar(const char *s)
{
unsigned char result[2];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - '0');
else if (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'f')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'a') + 10;
else if (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'F')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'A') + 10;
else
return -1;
}
return (result[0] << 4) | result[1];
}
/*
* Decode an url-encoded string.
* Returns a newly allocated string on success or NULL on failure.
*/
static char *
urldecode(const char *src)
{
char *ret, *dst;
int ch;
ret = xmalloc(strlen(src) + 1);
for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) {
switch (*src) {
case '+':
*dst++ = ' ';
break;
case '%':
if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
(ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
*dst++ = ch;
src += 2;
break;
default:
*dst++ = *src;
break;
}
}
*dst = '\0';
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse an (scp|ssh|sftp)://[user@]host[:port][/path] URI.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04
* Either user or path may be url-encoded (but not host or port).
* Caller must free returned user, host and path.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking)
* but the scheme must always be specified.
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
* If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to NULL.
* Returns 0 on success, 1 if non-uri/wrong scheme, -1 on error/invalid uri.
*/
int
parse_uri(const char *scheme, const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp,
int *portp, char **pathp)
{
char *uridup, *cp, *tmp, ch;
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
int port = -1, ret = -1;
size_t len;
len = strlen(scheme);
if (strncmp(uri, scheme, len) != 0 || strncmp(uri + len, "://", 3) != 0)
return 1;
uri += len + 3;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = -1;
if (pathp != NULL)
*pathp = NULL;
uridup = tmp = xstrdup(uri);
/* Extract optional ssh-info (username + connection params) */
if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
char *delim;
*cp = '\0';
/* Extract username and connection params */
if ((delim = strchr(tmp, ';')) != NULL) {
/* Just ignore connection params for now */
*delim = '\0';
}
if (*tmp == '\0') {
/* Empty username */
goto out;
}
if ((user = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
tmp = cp + 1;
}
/* Extract mandatory hostname */
if ((cp = hpdelim2(&tmp, &ch)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
goto out;
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
if (!valid_domain(host, 0, NULL))
goto out;
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
if (ch == ':') {
/* Convert and verify port. */
if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '/')) != NULL)
*cp = '\0';
if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
goto out;
tmp = cp ? cp + 1 : NULL;
}
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
/* Extract optional path */
if ((path = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = port;
if (pathp != NULL) {
*pathp = path;
path = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(uridup);
free(user);
free(host);
free(path);
return ret;
}
/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
void
addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char *cp;
u_int nalloc;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (r == -1)
fatal("addargs: argument too long");
nalloc = args->nalloc;
if (args->list == NULL) {
nalloc = 32;
args->num = 0;
} else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
nalloc *= 2;
args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
args->nalloc = nalloc;
args->list[args->num++] = cp;
args->list[args->num] = NULL;
}
void
replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char *cp;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (r == -1)
fatal("replacearg: argument too long");
if (which >= args->num)
fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
which, args->num);
free(args->list[which]);
args->list[which] = cp;
}
void
freeargs(arglist *args)
{
u_int i;
if (args->list != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
free(args->list[i]);
free(args->list);
args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
args->list = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
* Warning: this calls getpw*.
*/
-char *
-tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
+int
+tilde_expand(const char *filename, uid_t uid, char **retp)
{
const char *path, *sep;
char user[128], *ret;
struct passwd *pw;
u_int len, slash;
- if (*filename != '~')
- return (xstrdup(filename));
+ if (*filename != '~') {
+ *retp = xstrdup(filename);
+ return 0;
+ }
filename++;
path = strchr(filename, '/');
if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */
slash = path - filename;
- if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
+ if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1) {
+ error_f("~username too long");
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(user, filename, slash);
user[slash] = '\0';
- if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
- } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("No such user %s", user);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) { /* ~/path */
+ error_f("No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
+ return -1;
+ }
/* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/')
sep = "/";
else
sep = "";
/* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
if (path != NULL)
filename = path + 1;
- if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
- fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+ if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX) {
+ error_f("Path too long");
+ return -1;
+ }
- return (ret);
+ *retp = ret;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char *
+tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ if (tilde_expand(filename, uid, &ret) != 0)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ return ret;
}
/*
- * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
- * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
- * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
- * allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes and/or ${ENVIRONMENT}
+ * substitutions. A number of escapes may be specified as
+ * (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must be terminated
+ * by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory allocated by
+ * xmalloc which the caller must free.
*/
-char *
-percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+static char *
+vdollar_percent_expand(int *parseerror, int dollar, int percent,
+ const char *string, va_list ap)
{
#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16
- u_int num_keys, i, j;
+ u_int num_keys = 0, i;
struct {
const char *key;
const char *repl;
} keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
- char buf[4096];
- va_list ap;
+ struct sshbuf *buf;
+ int r, missingvar = 0;
+ char *ret = NULL, *var, *varend, *val;
+ size_t len;
- /* Gather keys */
- va_start(ap, string);
- for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
- keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
- if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
- break;
- keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
- if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
- fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__);
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if (parseerror == NULL)
+ fatal_f("null parseerror arg");
+ *parseerror = 1;
+
+ /* Gather keys if we're doing percent expansion. */
+ if (percent) {
+ for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
+ keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
+ break;
+ keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) {
+ fatal_f("NULL replacement for token %s",
+ keys[num_keys].key);
+ }
+ }
+ if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
+ fatal_f("too many keys");
+ if (num_keys == 0)
+ fatal_f("percent expansion without token list");
}
- if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
- fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__);
- va_end(ap);
/* Expand string */
- *buf = '\0';
for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
- if (*string != '%') {
+ /* Optionally process ${ENVIRONMENT} expansions. */
+ if (dollar && string[0] == '$' && string[1] == '{') {
+ string += 2; /* skip over '${' */
+ if ((varend = strchr(string, '}')) == NULL) {
+ error_f("environment variable '%s' missing "
+ "closing '}'", string);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ len = varend - string;
+ if (len == 0) {
+ error_f("zero-length environment variable");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ var = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ (void)strlcpy(var, string, len + 1);
+ if ((val = getenv(var)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("env var ${%s} has no value", var);
+ missingvar = 1;
+ } else {
+ debug3_f("expand ${%s} -> '%s'", var, val);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, val, strlen(val))) !=0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put ${}");
+ }
+ free(var);
+ string += len;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process percent expansions if we have a list of TOKENs.
+ * If we're not doing percent expansion everything just gets
+ * appended here.
+ */
+ if (*string != '%' || !percent) {
append:
- buf[i++] = *string;
- if (i >= sizeof(buf))
- fatal("%s: string too long", __func__);
- buf[i] = '\0';
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, *string)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 %%");
continue;
}
string++;
/* %% case */
if (*string == '%')
goto append;
- if (*string == '\0')
- fatal("%s: invalid format", __func__);
- for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) {
- if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) {
- i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf));
- if (i >= sizeof(buf))
- fatal("%s: string too long", __func__);
+ if (*string == '\0') {
+ error_f("invalid format");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) {
+ if (strchr(keys[i].key, *string) != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, keys[i].repl,
+ strlen(keys[i].repl))) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put %%-repl");
break;
}
}
- if (j >= num_keys)
- fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string);
+ if (i >= num_keys) {
+ error_f("unknown key %%%c", *string);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
- return (xstrdup(buf));
+ if (!missingvar && (ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+ *parseerror = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return *parseerror ? NULL : ret;
#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
}
+/*
+ * Expand only environment variables.
+ * Note that although this function is variadic like the other similar
+ * functions, any such arguments will be unused.
+ */
+
+char *
+dollar_expand(int *parseerr, const char *string, ...)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ int err;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 0, string, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (parseerr != NULL)
+ *parseerr = err;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is
+ * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid.
+ */
+char *
+percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ int err;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 0, 1, string, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (err)
+ fatal_f("failed");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is
+ * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid.
+ */
+char *
+percent_dollar_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ int err;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 1, string, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (err)
+ fatal_f("failed");
+ return ret;
+}
+
int
tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN)
return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode, ifname));
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD)
struct ifreq ifr;
char name[100];
int fd = -1, sock;
const char *tunbase = "tun";
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
tunbase = "tap";
/* Open the tunnel device */
if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
tunbase, tun);
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
break;
}
} else {
- debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun);
+ debug_f("invalid tunnel %u", tun);
return -1;
}
- if (fd < 0) {
- debug("%s: %s open: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno));
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ debug_f("%s open: %s", name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
+ debug_f("%s mode %d fd %d", name, mode, fd);
/* Bring interface up if it is not already */
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
goto failed;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
- debug("%s: get interface %s flags: %s", __func__,
- ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
+ debug_f("get interface %s flags: %s", ifr.ifr_name,
+ strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
- debug("%s: activate interface %s: %s", __func__,
- ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
+ debug_f("activate interface %s: %s", ifr.ifr_name,
+ strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
}
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = xstrdup(ifr.ifr_name);
close(sock);
return fd;
failed:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock);
return -1;
#else
error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform");
return (-1);
#endif
}
void
sanitise_stdfd(void)
{
int nullfd, dupfd;
if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) {
/* Only populate closed fds. */
if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) {
if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
}
if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
close(nullfd);
}
char *
tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
char b[3], *r;
size_t i, hl;
if (l > 65536)
return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
hl = l * 2 + 1;
r = xcalloc(1, hl);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
strlcat(r, b, hl);
}
return (r);
}
+/*
+ * Extend string *sp by the specified format. If *sp is not NULL (or empty),
+ * then the separator 'sep' will be prepended before the formatted arguments.
+ * Extended strings are heap allocated.
+ */
+void
+xextendf(char **sp, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *tmp1, *tmp2;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&tmp1, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (*sp == NULL || **sp == '\0') {
+ free(*sp);
+ *sp = tmp1;
+ return;
+ }
+ xasprintf(&tmp2, "%s%s%s", *sp, sep == NULL ? "" : sep, tmp1);
+ free(tmp1);
+ free(*sp);
+ *sp = tmp2;
+}
+
+
u_int64_t
get_u64(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int64_t v;
v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
return (v);
}
u_int32_t
get_u32(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int32_t v;
v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
return (v);
}
u_int32_t
get_u32_le(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int32_t v;
v = (u_int32_t)p[0];
v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
return (v);
}
u_int16_t
get_u16(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int16_t v;
v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
return (v);
}
void
put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
}
void
put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms)
{
struct timeval diff, finish;
monotime_tv(&finish);
timersub(&finish, start, &diff);
*ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000);
}
void
ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
{
if (ms < 0)
ms = 0;
tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000;
tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000;
}
void
monotime_ts(struct timespec *ts)
{
struct timeval tv;
#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && (defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || \
defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_REALTIME))
static int gettime_failed = 0;
if (!gettime_failed) {
# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
# ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_MONOTONIC */
# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
/* Not monotonic, but we're almost out of options here. */
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_REALTIME */
debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
gettime_failed = 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (BOOTTIME || MONOTONIC || REALTIME) */
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ts->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ts->tv_nsec = (long)tv.tv_usec * 1000;
}
void
monotime_tv(struct timeval *tv)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
tv->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
tv->tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
}
time_t
monotime(void)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
return ts.tv_sec;
}
double
monotime_double(void)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
return ts.tv_sec + ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000);
}
void
bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen)
{
bw->buflen = buflen;
bw->rate = kbps;
- bw->thresh = bw->rate;
+ bw->thresh = buflen;
bw->lamt = 0;
timerclear(&bw->bwstart);
timerclear(&bw->bwend);
-}
+}
/* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */
void
bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len)
{
u_int64_t waitlen;
struct timespec ts, rm;
+ bw->lamt += read_len;
if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) {
monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
return;
}
-
- bw->lamt += read_len;
if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh)
return;
monotime_tv(&bw->bwend);
timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend);
if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend))
return;
bw->lamt *= 8;
waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate;
bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) {
timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend);
/* Adjust the wait time */
if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) {
bw->thresh /= 2;
if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4)
bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4;
} else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) {
bw->thresh *= 2;
if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8)
bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8;
}
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts);
while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
ts = rm;
}
}
bw->lamt = 0;
monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
}
/* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */
void
mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len)
{
const char *tmpdir;
int r;
if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) {
r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir);
if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len)
return;
}
r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX");
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len)
- fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__);
+ fatal_f("template string too short");
}
static const struct {
const char *name;
int value;
} ipqos[] = {
{ "none", INT_MAX }, /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */
{ "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
{ "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
{ "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
{ "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
{ "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
{ "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
{ "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
{ "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
{ "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
{ "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
{ "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
{ "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
{ "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
{ "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
{ "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
{ "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
{ "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
{ "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
{ "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
{ "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
{ "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
+ { "le", IPTOS_DSCP_LE },
{ "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
{ "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
{ "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
int
parse_ipqos(const char *cp)
{
u_int i;
char *ep;
long val;
if (cp == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0)
return ipqos[i].value;
}
/* Try parsing as an integer */
val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255)
return -1;
return val;
}
const char *
iptos2str(int iptos)
{
int i;
static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"];
for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (ipqos[i].value == iptos)
return ipqos[i].name;
}
snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos);
return iptos_str;
}
void
lowercase(char *s)
{
for (; *s; s++)
*s = tolower((u_char)*s);
}
int
unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
int saved_errno, sock;
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path,
sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
- error("%s: path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket",
- __func__, path);
+ error_f("path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", path);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return -1;
}
sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0) {
+ if (sock == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("%s: socket: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (unlink_first == 1) {
if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT)
error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno));
}
- if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("%s: cannot bind to path %s: %s",
- __func__, path, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("cannot bind to path %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
- if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0) {
+ if (listen(sock, backlog) == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("%s: cannot listen on path %s: %s",
- __func__, path, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("cannot listen on path %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
unlink(path);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
return sock;
}
void
sock_set_v6only(int s)
{
#if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
int on = 1;
debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s);
if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno));
#endif
}
/*
* Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings
* are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise.
*/
static int
strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b)
{
if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL))
return 0;
if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or
* zero otherwise.
*/
int
forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b)
{
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0)
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0)
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0)
return 0;
/* allocated_port and handle are not checked */
return 1;
}
/* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */
int
daemonized(void)
{
int fd;
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) {
close(fd);
return 0; /* have controlling terminal */
}
if (getppid() != 1)
return 0; /* parent is not init */
if (getsid(0) != getpid())
return 0; /* not session leader */
debug3("already daemonized");
return 1;
}
-
/*
* Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
* escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
* and its members.
*/
int
-argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
+argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp, int terminate_on_comment)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
*argvp = NULL;
*argcp = 0;
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
/* Skip leading whitespace */
if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
continue;
-
+ if (terminate_on_comment && s[i] == '#')
+ break;
/* Start of a token */
quote = 0;
- if (s[i] == '\\' &&
- (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
- i++;
- else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
- quote = s[i++];
argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
argv[argc] = NULL;
/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (s[i] == '\\') {
if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
- s[i + 1] == '\\') {
+ s[i + 1] == '\\' ||
+ (quote == 0 && s[i + 1] == ' ')) {
i++; /* Skip '\' */
arg[j++] = s[i];
} else {
/* Unrecognised escape */
arg[j++] = s[i];
}
} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
break; /* done */
+ else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == '\"' || s[i] == '\''))
+ quote = s[i]; /* quote start */
else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
- break; /* done */
+ quote = 0; /* quote end */
else
arg[j++] = s[i];
}
if (s[i] == '\0') {
if (quote != 0) {
/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
break;
}
}
/* Success */
*argcp = argc;
*argvp = argv;
argc = 0;
argv = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
free(argv[i]);
free(argv);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
* necessary. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, j, ws, r;
char c, *ret;
struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
ws = 0;
sshbuf_reset(arg);
for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
r = 0;
c = argv[i][j];
switch (c) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
ws = 1;
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
break;
case '\\':
case '\'':
case '"':
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
break;
}
if (r != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
}
if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
}
if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("malloc failed");
memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
sshbuf_free(buf);
sshbuf_free(arg);
return ret;
}
+char *
+argv_next(int *argcp, char ***argvp)
+{
+ char *ret = (*argvp)[0];
+
+ if (*argcp > 0 && ret != NULL) {
+ (*argcp)--;
+ (*argvp)++;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+argv_consume(int *argcp)
+{
+ *argcp = 0;
+}
+
+void
+argv_free(char **av, int ac)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (av == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ free(av[i]);
+ free(av);
+}
+
/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
int
exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet)
{
int status;
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
- error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ error("%s waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
return -1;
} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
* of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
* of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
*
* XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
*
* Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
* avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
* error buffer plus max size as arguments.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
int
safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
char *cp;
int comparehome = 0;
struct stat st;
if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
comparehome = 1;
if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
return -1;
}
if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
(stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
buf);
return -1;
}
/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
for (;;) {
if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
return -1;
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 ||
(!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen,
"bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
return -1;
}
/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
break;
/*
* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
*/
if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
* avoid races.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
int
safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
char *err, size_t errlen)
{
struct stat st;
/* check the open file to avoid races */
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
file, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
}
/*
* Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
* already exists, its value is overridden.
*/
void
child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value)
{
char **env;
u_int envsize;
u_int i, namelen;
if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
return;
}
/*
* If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
* entry before continuing.
*/
if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
*envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
*envp[0] = NULL;
*envsizep = 1;
}
/*
* Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable
* already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
* at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
*/
env = *envp;
namelen = strlen(name);
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
break;
if (env[i]) {
/* Reuse the slot. */
free(env[i]);
} else {
/* New variable. Expand if necessary. */
envsize = *envsizep;
if (i >= envsize - 1) {
if (envsize >= 1000)
fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
envsize += 50;
env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
*envsizep = envsize;
}
/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
env[i + 1] = NULL;
}
/* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
/* XXX xasprintf */
env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
}
/*
* Check and optionally lowercase a domain name, also removes trailing '.'
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure, storing an error message in errstr.
*/
int
valid_domain(char *name, int makelower, const char **errstr)
{
size_t i, l = strlen(name);
u_char c, last = '\0';
static char errbuf[256];
if (l == 0) {
strlcpy(errbuf, "empty domain name", sizeof(errbuf));
goto bad;
}
if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name \"%.100s\" "
"starts with invalid character", name);
goto bad;
}
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
c = tolower((u_char)name[i]);
if (makelower)
name[i] = (char)c;
if (last == '.' && c == '.') {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
"\"%.100s\" contains consecutive separators", name);
goto bad;
}
if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) &&
c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
"\"%.100s\" contains invalid characters", name);
goto bad;
}
last = c;
}
if (name[l - 1] == '.')
name[l - 1] = '\0';
if (errstr != NULL)
*errstr = NULL;
return 1;
bad:
if (errstr != NULL)
*errstr = errbuf;
return 0;
}
/*
* Verify that a environment variable name (not including initial '$') is
* valid; consisting of one or more alphanumeric or underscore characters only.
* Returns 1 on valid, 0 otherwise.
*/
int
valid_env_name(const char *name)
{
const char *cp;
if (name[0] == '\0')
return 0;
for (cp = name; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)*cp) && *cp != '_')
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
const char *
atoi_err(const char *nptr, int *val)
{
const char *errstr = NULL;
long long num;
if (nptr == NULL || *nptr == '\0')
return "missing";
num = strtonum(nptr, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr == NULL)
*val = (int)num;
return errstr;
}
int
parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
{
struct tm tm;
time_t tt;
char buf[32], *fmt;
*tp = 0;
/*
* POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
* is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
* any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
*/
switch (strlen(s)) {
case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
break;
case 12: /* YYYYMMDDHHMM */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s",
s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10);
break;
case 14: /* YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s",
s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12);
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* success */
*tp = (uint64_t)tt;
return 0;
}
+/* On OpenBSD time_t is int64_t which is long long. */
+/* #define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX */
+
void
format_absolute_time(uint64_t t, char *buf, size_t len)
{
- time_t tt = t > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : t; /* XXX revisit in 2038 :P */
+ time_t tt = t > SSH_TIME_T_MAX ? SSH_TIME_T_MAX : t;
struct tm tm;
localtime_r(&tt, &tm);
strftime(buf, len, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm);
}
+
+/* check if path is absolute */
+int
+path_absolute(const char *path)
+{
+ return (*path == '/') ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+void
+skip_space(char **cpp)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ *cpp = cp;
+}
+
+/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
+
+/*
+ * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
+ * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
+ * if negated option matches.
+ * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
+ * point to the first character after the option.
+ */
+int
+opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp)
+{
+ size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
+ const char *opts = *optsp;
+ int negate = 0;
+
+ if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
+ opts += 3;
+ negate = 1;
+ }
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
+ *optsp = opts + opt_len;
+ return negate ? 0 : 1;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+char *
+opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp)
+{
+ const char *s = *sp;
+ char *ret;
+ size_t i;
+
+ *errstrp = NULL;
+ if (*s != '"') {
+ *errstrp = "missing start quote";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s++;
+ if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) {
+ *errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) {
+ if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"')
+ s++;
+ ret[i++] = *s++;
+ }
+ if (*s == '\0') {
+ *errstrp = "missing end quote";
+ free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret[i] = '\0';
+ s++;
+ *sp = s;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term)
+{
+ if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 &&
+ (*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') {
+ *opts += strlen(term) + 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+opt_array_append2(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
+ char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp, const char *s, int i)
+{
+
+ if (*lp >= INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive);
+
+ if (iarray != NULL) {
+ *iarray = xrecallocarray(*iarray, *lp, *lp + 1,
+ sizeof(**iarray));
+ (*iarray)[*lp] = i;
+ }
+
+ *array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array));
+ (*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s);
+ (*lp)++;
+}
+
+void
+opt_array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
+ char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s)
+{
+ opt_array_append2(file, line, directive, array, NULL, lp, s, 0);
+}
+
+sshsig_t
+ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa, osa;
+
+ /* mask all other signals while in handler */
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sa.sa_handler = handler;
+ sigfillset(&sa.sa_mask);
+#if defined(SA_RESTART) && !defined(NO_SA_RESTART)
+ if (signum != SIGALRM)
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+#endif
+ if (sigaction(signum, &sa, &osa) == -1) {
+ debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(signum), strerror(errno));
+ return SIG_ERR;
+ }
+ return osa.sa_handler;
+}
+
+int
+stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+{
+ int devnull, ret = 0;
+
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ error_f("open %s: %s", _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((do_stdin && dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+ (do_stdout && dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) ||
+ (do_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)) {
+ error_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
+ * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
+ * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
+ * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
+ * "tag" is prepended to log messages.
+ * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
+ * av[0].
+ */
+pid_t
+subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
+ struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *cp, errmsg[512];
+ u_int nenv = 0;
+ char **env = NULL;
+
+ /* If dropping privs, then must specify user and restore function */
+ if (drop_privs != NULL && (pw == NULL || restore_privs == NULL)) {
+ error("%s: inconsistent arguments", tag); /* XXX fatal? */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (pw == NULL && (pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: no user for current uid", tag);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (child != NULL)
+ *child = NULL;
+
+ debug3_f("%s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)",
+ tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
+
+ /* Check consistency */
+ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
+ (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
+ error_f("inconsistent flags");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
+ error_f("inconsistent flags/output");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
+ * and appears safe-ish to execute
+ */
+ if (!path_absolute(av[0])) {
+ error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (drop_privs != NULL)
+ drop_privs(pw);
+ if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) {
+ error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
+ av[0], strerror(errno));
+ goto restore_return;
+ }
+ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH) == 0 &&
+ safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+ error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
+ goto restore_return;
+ }
+ /* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
+ if (pipe(p) == -1) {
+ error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ restore_return:
+ if (restore_privs != NULL)
+ restore_privs();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (restore_privs != NULL)
+ restore_privs();
+
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1: /* error */
+ error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ close(p[1]);
+ return 0;
+ case 0: /* child */
+ /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
+ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV) == 0) {
+ nenv = 5;
+ env = xcalloc(sizeof(*env), nenv);
+ child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+ child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+ if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LANG", cp);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < NSIG; i++)
+ ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
+ fd = -1;
+ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
+ fd = p[1];
+ else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
+ fd = devnull;
+ if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ if (geteuid() == 0 &&
+ initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
+ pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) {
+ error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
+ dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (env != NULL)
+ execve(av[0], av, env);
+ else
+ execv(av[0], av);
+ error("%s %s \"%s\": %s", tag, env == NULL ? "execv" : "execve",
+ command, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(127);
+ default: /* parent */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ close(p[1]);
+ if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
+ close(p[0]);
+ else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ /* Don't leave zombie child */
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ ;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ debug3_f("%s pid %ld", tag, (long)pid);
+ if (child != NULL)
+ *child = f;
+ return pid;
+}
+
+const char *
+lookup_env_in_list(const char *env, char * const *envs, size_t nenvs)
+{
+ size_t i, envlen;
+
+ envlen = strlen(env);
+ for (i = 0; i < nenvs; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(envs[i], env, envlen) == 0 &&
+ envs[i][envlen] == '=') {
+ return envs[i] + envlen + 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.h b/crypto/openssh/misc.h
index 31b207a8d9d9..2e2dca54bf45 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/misc.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.h
@@ -1,175 +1,232 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.75 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.98 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef _MISC_H
#define _MISC_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
struct Forward {
char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */
int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */
char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */
char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */
int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */
int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
};
int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *);
int daemonized(void);
/* Common server and client forwarding options. */
struct ForwardOptions {
int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */
int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */
};
/* misc.c */
char *chop(char *);
+void rtrim(char *);
+void skip_space(char **);
char *strdelim(char **);
char *strdelimw(char **);
int set_nonblock(int);
int unset_nonblock(int);
void set_nodelay(int);
int set_reuseaddr(int);
char *get_rdomain(int);
int set_rdomain(int, const char *);
+int get_sock_af(int);
+void set_sock_tos(int, int);
+int waitrfd(int, int *);
+int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t, int *);
int a2port(const char *);
int a2tun(const char *, int *);
char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
+char *hpdelim2(char **, char *);
char *hpdelim(char **);
char *cleanhostname(char *);
char *colon(char *);
int parse_user_host_path(const char *, char **, char **, char **);
int parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
int parse_uri(const char *, const char *, char **, char **, int *, char **);
-long convtime(const char *);
+int convtime(const char *);
+const char *fmt_timeframe(time_t t);
+int tilde_expand(const char *, uid_t, char **);
char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
+
+char *dollar_expand(int *, const char *string, ...);
char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
+char *percent_dollar_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
char *tohex(const void *, size_t);
+void xextendf(char **s, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)));
void sanitise_stdfd(void);
void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
void monotime_ts(struct timespec *);
void monotime_tv(struct timeval *);
time_t monotime(void);
double monotime_double(void);
void lowercase(char *s);
int unix_listener(const char *, int, int);
int valid_domain(char *, int, const char **);
int valid_env_name(const char *);
const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *);
int parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *);
void format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t);
+int path_absolute(const char *);
+int stdfd_devnull(int, int, int);
void sock_set_v6only(int);
struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
+typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *);
+typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
+#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */
+#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */
+#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */
+#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH (1<<3) /* Don't check for safe cmd */
+#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV (1<<4) /* Keep parent environment */
+pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
+ struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
+
typedef struct arglist arglist;
struct arglist {
char **list;
u_int num;
u_int nalloc;
};
void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
void freeargs(arglist *);
int tun_open(int, int, char **);
/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00
#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01
#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02
#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT
#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
#define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff
#define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
#define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */
#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2
/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
u_int64_t get_u64(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
u_int32_t get_u32(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
u_int16_t get_u16(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */
u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
struct bwlimit {
size_t buflen;
- u_int64_t rate, thresh, lamt;
+ u_int64_t rate; /* desired rate in kbit/s */
+ u_int64_t thresh; /* threshold after which we'll check timers */
+ u_int64_t lamt; /* amount written in last timer interval */
struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
};
void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t);
void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t);
int parse_ipqos(const char *);
const char *iptos2str(int);
void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t);
void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
- const char *value);
+ const char *value);
+const char *lookup_env_in_list(const char *env,
+ char * const *envs, size_t nenvs);
-int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***);
+int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***, int);
char *argv_assemble(int, char **argv);
+char *argv_next(int *, char ***);
+void argv_consume(int *);
+void argv_free(char **, int);
+
int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int);
struct stat;
int safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
- char *, size_t);
+ char *, size_t);
int safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *,
- char *err, size_t errlen);
+ char *err, size_t errlen);
+
+/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
+int opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp);
+char *opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp);
+int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term);
+
+/* readconf/servconf option lists */
+void opt_array_append(const char *file, const int line,
+ const char *directive, char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s);
+void opt_array_append2(const char *file, const int line,
+ const char *directive, char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp,
+ const char *s, int i);
/* readpass.c */
#define RP_ECHO 0x0001
#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002
#define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004
#define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008
+struct notifier_ctx;
+
char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+struct notifier_ctx *notify_start(int, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
#define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+typedef void (*sshsig_t)(int);
+sshsig_t ssh_signal(int, sshsig_t);
+
#endif /* _MISC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli b/crypto/openssh/moduli
index 372c382a270c..81afe331b3b6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/moduli
+++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli
@@ -1,428 +1,450 @@
-# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.22 2018/09/20 08:07:03 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.30 2021/05/17 07:22:45 dtucker Exp $
# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
-20180403031539 2 6 100 2047 5 F78A3F3A47AFE34101F186DF022B970FB51586E65B1D1875E41D02EDDD4BDF6D6D8BA1CC296EA6A8BD7036297A0C01C636A55493E3ADEC2F1DAB9D8D7E0CCD39D7FFC9D4011C3F57A944AA1EEB1AC1784E28ACF7B6FB3AC49185F4E638B567DA6B4903CB8C6D815ED1253D512670FAF71E6BF1ED6669863B552B3BB2173A7F16262454142B7B928F91E60EED00BDFA465F2C46665BD30C1426F9B8D9611D086D6BAB672CB472E8F8E6990F623C2E7458991D982E199BB168C93F96F71974181F898D6C56C02D9DABA852E7E51CA0DC723255B49CAA122D2A6CC64F1389128A0E3298B0E155EC8A4D9BF1D1671B808DDD835015381C1F16C35A84D20A591E4B57
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
-20180403033427 2 6 100 2047 5 F78A3F3A47AFE34101F186DF022B970FB51586E65B1D1875E41D02EDDD4BDF6D6D8BA1CC296EA6A8BD7036297A0C01C636A55493E3ADEC2F1DAB9D8D7E0CCD39D7FFC9D4011C3F57A944AA1EEB1AC1784E28ACF7B6FB3AC49185F4E638B567DA6B4903CB8C6D815ED1253D512670FAF71E6BF1ED6669863B552B3BB2173A7F16262454142B7B928F91E60EED00BDFA465F2C46665BD30C1426F9B8D9611D086D6BAB672CB472E8F8E6990F623C2E7458991D982E199BB168C93F96F71974181F898D6C56C02D9DABA852E7E51CA0DC723255B49CAA122D2A6CC64F1389128A0E3298B0E155EC8A4D9BF1D1671B808DDD835015381C1F16C35A84D20A5B9F8E27
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
-20180403033742 2 6 100 2047 2 F78A3F3A47AFE34101F186DF022B970FB51586E65B1D1875E41D02EDDD4BDF6D6D8BA1CC296EA6A8BD7036297A0C01C636A55493E3ADEC2F1DAB9D8D7E0CCD39D7FFC9D4011C3F57A944AA1EEB1AC1784E28ACF7B6FB3AC49185F4E638B567DA6B4903CB8C6D815ED1253D512670FAF71E6BF1ED6669863B552B3BB2173A7F16262454142B7B928F91E60EED00BDFA465F2C46665BD30C1426F9B8D9611D086D6BAB672CB472E8F8E6990F623C2E7458991D982E199BB168C93F96F71974181F898D6C56C02D9DABA852E7E51CA0DC723255B49CAA122D2A6CC64F1389128A0E3298B0E155EC8A4D9BF1D1671B808DDD835015381C1F16C35A84D20A5C172DBB
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
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli.c b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
index 233cba8e881a..8dd36b1cf231 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
@@ -1,808 +1,813 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.32 2017/12/08 03:45:52 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.37 2019/11/15 06:00:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
* Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
* Copyright 2000 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX
*
* Sieve candidates for "safe" primes,
* suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli;
* that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime.
*
* First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive)
* Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive)
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/*
* File output defines
*/
/* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */
#define QLINESIZE (100+8192)
/*
* Size: decimal.
* Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M).
* WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N.
*/
#define QSIZE_MINIMUM (511)
/*
* Prime sieving defines
*/
/* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */
#define SHIFT_BIT (3)
#define SHIFT_BYTE (2)
#define SHIFT_WORD (SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE)
#define SHIFT_MEGABYTE (20)
#define SHIFT_MEGAWORD (SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE)
/*
* Using virtual memory can cause thrashing. This should be the largest
* number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity --
* that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks!
*/
#define LARGE_MINIMUM (8UL) /* megabytes */
/*
* Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size.
* Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits).
*/
#define LARGE_MAXIMUM (127UL) /* megabytes */
/*
* Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime
* has to be less than 2**32.
*/
#define SMALL_MAXIMUM (0xffffffffUL)
/* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */
#define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16)
/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
#define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16)
#define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
/* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
#define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
/* bit operations on 32-bit words */
#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
#define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
#define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
/*
* Prime testing defines
*/
/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
#define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4)
/*
* Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
*/
/* sieve 2**16 */
static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits;
/* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */
static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase;
/* sieve relative to the initial value */
static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers;
static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */
static BIGNUM *largebase;
int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
unsigned long);
/*
* print moduli out in consistent form,
*/
static int
qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries,
u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus)
{
struct tm *gtm;
time_t time_now;
int res;
time(&time_now);
gtm = gmtime(&time_now);
+ if (gtm == NULL)
+ return -1;
res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ",
gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday,
gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec,
otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator);
if (res < 0)
return (-1);
if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1)
return (-1);
res = fprintf(ofile, "\n");
fflush(ofile);
return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1);
}
/*
** Sieve p's and q's with small factors
*/
static void
sieve_large(u_int32_t s)
{
u_int32_t r, u;
debug3("sieve_large %u", s);
largetries++;
/* r = largebase mod s */
r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s);
if (r == 0)
u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */
else
u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */
if (u < largebits * 2) {
/*
* The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that
* largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in
* increments of 2*s
*/
if (u & 0x1)
u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */
/* Mark all multiples of 2*s */
for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s)
BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
}
/* r = p mod s */
r = (2 * r + 1) % s;
if (r == 0)
u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */
else
u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */
if (u < largebits * 4) {
/*
* The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that
* largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in
* increments of 4*s
*/
while (u & 0x3) {
if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s)
return;
u += s;
}
/* Mark all multiples of 4*s */
for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s)
BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
}
}
/*
* list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2)
* to standard output.
* The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
*/
int
gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
{
BIGNUM *q;
u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
time_t time_start, time_stop;
u_int32_t i;
int ret = 0;
largememory = memory;
if (memory != 0 &&
(memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated.
* This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p.
*/
if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) {
error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM);
return (-1);
} else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) {
error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM);
return (-1);
}
power--; /* decrement before squaring */
/*
* The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the
* density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range
* to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not
* guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime.
*/
largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER));
/*
* Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all
* of it.
*/
if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) {
logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB",
largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM;
}
if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) {
logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes",
largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
} else if (largememory > 0) {
logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes",
largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
}
TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
/*
* dynamically determine available memory
*/
while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL)
largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */
largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD;
largenumbers = largebits * 2; /* even numbers excluded */
/* validation check: count the number of primes tried */
largetries = 0;
if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
/*
* Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use
* specified parameter.
*/
if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
if (start == NULL) {
if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_rand failed");
} else {
if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL)
fatal("BN_copy: failed");
}
/* ensure odd */
if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0)
fatal("BN_set_bit: failed");
time(&time_start);
logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start),
largenumbers, power);
debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase));
/*
* TinySieve
*/
for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
/* The next tiny prime */
t = 2 * i + 3;
/* Mark all multiples of t */
for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t)
BIT_SET(TinySieve, j);
sieve_large(t);
}
/*
* Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid
* fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
*/
for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
/* The next tiny prime */
t = 2 * i + 3;
r = smallbase % t;
if (r == 0) {
s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */
} else {
/* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */
s = t - r;
}
/*
* The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that
* smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve
* in increments of 2*t
*/
if (s & 1)
s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */
/* Mark all multiples of 2*t */
for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t)
BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s);
}
/*
* SmallSieve
*/
for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) {
if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i))
continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */
/* The next small prime */
sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase);
}
memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
}
time(&time_stop);
logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %lld seconds",
ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long long)(time_stop - time_start));
for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) {
if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j))
continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */
debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j);
if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0)
fatal("BN_set_word failed");
if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0)
fatal("BN_add failed");
if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN,
MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries,
(power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) {
ret = -1;
break;
}
r++; /* count q */
}
time(&time_stop);
free(LargeSieve);
free(SmallSieve);
free(TinySieve);
logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r);
return (ret);
}
static void
write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno)
{
FILE *fp;
char tmp[PATH_MAX];
int r;
r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile);
- if (r == -1 || r >= PATH_MAX) {
+ if (r < 0 || r >= PATH_MAX) {
logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long");
return;
}
if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) {
logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) {
logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno));
unlink(tmp);
close(r);
return;
}
if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0
&& rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0)
debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'",
(unsigned long)lineno, cpfile);
else
logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
strerror(errno));
}
static unsigned long
read_checkpoint(char *cpfile)
{
FILE *fp;
unsigned long lineno = 0;
if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL)
return 0;
if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1)
logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile);
else
logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno);
fclose(fp);
return lineno;
}
static unsigned long
count_lines(FILE *f)
{
unsigned long count = 0;
char lp[QLINESIZE + 1];
if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) {
debug("input file is not seekable");
return ULONG_MAX;
}
while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL)
count++;
rewind(f);
debug("input file has %lu lines", count);
return count;
}
static char *
fmt_time(time_t seconds)
{
int day, hr, min;
static char buf[128];
min = (seconds / 60) % 60;
hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24;
day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24;
if (day > 0)
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min);
else
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min);
return buf;
}
static void
print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno,
unsigned long end_lineno)
{
static time_t time_start, time_prev;
time_t time_now, elapsed;
unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta;
double time_per_line;
char *eta_str;
time_now = monotime();
if (time_start == 0) {
time_start = time_prev = time_now;
return;
}
/* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */
if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60)
return;
time_prev = time_now;
elapsed = time_now - time_start;
processed = current_lineno - start_lineno;
remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno;
num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno;
time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed;
/* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */
time(&time_now);
if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) {
logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now),
processed, fmt_time(elapsed));
return;
}
percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process;
eta = time_per_line * remaining;
eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta));
logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s",
ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent,
fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str);
free(eta_str);
}
/*
* perform a Miller-Rabin primality test
* on the list of candidates
* (checking both q and p)
* The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes
*/
int
prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted,
char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines)
{
BIGNUM *q, *p, *a;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
char *cp, *lp;
u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0;
u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size;
unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno;
time_t time_start, time_stop;
- int res;
+ int res, is_prime;
if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) {
error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM);
return (-1);
}
if (num_lines == 0)
end_lineno = count_lines(in);
else
end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines;
time(&time_start);
if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_CTX_new failed");
debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)",
ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted);
if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file);
last_processed = start_lineno = MAXIMUM(last_processed, start_lineno);
if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX)
debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed);
else
debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed,
end_lineno);
res = 0;
lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1);
while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) {
count_in++;
if (count_in <= last_processed) {
debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or "
"specified start line", count_in);
continue;
}
if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in);
print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno);
if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') {
debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in);
continue;
}
/* XXX - fragile parser */
/* time */
cp = &lp[14]; /* (skip) */
/* type */
in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
/* tests */
in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) {
debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in);
continue;
}
/* tries */
in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
/* size (most significant bit) */
in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
/* generator (hex) */
generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16);
/* Skip white space */
cp += strspn(cp, " ");
/* modulus (hex) */
switch (in_type) {
case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN:
debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type);
a = q;
if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
/* p = 2*q + 1 */
if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_lshift failed");
if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_add_word failed");
in_size += 1;
generator_known = 0;
break;
case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED:
case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE:
case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR:
case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG:
case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type);
a = p;
if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
/* q = (p-1) / 2 */
if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_rshift failed");
break;
default:
debug2("Unknown prime type");
break;
}
/*
* due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
* the proposed bit size.
*/
if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
continue;
}
if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) {
debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size);
continue;
}
if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN)
in_tries += trials;
else
in_tries = trials;
/*
* guess unknown generator
*/
if (generator_known == 0) {
if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11)
generator_known = 2;
- else if (BN_mod_word(p, 12) == 5)
- generator_known = 3;
else {
u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10);
if (r == 3 || r == 7)
generator_known = 5;
}
}
/*
* skip tests when desired generator doesn't match
*/
if (generator_wanted > 0 &&
generator_wanted != generator_known) {
debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d",
count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted);
continue;
}
/*
* Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so
* skip those.
*/
if (generator_known == 0) {
debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in);
continue;
}
count_possible++;
/*
* The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is
* extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time
* really verifying that q is prime until after we know
* that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the
* vast majority of composite q's.
*/
- if (BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, ctx, NULL) <= 0) {
+ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, NULL, NULL);
+ if (is_prime < 0)
+ fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
+ if (is_prime == 0) {
debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test",
count_in);
continue;
}
/*
* q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure
* that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do
* the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that
* will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it
* doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count.
*/
- if (!BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, ctx, NULL)) {
+ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, NULL, NULL);
+ if (is_prime < 0)
+ fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
+ if (is_prime == 0) {
debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in);
continue;
}
debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in);
/* recheck q more rigorously */
- if (!BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, ctx, NULL)) {
+ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, NULL, NULL);
+ if (is_prime < 0)
+ fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
+ if (is_prime == 0) {
debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in);
continue;
}
debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in);
if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE,
in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN,
in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) {
res = -1;
break;
}
count_out++;
}
time(&time_stop);
free(lp);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(q);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
unlink(checkpoint_file);
logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds",
ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible,
(long) (time_stop - time_start));
return (res);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
index 531b2993ab6b..74c803e15ad3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -1,1875 +1,1941 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.186 2018/07/20 03:46:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.228 2021/08/11 05:20:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
#endif
/* Imports */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
-extern u_char session_id[];
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
/* State exported from the child */
static struct sshbuf *child_state;
/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
-int mm_answer_moduli(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_authserv(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_authpassword(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_keyverify(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pty(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_term(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_sesskey(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_sessid(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#ifdef USE_PAM
-int mm_answer_pam_start(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pam_account(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pam_query(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
-int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-int mm_answer_audit_event(int, struct sshbuf *);
-int mm_answer_audit_command(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
-static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-
static Authctxt *authctxt;
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
-static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
static char *auth_method = "unknown";
static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
struct mon_table {
enum monitor_reqtype type;
int flags;
- int (*f)(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
};
#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
+static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
+ struct mon_table **);
+static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
#ifdef USE_PAM
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
#ifdef GSSAPI
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
static void
monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
{
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type) {
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
return;
}
ent++;
}
}
static void
monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
{
struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
}
ent++;
}
}
void
-monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct mon_table *ent;
int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
debug3("preauth child monitor started");
if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- authctxt = _authctxt;
+ authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
partial = 0;
auth_method = "unknown";
auth_submethod = NULL;
auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
- authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+ authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
+ mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
- debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
- auth_method);
+ debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
}
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
- fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
- __func__, ent->type);
+ fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
+ ent->type);
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
__func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(
- pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+ ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif
}
if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
+ auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
if (!partial && !authenticated)
authctxt->failures++;
if (authenticated || partial) {
auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
}
}
}
if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+ fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
- fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
+ fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
- debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
- __func__, authctxt->user);
+ debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
- mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+ mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
;
if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
}
static void
monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
{
monitor_child_pid = pid;
}
static void
monitor_child_handler(int sig)
{
kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
}
void
-monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
#ifdef SIGXFSZ
- signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
}
for (;;)
- monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
+ monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
}
static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct sshbuf *logmsg;
- u_int len, level;
+ u_int len, level, forced;
char *msg;
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
/* Read length */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
+ debug_f("child log fd closed");
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
return -1;
}
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
- fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
+ fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
/* Read severity, message */
sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
- fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
/* Log it */
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- __func__, level);
- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+ fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+ sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
free(msg);
return 0;
}
-int
-monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+static int
+monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
struct mon_table **pent)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, ret;
u_char type;
struct pollfd pfd[2];
for (;;) {
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
- fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (pfd[1].revents) {
/*
* Drain all log messages before processing next
* monitor request.
*/
monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
continue;
}
if (pfd[0].revents)
break; /* Continues below */
}
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
- debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type)
break;
ent++;
}
if (ent->f != NULL) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
- fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
- type);
- ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+ fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
+ ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
- debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
- type);
+ debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
}
if (pent != NULL)
*pent = ent;
return ret;
}
- fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
/* NOTREACHED */
return (-1);
}
/* allowed key state */
static int
-monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
{
/* make sure key is allowed */
if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
return (0);
return (1);
}
static void
monitor_reset_key_state(void)
{
/* reset state */
free(key_blob);
free(hostbased_cuser);
free(hostbased_chost);
sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
key_blob = NULL;
key_bloblen = 0;
key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
key_opts = NULL;
hostbased_cuser = NULL;
hostbased_chost = NULL;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
-mm_answer_moduli(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
DH *dh;
const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
int r;
u_int min, want, max;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
+ debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
- fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
+ fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
sshbuf_reset(m);
dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
if (dh == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
return (0);
} else {
/* Send first bignum */
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
DH_free(dh);
}
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
return (0);
}
#endif
int
-mm_answer_sign(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
int r, is_proof = 0;
u_int keyid, compat;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
- debug3("%s", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (keyid > INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
+ fatal_f("invalid key ID");
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
*
* Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
* proof.
*
* XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
* it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
* than the full kex structure...
*/
if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
/*
* Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
* the client sent us.
*/
if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
- fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
+ fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
- "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
- __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
+ fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
+ datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
is_proof = 1;
}
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (session_id2_len == 0) {
session_id2_len = datlen;
session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
- compat)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sign");
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
- p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
} else
- fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
- debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
- is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
+ debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
+ is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
free(alg);
free(p);
free(signature);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
return (0);
}
-/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+#define PUTPW(b, id) \
+ do { \
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
+ &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
+ } while (0)
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
int
-mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char *username;
struct passwd *pwent;
int r, allowed = 0;
u_int i;
- debug3("%s", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
- fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
+ fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
+ pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
free(username);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (pwent == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
goto out;
}
allowed = 1;
authctxt->pw = pwent;
authctxt->valid = 1;
- /* XXX don't sent pwent to unpriv; send fake class/dir/shell too */
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(*pwent))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
+ /* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
+ PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
+ PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+ PUTPW(m, pw_change);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+ PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
#endif
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
out:
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (options.x != NULL) { \
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
- } \
+ if (options.x != NULL && \
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
/* Create valid auth method lists */
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
/*
* The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
* authentication to succeed.
*/
- debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
+ debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
}
- debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
+ debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
#endif
return (0);
}
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *banner;
int r;
sshbuf_reset(m);
banner = auth2_read_banner();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
free(banner);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r;
monitor_permit_authentications(1);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
free(authctxt->style);
authctxt->style = NULL;
}
return (0);
}
+/*
+ * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
+ * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
+ * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *list)
+{
+ char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
+ int found = 0;
+
+ l = ol;
+ for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
+ if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
+ }
+
+ free(ol);
+ return found;
+}
+
int
-mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
static int call_count;
char *passwd;
int r, authenticated;
size_t plen;
if (!options.password_authentication)
- fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(ssh, passwd);
- explicit_bzero(passwd, plen);
- free(passwd);
+ freezero(passwd, plen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble PAM");
#endif
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
auth_method = "none";
else
auth_method = "password";
/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
int
-mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name, *infotxt;
u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
char **prompts;
int r;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
- fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
&prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (success) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
}
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+ debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if (success) {
free(name);
free(infotxt);
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
}
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *response;
int r, authok;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
- fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
+ fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ authok = options.kbd_interactive_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
- debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
+ debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
free(response);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
int
-mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
- start_pam(authctxt);
+ start_pam(ssh);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int ret;
int r;
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__);
ret = do_pam_account();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
return (ret);
}
static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
int
-mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int ok = 0;
int r;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL)
fatal("%s: already called", __func__);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1);
ok = 1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info,
&num, &prompts, &echo_on);
if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
fatal("sshpam_device.query failed");
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(name);
free(info);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(prompts[i]);
}
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char **resp;
u_int i, num;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (num > 0) {
resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
free(resp[i]);
free(resp);
} else {
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
if (ret == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
/* Allow another attempt */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return r;
}
#endif
int
-mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *cuser, *chost;
u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
- enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+ u_int type = 0;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
- debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
- fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
+ (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
+ fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key");
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
auth_method = "publickey";
if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
break;
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
- if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
- options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1)
+ if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
break;
allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
auth_method = "hostbased";
if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
break;
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
- if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
- options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1)
+ if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
+ options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
break;
- allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
cuser, chost);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type);
break;
}
}
- debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
- auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
+ debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
+ pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
(key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
monitor_reset_key_state();
if (allowed) {
/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
key_blobtype = type;
key_opts = opts;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
hostbased_chost = chost;
} else {
/* Log failed attempt */
- auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
+ auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
}
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if (!allowed)
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return (0);
}
static int
-monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
char *userstyle, *cp;
size_t len;
u_char type;
int r, fail = 0;
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len < session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
"expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
if (type == 0)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
static int
-monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
- char *chost)
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+ const char *cuser, const char *chost)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
char *cp, *userstyle;
size_t len;
int r, fail = 0;
u_char type;
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
"expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
cp[len - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
/* verify client user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
int
-mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct sshkey *key;
- u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- char *sigalg;
+ const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
- int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
+ int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
+ int encoded_ret;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
if (*sigalg == '\0') {
free(sigalg);
sigalg = NULL;
}
/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
- valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
auth_method = "publickey";
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
default:
valid_data = 0;
break;
}
if (!valid_data)
- fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+ fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
+ key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
+ (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
- sigalg, active_state->compat);
- debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s", __func__, auth_method, key,
- (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+ sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
+ debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key),
+ (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+ (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
+
+ if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
+ req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+ !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
+ if (req_presence &&
+ (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+ "port %d rejected: user presence "
+ "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
+ sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+ req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
+ if (req_verify &&
+ (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+ "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
+ "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
- free(blob);
- free(signature);
- free(data);
- free(sigalg);
-
if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
monitor_reset_key_state();
- sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+ if (sig_details != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
+ }
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+ free(sigalg);
+ free(fp);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+
return ret == 0;
}
static void
-mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
static void
mm_session_close(Session *s)
{
- debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
session_unused(s->self);
}
int
-mm_answer_pty(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
Session *s;
int r, res, fd0;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
sshbuf_reset(m);
s = session_new();
if (s == NULL)
goto error;
s->authctxt = authctxt;
s->pw = authctxt->pw;
s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
if (res == 0)
goto error;
pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
/* We need to trick ttyslot */
if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
- fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
+ fatal_f("dup2");
- mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
+ mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
close(0);
/* send messages generated by record_login */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("send fds failed");
/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
- if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (fd0 != 0)
- error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
+ error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
- /* slave is not needed */
+ /* slave side of pty is not needed */
close(s->ttyfd);
s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+ debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
return (0);
error:
if (s != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
Session *s;
char *tty;
int r;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
sshbuf_reset(m);
free(tty);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_term(int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
+mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
int res, status;
- debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
+ debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
/* The child is terminating */
session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
sshpam_cleanup();
#endif
while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
exit(1);
res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
/* Terminate process */
exit(res);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* Report that an audit event occurred */
int
-mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int n;
ssh_audit_event_t event;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n;
switch (event) {
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- audit_event(event);
+ audit_event(ssh, event);
break;
default:
fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
}
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *cmd;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
audit_run_command(cmd);
free(cmd);
return (0);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
void
-monitor_clear_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
}
void
-monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct kex *kex;
int r;
- debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
+ debug3_f("packet_set_state");
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
-
- if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
- /* XXX set callbacks */
+ if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL");
+ if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) {
+ fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)",
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len);
+ }
+ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2,
+ session_id2_len) != 0)
+ fatal_f("session ID mismatch");
+ /* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
- kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
- }
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+ kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
-/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+/* This function requires careful sanity checking */
void
-mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+ debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
child_state);
- debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
+ debug3_f("GOT new keys");
}
/* XXX */
#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
} while (0)
static void
monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
{
int pair[2];
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
int on = 1;
#endif
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
- if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
if (do_logfds) {
if (pipe(pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
} else
mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
}
#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
struct monitor *
monitor_init(void)
{
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
return mon;
}
void
monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
{
monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
int
-mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_OID_desc goid;
OM_uint32 major;
size_t len;
u_char *p;
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
goid.elements = p;
goid.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
free(goid.elements);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc in;
gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
free(in.value);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
}
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
OM_uint32 ret;
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
free(gssbuf.value);
free(mic.value);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r, authenticated;
const char *displayname;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
index 16047299f882..683e5e07163e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
@@ -1,92 +1,95 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.21 2018/07/09 21:53:45 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.23 2019/01/19 21:43:56 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _MONITOR_H_
#define _MONITOR_H_
/* Please keep *_REQ_* values on even numbers and *_ANS_* on odd numbers */
enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_MODULI = 0, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI = 1,
MONITOR_REQ_FREE = 2,
MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV = 4,
MONITOR_REQ_SIGN = 6, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN = 7,
MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM = 8, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM = 9,
MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 10, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 11,
MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD = 12, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD = 13,
MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY = 14, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY = 15,
MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 16, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 17,
MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED = 22, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED = 23,
MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY = 24, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY = 25,
MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT = 26,
MONITOR_REQ_PTY = 28, MONITOR_ANS_PTY = 29,
MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP = 30,
MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY = 32, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY = 33,
MONITOR_REQ_SESSID = 34,
MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED = 36, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED = 37,
MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE = 38, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE = 39,
MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE = 40, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE = 41,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP = 42, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP = 43,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP = 44, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP = 45,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
};
+struct ssh;
+
struct monitor {
int m_recvfd;
int m_sendfd;
int m_log_recvfd;
int m_log_sendfd;
struct kex **m_pkex;
pid_t m_pid;
};
struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
struct Authctxt;
-void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *);
-void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *);
+void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+void monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-struct mon_table;
-int monitor_read(struct monitor*, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **);
+void monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+void monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
/* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */
void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *);
void mm_request_receive(int, struct sshbuf *);
void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *);
+void mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
index d766edcf11ca..a07727a8e743 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
@@ -1,187 +1,185 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.21 2016/02/29 20:22:36 jca Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.22 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
#include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
# include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#include "log.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
int
mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
struct msghdr msg;
#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
union {
struct cmsghdr hdr;
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
} cmsgbuf;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
#endif
struct iovec vec;
char ch = '\0';
ssize_t n;
struct pollfd pfd;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
#else
memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd;
#endif
vec.iov_base = &ch;
vec.iov_len = 1;
msg.msg_iov = &vec;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
pfd.fd = sock;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
- debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
+ debug3_f("sendmsg(%d): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
}
if (n == -1) {
- error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd,
- strerror(errno));
+ error_f("sendmsg(%d): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (n != 1) {
- error("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %zd", __func__, n);
+ error_f("sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %zd", n);
return -1;
}
return 0;
#else
error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
return -1;
#endif
}
int
mm_receive_fd(int sock)
{
#if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
struct msghdr msg;
#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
union {
struct cmsghdr hdr;
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
} cmsgbuf;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
#endif
struct iovec vec;
ssize_t n;
char ch;
int fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
vec.iov_base = &ch;
vec.iov_len = 1;
msg.msg_iov = &vec;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
#else
memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
#endif
pfd.fd = sock;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
- debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ debug3_f("recvmsg: %s", strerror(errno));
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
}
if (n == -1) {
- error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("recvmsg: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (n != 1) {
- error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %zd", __func__, n);
+ error_f("recvmsg: expected received 1 got %zd", n);
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) {
- error("%s: no fd", __func__);
+ error_f("no fd");
return -1;
}
#else
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
if (cmsg == NULL) {
- error("%s: no message header", __func__);
+ error_f("no message header");
return -1;
}
#ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) {
- error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__,
- SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type);
+ error_f("expected %d got %d", SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type);
return -1;
}
#endif
fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
#endif
return fd;
#else
- error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+ error_f("file descriptor passing not supported");
return -1;
#endif
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
index 732fb3476bf0..748333c75e59 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,1006 +1,1021 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.107 2018/07/20 03:46:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.123 2021/04/15 16:24:31 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include "dh.h"
#endif
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* Imports */
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
void
-mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx)
+mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *msg, void *ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *log_msg;
struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx;
int r;
size_t len;
if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1)
- fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__);
+ fatal_f("no log channel");
if ((log_msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, 0)) != 0 || /* length; filled below */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, level)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, forced)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(log_msg, msg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if ((len = sshbuf_len(log_msg)) < 4 || len > 0xffffffff)
- fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, len);
+ fatal_f("bad length %zu", len);
POKE_U32(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len - 4);
if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd,
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len) != len)
- fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(log_msg);
}
int
mm_is_monitor(void)
{
/*
* m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
* points to the unprivileged child.
*/
return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
}
void
mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
u_char buf[5];
- debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("entering, type %d", type);
if (mlen >= 0xffffffff)
- fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, mlen);
+ fatal_f("bad length %zu", mlen);
POKE_U32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
- fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
- fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4], *p = NULL;
u_int msg_len;
int r;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
cleanup_exit(255);
- fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
}
msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
+ fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
if (atomicio(read, sock, p, msg_len) != msg_len)
- fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char rtype;
int r;
- debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("entering, type %d", type);
mm_request_receive(sock, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &rtype)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (rtype != type)
- fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
- rtype, type);
+ fatal_f("read: rtype %d != type %d", rtype, type);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
BIGNUM *p, *g;
int r;
u_char success = 0;
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, max)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &success)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
if (success == 0)
- fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, g)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_f("MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed");
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &g)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse group");
- debug3("%s: remaining %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(m));
+ debug3_f("remaining %zu", sshbuf_len(m));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (dh_new_group(g, p));
}
#endif
int
-mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg, u_int compat)
+mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
struct sshbuf *m;
- u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, active_state);
+ u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, ssh);
int r;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
+#define GETPW(b, id) \
+ do { \
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pw %s", #id); \
+ if (len != sizeof(pw->id)) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "bad length for %s", #id); \
+ memcpy(&pw->id, p, len); \
+ } while (0)
+
struct passwd *
-mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username)
+mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct sshbuf *m;
struct passwd *pw;
size_t len;
u_int i;
ServerOptions *newopts;
int r;
u_char ok;
const u_char *p;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, username)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ok)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
if (ok == 0) {
pw = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* XXX don't like passing struct passwd like this */
pw = xcalloc(sizeof(*pw), 1);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (len != sizeof(*pw))
- fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
- memcpy(pw, p, sizeof(*pw));
-
+ GETPW(m, pw_uid);
+ GETPW(m, pw_gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+ GETPW(m, pw_change);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+ GETPW(m, pw_expire);
+#endif
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_passwd, NULL)) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_gecos, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_class, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_dir, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_shell, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pw");
out:
/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse opts");
if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
- fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
+ fatal_f("option block size mismatch");
newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1);
memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (newopts->x != NULL) { \
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
- &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
- } \
+ if (newopts->x != NULL && \
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \
NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \
for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
&newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
- __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
+ log_verbose_reset();
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+ log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
free(newopts);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (pw);
}
char *
mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *banner;
int r;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &banner, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
/* treat empty banner as missing banner */
if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
free(banner);
banner = NULL;
}
return (banner);
}
/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
void
mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
/* Do the password authentication */
int
mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
u_int maxtries = 0;
#endif
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, password)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxtries)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse PAM");
if (maxtries > INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: bad maxtries %u", __func__, maxtries);
+ fatal_fr(r, "bad maxtries");
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(maxtries);
#endif
sshbuf_free(m);
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
- __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
int
mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp));
}
int
-mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host,
- struct sshkey *key)
+mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
+ const char *user, const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL));
}
int
mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if (authoptp != NULL)
*authoptp = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, user ? user : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, host ? host : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &allowed)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY) {
- if ((r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshauthopt_deserialise: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY &&
+ (r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_deserialise");
sshbuf_free(m);
if (authoptp != NULL) {
*authoptp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return allowed;
}
/*
* This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
* privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
* for authentication.
*/
int
mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
- const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int encoded_ret = 0;
int r;
+ u_char sig_details_present, flags;
+ u_int counter;
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
+ debug3_f("entering");
+ if (sig_detailsp != NULL)
+ *sig_detailsp = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &sig_details_present)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ if (sig_details_present && encoded_ret == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &counter)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flags)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse sig_details");
+ if (sig_detailsp != NULL) {
+ *sig_detailsp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**sig_detailsp));
+ (*sig_detailsp)->sk_counter = counter;
+ (*sig_detailsp)->sk_flags = flags;
+ }
+ }
sshbuf_free(m);
if (encoded_ret != 0)
return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return 0;
}
void
-mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
+mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_packet_get_state");
mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m);
- debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
+ debug3_f("Finished sending state");
sshbuf_free(m);
}
int
mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *p, *msg;
int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1, r;
/* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+ error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
if (tmp1 > 0)
close(tmp1);
if (tmp2 > 0)
close(tmp2);
return 0;
}
close(tmp1);
close(tmp2);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
+ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY");
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
if (success == 0) {
- debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
+ debug3_f("pty alloc failed");
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &p, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
free(p);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "put loginmsg");
free(msg);
if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
- fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("receive fds failed");
/* Success */
return (1);
}
void
mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assmble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* closed dup'ed master */
- if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
-mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
u_int
mm_do_pam_account(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int ret;
char *msg;
size_t msglen;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, &msglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, msglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
return (ret);
}
void *
mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (NULL);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (authctxt);
}
int
mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int i, n;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, info, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(n);
if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
fatal("%s: received %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
__func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &((*prompts)[i]), NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &((*echo_on)[i]))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
int
mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int n, i;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, resp[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ret = (int)n; /* XXX */
debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
void
mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Request process termination */
void
mm_terminate(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
}
int
mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int success;
char *challenge;
int r;
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
if (success == 0) {
- debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
+ debug3_f("no challenge");
sshbuf_free(m);
return (-1);
}
/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &challenge, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse challenge");
sshbuf_free(m);
mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
- debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
+ debug3_f("received challenge: %s", challenge);
return (0);
}
int
mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authok;
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if (numresponses != 1)
return (-1);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, responses[0])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authok)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
void
-mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, event)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
void
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
*ctx = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, goid->elements, goid->length)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flagsp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
u_int flags;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, in->value, in->length)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, out)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (flagsp != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &flags)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse flags");
*flagsp = flags;
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
return(major);
}
int
mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(m);
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
index 644da081db8d..a163b67d2878 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,100 +1,102 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.38 2018/07/11 18:53:29 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.47 2021/04/15 16:24:31 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
#define _MM_WRAP_H_
extern int use_privsep;
#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
+struct ssh;
struct monitor;
struct Authctxt;
struct sshkey;
struct sshauthopt;
+struct sshkey_sig_details;
-void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
int mm_is_monitor(void);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
-int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t,
+#endif
+int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
const char *, u_int compat);
void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
-struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
int, struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
struct sshauthopt **);
-int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
+int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, struct sshkey *);
int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
-void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *);
+void mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh);
u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
-void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
#endif
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* Key export functions */
struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
-void monitor_clear_keystate(struct monitor *);
-void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *);
-void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *);
-void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*);
+void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor*);
/* bsdauth */
int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.c b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
index 1bd20f3d305b..d22c4e477d1c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/msg.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
@@ -1,94 +1,94 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.17 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.20 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "misc.h"
int
ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[5];
u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
- debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
+ debug3_f("type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
- error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+ error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) {
- error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+ error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
int
ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4], *p;
u_int msg_len;
int r;
debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno != EPIPE)
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
+ error_f("read header: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
msg_len = get_u32(buf);
- if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
+ if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
+ error_f("read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
return (-1);
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "reserve");
return -1;
}
if (atomicio(read, fd, p, msg_len) != msg_len) {
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mux.c b/crypto/openssh/mux.c
index 8e4b60827fc8..4c0eb4249bcd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/mux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mux.c
@@ -1,2391 +1,2343 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.77 2018/09/26 07:32:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.91 2021/07/23 04:00:59 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* ssh session multiplexing support */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* from ssh.c */
extern int tty_flag;
extern Options options;
-extern int stdin_null_flag;
extern char *host;
-extern int subsystem_flag;
extern struct sshbuf *command;
extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending;
/* Context for session open confirmation callback */
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
u_int want_tty;
u_int want_subsys;
u_int want_x_fwd;
u_int want_agent_fwd;
struct sshbuf *cmd;
char *term;
struct termios tio;
char **env;
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx {
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for global channel callback */
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
u_int cid; /* channel id */
u_int rid; /* request id */
int fid; /* forward id */
};
/* fd to control socket */
int muxserver_sock = -1;
/* client request id */
u_int muxclient_request_id = 0;
/* Multiplexing control command */
u_int muxclient_command = 0;
/* Set when signalled. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0;
/* PID of multiplex server */
static u_int muxserver_pid = 0;
static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL;
struct mux_master_state {
int hello_rcvd;
};
/* mux protocol messages */
#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
#define MUX_C_PROXY 0x1000000f
#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
#define MUX_S_PROXY 0x8000000f
/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */
#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static const struct {
u_int type;
int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *,
struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
} mux_master_handlers[] = {
{ MUX_MSG_HELLO, mux_master_process_hello },
{ MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, mux_master_process_new_session },
{ MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, mux_master_process_alive_check },
{ MUX_C_TERMINATE, mux_master_process_terminate },
{ MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, mux_master_process_open_fwd },
{ MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, mux_master_process_close_fwd },
{ MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, mux_master_process_stdio_fwd },
{ MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, mux_master_process_stop_listening },
{ MUX_C_PROXY, mux_master_process_proxy },
{ 0, NULL }
};
-/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _session_ channel */
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused)
{
Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
- debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
+ debug3_f("entering for channel %d", cid);
if (c == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
+ fatal_f("channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", cid);
if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d",
- __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+ fatal_f("channel %d missing control channel %d",
+ c->self, c->ctl_chan);
c->ctl_chan = -1;
cc->remote_id = 0;
cc->have_remote_id = 0;
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc);
}
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
}
-/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _control_ channel */
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused)
{
Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
- debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
+ debug3_f("entering for channel %d", cid);
if (c == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
+ fatal_f("channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", cid);
if (c->have_remote_id) {
if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %u",
- __func__, c->self, c->remote_id);
+ fatal_f("channel %d missing session channel %u",
+ c->self, c->remote_id);
c->remote_id = 0;
c->have_remote_id = 0;
sc->ctl_chan = -1;
if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) {
- debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: not open", sc->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc);
} else {
if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
chan_read_failed(ssh, sc);
if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
chan_write_failed(ssh, sc);
}
}
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
}
/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */
static int
env_permitted(char *env)
{
int i, ret;
char name[1024], *cp;
if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
return 0;
ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) {
- error("%s: name '%.100s...' too long", __func__, env);
+ error_f("name '%.100s...' too long", env);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Mux master protocol message handlers */
static int
mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
u_int ver;
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", c->self);
if (state->hello_rcvd) {
- error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__);
+ error_f("HELLO received twice");
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) {
- error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
return -1;
}
if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
- error("%s: unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u "
- "(expected %u)", __func__, ver, SSHMUX_VER);
+ error_f("unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u "
+ "(expected %u)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
return -1;
}
- debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver);
+ debug2_f("channel %d client version %u", c->self, ver);
/* No extensions are presently defined */
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
char *name = NULL;
size_t value_len = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, NULL, &value_len)) != 0) {
- error("%s: malformed extension: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse extension");
return -1;
}
- debug2("%s: Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu",
- __func__, name, value_len);
+ debug2_f("Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu",
+ name, value_len);
free(name);
}
state->hello_rcvd = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Enqueue a "ok" response to the reply buffer */
static void
reply_ok(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int rid)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_OK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
}
/* Enqueue an error response to the reply buffer */
static void
reply_error(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int type, u_int rid, const char *msg)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(reply, msg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
}
static int
mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
Channel *nc;
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx;
char *cmd, *cp;
u_int i, j, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax;
int r, new_fd[3];
/* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->term = NULL;
cctx->rid = rid;
cmd = NULL;
cctx->env = NULL;
env_len = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_tty)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_x_fwd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_agent_fwd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_subsys)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &escape_char)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cctx->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) {
malf:
free(cmd);
for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
free(cctx->env[j]);
free(cctx->env);
free(cctx->term);
free(cctx);
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ error_f("malformed message");
return -1;
}
#define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
goto malf;
if (!env_permitted(cp)) {
free(cp);
continue;
}
cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
sizeof(*cctx->env));
cctx->env[env_len++] = cp;
cctx->env[env_len] = NULL;
if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) {
- error("%s: >%d environment variables received, "
- "ignoring additional", __func__, MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS);
+ error_f(">%d environment variables received, "
+ "ignoring additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS);
break;
}
}
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, "
- "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self,
+ debug2_f("channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, "
+ "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", c->self,
cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd,
cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len);
if ((cctx->cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put(cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
free(cmd);
cmd = NULL;
/* Gather fds from client */
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
- error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
- __func__, i);
+ error_f("failed to receive fd %d from client", i);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
close(new_fd[j]);
for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
free(cctx->env[j]);
free(cctx->env);
free(cctx->term);
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"did not receive file descriptors");
return -1;
}
}
- debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__,
+ debug3_f("got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d",
new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
if (c->have_remote_id) {
- debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
+ debug2_f("session already open");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Multiple sessions not supported");
cleanup:
close(new_fd[0]);
close(new_fd[1]);
close(new_fd[2]);
free(cctx->term);
if (env_len != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx);
return 0;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) {
- debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__);
+ debug2_f("session refused by user");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */
if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
- error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
+ error_f("tcgetattr: %s", strerror(errno));
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (cctx->want_tty) {
window >>= 1;
packetmax >>= 1;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
- CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+ CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
- c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
+ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
c->have_remote_id = 1;
if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self,
client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
client_filter_cleanup,
client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char));
}
- debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
- __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
+ debug2_f("channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
+ nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self);
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
- debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: alive check", c->self);
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_ALIVE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, (u_int)getpid())) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
- debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: terminate request", c->self);
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ",
host)) {
- debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__);
+ debug2_f("termination refused by user");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
return 0;
}
}
quit_pending = 1;
reply_ok(reply, rid);
/* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */
return 0;
}
static char *
format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
char *ret;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *",
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
- fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
+ fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host,
fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype);
+ fatal_f("unknown forward type %u", ftype);
}
return ret;
}
static int
compare_host(const char *a, const char *b)
{
if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 0;
return strcmp(a, b) == 0;
}
static int
compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b)
{
if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path))
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path))
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void
mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
char *failmsg = NULL;
struct Forward *rfwd;
Channel *c;
struct sshbuf *out;
+ u_int port;
int r;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) {
/* no channel for reply */
- error("%s: unknown channel", __func__);
+ error_f("unknown channel");
return;
}
if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards ||
(options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL &&
options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) {
xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
goto fail;
}
rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
- debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__,
+ debug_f("%s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d",
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
- rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse port");
+ if (port > 65535) {
+ fatal("Invalid allocated port %u for "
+ "mux remote forward to %s:%d", port,
+ rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+ }
+ rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
" to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, fctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
rfwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle,
- rfwd->allocated_port);
+ rfwd->allocated_port);
} else {
reply_ok(out, fctx->rid);
}
goto out;
} else {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0)
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
- debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, "
- "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port,
+ debug2_f("clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, "
+ "connect %s:%d", rfwd->listen_port,
rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
free(rfwd->listen_host);
free(rfwd->listen_path);
free(rfwd->connect_host);
free(rfwd->connect_path);
memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd));
}
fail:
- error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
+ error_f("%s", failmsg);
reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, fctx->rid, failmsg);
free(failmsg);
out:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
sshbuf_free(out);
if (c->mux_pause <= 0)
- fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause);
+ fatal_f("mux_pause %d", c->mux_pause);
c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
}
static int
mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
struct Forward fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
u_int ftype;
u_int lport, cport;
int r, i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
/* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ error_f("malformed message");
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
+ debug2_f("channel %d: request %s", c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
- logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
+ logit_f("invalid forwarding type %u", ftype);
invalid:
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Invalid forwarding request");
return 0;
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
- logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
- "are mutually exclusive", __func__);
+ logit_f("streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
+ "are mutually exclusive");
goto invalid;
}
if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
- logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
- fwd.listen_port);
+ logit_f("invalid listen port %u", fwd.listen_port);
goto invalid;
}
if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL &&
fwd.connect_port >= 65536) ||
(ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
- logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
+ logit_f("invalid connect port %u",
fwd.connect_port);
goto invalid;
}
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL &&
fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
- logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
+ logit_f("missing connect host");
goto invalid;
}
/* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
exists:
- debug2("%s: found existing forwarding",
- __func__);
+ debug2_f("found existing forwarding");
reply_ok(reply, rid);
goto out;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (!compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i))
continue;
if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
goto exists;
- debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__);
+ debug2_f("found allocated port");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply FWD_REMOTE");
goto out;
}
break;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
- debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__);
+ debug2_f("forwarding refused by user");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto out;
}
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
fail:
- logit("%s: requested %s failed", __func__, fwd_desc);
+ logit_f("requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Port forwarding failed");
goto out;
}
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
freefwd = 0;
} else {
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd);
if (fwd.handle < 0)
goto fail;
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
fctx->cid = c->self;
fctx->rid = rid;
fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
fctx);
freefwd = 0;
c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
/* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
goto out;
}
reply_ok(reply, rid);
out:
free(fwd_desc);
if (freefwd) {
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
return ret;
}
static int
mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
const char *error_reason = NULL;
char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL;
u_int ftype;
int r, i, ret = 0;
u_int lport, cport;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ error_f("malformed message");
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self,
+ debug2_f("channel %d: request cancel %s", c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
/* make sure this has been requested */
found_fwd = NULL;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.remote_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (found_fwd == NULL)
error_reason = "port not forwarded";
else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) {
/*
* This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
* between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
* However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
* to use the actual listen port.
*/
if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1)
error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
} else { /* local and dynamic forwards */
/* Ditto */
if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port,
&options.fwd_opts) == -1)
error_reason = "port not found";
}
if (error_reason != NULL)
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, error_reason);
else {
reply_ok(reply, rid);
free(found_fwd->listen_host);
free(found_fwd->listen_path);
free(found_fwd->connect_host);
free(found_fwd->connect_path);
found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
}
out:
free(fwd_desc);
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
return ret;
}
static int
mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
Channel *nc;
char *chost = NULL;
u_int cport, i, j;
int r, new_fd[2];
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0) {
free(chost);
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ error_f("malformed message");
return -1;
}
- debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u",
- __func__, c->self, chost, cport);
+ debug2_f("channel %d: stdio fwd to %s:%u", c->self, chost, cport);
/* Gather fds from client */
for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
- error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
- __func__, i);
+ error_f("failed to receive fd %d from client", i);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
close(new_fd[j]);
free(chost);
/* prepare reply */
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"did not receive file descriptors");
return -1;
}
}
- debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__,
- new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
+ debug3_f("got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
if (c->have_remote_id) {
- debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
+ debug2_f("session already open");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Multiple sessions not supported");
cleanup:
close(new_fd[0]);
close(new_fd[1]);
free(chost);
return 0;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ",
chost, cport)) {
- debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__);
+ debug2_f("stdio fwd refused by user");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto cleanup;
}
}
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
- if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
- set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
-
- nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
+ nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1],
+ CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
free(chost);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
- c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
+ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
c->have_remote_id = 1;
- debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
- __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
+ debug2_f("channel_new: %d control %d", nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->rid = rid;
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */
static void
mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
Channel *c, *cc;
struct sshbuf *reply;
int r;
if (cctx == NULL)
- fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
+ fatal_f("cctx == NULL");
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
+ fatal_f("no channel for id %d", id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
+ fatal_f("channel %d lacks control channel %d",
id, c->ctl_chan);
if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if (!success) {
- debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
+ debug3_f("sending failure reply");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
"Session open refused by peer");
/* prepare reply */
goto done;
}
- debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
+ debug3_f("sending success reply");
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
done:
/* Send reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
sshbuf_free(reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
- fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
+ fatal_f("mux_pause %d", cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
free(cctx);
}
static int
mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
- debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self);
+ debug_f("channel %d: stop listening", c->self);
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared "
"connection to %s? ", host)) {
- debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__);
+ debug2_f("stop listen refused by user");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
return 0;
}
}
if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) {
channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel);
client_stop_mux();
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = NULL;
mux_listener_channel = NULL;
muxserver_sock = -1;
}
reply_ok(reply, rid);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
- debug("%s: channel %d: proxy request", __func__, c->self);
+ debug_f("channel %d: proxy request", c->self);
c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
return 0;
}
-/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */
+/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux client fd */
static int
mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
struct sshbuf *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
u_int type, rid, i;
int r, ret = -1;
if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
/* Setup ctx and */
if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
c->mux_ctx = state;
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self,
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
/* Send hello */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
/* no extensions */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+ debug3_f("channel %d: hello sent", c->self);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(c->input, &in)) != 0) {
malf:
- error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
+ error_f("malformed message");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &type)) != 0)
goto malf;
- debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu",
- __func__, c->self, type, sshbuf_len(in));
+ debug3_f("channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu", c->self,
+ type, sshbuf_len(in));
if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
rid = 0;
else {
if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
- error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
- "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
+ error_f("expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
+ "received 0x%08x", MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &rid)) != 0)
goto malf;
}
for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid,
c, in, out);
break;
}
}
if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
- error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type);
+ error_f("unsupported mux message 0x%08x", type);
reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "unsupported request");
ret = 0;
}
/* Enqueue reply packet */
- if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
out:
sshbuf_free(in);
sshbuf_free(out);
return ret;
}
void
mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
Channel *mux_chan;
int r;
- debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self,
- exitval);
+ debug3_f("channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", c->self, exitval);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
- __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+ fatal_f("channel %d missing mux %d", c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, exitval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
sshbuf_free(m);
}
void
mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
Channel *mux_chan;
int r;
- debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self);
+ debug3_f("channel %d: TTY alloc failed", c->self);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
- __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+ fatal_f("channel %d missing mux %d", c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
sshbuf_free(m);
}
/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */
void
muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh)
{
mode_t old_umask;
char *orig_control_path = options.control_path;
char rbuf[16+1];
u_int i, r;
int oerrno;
if (options.control_path == NULL ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
return;
debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
/*
* Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically
* establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid
* other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting
* an unready socket.
*/
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) {
r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10);
rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r :
(r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 :
'0' + r - 26 - 26;
}
rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0';
options.control_path = NULL;
xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf);
- debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path);
+ debug3_f("temporary control path %s", options.control_path);
old_umask = umask(0177);
muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0);
oerrno = errno;
umask(old_umask);
if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
"disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
disable_mux_master:
if (muxserver_sock != -1) {
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
}
free(orig_control_path);
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = NULL;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
return;
} else {
/* unix_listener() logs the error */
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */
if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
- fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__,
+ fatal_f("link mux listener %s => %s: %s",
options.control_path, orig_control_path,
strerror(errno));
}
error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing",
orig_control_path);
unlink(options.control_path);
goto disable_mux_master;
}
unlink(options.control_path);
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = orig_control_path;
set_nonblock(muxserver_sock);
mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener",
SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, options.control_path, 1);
mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb;
- debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__,
+ debug3_f("mux listener channel %d fd %d",
mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock);
}
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
static void
mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
const char *display;
Channel *c, *cc;
int i, r;
struct sshbuf *reply;
if (cctx == NULL)
- fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
+ fatal_f("cctx == NULL");
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
+ fatal_f("no channel for id %d", id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
+ fatal_f("channel %d lacks control channel %d",
id, c->ctl_chan);
if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if (!success) {
- debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
+ debug3_f("sending failure reply");
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
"Session open refused by peer");
goto done;
}
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data) == 0) {
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id,
display, proto, data, 1);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding",
CONFIRM_WARN);
}
}
if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send");
}
client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
- debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
+ debug3_f("sending success reply");
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reply");
done:
/* Send reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
sshbuf_free(reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
- fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
+ fatal_f("mux_pause %d", cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx->term);
if (cctx->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
free(cctx);
}
/* ** Multiplexing client support */
/* Exit signal handler */
static void
control_client_sighandler(int signo)
{
muxclient_terminate = signo;
}
/*
* Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to
* mux master.
*/
static void
control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
{
int save_errno = errno;
if (muxserver_pid > 1)
kill(muxserver_pid, signo);
errno = save_errno;
}
static int
mux_client_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *b, size_t need)
{
size_t have;
ssize_t len;
u_char *p;
struct pollfd pfd;
int r;
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(b, need, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
if (muxclient_terminate) {
errno = EINTR;
return -1;
}
len = read(fd, p + have, need - have);
- if (len < 0) {
+ if (len == -1) {
switch (errno) {
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EAGAIN:
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case EINTR:
continue;
default:
return -1;
}
}
if (len == 0) {
errno = EPIPE;
return -1;
}
have += (size_t)len;
}
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_write_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshbuf *queue;
u_int have, need;
int r, oerrno, len;
const u_char *ptr;
struct pollfd pfd;
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(queue, m)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
need = sshbuf_len(queue);
ptr = sshbuf_ptr(queue);
for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
if (muxclient_terminate) {
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = EINTR;
return -1;
}
len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have);
- if (len < 0) {
+ if (len == -1) {
switch (errno) {
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EAGAIN:
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case EINTR:
continue;
default:
oerrno = errno;
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
}
if (len == 0) {
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = EPIPE;
return -1;
}
have += (u_int)len;
}
sshbuf_free(queue);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_read_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshbuf *queue;
size_t need, have;
const u_char *ptr;
int r, oerrno;
if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, 4) != 0) {
if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE)
- debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__,
+ debug3_f("read header failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(queue));
if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, need) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
- debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ debug3_f("read body failed: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(queue, &ptr, &have)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(m, ptr, have)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "dequeue");
sshbuf_free(queue);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int type, ver;
int r, ret = -1;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: hello: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble hello");
/* no extensions */
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
- debug("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ debug_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their HELLO */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
- debug("%s: read packet failed", __func__);
+ debug_f("read packet failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) {
- error("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u",
- __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
+ error_f("expected HELLO (%u) got %u", MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode version: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
"(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
goto out;
}
- debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver);
+ debug2_f("master version %u", ver);
/* No extensions are presently defined */
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
char *name = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0) { /* value */
- error("%s: malformed extension: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse extension");
goto out;
}
debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name);
free(name);
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(m);
return ret;
}
static u_int
mux_client_request_alive(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int pid, type, rid;
int r;
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+ fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode remote ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse remote ID");
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ muxclient_request_id, rid);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode PID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse PID");
sshbuf_free(m);
- debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid);
+ debug3_f("done pid = %u", pid);
muxclient_request_id++;
return pid;
}
static void
mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_TERMINATE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request");
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
/* Remote end exited already */
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return;
}
- fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+ fatal_f("termination request failed: %s", e);
default:
- fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
}
static int
mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e, *fwd_desc;
const char *lhost, *chost;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd);
debug("Requesting %s %s",
cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc);
free(fwd_desc);
type = cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD;
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
lhost = fwd->listen_path;
else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
lhost = "";
else if (*fwd->listen_host == '\0')
lhost = "*";
else
lhost = fwd->listen_host;
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL)
chost = fwd->connect_path;
else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
chost = "";
else
chost = fwd->connect_host;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, lhost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->connect_port)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request");
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT:
if (cancel_flag)
- fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__);
+ fatal_f("got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &fwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode port: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse port");
verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
fwd->allocated_port,
fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
fwd->connect_port);
if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD)
fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
sshbuf_free(m);
error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e);
return -1;
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
sshbuf_free(m);
- error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ error_f("forwarding request failed: %s", e);
return -1;
default:
- fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag)
{
int i, ret = 0;
- debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__,
+ debug3_f("%s forwardings: %d local, %d remote",
cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request",
options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards);
/* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag,
options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ?
MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL,
options.local_forwards + i) != 0)
ret = -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE,
options.remote_forwards + i) != 0)
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
static int
mux_client_request_session(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
- const char *term;
+ const char *term = NULL;
u_int echar, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen;
extern char **environ;
- int r, i, devnull, rawmode;
+ int r, i, rawmode;
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
- error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
+ error_f("master alive request failed");
return -1;
}
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- }
+ if (options.stdin_null && stdfd_devnull(1, 0, 0) == -1)
+ fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+ if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv,
+ options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0')
+ term = getenv("TERM");
- if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL)
- term = "";
echar = 0xffffffff;
if (options.escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
echar = (u_int)options.escape_char;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, tty_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_x11)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_agent)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, subsystem_flag)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echar)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term == NULL ? "" : term)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, command)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request");
/* Pass environment */
if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) {
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (!env_permitted(environ[i]))
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, environ[i])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request sendenv");
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.setenv[i])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request setenv");
}
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("send fds failed");
- debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__);
+ debug3_f("session request sent");
/* Read their reply */
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
- error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
+ debug_f("master session id: %u", sid);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
error("Master refused session request: %s", e);
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+ error_f("session request failed: %s", e);
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
default:
sshbuf_free(m);
- error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
+ error_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
return -1;
}
muxclient_request_id++;
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_mux();
- signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
rawmode = tty_flag;
if (tty_flag)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/*
* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
* Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message.
* This process must read the value and wait for the closure of
* the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will
* terminate early too (possibly losing data).
*/
for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) {
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
break;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode ID: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
if (esid != sid)
- fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: "
- "my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, sid, esid);
+ fatal_f("tty alloc fail on unknown session: "
+ "my id %u theirs %u", sid, esid);
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty ==
REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
rawmode = 0;
continue;
case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode ID: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
if (esid != sid)
- fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: "
- "my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, sid, esid);
+ fatal_f("exit on unknown session: "
+ "my id %u theirs %u", sid, esid);
if (exitval_seen)
- fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__);
+ fatal_f("exitval sent twice");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &exitval)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode exit value: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse exitval");
exitval_seen = 1;
continue;
default:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+ fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e);
}
}
close(fd);
if (rawmode)
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
if (muxclient_terminate) {
debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate));
exitval = 255;
} else if (!exitval_seen) {
debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
exitval = 255;
} else
debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval);
if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
exit(exitval);
}
static int
mux_client_proxy(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_PROXY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request");
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ muxclient_request_id, rid);
if (type != MUX_S_PROXY) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+ fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ debug3_f("done");
muxclient_request_id++;
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid, sid;
- int r, devnull;
+ int r;
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
- error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
+ error_f("master alive request failed");
return -1;
}
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- }
+ if (options.stdin_null && stdfd_devnull(1, 0, 0) == -1)
+ fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.stdio_forward_host)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.stdio_forward_port)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request");
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("send fds failed");
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_mux();
- debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__);
+ debug3_f("stdio forward request sent");
/* Read their reply */
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
- error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
+ debug_f("master session id: %u", sid);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
sshbuf_free(m);
fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
sshbuf_free(m);
fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e);
default:
sshbuf_free(m);
- error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
+ error_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
return -1;
}
muxclient_request_id++;
- signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
/*
* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
*/
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
if (errno == EPIPE ||
(errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0))
return 0;
- fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("mux_client_read_packet: %s", strerror(errno));
}
- fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("master returned unexpected message %u", type);
}
static void
mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
- debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "request");
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
- fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
- fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
- __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
+ fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+ muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+ fatal_f("stop listening request failed: %s", e);
default:
- fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
- __func__, type);
+ fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
}
/* Multiplex client main loop. */
int
muxclient(const char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
int sock;
u_int pid;
if (muxclient_command == 0) {
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD;
else
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
}
switch (options.control_master) {
case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
break;
default:
return -1;
}
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
fatal("ControlPath too long ('%s' >= %u bytes)", path,
- (unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+ (unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path));
- if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
- fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+ fatal_f("socket(): %s", strerror(errno));
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
switch (muxclient_command) {
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
break;
default:
fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
if (errno == ECONNREFUSED &&
options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) {
debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path);
unlink(path);
} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
} else {
error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
close(sock);
return -1;
}
set_nonblock(sock);
if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) {
- error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__);
+ error_f("master hello exchange failed");
close(sock);
return -1;
}
switch (muxclient_command) {
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0)
- fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("master alive check failed");
fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
mux_client_request_terminate(sock);
if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0)
- fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("master forward request failed");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) {
- error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
+ error_f("master forward request failed");
return -1;
}
mux_client_request_session(sock);
return -1;
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP:
mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock);
if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0)
- error("%s: master cancel forward request failed",
- __func__);
+ error_f("master cancel forward request failed");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY:
mux_client_proxy(sock);
return (sock);
default:
fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command);
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
index d5a1b7a2fa24..f8fd1b5c9bd4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
@@ -1,211 +1,119 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.57 2018/09/12 01:34:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.68 2020/10/03 04:15:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-/* conditional algorithm support */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
+#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
+ "curve25519-sha256," \
+ "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp521,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
-#else
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp384,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
-#endif
-#else
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
- ",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-#else
-# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
- "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,"
-# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,"
-#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
- "hmac-sha2-256," \
- "hmac-sha2-512,"
-#else
-# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS
-# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14
-# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
-#endif
+ "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- "curve25519-sha256," \
- "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,"
-# else
-# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS ""
-# endif
-#define KEX_COMMON_KEX \
- KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- KEX_SHA2_METHODS
-
-#define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
- KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \
-
-#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
- "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
- KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
"ssh-ed25519," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-512," \
"rsa-sha2-256," \
"ssh-rsa"
-/* the actual algorithms */
-
-#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
- AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" \
",aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc"
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
-#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
+#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
/* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \
+ "ssh-ed25519," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
- "ssh-ed25519," \
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-512," \
- "rsa-sha2-256," \
- "ssh-rsa"
-
-#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-
-#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
- "curve25519-sha256," \
- "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-ed25519"
-#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
-#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
- "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
- "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
- "umac-64@openssh.com," \
- "umac-128@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-256," \
- "hmac-sha2-512," \
- "hmac-sha1"
-
-#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
-#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
-#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
-
-#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS "ssh-ed25519"
-
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ "rsa-sha2-256"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
#define KEX_CLIENT \
KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
#define KEX_SERVER \
KEX_SERVER_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/nchan.c b/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
index 8294d7fcad1d..7ef3a350b79a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
@@ -1,446 +1,439 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.69 2018/10/04 07:47:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.73 2021/05/19 01:24:05 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
/*
* SSH Protocol 1.5 aka New Channel Protocol
* Thanks to Martina, Axel and everyone who left Erlangen, leaving me bored.
* Written by Markus Friedl in October 1999
*
* Protocol versions 1.3 and 1.5 differ in the handshake protocol used for the
* tear down of channels:
*
* 1.3: strict request-ack-protocol:
* CLOSE ->
* <- CLOSE_CONFIRM
*
* 1.5: uses variations of:
* IEOF ->
* <- OCLOSE
* <- IEOF
* OCLOSE ->
* i.e. both sides have to close the channel
*
* 2.0: the EOF messages are optional
*
* See the debugging output from 'ssh -v' and 'sshd -d' of
* ssh-1.2.27 as an example.
*
*/
/* functions manipulating channel states */
/*
* EVENTS update channel input/output states execute ACTIONS
*/
/*
* ACTIONS: should never update the channel states
*/
static void chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *, Channel *);
static void chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *, Channel *);
/* helper */
static void chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *, Channel *);
static void chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *, Channel *);
static void chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *, Channel *);
static const char *ostates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_ieof", "closed" };
static const char *istates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_oclose", "closed" };
static void
chan_set_istate(Channel *c, u_int next)
{
if (c->istate > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED)
fatal("chan_set_istate: bad state %d -> %d", c->istate, next);
debug2("channel %d: input %s -> %s", c->self, istates[c->istate],
istates[next]);
c->istate = next;
}
static void
chan_set_ostate(Channel *c, u_int next)
{
if (c->ostate > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
fatal("chan_set_ostate: bad state %d -> %d", c->ostate, next);
debug2("channel %d: output %s -> %s", c->self, ostates[c->ostate],
ostates[next]);
c->ostate = next;
}
void
chan_read_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
debug2("channel %d: read failed", c->self);
switch (c->istate) {
case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c);
chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
break;
default:
error("channel %d: chan_read_failed for istate %d",
c->self, c->istate);
break;
}
}
void
chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
debug2("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self);
if (sshbuf_len(c->input)) {
error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer",
c->self);
return;
}
switch (c->istate) {
case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
if (!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_LOCAL)))
chan_send_eof2(ssh, c);
chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
break;
default:
error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d",
c->self, c->istate);
break;
}
}
void
chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
debug2("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self);
if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) {
error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer",
c->self);
return;
}
switch (c->ostate) {
case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c);
chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
break;
default:
error("channel %d: internal error: obuf_empty for ostate %d",
c->self, c->ostate);
break;
}
}
void
chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
debug2("channel %d: rcvd eow", c->self);
switch (c->istate) {
case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c);
chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
break;
}
}
static void
chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int r;
debug2("channel %d: send eof", c->self);
switch (c->istate) {
case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
- __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send CHANNEL_EOF");
c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_SENT;
break;
default:
error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d",
c->self, c->istate);
break;
}
}
static void
chan_send_close2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int r;
debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self);
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED ||
c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) {
error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d",
c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
} else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) {
error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self);
} else {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
- __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send CHANNEL_EOF");
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
}
}
static void
chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int r;
debug2("channel %d: send eow", c->self);
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) {
error("channel %d: must not sent eow on closed output",
c->self);
return;
}
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH))
+ if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH))
return;
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self);
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "eow@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send CHANNEL_EOF");
}
/* shared */
void
chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
debug2("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self);
c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_RCVD;
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN &&
sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0 &&
!CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
void
chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
debug2("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self);
if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) {
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
error("channel %d: protocol error: close rcvd twice",
c->self);
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
}
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
/* tear down larval channels immediately */
chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
return;
}
switch (c->ostate) {
case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
/*
* wait until a data from the channel is consumed if a CLOSE
* is received
*/
chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
break;
}
switch (c->istate) {
case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c);
chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c);
chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
break;
case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL))
chan_send_eof2(ssh, c);
chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c);
chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
break;
}
}
void
chan_write_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self);
switch (c->ostate) {
case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c);
if (strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
chan_send_eow2(ssh, c);
chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
break;
default:
error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d",
c->self, c->ostate);
break;
}
}
void
chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE;
}
int
chan_is_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int do_send)
{
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) {
debug2("channel %d: zombie", c->self);
return 1;
}
if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
return 0;
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) &&
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) &&
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
c->efd != -1 &&
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) {
debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %zu",
c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
return 0;
}
if (c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL) {
debug2("channel %d: is dead (local)", c->self);
return 1;
}
if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
if (do_send) {
chan_send_close2(ssh, c);
} else {
/* channel would be dead if we sent a close */
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) {
debug2("channel %d: almost dead",
c->self);
return 1;
}
}
}
if ((c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) &&
(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) {
debug2("channel %d: is dead", c->self);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* helper */
static void
chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
sshbuf_reset(c->output);
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
return;
/* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */
- debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
- c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->wfd, c->efd,
+ debug2_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
+ c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->wfd, c->efd,
channel_format_extended_usage(c));
if (c->sock != -1) {
- if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) < 0) {
- debug2("channel %d: %s: shutdown() failed for "
- "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, __func__,
- c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) == -1) {
+ debug2_f("channel %d: shutdown() failed for "
+ "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->sock,
+ c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) {
- logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- c->self, __func__, c->wfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) {
+ logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
+ "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->wfd,
+ c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
}
}
}
static void
chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
return;
- debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
- c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
+ debug2_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
+ c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
channel_format_extended_usage(c));
if (c->sock != -1) {
/*
* shutdown(sock, SHUT_READ) may return ENOTCONN if the
* write side has been closed already. (bug on Linux)
* HP-UX may return ENOTCONN also.
*/
- if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) < 0 && errno != ENOTCONN) {
- error("channel %d: %s: shutdown() failed for "
- "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- c->self, __func__, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) == -1 && errno != ENOTCONN) {
+ error_f("channel %d: shutdown() failed for "
+ "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->sock,
+ c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) {
- logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- c->self, __func__, c->rfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) {
+ logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
+ "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->rfd,
+ c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
}
}
}
static void
chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->efd == -1)
return;
if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
return;
- debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
- c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
+ debug_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
+ c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
channel_format_extended_usage(c));
- if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) {
- logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- c->self, __func__, c->efd, c->istate, c->ostate,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) {
+ logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
+ "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->efd,
+ c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/opacket.c b/crypto/openssh/opacket.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e637d7a71b5b..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/opacket.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,320 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: opacket.c,v 1.7 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */
-/* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-struct ssh *active_state, *backup_state;
-
-/* Map old to new API */
-
-void
-ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-void
-ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *ssh, int value)
-{
- u_char ch = value;
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, ch)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-void
-ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *ssh, u_int value)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, value)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-void
-ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t value)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_u64(ssh, value)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-void
-ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-void
-ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const char *str)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, str)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-void
-ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-void
-ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void
-ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve,
- const EC_POINT *point)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-# endif
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-
-void
-ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-u_int
-ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- u_char ch;
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &ch)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- return ch;
-}
-
-u_int
-ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- u_int val;
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &val)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- return val;
-}
-
-u_int64_t
-ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- u_int64_t val;
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u64(ssh, &val)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- return val;
-}
-
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-void
-ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-void
-ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-}
-# endif
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-
-void *
-ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- int r;
- size_t len;
- u_char *val;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (length_ptr != NULL)
- *length_ptr = (u_int)len;
- return val;
-}
-
-const void *
-ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- int r;
- size_t len;
- const u_char *val;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (length_ptr != NULL)
- *length_ptr = (u_int)len;
- return val;
-}
-
-char *
-ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr)
-{
- int r;
- size_t len;
- char *val;
-
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (length_ptr != NULL)
- *length_ptr = (u_int)len;
- return val;
-}
-
-/* Old API, that had to be reimplemented */
-
-void
-packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
-{
- active_state = ssh_packet_set_connection(active_state, fd_in, fd_out);
- if (active_state == NULL)
- fatal("%s: ssh_packet_set_connection failed", __func__);
-}
-
-u_int
-packet_get_char(void)
-{
- return (ssh_packet_get_char(active_state));
-}
-
-u_int
-packet_get_int(void)
-{
- return (ssh_packet_get_int(active_state));
-}
-
-int
-packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr)
-{
- u_char type;
- int r;
-
- if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
- return type;
-}
-
-int
-packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr)
-{
- u_char type;
- int r;
-
- if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr)))
- sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
- return type;
-}
-
-void
-packet_close(void)
-{
- ssh_packet_close(active_state);
- active_state = NULL;
-}
-
-void
-packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(active_state, buf, len)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
-}
-
-void
-packet_write_wait(void)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(active_state)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
-}
-
-void
-packet_write_poll(void)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(active_state)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
-}
-
-void
-packet_read_expect(int expected_type)
-{
- int r;
-
- if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(active_state, expected_type)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r);
-}
-
-void
-packet_disconnect(const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
- ssh_packet_disconnect(active_state, "%s", buf);
-}
-
-void
-packet_send_debug(const char *fmt, ...)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- va_list args;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
- ssh_packet_send_debug(active_state, "%s", buf);
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/opacket.h b/crypto/openssh/opacket.h
deleted file mode 100644
index f92fe586efb5..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/opacket.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: opacket.h,v 1.13 2018/07/06 09:03:02 sf Exp $ */
-#ifndef _OPACKET_H
-/* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */
-
-/* Map old to new API */
-void ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *, u_char);
-void ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *, int ch);
-void ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *, u_int value);
-void ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *, u_int64_t value);
-void ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value);
-void ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
-void ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len);
-void ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *, const char *str);
-void ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len);
-void ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *);
-
-u_int ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *);
-u_int ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *);
-u_int64_t ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *);
-void ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value);
-void ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
-void *ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr);
-char *ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr);
-
-/* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */
-#define ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh) \
-do { \
- int _len = ssh_packet_remaining(ssh); \
- if (_len > 0) { \
- logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \
- _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \
- ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, \
- "Packet integrity error."); \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
-/* old API */
-void packet_close(void);
-u_int packet_get_char(void);
-u_int packet_get_int(void);
-void packet_set_connection(int, int);
-int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *);
-int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *);
-void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len);
-void packet_write_wait(void);
-void packet_write_poll(void);
-void packet_read_expect(int expected_type);
-#define packet_set_timeout(timeout, count) \
- ssh_packet_set_timeout(active_state, (timeout), (count))
-#define packet_connection_is_on_socket() \
- ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(active_state)
-#define packet_set_nonblocking() \
- ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(active_state)
-#define packet_get_connection_in() \
- ssh_packet_get_connection_in(active_state)
-#define packet_get_connection_out() \
- ssh_packet_get_connection_out(active_state)
-#define packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags) \
- ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(active_state, (protocol_flags))
-#define packet_get_protocol_flags() \
- ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(active_state)
-#define packet_start(type) \
- ssh_packet_start(active_state, (type))
-#define packet_put_char(value) \
- ssh_packet_put_char(active_state, (value))
-#define packet_put_int(value) \
- ssh_packet_put_int(active_state, (value))
-#define packet_put_int64(value) \
- ssh_packet_put_int64(active_state, (value))
-#define packet_put_string( buf, len) \
- ssh_packet_put_string(active_state, (buf), (len))
-#define packet_put_cstring(str) \
- ssh_packet_put_cstring(active_state, (str))
-#define packet_put_raw(buf, len) \
- ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, (buf), (len))
-#define packet_put_bignum2(value) \
- ssh_packet_put_bignum2(active_state, (value))
-#define packet_send() \
- ssh_packet_send(active_state)
-#define packet_read() \
- ssh_packet_read(active_state)
-#define packet_get_int64() \
- ssh_packet_get_int64(active_state)
-#define packet_get_bignum2(value) \
- ssh_packet_get_bignum2(active_state, (value))
-#define packet_remaining() \
- ssh_packet_remaining(active_state)
-#define packet_get_string(length_ptr) \
- ssh_packet_get_string(active_state, (length_ptr))
-#define packet_get_string_ptr(length_ptr) \
- ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(active_state, (length_ptr))
-#define packet_get_cstring(length_ptr) \
- ssh_packet_get_cstring(active_state, (length_ptr))
-void packet_send_debug(const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-void packet_disconnect(const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
- __attribute__((noreturn));
-#define packet_have_data_to_write() \
- ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(active_state)
-#define packet_not_very_much_data_to_write() \
- ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(active_state)
-#define packet_set_interactive(interactive, qos_interactive, qos_bulk) \
- ssh_packet_set_interactive(active_state, (interactive), (qos_interactive), (qos_bulk))
-#define packet_is_interactive() \
- ssh_packet_is_interactive(active_state)
-#define packet_set_maxsize(s) \
- ssh_packet_set_maxsize(active_state, (s))
-#define packet_inc_alive_timeouts() \
- ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(active_state)
-#define packet_set_alive_timeouts(ka) \
- ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(active_state, (ka))
-#define packet_get_maxsize() \
- ssh_packet_get_maxsize(active_state)
-#define packet_add_padding(pad) \
- sshpkt_add_padding(active_state, (pad))
-#define packet_send_ignore(nbytes) \
- ssh_packet_send_ignore(active_state, (nbytes))
-#define packet_set_server() \
- ssh_packet_set_server(active_state)
-#define packet_set_authenticated() \
- ssh_packet_set_authenticated(active_state)
-#define packet_get_input() \
- ssh_packet_get_input(active_state)
-#define packet_get_output() \
- ssh_packet_get_output(active_state)
-#define packet_check_eom() \
- ssh_packet_check_eom(active_state)
-#define set_newkeys(mode) \
- ssh_set_newkeys(active_state, (mode))
-#define packet_get_state(m) \
- ssh_packet_get_state(active_state, m)
-#define packet_set_state(m) \
- ssh_packet_set_state(active_state, m)
-#define packet_get_raw(lenp) \
- sshpkt_ptr(active_state, lenp)
-#define packet_get_ecpoint(c,p) \
- ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(active_state, c, p)
-#define packet_put_ecpoint(c,p) \
- ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(active_state, c, p)
-#define packet_get_rekey_timeout() \
- ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(active_state)
-#define packet_set_rekey_limits(x,y) \
- ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(active_state, x, y)
-#define packet_get_bytes(x,y) \
- ssh_packet_get_bytes(active_state, x, y)
-#define packet_set_mux() \
- ssh_packet_set_mux(active_state)
-#define packet_get_mux() \
- ssh_packet_get_mux(active_state)
-#define packet_clear_keys() \
- ssh_packet_clear_keys(active_state)
-
-#endif /* _OPACKET_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
index c1e14cbd0ed4..5d53bef5757f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -1,115 +1,120 @@
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
srcdir=@srcdir@
top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
VPATH=@srcdir@
CC=@CC@
LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
LIBS=@LIBS@
AR=@AR@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@
OPENBSD=base64.o \
basename.o \
bcrypt_pbkdf.o \
bcrypt_pbkdf.o \
bindresvport.o \
blowfish.o \
daemon.o \
dirname.o \
explicit_bzero.o \
fmt_scaled.o \
freezero.o \
+ fnmatch.o \
getcwd.o \
getgrouplist.o \
getopt_long.o \
getrrsetbyname.o \
glob.o \
inet_aton.o \
inet_ntoa.o \
inet_ntop.o \
md5.o \
+ memmem.o \
mktemp.o \
pwcache.o \
readpassphrase.o \
reallocarray.o \
- realpath.o \
recallocarray.o \
- rmd160.o \
rresvport.o \
setenv.o \
setproctitle.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o \
sigact.o \
strcasestr.o \
strlcat.o \
strlcpy.o \
strmode.o \
strndup.o \
strnlen.o \
strptime.o \
strsep.o \
strtoll.o \
strtonum.o \
strtoull.o \
strtoul.o \
timingsafe_bcmp.o \
vis.o
COMPAT= arc4random.o \
bsd-asprintf.o \
bsd-closefrom.o \
bsd-cygwin_util.o \
bsd-err.o \
bsd-flock.o \
bsd-getline.o \
bsd-getpagesize.o \
bsd-getpeereid.o \
bsd-malloc.o \
bsd-misc.o \
bsd-nextstep.o \
bsd-openpty.o \
bsd-poll.o \
+ bsd-pselect.o \
bsd-setres_id.o \
bsd-signal.o \
bsd-snprintf.o \
bsd-statvfs.o \
bsd-waitpid.o \
fake-rfc2553.o \
getrrsetbyname-ldns.o \
kludge-fd_set.o \
openssl-compat.o \
libressl-api-compat.o \
xcrypt.o
PORTS= port-aix.o \
port-irix.o \
port-linux.o \
+ port-prngd.o \
port-solaris.o \
port-net.o \
port-uw.o
.c.o:
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
all: libopenbsd-compat.a
$(COMPAT): ../config.h
$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
$(PORTS): ../config.h
libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
$(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
$(RANLIB) $@
clean:
rm -f *.o *.a core
distclean: clean
rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
index 578f69f4f74f..14853aba43d1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
@@ -1,338 +1,344 @@
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */
/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
* Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
* Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
# include <sys/random.h>
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#endif
#include "log.h"
#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
#include "chacha_private.h"
#ifdef __GNUC__
#define inline __inline
#else /* !__GNUC__ */
#define inline
#endif /* !__GNUC__ */
/* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */
#define _ARC4_LOCK()
#define _ARC4_UNLOCK()
#define KEYSZ 32
#define IVSZ 8
#define BLOCKSZ 64
#define RSBUFSZ (16*BLOCKSZ)
static int rs_initialized;
static pid_t rs_stir_pid;
static chacha_ctx rs; /* chacha context for random keystream */
static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ]; /* keystream blocks */
static size_t rs_have; /* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
static size_t rs_count; /* bytes till reseed */
static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
static inline void
_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
{
if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
return;
chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0);
chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ);
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
# ifndef SSH_RANDOM_DEV
# define SSH_RANDOM_DEV "/dev/urandom"
# endif /* SSH_RANDOM_DEV */
static void
getrnd(u_char *s, size_t len)
{
- int fd;
+ int fd, save_errno;
ssize_t r;
size_t o = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM
if ((r = getrandom(s, len, 0)) > 0 && (size_t)r == len)
return;
#endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */
- if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno));
+ if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+ save_errno = errno;
+ /* Try egd/prngd before giving up. */
+ if (seed_from_prngd(s, len) == 0)
+ return;
+ fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV,
+ strerror(save_errno));
+ }
while (o < len) {
r = read(fd, s + o, len - o);
if (r < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
continue;
fatal("read %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno));
}
o += r;
}
close(fd);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static void
_rs_stir(void)
{
u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error 0x%lx)",
(unsigned long)ERR_get_error());
#else
getrnd(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#endif
if (!rs_initialized) {
rs_initialized = 1;
_rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
} else
_rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* invalidate rs_buf */
rs_have = 0;
memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ);
rs_count = 1600000;
}
static inline void
_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
{
pid_t pid = getpid();
if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) {
rs_stir_pid = pid;
_rs_stir();
} else
rs_count -= len;
}
static inline void
_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
{
#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ);
#endif
/* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ);
/* mix in optional user provided data */
if (dat) {
size_t i, m;
m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
}
/* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
_rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
}
static inline void
_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
{
u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
size_t m;
_rs_stir_if_needed(n);
while (n > 0) {
if (rs_have > 0) {
m = MIN(n, rs_have);
memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m);
memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m);
buf += m;
n -= m;
rs_have -= m;
}
if (rs_have == 0)
_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
}
}
static inline void
_rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val)
{
_rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
if (rs_have < sizeof(*val))
_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val));
memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val));
rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
return;
}
void
arc4random_stir(void)
{
_ARC4_LOCK();
_rs_stir();
_ARC4_UNLOCK();
}
void
arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen)
{
int m;
_ARC4_LOCK();
if (!rs_initialized)
_rs_stir();
while (datlen > 0) {
m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
_rs_rekey(dat, m);
dat += m;
datlen -= m;
}
_ARC4_UNLOCK();
}
u_int32_t
arc4random(void)
{
u_int32_t val;
_ARC4_LOCK();
_rs_random_u32(&val);
_ARC4_UNLOCK();
return val;
}
/*
* If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient
* arc4random_buf().
*/
# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
void
arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
{
_ARC4_LOCK();
_rs_random_buf(buf, n);
_ARC4_UNLOCK();
}
# endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
/* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */
#if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM)
void
arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
{
size_t i;
u_int32_t r = 0;
char *buf = (char *)_buf;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
r = arc4random();
buf[i] = r & 0xff;
r >>= 8;
}
explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r));
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
/*
* Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
* avoiding "modulo bias".
*
* Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
* returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This
* guarantees the selected random number will be inside
* [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
* after reduction modulo upper_bound.
*/
u_int32_t
arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
{
u_int32_t r, min;
if (upper_bound < 2)
return 0;
/* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
/*
* This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
* p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
* number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
* to re-roll.
*/
for (;;) {
r = arc4random();
if (r >= min)
break;
}
return r % upper_bound;
}
#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
#if 0
/*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <machine/pctr.h>
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
const int iter = 1000000;
int i;
pctrval v;
v = rdtsc();
for (i = 0; i < iter; i++)
arc4random();
v = rdtsc() - v;
v /= iter;
printf("%qd cycles\n", v);
exit(0);
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c
index 9e7466716425..b7dce095e4c3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/base64.c
@@ -1,315 +1,315 @@
/* $OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.5 2006/10/21 09:55:03 otto Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
* ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
* CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
* PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
* ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
*
* International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
* permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
* Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
* all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
* not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
* the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
* permission.
*
* To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
* under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
* the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
* dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is
* granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
* INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
* DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
* IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/base64.c */
#include "includes.h"
#if (!defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)) || (!defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON))
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "base64.h"
static const char Base64[] =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
static const char Pad64 = '=';
/* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt)
The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein
and Freed. It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for
convenience.
A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be
represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=",
is used to signify a special processing function.)
The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output
strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a
24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups.
These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each
of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet.
Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable
characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the
output string.
Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet
Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding
0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z
1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0
2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1
3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2
4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3
5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4
6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5
7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6
8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7
9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8
10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9
11 L 28 c 45 t 62 +
12 M 29 d 46 u 63 /
13 N 30 e 47 v
14 O 31 f 48 w (pad) =
15 P 32 g 49 x
16 Q 33 h 50 y
Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available
at the end of the data being encoded. A full encoding quantum is
always completed at the end of a quantity. When fewer than 24 input
bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the
right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Padding at the
end of the data is performed using the '=' character.
Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the
-------------------------------------------------
following cases can arise:
(1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral
multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded
output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters
with no "=" padding,
(2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits;
here, the final unit of encoded output will be two
characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or
(3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits;
here, the final unit of encoded output will be three
characters followed by one "=" padding character.
*/
#if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)
int
b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize)
{
size_t datalength = 0;
u_char input[3];
u_char output[4];
u_int i;
while (2 < srclength) {
input[0] = *src++;
input[1] = *src++;
input[2] = *src++;
srclength -= 3;
output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f;
if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
return (-1);
target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]];
}
/* Now we worry about padding. */
if (0 != srclength) {
/* Get what's left. */
input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++)
input[i] = *src++;
output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
return (-1);
target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
if (srclength == 1)
target[datalength++] = Pad64;
else
target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
target[datalength++] = Pad64;
}
if (datalength >= targsize)
return (-1);
target[datalength] = '\0'; /* Returned value doesn't count \0. */
return (datalength);
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */
#if !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON)
/* skips all whitespace anywhere.
converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after)
src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area.
it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error.
*/
int
b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
{
u_int tarindex, state;
int ch;
char *pos;
state = 0;
tarindex = 0;
while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') {
if (isspace(ch)) /* Skip whitespace anywhere. */
continue;
if (ch == Pad64)
break;
pos = strchr(Base64, ch);
- if (pos == 0) /* A non-base64 character. */
+ if (pos == 0) /* A non-base64 character. */
return (-1);
switch (state) {
case 0:
if (target) {
if (tarindex >= targsize)
return (-1);
target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2;
}
state = 1;
break;
case 1:
if (target) {
if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
return (-1);
target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 4;
target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f)
<< 4 ;
}
tarindex++;
state = 2;
break;
case 2:
if (target) {
if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
return (-1);
target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 2;
target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03)
<< 6;
}
tarindex++;
state = 3;
break;
case 3:
if (target) {
if (tarindex >= targsize)
return (-1);
target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64);
}
tarindex++;
state = 0;
break;
}
}
/*
* We are done decoding Base-64 chars. Let's see if we ended
* on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters.
*/
if (ch == Pad64) { /* We got a pad char. */
ch = *src++; /* Skip it, get next. */
switch (state) {
case 0: /* Invalid = in first position */
case 1: /* Invalid = in second position */
return (-1);
case 2: /* Valid, means one byte of info */
/* Skip any number of spaces. */
for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
if (!isspace(ch))
break;
/* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */
if (ch != Pad64)
return (-1);
ch = *src++; /* Skip the = */
/* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 3: /* Valid, means two bytes of info */
/*
* We know this char is an =. Is there anything but
* whitespace after it?
*/
for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
if (!isspace(ch))
return (-1);
/*
* Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra"
* bits that slopped past the last full byte were
* zeros. If we don't check them, they become a
* subliminal channel.
*/
if (target && target[tarindex] != 0)
return (-1);
}
} else {
/*
* We ended by seeing the end of the string. Make sure we
* have no partial bytes lying around.
*/
if (state != 0)
return (-1);
}
return (tarindex);
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) */
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
index 78523456387a..62728d38f002 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
@@ -1,179 +1,181 @@
/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c */
+
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
# include <blf.h>
#endif
#include "crypto_api.h"
#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
# undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
#endif
#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
#define MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
/*
* pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
*
* The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing
* function with the following modifications:
* 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512.
* 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits.
* 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modified
* to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"
* 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state
* expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.)
*
* Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller
* as a performance optimization.
*
* One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
* linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
* generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
* attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user
* always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
* entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
* wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
*/
#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8
#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4)
static void
bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
{
blf_ctx state;
u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] =
"OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite";
uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS];
int i;
uint16_t j;
size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
/* key expansion */
Blowfish_initstate(&state);
Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen);
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen);
Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen);
}
/* encryption */
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++)
cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext),
&j);
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
- blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t));
+ blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / (sizeof(uint64_t)));
/* copy out */
for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) {
out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff;
}
/* zap */
explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata));
explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state));
}
int
bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen,
u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds)
{
u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
u_int8_t *countsalt;
size_t i, j, amt, stride;
uint32_t count;
size_t origkeylen = keylen;
/* nothing crazy */
if (rounds < 1)
return -1;
if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 ||
keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20)
return -1;
if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL)
return -1;
stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out);
amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride;
memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen);
/* collapse password */
crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen);
/* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */
for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) {
countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff;
/* first round, salt is salt */
crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4);
bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out));
for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) {
/* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */
crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++)
out[j] ^= tmpout[j];
}
/*
* pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly.
*/
amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen);
for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
if (dest >= origkeylen)
break;
key[dest] = out[i];
}
keylen -= i;
}
/* zap */
explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out));
free(countsalt);
return 0;
}
#endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
index b56476a2d858..8fadca2dad66 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
@@ -1,109 +1,155 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004-2005 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H
# include <dirent.h>
# define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name)
#else
# define dirent direct
# define NAMLEN(dirent) (dirent)->d_namlen
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
# include <sys/ndir.h>
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
# include <sys/dir.h>
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H
# include <ndir.h>
# endif
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBPROC_H)
+# include <libproc.h>
+#endif
#ifndef OPEN_MAX
# define OPEN_MAX 256
#endif
#if 0
__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.11 2006/08/17 15:26:54 millert Exp $";
#endif /* lint */
+#ifndef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
/*
* Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to lowfd.
*/
+static void
+closefrom_fallback(int lowfd)
+{
+ long fd, maxfd;
+
+ /*
+ * Fall back on sysconf() or getdtablesize(). We avoid checking
+ * resource limits since it is possible to open a file descriptor
+ * and then drop the rlimit such that it is below the open fd.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+ maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX);
+#else
+ maxfd = getdtablesize();
+#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
+ if (maxfd < 0)
+ maxfd = OPEN_MAX;
+
+ for (fd = lowfd; fd < maxfd; fd++)
+ (void) close((int) fd);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
+
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
void
closefrom(int lowfd)
{
(void) fcntl(lowfd, F_CLOSEM, 0);
}
-#else
+#elif defined(HAVE_LIBPROC_H) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO)
void
closefrom(int lowfd)
{
- long fd, maxfd;
-#if defined(HAVE_DIRFD) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PID)
+ int i, r, sz;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+ struct proc_fdinfo *fdinfo_buf = NULL;
+
+ sz = proc_pidinfo(pid, PROC_PIDLISTFDS, 0, NULL, 0);
+ if (sz == 0)
+ return; /* no fds, really? */
+ else if (sz == -1)
+ goto fallback;
+ if ((fdinfo_buf = malloc(sz)) == NULL)
+ goto fallback;
+ r = proc_pidinfo(pid, PROC_PIDLISTFDS, 0, fdinfo_buf, sz);
+ if (r < 0 || r > sz)
+ goto fallback;
+ for (i = 0; i < r / (int)PROC_PIDLISTFD_SIZE; i++) {
+ if (fdinfo_buf[i].proc_fd >= lowfd)
+ close(fdinfo_buf[i].proc_fd);
+ }
+ free(fdinfo_buf);
+ return;
+ fallback:
+ free(fdinfo_buf);
+ closefrom_fallback(lowfd);
+ return;
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DIRFD) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PID)
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+ long fd;
char fdpath[PATH_MAX], *endp;
struct dirent *dent;
DIR *dirp;
int len;
/* Check for a /proc/$$/fd directory. */
len = snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/%ld/fd", (long)getpid());
if (len > 0 && (size_t)len < sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) {
while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
(void) close((int) fd);
}
(void) closedir(dirp);
- } else
-#endif
- {
- /*
- * Fall back on sysconf() or getdtablesize(). We avoid checking
- * resource limits since it is possible to open a file descriptor
- * and then drop the rlimit such that it is below the open fd.
- */
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
- maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX);
-#else
- maxfd = getdtablesize();
-#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
- if (maxfd < 0)
- maxfd = OPEN_MAX;
-
- for (fd = lowfd; fd < maxfd; fd++)
- (void) close((int) fd);
+ return;
}
+ /* /proc/$$/fd strategy failed, fall back to brute force closure */
+ closefrom_fallback(lowfd);
+}
+#else
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+ closefrom_fallback(lowfd);
}
#endif /* !HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
#endif /* HAVE_CLOSEFROM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
index fb49e30f5981..54628e2607b4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
@@ -1,120 +1,269 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
*
* This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
* binary mode on Windows systems.
*/
#define NO_BINARY_OPEN /* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <wchar.h>
+#include <wctype.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
int
binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
{
va_list ap;
mode_t mode;
va_start(ap, flags);
mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t);
va_end(ap);
return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode));
}
int
check_ntsec(const char *filename)
{
return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
}
const char *
cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()
{
static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2];
if (!cyg_privsep_user[0])
{
#ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME
if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user,
sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0)
#endif
strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user));
}
return cyg_privsep_user;
}
#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))
static struct wenv {
const char *name;
size_t namelen;
} wenv_arr[] = {
{ NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") },
{ NL("COMPUTERNAME=") },
{ NL("COMSPEC=") },
{ NL("CYGWIN=") },
{ NL("OS=") },
{ NL("PATH=") },
{ NL("PATHEXT=") },
{ NL("PROGRAMFILES=") },
{ NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") },
{ NL("SYSTEMROOT=") },
{ NL("WINDIR=") }
};
char **
fetch_windows_environment(void)
{
char **e, **p;
unsigned int i, idx = 0;
p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *));
for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) {
for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) {
if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen))
p[idx++] = *e;
}
}
p[idx] = NULL;
return p;
}
void
free_windows_environment(char **p)
{
free(p);
}
+/*
+ * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
+ * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
+ *
+ * The Cygwin version of this function must be case-insensitive and take
+ * Unicode characters into account.
+ */
+
+static int
+__match_pattern (const wchar_t *s, const wchar_t *pattern)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
+ if (!*pattern)
+ return !*s;
+
+ if (*pattern == '*') {
+ /* Skip the asterisk. */
+ pattern++;
+
+ /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
+ if (!*pattern)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
+ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
+ /*
+ * Look instances of the next character in
+ * pattern, and try to match starting from
+ * those.
+ */
+ for (; *s; s++)
+ if (*s == *pattern &&
+ __match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
+ return 1;
+ /* Failed. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
+ * match at each position.
+ */
+ for (; *s; s++)
+ if (__match_pattern(s, pattern))
+ return 1;
+ /* Failed. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * There must be at least one more character in the string.
+ * If we are at the end, fail.
+ */
+ if (!*s)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
+ if (*pattern != '?' && towlower(*pattern) != towlower(*s))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
+ s++;
+ pattern++;
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static int
+_match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
+{
+ wchar_t *ws;
+ wchar_t *wpattern;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((len = mbstowcs(NULL, s, 0)) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ ws = (wchar_t *) xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof (wchar_t));
+ mbstowcs(ws, s, len + 1);
+ if ((len = mbstowcs(NULL, pattern, 0)) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ wpattern = (wchar_t *) xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof (wchar_t));
+ mbstowcs(wpattern, pattern, len + 1);
+ ret = __match_pattern (ws, wpattern);
+ free(ws);
+ free(wpattern);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the string against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+int
+cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern)
+{
+ char sub[1024];
+ int negated;
+ int got_positive;
+ u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
+
+ got_positive = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len;) {
+ /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
+ if (pattern[i] == '!') {
+ negated = 1;
+ i++;
+ } else
+ negated = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
+ * subpattern to lowercase.
+ */
+ for (subi = 0;
+ i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
+ subi++, i++)
+ sub[subi] = pattern[i];
+ /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
+ if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
+ if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
+ i++;
+
+ /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
+ sub[subi] = '\0';
+
+ /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
+ if (_match_pattern(string, sub)) {
+ if (negated)
+ return -1; /* Negative */
+ else
+ got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
+ * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
+ */
+ return got_positive;
+}
+
#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
index 202c055dbae7..55c5a5b81b44 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
@@ -1,65 +1,66 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
*
* This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
* binary mode on Windows systems.
*/
#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
#undef ERROR
/* Avoid including windows headers. */
typedef void *HANDLE;
#define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1)
#define DNLEN 16
#define UNLEN 256
/* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including
windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitly. */
extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *);
extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE);
#include <sys/cygwin.h>
#include <io.h>
#define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user())
const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user();
int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
int check_ntsec(const char *);
char **fetch_windows_environment(void);
void free_windows_environment(char **);
+int cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *);
#ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN
#define open binary_open
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
index 5d7540a70f4b..059b6d3b3ec7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -1,327 +1,440 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
char *__progname;
#endif
/*
* NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0]
* Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle()
*/
char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0)
{
char *p, *q;
#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
extern char *__progname;
p = __progname;
#else
if (argv0 == NULL)
return ("unknown"); /* XXX */
p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
if (p == NULL)
p = argv0;
else
p++;
#endif
if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) {
perror("strdup");
exit(1);
}
return q;
}
#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
int setlogin(const char *name)
{
return (0);
}
#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host,
const char *user, const char *domain)
{
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
int seteuid(uid_t euid)
{
return (setreuid(-1, euid));
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
int setegid(uid_t egid)
{
return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1));
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
const char *strerror(int e)
{
extern int sys_nerr;
extern char *sys_errlist[];
if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
return (sys_errlist[e]);
return ("unlisted error");
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
{
struct utimbuf ub;
ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec;
ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec;
return (utime(filename, &ub));
}
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
+/*
+ * A limited implementation of utimensat() that only implements the
+ * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
+ * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
+ */
+int
+utimensat(int fd, const char *path, const struct timespec times[2],
+ int flag)
+{
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+# ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
+ int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
+# endif
+
+ tv[0].tv_sec = times[0].tv_sec;
+ tv[0].tv_usec = times[0].tv_nsec / 1000;
+ tv[1].tv_sec = times[1].tv_sec;
+ tv[1].tv_usec = times[1].tv_nsec / 1000;
+
+ if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+ }
+# ifndef HAVE_FUTIMES
+ return utimes(path, tv);
+# else
+# ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
+ if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+ oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+# endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
+ if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ ret = futimes(fd, tv);
+ close(fd);
+ return ret;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
+/*
+ * A limited implementation of fchownat() that only implements the
+ * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
+ * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
+ */
+int
+fchownat(int fd, const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group, int flag)
+{
+ int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
+
+ if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+ }
+# ifndef HAVE_FCHOWN
+ return chown(path, owner, group);
+# else
+# ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
+ if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+ oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+# endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
+ if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ ret = fchown(fd, owner, group);
+ close(fd);
+ return ret;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT
+/*
+ * A limited implementation of fchmodat() that only implements the
+ * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
+ * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
+ */
+int
+fchmodat(int fd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flag)
+{
+ int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
+
+ if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+ }
+# ifndef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ return chmod(path, mode);
+# else
+# ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
+ if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+ oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+# endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
+ if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ ret = fchmod(fd, mode);
+ close(fd);
+ return ret;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
int truncate(const char *path, off_t length)
{
int fd, ret, saverrno;
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return (-1);
ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
saverrno = errno;
close(fd);
if (ret == -1)
errno = saverrno;
return(ret);
}
#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
{
int rc, saverrno;
extern int errno;
struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait;
TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req)
(void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL);
rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait);
if (rc == -1) {
saverrno = errno;
(void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL);
errno = saverrno;
tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec -
(tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec);
tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec -
(tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec);
tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L;
tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L;
} else {
tremain.tv_sec = 0;
tremain.tv_usec = 0;
}
if (rem != NULL)
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
return(rc);
}
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP)
int usleep(unsigned int useconds)
{
struct timespec ts;
ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000;
ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000;
return nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
pid_t
tcgetpgrp(int fd)
{
int ctty_pgrp;
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1)
return(-1);
else
return(ctty_pgrp);
}
#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */
#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
int
tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration)
{
# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK)
struct timeval sleepytime;
sleepytime.tv_sec = 0;
sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000;
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1)
return (-1);
(void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime);
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1)
return (-1);
return (0);
# else
return -1;
# endif
}
#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */
#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
char *
strdup(const char *str)
{
size_t len;
char *cp;
len = strlen(str) + 1;
cp = malloc(len);
if (cp != NULL)
return(memcpy(cp, str, len));
return NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
int
isblank(int c)
{
return (c == ' ' || c == '\t');
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
pid_t
getpgid(pid_t pid)
{
#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID) && GETPGRP_VOID == 0
return getpgrp(pid);
#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP)
if (pid == 0)
return getpgrp();
#endif
errno = ESRCH;
return -1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
int
pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[])
{
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
/* a mbtowc that only supports ASCII */
int
mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n)
{
if (s == NULL || *s == '\0')
return 0; /* ASCII is not state-dependent */
if (*s < 0 || *s > 0x7f || n < 1) {
errno = EOPNOTSUPP;
return -1;
}
if (pwc != NULL)
*pwc = *s;
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
long long
llabs(long long j)
{
return (j < 0 ? -j : j);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BZERO
void
bzero(void *b, size_t n)
{
(void)memset(b, 0, n);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RAISE
int
raise(int sig)
{
kill(getpid(), sig);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETSID
pid_t
getsid(pid_t pid)
{
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
#endif
#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
#undef fflush
int _ssh_compat_fflush(FILE *f)
{
int r1, r2;
if (f == NULL) {
r1 = fflush(stdout);
r2 = fflush(stderr);
if (r1 == -1 || r2 == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
return fflush(f);
}
#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *
+localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result)
+{
+ struct tm *tm = localtime(timep);
+ *result = *tm;
+ return result;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
index 52ec528538b5..2206e1a82140 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@@ -1,160 +1,197 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
#define _BSD_MISC_H
#include "includes.h"
char *ssh_get_progname(char *);
+int seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *, size_t);
#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
int setenv(const char *, const char *, int);
#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
int setlogin(const char *);
#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
int seteuid(uid_t);
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
int setegid(uid_t);
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
const char *strerror(int);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF)
#define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0))
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
struct timeval {
long tv_sec;
long tv_usec;
}
#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
int utimes(char *, struct timeval *);
#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
+#ifndef AT_FDCWD
+# define AT_FDCWD (-2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT
+int fchmodat(int, const char *, mode_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
+int fchownat(int, const char *, uid_t, gid_t, int);
+#endif
+
#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
int truncate (const char *, off_t);
#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
-#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
struct timespec {
time_t tv_sec;
long tv_nsec;
};
-#endif
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+# include <time.h>
int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
+# include <time.h>
+/* start with the high bits and work down to minimise risk of overlap */
+# ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
+# define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000
+# endif
+int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_UTIMENSAT */
+
#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP
int usleep(unsigned int useconds);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
int tcsendbreak(int, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
int unsetenv(const char *);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
int isblank(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_PSELECT
+int pselect(int, fd_set *, fd_set *, fd_set *, const struct timespec *,
+ const sigset_t *);
+#endif
+
#ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT
# define endgrent() do { } while(0)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
# define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
# define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]);
#endif
/* bsd-err.h */
#ifndef HAVE_ERR
void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ERRX
void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_WARN
void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
long long llabs(long long);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_BZERO) && HAVE_DECL_BZERO == 0
void bzero(void *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RAISE
int raise(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETSID
pid_t getsid(pid_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK
# define LOCK_SH 0x01
# define LOCK_EX 0x02
# define LOCK_NB 0x04
# define LOCK_UN 0x08
int flock(int, int);
#endif
#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
# define fflush(x) (_ssh_compat_fflush(x))
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_REALPATH
+#define realpath(x, y) (sftp_realpath((x), (y)))
+#endif
+
#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
index e8ad542f8d55..1ab41f42b634 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
@@ -1,195 +1,206 @@
/*
* Please note: this implementation of openpty() is far from complete.
* it is just enough for portable OpenSSH's needs.
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
# include <sys/ioctl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
# include <pty.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H)
# include <sys/stropts.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include "misc.h"
+
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
int
openpty(int *amaster, int *aslave, char *name, struct termios *termp,
struct winsize *winp)
{
#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY)
/*
* _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more
* pty's automagically when needed
*/
char *slave;
if ((slave = _getpty(amaster, O_RDWR, 0622, 0)) == NULL)
return (-1);
/* Open the slave side. */
if ((*aslave = open(slave, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
/*
* This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x. (Note that Solaris 2.3
* also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.)
*/
int ptm;
char *pts;
- mysig_t old_signal;
+ sshsig_t old_signal;
if ((ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
return (-1);
/* XXX: need to close ptm on error? */
- old_signal = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ old_signal = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (grantpt(ptm) < 0)
return (-1);
- signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0)
return (-1);
if ((pts = ptsname(ptm)) == NULL)
return (-1);
*amaster = ptm;
/* Open the slave side. */
if ((*aslave = open(pts, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
+# if defined(I_FIND) && defined(__SVR4)
+ /*
+ * If the streams modules have already been pushed then there
+ * is no more work to do here.
+ */
+ if (ioctl(*aslave, I_FIND, "ptem") != 0)
+ return 0;
+# endif
+
/*
* Try to push the appropriate streams modules, as described
* in Solaris pts(7).
*/
ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
# ifndef __hpux
ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ttcompat");
# endif /* __hpux */
return (0);
#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC)
/* AIX-style pty code. */
const char *ttname;
if ((*amaster = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
return (-1);
if ((ttname = ttyname(*amaster)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if ((*aslave = open(ttname, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
#else
/* BSD-style pty code. */
char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64];
int i;
const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmno"
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef";
int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors);
int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors;
struct termios tio;
for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) {
snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty%c%c",
ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/tty%c%c",
ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
/* Try SCO style naming */
snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/ptyp%d", i);
snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%d", i);
if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
continue;
}
/* Open the slave side. */
if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
/* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */
if (tcgetattr(*amaster, &tio) != -1) {
tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON);
tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR);
tio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
tcsetattr(*amaster, TCSANOW, &tio);
}
return (0);
}
return (-1);
#endif
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
index 17945f5b46f5..8420ca1db378 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
@@ -1,61 +1,61 @@
/* $OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */
#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H)
#ifndef _COMPAT_POLL_H_
#define _COMPAT_POLL_H_
typedef struct pollfd {
- int fd;
+ int fd;
short events;
short revents;
} pollfd_t;
typedef unsigned int nfds_t;
#define POLLIN 0x0001
#define POLLOUT 0x0004
#define POLLERR 0x0008
#define POLLHUP 0x0010
#define POLLNVAL 0x0020
#if 0
/* the following are currently not implemented */
#define POLLPRI 0x0002
#define POLLRDNORM 0x0040
#define POLLNORM POLLRDNORM
#define POLLWRNORM POLLOUT
#define POLLRDBAND 0x0080
#define POLLWRBAND 0x0100
#endif
#define INFTIM (-1) /* not standard */
int poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int);
#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */
#endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fff1bf54f72c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Darren Tucker (dtucker at dtucker net).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_PSELECT
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h" /* for set_nonblock */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIGHANDLER_T
+typedef void (*sighandler_t)(int);
+#endif
+
+static sighandler_t saved_sighandler[_NSIG];
+
+/*
+ * Set up the descriptors. Because they are close-on-exec, in the case
+ * where sshd's re-exec fails notify_pipe will still point to a descriptor
+ * that was closed by the exec attempt but if that descriptor has been
+ * reopened then we'll attempt to use that. Ensure that notify_pipe is
+ * outside of the range used by sshd re-exec but within NFDBITS (so we don't
+ * need to expand the fd_sets).
+ */
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+static int
+pselect_notify_setup_fd(int *fd)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = fcntl(*fd, F_DUPFD, REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD)) < 0 ||
+ fcntl(r, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0 || r >= FD_SETSIZE)
+ return -1;
+ (void)close(*fd);
+ return (*fd = r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
+ * the race between select() and child_terminated
+ */
+static pid_t notify_pid;
+static int notify_pipe[2];
+static void
+pselect_notify_setup(void)
+{
+ static int initialized;
+
+ if (initialized && notify_pid == getpid())
+ return;
+ if (notify_pid == 0)
+ debug3_f("initializing");
+ else {
+ debug3_f("pid changed, reinitializing");
+ if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+ close(notify_pipe[0]);
+ if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+ close(notify_pipe[1]);
+ }
+ if (pipe(notify_pipe) == -1) {
+ error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+ } else if (pselect_notify_setup_fd(&notify_pipe[0]) == -1 ||
+ pselect_notify_setup_fd(&notify_pipe[1]) == -1) {
+ error("fcntl(notify_pipe, ...) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(notify_pipe[0]);
+ close(notify_pipe[1]);
+ } else {
+ set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
+ set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
+ notify_pid = getpid();
+ debug3_f("pid %d saved %d pipe0 %d pipe1 %d", getpid(),
+ notify_pid, notify_pipe[0], notify_pipe[1]);
+ initialized = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */
+ notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */
+}
+static void
+pselect_notify_parent(void)
+{
+ if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+ (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+}
+static void
+pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+{
+ if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+ FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+}
+static void
+pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+{
+ char c;
+
+ if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
+ debug2_f("reading");
+ FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+pselect_sig_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
+ pselect_notify_parent();
+ if (saved_sighandler[sig] != NULL)
+ (*saved_sighandler[sig])(sig); /* call original handler */
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A minimal implementation of pselect(2), built on top of select(2).
+ */
+
+int
+pselect(int nfds, fd_set *readfds, fd_set *writefds, fd_set *exceptfds,
+ const struct timespec *timeout, const sigset_t *mask)
+{
+ int ret, sig, saved_errno, unmasked = 0;
+ sigset_t osig;
+ struct sigaction sa, osa;
+ struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL;
+
+ if (timeout != NULL) {
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout->tv_sec;
+ tv.tv_usec = timeout->tv_nsec / 1000;
+ tvp = &tv;
+ }
+ if (mask == NULL) /* no signal mask, just call select */
+ return select(nfds, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp);
+
+ /* For each signal we're unmasking, install our handler if needed. */
+ for (sig = 0; sig < _NSIG; sig++) {
+ if (sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP || sigismember(mask, sig))
+ continue;
+ if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &sa) == 0 &&
+ sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN && sa.sa_handler != SIG_DFL) {
+ unmasked = 1;
+ if (sa.sa_handler == pselect_sig_handler)
+ continue;
+ sa.sa_handler = pselect_sig_handler;
+ if (sigaction(sig, &sa, &osa) == 0) {
+ debug3_f("installing signal handler for %s, "
+ "previous %p", strsignal(sig),
+ osa.sa_handler);
+ saved_sighandler[sig] = osa.sa_handler;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (unmasked) {
+ pselect_notify_setup();
+ pselect_notify_prepare(readfds);
+ nfds = MAX(nfds, notify_pipe[0]);
+ }
+
+ /* Unmask signals, call select then restore signal mask. */
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, mask, &osig);
+ ret = select(nfds, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osig, NULL);
+
+ if (unmasked)
+ pselect_notify_done(readfds);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
index 696ae7b28136..04752d5afa08 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
@@ -1,98 +1,98 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "log.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
int
setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
{
int ret = 0, saved_errno;
if (rgid != sgid) {
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
#if defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID)
if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("setregid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno));
+ error("setregid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)rgid, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
ret = -1;
}
#else
if (setegid(egid) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)egid, strerror(errno));
+ error("setegid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)egid, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
ret = -1;
}
if (setgid(rgid) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("setgid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno));
+ error("setgid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)rgid, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
ret = -1;
}
#endif
return ret;
}
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
int
setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
{
int ret = 0, saved_errno;
if (ruid != suid) {
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
#if defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("setreuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno));
+ error("setreuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)ruid, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
ret = -1;
}
#else
# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
if (seteuid(euid) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("seteuid %u: %.100s", euid, strerror(errno));
+ error("seteuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)euid, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
ret = -1;
}
# endif
if (setuid(ruid) < 0) {
saved_errno = errno;
- error("setuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno));
+ error("setuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)ruid, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
ret = -1;
}
#endif
return ret;
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
index 979010e84b5f..38d5e972e9e4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
@@ -1,62 +1,35 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h"
-#undef signal
-
-mysig_t
-mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
- struct sigaction sa, osa;
-
- if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1)
- return (mysig_t) -1;
- if (osa.sa_handler != act) {
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = 0;
-#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT
- if (sig == SIGALRM)
- sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
-#endif
- sa.sa_handler = act;
- if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1)
- return (mysig_t) -1;
- }
- return (osa.sa_handler);
-#else
- return (signal(sig, act));
-#endif
-}
-
#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL)
char *strsignal(int sig)
{
static char buf[16];
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", sig);
return buf;
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
index 4cb8cb7a0b92..8d8c4441968d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
@@ -1,39 +1,36 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _BSD_SIGNAL_H
#define _BSD_SIGNAL_H
#include "includes.h"
+#include <signal.h>
+
#ifndef _NSIG
# ifdef NSIG
# define _NSIG NSIG
# else
# define _NSIG 128
# endif
#endif
-/* wrapper for signal interface */
-typedef void (*mysig_t)(int);
-mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
-#define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b)
-
#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL)
char *strsignal(int);
#endif
#endif /* _BSD_SIGNAL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
index f27b9d808a2a..b9eaee14f3c0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
@@ -1,880 +1,880 @@
/*
* Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
* This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com)
* It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact
* on all source code distributions
*/
/**************************************************************
* Original:
* Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995
* A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included.
* Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that
* the version here does not include floating point...
*
* snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks
* for string length. This covers a nasty loophole.
*
* The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
* causing nast effects.
*
* More Recently:
* Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43
* This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point
* numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything
* from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from
* the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page.
*
* Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1
* Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this
* probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet
* support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint()
* was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways
* which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formatted the code
* to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the
* original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with:
* gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm
* and run snprintf for results.
*
* Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de> 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i
* The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats.
* Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work.
*
* Michael Elkins <me@cs.hmc.edu> 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8
* The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were
* missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so
* the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF.
*
* Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998
* fixed handling of %.0f
* added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
*
* tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001
* got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder)
* added C99 semantics
*
* date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31; author: herb; state: Exp; lines: +2 -0
* actually print args for %g and %e
*
* date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +8 -0
* Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here. I don't
* see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it
* locally. Fixes AIX and Solaris builds.
*
* date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24; author: tridge; state: Exp; lines: +5 -13
* put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of
* functions
*
* date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +21 -4
* Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg. Use __va_copy before using it
* when it exists.
*
* date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04; author: idra; state: Exp; lines: +20 -14
* Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp.
* Thanks to Ollie Oldham <ollie.oldham@metro-optix.com> for spotting it.
* few mods to make it easier to compile the tests.
- * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones.
+ * added the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones.
*
* Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003
* Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source
* tree with less trouble.
* Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition.
*
* Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003
* Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings.
*
* Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even
* if the C library has some snprintf functions already.
*
* Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007
* Fix integer overflows in return value.
* Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch()
*
**************************************************************/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */
# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
# define LDOUBLE long double
#else
# define LDOUBLE double
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG
# define LLONG long long
#else
# define LLONG long
#endif
/*
* dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf
*/
/* format read states */
#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
#define DP_S_FLAGS 1
#define DP_S_MIN 2
#define DP_S_DOT 3
#define DP_S_MAX 4
#define DP_S_MOD 5
#define DP_S_CONV 6
#define DP_S_DONE 7
/* format flags - Bits */
-#define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0)
-#define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1)
-#define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2)
-#define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3)
-#define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4)
-#define DP_F_UP (1 << 5)
-#define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6)
+#define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0)
+#define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1)
+#define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2)
+#define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3)
+#define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4)
+#define DP_F_UP (1 << 5)
+#define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6)
/* Conversion Flags */
#define DP_C_SHORT 1
#define DP_C_LONG 2
#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3
#define DP_C_LLONG 4
#define DP_C_SIZE 5
#define DP_C_INTMAX 6
#define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0')
#ifndef MAX
# define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q))
#endif
#define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \
do { \
if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \
errno = ERANGE; \
return -1; \
} \
if (pos < buflen) \
buf[pos] = thechar; \
(pos)++; \
} while (0)
static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format,
va_list args_in);
static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
char *value, int flags, int min, int max);
static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags);
static int
dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in)
{
char ch;
intmax_t value;
LDOUBLE fvalue;
char *strvalue;
int min;
int max;
int state;
int flags;
int cflags;
size_t currlen;
va_list args;
VA_COPY(args, args_in);
state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0;
max = -1;
ch = *format++;
while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
if (ch == '\0')
state = DP_S_DONE;
switch(state) {
case DP_S_DEFAULT:
if (ch == '%')
state = DP_S_FLAGS;
else
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
ch = *format++;
break;
case DP_S_FLAGS:
switch (ch) {
case '-':
flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '+':
flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
ch = *format++;
break;
case ' ':
flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '#':
flags |= DP_F_NUM;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '0':
flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
ch = *format++;
break;
default:
state = DP_S_MIN;
break;
}
break;
case DP_S_MIN:
if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch);
ch = *format++;
} else if (ch == '*') {
min = va_arg (args, int);
ch = *format++;
state = DP_S_DOT;
} else {
state = DP_S_DOT;
}
break;
case DP_S_DOT:
if (ch == '.') {
state = DP_S_MAX;
ch = *format++;
} else {
state = DP_S_MOD;
}
break;
case DP_S_MAX:
if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
if (max < 0)
max = 0;
max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch);
ch = *format++;
} else if (ch == '*') {
max = va_arg (args, int);
ch = *format++;
state = DP_S_MOD;
} else {
state = DP_S_MOD;
}
break;
case DP_S_MOD:
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'j':
cflags = DP_C_INTMAX;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'l':
cflags = DP_C_LONG;
ch = *format++;
if (ch == 'l') { /* It's a long long */
cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
ch = *format++;
}
break;
case 'L':
cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'z':
cflags = DP_C_SIZE;
ch = *format++;
break;
default:
break;
}
state = DP_S_CONV;
break;
case DP_S_CONV:
switch (ch) {
case 'd':
case 'i':
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
value = va_arg (args, int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
value = va_arg (args, long int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
value = va_arg (args, LLONG);
else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
value = va_arg (args, ssize_t);
else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
value = va_arg (args, intmax_t);
else
value = va_arg (args, int);
if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'o':
flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
value = va_arg (args, size_t);
#ifdef notyet
else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
#endif
else
value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
8, min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'u':
flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
value = va_arg (args, size_t);
#ifdef notyet
else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
#endif
else
value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
10, min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'X':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
case 'x':
flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
value = va_arg (args, size_t);
#ifdef notyet
else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
#endif
else
value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
16, min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'f':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'E':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
case 'e':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'G':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
case 'g':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'c':
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen,
va_arg (args, int));
break;
case 's':
strvalue = va_arg (args, char *);
if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)";
if (max == -1) {
max = strlen(strvalue);
}
if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min;
if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1)
return -1;
break;
case 'p':
strvalue = va_arg (args, void *);
if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
(long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
return -1;
break;
#if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh
case 'n':
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
short int *num;
num = va_arg (args, short int *);
*num = currlen;
} else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) {
long int *num;
num = va_arg (args, long int *);
*num = (long int)currlen;
} else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) {
LLONG *num;
num = va_arg (args, LLONG *);
*num = (LLONG)currlen;
} else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) {
ssize_t *num;
num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *);
*num = (ssize_t)currlen;
} else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) {
intmax_t *num;
num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *);
*num = (intmax_t)currlen;
} else {
int *num;
num = va_arg (args, int *);
*num = currlen;
}
break;
#endif
case '%':
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
break;
case 'w':
/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
ch = *format++;
break;
default:
/* Unknown, skip */
break;
}
ch = *format++;
state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
flags = cflags = min = 0;
max = -1;
break;
case DP_S_DONE:
break;
default:
/* hmm? */
break; /* some picky compilers need this */
}
}
if (maxlen != 0) {
if (currlen < maxlen - 1)
buffer[currlen] = '\0';
else if (maxlen > 0)
buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
}
return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1;
}
static int
fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
{
int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */
int cnt = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value);
#endif
if (value == 0) {
value = "<NULL>";
}
for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */
padlen = min - strln;
if (padlen < 0)
padlen = 0;
if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */
while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
--padlen;
++cnt;
}
while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value);
value++;
++cnt;
}
while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++padlen;
++cnt;
}
return 0;
}
/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
static int
fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
{
int signvalue = 0;
unsigned LLONG uvalue;
char convert[20];
int place = 0;
int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */
int caps = 0;
if (max < 0)
max = 0;
uvalue = value;
if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
if( value < 0 ) {
signvalue = '-';
uvalue = -value;
} else {
if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */
signvalue = '+';
else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
signvalue = ' ';
}
}
if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
do {
convert[place++] =
(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")
[uvalue % (unsigned)base ];
uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base );
} while(uvalue && (place < 20));
if (place == 20) place--;
convert[place] = 0;
zpadlen = max - place;
spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0);
if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0;
if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
spadlen = 0;
}
if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */
#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n",
- zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place);
+ zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place);
#endif
/* Spaces */
while (spadlen > 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
--spadlen;
}
/* Sign */
if (signvalue)
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
/* Zeros */
if (zpadlen > 0) {
while (zpadlen > 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
--zpadlen;
}
}
/* Digits */
while (place > 0) {
--place;
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]);
}
/* Left Justified spaces */
while (spadlen < 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++spadlen;
}
return 0;
}
static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
{
LDOUBLE result = value;
if (value < 0)
result = -value;
return result;
}
static LDOUBLE POW10(int val)
{
LDOUBLE result = 1;
while (val) {
result *= 10;
val--;
}
return result;
}
static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value)
{
LLONG intpart;
intpart = (LLONG)value;
value = value - intpart;
if (value >= 0.5) intpart++;
return intpart;
}
/* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should
be portable, but slow */
static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr)
{
int i;
long l;
double x = x0;
double f = 1.0;
for (i=0;i<100;i++) {
l = (long)x;
if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break;
x *= 0.1;
f *= 10.0;
}
if (i == 100) {
/*
* yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle.
* What do we do?
*/
(*iptr) = 0;
return 0;
}
if (i != 0) {
double i2;
double ret;
ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2);
(*iptr) = l*f + i2;
return ret;
}
(*iptr) = l;
return x - (*iptr);
}
static int
fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags)
{
int signvalue = 0;
double ufvalue;
char iconvert[311];
char fconvert[311];
int iplace = 0;
int fplace = 0;
int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */
int zpadlen = 0;
int caps = 0;
int idx;
double intpart;
double fracpart;
double temp;
/*
* AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default
* is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6
*/
if (max < 0)
max = 6;
ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue);
if (fvalue < 0) {
signvalue = '-';
} else {
if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */
signvalue = '+';
} else {
if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
signvalue = ' ';
}
}
#if 0
if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
#endif
#if 0
if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */
#endif
/*
* Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our
* conversion method
*/
if (max > 16)
max = 16;
/* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
* multiplying by a factor of 10
*/
temp = ufvalue;
my_modf(temp, &intpart);
fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) {
intpart++;
fracpart -= POW10(max);
}
/* Convert integer part */
do {
temp = intpart*0.1;
my_modf(temp, &intpart);
idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0);
/* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */
/* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */
iconvert[iplace++] =
(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
} while (intpart && (iplace < 311));
if (iplace == 311) iplace--;
iconvert[iplace] = 0;
/* Convert fractional part */
if (fracpart)
{
do {
temp = fracpart*0.1;
my_modf(temp, &fracpart);
idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0);
/* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */
/* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */
fconvert[fplace++] =
(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
} while(fracpart && (fplace < 311));
if (fplace == 311) fplace--;
}
fconvert[fplace] = 0;
/* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */
padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0);
zpadlen = max - fplace;
if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
if (padlen < 0)
padlen = 0;
if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */
if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
if (signvalue) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
--padlen;
signvalue = 0;
}
while (padlen > 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
--padlen;
}
}
while (padlen > 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
--padlen;
}
if (signvalue)
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
while (iplace > 0) {
--iplace;
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen);
#endif
/*
* Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
* char to print out.
*/
if (max > 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.');
while (zpadlen > 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
--zpadlen;
}
while (fplace > 0) {
--fplace;
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]);
}
}
while (padlen < 0) {
DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++padlen;
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */
#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
int
vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
return dopr(str, count, fmt, args);
}
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF)
int
snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
index e3bd87d985a3..10d8764392c2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
@@ -1,88 +1,94 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
* IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS)
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
# include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#ifndef MNAMELEN
# define MNAMELEN 32
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES
+# define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS
static void
copy_statfs_to_statvfs(struct statvfs *to, struct statfs *from)
{
to->f_bsize = from->f_bsize;
to->f_frsize = from->f_bsize; /* no exact equivalent */
to->f_blocks = from->f_blocks;
to->f_bfree = from->f_bfree;
to->f_bavail = from->f_bavail;
to->f_files = from->f_files;
to->f_ffree = from->f_ffree;
to->f_favail = from->f_ffree; /* no exact equivalent */
to->f_fsid = 0; /* XXX fix me */
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS
to->f_flag = from->f_flags;
#else
to->f_flag = 0;
#endif
to->f_namemax = MNAMELEN;
}
+#endif
# ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
int statvfs(const char *path, struct statvfs *buf)
{
-# ifdef HAVE_STATFS
+# if defined(HAVE_STATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS)
struct statfs fs;
memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
if (statfs(path, &fs) == -1)
return -1;
copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
return 0;
# else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
# endif
}
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
int fstatvfs(int fd, struct statvfs *buf)
{
-# ifdef HAVE_FSTATFS
+# if defined(HAVE_FSTATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS)
struct statfs fs;
memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
if (fstatfs(fd, &fs) == -1)
return -1;
copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
return 0;
# else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
# endif
}
# endif
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
index b551268ab063..bd61b6909240 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
@@ -1,49 +1,49 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H
#define _BSD_WAITPID_H
#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
/* Clean out any potential issues */
#undef WIFEXITED
#undef WIFSTOPPED
#undef WIFSIGNALED
/* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */
#define _W_INT(w) (*(int*)&(w)) /* convert union wait to int */
#define WIFEXITED(w) (!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377))
#define WIFSTOPPED(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & 0100)
#define WIFSIGNALED(w) (!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w))
#define WEXITSTATUS(w) (int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1)
#define WTERMSIG(w) (int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1)
#define WCOREFLAG 0x80
-#define WCOREDUMP(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG)
+#define WCOREDUMP(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG)
/* Prototype */
pid_t waitpid(int, int *, int);
#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
#endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
index 6ef9825a9ad3..68cd2c10b3c8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
@@ -1,57 +1,65 @@
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */
/* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */
/*
* Public domain.
* Written by Ted Unangst
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <string.h>
/*
* explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero
*/
#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
-#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_S
+#ifdef HAVE_EXPLICIT_MEMSET
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+ (void)explicit_memset(p, 0, n);
+}
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_MEMSET_S)
void
explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
{
if (n == 0)
return;
(void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n);
}
#else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
/*
* Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid
* dead-store optimisation eliminating the call.
*/
static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero;
void
explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
{
if (n == 0)
return;
/*
* clang -fsanitize=memory needs to intercept memset-like functions
* to correctly detect memory initialisation. Make sure one is called
* directly since our indirection trick above successfully confuses it.
*/
#if defined(__has_feature)
# if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
memset(p, 0, n);
# endif
#endif
ssh_bzero(p, n);
}
#endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
#endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b5641a091632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.22 2020/03/13 03:25:45 djm Exp $ */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 2011, VMware, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * * Neither the name of the VMware, Inc. nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL VMWARE, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, 2016 Todd C. Miller <millert@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Authored by William A. Rowe Jr. <wrowe; apache.org, vmware.com>, April 2011
+ *
+ * Derived from The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, IEEE Std 1003.1-2008
+ * as described in;
+ * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fnmatch.html
+ *
+ * Filename pattern matches defined in section 2.13, "Pattern Matching Notation"
+ * from chapter 2. "Shell Command Language"
+ * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/utilities/V3_chap02.html#tag_18_13
+ * where; 1. A bracket expression starting with an unquoted <circumflex> '^'
+ * character CONTINUES to specify a non-matching list; 2. an explicit <period> '.'
+ * in a bracket expression matching list, e.g. "[.abc]" does NOT match a leading
+ * <period> in a filename; 3. a <left-square-bracket> '[' which does not introduce
+ * a valid bracket expression is treated as an ordinary character; 4. a differing
+ * number of consecutive slashes within pattern and string will NOT match;
+ * 5. a trailing '\' in FNM_ESCAPE mode is treated as an ordinary '\' character.
+ *
+ * Bracket expansion defined in section 9.3.5, "RE Bracket Expression",
+ * from chapter 9, "Regular Expressions"
+ * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap09.html#tag_09_03_05
+ * with no support for collating symbols, equivalence class expressions or
+ * character class expressions. A partial range expression with a leading
+ * hyphen following a valid range expression will match only the ordinary
+ * <hyphen> and the ending character (e.g. "[a-m-z]" will match characters
+ * 'a' through 'm', a <hyphen> '-', or a 'z').
+ *
+ * Supports BSD extensions FNM_LEADING_DIR to match pattern to the end of one
+ * path segment of string, and FNM_CASEFOLD to ignore alpha case.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Only POSIX/C single byte locales are correctly supported at this time.
+ * Notably, non-POSIX locales with FNM_CASEFOLD produce undefined results,
+ * particularly in ranges of mixed case (e.g. "[A-z]") or spanning alpha and
+ * nonalpha characters within a range.
+ *
+ * XXX comments below indicate porting required for multi-byte character sets
+ * and non-POSIX locale collation orders; requires mbr* APIs to track shift
+ * state of pattern and string (rewinding pattern and string repeatedly).
+ *
+ * Certain parts of the code assume 0x00-0x3F are unique with any MBCS (e.g.
+ * UTF-8, SHIFT-JIS, etc). Any implementation allowing '\' as an alternate
+ * path delimiter must be aware that 0x5C is NOT unique within SHIFT-JIS.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/fnmatch.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH
+
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "charclass.h"
+
+#define RANGE_MATCH 1
+#define RANGE_NOMATCH 0
+#define RANGE_ERROR (-1)
+
+static int
+classmatch(const char *pattern, char test, int foldcase, const char **ep)
+{
+ const char * const mismatch = pattern;
+ const char *colon;
+ struct cclass *cc;
+ int rval = RANGE_NOMATCH;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (pattern[0] != '[' || pattern[1] != ':') {
+ *ep = mismatch;
+ return RANGE_ERROR;
+ }
+ pattern += 2;
+
+ if ((colon = strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']') {
+ *ep = mismatch;
+ return RANGE_ERROR;
+ }
+ *ep = colon + 2;
+ len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
+
+ if (foldcase && strncmp(pattern, "upper:]", 7) == 0)
+ pattern = "lower:]";
+ for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
+ if (!strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0') {
+ if (cc->isctype((unsigned char)test))
+ rval = RANGE_MATCH;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cc->name == NULL) {
+ /* invalid character class, treat as normal text */
+ *ep = mismatch;
+ rval = RANGE_ERROR;
+ }
+ return rval;
+}
+
+/* Most MBCS/collation/case issues handled here. Wildcard '*' is not handled.
+ * EOS '\0' and the FNM_PATHNAME '/' delimiters are not advanced over,
+ * however the "\/" sequence is advanced to '/'.
+ *
+ * Both pattern and string are **char to support pointer increment of arbitrary
+ * multibyte characters for the given locale, in a later iteration of this code
+ */
+static int fnmatch_ch(const char **pattern, const char **string, int flags)
+{
+ const char * const mismatch = *pattern;
+ const int nocase = !!(flags & FNM_CASEFOLD);
+ const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE);
+ const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME);
+ int result = FNM_NOMATCH;
+ const char *startch;
+ int negate;
+
+ if (**pattern == '[') {
+ ++*pattern;
+
+ /* Handle negation, either leading ! or ^ operators */
+ negate = (**pattern == '!') || (**pattern == '^');
+ if (negate)
+ ++*pattern;
+
+ /* ']' is an ordinary char at the start of the range pattern */
+ if (**pattern == ']')
+ goto leadingclosebrace;
+
+ while (**pattern) {
+ if (**pattern == ']') {
+ ++*pattern;
+ /* XXX: Fix for MBCS character width */
+ ++*string;
+ return (result ^ negate);
+ }
+
+ if (escape && (**pattern == '\\')) {
+ ++*pattern;
+
+ /* Patterns must terminate with ']', not EOS */
+ if (!**pattern)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Patterns must terminate with ']' not '/' */
+ if (slash && (**pattern == '/'))
+ break;
+
+ /* Match character classes. */
+ switch (classmatch(*pattern, **string, nocase, pattern)) {
+ case RANGE_MATCH:
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ case RANGE_NOMATCH:
+ /* Valid character class but no match. */
+ continue;
+ default:
+ /* Not a valid character class. */
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!**pattern)
+ break;
+
+leadingclosebrace:
+ /* Look at only well-formed range patterns;
+ * "x-]" is not allowed unless escaped ("x-\]")
+ * XXX: Fix for locale/MBCS character width
+ */
+ if (((*pattern)[1] == '-') && ((*pattern)[2] != ']')) {
+ startch = *pattern;
+ *pattern += (escape && ((*pattern)[2] == '\\')) ? 3 : 2;
+
+ /*
+ * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern, EOS
+ * terminated or ranges containing a slash in
+ * FNM_PATHNAME mode pattern fall out to to the
+ * rewind and test '[' literal code path.
+ */
+ if (!**pattern || (slash && (**pattern == '/')))
+ break;
+
+ /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */
+ if ((**string >= *startch) && (**string <= **pattern))
+ result = 0;
+ else if (nocase &&
+ (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)*startch) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) >=
+ tolower((unsigned char)*startch)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) <=
+ tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+ result = 0;
+
+ ++*pattern;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */
+ if ((**string == **pattern))
+ result = 0;
+ else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) ==
+ tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+ result = 0;
+
+ ++*pattern;
+ }
+ /*
+ * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern;
+ * Rewind and reset result to test '[' literal
+ */
+ *pattern = mismatch;
+ result = FNM_NOMATCH;
+ } else if (**pattern == '?') {
+ /* Optimize '?' match before unescaping **pattern */
+ if (!**string || (slash && (**string == '/')))
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ result = 0;
+ goto fnmatch_ch_success;
+ } else if (escape && (**pattern == '\\') && (*pattern)[1]) {
+ ++*pattern;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by the MBCS char width */
+ if (**string == **pattern)
+ result = 0;
+ else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) ==
+ tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+ result = 0;
+
+ /* Refuse to advance over trailing slash or NULs */
+ if (**string == '\0' || **pattern == '\0' ||
+ (slash && ((**string == '/') || (**pattern == '/'))))
+ return result;
+
+fnmatch_ch_success:
+ ++*pattern;
+ ++*string;
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+int fnmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int flags)
+{
+ static const char dummystring[2] = {' ', 0};
+ const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE);
+ const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME);
+ const int leading_dir = !!(flags & FNM_LEADING_DIR);
+ const char *dummyptr, *matchptr, *strendseg;
+ int wild;
+ /* For '*' wild processing only; suppress 'used before initialization'
+ * warnings with dummy initialization values;
+ */
+ const char *strstartseg = NULL;
+ const char *mismatch = NULL;
+ int matchlen = 0;
+
+ if (*pattern == '*')
+ goto firstsegment;
+
+ while (*pattern && *string) {
+ /*
+ * Pre-decode "\/" which has no special significance, and
+ * match balanced slashes, starting a new segment pattern.
+ */
+ if (slash && escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))
+ ++pattern;
+ if (slash && (*pattern == '/') && (*string == '/')) {
+ ++pattern;
+ ++string;
+ }
+
+firstsegment:
+ /*
+ * At the beginning of each segment, validate leading period
+ * behavior.
+ */
+ if ((flags & FNM_PERIOD) && (*string == '.')) {
+ if (*pattern == '.')
+ ++pattern;
+ else if (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '.'))
+ pattern += 2;
+ else
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ ++string;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Determine the end of string segment. Presumes '/'
+ * character is unique, not composite in any MBCS encoding
+ */
+ if (slash) {
+ strendseg = strchr(string, '/');
+ if (!strendseg)
+ strendseg = strchr(string, '\0');
+ } else {
+ strendseg = strchr(string, '\0');
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allow pattern '*' to be consumed even with no remaining
+ * string to match.
+ */
+ while (*pattern) {
+ if ((string > strendseg) ||
+ ((string == strendseg) && (*pattern != '*')))
+ break;
+
+ if (slash && ((*pattern == '/') ||
+ (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Reduce groups of '*' and '?' to n '?' matches
+ * followed by one '*' test for simplicity.
+ */
+ for (wild = 0; (*pattern == '*') || (*pattern == '?'); ++pattern) {
+ if (*pattern == '*') {
+ wild = 1;
+ } else if (string < strendseg) { /* && (*pattern == '?') */
+ /* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */
+ ++string;
+ }
+ else { /* (string >= strendseg) && (*pattern == '?') */
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (wild) {
+ strstartseg = string;
+ mismatch = pattern;
+
+ /*
+ * Count fixed (non '*') char matches remaining
+ * in pattern * excluding '/' (or "\/") and '*'.
+ */
+ for (matchptr = pattern, matchlen = 0; 1; ++matchlen) {
+ if ((*matchptr == '\0') ||
+ (slash && ((*matchptr == '/') ||
+ (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') &&
+ (matchptr[1] == '/'))))) {
+ /* Compare precisely this many
+ * trailing string chars, the
+ * resulting match needs no
+ * wildcard loop.
+ */
+ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+ if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ string = strendseg - matchlen;
+ wild = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (*matchptr == '*') {
+ /*
+ * Ensure at least this many
+ * trailing string chars remain
+ * for the first comparison.
+ */
+ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+ if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ /*
+ * Begin first wild comparison
+ * at the current position.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Skip forward in pattern by a single
+ * character match Use a dummy
+ * fnmatch_ch() test to count one
+ * "[range]" escape.
+ */
+ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+ if (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') &&
+ matchptr[1]) {
+ matchptr += 2;
+ } else if (*matchptr == '[') {
+ dummyptr = dummystring;
+ fnmatch_ch(&matchptr, &dummyptr,
+ flags);
+ } else {
+ ++matchptr;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Incrementally match string against the pattern. */
+ while (*pattern && (string < strendseg)) {
+ /* Success; begin a new wild pattern search. */
+ if (*pattern == '*')
+ break;
+
+ if (slash && ((*string == '/') ||
+ (*pattern == '/') || (escape &&
+ (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Compare ch's (the pattern is advanced over
+ * "\/" to the '/', but slashes will mismatch,
+ * and are not consumed).
+ */
+ if (!fnmatch_ch(&pattern, &string, flags))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Failed to match, loop against next char
+ * offset of string segment until not enough
+ * string chars remain to match the fixed
+ * pattern.
+ */
+ if (wild) {
+ /* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */
+ string = ++strstartseg;
+ if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ pattern = mismatch;
+ continue;
+ } else
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*string && !((slash || leading_dir) && (*string == '/')))
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ if (*pattern && !(slash && ((*pattern == '/') ||
+ (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/')))))
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ if (leading_dir && !*pattern && *string == '/')
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Where both pattern and string are at EOS, declare success. */
+ if (!*string && !*pattern)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Pattern didn't match to the end of string. */
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FNMATCH */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d3bc4a8634f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.8 2005/12/13 00:35:22 millert Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:53 cgd Exp $ */
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * @(#)fnmatch.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/fnmatch.h */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
+/* Ensure we define FNM_CASEFOLD */
+#define __BSD_VISIBLE 1
+
+#ifndef _FNMATCH_H_
+#define _FNMATCH_H_
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+#endif
+
+#define FNM_NOMATCH 1 /* Match failed. */
+#define FNM_NOSYS 2 /* Function not supported (unused). */
+
+#define FNM_NOESCAPE 0x01 /* Disable backslash escaping. */
+#define FNM_PATHNAME 0x02 /* Slash must be matched by slash. */
+#define FNM_PERIOD 0x04 /* Period must be matched by period. */
+#if __BSD_VISIBLE
+#define FNM_LEADING_DIR 0x08 /* Ignore /<tail> after Imatch. */
+#define FNM_CASEFOLD 0x10 /* Case insensitive search. */
+#define FNM_IGNORECASE FNM_CASEFOLD
+#define FNM_FILE_NAME FNM_PATHNAME
+#endif
+
+/* __BEGIN_DECLS */
+int fnmatch(const char *, const char *, int);
+/* __END_DECLS */
+
+#endif /* !_FNMATCH_H_ */
+#endif /* ! HAVE_FNMATCH_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
index e28947430578..1a5001f7d98a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
@@ -1,532 +1,532 @@
/* $OpenBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.25 2011/03/05 22:10:11 guenther Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.15 2002/01/31 22:43:40 tv Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
* Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
* Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
*/
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/getopt_long.c */
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
/*
* Some defines to make it easier to keep the code in sync with upstream.
* getopt opterr optind optopt optreset optarg are all in defines.h which is
* pulled in by includes.h.
*/
#define warnx logit
#if 0
#include <err.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "log.h"
int opterr = 1; /* if error message should be printed */
int optind = 1; /* index into parent argv vector */
int optopt = '?'; /* character checked for validity */
int optreset; /* reset getopt */
char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */
#define PRINT_ERROR ((opterr) && (*options != ':'))
#define FLAG_PERMUTE 0x01 /* permute non-options to the end of argv */
#define FLAG_ALLARGS 0x02 /* treat non-options as args to option "-1" */
#define FLAG_LONGONLY 0x04 /* operate as getopt_long_only */
/* return values */
#define BADCH (int)'?'
#define BADARG ((*options == ':') ? (int)':' : (int)'?')
-#define INORDER (int)1
+#define INORDER (int)1
#define EMSG ""
static int getopt_internal(int, char * const *, const char *,
const struct option *, int *, int);
static int parse_long_options(char * const *, const char *,
const struct option *, int *, int);
static int gcd(int, int);
static void permute_args(int, int, int, char * const *);
static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */
/* XXX: set optreset to 1 rather than these two */
static int nonopt_start = -1; /* first non option argument (for permute) */
static int nonopt_end = -1; /* first option after non options (for permute) */
/* Error messages */
static const char recargchar[] = "option requires an argument -- %c";
static const char recargstring[] = "option requires an argument -- %s";
static const char ambig[] = "ambiguous option -- %.*s";
static const char noarg[] = "option doesn't take an argument -- %.*s";
static const char illoptchar[] = "unknown option -- %c";
static const char illoptstring[] = "unknown option -- %s";
/*
* Compute the greatest common divisor of a and b.
*/
static int
gcd(int a, int b)
{
int c;
c = a % b;
while (c != 0) {
a = b;
b = c;
c = a % b;
}
return (b);
}
/*
* Exchange the block from nonopt_start to nonopt_end with the block
* from nonopt_end to opt_end (keeping the same order of arguments
* in each block).
*/
static void
permute_args(int panonopt_start, int panonopt_end, int opt_end,
char * const *nargv)
{
int cstart, cyclelen, i, j, ncycle, nnonopts, nopts, pos;
char *swap;
/*
* compute lengths of blocks and number and size of cycles
*/
nnonopts = panonopt_end - panonopt_start;
nopts = opt_end - panonopt_end;
ncycle = gcd(nnonopts, nopts);
cyclelen = (opt_end - panonopt_start) / ncycle;
for (i = 0; i < ncycle; i++) {
cstart = panonopt_end+i;
pos = cstart;
for (j = 0; j < cyclelen; j++) {
if (pos >= panonopt_end)
pos -= nnonopts;
else
pos += nopts;
swap = nargv[pos];
/* LINTED const cast */
((char **) nargv)[pos] = nargv[cstart];
/* LINTED const cast */
((char **)nargv)[cstart] = swap;
}
}
}
/*
* parse_long_options --
* Parse long options in argc/argv argument vector.
* Returns -1 if short_too is set and the option does not match long_options.
*/
static int
parse_long_options(char * const *nargv, const char *options,
const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int short_too)
{
char *current_argv, *has_equal;
size_t current_argv_len;
int i, match;
current_argv = place;
match = -1;
optind++;
if ((has_equal = strchr(current_argv, '=')) != NULL) {
/* argument found (--option=arg) */
current_argv_len = has_equal - current_argv;
has_equal++;
} else
current_argv_len = strlen(current_argv);
for (i = 0; long_options[i].name; i++) {
/* find matching long option */
if (strncmp(current_argv, long_options[i].name,
current_argv_len))
continue;
if (strlen(long_options[i].name) == current_argv_len) {
/* exact match */
match = i;
break;
}
/*
* If this is a known short option, don't allow
* a partial match of a single character.
*/
if (short_too && current_argv_len == 1)
continue;
if (match == -1) /* partial match */
match = i;
else {
/* ambiguous abbreviation */
if (PRINT_ERROR)
warnx(ambig, (int)current_argv_len,
current_argv);
optopt = 0;
return (BADCH);
}
}
if (match != -1) { /* option found */
if (long_options[match].has_arg == no_argument
&& has_equal) {
if (PRINT_ERROR)
warnx(noarg, (int)current_argv_len,
current_argv);
/*
* XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag
*/
if (long_options[match].flag == NULL)
optopt = long_options[match].val;
else
optopt = 0;
return (BADARG);
}
if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument ||
long_options[match].has_arg == optional_argument) {
if (has_equal)
optarg = has_equal;
else if (long_options[match].has_arg ==
required_argument) {
/*
* optional argument doesn't use next nargv
*/
optarg = nargv[optind++];
}
}
if ((long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument)
&& (optarg == NULL)) {
/*
* Missing argument; leading ':' indicates no error
* should be generated.
*/
if (PRINT_ERROR)
warnx(recargstring,
current_argv);
/*
* XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag
*/
if (long_options[match].flag == NULL)
optopt = long_options[match].val;
else
optopt = 0;
--optind;
return (BADARG);
}
} else { /* unknown option */
if (short_too) {
--optind;
return (-1);
}
if (PRINT_ERROR)
warnx(illoptstring, current_argv);
optopt = 0;
return (BADCH);
}
if (idx)
*idx = match;
if (long_options[match].flag) {
*long_options[match].flag = long_options[match].val;
return (0);
} else
return (long_options[match].val);
}
/*
* getopt_internal --
* Parse argc/argv argument vector. Called by user level routines.
*/
static int
getopt_internal(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int flags)
{
char *oli; /* option letter list index */
int optchar, short_too;
static int posixly_correct = -1;
if (options == NULL)
return (-1);
/*
* XXX Some GNU programs (like cvs) set optind to 0 instead of
* XXX using optreset. Work around this braindamage.
*/
if (optind == 0)
optind = optreset = 1;
/*
* Disable GNU extensions if POSIXLY_CORRECT is set or options
* string begins with a '+'.
*/
if (posixly_correct == -1 || optreset)
posixly_correct = (getenv("POSIXLY_CORRECT") != NULL);
if (*options == '-')
flags |= FLAG_ALLARGS;
else if (posixly_correct || *options == '+')
flags &= ~FLAG_PERMUTE;
if (*options == '+' || *options == '-')
options++;
optarg = NULL;
if (optreset)
nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
start:
if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */
optreset = 0;
if (optind >= nargc) { /* end of argument vector */
place = EMSG;
if (nonopt_end != -1) {
/* do permutation, if we have to */
permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
optind, nargv);
optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start;
}
else if (nonopt_start != -1) {
/*
* If we skipped non-options, set optind
* to the first of them.
*/
optind = nonopt_start;
}
nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
return (-1);
}
if (*(place = nargv[optind]) != '-' ||
(place[1] == '\0' && strchr(options, '-') == NULL)) {
place = EMSG; /* found non-option */
if (flags & FLAG_ALLARGS) {
/*
* GNU extension:
* return non-option as argument to option 1
*/
optarg = nargv[optind++];
return (INORDER);
}
if (!(flags & FLAG_PERMUTE)) {
/*
* If no permutation wanted, stop parsing
* at first non-option.
*/
return (-1);
}
/* do permutation */
if (nonopt_start == -1)
nonopt_start = optind;
else if (nonopt_end != -1) {
permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
optind, nargv);
nonopt_start = optind -
(nonopt_end - nonopt_start);
nonopt_end = -1;
}
optind++;
/* process next argument */
goto start;
}
if (nonopt_start != -1 && nonopt_end == -1)
nonopt_end = optind;
/*
* If we have "-" do nothing, if "--" we are done.
*/
if (place[1] != '\0' && *++place == '-' && place[1] == '\0') {
optind++;
place = EMSG;
/*
* We found an option (--), so if we skipped
* non-options, we have to permute.
*/
if (nonopt_end != -1) {
permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
optind, nargv);
optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start;
}
nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
return (-1);
}
}
/*
* Check long options if:
* 1) we were passed some
* 2) the arg is not just "-"
* 3) either the arg starts with -- we are getopt_long_only()
*/
if (long_options != NULL && place != nargv[optind] &&
(*place == '-' || (flags & FLAG_LONGONLY))) {
short_too = 0;
if (*place == '-')
place++; /* --foo long option */
else if (*place != ':' && strchr(options, *place) != NULL)
short_too = 1; /* could be short option too */
optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options,
idx, short_too);
if (optchar != -1) {
place = EMSG;
return (optchar);
}
}
if ((optchar = (int)*place++) == (int)':' ||
(optchar == (int)'-' && *place != '\0') ||
(oli = strchr(options, optchar)) == NULL) {
/*
* If the user specified "-" and '-' isn't listed in
* options, return -1 (non-option) as per POSIX.
* Otherwise, it is an unknown option character (or ':').
*/
if (optchar == (int)'-' && *place == '\0')
return (-1);
if (!*place)
++optind;
if (PRINT_ERROR)
warnx(illoptchar, optchar);
optopt = optchar;
return (BADCH);
}
if (long_options != NULL && optchar == 'W' && oli[1] == ';') {
/* -W long-option */
if (*place) /* no space */
/* NOTHING */;
else if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */
place = EMSG;
if (PRINT_ERROR)
warnx(recargchar, optchar);
optopt = optchar;
return (BADARG);
} else /* white space */
place = nargv[optind];
optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options,
idx, 0);
place = EMSG;
return (optchar);
}
if (*++oli != ':') { /* doesn't take argument */
if (!*place)
++optind;
} else { /* takes (optional) argument */
optarg = NULL;
if (*place) /* no white space */
optarg = place;
else if (oli[1] != ':') { /* arg not optional */
if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */
place = EMSG;
if (PRINT_ERROR)
warnx(recargchar, optchar);
optopt = optchar;
return (BADARG);
} else
optarg = nargv[optind];
}
place = EMSG;
++optind;
}
/* dump back option letter */
return (optchar);
}
/*
* getopt --
* Parse argc/argv argument vector.
*
* [eventually this will replace the BSD getopt]
*/
int
getopt(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options)
{
/*
* We don't pass FLAG_PERMUTE to getopt_internal() since
* the BSD getopt(3) (unlike GNU) has never done this.
*
* Furthermore, since many privileged programs call getopt()
* before dropping privileges it makes sense to keep things
* as simple (and bug-free) as possible.
*/
return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, NULL, NULL, 0));
}
#if 0
/*
* getopt_long --
* Parse argc/argv argument vector.
*/
int
getopt_long(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
const struct option *long_options, int *idx)
{
return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx,
FLAG_PERMUTE));
}
/*
* getopt_long_only --
* Parse argc/argv argument vector.
*/
int
getopt_long_only(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
const struct option *long_options, int *idx)
{
return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx,
FLAG_PERMUTE|FLAG_LONGONLY));
}
#endif
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
index 7c97e67f557c..e89151789aa3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
@@ -1,1066 +1,1079 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.38 2011/09/22 06:27:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.49 2020/04/21 08:25:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
* Guido van Rossum.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
/*
* glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
*
* The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
*
* Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
*
* GLOB_QUOTE:
* Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
* character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
* GLOB_MAGCHAR:
* Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
* GLOB_NOMAGIC:
* Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
* not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing]
* GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
* Use alternately specified directory access functions.
* GLOB_TILDE:
* expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
* GLOB_BRACE:
* expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
* gl_matchc:
* Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "glob.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
!defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
#include "charclass.h"
+#ifdef TILDE
+# undef TILDE
+#endif
+
#define DOLLAR '$'
#define DOT '.'
#define EOS '\0'
#define LBRACKET '['
#define NOT '!'
#define QUESTION '?'
#define QUOTE '\\'
#define RANGE '-'
#define RBRACKET ']'
#define SEP '/'
#define STAR '*'
#define TILDE '~'
#define UNDERSCORE '_'
#define LBRACE '{'
#define RBRACE '}'
#define SLASH '/'
#define COMMA ','
#ifndef DEBUG
#define M_QUOTE 0x8000
#define M_PROTECT 0x4000
#define M_MASK 0xffff
#define M_ASCII 0x00ff
typedef u_short Char;
#else
#define M_QUOTE 0x80
#define M_PROTECT 0x40
#define M_MASK 0xff
#define M_ASCII 0x7f
typedef char Char;
#endif
#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
#define M_ALL META('*')
#define M_END META(']')
#define M_NOT META('!')
#define M_ONE META('?')
#define M_RNG META('-')
#define M_SET META('[')
#define M_CLASS META(':')
#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
#define GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC 65536
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 128
+#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 2048
#define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384
-/* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR 64
-
struct glob_lim {
size_t glim_malloc;
size_t glim_stat;
size_t glim_readdir;
};
struct glob_path_stat {
char *gps_path;
struct stat *gps_stat;
};
static int compare(const void *, const void *);
static int compare_gps(const void *, const void *);
-static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int);
+static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, size_t);
static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *);
static Char *g_strchr(const Char *, int);
static int g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t);
static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *,
struct stat *);
static const Char *
globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *,
struct glob_lim *);
-static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *, int);
+static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *);
#ifdef DEBUG
static void qprintf(const char *, Char *);
#endif
int
glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int),
glob_t *pglob)
{
const u_char *patnext;
int c;
- Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[PATH_MAX];
struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 };
- if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
- return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
-
patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
pglob->gl_offs = 0;
}
pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
- if (pglob->gl_offs < 0 || pglob->gl_pathc < 0 ||
- pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
- pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
+ if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
+ return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+
+ if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+ pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
return GLOB_NOSPACE;
bufnext = patbuf;
- bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1;
+ bufend = bufnext + PATH_MAX - 1;
if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
*bufnext++ = c;
else {
/* Protect the quoted characters. */
while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
if (c == QUOTE) {
if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
c = QUOTE;
--patnext;
}
*bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
} else
*bufnext++ = c;
}
*bufnext = EOS;
if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
else
return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
}
/*
* Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
* invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
* characters
*/
static int
globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
const Char* ptr = pattern;
/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp);
return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
}
/*
* Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
* If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
* If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
*/
static int
globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob,
struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
int i, rv;
Char *lm, *ls;
const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
- Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ Char patbuf[PATH_MAX];
/* copy part up to the brace */
for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
;
*lm = EOS;
ls = lm;
/* Find the balanced brace */
for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
/* Ignore everything between [] */
for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
;
if (*pe == EOS) {
/*
* We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
* Ignore and just look for RBRACE
*/
pe = pm;
}
} else if (*pe == LBRACE)
i++;
else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
if (i == 0)
break;
i--;
}
/* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS)
return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
switch (*pm) {
case LBRACKET:
/* Ignore everything between [] */
for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
;
if (*pm == EOS) {
/*
* We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
* Ignore and just look for RBRACE
*/
pm = pl;
}
break;
case LBRACE:
i++;
break;
case RBRACE:
if (i) {
i--;
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case COMMA:
if (i && *pm == COMMA)
break;
else {
/* Append the current string */
for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
;
/*
* Append the rest of the pattern after the
* closing brace
*/
for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
;
/* Expand the current pattern */
#ifdef DEBUG
qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
#endif
rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH)
return rv;
/* move after the comma, to the next string */
pl = pm + 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* expand tilde from the passwd file.
*/
static const Char *
globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
char *h;
const Char *p;
Char *b, *eb;
if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
return pattern;
/* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
;
*h = EOS;
#if 0
if (h == (char *)eb)
return what;
#endif
if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
/*
* handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
* first and then trying the password file
*/
#if 0
if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
#endif
if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
return pattern;
else
h = pwd->pw_dir;
}
} else {
/*
* Expand a ~user
*/
if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
return pattern;
else
h = pwd->pw_dir;
}
/* Copy the home directory */
for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
;
/* Append the rest of the pattern */
while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
;
*b = EOS;
return patbuf;
}
static int
g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
{
int rv = 0;
while (n--) {
rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++;
if (rv)
break;
if (*s1++ == '\0')
break;
}
return rv;
}
static int
g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp)
{
const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1;
Char *bufnext = *bufnextp;
const Char *colon;
struct cclass *cc;
size_t len;
if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']')
return 1; /* not a character class */
len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0')
break;
}
if (cc->name == NULL)
return -1; /* invalid character class */
*bufnext++ = M_CLASS;
*bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]);
*bufnextp = bufnext;
*patternp += len + 3;
return 0;
}
/*
* The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
* quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
* sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0
* if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error
* to find no matches.
*/
static int
glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
const Char *qpatnext;
- int c, err, oldpathc;
- Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int c, err;
+ size_t oldpathc;
+ Char *bufnext, patbuf[PATH_MAX];
- qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob);
+ qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, PATH_MAX, pglob);
oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
bufnext = patbuf;
/* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
switch (c) {
case LBRACKET:
c = *qpatnext;
if (c == NOT)
++qpatnext;
if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
*bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
if (c == NOT)
--qpatnext;
break;
}
*bufnext++ = M_SET;
if (c == NOT)
*bufnext++ = M_NOT;
c = *qpatnext++;
do {
if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') {
do {
err = g_charclass(&qpatnext,
&bufnext);
if (err)
break;
c = *qpatnext++;
} while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':');
if (err == -1 &&
!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK))
return GLOB_NOMATCH;
if (c == RBRACKET)
break;
}
*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
(c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
*bufnext++ = M_RNG;
*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
qpatnext += 2;
}
} while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
*bufnext++ = M_END;
break;
case QUESTION:
pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
*bufnext++ = M_ONE;
break;
case STAR:
pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
/* collapse adjacent stars to one,
* to avoid exponential behavior
*/
if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
*bufnext++ = M_ALL;
break;
default:
*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
break;
}
}
*bufnext = EOS;
#ifdef DEBUG
qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
#endif
- if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
+ if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+PATH_MAX-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
return(err);
/*
* If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
* if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
* and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
* GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
*/
if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL));
else
return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
}
if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) {
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) {
/* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */
struct glob_path_stat *path_stat;
- int i;
- int n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
- int o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
+ size_t i;
+ size_t n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
+ size_t o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL)
return GLOB_NOSPACE;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i];
path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i];
}
qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path;
pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat;
}
free(path_stat);
} else {
qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *),
compare);
}
}
return(0);
}
static int
compare(const void *p, const void *q)
{
return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
}
static int
compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q)
{
const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p;
const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q;
return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path));
}
static int
glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
- Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ Char pathbuf[PATH_MAX];
/* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
if (*pattern == EOS)
return(0);
- return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
- pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+ return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1,
+ pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1,
pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
}
/*
* The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
* of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
* meta characters.
*/
static int
glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
struct stat sb;
Char *p, *q;
int anymeta;
/*
* Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
* segment with meta character found.
*/
for (anymeta = 0;;) {
if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */
*pathend = EOS;
- if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
- return(0);
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) {
errno = 0;
*pathend++ = SEP;
*pathend = EOS;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
+ if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
+ return(0);
if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
(S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
(g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
return (1);
*pathend++ = SEP;
*pathend = EOS;
}
++pglob->gl_matchc;
return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb));
}
/* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
q = pathend;
p = pattern;
while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
if (ismeta(*p))
anymeta = 1;
if (q+1 > pathend_last)
return (1);
*q++ = *p++;
}
if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */
pathend = q;
pattern = p;
while (*pattern == SEP) {
if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
return (1);
*pathend++ = *pattern++;
}
} else
/* Need expansion, recurse. */
return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last,
pglob, limitp));
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
static int
glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob,
struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
struct dirent *dp;
DIR *dirp;
int err;
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
/*
* The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
* assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
* and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
* structures.
*/
struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *);
if (pathend > pathend_last)
return (1);
*pathend = EOS;
errno = 0;
if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
/* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(GLOB_ABORTED);
if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
return(GLOB_ABORTED);
}
return(0);
}
err = 0;
/* Search directory for matching names. */
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
else
readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir;
while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
u_char *sc;
Char *dc;
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) {
errno = 0;
*pathend++ = SEP;
*pathend = EOS;
err = GLOB_NOSPACE;
break;
}
/* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
continue;
dc = pathend;
sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
;
if (dc >= pathend_last) {
*dc = EOS;
err = 1;
break;
}
- if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern, GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR)) {
+ if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) {
*pathend = EOS;
continue;
}
err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
if (err)
break;
}
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
(*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
else
closedir(dirp);
return(err);
}
/*
* Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item,
* add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
*
* This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
* crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
* behavior.
*
* Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
*
* Invariant of the glob_t structure:
* Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
* gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
*/
static int
globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp,
struct stat *sb)
{
char **pathv;
- ssize_t i;
- size_t newn, len;
+ size_t i, newn, len;
char *copy = NULL;
const Char *p;
struct stat **statv;
newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs;
- if (pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX ||
- pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
- newn >= INT_MAX ||
+ if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+ pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+ newn >= SSIZE_MAX ||
SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn ||
SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) {
nospace:
- for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < (ssize_t)(newn - 2); i++) {
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < newn - 2; i++) {
if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 &&
pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
}
- if (pglob->gl_pathv) {
- free(pglob->gl_pathv);
- pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
- }
- if (pglob->gl_statv) {
- free(pglob->gl_statv);
- pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
- }
+ free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ free(pglob->gl_statv);
+ pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
- pathv = realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newn * sizeof(*pathv));
+ pathv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_pathv, newn, sizeof(*pathv));
if (pathv == NULL)
goto nospace;
if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
- for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i > 0; i--)
*--pathv = NULL;
}
pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) {
- statv = realloc(pglob->gl_statv, newn * sizeof(*statv));
+ statv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_statv, newn, sizeof(*statv));
if (statv == NULL)
goto nospace;
if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
statv += pglob->gl_offs;
- for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i > 0; i--)
*--statv = NULL;
}
pglob->gl_statv = statv;
if (sb == NULL)
statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
else {
limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv);
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
errno = 0;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] =
malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL)
goto copy_error;
memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb,
sizeof(*sb));
}
statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL;
}
for (p = path; *p++;)
;
len = (size_t)(p - path);
limitp->glim_malloc += len;
if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
free(copy);
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
}
pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
(newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc >
GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
errno = 0;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
copy_error:
return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
}
/*
* pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the *
- * pattern causes a recursion level.
+ * pattern causes an iteration.
+ *
+ * Note, this function differs from the original as per the discussion
+ * here: https://research.swtch.com/glob
+ *
+ * Basically we removed the recursion and made it use the algorithm
+ * from Russ Cox to not go quadratic on cases like a file called
+ * ("a" x 100) . "x" matched against a pattern like "a*a*a*a*a*a*a*y".
*/
static int
-match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend, int recur)
+match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend)
{
int ok, negate_range;
Char c, k;
+ Char *nextp = NULL;
+ Char *nextn = NULL;
- if (recur-- == 0)
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
-
+loop:
while (pat < patend) {
c = *pat++;
switch (c & M_MASK) {
case M_ALL:
while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL)
pat++; /* eat consecutive '*' */
if (pat == patend)
return(1);
- do {
- if (match(name, pat, patend, recur))
- return(1);
- } while (*name++ != EOS);
- return(0);
+ if (*name == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ nextn = name + 1;
+ nextp = pat - 1;
+ break;
case M_ONE:
if (*name++ == EOS)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
break;
case M_SET:
ok = 0;
if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
++pat;
while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) {
if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) {
Char idx = *pat & M_MASK;
if (idx < NCCLASSES &&
cclasses[idx].isctype(k))
ok = 1;
++pat;
}
if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
ok = 1;
pat += 2;
} else if (c == k)
ok = 1;
}
if (ok == negate_range)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
break;
default:
if (*name++ != c)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
break;
}
}
- return(*name == EOS);
+ if (*name == EOS)
+ return(1);
+
+fail:
+ if (nextn) {
+ pat = nextp;
+ name = nextn;
+ goto loop;
+ }
+ return(0);
}
/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
void
globfree(glob_t *pglob)
{
- int i;
+ size_t i;
char **pp;
if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
- if (*pp)
- free(*pp);
+ free(*pp);
free(pglob->gl_pathv);
pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
}
if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) {
- if (pglob->gl_statv[i] != NULL)
- free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+ free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
}
free(pglob->gl_statv);
pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
}
}
static DIR *
g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob)
{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
if (!*str)
strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf);
else {
if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(NULL);
}
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
return(opendir(buf));
}
static int
g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(-1);
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
return(lstat(buf, sb));
}
static int
g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(-1);
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
return(stat(buf, sb));
}
static Char *
g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch)
{
do {
if (*str == ch)
return ((Char *)str);
} while (*str++);
return (NULL);
}
static int
-g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len)
+g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, size_t len)
{
while (len--) {
if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
#ifdef DEBUG
static void
qprintf(const char *str, Char *s)
{
Char *p;
(void)printf("%s:\n", str);
for (p = s; *p; p++)
(void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
(void)printf("\n");
for (p = s; *p; p++)
(void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
(void)printf("\n");
for (p = s; *p; p++)
(void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
(void)printf("\n");
}
#endif
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
index f069a05dc656..1692d36cc25a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
@@ -1,107 +1,108 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.11 2010/09/24 13:32:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.14 2019/02/04 16:45:40 millert Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
* Guido van Rossum.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
!defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
#ifndef _COMPAT_GLOB_H_
#define _COMPAT_GLOB_H_
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
# define glob_t _ssh_compat_glob_t
# define glob(a, b, c, d) _ssh__compat_glob(a, b, c, d)
# define globfree(a) _ssh__compat_globfree(a)
struct stat;
typedef struct {
- int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */
- int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */
- int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
+ size_t gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */
+ size_t gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */
+ size_t gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */
struct stat **gl_statv; /* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */
/* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int);
/*
* Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
* versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
* and lstat(2).
*/
void (*gl_closedir)(void *);
struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *);
void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *);
int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *);
int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *);
} glob_t;
#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */
#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */
#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */
#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */
#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */
#define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */
#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */
#define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */
#define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
#define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */
#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */
#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */
#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */
#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
#define GLOB_KEEPSTAT 0x4000 /* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */
#define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */
int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
void globfree(glob_t *);
#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
index de3e64a63f12..801a2e8dd3d9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
@@ -1,636 +1,640 @@
/* $OpenBSD: dsa_lib.c,v 1.29 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_lib.c,v 1.37 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: evp_lib.c,v 1.17 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: dh_lib.c,v 1.32 2018/05/02 15:48:38 tb Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: p_lib.c,v 1.24 2018/05/30 15:40:50 tb Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* $OpenBSD: dsa_asn1.c,v 1.22 2018/06/14 17:03:19 jsing Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ecs_asn1.c,v 1.9 2018/03/17 15:24:44 tb Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* $OpenBSD: rsa_meth.c,v 1.2 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
void
DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
{
if (p != NULL)
*p = d->p;
if (q != NULL)
*q = d->q;
if (g != NULL)
*g = d->g;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
int
DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
{
if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) ||
(d->g == NULL && g == NULL))
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
BN_free(d->p);
d->p = p;
}
if (q != NULL) {
BN_free(d->q);
d->q = q;
}
if (g != NULL) {
BN_free(d->g);
d->g = g;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
void
DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
{
if (pub_key != NULL)
*pub_key = d->pub_key;
if (priv_key != NULL)
*priv_key = d->priv_key;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
int
DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
{
if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
return 0;
if (pub_key != NULL) {
BN_free(d->pub_key);
d->pub_key = pub_key;
}
if (priv_key != NULL) {
BN_free(d->priv_key);
d->priv_key = priv_key;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
void
RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
{
if (n != NULL)
*n = r->n;
if (e != NULL)
*e = r->e;
if (d != NULL)
*d = r->d;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
int
RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
{
if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
return 0;
if (n != NULL) {
BN_free(r->n);
r->n = n;
}
if (e != NULL) {
BN_free(r->e);
r->e = e;
}
if (d != NULL) {
BN_free(r->d);
r->d = d;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
void
RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
const BIGNUM **iqmp)
{
if (dmp1 != NULL)
*dmp1 = r->dmp1;
if (dmq1 != NULL)
*dmq1 = r->dmq1;
if (iqmp != NULL)
*iqmp = r->iqmp;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
int
RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
{
if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) ||
(r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) ||
(r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
- return 0;
+ return 0;
if (dmp1 != NULL) {
BN_free(r->dmp1);
r->dmp1 = dmp1;
}
if (dmq1 != NULL) {
BN_free(r->dmq1);
r->dmq1 = dmq1;
}
if (iqmp != NULL) {
BN_free(r->iqmp);
r->iqmp = iqmp;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
void
RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
{
if (p != NULL)
*p = r->p;
if (q != NULL)
*q = r->q;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
int
RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
{
if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
BN_free(r->p);
r->p = p;
}
if (q != NULL) {
BN_free(r->q);
r->q = q;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
int
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t len)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0)
return 0;
if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
return 0;
if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */
/*
* Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero,
* since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid.
*/
if (len != 0) {
if (iv == NULL)
return 0;
# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV
memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), len);
# else
memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, len);
# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV */
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
int
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0)
return 0;
if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
return 0;
if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */
/*
* Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero,
* since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid.
*/
if (len != 0) {
if (iv == NULL)
return 0;
# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, len);
# else
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len);
# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST */
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0
void
DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
{
if (pr != NULL)
*pr = sig->r;
if (ps != NULL)
*ps = sig->s;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0
int
DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
{
if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
return 0;
BN_clear_free(sig->r);
sig->r = r;
BN_clear_free(sig->s);
sig->s = s;
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
void
ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
{
if (pr != NULL)
*pr = sig->r;
if (ps != NULL)
*ps = sig->s;
}
#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */
#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
int
ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
{
if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
return 0;
BN_clear_free(sig->r);
BN_clear_free(sig->s);
sig->r = r;
sig->s = s;
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
void
DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
{
if (p != NULL)
*p = dh->p;
if (q != NULL)
*q = dh->q;
if (g != NULL)
*g = dh->g;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
int
DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
{
if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->p);
dh->p = p;
}
if (q != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->q);
dh->q = q;
}
if (g != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->g);
dh->g = g;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
void
DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
{
if (pub_key != NULL)
*pub_key = dh->pub_key;
if (priv_key != NULL)
*priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
int
DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
{
if (pub_key != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->pub_key);
dh->pub_key = pub_key;
}
if (priv_key != NULL) {
BN_free(dh->priv_key);
dh->priv_key = priv_key;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
int
DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
{
if (length < 0 || length > INT_MAX)
return 0;
dh->length = length;
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
void
RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth)
{
if (meth != NULL) {
free((char *)meth->name);
free(meth);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
RSA_METHOD *
RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
{
RSA_METHOD *copy;
if ((copy = calloc(1, sizeof(*copy))) == NULL)
return NULL;
memcpy(copy, meth, sizeof(*copy));
if ((copy->name = strdup(meth->name)) == NULL) {
free(copy);
return NULL;
}
return copy;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
int
RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name)
{
char *copy;
if ((copy = strdup(name)) == NULL)
return 0;
free((char *)meth->name);
meth->name = copy;
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
int
(*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa)
{
return meth->finish;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
int
RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding))
{
meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc;
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
int
RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding))
{
meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec;
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
int
RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa))
{
meth->finish = finish;
return 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
RSA *
EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
/* EVPerror(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY); */
return NULL;
}
return pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW
EVP_MD_CTX *
EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
{
return calloc(1, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
}
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE
void
EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
free(ctx);
}
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/memmem.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/memmem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2637401d7c6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/memmem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: memmem.c,v 1.5 2020/04/16 12:39:28 claudio Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Rich Felker, et al.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
+ * SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/memmem.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MEMMEM
+
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+static char *
+twobyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+ uint16_t nw = n[0]<<8 | n[1], hw = h[0]<<8 | h[1];
+ for (h+=2, k-=2; k; k--, hw = hw<<8 | *h++)
+ if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-2;
+ return hw == nw ? (char *)h-2 : 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+threebyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+ uint32_t nw = n[0]<<24 | n[1]<<16 | n[2]<<8;
+ uint32_t hw = h[0]<<24 | h[1]<<16 | h[2]<<8;
+ for (h+=3, k-=3; k; k--, hw = (hw|*h++)<<8)
+ if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-3;
+ return hw == nw ? (char *)h-3 : 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+fourbyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+ uint32_t nw = n[0]<<24 | n[1]<<16 | n[2]<<8 | n[3];
+ uint32_t hw = h[0]<<24 | h[1]<<16 | h[2]<<8 | h[3];
+ for (h+=4, k-=4; k; k--, hw = hw<<8 | *h++)
+ if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-4;
+ return hw == nw ? (char *)h-4 : 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/* In -portable, defines.h ensures that these are already defined. */
+#define MAX(a,b) ((a)>(b)?(a):(b))
+#define MIN(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#define BITOP(a,b,op) \
+ ((a)[(size_t)(b)/(8*sizeof *(a))] op (size_t)1<<((size_t)(b)%(8*sizeof *(a))))
+
+/*
+ * Maxime Crochemore and Dominique Perrin, Two-way string-matching,
+ * Journal of the ACM, 38(3):651-675, July 1991.
+ */
+static char *
+twoway_memmem(const unsigned char *h, const unsigned char *z,
+ const unsigned char *n, size_t l)
+{
+ size_t i, ip, jp, k, p, ms, p0, mem, mem0;
+ size_t byteset[32 / sizeof(size_t)] = { 0 };
+ size_t shift[256];
+
+ /* Computing length of needle and fill shift table */
+ for (i=0; i<l; i++)
+ BITOP(byteset, n[i], |=), shift[n[i]] = i+1;
+
+ /* Compute maximal suffix */
+ ip = -1; jp = 0; k = p = 1;
+ while (jp+k<l) {
+ if (n[ip+k] == n[jp+k]) {
+ if (k == p) {
+ jp += p;
+ k = 1;
+ } else k++;
+ } else if (n[ip+k] > n[jp+k]) {
+ jp += k;
+ k = 1;
+ p = jp - ip;
+ } else {
+ ip = jp++;
+ k = p = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ ms = ip;
+ p0 = p;
+
+ /* And with the opposite comparison */
+ ip = -1; jp = 0; k = p = 1;
+ while (jp+k<l) {
+ if (n[ip+k] == n[jp+k]) {
+ if (k == p) {
+ jp += p;
+ k = 1;
+ } else k++;
+ } else if (n[ip+k] < n[jp+k]) {
+ jp += k;
+ k = 1;
+ p = jp - ip;
+ } else {
+ ip = jp++;
+ k = p = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ip+1 > ms+1) ms = ip;
+ else p = p0;
+
+ /* Periodic needle? */
+ if (memcmp(n, n+p, ms+1)) {
+ mem0 = 0;
+ p = MAX(ms, l-ms-1) + 1;
+ } else mem0 = l-p;
+ mem = 0;
+
+ /* Search loop */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If remainder of haystack is shorter than needle, done */
+ if (z-h < l) return 0;
+
+ /* Check last byte first; advance by shift on mismatch */
+ if (BITOP(byteset, h[l-1], &)) {
+ k = l-shift[h[l-1]];
+ if (k) {
+ if (k < mem) k = mem;
+ h += k;
+ mem = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ h += l;
+ mem = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Compare right half */
+ for (k=MAX(ms+1,mem); k<l && n[k] == h[k]; k++);
+ if (k < l) {
+ h += k-ms;
+ mem = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Compare left half */
+ for (k=ms+1; k>mem && n[k-1] == h[k-1]; k--);
+ if (k <= mem) return (char *)h;
+ h += p;
+ mem = mem0;
+ }
+}
+
+void *
+memmem(const void *h0, size_t k, const void *n0, size_t l)
+{
+ const unsigned char *h = h0, *n = n0;
+
+ /* Return immediately on empty needle */
+ if (!l) return (void *)h;
+
+ /* Return immediately when needle is longer than haystack */
+ if (k<l) return 0;
+
+ /* Use faster algorithms for short needles */
+ h = memchr(h0, *n, k);
+ if (!h || l==1) return (void *)h;
+ k -= h - (const unsigned char *)h0;
+ if (k<l) return 0;
+ if (l==2) return twobyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+ if (l==3) return threebyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+ if (l==4) return fourbyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+
+ return twoway_memmem(h, h+k, n, l);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(memmem);
+#endif /* HAVE_MEMMEM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
index 4eb52f421b72..ac922c1ecbe5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
@@ -1,141 +1,141 @@
/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */
/* Changes: Removed mktemp */
/* $OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.30 2010/03/21 23:09:30 schwarze Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1996-1998, 2008 Theo de Raadt
* Copyright (c) 1997, 2008-2009 Todd C. Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdio/mktemp.c */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP)
#define MKTEMP_NAME 0
#define MKTEMP_FILE 1
#define MKTEMP_DIR 2
#define TEMPCHARS "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
#define NUM_CHARS (sizeof(TEMPCHARS) - 1)
static int
mktemp_internal(char *path, int slen, int mode)
{
char *start, *cp, *ep;
const char *tempchars = TEMPCHARS;
unsigned int r, tries;
struct stat sb;
size_t len;
int fd;
len = strlen(path);
if (len == 0 || slen < 0 || (size_t)slen >= len) {
errno = EINVAL;
return(-1);
}
ep = path + len - slen;
tries = 1;
for (start = ep; start > path && start[-1] == 'X'; start--) {
if (tries < INT_MAX / NUM_CHARS)
tries *= NUM_CHARS;
}
tries *= 2;
do {
for (cp = start; cp != ep; cp++) {
r = arc4random_uniform(NUM_CHARS);
*cp = tempchars[r];
}
switch (mode) {
case MKTEMP_NAME:
if (lstat(path, &sb) != 0)
return(errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1);
break;
case MKTEMP_FILE:
fd = open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST)
return(fd);
break;
case MKTEMP_DIR:
if (mkdir(path, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR) == 0)
return(0);
if (errno != EEXIST)
return(-1);
break;
}
} while (--tries);
errno = EEXIST;
return(-1);
}
#if 0
char *_mktemp(char *);
char *
_mktemp(char *path)
{
if (mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_NAME) == -1)
return(NULL);
return(path);
}
__warn_references(mktemp,
"warning: mktemp() possibly used unsafely; consider using mkstemp()");
char *
mktemp(char *path)
{
return(_mktemp(path));
}
#endif
int
mkstemp(char *path)
{
return(mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_FILE));
}
int
mkstemps(char *path, int slen)
{
return(mktemp_internal(path, slen, MKTEMP_FILE));
}
char *
mkdtemp(char *path)
{
int error;
error = mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_DIR);
return(error ? NULL : path);
}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) */
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index f5c833bf271f..a7209ceb26a9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,356 +1,366 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* for wchar_t */
/* OpenBSD function replacements */
#include "base64.h"
#include "sigact.h"
#include "readpassphrase.h"
#include "vis.h"
#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
#include "sha1.h"
#include "sha2.h"
-#include "rmd160.h"
#include "md5.h"
#include "blf.h"
+#include "fnmatch.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS)
+# include <login_cap.h>
+# define login_getpwclass(pw) login_getclass(pw->pw_class)
+#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
char *basename(const char *path);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
void closefrom(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETLINE
+#include <stdio.h>
ssize_t getline(char **, size_t *, FILE *);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
int getpagesize(void);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD
char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM) && HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM == 0
+void *memmem(const void *, size_t, const void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY
void *recallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t);
#endif
-#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
-/*
- * glibc's FORTIFY_SOURCE can redefine this and prevent us picking up the
- * compat version.
- */
-# ifdef BROKEN_REALPATH
-# define realpath(x, y) _ssh_compat_realpath(x, y)
-# endif
-
-char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
-#endif
-
#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR
char *strcasestr(const char *, const char *);
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN
+size_t strnlen(const char *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP
+char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n);
+#endif
+
#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
void strmode(int mode, char *p);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
#include <time.h>
char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm);
#endif
-#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP)
int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
int mkstemp(char *path);
char *mkdtemp(char *path);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
char *dirname(const char *path);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
#define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7
int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
int scan_scaled(char *, long long *);
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h"
#endif
#if ((defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0) || \
(defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0))
# include <sys/types.h>
# include <sys/uio.h>
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0
int readv(int, struct iovec *, int);
# endif
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
# endif
#endif
/* Home grown routines */
+#include "bsd-signal.h"
#include "bsd-misc.h"
#include "bsd-setres_id.h"
-#include "bsd-signal.h"
#include "bsd-statvfs.h"
#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
#include "bsd-poll.h"
-#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID) && HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID == 0
int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
# define arc4random_stir()
# endif
#else
unsigned int arc4random(void);
void arc4random_stir(void);
#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
# include <sys/ioctl.h> /* for struct winsize */
int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
#endif
/* multibyte character support */
#ifndef HAVE_MBLEN
# define mblen(x, y) (1)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_WCWIDTH
# define wcwidth(x) (((x) >= 0x20 && (x) <= 0x7e) ? 1 : -1)
/* force our no-op nl_langinfo and mbtowc */
# undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
# undef HAVE_MBTOWC
# undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
# define nl_langinfo(x) ""
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
int mbtowc(wchar_t *, const char*, size_t);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
# include <stdarg.h>
#endif
/*
* Some platforms unconditionally undefine va_copy() so we define VA_COPY()
* instead. This is known to be the case on at least some configurations of
* AIX with the xlc compiler.
*/
#ifndef VA_COPY
# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
# define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
# define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t,
u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO
void freezero(void *, size_t);
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+#endif
+
char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
#include "fake-rfc2553.h"
/* Routines for a single OS platform */
#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
#include "port-aix.h"
#include "port-irix.h"
#include "port-linux.h"
#include "port-solaris.h"
#include "port-net.h"
#include "port-uw.h"
/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */
#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
# include <features.h>
# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
# include <sys/socket.h> /* Ensure include guard is defined */
# undef FD_SET
# undef FD_ISSET
# define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set)
# define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set)
void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *);
int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *);
# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
index 8b4a36274606..a37ca61bf2d4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -1,88 +1,96 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
* IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
# include <openssl/conf.h>
#endif
#include "log.h"
#include "openssl-compat.h"
/*
* OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
* We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
* After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
* allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
* within a patch series.
*/
int
ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
{
long mask, hfix, lfix;
/* exact match is always OK */
if (headerver == libver)
return 1;
/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
}
/*
* For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
* fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
*/
mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
return 1;
return 0;
}
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
void
-ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
+ssh_libcrypto_init(void)
{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS) && \
+ defined(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS |
+ OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL);
+#elif defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS)
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L
- OPENSSL_config(NULL);
-#else
+ /* Load the libcrypto config file to pick up engines defined there */
+# if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO) && defined(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG)
OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS |
OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL);
-#endif
+# else
+ OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+# endif
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE */
}
-#endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index 9e0264c04167..8ca50b5ace63 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,236 +1,237 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
* IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/dh.h>
int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
+void ssh_libcrypto_init(void);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000100fL)
+# error OpenSSL 1.0.1 or greater is required
+#endif
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090805fL)
-# error OpenSSL 0.9.8f or greater is required
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OpenSSL_version(x) SSLeay_version(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int
#else
# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
#endif
+#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+# if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x3010000fL
+# define HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20
+# endif
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
# define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
# define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
# define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
#endif
/* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED)
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1
#endif
/* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
# error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */
# else
# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0)
# endif
#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160)
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_RMD160)
-# undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/*
- * We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents
- * to automatically handle OpenSSL engine initialisation.
- *
- * In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must
- * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and
- * implement the ssh_* equivalents.
- */
-#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
-
-# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
-# ifdef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
-# undef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
-# endif
-# define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()
-# endif
-
-void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void);
-
-#endif /* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */
-
/* LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API compat */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q,
const BIGNUM **g);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key,
const BIGNUM **priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV
+# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv
+# else /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV */
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *iv, size_t len);
+# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV */
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t len);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e,
const BIGNUM **d);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
const BIGNUM **iqmp);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */
#ifndef DSA_SIG_GET0
void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
#endif /* DSA_SIG_GET0 */
#ifndef DSA_SIG_SET0
int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
#endif /* DSA_SIG_SET0 */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */
#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q,
const BIGNUM **g);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa));
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new
EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free
void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
index 943177c708c9..2ac9bad09834 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -1,480 +1,483 @@
/*
*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef _AIX
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "log.h"
-#ifdef _AIX
-
#include <errno.h>
#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
# include <netdb.h>
#endif
#include <uinfo.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
# include <login.h>
# include <userpw.h>
# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
# include <sys/audit.h>
# endif
# include <usersec.h>
#endif
#include "port-aix.h"
static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL;
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
# endif
/*
* AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored -
* a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set
*
* NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to
* acquire due to privsep code. We will just drop support.
*/
void
aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw)
{
u_int i;
size_t len;
char *cp;
len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name));
cp = xmalloc(len);
i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0',
pw->pw_name, '\0');
if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1)
fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno));
debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i);
free(cp);
}
# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
/*
* Remove embedded newlines in string (if any).
* Used before logging messages returned by AIX authentication functions
* so the message is logged on one line.
*/
void
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *p)
{
if (p == NULL)
return;
for (; *p; p++) {
if (*p == '\n')
*p = ' ';
}
/* Remove trailing whitespace */
if (*--p == ' ')
*p = '\0';
}
/*
* Test specifically for the case where SYSTEM == NONE and AUTH1 contains
* anything other than NONE or SYSTEM, which indicates that the admin has
* configured the account for purely AUTH1-type authentication.
*
* Since authenticate() doesn't check AUTH1, and sshd can't sanely support
* AUTH1 itself, in such a case authenticate() will allow access without
* authentation, which is almost certainly not what the admin intends.
*
* (The native tools, eg login, will process the AUTH1 list in addition to
* the SYSTEM list by using ckuserID(), however ckuserID() and AUTH1 methods
* have been deprecated since AIX 4.2.x and would be very difficult for sshd
* to support.
*
* Returns 0 if an unsupportable combination is found, 1 otherwise.
*/
static int
aix_valid_authentications(const char *user)
{
char *auth1, *sys, *p;
int valid = 1;
if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTHSYSTEM, &sys, SEC_CHAR) != 0) {
logit("Can't retrieve attribute SYSTEM for %s: %.100s",
user, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
debug3("AIX SYSTEM attribute %s", sys);
if (strcmp(sys, "NONE") != 0)
return 1; /* not "NONE", so is OK */
if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTH1, &auth1, SEC_LIST) != 0) {
logit("Can't retrieve attribute auth1 for %s: %.100s",
user, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
p = auth1;
/* A SEC_LIST is concatenated strings, ending with two NULs. */
while (p[0] != '\0' && p[1] != '\0') {
debug3("AIX auth1 attribute list member %s", p);
if (strcmp(p, "NONE") != 0 && strcmp(p, "SYSTEM")) {
logit("Account %s has unsupported auth1 value '%s'",
user, p);
valid = 0;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
return (valid);
}
/*
* Do authentication via AIX's authenticate routine. We loop until the
* reenter parameter is 0, but normally authenticate is called only once.
*
* Note: this function returns 1 on success, whereas AIX's authenticate()
* returns 0.
*/
int
sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
{
Authctxt *ctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
int r, authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result;
do {
result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter,
&authmsg);
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg);
debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result,
authmsg);
} while (reenter);
if (!aix_valid_authentications(name))
result = -1;
if (result == 0) {
authsuccess = 1;
/*
* Record successful login. We don't have a pty yet, so just
* label the line as "ssh"
*/
aix_setauthdb(name);
/*
* Check if the user's password is expired.
*/
expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg);
if (msg && *msg) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ctxt->loginmsg,
msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
}
debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg);
switch (expired) {
case 0: /* password not expired */
break;
case 1: /* expired, password change required */
ctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
break;
default: /* user can't change(2) or other error (-1) */
logit("Password can't be changed for user %s: %.100s",
name, msg);
free(msg);
authsuccess = 0;
}
aix_restoreauthdb();
}
free(authmsg);
return authsuccess;
}
/*
* Check if specified account is permitted to log in.
* Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed.
*/
int
sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *loginmsg)
{
char *msg = NULL;
int r, result, permitted = 0;
struct stat st;
/*
* Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls
* logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since
* loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege).
*/
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) {
debug3("%s: not checking", __func__);
return 1;
}
result = loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg);
if (result == 0)
permitted = 1;
/*
* If restricted because /etc/nologin exists, the login will be denied
* in session.c after the nologin message is sent, so allow for now
* and do not append the returned message.
*/
if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0)
permitted = 1;
else if (msg != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (msg == NULL)
msg = xstrdup("(none)");
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
debug3("AIX/loginrestrictions returned %d msg %.100s", result, msg);
if (!permitted)
logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, msg);
free(msg);
return permitted;
}
int
sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
struct sshbuf *loginmsg)
{
char *msg = NULL;
int success = 0;
aix_setauthdb(user);
if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
success = 1;
if (msg != NULL) {
debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
if (lastlogin_msg == NULL)
lastlogin_msg = msg;
}
}
aix_restoreauthdb();
return (success);
}
char *
sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid)
{
char *msg = lastlogin_msg;
lastlogin_msg = NULL;
return msg;
}
# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
/*
* record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
*/
void
-record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname)
+record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ttyname)
{
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
aix_setauthdb(user);
# ifdef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname,
AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH);
# else
loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname);
# endif
aix_restoreauthdb();
}
# endif /* CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN */
/*
* If we have setauthdb, retrieve the password registry for the user's
* account then feed it to setauthdb. This will mean that subsequent AIX auth
* functions will only use the specified loadable module. If we don't have
* setauthdb this is a no-op.
*/
void
aix_setauthdb(const char *user)
{
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
char *registry;
if (setuserdb(S_READ) == -1) {
debug3("%s: Could not open userdb to read", __func__);
return;
}
if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_REGISTRY, &registry, SEC_CHAR) == 0) {
if (setauthdb(registry, old_registry) == 0)
debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s'", registry);
else
debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s' failed: %s",
registry, strerror(errno));
} else
debug3("%s: Could not read S_REGISTRY for user: %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
enduserdb();
# endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
}
/*
* Restore the user's registry settings from old_registry.
* Note that if the first aix_setauthdb fails, setauthdb("") is still safe
* (it restores the system default behaviour). If we don't have setauthdb,
* this is a no-op.
*/
void
aix_restoreauthdb(void)
{
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
if (setauthdb(old_registry, NULL) == 0)
debug3("%s: restoring old registry '%s'", __func__,
old_registry);
else
debug3("%s: failed to restore old registry %s", __func__,
old_registry);
# endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
}
# endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
# ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
/*
- * aix_krb5_get_principal_name: returns the user's kerberos client principal name if
- * configured, otherwise NULL. Caller must free returned string.
+ * aix_krb5_get_principal_name: returns the user's kerberos client principal
+ * name if configured, otherwise NULL. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
-aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *pw_name)
+aix_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *const_pw_name)
{
+ char *pw_name = (char *)const_pw_name;
char *authname = NULL, *authdomain = NULL, *principal = NULL;
setuserdb(S_READ);
if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHDOMAIN, &authdomain, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHDOMAIN: %s", strerror(errno));
if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHNAME, &authname, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHNAME: %s", strerror(errno));
if (authdomain != NULL)
- xasprintf(&principal, "%s@%s", authname ? authname : pw_name, authdomain);
+ xasprintf(&principal, "%s@%s", authname ? authname : pw_name,
+ authdomain);
else if (authname != NULL)
principal = xstrdup(authname);
enduserdb();
return principal;
}
# endif /* USE_AIX_KRB_NAME */
# if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO)
# undef getnameinfo
/*
* For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros
* IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it
* with a function that will.
*/
int
sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
u_int32_t *a6;
if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) &&
sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32;
if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) {
strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen);
snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port);
return 0;
}
}
return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
}
# endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
# if defined(USE_GETGRSET)
# include <stdlib.h>
int
getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t pgid, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
{
char *cp, *grplist, *grp;
gid_t gid;
int ret = 0, ngroups = 0, maxgroups;
- long l;
+ long long ll;
maxgroups = *grpcnt;
if ((cp = grplist = getgrset(user)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* handle zero-length case */
if (maxgroups <= 0) {
*grpcnt = 0;
return -1;
}
/* copy primary group */
groups[ngroups++] = pgid;
/* copy each entry from getgrset into group list */
while ((grp = strsep(&grplist, ",")) != NULL) {
- l = strtol(grp, NULL, 10);
- if (ngroups >= maxgroups || l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) {
+ ll = strtoll(grp, NULL, 10);
+ if (ngroups >= maxgroups || ll < 0 || ll > UID_MAX) {
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
- gid = (gid_t)l;
+ gid = (gid_t)ll;
if (gid == pgid)
continue; /* we have already added primary gid */
groups[ngroups++] = gid;
}
out:
free(cp);
*grpcnt = ngroups;
return ret;
}
# endif /* USE_GETGRSET */
#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
index 748c0e4e3109..0ee366140b5b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -1,126 +1,127 @@
/*
*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifdef _AIX
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
# include <sys/socket.h>
#endif
+struct ssh;
struct sshbuf;
/* These should be in the system headers but are not. */
int usrinfo(int, char *, int);
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
int setauthdb(const char *, char *);
#endif
/* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
int passwdexpired(char *, char **);
#endif
/* Some versions define r_type in the above headers, which causes a conflict */
#ifdef r_type
# undef r_type
#endif
/* AIX 4.2.x doesn't have nanosleep but does have nsleep which is equivalent */
#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
# define nanosleep(a,b) nsleep(a,b)
#endif
/* For struct timespec on AIX 4.2.x */
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
# include <sys/timers.h>
#endif
/* for setpcred and friends */
#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H
# include <usersec.h>
#endif
/*
* According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15
* chars or less plus terminating NUL.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
# define REGISTRY_SIZE 16
#endif
void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *);
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 1
int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, struct sshbuf *);
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
-int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *,
- const char *, struct sshbuf *);
+int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *,
+ struct sshbuf *);
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t);
# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
# if defined(S_AUTHDOMAIN) && defined (S_AUTHNAME)
# define USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
-char *aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *);
+char *aix_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
# endif
#endif
void aix_setauthdb(const char *);
void aix_restoreauthdb(void);
void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *);
#if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
# ifdef getnameinfo
# undef getnameinfo
# endif
int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
char *, size_t, int);
# define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (sshaix_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
#endif
/*
* We use getgrset in preference to multiple getgrent calls for efficiency
* plus it supports NIS and LDAP groups.
*/
#if !defined(HAVE_GETGROUPLIST) && defined(HAVE_GETGRSET)
# define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
# define USE_GETGRSET
int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
#endif
#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
index 525b029092fb..aebffb0143b9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
@@ -1,90 +1,92 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
# include <proj.h>
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
# include <sys/resource.h>
#endif
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
# include <sat.h>
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+#include "log.h"
+
void
irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
prid_t projid;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
jid_t jid = 0;
#elif defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
int jid = 0;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive");
if (jid == -1)
fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
/* initialize array session */
if (jid == 0 && newarraysess() != 0)
fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
/* initialize irix project info */
if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) {
debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0");
projid = 0;
}
if (setprid(projid))
fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s",
(int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) {
debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid);
if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid))
debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
}
#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
index 622988822adf..77cb8213a12e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -1,313 +1,310 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
* Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "port-linux.h"
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
#endif
/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
int
ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
{
static int enabled = -1;
if (enabled == -1) {
enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
}
return (enabled);
}
/* Return the default security context for the given username */
-static security_context_t
+static char *
ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
{
- security_context_t sc = NULL;
- char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+ char *sc = NULL, *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
int r;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
return NULL;
#else
sename = pwname;
lvl = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
#else
r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
#endif
if (r != 0) {
switch (security_getenforce()) {
case -1:
fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
"security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
case 0:
error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
"context for %s", __func__, pwname);
sc = NULL;
break;
default:
fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
"context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
__func__, pwname);
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
free(sename);
free(lvl);
#endif
return sc;
}
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
{
- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ char *user_ctx = NULL;
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
switch (security_getenforce()) {
case -1:
fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
case 0:
error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
"context for %s", __func__, pwname);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
"for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
}
}
if (user_ctx != NULL)
freecon(user_ctx);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
void
ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
{
- security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
- security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL;
+ char *new_tty_ctx = NULL, *user_ctx = NULL, *old_tty_ctx = NULL;
security_class_t chrclass;
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if ((chrclass = string_to_security_class("chr_file")) == 0) {
error("%s: couldn't get security class for chr_file", __func__);
goto out;
}
if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
chrclass, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
out:
if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
freecon(new_tty_ctx);
if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
freecon(old_tty_ctx);
if (user_ctx != NULL)
freecon(user_ctx);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
void
ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
{
int len, newlen;
char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
- void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
+ LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
- if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
+ if (getcon(&oldctx) < 0) {
logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
NULL) {
- logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
+ logit("%s: unparsable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
return;
}
/*
* Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined
* security context.
*/
if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
- switchlog = debug3;
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3;
newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
len = cx - oldctx + 1;
memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len);
strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
oldctx, newctx);
if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
- newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+ do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+ __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
free(oldctx);
free(newctx);
}
void
ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
{
- security_context_t context;
+ char *context;
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
if (path == NULL) {
setfscreatecon(NULL);
return;
}
if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
setfscreatecon(context);
}
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
/*
* The magic "don't kill me" values, old and new, as documented in eg:
* http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.32/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
* http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.36/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
*/
static int oom_adj_save = INT_MIN;
static char *oom_adj_path = NULL;
struct {
char *path;
int value;
} oom_adjust[] = {
{"/proc/self/oom_score_adj", -1000}, /* kernels >= 2.6.36 */
{"/proc/self/oom_adj", -17}, /* kernels <= 2.6.35 */
{NULL, 0},
};
/*
* Tell the kernel's out-of-memory killer to avoid sshd.
* Returns the previous oom_adj value or zero.
*/
void
oom_adjust_setup(void)
{
int i, value;
FILE *fp;
debug3("%s", __func__);
for (i = 0; oom_adjust[i].path != NULL; i++) {
oom_adj_path = oom_adjust[i].path;
value = oom_adjust[i].value;
if ((fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "r+")) != NULL) {
if (fscanf(fp, "%d", &oom_adj_save) != 1)
verbose("error reading %s: %s", oom_adj_path,
strerror(errno));
else {
rewind(fp);
if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", value) <= 0)
verbose("error writing %s: %s",
oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
else
debug("Set %s from %d to %d",
oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save, value);
}
fclose(fp);
return;
}
}
oom_adj_path = NULL;
}
/* Restore the saved OOM adjustment */
void
oom_adjust_restore(void)
{
FILE *fp;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (oom_adj_save == INT_MIN || oom_adj_path == NULL ||
(fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "w")) == NULL)
return;
if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", oom_adj_save) <= 0)
verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
else
debug("Set %s to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save);
fclose(fp);
return;
}
#endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-net.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
index bb535626ffe0..198e73f0de20 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
@@ -1,374 +1,378 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* This file contains various portability code for network support,
* including tun/tap forwarding and routing domains.
*/
#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
#include <linux/if.h>
#endif
#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX)
char *
sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
{
char dev[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
socklen_t len = sizeof(dev) - 1;
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, dev, &len) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot determine VRF for fd=%d : %s",
__func__, fd, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
dev[len] = '\0';
return strdup(dev);
}
int
sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
error("%s: setsockopt(%d, SO_BINDTODEVICE, %s): %s",
- __func__, fd, name, strerror(errno));
+ __func__, fd, name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
int fd;
/*
* This is a pretty crappy way to test. It would be better to
* check whether "name" represents a VRF device, but apparently
* that requires an rtnetlink transaction.
*/
if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
return 0;
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
close(fd);
return 1;
}
#elif defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX)
/* XXX examples */
char *
sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
{
return NULL;
}
int
sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
return -1;
}
int
valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
return 0;
}
void
sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name)
{
fatal("%s: not supported", __func__);
}
#endif /* defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) */
/*
* This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
* uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
* settings.
*
* SSH_TUN_LINUX Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
* SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF Translate the OpenBSD address family
* SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF Prepend/remove the address family
*/
/*
* System-specific tunnel open function
*/
#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+#define TUN_CTRL_DEV "/dev/net/tun"
int
sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int fd = -1;
const char *name = NULL;
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
-
- if ((fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control interface: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((fd = open(TUN_CTRL_DEV, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control device \"%s\": %s",
+ __func__, TUN_CTRL_DEV, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else {
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
}
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
tun, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
}
if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
mode, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
else
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
goto failed;
return (fd);
failed:
close(fd);
return (-1);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
#include <net/if_tun.h>
#endif
int
sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
char name[100];
- int fd = -1, sock, flag;
+ int fd = -1, sock;
const char *tunbase = "tun";
+#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ int flag;
+#endif
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
return (-1);
#else
tunbase = "tap";
#endif
}
/* Open the tunnel device */
if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
tunbase, tun);
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
break;
}
} else {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
return (-1);
}
if (fd < 0) {
debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
/* Turn on tunnel headers */
- flag = 1;
#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+ flag = 1;
if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
strerror(errno));
close(fd);
}
#endif
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
/* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
goto failed;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
}
if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
goto failed;
close(sock);
return (fd);
failed:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock);
debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
mode, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
/*
* System-specific channel filters
*/
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
/*
* The tunnel forwarding protocol prepends the address family of forwarded
* IP packets using OpenBSD's numbers.
*/
#define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2
#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24
int
sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, char *buf, int _len)
{
int r;
size_t len;
char *ptr = buf;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
struct ip iph;
#endif
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
u_int32_t af;
#endif
/* XXX update channel input filter API to use unsigned length */
if (_len < 0)
return -1;
len = _len;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
if (len <= sizeof(iph) || len > sizeof(rbuf) - 4)
return -1;
/* Determine address family from packet IP header. */
memcpy(&iph, buf, sizeof(iph));
af = iph.ip_v == 6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET;
/* Prepend address family to packet using OpenBSD constants */
memcpy(rbuf + 4, buf, len);
len += 4;
POKE_U32(rbuf, af);
ptr = rbuf;
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
/* Convert existing address family header to OpenBSD value */
if (len <= 4)
return -1;
af = PEEK_U32(buf);
/* Put it back */
POKE_U32(buf, af == AF_INET6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET);
#endif
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, ptr, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return (0);
}
u_char *
sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c,
u_char **data, size_t *dlen)
{
u_char *buf;
u_int32_t af;
int r;
/* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, data, dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (*dlen < sizeof(af))
return (NULL);
buf = *data;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
/* skip address family */
*dlen -= sizeof(af);
buf = *data + sizeof(af);
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
/* translate address family */
af = (PEEK_U32(buf) == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
POKE_U32(buf, af);
#endif
return (buf);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/entropy.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-prngd.c
similarity index 68%
copy from crypto/openssh/entropy.c
copy to crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-prngd.c
index c178c00cf61c..6afa8f913ae3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-prngd.c
@@ -1,250 +1,164 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
-#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
-
-/*
- * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
- * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
- * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
- * PRNGd.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
-
-#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
+#if defined(PRNGD_PORT) || defined(PRNGD_SOCKET)
/*
+ * EGD/PRNGD interface.
+ *
* Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
* listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
* 'socket_path'.
* Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
* supplied.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
*/
-int
+static int
get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
{
int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
u_char msg[2];
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
- mysig_t old_sigpipe;
+ sshsig_t old_sigpipe;
/* Sanity checks */
if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
if (socket_path != NULL &&
strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
fatal("Random pool path is too long");
if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
if (tcp_port != 0) {
addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
} else {
addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
strlen(socket_path) + 1;
}
- old_sigpipe = signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ old_sigpipe = ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
errors = 0;
rval = -1;
reopen:
fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd == -1) {
error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
if (tcp_port != 0) {
error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
tcp_port, strerror(errno));
} else {
error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
}
goto done;
}
/* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
msg[0] = 0x02;
msg[1] = len;
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
close(fd);
errors++;
goto reopen;
}
error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
close(fd);
errors++;
goto reopen;
}
error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
rval = 0;
done:
- signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
return rval;
}
+#endif /* PRNGD_PORT || PRNGD_SOCKET */
-static int
+int
seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
{
#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
return -1;
}
-
-void
-rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m)
-{
- u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
- size_t len = sizeof(buf);
- int r;
-
- if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) {
- error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
- ERR_get_error());
- len = 0;
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, buf, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
-}
-
-void
-rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m)
-{
- u_char *buf = NULL;
- size_t len = 0;
- int r;
-
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &buf, &len)) != 0
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
- debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len);
- RAND_add(buf, len, len);
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-
-void
-seed_rng(void)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
-#endif
- if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()))
- fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
- return;
- }
-
- if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
- fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
- memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
- if (RAND_status() != 1)
- fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
-}
-
-#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-
-/* Handled in arc4random() */
-void
-seed_rng(void)
-{
-}
-
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
index 0e89dc3261d7..b84fbff5e7f5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
@@ -1,363 +1,361 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "config.h"
#include "includes.h"
-#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
-
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
#include <libcontract.h>
#include <sys/contract/process.h>
#include <sys/ctfs.h>
-#include "log.h"
-
#define CT_TEMPLATE CTFS_ROOT "/process/template"
#define CT_LATEST CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest"
static int tmpl_fd = -1;
/* Lookup the latest process contract */
static ctid_t
get_active_process_contract_id(void)
{
int stat_fd;
ctid_t ctid = -1;
ct_stathdl_t stathdl;
if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process "
"contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) {
error("%s: Error reading process contract "
"status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) {
error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
ct_status_free(stathdl);
out:
close(stat_fd);
return ctid;
}
void
solaris_contract_pre_fork(void)
{
if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
return;
}
debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d",
__func__, tmpl_fd);
/* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */
if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) {
error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set "
"(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
"fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) {
error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
"critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
"informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
/* Now make this the active template for this process. */
if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) {
error("%s: Error activating process contract "
"template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
return;
fail:
if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
close(tmpl_fd);
tmpl_fd = -1;
}
}
void
solaris_contract_post_fork_child()
{
debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d",
__func__, tmpl_fd);
/* Clear the active template. */
if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0)
error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
"template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(tmpl_fd);
tmpl_fd = -1;
}
void
solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid)
{
ctid_t ctid;
char ctl_path[256];
int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1;
debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd);
if (tmpl_fd == -1)
return;
/* First clear the active template. */
if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0)
error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
"template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(tmpl_fd);
tmpl_fd = -1;
/*
* If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing
* th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing
* more do.
*/
if (r != 0 || pid <= 0)
return;
/* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */
ctid = get_active_process_contract_id();
debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid);
snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path),
CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid);
if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
error("%s: Error opening process contract "
"ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) {
error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
close(ctl_fd);
return;
fail:
if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
close(tmpl_fd);
tmpl_fd = -1;
}
if (stat_fd != -1)
close(stat_fd);
if (ctl_fd != -1)
close(ctl_fd);
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
#include <sys/task.h>
#include <project.h>
/*
* Get/set solaris default project.
* If we fail, just run along gracefully.
*/
void
solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct project *defaultproject;
struct project tempproject;
char buf[1024];
/* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully */
if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf,
sizeof(buf))) != NULL) {
/* set default project */
if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name,
TASK_NORMAL) != 0)
debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name,
strerror(errno));
} else {
/* debug on getdefaultproj() error */
debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
}
}
#endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
# ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H
# include <priv.h>
# endif
priv_set_t *
solaris_basic_privset(void)
{
priv_set_t *pset;
#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET
if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) {
error("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
priv_basicset(pset);
#else
if ((pset = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) {
error("priv_str_to_set: %s", strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
#endif
return pset;
}
void
solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void)
{
priv_set_t *pset = NULL, *npset = NULL;
/*
* Note: this variant avoids dropping DAC filesystem rights, in case
* the process calling it is running as root and should have the
* ability to read/write/chown any file on the system.
*
* We start with the basic set, then *add* the DAC rights to it while
* taking away other parts of BASIC we don't need. Then we intersect
* this with our existing PERMITTED set. In this way we keep any
* DAC rights we had before, while otherwise reducing ourselves to
* the minimum set of privileges we need to proceed.
*
* This also means we drop any other parts of "root" that we don't
* need (e.g. the ability to kill any process, create new device nodes
* etc etc).
*/
if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL)
fatal("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((npset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
if (priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_CHOWN) != 0 ||
priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ) != 0 ||
priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH) != 0 ||
priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_WRITE) != 0 ||
priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_OWNER) != 0)
fatal("priv_addset: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (priv_delset(npset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+ if (priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
priv_delset(npset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
#endif
- priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 ||
priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
if (getppriv(PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0)
fatal("getppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
priv_intersect(pset, npset);
if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, npset) != 0 ||
setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, npset) != 0 ||
setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, npset) != 0)
fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
priv_freeset(pset);
priv_freeset(npset);
}
void
solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void)
{
priv_set_t *pset = NULL;
/* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
#endif
priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 ||
setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 ||
setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0)
fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
priv_freeset(pset);
}
void
solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void)
{
priv_set_t *pset = NULL;
/* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
#endif
priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
- priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
- priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
+ priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0)
fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 ||
setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 ||
setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0)
fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
priv_freeset(pset);
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
index 132213131e8f..074f80c8d3d5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
@@ -1,153 +1,153 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
# include <crypt.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
#include "servconf.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
int nischeck(char *);
int
sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
char *salt;
int result;
/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
if (pw_password == NULL)
return 0;
/* Check for users with no password. */
if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
return (1);
/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx";
/*
* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
* are identical.
*/
#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) {
result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)
|| (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0));
}
else
#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0);
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
if (authctxt->valid)
free(pw_password);
#endif
return(result);
}
#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
int
nischeck(char *namep)
{
char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd";
FILE *fd;
struct passwd *ent = NULL;
if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) {
/*
* If the passwd file has disappeared we are in a bad state.
* However, returning 0 will send us back through the
* authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for
* passwords earlier.
*/
return(0);
}
/*
* fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain
* that the user is local.
*/
while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) {
if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) {
/* Local user */
fclose (fd);
return(0);
}
}
fclose (fd);
return (1);
}
#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
/*
NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2
functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free
*/
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
char *
get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
{
char *pw_password = NULL;
uinfo_t uinfo;
if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) {
ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password);
if (pw_password == NULL)
fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd");
ia_closeinfo(uinfo);
- return pw_password;
+ return pw_password;
}
else
fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
}
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c
index 5a8b78801b91..826c2378ba25 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c
@@ -1,114 +1,114 @@
/* $OpenBSD: pwcache.c,v 1.9 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/pwcache.c */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#define NCACHE 64 /* power of 2 */
#define MASK (NCACHE - 1) /* bits to store with */
#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
char *
user_from_uid(uid_t uid, int nouser)
{
static struct ncache {
uid_t uid;
char *name;
} c_uid[NCACHE];
static int pwopen;
static char nbuf[15]; /* 32 bits == 10 digits */
struct passwd *pw;
struct ncache *cp;
cp = c_uid + (uid & MASK);
if (cp->uid != uid || cp->name == NULL) {
if (pwopen == 0) {
#ifdef HAVE_SETPASSENT
setpassent(1);
#endif
pwopen = 1;
}
if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
if (nouser)
return (NULL);
- (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%u", uid);
+ (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%lu", (u_long)uid);
}
cp->uid = uid;
if (cp->name != NULL)
free(cp->name);
cp->name = strdup(pw ? pw->pw_name : nbuf);
}
return (cp->name);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
char *
group_from_gid(gid_t gid, int nogroup)
{
static struct ncache {
gid_t gid;
char *name;
} c_gid[NCACHE];
static int gropen;
static char nbuf[15]; /* 32 bits == 10 digits */
struct group *gr;
struct ncache *cp;
cp = c_gid + (gid & MASK);
if (cp->gid != gid || cp->name == NULL) {
if (gropen == 0) {
#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
setgroupent(1);
#endif
gropen = 1;
}
if ((gr = getgrgid(gid)) == NULL) {
if (nogroup)
return (NULL);
- (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%u", gid);
+ (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%lu", (u_long)gid);
}
cp->gid = gid;
if (cp->name != NULL)
free(cp->name);
cp->name = strdup(gr ? gr->gr_name : nbuf);
}
return (cp->name);
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
index 529331be5c26..dd8cdc4b7e7a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
@@ -1,36 +1,36 @@
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
srcdir=@srcdir@
top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
VPATH=@srcdir@
CC=@CC@
LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I../.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. -I$(srcdir)/../.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
LIBS=@LIBS@
LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT)
TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
- strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT)
+ strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT) utimensattest$(EXEEXT)
all: t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
%$(EXEEXT): %.c $(LIBCOMPAT)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS)
t-exec: $(TESTPROGS)
@echo running compat regress tests
@for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \
done
@echo finished compat regress tests
clean:
rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out
distclean: clean
rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
index 82ffeb9a7613..7a69fb2b1a4e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
@@ -1,63 +1,63 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define NUM_OPENS 10
-int closefrom(int);
-
void
fail(char *msg)
{
fprintf(stderr, "closefrom: %s\n", msg);
exit(1);
}
int
main(void)
{
int i, max, fds[NUM_OPENS];
char buf[512];
for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
exit(0); /* can't test */
max = i - 1;
/* should close last fd only */
closefrom(fds[max]);
if (close(fds[max]) != -1)
fail("failed to close highest fd");
/* make sure we can still use remaining descriptors */
for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
if (read(fds[i], buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
fail("closed descriptors it should not have");
/* should close all fds */
closefrom(fds[0]);
for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
if (close(fds[i]) != -1)
fail("failed to close from lowest fd");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
index 5d019b5981a2..43825b24c3eb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
@@ -1,69 +1,71 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
struct version_test {
long headerver;
long libver;
int result;
} version_tests[] = {
/* built with 0.9.8b release headers */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1}, /* exact match */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1}, /* older library fix version: ok */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0}, /* older library minor version: NO */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */
{ 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */
/* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0}, /* older library fix version: NO */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */
{ 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */
};
void
fail(long hver, long lver, int result)
{
fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result);
exit(1);
}
int
main(void)
{
unsigned int i;
int res;
long hver, lver;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) {
hver = version_tests[i].headerver;
lver = version_tests[i].libver;
res = version_tests[i].result;
if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res)
fail(hver, lver, res);
}
exit(0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
index 4ca63e18048c..a3134db1ca94 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
@@ -1,73 +1,76 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
* Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define BUFSZ 2048
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
static int failed = 0;
static void
fail(const char *m)
{
fprintf(stderr, "snprintftest: %s\n", m);
failed = 1;
}
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
int
main(void)
{
char b[5];
- char *src;
+ char *src = NULL;
snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
if (b[4] != '\0')
fail("snprintf does not correctly terminate long strings");
/* check for read overrun on unterminated string */
if ((src = malloc(BUFSZ)) == NULL) {
fail("malloc failed");
} else {
memset(src, 'a', BUFSZ);
snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%.*s", 1, src);
if (strcmp(b, "a") != 0)
fail("failed with length limit '%%.s'");
}
/* check that snprintf and vsnprintf return sane values */
if (snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
fail("snprintf does not return required length");
if (x_snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
fail("vsnprintf does not return required length");
+ free(src);
return failed;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
index 7f6d779bedb3..8a3ccf77169f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
@@ -1,45 +1,47 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
static int fail = 0;
void
test(const char *a)
{
char *b;
b = strdup(a);
if (b == 0) {
fail = 1;
return;
}
if (strcmp(a, b) != 0)
fail = 1;
free(b);
}
int
main(void)
{
test("");
test("a");
test("\0");
test("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz");
return fail;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
index 50ca5bd22d4e..46bd2b916494 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
@@ -1,80 +1,82 @@
/* $OpenBSD: strtonumtest.c,v 1.1 2004/08/03 20:38:36 otto Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: regress/lib/libc/strtonum/strtonumtest.c */
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONGLONG_MAX on AIX */
#if defined(LONGLONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX)
# define LLONG_MAX LONGLONG_MAX
# define LLONG_MIN LONGLONG_MIN
#endif
/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONG_LONG_MAX on HP-UX */
#if defined(LONG_LONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX)
# define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX
# define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN
#endif
long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
int fail;
void
test(const char *p, long long lb, long long ub, int ok)
{
long long val;
const char *q;
val = strtonum(p, lb, ub, &q);
if (ok && q != NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] ", p, lb, ub);
fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER NOT ACCEPTED %s\n", q);
fail = 1;
} else if (!ok && q == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] %lld ", p, lb, ub, val);
fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER ACCEPTED\n");
fail = 1;
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
test("1", 0, 10, 1);
test("0", -2, 5, 1);
test("0", 2, 5, 0);
test("0", 2, LLONG_MAX, 0);
test("-2", 0, LLONG_MAX, 0);
test("0", -5, LLONG_MAX, 1);
test("-3", -3, LLONG_MAX, 1);
test("-9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
test("9223372036854775807", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
test("-9223372036854775809", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
test("9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
test("1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
test("-1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
test("-2", 10, -1, 0);
test("-2", -10, -1, 1);
test("-20", -10, -1, 0);
test("20", -10, -1, 0);
return (fail);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/utimensattest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/utimensattest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bbc66c48523e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/utimensattest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define TMPFILE "utimensat.tmp"
+#define TMPFILE2 "utimensat.tmp2"
+
+#ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
+# define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000
+#endif
+
+int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int);
+
+static void
+cleanup(void)
+{
+ (void)unlink(TMPFILE);
+ (void)unlink(TMPFILE2);
+}
+
+static void
+fail(char *msg, long expect, long got)
+{
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+
+ if (expect == got && got == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "utimensat: %s: %s\n", msg,
+ strerror(saved_errno));
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "utimensat: %s: expected %ld got %ld\n",
+ msg, expect, got);
+ cleanup();
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+ int fd;
+ struct stat sb;
+ struct timespec ts[2];
+
+ cleanup();
+ if ((fd = open(TMPFILE, O_CREAT, 0600)) == -1)
+ fail("open", 0, 0);
+ close(fd);
+
+ ts[0].tv_sec = 12345678;
+ ts[0].tv_nsec = 23456789;
+ ts[1].tv_sec = 34567890;
+ ts[1].tv_nsec = 45678901;
+ if (utimensat(AT_FDCWD, TMPFILE, ts, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1)
+ fail("utimensat", 0, 0);
+
+ if (stat(TMPFILE, &sb) == -1)
+ fail("stat", 0, 0 );
+ if (sb.st_atime != 12345678)
+ fail("st_atime", 0, 0 );
+ if (sb.st_mtime != 34567890)
+ fail("st_mtime", 0, 0 );
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * Results expected to be rounded to the nearest microsecond.
+ * Depends on timestamp precision in kernel and filesystem so
+ * disabled by default.
+ */
+ if (sb.st_atim.tv_nsec != 23456000)
+ fail("atim.tv_nsec", 23456000, sb.st_atim.tv_nsec);
+ if (sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 45678000)
+ fail("mtim.tv_nsec", 45678000, sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
+ * should update the symlink and not the destination. The compat
+ * code doesn't have a way to do this, so where possible it fails
+ * with instead of following a symlink when explicitly asked not to.
+ * Here we just test that it does not update the destination.
+ */
+ if (rename(TMPFILE, TMPFILE2) == -1)
+ fail("rename", 0, 0);
+ if (symlink(TMPFILE2, TMPFILE) == -1)
+ fail("symlink", 0, 0);
+ ts[0].tv_sec = 11223344;
+ ts[1].tv_sec = 55667788;
+ (void)utimensat(AT_FDCWD, TMPFILE, ts, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (stat(TMPFILE2, &sb) == -1)
+ fail("stat", 0, 0 );
+ if (sb.st_atime == 11223344)
+ fail("utimensat symlink st_atime", 0, 0 );
+ if (sb.st_mtime == 55667788)
+ fail("utimensat symlink st_mtime", 0, 0 );
+
+ cleanup();
+ exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e915141a5715..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-/*
- * Preneel, Bosselaers, Dobbertin, "The Cryptographic Hash Function RIPEMD-160",
- * RSA Laboratories, CryptoBytes, Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 1997,
- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/cryptobytes/crypto3n2.pdf
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
-#include <endian.h>
-#endif
-#include <string.h>
-#include <rmd160.h>
-
-#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
- (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \
- (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \
- (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \
- (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \
- (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
- (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
- (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
- (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
-
-#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
- (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
- (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
- (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
- (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
-
-#define H0 0x67452301U
-#define H1 0xEFCDAB89U
-#define H2 0x98BADCFEU
-#define H3 0x10325476U
-#define H4 0xC3D2E1F0U
-
-#define K0 0x00000000U
-#define K1 0x5A827999U
-#define K2 0x6ED9EBA1U
-#define K3 0x8F1BBCDCU
-#define K4 0xA953FD4EU
-
-#define KK0 0x50A28BE6U
-#define KK1 0x5C4DD124U
-#define KK2 0x6D703EF3U
-#define KK3 0x7A6D76E9U
-#define KK4 0x00000000U
-
-/* rotate x left n bits. */
-#define ROL(n, x) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
-
-#define F0(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
-#define F1(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
-#define F2(x, y, z) (((x) | (~y)) ^ (z))
-#define F3(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
-#define F4(x, y, z) ((x) ^ ((y) | (~z)))
-
-#define R(a, b, c, d, e, Fj, Kj, sj, rj) \
- do { \
- a = ROL(sj, a + Fj(b,c,d) + X(rj) + Kj) + e; \
- c = ROL(10, c); \
- } while(0)
-
-#define X(i) x[i]
-
-static u_int8_t PADDING[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH] = {
- 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
-void
-RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
-{
- ctx->count = 0;
- ctx->state[0] = H0;
- ctx->state[1] = H1;
- ctx->state[2] = H2;
- ctx->state[3] = H3;
- ctx->state[4] = H4;
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *ctx, const u_int8_t *input, size_t len)
-{
- size_t have, off, need;
-
- have = (ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- need = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - have;
- ctx->count += 8 * len;
- off = 0;
-
- if (len >= need) {
- if (have) {
- memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need);
- RMD160Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer);
- off = need;
- have = 0;
- }
- /* now the buffer is empty */
- while (off + RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH <= len) {
- RMD160Transform(ctx->state, input+off);
- off += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- }
- }
- if (off < len)
- memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input+off, len-off);
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
-{
- u_int8_t size[8];
- size_t padlen;
-
- PUT_64BIT_LE(size, ctx->count);
-
- /*
- * pad to RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH byte blocks, at least one byte from
- * PADDING plus 8 bytes for the size
- */
- padlen = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - ((ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
- if (padlen < 1 + 8)
- padlen += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- RMD160Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */
- RMD160Update(ctx, size, 8);
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Final(u_int8_t digest[RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i;
-
- RMD160Pad(ctx);
- for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
- PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i*4, ctx->state[i]);
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof (*ctx));
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t block[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
-{
- u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, t, x[16];
-
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- memcpy(x, block, RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
-#else
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- x[i] = (u_int32_t)(
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 0]) |
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 1]) << 8 |
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 2]) << 16 |
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 3]) << 24);
-#endif
-
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
-
- /* Round 1 */
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 11, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 14, 1);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 15, 2);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 12, 3);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 5, 4);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 5);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 7, 6);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 9, 7);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 11, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 13, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 14, 10);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 15, 11);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 6, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 7, 13);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 9, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 15); /* #15 */
- /* Round 2 */
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 7, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 6, 4);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 8, 13);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 13, 1);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 11, 10);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 9, 6);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 7, 15);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 15, 3);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 12, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 15, 9);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 9, 5);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 11, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 13, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 12, 8); /* #31 */
- /* Round 3 */
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 11, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 10);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 6, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 7, 4);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 14, 9);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 9, 15);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 15, 1);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 14, 2);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 8, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 13, 0);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 6, 6);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 5, 13);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 12, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 7, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 5, 12); /* #47 */
- /* Round 4 */
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 11, 1);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 12, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 14, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 15, 10);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 0);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 15, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 9, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 4);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 9, 13);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 5, 7);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 6, 15);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 14);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 6, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 5, 6);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 12, 2); /* #63 */
- /* Round 5 */
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 9, 4);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 15, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 5, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 11, 9);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 6, 7);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 8, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 13, 2);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 12, 10);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 5, 14);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 12, 1);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 13, 3);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 14, 8);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 11, 11);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 8, 6);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 5, 15);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 6, 13); /* #79 */
-
- aa = a ; bb = b; cc = c; dd = d; ee = e;
-
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
-
- /* Parallel round 1 */
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 5);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 9, 14);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 9, 7);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 11, 0);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 13, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 15, 2);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 15, 11);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 5, 4);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 7, 13);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 7, 6);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 15);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 11, 8);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 14, 1);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 14, 10);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 12, 3);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 6, 12); /* #15 */
- /* Parallel round 2 */
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 9, 6);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 13, 11);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 15, 3);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 7);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 12, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 8, 13);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 9, 5);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 11, 10);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 7, 15);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 12, 8);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 7, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 6, 4);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 15, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 13, 1);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 11, 2); /* #31 */
- /* Parallel round 3 */
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 9, 15);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 7, 5);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 15, 1);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 11, 3);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 8, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 6, 14);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 6, 6);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 14, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 12, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 13, 8);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 14, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 13, 10);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 13, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 7, 4);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 13); /* #47 */
- /* Parallel round 4 */
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 15, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 5, 6);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 8, 4);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 11, 1);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 14, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 14, 11);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 6, 15);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 14, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 6, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 9, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 12, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 9, 13);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 12, 9);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 5, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 15, 10);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 8, 14); /* #63 */
- /* Parallel round 5 */
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 8, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 15);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 12, 10);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 9, 4);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 12, 1);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 5, 5);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 14, 8);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 6, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 8, 6);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 13, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 6, 13);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 14);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 15, 0);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 13, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 11, 9);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 11, 11); /* #79 */
-
- t = state[1] + cc + d;
- state[1] = state[2] + dd + e;
- state[2] = state[3] + ee + a;
- state[3] = state[4] + aa + b;
- state[4] = state[0] + bb + c;
- state[0] = t;
-}
-
-#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 99c1dcdc060a..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rmd160.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef _RMD160_H
-#define _RMD160_H
-
-#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
-
-#define RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
-#define RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
-#define RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
-
-/* RMD160 context. */
-typedef struct RMD160Context {
- u_int32_t state[5]; /* state */
- u_int64_t count; /* number of bits, mod 2^64 */
- u_int8_t buffer[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* input buffer */
-} RMD160_CTX;
-
-void RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *);
-void RMD160Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
-void RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *);
-void RMD160Final(u_int8_t [RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160End(RMD160_CTX *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160File(const char *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-
-#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
-#endif /* _RMD160_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
index 373b701d9c6f..86954c284ee3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
@@ -1,226 +1,228 @@
/* $OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.13 2010/08/23 22:31:50 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/setenv.c */
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV)
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
extern char **environ;
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
static char **lastenv; /* last value of environ */
+#endif
/* OpenSSH Portable: __findenv is from getenv.c rev 1.8, made static */
/*
* __findenv --
* Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL.
* Starts searching within the environmental array at offset.
* Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the
* environmental array, for use by putenv(3), setenv(3) and unsetenv(3).
* Explicitly removes '=' in argument name.
*
* This routine *should* be a static; don't use it.
*/
static char *
__findenv(const char *name, int len, int *offset)
{
extern char **environ;
int i;
const char *np;
char **p, *cp;
if (name == NULL || environ == NULL)
return (NULL);
for (p = environ + *offset; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) {
for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--)
if (*cp++ != *np++)
break;
if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') {
*offset = p - environ;
return (cp);
}
}
return (NULL);
}
#if 0 /* nothing uses putenv */
/*
* putenv --
* Add a name=value string directly to the environmental, replacing
* any current value.
*/
int
putenv(char *str)
{
char **P, *cp;
size_t cnt;
int offset = 0;
for (cp = str; *cp && *cp != '='; ++cp)
;
if (*cp != '=') {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1); /* missing `=' in string */
}
if (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset) != NULL) {
environ[offset++] = str;
/* could be set multiple times */
while (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset)) {
for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
break;
}
return (0);
}
/* create new slot for string */
for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++)
;
cnt = P - environ;
P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2));
if (!P)
return (-1);
if (lastenv != environ)
memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
lastenv = environ = P;
environ[cnt] = str;
environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
return (0);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
/*
* setenv --
* Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be
* "value". If rewrite is set, replace any current value.
*/
int
setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int rewrite)
{
char *C, **P;
const char *np;
int l_value, offset = 0;
for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
;
#ifdef notyet
if (*np) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1); /* has `=' in name */
}
#endif
l_value = strlen(value);
if ((C = __findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) != NULL) {
int tmpoff = offset + 1;
if (!rewrite)
return (0);
#if 0 /* XXX - existing entry may not be writable */
if (strlen(C) >= l_value) { /* old larger; copy over */
while ((*C++ = *value++))
;
return (0);
}
#endif
/* could be set multiple times */
while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &tmpoff)) {
for (P = &environ[tmpoff];; ++P)
if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
break;
}
} else { /* create new slot */
size_t cnt;
for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++)
;
cnt = P - environ;
P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2));
if (!P)
return (-1);
if (lastenv != environ)
memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
lastenv = environ = P;
offset = cnt;
environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
}
if (!(environ[offset] = /* name + `=' + value */
malloc((size_t)((int)(np - name) + l_value + 2))))
return (-1);
for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C)
;
for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); )
;
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETENV */
#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
/*
* unsetenv(name) --
* Delete environmental variable "name".
*/
int
unsetenv(const char *name)
{
char **P;
const char *np;
int offset = 0;
if (!name || !*name) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1);
}
for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
;
if (*np) {
errno = EINVAL;
return (-1); /* has `=' in name */
}
/* could be set multiple times */
while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) {
for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
break;
}
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV */
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
index dbd1a95a061a..e4064323a630 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
@@ -1,169 +1,170 @@
/* Based on conf.c from UCB sendmail 8.8.8 */
/*
* Copyright 2003 Damien Miller
* Copyright (c) 1983, 1995-1997 Eric P. Allman
* Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
#include <sys/pstat.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <vis.h>
#define SPT_NONE 0 /* don't use it at all */
#define SPT_PSTAT 1 /* use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) */
#define SPT_REUSEARGV 2 /* cover argv with title information */
#ifndef SPT_TYPE
# define SPT_TYPE SPT_NONE
#endif
#ifndef SPT_PADCHAR
# define SPT_PADCHAR '\0'
#endif
#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
static char *argv_start = NULL;
static size_t argv_env_len = 0;
#endif
#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
void
compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[])
{
#if !defined(HAVE_SETPROCTITLE) && \
defined(SPT_TYPE) && SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
extern char **environ;
char *lastargv = NULL;
char **envp = environ;
int i;
/*
* NB: This assumes that argv has already been copied out of the
* way. This is true for sshd, but may not be true for other
* programs. Beware.
*/
if (argc == 0 || argv[0] == NULL)
return;
/* Fail if we can't allocate room for the new environment */
for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
;
if ((environ = calloc(i + 1, sizeof(*environ))) == NULL) {
environ = envp; /* put it back */
return;
}
/*
* Find the last argv string or environment variable within
* our process memory area.
*/
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (lastargv == NULL || lastargv + 1 == argv[i])
lastargv = argv[i] + strlen(argv[i]);
}
for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (lastargv + 1 == envp[i])
lastargv = envp[i] + strlen(envp[i]);
}
argv[1] = NULL;
argv_start = argv[0];
argv_env_len = lastargv - argv[0] - 1;
/*
* Copy environment
* XXX - will truncate env on strdup fail
*/
for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
environ[i] = strdup(envp[i]);
environ[i] = NULL;
#endif /* SPT_REUSEARGV */
}
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
void
setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...)
{
#if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE
va_list ap;
char buf[1024], ptitle[1024];
size_t len = 0;
int r;
extern char *__progname;
#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
union pstun pst;
#endif
#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
if (argv_env_len <= 0)
return;
#endif
strlcpy(buf, __progname, sizeof(buf));
r = -1;
va_start(ap, fmt);
if (fmt != NULL) {
len = strlcat(buf, ": ", sizeof(buf));
if (len < sizeof(buf))
r = vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len , fmt, ap);
}
va_end(ap);
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) - len)
return;
strnvis(ptitle, buf, sizeof(ptitle),
VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL);
#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
pst.pst_command = ptitle;
pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, strlen(ptitle), 0, 0);
#elif SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
/* debug("setproctitle: copy \"%s\" into len %d",
buf, argv_env_len); */
len = strlcpy(argv_start, ptitle, argv_env_len);
for(; len < argv_env_len; len++)
argv_start[len] = SPT_PADCHAR;
#endif
#endif /* SPT_NONE */
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha1.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
index 4b5381f87582..73f8974853d1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
@@ -1,177 +1,182 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sha1.c,v 1.23 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sha1.c,v 1.27 2019/06/07 22:56:36 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* SHA-1 in C
* By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
* 100% Public Domain
*
* Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1)
* "abc"
* A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
* "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
* 84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1
* A million repetitions of "a"
* 34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
-#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits))))
/*
* blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand.
* I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay
*/
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \
|(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF))
#else
# define blk0(i) block->l[i]
#endif
#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \
^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1))
/*
* (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations (rounds) used in SHA1
*/
#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
typedef union {
u_int8_t c[64];
u_int32_t l[16];
} CHAR64LONG16;
/*
* Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm.
*/
void
SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e;
u_int8_t workspace[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH];
CHAR64LONG16 *block = (CHAR64LONG16 *)workspace;
(void)memcpy(block, buffer, SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
/* Copy context->state[] to working vars */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
/* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */
R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3);
R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7);
R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11);
R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15);
R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19);
R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23);
R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27);
R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31);
R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35);
R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39);
R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43);
R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47);
R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51);
R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55);
R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59);
R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63);
R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67);
R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71);
R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75);
R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79);
/* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
/* Wipe variables */
a = b = c = d = e = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Transform);
/*
* SHA1Init - Initialize new context
*/
void
SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *context)
{
/* SHA1 initialization constants */
context->count = 0;
context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Init);
/*
* Run your data through this.
*/
void
SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j;
j = (size_t)((context->count >> 3) & 63);
- context->count += (len << 3);
+ context->count += ((u_int64_t)len << 3);
if ((j + len) > 63) {
(void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j));
SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64)
SHA1Transform(context->state, (u_int8_t *)&data[i]);
j = 0;
} else {
i = 0;
}
(void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i);
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Update);
/*
* Add padding and return the message digest.
*/
void
SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *context)
{
u_int8_t finalcount[8];
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
finalcount[i] = (u_int8_t)((context->count >>
((7 - (i & 7)) * 8)) & 255); /* Endian independent */
}
SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\200", 1);
while ((context->count & 504) != 448)
SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\0", 1);
SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8); /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Pad);
void
SHA1Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *context)
{
u_int i;
SHA1Pad(context);
for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
digest[i] = (u_int8_t)
((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);
}
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Final);
#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
index b55ea30ac743..4f2ad8f2352a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
@@ -1,904 +1,1010 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.11 2005/08/08 08:05:35 espie Exp */
+/* $OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.28 2019/07/23 12:35:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* FILE: sha2.c
* AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
#include "includes.h"
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-# define _NEED_SHA2 1
-# endif
-#else
-# define _NEED_SHA2 1
-#endif
+#if !defined(HAVE_SHA256UPDATE) || !defined(HAVE_SHA384UPDATE) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_SHA512UPDATE)
-#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE)
+/* no-op out, similar to DEF_WEAK but only needed here */
+#define MAKE_CLONE(x, y) void __ssh_compat_make_clone_##x_##y(void)
#include <string.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sha2.h"
/*
* UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
* You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
* loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
* later in this file). Either define on the command line, for example:
*
* cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
*
* or define below:
*
* #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
*
*/
+#ifndef SHA2_SMALL
+#if defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
+#define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+#endif
+#endif
-/*** SHA-256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
+/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
/*
* BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
*
* Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER. If your
* architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
* LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
* equivalent.
*
* If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
* hand like this:
*
* #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
* #define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
*
* And for little-endian machines, add:
*
* #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
*
* Or for big-endian machines:
*
* #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
*
* The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
* appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
* <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
* made).
*/
#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
#endif
-/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
+#define SHA224_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do { \
(dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24); \
} while(0)
#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do { \
(dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) | \
((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) | \
((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) | \
((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56); \
} while (0)
#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
(cp)[0] = (src) >> 56; \
(cp)[1] = (src) >> 48; \
(cp)[2] = (src) >> 40; \
(cp)[3] = (src) >> 32; \
(cp)[4] = (src) >> 24; \
(cp)[5] = (src) >> 16; \
(cp)[6] = (src) >> 8; \
(cp)[7] = (src); \
} while (0)
#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
(cp)[0] = (src) >> 24; \
(cp)[1] = (src) >> 16; \
(cp)[2] = (src) >> 8; \
(cp)[3] = (src); \
} while (0)
/*
* Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
* unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
* 64-bit words):
*/
#define ADDINC128(w,n) do { \
(w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n); \
if ((w)[0] < (n)) { \
(w)[1]++; \
} \
} while (0)
/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
/*
* Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
*
* NOTE: The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
- * S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-256/384/512 description document
+ * S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-224/256/384/512 description document
* (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
* same "backwards" definition.
*/
-/* Shift-right (used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
-#define R(b,x) ((x) >> (b))
-/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-256): */
+/* Shift-right (used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
+#define R(b,x) ((x) >> (b))
+/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-224 and SHA-256): */
#define S32(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
#define S64(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
-/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
+/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
#define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
-/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-256: */
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-224 and SHA-256: */
#define Sigma0_256(x) (S32(2, (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
#define Sigma1_256(x) (S32(6, (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
#define sigma0_256(x) (S32(7, (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 , (x)))
#define sigma1_256(x) (S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10, (x)))
/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
#define Sigma0_512(x) (S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
#define Sigma1_512(x) (S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
#define sigma0_512(x) (S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7, (x)))
#define sigma1_512(x) (S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6, (x)))
/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
-/* Hash constant words K for SHA-256: */
-const static u_int32_t K256[64] = {
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-224 and SHA-256: */
+static const u_int32_t K256[64] = {
0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
};
/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
-const static u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+static const u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
0x6a09e667UL,
0xbb67ae85UL,
0x3c6ef372UL,
0xa54ff53aUL,
0x510e527fUL,
0x9b05688cUL,
0x1f83d9abUL,
0x5be0cd19UL
};
/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
-const static u_int64_t K512[80] = {
+static const u_int64_t K512[80] = {
0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
};
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
+static const u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+ 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
+ 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
+ 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
+ 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
+ 0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
+ 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
+ 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
+ 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
+};
+
+#if !defined(SHA2_SMALL)
+#if 0
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-224: */
+static const u_int32_t sha224_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+ 0xc1059ed8UL,
+ 0x367cd507UL,
+ 0x3070dd17UL,
+ 0xf70e5939UL,
+ 0xffc00b31UL,
+ 0x68581511UL,
+ 0x64f98fa7UL,
+ 0xbefa4fa4UL
+};
+#endif /* 0 */
+
/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
-const static u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+static const u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
};
-/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
-const static u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
- 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
- 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
- 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
- 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
- 0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
- 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
- 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
- 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
+#if 0
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512-256 */
+static const u_int64_t sha512_256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+ 0x22312194fc2bf72cULL,
+ 0x9f555fa3c84c64c2ULL,
+ 0x2393b86b6f53b151ULL,
+ 0x963877195940eabdULL,
+ 0x96283ee2a88effe3ULL,
+ 0xbe5e1e2553863992ULL,
+ 0x2b0199fc2c85b8aaULL,
+ 0x0eb72ddc81c52ca2ULL
};
+/*** SHA-224: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA224Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+ memcpy(context->state.st32, sha224_initial_hash_value,
+ sizeof(sha224_initial_hash_value));
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+ context->bitcount[0] = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Init);
+
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Transform, SHA256Transform);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Update, SHA256Update);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Pad, SHA256Pad);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Transform);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Update);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Pad);
+
+void
+SHA224Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+ SHA224Pad(context);
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ int i;
+
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
+ BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]);
+#else
+ memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Final);
+#endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */
+#endif /* 0 */
/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
void
-SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *context)
+SHA256Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
- if (context == NULL)
- return;
- memcpy(context->state, sha256_initial_hash_value,
+ memcpy(context->state.st32, sha256_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
- context->bitcount = 0;
+ context->bitcount[0] = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Init);
#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); \
data += 4; \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
s0 = sigma0_256(s0); \
s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
s1 = sigma1_256(s1); \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + \
(W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
void
-SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int32_t T1, W256[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 16);
/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
do {
ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 64);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
}
#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
void
-SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int32_t T1, T2, W256[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
data += 4;
/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 16);
do {
/* Part of the message block expansion: */
s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];
s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] +
(W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 64);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
}
#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Transform);
void
-SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+SHA256Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
{
- size_t freespace, usedspace;
+ u_int64_t freespace, usedspace;
/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
if (len == 0)
return;
- usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
if (len >= freespace) {
/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
- context->bitcount += freespace << 3;
+ context->bitcount[0] += freespace << 3;
len -= freespace;
data += freespace;
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
} else {
/* The buffer is not yet full */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
- context->bitcount += len << 3;
+ context->bitcount[0] += (u_int64_t)len << 3;
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
return;
}
}
while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, data);
- context->bitcount += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
+ SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, data);
+ context->bitcount[0] += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
if (len > 0) {
/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
- context->bitcount += len << 3;
+ context->bitcount[0] += len << 3;
}
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Update);
void
-SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *context)
+SHA256Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
unsigned int usedspace;
- usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+ usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Set-up for the last transform: */
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
} else {
if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
}
/* Do second-to-last transform: */
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
/* Prepare for last transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
}
} else {
/* Set-up for the last transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
*context->buffer = 0x80;
}
/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
- context->bitcount);
+ context->bitcount[0]);
/* Final transform: */
- SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Pad);
void
-SHA256_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *context)
+SHA256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
- SHA256_Pad(context);
+ SHA256Pad(context);
- /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
- if (digest != NULL) {
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- int i;
+ int i;
- /* Convert TO host byte order */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state[i]);
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]);
#else
- memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
- }
+ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Final);
/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
void
-SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *context)
+SHA512Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
- if (context == NULL)
- return;
- memcpy(context->state, sha512_initial_hash_value,
+ memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Init);
#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); \
data += 8; \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
s0 = sigma0_512(s0); \
s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
s1 = sigma1_512(s1); \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + \
(W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
void
-SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int64_t T1, W512[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 16);
/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
do {
ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 80);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
}
#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
void
-SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int64_t T1, T2, W512[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
data += 8;
/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 16);
do {
/* Part of the message block expansion: */
s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
s1 = sigma1_512(s1);
/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
(W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 80);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
}
#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Transform);
void
-SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+SHA512Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
{
size_t freespace, usedspace;
/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
if (len == 0)
return;
usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
if (len >= freespace) {
/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
len -= freespace;
data += freespace;
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
} else {
/* The buffer is not yet full */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
return;
}
}
while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, data);
+ SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, data);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
if (len > 0) {
/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
}
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Update);
void
-SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+SHA512Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
unsigned int usedspace;
usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Set-up for the last transform: */
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
} else {
if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
}
/* Do second-to-last transform: */
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
/* And set-up for the last transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
}
} else {
/* Prepare for final transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
*context->buffer = 0x80;
}
/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
context->bitcount[1]);
BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
context->bitcount[0]);
/* Final transform: */
- SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+ SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Pad);
void
-SHA512_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *context)
+SHA512Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
- SHA512_Pad(context);
+ SHA512Pad(context);
- /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
- if (digest != NULL) {
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- int i;
+ int i;
- /* Convert TO host byte order */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
#else
- memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
- }
+ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Final);
+#if !defined(SHA2_SMALL)
/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
void
-SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *context)
+SHA384Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
- if (context == NULL)
- return;
- memcpy(context->state, sha384_initial_hash_value,
+ memcpy(context->state.st64, sha384_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Init);
-#if 0
-__weak_alias(SHA384_Transform, SHA512_Transform);
-__weak_alias(SHA384_Update, SHA512_Update);
-__weak_alias(SHA384_Pad, SHA512_Pad);
-#endif
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Transform, SHA512Transform);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Update, SHA512Update);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Pad, SHA512Pad);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Transform);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Update);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Pad);
+/* Equivalent of MAKE_CLONE (which is a no-op) for SHA384 funcs */
void
-SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+SHA384Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
- return SHA512_Transform(state, data);
+ SHA512Transform(state, data);
}
void
-SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+SHA384Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
{
- SHA512_Update(context, data, len);
+ SHA512Update(context, data, len);
}
void
-SHA384_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+SHA384Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
- SHA512_Pad(context);
+ SHA512Pad(context);
}
void
-SHA384_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *context)
+SHA384Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
- SHA384_Pad(context);
+ SHA384Pad(context);
- /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
- if (digest != NULL) {
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- int i;
+ int i;
- /* Convert TO host byte order */
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
- BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
#else
- memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
- }
+ /* Zero out state data */
+ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Final);
+
+#if 0
+/*** SHA-512/256: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA512_256Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+ memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_256_initial_hash_value,
+ sizeof(sha512_256_initial_hash_value));
+ memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+ context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Init);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Transform, SHA512Transform);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Update, SHA512Update);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Pad, SHA512Pad);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Transform);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Update);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Pad);
+
+void
+SHA512_256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+ SHA512_256Pad(context);
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ int i;
+
+ /* Convert TO host byte order */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
+#else
+ memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
/* Zero out state data */
- memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+ explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Final);
+#endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */
+#endif /* 0 */
-#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA{256,384,512}UPDATE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
index c6e6c97a5397..d051e96e83c9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
@@ -1,134 +1,174 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.6 2004/06/22 01:57:30 jfb Exp */
+/* $OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.10 2016/09/03 17:00:29 tedu Exp $ */
/*
* FILE: sha2.h
* AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */
#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H
#define _SSHSHA2_H
#include "includes.h"
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-# include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-# define _NEED_SHA2 1
-# endif
-#else
-# define _NEED_SHA2 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE)
+#if !defined(HAVE_SHA256UPDATE) || !defined(HAVE_SHA384UPDATE) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_SHA512UPDATE)
/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+#define SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
+#define SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH 28
+#define SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH 128
#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH 48
#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH 128
#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH 64
#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA512_256_BLOCK_LENGTH 128
+#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
+#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
-/*** SHA-256/384/512 Context Structures *******************************/
-typedef struct _SHA256_CTX {
- u_int32_t state[8];
- u_int64_t bitcount;
- u_int8_t buffer[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-} SHA256_CTX;
-typedef struct _SHA512_CTX {
- u_int64_t state[8];
+/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Context Structure *******************************/
+typedef struct _SHA2_CTX {
+ union {
+ u_int32_t st32[8];
+ u_int64_t st64[8];
+ } state;
u_int64_t bitcount[2];
u_int8_t buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-} SHA512_CTX;
+} SHA2_CTX;
-typedef SHA512_CTX SHA384_CTX;
+#if 0
+__BEGIN_DECLS
+void SHA224Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA224Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA224Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA224Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA224Final(u_int8_t [SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* 0 */
-void SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *);
-void SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
-void SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+#ifndef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE
+void SHA256Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA256Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *);
-void SHA256_Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *)
+void SHA256Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA256Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_End(SHA256_CTX *, char *)
+char *SHA256End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_File(const char *, char *)
+char *SHA256File(const char *, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+char *SHA256FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA256_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+char *SHA256Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA256UPDATE */
-void SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *);
-void SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
-void SHA384_Update(SHA384_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+#ifndef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE
+void SHA384Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA384Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA384Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void SHA384_Pad(SHA384_CTX *);
-void SHA384_Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *)
+void SHA384Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA384Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_End(SHA384_CTX *, char *)
+char *SHA384End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_File(const char *, char *)
+char *SHA384File(const char *, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+char *SHA384FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA384_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+char *SHA384Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA384UPDATE */
-void SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *);
-void SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
-void SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+#ifndef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE
+void SHA512Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *);
-void SHA512_Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *)
+void SHA512Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_End(SHA512_CTX *, char *)
+char *SHA512End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_File(const char *, char *)
+char *SHA512File(const char *, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+char *SHA512FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *SHA512_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+char *SHA512Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA512UPDATE */
+
+#if 0
+void SHA512_256Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512_256Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512_256Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA512_256Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512_256Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256File(const char *, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+ __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+__END_DECLS
+#endif /* 0 */
-#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA{256,384,512}UPDATE */
#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
index 87f2f24b2583..130d89684e90 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
@@ -1,72 +1,72 @@
/* $OpenBSD: strtonum.c,v 1.6 2004/08/03 19:38:01 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Ted Unangst and Todd Miller
* All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtonum.c */
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <errno.h>
-#define INVALID 1
-#define TOOSMALL 2
-#define TOOLARGE 3
+#define INVALID 1
+#define TOOSMALL 2
+#define TOOLARGE 3
long long
strtonum(const char *numstr, long long minval, long long maxval,
const char **errstrp)
{
long long ll = 0;
char *ep;
int error = 0;
struct errval {
const char *errstr;
int err;
} ev[4] = {
{ NULL, 0 },
{ "invalid", EINVAL },
{ "too small", ERANGE },
{ "too large", ERANGE },
};
ev[0].err = errno;
errno = 0;
if (minval > maxval)
error = INVALID;
else {
ll = strtoll(numstr, &ep, 10);
if (numstr == ep || *ep != '\0')
error = INVALID;
else if ((ll == LLONG_MIN && errno == ERANGE) || ll < minval)
error = TOOSMALL;
else if ((ll == LLONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) || ll > maxval)
error = TOOLARGE;
}
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = ev[error].errstr;
errno = ev[error].err;
if (error)
ll = 0;
return (ll);
}
#endif /* HAVE_STRTONUM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
index af93d6814025..816c15cd4262 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
@@ -1,658 +1,628 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.36 2012/04/11 13:29:14 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.45 2018/07/12 14:22:54 sashan Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/queue.h */
#ifndef _FAKE_QUEUE_H_
#define _FAKE_QUEUE_H_
/*
* Require for OS/X and other platforms that have old/broken/incomplete
* <sys/queue.h>.
*/
-#undef SLIST_HEAD
-#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
-#undef SLIST_ENTRY
-#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR
-#undef SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE
-#undef SLIST_FIRST
-#undef SLIST_END
-#undef SLIST_EMPTY
-#undef SLIST_NEXT
-#undef SLIST_FOREACH
-#undef SLIST_INIT
-#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER
-#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE
-#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT
-#undef LIST_HEAD
-#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_END
+#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE
+#undef LIST_EMPTY
+#undef LIST_END
#undef LIST_ENTRY
#undef LIST_FIRST
-#undef LIST_END
-#undef LIST_EMPTY
-#undef LIST_NEXT
#undef LIST_FOREACH
#undef LIST_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef LIST_HEAD
+#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
#undef LIST_INIT
#undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER
#undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE
#undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef LIST_NEXT
#undef LIST_REMOVE
#undef LIST_REPLACE
-#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD
-#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_CONCAT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_END
#undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY
#undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST
-#undef SIMPLEQ_END
-#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY
-#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT
#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
#undef SIMPLEQ_INIT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
-#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER
#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD
-#undef TAILQ_HEAD
-#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SLIST_EMPTY
+#undef SLIST_END
+#undef SLIST_ENTRY
+#undef SLIST_FIRST
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef SLIST_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SLIST_INIT
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_NEXT
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_CONCAT
+#undef TAILQ_EMPTY
+#undef TAILQ_END
#undef TAILQ_ENTRY
#undef TAILQ_FIRST
-#undef TAILQ_END
-#undef TAILQ_NEXT
-#undef TAILQ_LAST
-#undef TAILQ_PREV
-#undef TAILQ_EMPTY
#undef TAILQ_FOREACH
#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
-#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE
#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
#undef TAILQ_INIT
-#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD
-#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL
#undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER
#undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef TAILQ_LAST
+#undef TAILQ_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_PREV
#undef TAILQ_REMOVE
#undef TAILQ_REPLACE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD
-#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
-#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY
-#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST
-#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST
-#undef CIRCLEQ_END
-#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT
-#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV
-#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY
-#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH
-#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
-#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
-#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE
-#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE
/*
- * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists,
- * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues.
+ * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists,
+ * lists, simple queues, tail queues and XOR simple queues.
*
*
* A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements
* are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at
* the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be
* added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list.
* Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit
* macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may
* only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal
* for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for
* implementing a LIFO queue.
*
* A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward
* pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked
* so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
* traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before
* or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list
* may only be traversed in the forward direction.
*
- * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the
+ * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
* list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly
* linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the
* head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
* an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the
* list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction.
*
* A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
* list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
* linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
* traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or
* after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of
* the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction.
*
- * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
- * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
- * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
- * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
- * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list.
- * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more
- * complex end of list detection.
+ * An XOR simple queue is used in the same way as a regular simple queue.
+ * The difference is that the head structure also includes a "cookie" that
+ * is XOR'd with the queue pointer (first, last or next) to generate the
+ * real pointer value.
*
* For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page.
*/
#if defined(QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG) || (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC))
-#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = ((void *)-1)
+#define _Q_INVALID ((void *)-1)
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = _Q_INVALID
#else
#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a)
#endif
/*
* Singly-linked List definitions.
*/
#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \
}
-
+
#define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL }
-
+
#define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \
}
-
+
/*
* Singly-linked List access methods.
*/
#define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first)
#define SLIST_END(head) NULL
#define SLIST_EMPTY(head) (SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head))
#define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next)
#define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \
(var) != SLIST_END(head); \
(var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field))
#define SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \
(var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* Singly-linked List functions.
*/
#define SLIST_INIT(head) { \
SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head); \
}
#define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next; \
(slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first; \
(head)->slh_first = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \
(head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next; \
} while (0)
#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do { \
if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) { \
SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field); \
} else { \
struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first; \
\
while (curelm->field.sle_next != (elm)) \
curelm = curelm->field.sle_next; \
curelm->field.sle_next = \
curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next); \
} \
+ _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next); \
} while (0)
/*
* List definitions.
*/
#define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \
}
#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL }
#define LIST_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \
struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \
}
/*
- * List access methods
+ * List access methods.
*/
#define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first)
#define LIST_END(head) NULL
#define LIST_EMPTY(head) (LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head))
#define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next)
#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \
(var)!= LIST_END(head); \
(var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field))
#define LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \
(var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* List functions.
*/
#define LIST_INIT(head) do { \
LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head); \
} while (0)
#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \
(listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
&(elm)->field.le_next; \
(listelm)->field.le_next = (elm); \
(elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next; \
} while (0)
#define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \
(elm)->field.le_next = (listelm); \
*(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \
(listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next; \
} while (0)
#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL) \
(head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\
(head)->lh_first = (elm); \
(elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first; \
} while (0)
#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \
if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL) \
(elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
(elm)->field.le_prev; \
*(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next; \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \
} while (0)
#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do { \
if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \
(elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
&(elm2)->field.le_next; \
(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev; \
*(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \
} while (0)
/*
* Simple queue definitions.
*/
#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *sqh_first; /* first element */ \
struct type **sqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
}
#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL, &(head).sqh_first }
#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *sqe_next; /* next element */ \
}
/*
* Simple queue access methods.
*/
#define SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->sqh_first)
#define SIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL
#define SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head))
#define SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sqe_next)
#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head); \
(var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) && ((tvar) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* Simple queue functions.
*/
#define SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
(head)->sqh_first = NULL; \
(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL) \
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
(head)->sqh_first = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL; \
*(head)->sqh_last = (elm); \
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
(listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm); \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \
if (((head)->sqh_first = (head)->sqh_first->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \
(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (elm)->field.sqe_next->field.sqe_next) \
== NULL) \
(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
} while (0)
+#define SIMPLEQ_CONCAT(head1, head2) do { \
+ if (!SIMPLEQ_EMPTY((head2))) { \
+ *(head1)->sqh_last = (head2)->sqh_first; \
+ (head1)->sqh_last = (head2)->sqh_last; \
+ SIMPLEQ_INIT((head2)); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue definitions.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
+struct name { \
+ struct type *sqx_first; /* first element */ \
+ struct type **sqx_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
+ unsigned long sqx_cookie; \
+}
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
+struct { \
+ struct type *sqx_next; /* next element */ \
+}
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue access methods.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ptr) ((__typeof(ptr))((head)->sqx_cookie ^ \
+ (unsigned long)(ptr)))
+#define XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ((head)->sqx_first))
+#define XSIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL
+#define XSIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == XSIMPLEQ_END(head))
+#define XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, elm, field) XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ((elm)->field.sqx_next))
+
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
+ for ((var) = XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) != XSIMPLEQ_END(head); \
+ (var) = XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, var, field))
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
+ for ((var) = XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) && ((tvar) = XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, var, field), 1); \
+ (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue functions.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
+ arc4random_buf(&(head)->sqx_cookie, sizeof((head)->sqx_cookie)); \
+ (head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL); \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(head)->sqx_first); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = (head)->sqx_first) == \
+ XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+ (head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm)); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL); \
+ *(XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (head)->sqx_last)) = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm)); \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = (listelm)->field.sqx_next) == \
+ XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+ (listelm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm)); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \
+ if (((head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, \
+ (head)->sqx_first)->field.sqx_next) == XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(head)->sqx_first); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, \
+ (elm)->field.sqx_next)->field.sqx_next) \
+ == XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+ (head)->sqx_last = \
+ XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+} while (0)
+
+
/*
* Tail queue definitions.
*/
#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \
struct name { \
struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \
struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
}
#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
{ NULL, &(head).tqh_first }
#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \
struct { \
struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \
struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \
}
-/*
- * tail queue access methods
+/*
+ * Tail queue access methods.
*/
#define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first)
#define TAILQ_END(head) NULL
#define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next)
#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \
(*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last))
/* XXX */
#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \
(*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last))
#define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) \
(TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head); \
(var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \
((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field) \
for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head); \
(var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field))
#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \
for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \
(var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \
((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \
(var) = (tvar))
/*
* Tail queue functions.
*/
#define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \
(head)->tqh_first = NULL; \
(head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL) \
(head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = \
&(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
(head)->tqh_first = (elm); \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL; \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \
*(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\
(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
&(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
(listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm); \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \
(elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm); \
*(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \
(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \
if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \
(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
(elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
*(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next; \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \
} while (0)
#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \
if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \
(elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
&(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \
else \
(head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \
(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
*(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \
_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \
} while (0)
-/*
- * Circular queue definitions.
- */
-#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
-struct name { \
- struct type *cqh_first; /* first element */ \
- struct type *cqh_last; /* last element */ \
-}
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
- { CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) }
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
-struct { \
- struct type *cqe_next; /* next element */ \
- struct type *cqe_prev; /* previous element */ \
-}
-
-/*
- * Circular queue access methods
- */
-#define CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->cqh_first)
-#define CIRCLEQ_LAST(head) ((head)->cqh_last)
-#define CIRCLEQ_END(head) ((void *)(head))
-#define CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_next)
-#define CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_prev)
-#define CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head) \
- (CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
- for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \
- for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \
- ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \
- (var) = (tvar))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field) \
- for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field))
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \
- for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head, headname); \
- (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \
- ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \
- (var) = (tvar))
-
-/*
- * Circular queue functions.
- */
-#define CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
- (head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next; \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm); \
- if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
- else \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm); \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev; \
- if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
- else \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
- (listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first; \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
- else \
- (head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last; \
- if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
- else \
- (head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \
- if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \
- else \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \
- if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next; \
- else \
- (elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = \
- (elm)->field.cqe_next; \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \
- if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) == \
- CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head).cqh_last = (elm2); \
- else \
- (elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2); \
- if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) == \
- CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
- (head).cqh_first = (elm2); \
- else \
- (elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2); \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \
- _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \
+#define TAILQ_CONCAT(head1, head2, field) do { \
+ if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(head2)) { \
+ *(head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_first; \
+ (head2)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = (head1)->tqh_last; \
+ (head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_last; \
+ TAILQ_INIT((head2)); \
+ } \
} while (0)
-#endif /* !_FAKE_QUEUE_H_ */
+#endif /* !_SYS_QUEUE_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
index 8f4077d4c27f..bc8314287cba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
@@ -1,2685 +1,2717 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.277 2018/07/16 03:09:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.301 2021/07/16 09:00:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
* with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <time.h>
/*
* Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have
* "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs.
*/
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# endif
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
#include <zlib.h>
+#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "crc32.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "blacklist_client.h"
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
#define DBG(x) x
#else
#define DBG(x)
#endif
#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
struct packet_state {
u_int32_t seqnr;
u_int32_t packets;
u_int64_t blocks;
u_int64_t bytes;
};
struct packet {
TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
u_char type;
struct sshbuf *payload;
};
struct session_state {
/*
* This variable contains the file descriptors used for
* communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
* reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
* descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
*/
int connection_in;
int connection_out;
/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
u_int remote_protocol_flags;
/* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context;
/* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context;
/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
struct sshbuf *input;
/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
struct sshbuf *output;
/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet;
/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
struct sshbuf *incoming_packet;
/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
struct sshbuf *compression_buffer;
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
/* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */
z_stream compression_in_stream;
z_stream compression_out_stream;
+#endif
int compression_in_started;
int compression_out_started;
int compression_in_failures;
int compression_out_failures;
/* default maximum packet size */
u_int max_packet_size;
/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
int initialized;
/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
int interactive_mode;
/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
int server_side;
/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
int after_authentication;
int keep_alive_timeouts;
/* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
int packet_timeout_ms;
/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
/* Volume-based rekeying */
u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit;
/* Time-based rekeying */
u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */
time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */
/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
u_char extra_pad;
/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
u_int packet_discard;
size_t packet_discard_mac_already;
struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac;
/* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
u_int packlen;
/* Used in packet_send2 */
int rekeying;
/* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */
int mux;
/* Used in packet_set_interactive */
int set_interactive_called;
/* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
int set_maxsize_called;
/* One-off warning about weak ciphers */
int cipher_warning_done;
/* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */
ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in;
void *hook_in_ctx;
TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
};
struct ssh *
ssh_alloc_session_state(void)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
struct session_state *state = NULL;
if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL ||
(state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL ||
+ (ssh->kex = kex_new()) == NULL ||
(state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
goto fail;
TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
state->connection_in = -1;
state->connection_out = -1;
state->max_packet_size = 32768;
state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
state->initialized = 1;
/*
* ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until
* we've done the initial key exchange.
*/
state->rekeying = 1;
ssh->state = state;
return ssh;
fail:
+ if (ssh) {
+ kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ free(ssh);
+ }
if (state) {
sshbuf_free(state->input);
sshbuf_free(state->output);
sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
free(state);
}
- free(ssh);
return NULL;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx)
{
ssh->state->hook_in = hook;
ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx;
}
/* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */
int
ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->rekeying ||
(ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0);
}
/*
* Sets the descriptors used for communication.
*/
struct ssh *
ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
{
struct session_state *state;
const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
int r;
if (none == NULL) {
- error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__);
+ error_f("cannot load cipher 'none'");
return NULL;
}
if (ssh == NULL)
ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state();
if (ssh == NULL) {
- error("%s: cound not allocate state", __func__);
+ error_f("could not allocate state");
return NULL;
}
state = ssh->state;
state->connection_in = fd_in;
state->connection_out = fd_out;
if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
- error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "cipher_init failed");
free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
return NULL;
}
state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
/*
* Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error
* messages that might be generated after the connection has closed.
*/
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
return ssh;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
return;
}
if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
else
state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->mux = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
+ kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
}
int
ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->mux;
}
int
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
int r;
free(ssh->log_preamble);
if (fmt == NULL)
ssh->log_preamble = NULL;
else {
va_start(args, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
char buf[1024];
size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already)
dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already;
memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen)
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf,
sizeof(buf))) != 0)
return r;
(void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac,
state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen,
NULL, 0);
}
logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
}
static int
ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc,
struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
}
/*
* Record number of bytes over which the mac has already
* been computed in order to minimize timing attacks.
*/
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already;
}
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard)
return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh);
state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input);
return 0;
}
/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
int
ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state;
struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
if (ssh == NULL || ssh->state == NULL)
return 0;
state = ssh->state;
if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
return 0;
/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
return 1;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
- &fromlen) < 0)
+ &fromlen) == -1)
return 0;
tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
- &tolen) < 0)
+ &tolen) == -1)
return 0;
if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
return 0;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
return 0;
return 1;
}
void
ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes)
{
if (ibytes)
*ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes;
if (obytes)
*obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes;
}
int
ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct sockaddr_storage to;
- socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
-
- memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
- if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
- &tolen) < 0)
- return 0;
-#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
- if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
- IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
- return AF_INET;
-#endif
- return to.ss_family;
+ return get_sock_af(ssh->state->connection_out);
}
/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
void
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh)
{
/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in);
if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in)
set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out);
}
/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
int
ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->connection_in;
}
/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
int
ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->connection_out;
}
/*
* Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
* string must not be freed.
*/
const char *
ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int sock;
/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
sock = ssh->state->connection_in;
ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock);
ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock);
} else {
- ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
+ ssh->remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
ssh->remote_port = 65535;
- ssh->local_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
+ ssh->local_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
ssh->local_port = 65535;
}
}
return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
}
/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
int
ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->remote_port;
}
/*
* Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned
* string must not be freed.
*/
const char *
ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->local_ipaddr;
}
/* Returns the port number of the local host. */
int
ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->local_port;
}
/* Returns the routing domain of the input socket, or NULL if unavailable */
const char *
ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->rdomain_in != NULL)
return ssh->rdomain_in;
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
return NULL;
ssh->rdomain_in = get_rdomain(ssh->state->connection_in);
return ssh->rdomain_in;
}
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
static void
ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int mode;
if (!state->initialized)
return;
state->initialized = 0;
if (do_close) {
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
close(state->connection_out);
} else {
close(state->connection_in);
close(state->connection_out);
}
}
sshbuf_free(state->input);
sshbuf_free(state->output);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */
state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode); /* next keys */
}
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
/* compression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */
if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) {
sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
if (state->compression_out_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
debug("compress outgoing: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
deflateEnd(stream);
}
if (state->compression_in_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream;
debug("compress incoming: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
inflateEnd(stream);
}
}
+#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
cipher_free(state->send_context);
cipher_free(state->receive_context);
state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
if (do_close) {
free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
free(ssh->state);
ssh->state = NULL;
+ kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ ssh->kex = NULL;
}
}
void
ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1);
}
void
ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0);
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
void
ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags)
{
ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
}
/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
u_int
ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags;
}
/*
* Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
* Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
*/
static int
ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
- ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
+ ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
static int
start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
{
if (level < 1 || level > 9)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
case Z_OK:
ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static int
start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1)
inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream);
switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) {
case Z_OK:
ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
/* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */
static int
compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
u_char buf[4096];
int r, status;
if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* This case is not handled below. */
if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0)
return 0;
/* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in =
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
/* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
do {
/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
/* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
switch (status) {
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
case Z_OK:
/* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
default:
ssh->state->compression_out_failures++;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
} while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0);
return 0;
}
static int
uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
u_char buf[4096];
int r, status;
if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in =
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
for (;;) {
/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream,
Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
switch (status) {
case Z_OK:
if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
/*
* Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
* inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
* be the error that we get.
*/
return 0;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
default:
ssh->state->compression_in_failures++;
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
+#else /* WITH_ZLIB */
+
+static int
+start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
+
void
ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) {
kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]);
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
}
int
ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp;
struct packet_state *ps;
u_int64_t *max_blocks;
const char *wmsg;
int r, crypt_type;
+ const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in";
debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
ccp = &state->send_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
ps = &state->p_send;
max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out;
} else {
ccp = &state->receive_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
ps = &state->p_read;
max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in;
}
if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
- debug("set_newkeys: rekeying, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, "
- "output %llu bytes %llu blocks",
- (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes,
- (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks,
- (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
- (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
- cipher_free(*ccp);
- *ccp = NULL;
+ debug_f("rekeying %s, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, "
+ "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", dir,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0;
/* move newkeys from kex to state */
if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
return r;
}
mac->enabled = 1;
- DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
+ DBG(debug_f("cipher_init_context: %s", dir));
+ cipher_free(*ccp);
+ *ccp = NULL;
if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
return r;
if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
(wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) {
error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
}
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
(comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
- state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
+ state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
return r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
comp->enabled = 1;
}
/*
* The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
* so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
* See RFC4344 section 3.2.
*/
if (enc->block_size >= 16)
*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
else
*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
if (state->rekey_limit)
*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
- debug("rekey after %llu blocks", (unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
+ debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir,
+ (unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
return 0;
}
#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
static int
ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int32_t out_blocks;
/* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
if (!state->after_authentication)
return 0;
/* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
- if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
+ if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
return 0;
/* Peer can't rekey */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
return 0;
/*
* Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
* make progress when rekey limits are very small.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
return 0;
/* Time-based rekeying */
if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
(int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
return 1;
/*
* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction
* As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
return 1;
/* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maximum blocks */
out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
return (state->max_blocks_out &&
(state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
(state->max_blocks_in &&
(state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
}
+int
+ssh_packet_check_rekey(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ if (!ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0))
+ return 0;
+ debug3_f("rekex triggered");
+ return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
+}
+
/*
* Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
* This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
* and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
*/
static int
ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r, mode;
/*
* Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
* with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
*/
state->after_authentication = 1;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
comp->enabled = 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */
int
ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type)
{
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
return 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
/*
* Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
*/
int
ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0;
u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
u_int len;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r, block_size;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5];
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("send packet: type %u", type);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
#endif
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
/* skip header, compress only payload */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet,
"\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len,
sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)));
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
/*
* calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
* minimum padding is 4 bytes
*/
len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
if (padlen < 4)
padlen += block_size;
if (state->extra_pad) {
tmp = state->extra_pad;
state->extra_pad =
ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size);
/* check if roundup overflowed */
if (state->extra_pad < tmp)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad;
/* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */
if (tmp > state->extra_pad)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
pad = state->extra_pad - tmp;
- DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
- __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
+ DBG(debug3_f("adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
+ pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
tmp = padlen;
padlen += pad;
/* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */
if (padlen < tmp)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */
state->extra_pad = 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) {
/* random padding */
arc4random_buf(cp, padlen);
} else {
/* clear padding */
explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
if (cp == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
cp[4] = padlen;
DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
len, padlen, aadlen));
/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len,
macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr));
}
/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* append unencrypted MAC */
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
if (mac->etm) {
/* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
state->p_send.seqnr));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
state->p_send.bytes += len;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */
static int
ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type)
{
return
type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN &&
type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST &&
type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT &&
type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO;
}
int
ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct packet *p;
u_char type;
int r, need_rekey;
if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5];
need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) &&
ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
/*
* During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages.
* Queue everything else.
*/
if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) {
if (need_rekey)
- debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
+ debug3_f("rekex triggered");
debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
if (p == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
p->type = type;
p->payload = state->outgoing_packet;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next);
state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new();
if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (need_rekey) {
/*
* This packet triggered a rekey, so send the
* KEXINIT now.
* NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex().
*/
return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
}
return 0;
}
/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
state->rekeying = 1;
if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
/* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
state->rekeying = 0;
state->rekey_time = monotime();
while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
type = p->type;
/*
* If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the
* remaining packets in the queue for now.
* NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex.
*/
if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh,
sshbuf_len(p->payload))) {
- debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex",
- __func__);
+ debug3_f("queued packet triggered rekex");
return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
}
debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
state->outgoing_packet = p->payload;
TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
free(p);
if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
* no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
* be used during the interactive session.
*/
int
ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len, r, ms_remain;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/*
* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
* been sent.
*/
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
break;
/*
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
for (;;) {
- if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
monotime_tv(&start);
}
if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
r = 0;
break;
}
}
if (r == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
goto out;
}
/* Read data from the socket. */
len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
}
- if (len < 0) {
+ if (len == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Append it to the buffer. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
out:
free(setp);
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_char type;
int r;
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "read");
return type;
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
* that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
*/
int
ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type)
{
int r;
u_char type;
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
if (type != expected_type) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
expected_type, type)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static int
ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *cp;
size_t need;
int r;
if (ssh->kex)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input);
if (state->packlen == 0) {
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
need = state->packlen + 4;
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4,
state->packlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
return r;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
- debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, *typep);
+ debug3_f("type %u", *typep);
/* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *cp;
u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r;
if (state->mux)
return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
if (state->packet_discard)
return 0;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context,
&state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
return 0;
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
} else if (state->packlen == 0) {
/*
* check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
* decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
return 0;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context,
state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
goto out;
}
DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
if (aadlen) {
/* only the payload is encrypted */
need = state->packlen;
} else {
/*
* the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
* have a partial packet of block_size bytes
*/
need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
}
DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
" aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
if (need % block_size != 0) {
logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
need, block_size, need % block_size);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
}
/*
* check if the entire packet has been received and
* decrypt into incoming_packet:
* 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
* 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
* 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
* 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
/* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */
if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen,
maclen)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
goto out;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
/* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */
if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
goto out;
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
}
/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
/* get padlen */
padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
if (padlen < 4) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
}
/*
* get packet type, implies consume.
* return length of payload (without type field)
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (state->hook_in != NULL &&
(r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep,
state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0)
return r;
if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
- /* do we need to rekey? */
- if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
- debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
- if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
- return r;
- }
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+ return r;
out:
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int reason, seqnr;
int r;
u_char *msg;
for (;;) {
msg = NULL;
r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (*typep) {
state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
}
switch (*typep) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
free(msg);
return r;
}
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
"%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
free(msg);
return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
seqnr);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
* together with packet_read_poll.
*/
int
ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (state->packet_discard) {
state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
state->packet_discard -= len;
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
}
/*
* Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
* can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
* message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
* in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
* authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
* exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait.
*/
void
ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
debug3("sending debug message: %s", buf);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send DEBUG");
}
void
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l)
{
snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d",
ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "",
ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
}
/*
* Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
*/
-void
-sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
+static void
+sshpkt_vfatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
- char remote_id[512];
+ char *tag = NULL, remote_id[512];
+ int oerrno = errno;
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
switch (r) {
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
- BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
+ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+ errno = oerrno;
logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. "
"Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r),
ssh->kex->failed_choice);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
+ if (vasprintf(&tag, fmt, ap) == -1) {
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+ logdie_f("could not allocate failure message");
+ }
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
- logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s",
+ errno = oerrno;
+ logdie_r(r, "%s%sConnection %s %s",
tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
- ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
- remote_id, ssh_err(r));
+ ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
}
}
+void
+sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ sshpkt_vfatal(ssh, r, fmt, ap);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ va_end(ap);
+ logdie_f("should have exited");
+}
+
/*
* Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
* connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
* should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
* not exceed 1024 bytes.
*/
void
ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024], remote_id[512];
va_list args;
static int disconnecting = 0;
int r;
if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
disconnecting = 1;
/*
* Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
* message is of limited size.
*/
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
/* Display the error locally */
logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf);
/*
* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
* for it to get sent.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r);
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
/* Close the connection. */
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of
* the output.
*/
int
ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len = sshbuf_len(state->output);
int r;
if (len > 0) {
len = write(state->connection_out,
sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len);
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
return 0;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (len == 0)
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
* written.
*/
int
ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
{
fd_set *setp;
int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
for (;;) {
- if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
monotime_tv(&start);
}
if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
- if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+ if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
free(setp);
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
}
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
}
free(setp);
return 0;
}
/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
int
ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0;
}
/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
int
ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state->interactive_mode)
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384;
else
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos)
{
-#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX)
return;
- switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) {
-# ifdef IP_TOS
- case AF_INET:
- debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
- if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
- IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
- tos, strerror(errno));
- break;
-# endif /* IP_TOS */
-# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS
- case AF_INET6:
- debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
- if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
- IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
- tos, strerror(errno));
- break;
-# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
- }
-#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
+ set_sock_tos(ssh->state->connection_in, tos);
}
/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
void
ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (state->set_interactive_called)
return;
state->set_interactive_called = 1;
/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
state->interactive_mode = interactive;
/* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
return;
set_nodelay(state->connection_in);
- ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive :
- qos_bulk);
+ ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk);
}
/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
int
ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->interactive_mode;
}
int
ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (state->set_maxsize_called) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
state->max_packet_size, s);
return -1;
}
if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
return -1;
}
state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
state->max_packet_size = s;
return s;
}
int
ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
{
ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
}
u_int
ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds)
{
debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
(unsigned int)seconds);
ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
}
time_t
ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh)
{
time_t seconds;
seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval -
monotime();
return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
}
void
ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->server_side = 1;
+ ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */
}
void
ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
}
void *
ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return (void *)ssh->state->input;
}
void *
ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return (void *)ssh->state->output;
}
/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
static int
ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
- debug("%s: called", __func__);
+ debug_f("called");
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */
/* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */
static int
kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
{
int r;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id,
- kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */
static int
newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey;
int r;
if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context :
ssh->state->receive_context;
if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
return r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* serialize packet state into a blob */
int
ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */
static int
newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
int r;
if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
mac->key_len = maclen;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
enc->key_len = keylen;
enc->iv_len = ivlen;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
newkey = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(newkey);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */
static int
kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
{
struct kex *kex;
int r;
- if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(struct kex))) == NULL ||
- (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
- (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
+ if ((kex = kex_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->hostkey_alg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->client_version_string, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->server_version_string, NULL)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0)
goto out;
kex->server = 1;
kex->done = 1;
r = 0;
out:
if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) {
- if (kex != NULL) {
- sshbuf_free(kex->my);
- sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
- free(kex);
- }
+ kex_free(kex);
if (kexp != NULL)
*kexp = NULL;
} else {
+ kex_free(*kexp);
*kexp = kex;
}
return r;
}
/*
* Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization).
* Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors.
*/
int
ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *input, *output;
size_t ilen, olen;
int r;
if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
/*
- * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
+ * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep child we
* count from the completion of the authentication.
*/
state->rekey_time = monotime();
/* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
sshbuf_reset(state->input);
sshbuf_reset(state->output);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(m))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ debug3_f("done");
return 0;
}
/* NEW API */
/* put data to the outgoing packet */
int
sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
}
int
sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
}
int
sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
int
sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
+int
+sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp)
+{
+ return sshbuf_froms(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
int
sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* fetch data from the incoming packet */
int
sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-
int
-sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
+sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp)
{
- return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
+ return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
return 0;
}
const u_char *
sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
{
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
}
/* start a new packet */
int
sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
{
u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */
DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type;
sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet);
return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
static int
ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char type, *cp;
size_t len;
int r;
if (ssh->kex)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
if (len < 6)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
type = cp[5];
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
- debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("type %u", type);
/* drop everything, but the connection protocol */
if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN &&
type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) {
POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output,
state->outgoing_packet)) != 0)
return r;
/* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */
}
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
return 0;
}
/*
* 9.2. Ignored Data Message
*
* byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
* string data
*
* All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
* time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
* required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
* protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
*/
int
sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes)
{
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
int r;
u_int i;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
return r;
rnd >>= 8;
}
return 0;
}
/* send it */
int
sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux)
return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh);
return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
}
int
sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
int
sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad)
{
ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.h b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
index 170203cabeb2..2ad0e70cfd79 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
@@ -1,222 +1,222 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.86 2018/07/09 21:20:26 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.93 2021/07/16 09:00:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Interface for the packet protocol functions.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef PACKET_H
#define PACKET_H
#include <termios.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
# define BIGNUM void
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include <signal.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
struct kex;
struct sshkey;
struct sshbuf;
struct session_state; /* private session data */
#include "dispatch.h" /* typedef, DISPATCH_MAX */
struct key_entry {
TAILQ_ENTRY(key_entry) next;
struct sshkey *key;
};
struct ssh {
/* Session state */
struct session_state *state;
/* Key exchange */
struct kex *kex;
/* cached local and remote ip addresses and ports */
char *remote_ipaddr;
int remote_port;
char *local_ipaddr;
int local_port;
char *rdomain_in;
/* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */
char *log_preamble;
/* Dispatcher table */
dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
/* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */
int dispatch_skip_packets;
/* datafellows */
int compat;
/* Lists for private and public keys */
TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) private_keys;
TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) public_keys;
/* Client/Server authentication context */
void *authctxt;
/* Channels context */
struct ssh_channels *chanctxt;
/* APP data */
void *app_data;
};
typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *,
u_char *, void *);
struct ssh *ssh_alloc_session_state(void);
struct ssh *ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *, int, int);
void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *, int, int);
int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *, ssh_packet_hook_fn *, void *);
void ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *);
void ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *, int);
int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_check_rekey(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *, u_int);
u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *, int);
void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *, int, int, int);
int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char);
int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type);
int ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len);
int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
const void *ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr);
void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)))
__attribute__((noreturn));
void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *, int mode);
void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *, u_int64_t *, u_int64_t *);
int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *);
void ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *, int, struct termios *);
void ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *, int);
void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *, int);
int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
const char *ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *);
const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);
const char *ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t);
time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);
void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
void *ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *);
/* new API */
int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type);
int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh);
int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *, u_char);
-void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r);
+void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)))
+ __attribute__((noreturn));
int sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *, u_int);
int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b);
int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val);
int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val);
int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val);
int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v);
int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v);
int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v);
int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len);
int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp);
int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp);
int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp);
int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp);
int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
-int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v);
+int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp);
int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh);
void sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l);
const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp);
-/* OLD API */
-extern struct ssh *active_state;
-#include "opacket.h"
-
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
# undef BIGNUM
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#endif
#endif /* PACKET_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
index 78c25ae0888c..eafa7d4efa41 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
@@ -1,173 +1,180 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.28 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.31 2019/11/12 19:33:08 markus Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#define ETCDIR "/etc"
#ifndef SSHDIR
#define SSHDIR ETCDIR "/ssh"
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
#endif
/*
* System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be
* world-readable.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts"
/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2"
/*
* Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config
* should be world-readable.
*/
#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/sshd_config"
#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config"
#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli"
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
#endif
/*
* The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
* make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
/*
* The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The
* directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh"
/*
* Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be
* readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not
* contain anything particularly secret.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts"
/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts2"
/*
* Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This
* file should only be readable by the user him/herself.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_xmss"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa_sk"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519_sk"
/*
* Configuration file in user's home directory. This file need not be
* readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
* particularly secret. If the user's home directory resides on an NFS
* volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/config"
/*
* File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
* user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
* but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user's home
* directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
* may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is
* running as root.)
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys"
/* backward compat for protocol v2 */
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys2"
/*
* Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with
* /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be
* passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in
* use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/rc"
#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC SSHDIR "/sshrc"
/*
* Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use
* ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv"
#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv"
/*
* Default location of askpass
*/
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/local/bin/ssh-askpass"
#endif
/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN
#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN "/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign"
#endif
/* Location of ssh-pkcs11-helper to support keys in tokens */
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
#define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper"
#endif
+/* Location of ssh-sk-helper to support keys in security keys */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER
+#define _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-sk-helper"
+#endif
+
/* xauth for X11 forwarding */
#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH
#define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/local/bin/xauth"
#endif
/* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */
#ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X
#define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
#endif
/* for scp */
#ifndef _PATH_CP
#define _PATH_CP "cp"
#endif
/* for sftp */
#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
#endif
/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */
#ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR "/var/empty"
#endif
/* for passwd change */
#ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd"
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_LS
#define _PATH_LS "ls"
#endif
/* Askpass program define */
#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/platform.c b/crypto/openssh/platform.c
index 41acc9370d5e..44ba71dc5fcb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/platform.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/platform.c
@@ -1,198 +1,199 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "platform.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
extern int use_privsep;
extern ServerOptions options;
void
platform_pre_listen(void)
{
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
/* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */
oom_adjust_setup();
#endif
}
void
platform_pre_fork(void)
{
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
solaris_contract_pre_fork();
#endif
}
void
platform_pre_restart(void)
{
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
oom_adjust_restore();
#endif
}
void
platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid)
{
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid);
#endif
}
void
platform_post_fork_child(void)
{
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
solaris_contract_post_fork_child();
#endif
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
oom_adjust_restore();
#endif
}
/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
int
platform_privileged_uidswap(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */
return 1;
#else
return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
#endif
}
/*
* This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is
* not running as root.
*/
void
platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
/* Cache selinux status for later use */
(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
#endif
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
/*
* If solaris projects were detected, set the default now, unless
* we are using PAM in which case it is the responsibility of the
* PAM stack.
*/
if (!options.use_pam && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0))
solaris_set_default_project(pw);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__)
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
setpgid(0, 0);
# endif
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
/*
* If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds
* before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext).
*/
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
}
}
# endif /* USE_PAM */
#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
/* Sets login uid for accounting */
if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
}
/*
* This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only
* called if sshd is running as root.
*/
void
platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
{
#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
/*
* PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
* These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
* Reestablish them here.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY))
irix_setusercontext(pw);
#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
#ifdef _AIX
aix_usrinfo(pw);
#endif /* _AIX */
#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
/*
* If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real
* uid which we will need for chroot. If we don't have a
* chroot directory, we don't override anything.
*/
{
char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] =
{ "REAL_USER=root", NULL };
if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0)
creds = chroot_creds;
if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1)
fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
#endif
}
char *
platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
{
#ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name);
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
index fe9bf52e4c90..8baf798f1813 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
@@ -1,306 +1,296 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.45 2016/06/30 05:17:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.50 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
#define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
#define MAX_WINSIZE 512
#define PADDING 1 /* padding between the progress indicators */
#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1 /* update the progress meter every second */
#define STALL_TIME 5 /* we're stalled after this many seconds */
/* determines whether we can output to the terminal */
static int can_output(void);
/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */
static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
/* window resizing */
static void sig_winch(int);
static void setscreensize(void);
-/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
-void refresh_progress_meter(void);
-
/* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
-static void update_progress_meter(int);
+static void sig_alarm(int);
static double start; /* start progress */
static double last_update; /* last progress update */
static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */
static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */
static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */
static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */
static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */
static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */
static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */
static int win_size; /* terminal window size */
static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t alarm_fired;
/* units for format_size */
static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
static int
can_output(void)
{
return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO));
}
static void
format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
{
int i;
bytes *= 100;
for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
if (i == 0) {
i++;
bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
}
snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s",
(long long) (bytes + 5) / 100,
(long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10,
unit[i],
i ? "B" : " ");
}
static void
format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s",
(long long) bytes,
unit[i],
i ? "B" : " ");
}
void
-refresh_progress_meter(void)
+refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
{
char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
off_t transferred;
double elapsed, now;
int percent;
off_t bytes_left;
int cur_speed;
int hours, minutes, seconds;
- int i, len;
int file_len;
+ if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+ return;
+ alarm_fired = 0;
+
+ if (win_resized) {
+ setscreensize();
+ win_resized = 0;
+ }
+
transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos);
cur_pos = *counter;
now = monotime_double();
bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
if (bytes_left > 0)
elapsed = now - last_update;
else {
elapsed = now - start;
/* Calculate true total speed when done */
transferred = end_pos - start_pos;
bytes_per_second = 0;
}
/* calculate speed */
if (elapsed != 0)
cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed);
else
cur_speed = transferred;
#define AGE_FACTOR 0.9
if (bytes_per_second != 0) {
bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) +
(cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR));
} else
bytes_per_second = cur_speed;
/* filename */
buf[0] = '\0';
- file_len = win_size - 35;
+ file_len = win_size - 36;
if (file_len > 0) {
- len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
- if (len < 0)
- len = 0;
- if (len >= file_len + 1)
- len = file_len;
- for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
- buf[i] = ' ';
- buf[file_len] = '\0';
+ buf[0] = '\r';
+ snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s",
+ file_len, file);
}
/* percent of transfer done */
if (end_pos == 0 || cur_pos == end_pos)
percent = 100;
else
percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100;
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
" %3d%% ", percent);
/* amount transferred */
format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
cur_pos);
strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
/* bandwidth usage */
format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
(off_t)bytes_per_second);
strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
/* ETA */
if (!transferred)
stalled += elapsed;
else
stalled = 0;
if (stalled >= STALL_TIME)
strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size);
else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left)
strlcat(buf, " --:-- ETA", win_size);
else {
if (bytes_left > 0)
seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second;
else
seconds = elapsed;
hours = seconds / 3600;
seconds -= hours * 3600;
minutes = seconds / 60;
seconds -= minutes * 60;
if (hours != 0)
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
"%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds);
else
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
" %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds);
if (bytes_left > 0)
strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size);
else
strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
}
atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
last_update = now;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
-update_progress_meter(int ignore)
+sig_alarm(int ignore)
{
- int save_errno;
-
- save_errno = errno;
-
- if (win_resized) {
- setscreensize();
- win_resized = 0;
- }
- if (can_output())
- refresh_progress_meter();
-
- signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+ alarm_fired = 1;
alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
- errno = save_errno;
}
void
start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
{
start = last_update = monotime_double();
file = f;
start_pos = *ctr;
end_pos = filesize;
cur_pos = 0;
counter = ctr;
stalled = 0;
bytes_per_second = 0;
setscreensize();
- if (can_output())
- refresh_progress_meter();
+ refresh_progress_meter(1);
- signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
- signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
}
void
stop_progress_meter(void)
{
alarm(0);
if (!can_output())
return;
/* Ensure we complete the progress */
if (cur_pos != end_pos)
- refresh_progress_meter();
+ refresh_progress_meter(1);
atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sig_winch(int sig)
{
win_resized = 1;
}
static void
setscreensize(void)
{
struct winsize winsize;
if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
winsize.ws_col != 0) {
if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
else
win_size = winsize.ws_col;
} else
win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
index bf179dca6518..1703ea75babc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
@@ -1,27 +1,28 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.3 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.5 2019/01/24 16:52:17 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
+void refresh_progress_meter(int);
void stop_progress_meter(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
index c1147a9e2e5f..7abefb6f5627 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@@ -1,2793 +1,3465 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.300 2018/10/05 14:26:09 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.361 2021/07/23 04:04:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for reading the configuration files.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
# include <glob.h>
#else
# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "version.h"
/* Format of the configuration file:
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
# Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single
# host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
# that they are given in.
Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
User foo
Host fake.com
- HostName another.host.name.real.org
+ Hostname another.host.name.real.org
User blaah
Port 34289
ForwardX11 no
ForwardAgent no
Host books.com
RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
Ciphers 3des-cbc
Host fascist.blob.com
Port 23123
User tylonen
PasswordAuthentication no
Host puukko.hut.fi
User t35124p
ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
Host *.fr
PublicKeyAuthentication no
Host *.su
Ciphers aes128-ctr
PasswordAuthentication no
Host vpn.fake.com
Tunnel yes
TunnelDevice 3
# Defaults for various options
Host *
ForwardAgent no
ForwardX11 no
PasswordAuthentication yes
- RSAAuthentication yes
- RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
StrictHostKeyChecking yes
TcpKeepAlive no
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
Port 22
EscapeChar ~
*/
static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
- int flags, int *activep, int depth);
+ int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth);
static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line,
- const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int depth);
+ const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags,
+ int *want_final_pass, int depth);
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
oBadOption,
oVersionAddendum,
oHost, oMatch, oInclude,
oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout,
oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure,
- oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
- oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
- oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
+ oPasswordAuthentication,
+ oXAuthLocation,
+ oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
+ oPermitRemoteOpen,
oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent,
- oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
+ oUser, oEscapeChar, oProxyCommand,
oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
- oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
- oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oMacs,
+ oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
+ oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oLogVerbose, oCiphers, oMacs,
oPubkeyAuthentication,
oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider,
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
oVisualHostKey,
- oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+ oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull,
+ oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
- oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
- oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
+ oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
+ oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
} OpCodes;
/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
static struct {
const char *name;
OpCodes opcode;
} keywords[] = {
/* Deprecated options */
{ "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */
{ "cipher", oDeprecated },
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
{ "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated },
/* Unsupported options */
{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+ { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
# else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
+ { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
# else
{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
#endif
- { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
{ "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout },
{ "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "skeyauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "tisauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
- { "skeyauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */
{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
{ "certificatefile", oCertificateFile },
{ "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent },
{ "identityagent", oIdentityAgent },
- { "hostname", oHostName },
+ { "hostname", oHostname },
{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
{ "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
{ "port", oPort },
{ "ciphers", oCiphers },
{ "macs", oMacs },
{ "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
{ "localforward", oLocalForward },
+ { "permitremoteopen", oPermitRemoteOpen },
{ "user", oUser },
{ "host", oHost },
{ "match", oMatch },
{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
{ "compression", oCompression },
{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */
{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
{ "syslogfacility", oLogFacility },
{ "loglevel", oLogLevel },
+ { "logverbose", oLogVerbose },
{ "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
{ "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms },
{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
{ "bindinterface", oBindInterface },
{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
{ "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
{ "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
{ "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
{ "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
{ "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval },
{ "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax },
{ "sendenv", oSendEnv },
{ "setenv", oSetEnv },
{ "controlpath", oControlPath },
{ "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
{ "controlpersist", oControlPersist },
{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
{ "include", oInclude },
{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
{ "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
+ { "sessiontype", oSessionType },
+ { "stdinnull", oStdinNull },
+ { "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication },
{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask },
{ "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink },
{ "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys },
{ "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash },
{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
- { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
- { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
+ { "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms },
+ { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */
+ { "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms },
+ { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */
{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+ { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ { "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
{ "hpndisabled", oDeprecated },
{ "hpnbuffersize", oDeprecated },
{ "tcprcvbufpoll", oDeprecated },
{ "tcprcvbuf", oDeprecated },
{ "noneenabled", oUnsupported },
{ "noneswitch", oUnsupported },
{ "versionaddendum", oVersionAddendum },
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
+static const char *lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code);
+
+const char *
+kex_default_pk_alg(void)
+{
+ static char *pkalgs;
+
+ if (pkalgs == NULL) {
+ char *all_key;
+
+ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ pkalgs = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ free(all_key);
+ }
+ return pkalgs;
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host, const char *portstr,
+ const char *user)
+{
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+ u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+
+ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_update(md, user, strlen(user)) < 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0)
+ fatal_f("mux digest failed");
+ ssh_digest_free(md);
+ return tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
+}
+
/*
* Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
* error.
*/
void
add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{
struct Forward *fwd;
int i;
/* Don't add duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i))
return;
}
options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards,
options->num_local_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
}
/*
* Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is
* an error.
*/
void
add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{
struct Forward *fwd;
int i;
/* Don't add duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i))
return;
}
options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards,
options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
fwd->handle = newfwd->handle;
fwd->allocated_port = 0;
}
static void
clear_forwardings(Options *options)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path);
free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path);
}
if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) {
free(options->local_forwards);
options->local_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path);
}
if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) {
free(options->remote_forwards);
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
}
void
add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
{
int i;
if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)",
SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
/* Avoid registering duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) {
if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
+ debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path);
return;
}
}
options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] =
userprovided;
options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] =
xstrdup(path);
}
void
add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename,
int userprovided)
{
char *path;
int i;
if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */
path = xstrdup(filename);
else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path);
/* Avoid registering duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) {
if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
+ debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path);
free(path);
return;
}
}
options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] =
userprovided;
options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path;
}
int
default_ssh_port(void)
{
static int port;
struct servent *sp;
if (port == 0) {
sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
}
return port;
}
/*
* Execute a command in a shell.
* Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit.
*/
static int
execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
{
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
- int devnull, status;
+ int status;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
- /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (access(shell, X_OK) == -1) {
+ fatal("Shell \"%s\" is not executable: %s",
+ shell, strerror(errno));
+ }
debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd);
/* Fork and execute the command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[4];
- /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
+ fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd);
argv[3] = NULL;
execv(argv[0], argv);
error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno));
/* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
kill(getpid(), SIGTERM);
_exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
- if (pid < 0)
- fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- close(devnull);
+ if (pid == -1)
+ fatal_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
- fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd);
return -1;
}
debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
return WEXITSTATUS(status);
}
/*
* Parse and execute a Match directive.
*/
static int
match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
- const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon,
- const char *filename, int linenum)
+ const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int final_pass,
+ int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
const char *ruser;
int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
char uidstr[32];
/*
* Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
* must be prepared to use default values.
*/
port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port;
ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user;
- if (post_canon) {
+ if (final_pass) {
host = xstrdup(options->hostname);
} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
"h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
} else {
host = xstrdup(host_arg);
}
debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
cp, host, original_host);
while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
- criteria = NULL;
+ /* Terminate on comment */
+ if (*attrib == '#') {
+ cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
+ break;
+ }
+ arg = criteria = NULL;
this_result = 1;
if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
attrib++;
- /* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
+ /* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
- if (attributes > 1 ||
- ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
+ if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL &&
+ *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) {
error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined "
"with other Match attributes",
filename, linenum, oattrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
+ if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#')
+ cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
if (result)
result = negate ? 0 : 1;
goto out;
}
attributes++;
- if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0) {
- r = !!post_canon; /* force bitmask member to boolean */
+ /* criteria "final" and "canonical" have no argument */
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If the config requests "Match final" then remember
+ * this so we can perform a second pass later.
+ */
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0 &&
+ want_final_pass != NULL)
+ *want_final_pass = 1;
+ r = !!final_pass; /* force bitmask member to boolean */
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'",
filename, linenum,
this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
continue;
}
/* All other criteria require an argument */
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL ||
+ *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(host);
r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(ruser);
r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) {
+ char *conn_hash_hex, *keyalias;
+
if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+ conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(thishost, host,
+ portstr, ruser);
+ keyalias = options->host_key_alias ?
+ options->host_key_alias : host;
cmd = percent_expand(arg,
+ "C", conn_hash_hex,
"L", shorthost,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
+ "k", keyalias,
"l", thishost,
"n", original_host,
"p", portstr,
"r", ruser,
"u", pw->pw_name,
"i", uidstr,
(char *)NULL);
+ free(conn_hash_hex);
if (result != 1) {
/* skip execution if prior predicate failed */
debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec "
"\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd);
free(cmd);
continue;
}
r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
if (r == -1) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec "
"'%.100s' error", filename,
linenum, cmd);
}
criteria = xstrdup(cmd);
free(cmd);
/* Force exit status to boolean */
r = r == 0;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else {
error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ",
filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ",
oattrib, criteria);
free(criteria);
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
result = -1;
goto out;
}
out:
if (result != -1)
debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
*condition = cp;
free(host);
return result;
}
/* Remove environment variable by pattern */
static void
rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
char *cp;
/* Remove an environment variable */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) {
cp = xstrdup(options->send_env[i]);
if (!match_pattern(cp, arg + 1)) {
free(cp);
i++;
continue;
}
debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
free(cp);
free(options->send_env[i]);
options->send_env[i] = NULL;
for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) {
options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1];
options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL;
}
options->num_send_env--;
/* NB. don't increment i */
}
+ if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
+ options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
+ onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
+ sizeof(*options->send_env));
+ }
}
/*
* Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
*/
static OpCodes
parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum,
const char *ignored_unknown)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
return keywords[i].opcode;
if (ignored_unknown != NULL &&
match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1)
return oIgnoredUnknownOption;
error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
return oBadOption;
}
/* Multistate option parsing */
struct multistate {
char *key;
int value;
};
static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ "ask", 2 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = {
{ "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
{ "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
{ "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK },
{ "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ "ask", 2 },
{ "confirm", 3 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
{ "inet", AF_INET },
{ "inet6", AF_INET6 },
{ "any", AF_UNSPEC },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = {
{ "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
{ "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
{ "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
{ "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
{ "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO },
{ "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK },
{ "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = {
{ "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET },
{ "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT },
{ "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
{ "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
{ "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
{ "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = {
{ "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
{ "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
{ "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
{ "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
{ "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE },
{ "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
+static const struct multistate multistate_sessiontype[] = {
+ { "none", SESSION_TYPE_NONE },
+ { "subsystem", SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM },
+ { "default", SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = {
{ "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
{ "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
{ "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
{ "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
{ "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
+static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+ { "yes", COMP_ZLIB },
+#endif
+ { "no", COMP_NONE },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
+
+static int
+parse_multistate_value(const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum,
+ const struct multistate *multistate_ptr)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0)
+ return multistate_ptr[i].value;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
/*
* Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
* only sets those values that have not already been set.
*/
int
process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
int linenum, int *activep, int flags)
{
return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
- line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, 0);
+ line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, NULL, 0);
}
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
static int
process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
- int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int depth)
+ int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
{
- char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2;
- char **cpptr, fwdarg[256];
- u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0;
+ char *str, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, *p, ch;
+ char **cpptr, ***cppptr, fwdarg[256];
+ u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, max_entries = 0;
int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0;
int remotefwd, dynamicfwd;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
long long val64;
size_t len;
struct Forward fwd;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
struct allowed_cname *cname;
glob_t gl;
const char *errstr;
+ char **oav = NULL, **av;
+ int oac = 0, ac;
+ int ret = -1;
if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
- s = line;
+ str = line;
/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
- if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
+ if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace. */
if (*keyword == '\0')
- keyword = strdelim(&s);
+ keyword = strdelim(&str);
if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
return 0;
/* Match lowercase keyword */
lowercase(keyword);
+ /* Prepare to parse remainder of line */
+ if (str != NULL)
+ str += strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
+ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ return -1;
+ }
opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum,
options->ignored_unknown);
+ if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) {
+ error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ac = oac;
+ av = oav;
switch (opcode) {
case oBadOption:
/* don't panic, but count bad options */
- return -1;
+ goto out;
case oIgnore:
- return 0;
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case oIgnoredUnknownOption:
debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
- return 0;
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case oConnectTimeout:
intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
parse_time:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: missing time value.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
value = -1;
- else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+ else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) {
+ error("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oForwardAgent:
intptr = &options->forward_agent;
- parse_flag:
- multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
- parse_multistate:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
+
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
value = -1;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
break;
}
}
- if (value == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (value != -1) {
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* ForwardAgent wasn't 'yes' or 'no', assume a path */
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
- break;
+ *intptr = 1;
+
+ charptr = &options->forward_agent_sock_path;
+ goto parse_agent_path;
case oForwardX11:
intptr = &options->forward_x11;
- goto parse_flag;
+ parse_flag:
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ parse_multistate:
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if ((value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum,
+ multistate_ptr)) == -1) {
+ error("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
case oForwardX11Trusted:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
goto parse_flag;
case oForwardX11Timeout:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout;
goto parse_time;
case oGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
goto parse_flag;
case oExitOnForwardFailure:
intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
goto parse_flag;
case oPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
goto parse_string;
case oPubkeyAuthentication:
intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
- case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
case oGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oGssDelegateCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
goto parse_flag;
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
case oCheckHostIP:
intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
goto parse_flag;
case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
goto parse_multistate;
case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey;
goto parse_multistate;
case oCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
- goto parse_flag;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
+ goto parse_multistate;
case oTCPKeepAlive:
intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
goto parse_flag;
case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
goto parse_int;
case oRekeyLimit:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
val64 = 0;
} else {
- if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
+ if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
- if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = val64;
- if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
- if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) {
- (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */
+ if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */
+ if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) {
+ (void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* discard */
break;
}
intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
goto parse_time;
}
break;
case oIdentityFile:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep) {
intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
- if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).",
- filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+ if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files "
+ "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum,
+ SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+ goto out;
+ }
add_identity_file(options, NULL,
arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
}
break;
case oCertificateFile:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep) {
intptr = &options->num_certificate_files;
if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate "
+ error("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate "
"files specified (max %d).",
filename, linenum,
SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
+ goto out;
}
add_certificate_file(options, arg,
flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
}
break;
case oXAuthLocation:
charptr=&options->xauth_location;
goto parse_string;
case oUser:
charptr = &options->user;
parse_string:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles;
uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles;
max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
parse_char_array:
- if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) {
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries)
- fatal("%s line %d: "
- "too many authorized keys files.",
- filename, linenum);
+ i = 0;
+ value = *uintptr == 0; /* was array empty when we started? */
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Allow "none" only in first position */
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+ if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+ "argument must appear alone.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ i++;
+ if (*activep && value) {
+ if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) {
+ error("%s line %d: too many %s "
+ "entries.", filename, linenum,
+ keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
}
- return 0;
+ break;
case oUserKnownHostsFile:
cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles;
uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles;
max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
goto parse_char_array;
- case oHostName:
+ case oHostname:
charptr = &options->hostname;
goto parse_string;
case oHostKeyAlias:
charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
goto parse_string;
case oPreferredAuthentications:
charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
goto parse_string;
case oBindAddress:
charptr = &options->bind_address;
goto parse_string;
case oBindInterface:
charptr = &options->bind_interface;
goto parse_string;
case oPKCS11Provider:
charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider;
goto parse_string;
+ case oSecurityKeyProvider:
+ charptr = &options->sk_provider;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oKnownHostsCommand:
+ charptr = &options->known_hosts_command;
+ goto parse_command;
+
case oProxyCommand:
charptr = &options->proxy_command;
/* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */
if (options->jump_host != NULL)
charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */
parse_command:
- if (s == NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
+ if (str == NULL) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "=");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = xstrdup(s + len);
- return 0;
+ *charptr = xstrdup(str + len);
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case oProxyJump:
- if (s == NULL) {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ if (str == NULL) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
}
- len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
- if (parse_jump(s + len, options, *activep) == -1) {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"",
- filename, linenum, s + len);
+ len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "=");
+ /* XXX use argv? */
+ if (parse_jump(str + len, options, *activep) == -1) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, str + len);
+ goto out;
}
- return 0;
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case oPort:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
value = a2port(arg);
- if (value <= 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.",
+ if (value <= 0) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && options->port == -1)
options->port = value;
break;
case oConnectionAttempts:
intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
parse_int:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) {
+ error("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
filename, linenum, errstr);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oCiphers:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*arg != '-' &&
+ !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)){
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oMacs:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*arg != '-' &&
+ !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oKexAlgorithms:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*arg != '-' &&
- !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+ !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+ arg + 1 : arg)) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
-parse_keytypes:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+parse_pubkey_algos:
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*arg != '-' &&
- !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+ arg + 1 : arg, 1)) {
+ error("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oCASignatureAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
- goto parse_keytypes;
+ goto parse_pubkey_algos;
case oLogLevel:
log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
value = log_level_number(arg);
- if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+ if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
break;
case oLogFacility:
log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
value = log_facility_number(arg);
- if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
+ if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
break;
+ case oLogVerbose:
+ cppptr = &options->log_verbose;
+ uintptr = &options->num_log_verbose;
+ i = 0;
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Allow "none" only in first position */
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+ if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+ "argument must appear alone.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ i++;
+ if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) {
+ *cppptr = xrecallocarray(*cppptr, *uintptr,
+ *uintptr + 1, sizeof(**cppptr));
+ (*cppptr)[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
case oLocalForward:
case oRemoteForward:
case oDynamicForward:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward);
dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward);
if (!dynamicfwd) {
- arg2 = strdelim(&s);
+ arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') {
if (remotefwd)
dynamicfwd = 1;
- else
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target "
+ else {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing target "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
} else {
/* construct a string for parse_forward */
snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg,
arg2);
}
}
if (dynamicfwd)
strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
- if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
+ if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep) {
if (remotefwd) {
add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
} else {
add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
}
}
break;
+ case oPermitRemoteOpen:
+ uintptr = &options->num_permitted_remote_opens;
+ cppptr = &options->permitted_remote_opens;
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification",
+ filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+ uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+ if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
+ *uintptr = 1;
+ *cppptr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**cppptr));
+ (*cppptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
+ ch = '\0';
+ p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
+ if (p == NULL || ch == '/') {
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s",
+ filename, linenum,
+ lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+ }
+ p = cleanhostname(p);
+ /*
+ * don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid
+ * dependency on channels.[ch] here.
+ */
+ if (arg == NULL ||
+ (strcmp(arg, "*") != 0 && a2port(arg) <= 0)) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in %s",
+ filename, linenum,
+ lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+ }
+ if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum,
+ lookup_opcode_name(opcode),
+ cppptr, uintptr, arg2);
+ }
+ free(arg2);
+ }
+ break;
+
case oClearAllForwardings:
intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
goto parse_flag;
case oHost:
- if (cmdline)
- fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
+ if (cmdline) {
+ error("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
+ goto out;
+ }
*activep = 0;
arg2 = NULL;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0)
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0) {
+ argv_consume(&ac);
break;
+ }
negated = *arg == '!';
if (negated)
arg++;
if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
if (negated) {
debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host "
"block because of negated match "
"for %.100s", filename, linenum,
arg);
*activep = 0;
+ argv_consume(&ac);
break;
}
if (!*activep)
arg2 = arg; /* logged below */
*activep = 1;
}
}
if (*activep)
debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s",
filename, linenum, arg2);
- /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */
- return 0;
+ break;
case oMatch:
- if (cmdline)
- fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
+ if (cmdline) {
+ error("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
- value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host,
- flags & SSHCONF_POSTCANON, filename, linenum);
- if (value < 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+ goto out;
+ }
+ value = match_cfg_line(options, &str, pw, host, original_host,
+ flags & SSHCONF_FINAL, want_final_pass,
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (value < 0) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
*activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+ /*
+ * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then
+ * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail.
+ */
+
+ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+ argv_consume(&ac);
break;
case oEscapeChar:
intptr = &options->escape_char;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
else if (arg[1] == '\0')
value = (u_char) arg[0];
else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
(u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
else {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
filename, linenum);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */
+ goto out;
}
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oAddressFamily:
intptr = &options->address_family;
multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
goto parse_multistate;
case oEnableSSHKeysign:
intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
goto parse_flag;
case oIdentitiesOnly:
intptr = &options->identities_only;
goto parse_flag;
case oServerAliveInterval:
intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
goto parse_time;
case oServerAliveCountMax:
intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max;
goto parse_int;
case oSendEnv:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) {
+ error("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (!*activep)
continue;
if (*arg == '-') {
/* Removing an env var */
rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum);
continue;
} else {
/* Adding an env var */
- if (options->num_send_env >= INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.",
+ if (options->num_send_env >= INT_MAX) {
+ error("%s line %d: too many send env.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
options->send_env = xrecallocarray(
options->send_env, options->num_send_env,
options->num_send_env + 1,
sizeof(*options->send_env));
options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
}
break;
case oSetEnv:
value = options->num_setenv;
- while ((arg = strdelimw(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.",
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) {
+ error("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (!*activep || value != 0)
continue;
/* Adding a setenv var */
- if (options->num_setenv >= INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many SetEnv.",
+ if (options->num_setenv >= INT_MAX) {
+ error("%s line %d: too many SetEnv.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
options->setenv = xrecallocarray(
options->setenv, options->num_setenv,
options->num_setenv + 1, sizeof(*options->setenv));
options->setenv[options->num_setenv++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case oControlPath:
charptr = &options->control_path;
goto parse_string;
case oControlMaster:
intptr = &options->control_master;
multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster;
goto parse_multistate;
case oControlPersist:
/* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */
intptr = &options->control_persist;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
" argument.", filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
value = 0;
value2 = 0; /* timeout */
if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
value = 0;
else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
value = 1;
else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0)
value = 1;
- else
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
+ else {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
*intptr = value;
options->control_persist_timeout = value2;
}
break;
case oHashKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
goto parse_flag;
case oTunnel:
intptr = &options->tun_open;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel;
goto parse_multistate;
case oTunnelDevice:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
value = a2tun(arg, &value2);
- if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum);
- if (*activep) {
+ if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*activep && options->tun_local == -1) {
options->tun_local = value;
options->tun_remote = value2;
}
break;
case oLocalCommand:
charptr = &options->local_command;
goto parse_command;
case oPermitLocalCommand:
intptr = &options->permit_local_command;
goto parse_flag;
case oRemoteCommand:
charptr = &options->remote_command;
goto parse_command;
case oVisualHostKey:
intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
goto parse_flag;
case oInclude:
- if (cmdline)
- fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
+ if (cmdline) {
+ error("Include directive not supported as a "
"command-line option");
+ goto out;
+ }
value = 0;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
/*
* Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration
* files may begin with '~/' but system configurations
* must not. If the path is relative, then treat it
* as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or
* /etc/ssh for system ones.
*/
- if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.",
+ if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.",
filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*arg != '/' && *arg != '~') {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!path_absolute(arg) && *arg != '~') {
xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s",
(flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ?
"~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg);
} else
arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl));
r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl);
if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
"files",filename, linenum, arg2);
free(arg2);
continue;
- } else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ } else if (r != 0) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
filename, linenum, arg2);
+ goto out;
+ }
free(arg2);
oactive = *activep;
- for (i = 0; i < (u_int)gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s "
"depth %d%s", filename, linenum,
gl.gl_pathv[i], depth,
oactive ? "" : " (parse only)");
r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i],
pw, host, original_host, options,
flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
(oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
- activep, depth + 1);
+ activep, want_final_pass, depth + 1);
if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) {
- fatal("Can't open user config file "
+ error("Can't open user config file "
"%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i],
strerror(errno));
+ globfree(&gl);
+ goto out;
}
/*
* don't let Match in includes clobber the
* containing file's Match state.
*/
*activep = oactive;
if (r != 1)
value = -1;
}
globfree(&gl);
}
if (value != 0)
- return value;
+ ret = value;
break;
case oIPQoS:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) {
+ error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
- arg = strdelim(&s);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (arg == NULL)
value2 = value;
- else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+ else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) {
+ error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*activep) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*activep && options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) {
options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
}
break;
case oRequestTTY:
intptr = &options->request_tty;
multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty;
goto parse_multistate;
+ case oSessionType:
+ intptr = &options->session_type;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_sessiontype;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
+ case oStdinNull:
+ intptr = &options->stdin_null;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oForkAfterAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->fork_after_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oVersionAddendum:
- if (s == NULL)
+ if (str == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
- len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE);
+ len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
- if (strcasecmp(s + len, "none") == 0)
+ if (strcasecmp(str + len, "none") == 0)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- else if (strchr(s + len, '\r') != NULL)
+ else if (strchr(str + len, '\r') != NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument",
filename, linenum);
else
- options->version_addendum = xstrdup(s + len);
+ options->version_addendum = xstrdup(str + len);
}
return 0;
case oIgnoreUnknown:
charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
goto parse_string;
case oProxyUseFdpass:
intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
goto parse_flag;
case oCanonicalDomains:
value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ i = 0;
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Allow "none" only in first position */
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+ if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+ "argument must appear alone.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ i++;
if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) {
- fatal("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum,
+ error("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum,
errstr);
+ goto out;
}
if (!*activep || value)
continue;
- if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
+ if (options->num_canonical_domains >=
+ MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) {
+ error("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
options->canonical_domains[
options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs:
value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
/* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */
if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0)
arg2 = arg;
else {
lowercase(arg);
if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL ||
arg2[1] == '\0') {
- fatal("%s line %d: "
+ error("%s line %d: "
"Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, arg);
+ goto out;
}
*arg2 = '\0';
arg2++;
}
if (!*activep || value)
continue;
- if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
- fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
+ if (options->num_permitted_cnames >=
+ MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) {
+ error("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
cname = options->permitted_cnames +
options->num_permitted_cnames++;
cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg);
cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2);
}
break;
case oCanonicalizeHostname:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname;
multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname;
goto parse_multistate;
case oCanonicalizeMaxDots:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots;
goto parse_int;
case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local;
goto parse_flag;
case oStreamLocalBindMask:
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask "
+ "argument.", filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
/* Parse mode in octal format */
value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8);
- if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
+ if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
break;
case oStreamLocalBindUnlink:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
goto parse_flag;
case oRevokedHostKeys:
charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys;
goto parse_string;
case oFingerprintHash:
intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
- if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
+ goto out;
+ }
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oUpdateHostkeys:
intptr = &options->update_hostkeys;
multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
goto parse_multistate;
- case oHostbasedKeyTypes:
- charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
- goto parse_keytypes;
+ case oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms:
+ charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos;
+ goto parse_pubkey_algos;
- case oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
- charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
- goto parse_keytypes;
+ case oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms:
+ charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos;
+ goto parse_pubkey_algos;
case oAddKeysToAgent:
- intptr = &options->add_keys_to_agent;
- multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoaskconfirm;
- goto parse_multistate;
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum,
+ multistate_yesnoaskconfirm);
+ value2 = 0; /* unlimited lifespan by default */
+ if (value == 3 && arg2 != NULL) {
+ /* allow "AddKeysToAgent confirm 5m" */
+ if ((value2 = convtime(arg2)) == -1 ||
+ value2 > INT_MAX) {
+ error("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if (value == -1 && arg2 == NULL) {
+ if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) == -1 ||
+ value2 > INT_MAX) {
+ error("%s line %d: unsupported option",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ value = 1; /* yes */
+ } else if (value == -1 || arg2 != NULL) {
+ error("%s line %d: unsupported option",
+ filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*activep && options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) {
+ options->add_keys_to_agent = value;
+ options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = value2;
+ }
+ break;
case oIdentityAgent:
charptr = &options->identity_agent;
- arg = strdelim(&s);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ parse_agent_path:
/* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */
- if (arg[0] == '$' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.",
+ if ((arg2 = dollar_expand(&r, arg)) == NULL || r) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment expansion "
+ "%s.", filename, linenum, arg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ free(arg2);
+ /* check for legacy environment format */
+ if (arg[0] == '$' && arg[1] != '{' &&
+ !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.",
filename, linenum, arg);
+ goto out;
}
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oDeprecated:
debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
- return 0;
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case oUnsupported:
error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
- return 0;
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
default:
- fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode);
+ error("%s line %d: Unimplemented opcode %d",
+ filename, linenum, opcode);
+ goto out;
}
/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
- if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (ac > 0) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments "
+ "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
}
- return 0;
+
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ argv_free(oav, oac);
+ return ret;
}
/*
* Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options
* should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if
* there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
*/
int
read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
- const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags)
+ const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags,
+ int *want_final_pass)
{
int active = 1;
return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host,
- options, flags, &active, 0);
+ options, flags, &active, want_final_pass, 0);
}
#define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
static int
read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
- int flags, int *activep, int depth)
+ int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
int linenum;
int bad_options = 0;
if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return 0;
if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) {
struct stat sb;
if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
(sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
}
debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
/*
* Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned
* on/off by Host specifications.
*/
linenum = 0;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
/* Update line number counter. */
linenum++;
+ /*
+ * Trim out comments and strip whitespace.
+ * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
+ * line numbers later for error messages.
+ */
if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
- line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, depth) != 0)
+ line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, want_final_pass,
+ depth) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
return 1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
int
option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
{
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
}
/*
* Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
* been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
* are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
* system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called.
*/
void
initialize_options(Options * options)
{
memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
options->version_addendum = NULL;
options->forward_agent = -1;
+ options->forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
options->forward_x11 = -1;
options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
options->forward_x11_timeout = -1;
options->stdio_forward_host = NULL;
options->stdio_forward_port = 0;
options->clear_forwardings = -1;
options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_authentication = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
options->batch_mode = -1;
options->check_host_ip = -1;
options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
options->compression = -1;
options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
options->port = -1;
options->address_family = -1;
options->connection_attempts = -1;
options->connection_timeout = -1;
options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
options->num_identity_files = 0;
+ memset(options->identity_keys, 0, sizeof(options->identity_keys));
options->num_certificate_files = 0;
+ memset(options->certificates, 0, sizeof(options->certificates));
options->hostname = NULL;
options->host_key_alias = NULL;
options->proxy_command = NULL;
options->jump_user = NULL;
options->jump_host = NULL;
options->jump_port = -1;
options->jump_extra = NULL;
options->user = NULL;
options->escape_char = -1;
options->num_system_hostfiles = 0;
options->num_user_hostfiles = 0;
options->local_forwards = NULL;
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+ options->permitted_remote_opens = NULL;
+ options->num_permitted_remote_opens = 0;
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+ options->num_log_verbose = 0;
+ options->log_verbose = NULL;
options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
options->bind_address = NULL;
options->bind_interface = NULL;
options->pkcs11_provider = NULL;
+ options->sk_provider = NULL;
options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
options->identities_only = - 1;
options->rekey_limit = - 1;
options->rekey_interval = -1;
options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
options->server_alive_interval = -1;
options->server_alive_count_max = -1;
options->send_env = NULL;
options->num_send_env = 0;
options->setenv = NULL;
options->num_setenv = 0;
options->control_path = NULL;
options->control_master = -1;
options->control_persist = -1;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
options->tun_open = -1;
options->tun_local = -1;
options->tun_remote = -1;
options->local_command = NULL;
options->permit_local_command = -1;
options->remote_command = NULL;
options->add_keys_to_agent = -1;
+ options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = -1;
options->identity_agent = NULL;
options->visual_host_key = -1;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->request_tty = -1;
+ options->session_type = -1;
+ options->stdin_null = -1;
+ options->fork_after_authentication = -1;
options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
options->update_hostkeys = -1;
- options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
- options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
+ options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
+ options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
+ options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
}
/*
* A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options
* needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed.
*/
void
fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options)
{
if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
}
/*
* Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
* options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
*/
-void
+int
fill_default_options(Options * options)
{
char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
- int r;
+ char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
+ int ret = 0, r;
if (options->forward_agent == -1)
options->forward_agent = 0;
if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
options->forward_x11 = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
/*
* stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer
* setting the values so they can be overridden.
*/
if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
options->exit_on_forward_failure =
options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
if (options->clear_forwardings == -1)
options->clear_forwardings =
options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
clear_forwardings(options);
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
- options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
+ options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
- if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
if (options->batch_mode == -1)
options->batch_mode = 0;
if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
options->check_host_ip = 0;
if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK;
if (options->compression == -1)
options->compression = 0;
if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
if (options->port == -1)
options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
options->connection_attempts = 1;
if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
- if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
+ if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) {
options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
+ options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = 0;
+ }
if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, 0);
#endif
add_identity_file(options, "~/",
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0);
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0);
}
if (options->escape_char == -1)
options->escape_char = '~';
if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) {
options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE);
options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2);
}
+ if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) {
+ if (options->verify_host_key_dns <= 0 &&
+ (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0 ||
+ (options->num_user_hostfiles == 1 && strcmp(options->
+ user_hostfiles[0], _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE) == 0)))
+ options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES;
+ else
+ options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO;
+ }
if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) {
options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER;
if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
if (options->identities_only == -1)
options->identities_only = 0;
if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = 0;
if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
options->rekey_interval = 0;
#if HAVE_LDNS
if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
/* automatically trust a verified SSHFP record */
options->verify_host_key_dns = 1;
#else
if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
#endif
if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
options->server_alive_interval = 0;
if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->control_master == -1)
options->control_master = 0;
if (options->control_persist == -1) {
options->control_persist = 0;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
}
if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->tun_open == -1)
options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
if (options->tun_local == -1)
options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->tun_remote == -1)
options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
options->permit_local_command = 0;
if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
options->visual_host_key = 0;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
if (options->request_tty == -1)
options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
+ if (options->session_type == -1)
+ options->session_type = SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT;
+ if (options->stdin_null == -1)
+ options->stdin_null = 0;
+ if (options->fork_after_authentication == -1)
+ options->fork_after_authentication = 0;
if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
- if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
- options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+#else
+ if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+#endif
/* Expand KEX name lists */
all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+ def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
do { \
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
- defaults, all)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
+ defaults, all)) != 0) { \
+ error_fr(r, "%s", #what); \
+ goto fail; \
+ } \
} while (0)
- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
+ ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
- free(all_cipher);
- free(all_mac);
- free(all_kex);
- free(all_key);
- free(all_sig);
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
free(v); \
v = NULL; \
} \
} while(0)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pkcs11_provider);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->known_hosts_command);
if (options->jump_host != NULL &&
strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 &&
options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) {
free(options->jump_host);
options->jump_host = NULL;
}
/* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */
/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
/* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
/* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD);
+
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ fail:
+ free(all_cipher);
+ free(all_mac);
+ free(all_kex);
+ free(all_key);
+ free(all_sig);
+ free(def_cipher);
+ free(def_mac);
+ free(def_kex);
+ free(def_key);
+ free(def_sig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+free_options(Options *o)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (o == NULL)
+ return;
+
+#define FREE_ARRAY(type, n, a) \
+ do { \
+ type _i; \
+ for (_i = 0; _i < (n); _i++) \
+ free((a)[_i]); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ free(o->forward_agent_sock_path);
+ free(o->xauth_location);
+ FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose);
+ free(o->log_verbose);
+ free(o->ciphers);
+ free(o->macs);
+ free(o->hostkeyalgorithms);
+ free(o->kex_algorithms);
+ free(o->ca_sign_algorithms);
+ free(o->hostname);
+ free(o->host_key_alias);
+ free(o->proxy_command);
+ free(o->user);
+ FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
+ FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
+ free(o->preferred_authentications);
+ free(o->bind_address);
+ free(o->bind_interface);
+ free(o->pkcs11_provider);
+ free(o->sk_provider);
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_identity_files; i++) {
+ free(o->identity_files[i]);
+ sshkey_free(o->identity_keys[i]);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_certificate_files; i++) {
+ free(o->certificate_files[i]);
+ sshkey_free(o->certificates[i]);
+ }
+ free(o->identity_agent);
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
+ free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_path);
+ free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
+ free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_path);
+ }
+ free(o->local_forwards);
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
+ free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_path);
+ free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
+ free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_path);
+ }
+ free(o->remote_forwards);
+ free(o->stdio_forward_host);
+ FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
+ free(o->send_env);
+ FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
+ free(o->setenv);
+ free(o->control_path);
+ free(o->local_command);
+ free(o->remote_command);
+ FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains);
+ for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+ free(o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list);
+ free(o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list);
+ }
+ free(o->revoked_host_keys);
+ free(o->hostbased_accepted_algos);
+ free(o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ free(o->jump_user);
+ free(o->jump_host);
+ free(o->jump_extra);
+ free(o->ignored_unknown);
+ explicit_bzero(o, sizeof(*o));
+#undef FREE_ARRAY
}
struct fwdarg {
char *arg;
int ispath;
};
/*
* parse_fwd_field
* parses the next field in a port forwarding specification.
* sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon
* or sets it to NULL at end of string.
* returns 0 on success, else non-zero.
*/
static int
parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd)
{
char *ep, *cp = *p;
int ispath = 0;
if (*cp == '\0') {
*p = NULL;
return -1; /* end of string */
}
/*
* A field escaped with square brackets is used literally.
* XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash?
*/
if (*cp == '[') {
/* find matching ']' */
for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) {
if (*ep == '/')
ispath = 1;
}
/* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */
if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0'))
return -1;
/* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */
*ep++ = '\0';
if (*ep != '\0')
*ep++ = '\0';
fwd->arg = cp + 1;
fwd->ispath = ispath;
*p = ep;
return 0;
}
for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
switch (*cp) {
case '\\':
memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1);
if (*cp == '\0')
return -1;
break;
case '/':
ispath = 1;
break;
case ':':
*cp++ = '\0';
goto done;
}
}
done:
fwd->arg = *p;
fwd->ispath = ispath;
*p = cp;
return 0;
}
/*
* parse_forward
* parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
* dynamicfwd == 0
* [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath
* listenpath:connectpath
* dynamicfwd == 1
* [listenhost:]listenport
* returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
*/
int
parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
{
struct fwdarg fwdargs[4];
char *p, *cp;
- int i;
+ int i, err;
memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd));
memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs));
- cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
+ /*
+ * We expand environment variables before checking if we think they're
+ * paths so that if ${VAR} expands to a fully qualified path it is
+ * treated as a path.
+ */
+ cp = p = dollar_expand(&err, fwdspec);
+ if (p == NULL || err)
+ return 0;
/* skip leading spaces */
while (isspace((u_char)*cp))
cp++;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0)
break;
}
/* Check for trailing garbage */
if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
i = 0; /* failure */
}
switch (i) {
case 1:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
}
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
break;
case 2:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
}
break;
case 3:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
} else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) {
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
}
break;
case 4:
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg);
break;
default:
i = 0; /* failure */
}
free(p);
if (dynamicfwd) {
if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
goto fail_free;
} else {
if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) {
if (fwd->connect_path == NULL &&
fwd->listen_path == NULL)
goto fail_free;
}
if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL)
goto fail_free;
}
if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) ||
(!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
goto fail_free;
- /* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */
+ /*
+ * XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not
+ * match this host
+ */
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
goto fail_free;
return (i);
fail_free:
free(fwd->connect_host);
fwd->connect_host = NULL;
free(fwd->connect_path);
fwd->connect_path = NULL;
free(fwd->listen_host);
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
free(fwd->listen_path);
fwd->listen_path = NULL;
return (0);
}
int
parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active)
{
char *orig, *sdup, *cp;
char *host = NULL, *user = NULL;
- int ret = -1, port = -1, first;
+ int r, ret = -1, port = -1, first;
active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL;
orig = sdup = xstrdup(s);
+
+ /* Remove comment and trailing whitespace */
+ if ((cp = strchr(orig, '#')) != NULL)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ rtrim(orig);
+
first = active;
do {
if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0)
break;
if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL)
cp = sdup; /* last */
else
*cp++ = '\0';
if (first) {
/* First argument and configuration is active */
- if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port) == -1 ||
- parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0)
+ r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port);
+ if (r == -1 || (r == 1 &&
+ parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0))
goto out;
} else {
/* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */
- if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 ||
- parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r == -1 || (r == 1 &&
+ parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0))
goto out;
}
first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */
} while (cp != sdup);
/* success */
if (active) {
if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) {
o->jump_host = xstrdup("none");
o->jump_port = 0;
} else {
o->jump_user = user;
o->jump_host = host;
o->jump_port = port;
o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
user = host = NULL;
if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) {
o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s);
o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0';
}
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(orig);
free(user);
free(host);
return ret;
}
int
parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
{
- char *path;
- int r;
+ char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
+ int r, port;
- r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, userp, hostp, portp, &path);
+ r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, &user, &host, &port, &path);
if (r == 0 && path != NULL)
r = -1; /* path not allowed */
+ if (r == 0) {
+ if (userp != NULL) {
+ *userp = user;
+ user = NULL;
+ }
+ if (hostp != NULL) {
+ *hostp = host;
+ host = NULL;
+ }
+ if (portp != NULL)
+ *portp = port;
+ }
+ free(user);
+ free(host);
+ free(path);
return r;
}
/* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */
static const char *
fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (m[i].value == val)
return m[i].key;
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static const char *
fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val)
{
if (val == -1)
return "unset";
switch (code) {
case oAddressFamily:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
case oUpdateHostkeys:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask);
case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey);
case oControlMaster:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster);
case oTunnel:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel);
case oRequestTTY:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty);
+ case oSessionType:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_sessiontype);
case oCanonicalizeHostname:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname);
case oAddKeysToAgent:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm);
case oFingerprintHash:
return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
default:
switch (val) {
case 0:
return "no";
case 1:
return "yes";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
}
static const char *
lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
return(keywords[i].name);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static void
dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
static void
dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+ if (count == 0)
+ printf(" none");
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf(" %s", vals[i]);
printf("\n");
}
static void
dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
{
const struct Forward *fwd;
u_int i;
/* oDynamicForward */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
fwd = &fwds[i];
if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
continue;
if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
continue;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path);
else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port);
else {
printf(" [%s]:%d",
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
}
if (code != oDynamicForward) {
if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path);
else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port);
else {
printf(" [%s]:%d",
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
void
dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
{
- int i;
+ int i, r;
char buf[8], *all_key;
- /* This is normally prepared in ssh_kex2 */
+ /*
+ * Expand HostKeyAlgorithms name lists. This isn't handled in
+ * fill_default_options() like the other algorithm lists because
+ * the host key algorithms are by default dynamically chosen based
+ * on the host's keys found in known_hosts.
+ */
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- if (kex_assemble_names( &o->hostkeyalgorithms,
- KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
- fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(),
+ all_key)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "expand HostKeyAlgorithms");
free(all_key);
/* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */
dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user);
- dump_cfg_string(oHostName, host);
+ dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host);
dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port);
/* Flag options */
- dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
#endif /* GSSAPI */
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oSessionType, o->session_type);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oStdinNull, o->stdin_null);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForkAfterAuthentication, o->fork_after_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys);
/* Integer options */
dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
/* String options */
dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface);
- dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT);
+ dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers);
dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path);
dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias);
- dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types);
+ dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos);
dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent);
dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown);
dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices);
- dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_CLIENT_KEX);
- dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms ? o->ca_sign_algorithms : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS);
+ dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command);
dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
- dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC);
+ dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
#endif
+ dump_cfg_string(oSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
- dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
+ dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);
dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ dump_cfg_string(oKnownHostsCommand, o->known_hosts_command);
/* Forwards */
dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards);
/* String array options */
dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains);
dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oLogVerbose,
+ o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose);
/* Special cases */
+ /* PermitRemoteOpen */
+ if (o->num_permitted_remote_opens == 0)
+ printf("%s any\n", lookup_opcode_name(oPermitRemoteOpen));
+ else
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oPermitRemoteOpen,
+ o->num_permitted_remote_opens, o->permitted_remote_opens);
+
+ /* AddKeysToAgent */
+ if (o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan <= 0)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent);
+ else {
+ printf("addkeystoagent%s %d\n",
+ o->add_keys_to_agent == 3 ? " confirm" : "",
+ o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan);
+ }
+
+ /* oForwardAgent */
+ if (o->forward_agent_sock_path == NULL)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
+ else
+ dump_cfg_string(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent_sock_path);
+
/* oConnectTimeout */
if (o->connection_timeout == -1)
printf("connecttimeout none\n");
else
dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout);
/* oTunnelDevice */
printf("tunneldevice");
if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
printf(" any");
else
printf(" %d", o->tun_local);
if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
printf(":any");
else
printf(":%d", o->tun_remote);
printf("\n");
/* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */
if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) {
printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames");
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list,
o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list);
}
printf("\n");
}
/* oControlPersist */
if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0)
dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist);
else
dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout);
/* oEscapeChar */
if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
printf("escapechar none\n");
else {
vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0);
printf("escapechar %s\n", buf);
}
/* oIPQoS */
printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
/* oRekeyLimit */
printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n",
(unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval);
/* oStreamLocalBindMask */
printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n",
o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
/* oLogFacility */
printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
/* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */
if (o->jump_host == NULL)
dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command);
else {
/* Check for numeric addresses */
i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL ||
strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port);
printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
/* optional additional jump spec */
o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra,
o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",",
/* optional user */
o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user,
o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@",
/* opening [ if hostname is numeric */
i ? "[" : "",
/* mandatory hostname */
o->jump_host,
/* closing ] if hostname is numeric */
i ? "]" : "",
/* optional port number */
o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":",
o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf);
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
index ed92bb182d31..f3ac60bd71ee 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
@@ -1,222 +1,241 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.128 2018/09/20 03:30:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.144 2021/07/23 04:04:52 djm Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for reading the configuration file.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef READCONF_H
#define READCONF_H
/* Data structure for representing option data. */
#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32
#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32
#define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
struct allowed_cname {
char *source_list;
char *target_list;
};
typedef struct {
int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
+ char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* Optional path of the agent. */
int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */
int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */
int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */
-
+ u_int num_log_verbose; /* Verbose log overrides */
+ char **log_verbose;
int port; /* Port to connect. */
int address_family;
int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before
* giving up */
int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before
* aborting connection attempt */
int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
* prompts. */
char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
char *user; /* User to log in as. */
int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */
char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
char *preferred_authentications;
char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */
char *bind_interface; /* local interface for bind address */
char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */
+ char *sk_provider; /* Security key provider */
int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */
int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */
char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int add_keys_to_agent;
+ int add_keys_to_agent_lifespan;
char *identity_agent; /* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */
/* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_local_forwards;
struct Forward *local_forwards;
/* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_remote_forwards;
struct Forward *remote_forwards;
int clear_forwardings;
+ /* Restrict remote dynamic forwarding */
+ char **permitted_remote_opens;
+ u_int num_permitted_remote_opens;
+
/* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */
char *stdio_forward_host;
int stdio_forward_port;
int enable_ssh_keysign;
int64_t rekey_limit;
int rekey_interval;
int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
int identities_only;
int server_alive_interval;
int server_alive_count_max;
int num_send_env;
char **send_env;
int num_setenv;
char **setenv;
char *control_path;
int control_master;
int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */
int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */
int hash_known_hosts;
int tun_open; /* tun(4) */
int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */
int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */
char *local_command;
int permit_local_command;
char *remote_command;
int visual_host_key;
int request_tty;
+ int session_type;
+ int stdin_null;
+ int fork_after_authentication;
int proxy_use_fdpass;
int num_canonical_domains;
char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
int canonicalize_hostname;
int canonicalize_max_dots;
int canonicalize_fallback_local;
int num_permitted_cnames;
struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
char *revoked_host_keys;
int fingerprint_hash;
int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
- char *hostbased_key_types;
- char *pubkey_key_types;
+ char *hostbased_accepted_algos;
+ char *pubkey_accepted_algos;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
char *jump_user;
char *jump_host;
int jump_port;
char *jump_extra;
+ char *known_hosts_command;
+
char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
} Options;
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4
#define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0
#define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1
#define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2
#define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3
+#define SESSION_TYPE_NONE 0
+#define SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM 1
+#define SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT 2
+
#define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */
#define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */
-#define SSHCONF_POSTCANON 4 /* After hostname canonicalisation */
+#define SSHCONF_FINAL 4 /* Final pass over config, after canon. */
#define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH 8 /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF 0
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW 1
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES 2
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK 3
+const char *kex_default_pk_alg(void);
+char *ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host,
+ const char *portstr, const char *user);
void initialize_options(Options *);
-void fill_default_options(Options *);
+int fill_default_options(Options *);
void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *);
+void free_options(Options *o);
int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int);
int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
- const char *, Options *, int);
+ const char *, Options *, int, int *);
int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int);
int parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int);
int parse_ssh_uri(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
int default_ssh_port(void);
int option_clear_or_none(const char *);
void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host);
void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int);
void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int);
#endif /* READCONF_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readpass.c b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
index f160f866b885..39af25c88729 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
@@ -1,192 +1,331 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.52 2018/07/18 11:34:04 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.69 2021/07/23 05:56:47 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
static char *
-ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
+ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg, const char *env_hint)
{
pid_t pid, ret;
size_t len;
char *pass;
int p[2], status;
char buf[1024];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
- error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+ error_f("fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
if (askpass == NULL)
fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
- if (pipe(p) < 0) {
- error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(p) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
- error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+ error_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
return NULL;
}
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[0]);
- if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
- fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (env_hint != NULL)
+ setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", env_hint, 1);
execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL);
- fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
}
close(p[1]);
len = 0;
do {
ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len);
if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (r <= 0)
break;
len += r;
} while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0);
buf[len] = '\0';
close(p[0]);
- while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) < 0)
+ while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return NULL;
}
buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
pass = xstrdup(buf);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return pass;
}
+/* private/internal read_passphrase flags */
+#define RP_ASK_PERMISSION 0x8000 /* pass hint to askpass for confirm UI */
+
/*
* Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the
* passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If
* RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
- * tty is available
+ * tty is or askpass program is available
*/
char *
read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
{
- char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
- int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd;
+ char cr = '\r', *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
+ int rppflags, ttyfd, use_askpass = 0, allow_askpass = 0;
+ const char *askpass_hint = NULL;
+ const char *s;
+
+ if ((s = getenv("DISPLAY")) != NULL)
+ allow_askpass = *s != '\0';
+ if ((s = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV)) != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(s, "force") == 0) {
+ use_askpass = 1;
+ allow_askpass = 1;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(s, "prefer") == 0)
+ use_askpass = allow_askpass;
+ else if (strcasecmp(s, "never") == 0)
+ allow_askpass = 0;
+ }
rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
- if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
+ if (use_askpass)
+ debug_f("requested to askpass");
+ else if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
use_askpass = 1;
else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
- debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty");
+ debug_f("stdin is not a tty");
use_askpass = 1;
}
} else {
rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
- if (ttyfd >= 0)
+ if (ttyfd >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we're on a tty, ensure that show the prompt at
+ * the beginning of the line. This will hopefully
+ * clobber any password characters the user has
+ * optimistically typed before echo is disabled.
+ */
+ (void)write(ttyfd, &cr, 1);
close(ttyfd);
- else {
- debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
+ } else {
+ debug_f("can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
strerror(errno));
use_askpass = 1;
}
}
- if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL)
+ if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && !allow_askpass)
return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup("");
- if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) {
+ if (use_askpass && allow_askpass) {
if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
else
askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
- if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt)) == NULL)
+ if ((flags & RP_ASK_PERMISSION) != 0)
+ askpass_hint = "confirm";
+ if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt, askpass_hint)) == NULL)
if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF))
return xstrdup("");
return ret;
}
if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) {
if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)
return NULL;
return xstrdup("");
}
ret = xstrdup(buf);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return ret;
}
int
ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
char *p, prompt[1024];
int allowed = 0;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
- p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+ p = read_passphrase(prompt,
+ RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ASK_PERMISSION);
if (p != NULL) {
/*
* Accept empty responses and responses consisting
* of the word "yes" as affirmative.
*/
if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' ||
strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
allowed = 1;
free(p);
}
return (allowed);
}
+
+static void
+writemsg(const char *msg)
+{
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r", 1);
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, strlen(msg));
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r\n", 2);
+}
+
+struct notifier_ctx {
+ pid_t pid;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+};
+
+struct notifier_ctx *
+notify_start(int force_askpass, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ char *prompt = NULL;
+ pid_t pid = -1;
+ void (*osigchld)(int) = NULL;
+ const char *askpass, *s;
+ struct notifier_ctx *ret = NULL;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&prompt, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ if (fflush(NULL) != 0)
+ error_f("fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (!force_askpass && isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) {
+ writemsg(prompt);
+ goto out_ctx;
+ }
+ if ((askpass = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS")) == NULL)
+ askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
+ if (*askpass == '\0') {
+ debug3_f("cannot notify: no askpass");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL &&
+ ((s = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV)) == NULL ||
+ strcmp(s, "force") != 0)) {
+ debug3_f("cannot notify: no display");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+ error_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ free(prompt);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
+ fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", "none", 1); /* hint to UI */
+ execlp(askpass, askpass, prompt, (char *)NULL);
+ error_f("exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ out_ctx:
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ fatal_f("calloc failed");
+ }
+ ret->pid = pid;
+ ret->osigchld = osigchld;
+ out:
+ free(prompt);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *ctx, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ va_list args;
+
+ if (ctx != NULL && fmt != NULL && ctx->pid == -1) {
+ /*
+ * notify_start wrote to stderr, so send conclusion message
+ * there too
+ */
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ writemsg(msg);
+ free(msg);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pid <= 0) {
+ free(ctx);
+ return;
+ }
+ kill(ctx->pid, SIGTERM);
+ while ((ret = waitpid(ctx->pid, NULL, 0)) == -1) {
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret == -1)
+ fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, ctx->osigchld);
+ free(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
index 647b4a049be3..810d74ce599d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,241 +1,272 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.97 2018/06/07 04:46:34 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.116 2021/08/04 21:28:00 djm Exp $
-REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec
-tests: prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
+
+# File based tests
+file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
# Interop tests are not run by default
interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
prep:
test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out
clean:
for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done
- test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN}
rm -rf $(OBJ).putty
distclean: clean
LTESTS= connect \
proxy-connect \
+ sshfp-connect \
connect-privsep \
connect-uri \
proto-version \
proto-mismatch \
exit-status \
envpass \
transfer \
banner \
rekey \
+ dhgex \
stderr-data \
stderr-after-eof \
broken-pipe \
try-ciphers \
yes-head \
login-timeout \
agent \
agent-getpeereid \
agent-timeout \
agent-ptrace \
+ agent-subprocess \
keyscan \
keygen-change \
+ keygen-comment \
keygen-convert \
+ keygen-knownhosts \
keygen-moduli \
+ keygen-sshfp \
key-options \
scp \
+ scp3 \
scp-uri \
sftp \
sftp-chroot \
sftp-cmds \
sftp-badcmds \
sftp-batch \
sftp-glob \
sftp-perm \
sftp-uri \
reconfigure \
dynamic-forward \
forwarding \
multiplex \
reexec \
brokenkeys \
sshcfgparse \
cfgparse \
cfgmatch \
cfgmatchlisten \
+ percent \
addrmatch \
localcommand \
forcecommand \
portnum \
keytype \
kextype \
cert-hostkey \
cert-userkey \
host-expand \
keys-command \
forward-control \
integrity \
krl \
multipubkey \
limit-keytype \
hostkey-agent \
- keygen-knownhosts \
hostkey-rotate \
principals-command \
cert-file \
cfginclude \
+ servcfginclude \
allow-deny-users \
- authinfo
-
+ authinfo \
+ sshsig \
+ knownhosts-command
-# dhgex \
INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
-#LTESTS= cipher-speed
+EXTRA_TESTS= agent-pkcs11
+#EXTRA_TESTS+= cipher-speed
USERNAME= ${LOGNAME}
CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \
authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \
authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \
banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \
ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \
expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \
- hkr.* host.ed25519 host.rsa host.rsa1 host_* \
- host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \
+ hkr.* host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
+ host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 host.ssh-dss host.ssh-ed25519 \
+ host.ssh-rsa host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \
key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \
- key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* \
+ key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* askpass \
known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
- pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log \
- remote_pid revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub \
- rsa1 rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \
+ pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
+ revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \
rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
+ ssh-rsa_oldfmt knownhosts_command \
ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
- ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
- sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
+ ssh_proxy_* sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config.* \
+ sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
user_*key* user_ca* user_key*
-SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USERNAME} /var/run/keycommand_${USERNAME}
-
# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX"
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
CPPFLAGS=-I..
t1:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
t2:
cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out
chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
t3:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
t4:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok
t5:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok
t6:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2
chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2
$(OBJ)/t7.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@
t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t8.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@
t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t9.out:
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@
t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t10.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@
t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
t11:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok
$(OBJ)/t12.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@
t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null
t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh}
+ @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+ for TEST in ""$?; do \
+ skip=no; \
+ for t in ""$${SKIP_LTESTS}; do \
+ if [ "x$${t}.sh" = "x$${TEST}" ]; then skip=yes; fi; \
+ done; \
+ if [ "x$${skip}" = "xno" ]; then \
+ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+ else \
+ echo skip test $${TEST} 1>&2; \
+ fi; \
+ done
+
+t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done
-t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
+t-extra: ${EXTRA_TESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done
# Not run by default
interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS}
# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile
unit:
set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \
V="" ; \
test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
- $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
- $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \
+ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/authopt/test_authopt \
+ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/authopt/testdata ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \
+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/misc/test_misc ; \
if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes" ; then \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \
fi \
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress b/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress
index 315fe149a0f5..ac2e8487e78e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress
@@ -1,109 +1,161 @@
Overview.
$ ./configure && make tests
You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to
abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure.
The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is
driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand
based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is
called multiple times by the Makefile.
Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error.
Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed
test and continue.
OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test
suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications.
Environment variables.
SKIP_UNIT: Skip unit tests.
SUDO: path to sudo/doas command, if desired. Note that some systems
(notably systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests.
LTESTS: Whitespace separated list of tests (filenames without the .sh
extension) to run.
+SKIP_LTESTS: Whitespace separated list of tests to skip.
OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir.
TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts.
TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL: set to "yes" to make any failure abort the test
currently in progress.
TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests.
TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output.
TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
before running each test.
TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to
ssh_config before running each test.
TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests
TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x is one of
SSH, SSHD, SSHAGENT, SSHADD, SSHKEYGEN, SSHKEYSCAN, SFTP or
SFTPSERVER
USE_VALGRIND: Run the tests under valgrind memory checker.
Individual tests.
You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg:
$ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout
If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh
directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the
test scripts themselves, for example:
$ cd regress
$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \
agent-timeout.sh
ok agent timeout test
Files.
test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files
and keys and runs the specified test.
At the time of writing, the individual tests are:
-agent-timeout.sh: agent timeout test
-agent.sh: simple agent test
-broken-pipe.sh: broken pipe test
-connect-privsep.sh: proxy connect with privsep
connect.sh: simple connect
+proxy-connect.sh: proxy connect
+connect-privsep.sh: proxy connect with privsep
+connect-uri.sh: uri connect
+proto-version.sh: sshd version with different protocol combinations
+proto-mismatch.sh: protocol version mismatch
exit-status.sh: remote exit status
-forwarding.sh: local and remote forwarding
-keygen-change.sh: change passphrase for key
+envpass.sh: environment passing
+transfer.sh: transfer data
+banner.sh: banner
+rekey.sh: rekey
+stderr-data.sh: stderr data transfer
+stderr-after-eof.sh: stderr data after eof
+broken-pipe.sh: broken pipe test
+try-ciphers.sh: try ciphers
+yes-head.sh: yes pipe head
+login-timeout.sh: connect after login grace timeout
+agent.sh: simple connect via agent
+agent-getpeereid.sh: disallow agent attach from other uid
+agent-timeout.sh: agent timeout test
+agent-ptrace.sh: disallow agent ptrace attach
keyscan.sh: keyscan
-proto-mismatch.sh: protocol version mismatch
-proto-version.sh: sshd version with different protocol combinations
-proxy-connect.sh: proxy connect
+keygen-change.sh: change passphrase for key
+keygen-convert.sh: convert keys
+keygen-moduli.sh: keygen moduli
+key-options.sh: key options
+scp.sh: scp
+scp-uri.sh: scp-uri
sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get
+sftp-chroot.sh: sftp in chroot
+sftp-cmds.sh: sftp command
+sftp-badcmds.sh: sftp invalid commands
+sftp-batch.sh: sftp batchfile
+sftp-glob.sh: sftp glob
+sftp-perm.sh: sftp permissions
+sftp-uri.sh: sftp-uri
ssh-com-client.sh: connect with ssh.com client
ssh-com-keygen.sh: ssh.com key import
ssh-com-sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server
ssh-com.sh: connect to ssh.com server
-stderr-after-eof.sh: stderr data after eof
-stderr-data.sh: stderr data transfer
-transfer.sh: transfer data
-try-ciphers.sh: try ciphers
-yes-head.sh: yes pipe head
+reconfigure.sh: simple connect after reconfigure
+dynamic-forward.sh: dynamic forwarding
+forwarding.sh: local and remote forwarding
+multiplex.sh: connection multiplexing
+reexec.sh: reexec tests
+brokenkeys.sh: broken keys
+sshcfgparse.sh: ssh config parse
+cfgparse.sh: sshd config parse
+cfgmatch.sh: sshd_config match
+cfgmatchlisten.sh: sshd_config matchlisten
+addrmatch.sh: address match
+localcommand.sh: localcommand
+forcecommand.sh: forced command
+portnum.sh: port number parsing
+keytype.sh: login with different key types
+kextype.sh: login with different key exchange algorithms
+cert-hostkey.sh certified host keys
+cert-userkey.sh: certified user keys
+host-expand.sh: expand %h and %n
+keys-command.sh: authorized keys from command
+forward-control.sh: sshd control of local and remote forwarding
+integrity.sh: integrity
+krl.sh: key revocation lists
+multipubkey.sh: multiple pubkey
+limit-keytype.sh: restrict pubkey type
+hostkey-agent.sh: hostkey agent
+keygen-knownhosts.sh: ssh-keygen known_hosts
+hostkey-rotate.sh: hostkey rotate
+principals-command.sh: authorized principals command
+cert-file.sh: ssh with certificates
+cfginclude.sh: config include
+allow-deny-users.sh: AllowUsers/DenyUsers
+authinfo.sh: authinfo
Problems?
Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on:
$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh
Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions:
- run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname]
- set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of
auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog).
Known Issues.
- Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the
multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts
will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp).
- Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head
test to fail. The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and
exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/addrmatch.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/addrmatch.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 1584bd4053d6..26e0c9910c47
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/addrmatch.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/addrmatch.sh
@@ -1,56 +1,68 @@
-# $OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.4 2012/05/13 01:42:32 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.6 2020/08/28 03:17:13 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="address match"
mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
run_trial()
{
user="$1"; addr="$2"; host="$3"; laddr="$4"; lport="$5"
expected="$6"; descr="$7"
verbose "test $descr for $user $addr $host"
result=`${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -T \
-C user=${user},addr=${addr},host=${host},laddr=${laddr},lport=${lport} | \
awk '/^forcecommand/ {print $2}'`
if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
fail "failed '$descr' expected $expected got $result"
fi
}
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy <<EOD
ForceCommand nomatch
Match Address 192.168.0.0/16,!192.168.30.0/24,10.0.0.0/8,host.example.com
ForceCommand match1
Match Address 1.1.1.1,::1,!::3,2000::/16
ForceCommand match2
Match LocalAddress 127.0.0.1,::1
ForceCommand match3
Match LocalPort 5678
ForceCommand match4
EOD
run_trial user 192.168.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "first entry"
run_trial user 192.168.30.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "negative match"
run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "no match"
run_trial user 10.255.255.254 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "list middle"
run_trial user 192.168.30.1 192.168.0.1 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "faked IP in hostname"
run_trial user 1.1.1.1 somehost.example.com 1.2.3.4 1234 match2 "bare IP4 address"
run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 127.0.0.1 1234 match3 "localaddress"
run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 5678 match4 "localport"
if test "$TEST_SSH_IPV6" != "no"; then
run_trial user ::1 somehost.example.com ::2 1234 match2 "bare IP6 address"
-run_trial user ::2 somehost.exaple.com ::2 1234 nomatch "deny IPv6"
+run_trial user ::2 somehost.example.com ::2 1234 nomatch "deny IPv6"
run_trial user ::3 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 negated"
run_trial user ::4 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 no match"
run_trial user 2000::1 somehost ::2 1234 match2 "IP6 network"
run_trial user 2001::1 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 network"
run_trial user ::5 somehost ::1 1234 match3 "IP6 localaddress"
run_trial user ::5 somehost ::2 5678 match4 "IP6 localport"
fi
+#
+# Check that we catch invalid address/mask in Match Address/Localaddress
+#
+for i in 10.0.1.0/8 10.0.0.1/24 2000:aa:bb:01::/56; do
+ for a in address localaddress; do
+ verbose "test invalid Match $a $i"
+ echo "Match $a $i" > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ ${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -t >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted invalid match $a $i"
+ done
+done
+
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
rm $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
index 769c29e8da47..ddeef01f1b73 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
@@ -1,57 +1,57 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.10 2018/02/09 03:40:22 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.11 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
UNPRIV=nobody
ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent
if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then
:
else
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
fi
case "x$SUDO" in
xsudo) sudo=1;;
- xdoas) ;;
+ xdoas|xdoas\ *) ;;
x)
echo "need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV"
echo SKIPPED
exit 0 ;;
*)
echo "unsupported $SUDO - "doas" and "sudo" are allowed"
exit 0 ;;
esac
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
fi
if test -z "$sudo" ; then
# doas
${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
else
# sudo
< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
fi
r=$?
if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
rm -f ${OBJ}/agent
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index db3018b885fe..268a70de8885
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
@@ -1,71 +1,124 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.9 2021/07/25 12:13:03 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="pkcs11 agent test"
-TEST_SSH_PIN=""
-TEST_SSH_PKCS11=/usr/local/lib/soft-pkcs11.so.0.0
+try_token_libs() {
+ for _lib in "$@" ; do
+ if test -f "$_lib" ; then
+ verbose "Using token library $_lib"
+ TEST_SSH_PKCS11="$_lib"
+ return
+ fi
+ done
+ echo "skipped: Unable to find PKCS#11 token library"
+ exit 0
+}
+
+try_token_libs \
+ /usr/local/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \
+ /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so \
+ /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so
+
+TEST_SSH_PIN=1234
+TEST_SSH_SOPIN=12345678
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}"
+ export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
+fi
test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist"
-# setup environment for soft-pkcs11 token
-SOFTPKCS11RC=$OBJ/pkcs11.info
-export SOFTPKCS11RC
+# setup environment for softhsm2 token
+DIR=$OBJ/SOFTHSM
+rm -rf $DIR
+TOKEN=$DIR/tokendir
+mkdir -p $TOKEN
+SOFTHSM2_CONF=$DIR/softhsm2.conf
+export SOFTHSM2_CONF
+cat > $SOFTHSM2_CONF << EOF
+# SoftHSM v2 configuration file
+directories.tokendir = ${TOKEN}
+objectstore.backend = file
+# ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG
+log.level = DEBUG
+# If CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE flag should be set
+slots.removable = false
+EOF
+out=$(softhsm2-util --init-token --free --label token-slot-0 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --so-pin "$TEST_SSH_SOPIN")
+slot=$(echo -- $out | sed 's/.* //')
+
# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass
SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true
export SSH_ASKPASS
unset DISPLAY
# start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin
notty() {
perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid();
if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@"
}
+trace "generating keys"
+RSA=${DIR}/RSA
+EC=${DIR}/EC
+$OPENSSL_BIN genpkey -algorithm rsa > $RSA
+$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $RSA |\
+ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 01 --id 01 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin
+$OPENSSL_BIN genpkey \
+ -genparam \
+ -algorithm ec \
+ -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 |\
+ $OPENSSL_BIN genpkey \
+ -paramfile /dev/stdin > $EC
+$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $EC |\
+ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 02 --id 02 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin
+
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
- trace "generating key/cert"
- rm -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key $OBJ/pkcs11.crt
- openssl genrsa -out $OBJ/pkcs11.key 2048 > /dev/null 2>&1
- chmod 600 $OBJ/pkcs11.key
- openssl req -key $OBJ/pkcs11.key -new -x509 \
- -out $OBJ/pkcs11.crt -text -subj '/CN=pkcs11 test' > /dev/null
- printf "a\ta\t$OBJ/pkcs11.crt\t$OBJ/pkcs11.key" > $SOFTPKCS11RC
- # add to authorized keys
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-
trace "add pkcs11 key to agent"
echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "pkcs11 list via agent"
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
fi
- trace "pkcs11 connect via agent"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5
- r=$?
- if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)"
- fi
+ for k in $RSA $EC; do
+ trace "testing $k"
+ chmod 600 $k
+ ssh-keygen -y -f $k > $k.pub
+ pub=$(cat $k.pub)
+ ${SSHADD} -L | grep -q "$pub" || fail "key $k missing in ssh-add -L"
+ ${SSHADD} -T $k.pub || fail "ssh-add -T with $k failed"
+
+ # add to authorized keys
+ cat $k.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ trace "pkcs11 connect via agent ($k)"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5
+ r=$?
+ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)"
+ fi
+ done
trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
index 2d795ee32043..9cd68d7ec84e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
@@ -1,66 +1,66 @@
# $OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.3 2015/09/11 04:55:01 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="disallow agent ptrace attach"
if have_prog uname ; then
case `uname` in
AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1)
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
;;
esac
fi
if [ "x$USER" = "xroot" ]; then
echo "Skipped: running as root"
exit 0
fi
if have_prog gdb ; then
: ok
else
echo "skipped (gdb not found)"
exit 0
fi
if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then
: ok
else
echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)"
exit 0
fi
if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
exit 0
else
$SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT}
$SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT}
$SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT}
fi
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
# ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF
quit
EOF
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "gdb failed: exit code $r"
fi
egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out
r=$?
rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-subprocess.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-subprocess.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f36d70cccae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-subprocess.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# $OpenBSD: agent-subprocess.sh,v 1.1 2020/06/19 05:07:09 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="agent subprocess"
+
+trace "ensure agent exits when run as subprocess"
+${SSHAGENT} sh -c "echo \$SSH_AGENT_PID >$OBJ/pidfile; sleep 1"
+
+pid=`cat $OBJ/pidfile`
+
+# Currently ssh-agent polls every 10s so we need to wait at least that long.
+n=12
+while kill -0 $pid >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "$n" -gt "0"; do
+ n=$(($n - 1))
+ sleep 1
+done
+
+if test "$n" -eq "0"; then
+ fail "agent still running"
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/pidfile
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-timeout.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-timeout.sh
index 9598c2032d26..6dec09285908 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-timeout.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-timeout.sh
@@ -1,36 +1,38 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.6 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="agent timeout test"
SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS}` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
trace "add keys with timeout"
+ keys=0
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
- ${SSHADD} -t ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1
+ ${SSHADD} -kt ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
fi
+ keys=$((${keys} + 1))
done
n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l`
trace "agent has $n keys"
- if [ $n -ne 2 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add -l did not return 2 keys: $n"
+ if [ $n -ne $keys ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l did not return $keys keys: $n"
fi
trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds"
sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh
index 7111056c9be4..f187b6757201 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent.sh
@@ -1,117 +1,227 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.13 2017/12/19 00:49:30 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.20 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="simple agent test"
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
fi
-trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+trace "start agent, args ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
fi
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s | sed 's/SSH_/FW_SSH_/g'` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fatal "could not start second ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
fi
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key \
|| fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
trace "overwrite authorized keys"
printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
# generate user key for agent
rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent.pub*
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed"
# Make a certificate for each too.
${SSHKEYGEN} -qs $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "$t cert" \
-n estragon $OBJ/$t-agent.pub || fatal "ca sign failed"
# add to authorized keys
cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- # add privat key to agent
+ # add private key to agent
${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+ fi
+ # add private key to second agent
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
fi
- # Remove private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it.
- rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent
+ # Move private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it.
+ # Keep the corresponding public keys/certs around for later use.
+ mv -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent-private
+ cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private.pub
+ cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private-cert.pub
done
# Remove explicit identity directives from ssh_proxy
mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
grep -vi identityfile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
fi
# the same for full pubkey output
${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "simple connect via agent"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
trace "connect via agent using $t key"
+ if [ "$t" = "ssh-dss" ]; then
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ fi
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
done
trace "agent forwarding"
${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
fi
+${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
"${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52"
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
fi
+trace "agent forwarding different agent"
+${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l via agent path env fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
+# Remove keys from forwarded agent, ssh-add on remote machine should now fail.
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l with different agent did not fail with exit code 1 (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
(printf 'cert-authority,principals="estragon" '; cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub) \
> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ if [ "$t" != "ssh-dss" ]; then
trace "connect via agent using $t key"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub \
-oCertificateFile=$OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub \
-oIdentitiesOnly=yes somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
+ fi
done
+## Deletion tests.
+
trace "delete all agent keys"
${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
fi
+# make sure they're gone
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l returned unexpected exit code: $r"
+fi
+trace "readd keys"
+# re-add keys/certs to agent
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+done
+# make sure they are there
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+check_key_absent() {
+ ${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ fail "$1 key unexpectedly present"
+ fi
+}
+check_key_present() {
+ ${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "$1 key missing from agent"
+ fi
+}
+
+# delete the ed25519 key
+trace "delete single key by file"
+${SSHADD} -qdk $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Put key/cert back.
+${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+# Delete both key and certificate.
+trace "delete key/cert by file"
+${SSHADD} -qd $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Put key/cert back.
+${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+# Delete certificate via stdin
+${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-cert.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Delete key via stdin
+${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+SSH_AGENT_PID=$FW_SSH_AGENT_PID ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/allow-deny-users.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
index 5c389512247c..6c053eef0882 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
@@ -1,45 +1,43 @@
# Public Domain
# Zev Weiss, 2016
-# $OpenBSD: allow-deny-users.sh,v 1.5 2018/07/13 02:13:50 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: allow-deny-users.sh,v 1.6 2021/06/07 00:00:50 djm Exp $
tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers"
me="$LOGNAME"
if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then
me=`whoami`
fi
other="nobody"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
test_auth()
{
deny="$1"
allow="$2"
should_succeed="$3"
failmsg="$4"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- echo DenyUsers="$deny" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- echo AllowUsers="$allow" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-
- start_sshd -oDenyUsers="$deny" -oAllowUsers="$allow"
+ test -z "$deny" || echo DenyUsers="$deny" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ test -z "$allow" || echo AllowUsers="$allow" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$me@somehost" true
status=$?
if (test $status -eq 0 && ! $should_succeed) \
|| (test $status -ne 0 && $should_succeed); then
fail "$failmsg"
fi
}
# DenyUsers AllowUsers should_succeed failure_message
test_auth "" "" true "user in neither DenyUsers nor AllowUsers denied"
test_auth "$other $me" "" false "user in DenyUsers allowed"
test_auth "$me $other" "" false "user in DenyUsers allowed"
test_auth "" "$other" false "user not in AllowUsers allowed"
test_auth "" "$other $me" true "user in AllowUsers denied"
test_auth "" "$me $other" true "user in AllowUsers denied"
test_auth "$me $other" "$me $other" false "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed"
test_auth "$other $me" "$other $me" false "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/banner.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/banner.sh
index 0d9654fe247a..a84feb5ad7c1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/banner.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/banner.sh
@@ -1,44 +1,46 @@
-# $OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.4 2021/08/08 06:38:33 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="banner"
echo "Banner $OBJ/banner.in" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in
touch $OBJ/empty.in
trace "test missing banner file"
verbose "test $tid: missing banner file"
( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
fail "missing banner file"
for s in 0 10 100 1000 10000 100000 ; do
if [ "$s" = "0" ]; then
# create empty banner
touch $OBJ/banner.in
elif [ "$s" = "10" ]; then
# create 10-byte banner file
echo "abcdefghi" >$OBJ/banner.in
else
# increase size 10x
cp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out
for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ; do
cat $OBJ/banner.out >> $OBJ/banner.in
done
fi
trace "test banner size $s"
verbose "test $tid: size $s"
( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
cmp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
fail "banner size $s mismatch"
done
trace "test suppress banner (-q)"
verbose "test $tid: suppress banner (-q)"
-( ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
+# ssh-log-wrapper drops "-q" to preserve debug output so use ssh directly
+# for just this test.
+( ${REAL_SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
fail "suppress banner (-q)"
rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 1157a3582e5f..94e672a99b6c
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-file.sh
@@ -1,166 +1,166 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.7 2018/04/10 00:14:10 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.8 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="ssh with certificates"
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
# Create a CA key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key1 ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key2 ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Make some keys and certificates.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Move the certificate to a different address to better control
# when it is offered.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1"
rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1"
rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case.
trace 'try with identity files'
opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities.
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config
# XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of
# keys via environment variable or similar.
# Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub.
verbose "identity cert with no plain public file"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
-i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52
[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed"
# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work.
verbose "CertificateFile with no plain public file"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
-oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \
-i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52
[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed"
# Just keys should fail
verbose "plain keys"
${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh succeeded with no certs"
fi
# Keys with untrusted cert should fail.
verbose "untrusted cert"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert"
fi
# Good cert with bad key should fail.
verbose "good cert, bad key"
opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2"
opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key"
fi
# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed.
verbose "single trusted"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key"
fi
# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed.
verbose "multiple trusted"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh failed with multiple certs"
fi
#next, using an agent in combination with the keys
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
fatal "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
fi
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
fi
# add private keys to agent
${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key2 > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
fi
${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key1 > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
fi
# try ssh with the agent and certificates
opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
# with no certificates, should fail
${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with no cert"
fi
#with an untrusted certificate, should fail
opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with bad cert"
fi
#with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed
opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with agent in failed with good cert"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
#cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index d2ecd318beae..de8652b0e5e2
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
@@ -1,321 +1,331 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.16 2018/07/03 11:43:49 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.25 2021/06/08 22:30:27 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="certified host keys"
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/host_revoked_*
rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* $OBJ/host_krl_*
# Allow all hostkey/pubkey types, prefer certs for the client
+rsa=0
types=""
-for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
+for i in `$SSH -Q key | maybe_filter_sk`; do
if [ -z "$types" ]; then
types="$i"
continue
fi
case "$i" in
# Special treatment for RSA keys.
*rsa*cert*)
types="rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,$i,$types"
types="rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,$types";;
*rsa*)
+ rsa=1
types="$types,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,$i";;
# Prefer certificate to plain keys.
*cert*) types="$i,$types";;
*) types="$types,$i";;
esac
done
(
echo "HostKeyAlgorithms ${types}"
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms *"
) >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
(
echo "HostKeyAlgorithms *"
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms *"
) >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1'
kh_ca() {
for k in "$@" ; do
printf "@cert-authority $HOSTS "
cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
done
}
kh_revoke() {
for k in "$@" ; do
printf "@revoked * "
cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
done
}
# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts. Ed25519 chosen for speed.
-# RSA for testing RSA/SHA2 signatures.
+# RSA for testing RSA/SHA2 signatures if supported.
+ktype2=ed25519
+[ "x$rsa" = "x1" ] && ktype2=rsa
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\
fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/host_ca_key2 ||\
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key2 ||\
fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
# Plain text revocation files
touch $OBJ/host_revoked_empty
touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
+PLAIN_TYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
fi
# Prepare certificate, plain key and CA KRLs
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_empty || fatal "KRL init failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_plain || fatal "KRL init failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_cert || fatal "KRL init failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_ca $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub \
|| fatal "KRL init failed"
# Generate and sign host keys
serial=1
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert"
# Generate and sign a host key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
-f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_plain \
$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub || fatal "KRL update failed"
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
*) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $ca -z $serial $tflag \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_cert \
$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub || \
fatal "KRL update failed"
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
serial=`expr $serial + 1`
done
attempt_connect() {
_ident="$1"
_expect_success="$2"
shift; shift
verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success"
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
"$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
_r=$?
if [ "x$_expect_success" = "xyes" ] ; then
if [ $_r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $_ident failed"
fi
else
if [ $_r -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $_ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
}
# Basic connect and revocation tests.
-for privsep in yes no ; do
+for privsep in yes ; do
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# test name expect success
attempt_connect "$ktype basic connect" "yes"
attempt_connect "$ktype empty KRL" "yes" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_empty
attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ plain key revoked" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_plain
attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ cert revoked" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_cert
attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ CA revoked" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_ca
attempt_connect "$ktype empty plaintext revocation" "yes" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_empty
attempt_connect "$ktype plain key plaintext revocation" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_plain
attempt_connect "$ktype cert plaintext revocation" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_cert
attempt_connect "$ktype CA plaintext revocation" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_ca
done
done
# Revoked certificates with key present
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey"
kh_revoke cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
done
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-for privsep in yes no ; do
+for privsep in yes ; do
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
done
# Revoked CA
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
kh_revoke host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
test_one() {
ident=$1
result=$2
sign_opts=$3
- for kt in rsa ed25519 ; do
+ for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES; do
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
*) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $ca $tflag -I "regress host key for $USER" \
$sign_opts $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
done
}
test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS"
test_one "empty principals" success "-h"
test_one "wrong principals" failure "-h -n foo"
-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20300101:20320101"
test_one "cert expired" failure "-h -V19800101:19900101"
test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key"
# Generate and sign a host key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
*) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q $tflag -s $ca $tflag \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
(
printf "$HOSTS "
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
- -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=none -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
+ # Also check that it works when the known_hosts file is not in the
+ # first array position.
+ ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile="/dev/null $OBJ/known_hosts-cert" \
+ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=none -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh cert connect failed known_hosts 2nd"
+ fi
done
# Wrong certificate
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert"
rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key*
# Self-sign key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed"
case $kt in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $kt" ;;
*) tflag="" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} $tflag -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 30c2c156d2f1..baa6903ea268
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh
@@ -1,391 +1,404 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.19 2018/03/12 00:54:04 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.26 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="certified user keys"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
EXTRA_TYPES=""
+rsa=""
if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ rsa=rsa
PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
fi
kname() {
- case $ktype in
- rsa-sha2-*) n="$ktype" ;;
+ case $1 in
+ rsa-sha2-*) n="$1" ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-*) n="sk-ecdsa" ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519*) n="sk-ssh-ed25519" ;;
# subshell because some seds will add a newline
*) n=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^dsa/ssh-dss/;s/^rsa/ssh-rsa/;s/^ed/ssh-ed/') ;;
esac
- echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*"
+ if [ -z "$rsa" ]; then
+ echo "$n*,ssh-ed25519*"
+ else
+ echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*"
+ fi
}
# Create a CA key
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+if [ ! -z "$rsa" ]; then
+ catype=rsa
+else
+ catype=ed25519
+fi
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $catype -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
# Generate and sign user keys
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES $EXTRA_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
-f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
# Generate RSA/SHA2 certs for rsa-sha2* keys.
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype" ;;
*) tflag="" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -z $$ \
-I "regress user key for $USER" \
-n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $tflag $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
done
# Test explicitly-specified principals
for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
t=$(kname $ktype)
- for privsep in yes no ; do
+ for privsep in yes ; do
_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep"
# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \
"$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# Missing authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Empty authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Wrong authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# authorized_principals with bad key option
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=false
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=true
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# Setup for principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# Wrong principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
done
basic_tests() {
auth=$1
if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
# Add CA to authorized_keys
(
printf 'cert-authority '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
else
echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
fi
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
t=$(kname $ktype)
- for privsep in yes no ; do
+ for privsep in yes ; do
_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth"
# Simple connect
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# Revoked keys
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked"
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \
$OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
fi
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL"
rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \
$OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
fi
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
# Revoked CA
verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
fi
done
verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user"
${SSH} -i $OBJ/user_ca_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
}
basic_tests authorized_keys
basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys
test_one() {
ident=$1
result=$2
sign_opts=$3
auth_choice=$4
auth_opt=$5
if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then
auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys"
fi
for auth in $auth_choice ; do
- for ktype in rsa ed25519 ; do
+ for ktype in $rsa ed25519 ; do
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
# Add CA to authorized_keys
(
printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} "
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
else
echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \
>> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}*" \
+ echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}*" \
>> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then
echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
fi
fi
verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
-I "regress user key for $USER" \
$sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
done
done
}
test_one "correct principal" success "-n ${USER}"
test_one "host-certificate" failure "-n ${USER} -h"
test_one "wrong principals" failure "-n foo"
-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20300101:20320101"
test_one "cert expired" failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101"
test_one "cert valid interval" success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w"
test_one "wrong source-address" failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"
test_one "force-command" failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false"
# Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals
test_one "empty principals" success "" authorized_keys
test_one "empty principals" failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys
# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert
# should always be refused.
# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \
TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
# principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \
authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
# command= options vs. force-command in key
test_one "force-command match true" success \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \
authorized_keys ',command="true"'
test_one "force-command match true" failure \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \
authorized_keys ',command="false"'
test_one "force-command mismatch 1" failure \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \
authorized_keys ',command="true"'
test_one "force-command mismatch 2" failure \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \
authorized_keys ',command="false"'
# Wrong certificate
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
t=$(kname $ktype)
# Self-sign
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
"regress user key for $USER" \
-n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert"
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cfginclude.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfginclude.sh
index 2fc39ce45b8a..f5b492f17867 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cfginclude.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfginclude.sh
@@ -1,293 +1,293 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.3 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="config include"
# to appease StrictModes
umask 022
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aa
-Match host b
+Match host b # comment
Hostname bb
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Match host c
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Hostname cc
Match host m
- Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+ Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # comment
Host d
- Hostname dd
+ Hostname dd # comment
Host e
Hostname ee
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Host f
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Hostname ff
Host n
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF
Match host xxxxxx
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aaa
Match host b
Hostname bbb
-Match host c
+Match host c # comment
Hostname ccc
-Host d
+Host d # comment
Hostname ddd
Host e
Hostname eee
Host f
- Hostname fff
+ Hostname fff # comment
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aaaa
Match host b
Hostname bbbb
Match host c
Hostname cccc
Host d
Hostname dddd
Host e
Hostname eeee
Host f
Hostname ffff
Match all
Hostname xxxx
_EOF
trial() {
_host="$1"
_exp="$2"
${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out ||
fatal "ssh config parse failed"
_got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
fi
}
trial a aa
trial b bb
trial c ccc
trial d dd
trial e ee
trial f fff
trial m xxxx
trial n xxxx
trial x x
# Prepare an included config with an error.
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF
Hostname xxxx
Junk
_EOF
${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \
fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Hostname aa
_EOF
trial a aa
# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
Match host x
_EOF
trial a aa
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
Host x
_EOF
trial a aa
# cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
-# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.3 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="config include"
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aa
Match host b
Hostname bb
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Match host c
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Hostname cc
Match host m
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Host d
Hostname dd
Host e
Hostname ee
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Host f
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Hostname ff
Host n
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF
Match host xxxxxx
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aaa
-Match host b
+Match host b # comment
Hostname bbb
Match host c
- Hostname ccc
+ Hostname ccc # comment
Host d
Hostname ddd
Host e
Hostname eee
Host f
Hostname fff
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aaaa
Match host b
Hostname bbbb
Match host c
Hostname cccc
Host d
Hostname dddd
Host e
Hostname eeee
Host f
Hostname ffff
-Match all
- Hostname xxxx
+Match all # comment
+ Hostname xxxx # comment
_EOF
trial() {
_host="$1"
_exp="$2"
${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out ||
fatal "ssh config parse failed"
_got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
fi
}
trial a aa
trial b bb
trial c ccc
trial d dd
trial e ee
trial f fff
trial m xxxx
trial n xxxx
trial x x
# Prepare an included config with an error.
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF
Hostname xxxx
Junk
_EOF
${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \
fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Hostname aa
_EOF
trial a aa
# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
Match host x
_EOF
trial a aa
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
Host x
_EOF
trial a aa
# Ensure that recursive includes are bounded.
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i
_EOF
${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
fail "ssh include allowed infinite recursion?" # or hang...
# cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatch.sh
index dd11e404dc4f..05a6668551a9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatch.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatch.sh
@@ -1,115 +1,158 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.11 2017/10/04 18:50:23 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.13 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="sshd_config match"
pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid
fwdport=3301
fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
start_client()
{
rm -f $pidfile
${SSH} -q $fwd "$@" somehost \
exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
client_pid=$!
# Wait for remote end
n=0
while test ! -f $pidfile ; do
sleep 1
n=`expr $n + 1`
if test $n -gt 60; then
kill $client_pid
fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
fi
done
}
stop_client()
{
pid=`cat $pidfile`
if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
kill $pid
fi
wait
}
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 # comment" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null # comment" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1 # comment" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
-start_sshd
+${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
+ fail "config w/match fails config test"
-#set -x
+start_sshd
# Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config. This should be permitted
trace "match permitopen localhost"
start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
fail "match permitopen permit"
stop_client
# Same but from different source. This should not be permitted
trace "match permitopen proxy"
start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
fail "match permitopen deny"
stop_client
# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied.
cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
done
trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts"
start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt"
stop_client
# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair.
# Should be permitted.
trace "match permitopen localhost"
start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
fail "match permitopen permit"
stop_client
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section
trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts"
start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
fail "match override permitopen"
stop_client
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a
# PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list
trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts"
start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
fail "nomatch override permitopen"
stop_client
+
+# Test parsing of available Match criteria (with the exception of Group which
+# requires knowledge of actual group memberships user running the test).
+params="user:user:u1 host:host:h1 address:addr:1.2.3.4 \
+ localaddress:laddr:5.6.7.8 rdomain:rdomain:rdom1"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+for i in $params; do
+ config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
+ criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+ value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+ cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
+ Match $config $value
+ Banner /$value
+EOD
+done
+
+${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
+ fail "validate config for w/out spec"
+
+# Test matching each criteria.
+for i in $params; do
+ testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+ expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+ spec=""
+ for j in $params; do
+ config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
+ criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
+ value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
+ if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
+ spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
+ else
+ spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
+ fi
+ done
+ trace "test spec $spec"
+ result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
+ awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
+ if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
+ fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
+ fi
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/conch-ciphers.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 199d863a0dcd..6678813a2bdb
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
-# $OpenBSD: conch-ciphers.sh,v 1.3 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: conch-ciphers.sh,v 1.4 2019/07/05 04:12:46 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="conch ciphers"
if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then
echo "conch interop tests not enabled"
exit 0
fi
start_sshd
for c in aes256-ctr aes256-cbc aes192-ctr aes192-cbc aes128-ctr aes128-cbc \
cast128-cbc blowfish 3des-cbc ; do
verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
rm -f ${COPY}
# XXX the 2nd "cat" seems to be needed because of buggy FD handling
# in conch
- ${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/rsa --port $PORT --user $USER -e none \
+ ${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/ssh-rsa --port $PORT --user $USER -e none \
--known-hosts $OBJ/known_hosts --notty --noagent --nox11 -n \
127.0.0.1 "cat ${DATA}" 2>/dev/null | cat > ${COPY}
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
rm -f ${COPY}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/connect-privsep.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/connect-privsep.sh
index b6abb65e3566..8970340a29c4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/connect-privsep.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/connect-privsep.sh
@@ -1,35 +1,34 @@
# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.9 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="proxy connect with privsep"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect failed"
fi
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised
- warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect failed"
+ fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect failed"
fi
# Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest
# with every malloc.conf option (and none).
-if [ -z "TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS" ]; then
+if [ -z "$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS" ]; then
mopts="C F G J R S U X < >"
else
mopts=`echo $TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS | sed 's/./& /g'`
fi
for m in '' $mopts ; do
env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect mopt '$m' failed"
fi
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/connect.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/connect.sh
index 1b344b6034e9..46f12b7b3c92 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/connect.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/connect.sh
@@ -1,11 +1,18 @@
-# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.8 2020/01/25 02:57:53 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="simple connect"
start_sshd
+trace "direct connect"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect with failed"
+ fail "ssh direct connect failed"
+fi
+
+trace "proxy connect"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -o "proxycommand $NC %h %p" somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh proxycommand connect failed"
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 61fc178e890c..6dd4cfe3f94a
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/dhgex.sh
@@ -1,59 +1,61 @@
-# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.4 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.7 2020/12/21 22:48:41 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="dhgex"
LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
rm -f ${LOG}
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange`
ssh_test_dhgex()
{
bits="$1"; shift
cipher="$1"; shift
kex="$1"; shift
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
rm -f ${LOG}
opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher"
min=2048
max=8192
groupsz="$min<$bits<$max"
verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher"
${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh failed ($@)"
fi
# check what we request
grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}`
fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got"
fi
- # check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file)
- gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`"
- if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then
+ # check what we got.
+ gotbits="`awk 'BEGIN{FS="/"}/bits set:/{print $2}' ${LOG} |
+ head -1 | tr -d '\r\n'`"
+ trace "expected '$bits' got '$gotbits'"
+ if [ -z "$gotbits" ] || [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then
fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits"
fi
}
check()
{
bits="$1"; shift
for c in $@; do
for k in $kexs; do
ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k
done
done
}
-#check 2048 3des-cbc
+check 3072 3des-cbc # 112 bits.
check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128`
check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192`
check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256`
-check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+check 8192 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/ed25519_openssh.prv b/crypto/openssh/regress/ed25519_openssh.prv
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9f191b778962
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/ed25519_openssh.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACDE8/0FM7Yw6xc53QpiZUQAh/LK2mEAwNDNYdSR6GIGIwAAAKC+Cfdzvgn3
+cwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDE8/0FM7Yw6xc53QpiZUQAh/LK2mEAwNDNYdSR6GIGIw
+AAAEBm+60DgH0WMW7Z5oyvu1dxo7MaXe5RRMWTMJCfLkHexMTz/QUztjDrFzndCmJlRACH
+8sraYQDA0M1h1JHoYgYjAAAAGWR0dWNrZXJAcXVvbGwuZHR1Y2tlci5uZXQBAgME
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/ed25519_openssh.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/ed25519_openssh.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..910363138658
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/ed25519_openssh.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIMTz/QUztjDrFzndCmJlRACH8sraYQDA0M1h1JHoYgYj
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/forward-control.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/forward-control.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 3b1f69a71e56..02f7667a665b
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/forward-control.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/forward-control.sh
@@ -1,235 +1,235 @@
-# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.7 2018/06/07 14:29:43 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.8 2021/05/07 09:23:40 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding"
LFWD_PORT=3320
RFWD_PORT=3321
CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
READY=$OBJ/ready
wait_for_file_to_appear() {
_path=$1
_n=0
while test ! -f $_path ; do
test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear"
_n=`expr $_n + 1`
test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
sleep 1
done
return 0
}
wait_for_process_to_exit() {
_pid=$1
_n=0
while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do
test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit"
_n=`expr $_n + 1`
test $_n -ge 20 && return 1
sleep 1
done
return 0
}
# usage: check_lfwd Y|N message
check_lfwd() {
_expected=$1
_message=$2
rm -f $READY
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
-L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
-n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
>/dev/null 2>&1 &
_sshpid=$!
wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \
fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \
- -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ -oConnectionAttempts=10 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
_result=$?
kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
else
verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
fi
}
# usage: check_rfwd Y|N message
check_rfwd() {
_expected=$1
_message=$2
rm -f $READY
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
-R127.0.0.1:$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
-n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \
>/dev/null 2>&1 &
_sshpid=$!
wait_for_file_to_appear $READY
_result=$?
if test $_result -eq 0 ; then
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \
- -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+ -oConnectionAttempts=10 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
_result=$?
kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null
wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
fi
if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
else
verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
fi
}
start_sshd
cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak
cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak
# Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding
check_lfwd Y "default configuration"
check_rfwd Y "default configuration"
# Usage: lperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
lperm_tests() {
_tcpfwd=$1
_plain_lfwd=$2
_plain_rfwd=$3
_nopermit_lfwd=$4
_nopermit_rfwd=$5
_permit_lfwd=$6
_permit_rfwd=$7
_badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22
_badfwd2=127.0.0.2:22
_goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT}
cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
_prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
# No PermitOpen
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix"
check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix"
# PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
# PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen"
check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen"
# permitopen keys option.
# NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same
# success/fail as via sshd_config
# permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match
sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_badfwd2\" /" \
< ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
> ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail"
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
# permitopen via authorized_keys that does match
sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \
< ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
> ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail"
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
check_rfwd $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
# Check port-forwarding flags in authorized_keys.
# These two should refuse all.
sed "s/^/no-port-forwarding /" \
< ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
> ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 3 fail"
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding"
check_rfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding"
sed "s/^/restrict /" \
< ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
> ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 4 fail"
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd N "$_prefix, restrict"
check_rfwd N "$_prefix, restrict"
# This should pass the same cases as _nopermit*
sed "s/^/restrict,port-forwarding /" \
< ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
> ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 5 fail"
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding"
check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding"
}
# permit-open none mismatch match
# AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote
lperm_tests yes Y Y N Y Y Y
lperm_tests local Y N N N Y N
lperm_tests remote N Y N Y N Y
lperm_tests no N N N N N N
# Usage: rperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
rperm_tests() {
_tcpfwd=$1
_plain_lfwd=$2
_plain_rfwd=$3
_nopermit_lfwd=$4
_nopermit_rfwd=$5
_permit_lfwd=$6
_permit_rfwd=$7
_badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22
_badfwd2=127.0.0.2:${RFWD_PORT}
_goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${RFWD_PORT}
cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
_prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
# PermitListen via sshd_config that doesn't match
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen"
check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen"
# PermitListen via sshd_config that does match
( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \
> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen"
check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen"
}
# permit-remote-open none mismatch match
# AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote
rperm_tests yes Y Y Y N Y Y
rperm_tests local Y N Y N Y N
rperm_tests remote N Y N N N Y
rperm_tests no N N N N N N
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
index 7d0fae114697..a72bd3a05cfa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
@@ -1,136 +1,136 @@
-# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.24 2021/05/07 09:23:40 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="local and remote forwarding"
DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT}
start_sshd
base=33
last=$PORT
fwd=""
make_tmpdir
CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock
for j in 0 1 2; do
for i in 0 1 2; do
a=$base$j$i
b=`expr $a + 50`
c=$last
# fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c
fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c"
last=$a
done
done
trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
rm -f $CTL
-${SSH} -S $CTL -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost
trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=10' \
somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
for d in L R; do
trace "exit on -$d forward failure"
# this one should succeed
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
-$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
fatal "connection failed, should not"
else
# this one should fail
${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
-$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-$d ${base}01:localhost:$PORT \
-$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
-oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
r=$?
if [ $r != 255 ]; then
fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)"
fi
fi
done
trace "simple clear forwarding"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
trace "clear local forward"
rm -f $CTL
-${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
else
# this one should fail
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
fail "local forwarding not cleared"
fi
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
trace "clear remote forward"
rm -f $CTL
-${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
- -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
else
# this one should fail
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
fi
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
trace "stdio forwarding"
cmd="${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config"
$cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" somehost true
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
fail "stdio forwarding"
fi
echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
rm -f $CTL
-${SSH} -S $CTL -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost
trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=10' \
somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123]
-${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10
-${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost
+${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost
+${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost
+${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=10' \
somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost
-${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/host-expand.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/host-expand.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 811b6b9ab25a..d6736e246501
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
@@ -1,53 +1,53 @@
-# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.7 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="hostkey agent"
rm -f $OBJ/agent-key.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
[ $r -ne 0 ] && fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
trace "load hostkeys"
-for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
(
printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub
) >> $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
${SSHADD} $OBJ/agent-key.$k >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fatal "couldn't load key $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
# Remove private key so the server can't use it.
rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k || fatal "couldn't rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
done
cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-for ps in no yes; do
- for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+for ps in yes; do
+ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "privsep=$ps failed"
fi
if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k privsep=$ps"
fi
done
done
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index d69de32557a6..2852c457c259
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
@@ -1,110 +1,124 @@
-# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.5 2015/09/04 04:23:10 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.9 2020/10/07 06:38:16 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="hostkey rotate"
-# Need full names here since they are used in HostKeyAlgorithms
-HOSTKEY_TYPES="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ssh-ed25519 ssh-rsa ssh-dss"
-
-rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+grep -vi 'globalknownhostsfile' $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+echo "GlobalKnownHostsFile=none" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
rm $OBJ/known_hosts
+# The "primary" key type is ed25519 since it's supported even when built
+# without OpenSSL. The secondary is RSA if it's supported.
+primary="ssh-ed25519"
+secondary="$primary"
+
trace "prepare hostkeys"
nkeys=0
all_algs=""
-for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1`
test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs},"
all_algs="${all_algs}$k"
+ case "$k" in
+ ssh-rsa) secondary="ssh-rsa" ;;
+ esac
done
dossh() {
# All ssh should succeed in this test
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed"
}
expect_nkeys() {
_expected=$1
_message=$2
_n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed"
[ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)"
}
check_key_present() {
_type=$1
_kfile=$2
test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub"
_kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \
fatal "awk failed"
fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null
}
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no
verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no"
>$OBJ/known_hosts
-dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-ed25519 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no
+dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$primary -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no
# Verify no additional keys learned
expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys"
-check_key_present ssh-ed25519 || fail "unstrict didn't learn key"
+check_key_present $primary || fail "unstrict didn't learn key"
# Connect to sshd as usual
verbose "learn additional hostkeys"
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
# Check that other keys learned
expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys"
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
+ check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn keytype $k"
+done
# Check each key type
-for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k"
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs
expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k"
- check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k"
+ check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k correctly"
done
# Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn
-verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey"
-mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old
-rm -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa
-${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
-dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
-# Check that the key was replaced
-expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+if [ "$primary" != "$secondary" ]; then
+ verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey type=${secondary}"
+ mv $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old
+ rm -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${secondary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary} -N '' || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen $secondary"
+ dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
+ # Check that the key was replaced
+ expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+ check_key_present ${secondary} $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old && \
+ fail "old key present"
+ check_key_present ${secondary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+fi
# Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect
verbose "learn new primary hostkey"
-${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
-( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new ) \
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${primary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen ed25519"
+( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new ) \
> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Check new hostkey added
-dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs
expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "current key missing"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub || fail "new key missing"
+check_key_present ${primary} || fail "current key missing"
+check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub || fail "new key missing"
# Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd
verbose "rotate primary hostkey"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old
-mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub
-mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa
+mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old
+mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub
+mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new $OBJ/hkr.${primary}
# Check old hostkey removed
-dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs
expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old && fail "old key present"
+check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
# Connect again, forcing rotated key
verbose "check rotate primary hostkey"
-dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary}
expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys"
-check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 3eda40f0a3d3..bc030cb74f35
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,76 +1,76 @@
-# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.23 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.24 2020/01/21 08:06:27 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="integrity"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
tries=10
startoffset=2900
macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
# handled specially below.
macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`"
# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the
# offset into the stream right.
-echo "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" \
- >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+#echo "KexAlgorithms -diffie-hellman-group*" \
+# >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
-cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
for m in $macs; do
trace "test $tid: mac $m"
elen=0
epad=0
emac=0
etmo=0
ecnt=0
skip=0
for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
skip=`expr $skip - 1`
if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
# avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
continue
fi
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# modify output from sshd at offset $off
pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
macopt="-c $m"
else
echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr"
fi
verbose "test $tid: $m @$off"
${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
-oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \
999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
fi
ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \
tr -s '\r\n' '.')
case "$out" in
Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
*Timeout,?server*)
etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;;
*) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
esac
done
verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo"
if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
fail "$m: no mac errors"
fi
expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo`
if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
fi
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/key-options.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/key-options.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 112c9bd8ec5c..2f3d66e2e9ea
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/key-options.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/key-options.sh
@@ -1,118 +1,124 @@
# $OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.9 2018/07/03 13:53:26 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="key options"
origkeys="$OBJ/authkeys_orig"
authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}"
cp $authkeys $origkeys
+# Allocating ptys can require privileges on some platforms.
+skip_pty=""
+if ! config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY && [ "x$SUDO" = "x" ]; then
+ skip_pty="no openpty(3) and SUDO not set"
+fi
+
# Test command= forced command
for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do
sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
verbose "key option $c"
r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo`
if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then
fail "key option forced command not restricted"
fi
if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
fail "key option forced command not executed"
fi
done
# Test no-pty
expect_pty_succeed() {
which=$1
opts=$2
rm -f $OBJ/data
sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
verbose "key option pty $which"
- config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY || verbose "skipped for no openpty(3)"
+ [ "x$skip_pty" != "x" ] && verbose "skipped because $skip_pty" && return
${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0"
if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
fail "key option failed $which"
else
r=`cat $OBJ/data`
case "$r" in
/dev/*) ;;
*) fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;;
esac
fi
}
expect_pty_fail() {
which=$1
opts=$2
rm -f $OBJ/data
sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
verbose "key option pty $which"
- config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY || verbose "skipped for no openpty(3)"
+ [ "x$skip_pty" != "x" ] && verbose "skipped because $skip_pty" && return
${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0"
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
r=`cat $OBJ/data`
if [ -e "$r" ]; then
fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)"
fi
case "$r" in
/dev/*) fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;;
*) ;;
esac
fi
}
# First ensure that we can allocate a pty by default.
expect_pty_succeed "default" ""
expect_pty_fail "no-pty" "no-pty"
expect_pty_fail "restrict" "restrict"
expect_pty_succeed "restrict,pty" "restrict,pty"
# Test environment=
# XXX this can fail if ~/.ssh/environment exists for the user running the test
echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
verbose "key option environment"
r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'`
if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
fail "key option environment not set"
fi
# Test from= restriction
start_sshd
for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do
cat $origkeys >$authkeys
${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "key option failed without restriction"
fi
sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '`
verbose "key option $from"
r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'`
if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then
fail "key option $from not restricted"
fi
r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'`
if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then
fail "key option $from not allowed but should be"
fi
done
check_valid_before() {
which=$1
opts=$2
expect=$3
sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
verbose "key option expiry-time $which"
${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
r=$?
case "$expect" in
fail) test $r -eq 0 && fail "key option succeeded $which" ;;
pass) test $r -ne 0 && fail "key option failed $which" ;;
*) fatal "unknown expectation $expect" ;;
esac
}
check_valid_before "default" "" "pass"
check_valid_before "invalid" 'expiry-time="INVALID"' "fail"
check_valid_before "expired" 'expiry-time="19990101"' "fail"
check_valid_before "valid" 'expiry-time="20380101"' "pass"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-change.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-change.sh
index 8b8acd52fb9f..3863e33b5287 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-change.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-change.sh
@@ -1,25 +1,22 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.9 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="change passphrase for key"
S1="secret1"
S2="2secret"
-KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain`
-
-for t in $KEYTYPES; do
- # generate user key for agent
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
trace "generating $t key"
rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key"
fi
else
fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed"
fi
rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-comment.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-comment.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..af571d39035f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-comment.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#    Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="Comment extraction from private key"
+
+S1="secret1"
+
+check_fingerprint () {
+ file="$1"
+ comment="$2"
+ trace "fingerprinting $file"
+ if ! ${SSHKEYGEN} -l -E sha256 -f $file > $OBJ/$t-fgp ; then
+ fail "ssh-keygen -l failed for $t-key"
+ fi
+ if ! egrep "^([0-9]+) SHA256:(.){43} ${comment} \(.*\)\$" \
+ $OBJ/$t-fgp >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ fail "comment is not correctly recovered for $t-key"
+ fi
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t-fgp
+}
+
+for fmt in '' RFC4716 PKCS8 PEM; do
+ for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+ trace "generating $t key in '$fmt' format"
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t-key*
+ oldfmt=""
+ case "$fmt" in
+ PKCS8|PEM) oldfmt=1 ;;
+ esac
+ # Some key types like ssh-ed25519 and *@openssh.com are never
+ # stored in old formats.
+ case "$t" in
+ ssh-ed25519|*openssh.com) test -z "$oldfmt" || continue ;;
+ esac
+ comment="foo bar"
+ fmtarg=""
+ test -z "$fmt" || fmtarg="-m $fmt"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} $fmtarg -N '' -C "${comment}" \
+ -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fatal "keygen of $t in format $fmt failed"
+ check_fingerprint $OBJ/$t-key "${comment}"
+ check_fingerprint $OBJ/$t-key.pub "${comment}"
+ # Output fingerprint using only private file
+ trace "fingerprinting $t key using private key file"
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub
+ if [ ! -z "$oldfmt" ] ; then
+ # Comment cannot be recovered from old format keys.
+ comment="no comment"
+ fi
+ check_fingerprint $OBJ/$t-key "${comment}"
+ rm -f $OBJ/$t-key*
+ done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-convert.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-convert.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index ad0e9c637d0f..95656581c5b1
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-convert.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-convert.sh
@@ -1,33 +1,55 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keygen-convert.sh,v 1.1 2009/11/09 04:20:04 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-convert.sh,v 1.6 2021/07/24 02:57:28 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="convert keys"
-for t in rsa dsa; do
+cat > $OBJ/askpass <<EOD
+#!/bin/sh
+echo hunter2
+EOD
+chmod u+x $OBJ/askpass
+
+if ${SSHKEYGEN} -? 2>&1 | grep "ssh-keygen -e" >/dev/null; then
+ test_import_export=1
+fi
+
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
# generate user key for agent
trace "generating $t key"
rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N "" -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
- trace "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc || \
- fail "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
+ if test "x$test_import_export" = "x1"; then
+ trace "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc || \
+ fail "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
+
+ trace "export $t public to rfc4716 public"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
+ fail "$t public to rfc4716 public"
+
+ cmp $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
+ fail "$t rfc4716 exports differ between public and private"
- trace "export $t public to rfc4716 public"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
- fail "$t public to rfc4716 public"
+ trace "import $t rfc4716 public"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -i -f $OBJ/$t-key-rfc >$OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
+ fail "$t import rfc4716 public"
- cmp $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
- fail "$t rfc4716 exports differ between public and private"
+ cut -f1,2 -d " " $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
+ cmp $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
+ fail "$t imported differs from original"
+ fi
- trace "import $t rfc4716 public"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -i -f $OBJ/$t-key-rfc >$OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
- fail "$t import rfc4716 public"
+ trace "set passphrase $t"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -p -P '' -N 'hunter2' -f $OBJ/$t-key >/dev/null || \
+ fail "$t set passphrase failed"
- cut -f1,2 -d " " $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
- cmp $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
- fail "$t imported differs from original"
+ trace "export $t to public with passphrase"
+ SSH_ASKPASS=$OBJ/askpass SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force \
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
+ cmp $OBJ/$t-key.pub $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub || \
+ fail "$t exported pubkey differs from generated"
rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub \
$OBJ/$t-rfc-imported $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-moduli.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
index d4e771383fea..8be53f92f852 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
@@ -1,18 +1,27 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keygen-moduli.sh,v 1.2 2016/09/14 00:45:31 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-moduli.sh,v 1.4 2020/01/02 13:25:38 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="keygen moduli"
+dhgex=0
+for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+ case $kex in
+ diffie-hellman-group*) dhgex=1 ;;
+ esac
+done
+
# Try "start at the beginning and stop after 1", "skip 1 then stop after 1"
# and "skip 2 and run to the end with checkpointing". Since our test data
# file has 3 lines, these should always result in 1 line of output.
-for i in "-J1" "-j1 -J1" "-j2 -K $OBJ/moduli.ckpt"; do
+if [ "x$dhgex" = "x1" ]; then
+ for i in "-O lines=1" "-O start-line=1 -O lines=1" "-O start-line=2 -O checkpoint=$OBJ/moduli.ckpt"; do
trace "keygen $i"
rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -T $OBJ/moduli.out -f ${SRC}/moduli.in $i 2>/dev/null || \
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -M screen -f ${SRC}/moduli.in $i $OBJ/moduli.out 2>/dev/null || \
fail "keygen screen failed $i"
lines=`wc -l <$OBJ/moduli.out`
test "$lines" -eq "1" || fail "expected 1 line, got $lines"
-done
+ done
+fi
rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2abf9adecac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-sshfp.sh,v 1.2 2021/07/19 02:29:28 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="keygen-sshfp"
+
+trace "keygen fingerprints"
+fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub | \
+ awk '$5=="1"{print $6}'`
+if [ "$fp" != "8a8647a7567e202ce317e62606c799c53d4c121f" ]; then
+ fail "keygen fingerprint sha1"
+fi
+fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub | \
+ awk '$5=="2"{print $6}'`
+if [ "$fp" != \
+ "54a506fb849aafb9f229cf78a94436c281efcb4ae67c8a430e8c06afcb5ee18f" ]; then
+ fail "keygen fingerprint sha256"
+fi
+
+if ${SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ssh-rsa >/dev/null; then
+ fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/rsa_openssh.pub | awk '$5=="1"{print $6}'`
+ if [ "$fp" != "99c79cc09f5f81069cc017cdf9552cfc94b3b929" ]; then
+ fail "keygen fingerprint sha1"
+ fi
+ fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/rsa_openssh.pub | awk '$5=="2"{print $6}'`
+ if [ "$fp" != \
+ "e30d6b9eb7a4de495324e4d5870b8220577993ea6af417e8e4a4f1c5bf01a9b6" ]; then
+ fail "keygen fingerprint sha256"
+ fi
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 4029e2c78637..33b6e7b423df
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh
@@ -1,82 +1,81 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.4 2016/09/26 21:34:38 bluhm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.6 2019/07/25 08:48:11 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="authorized keys from command"
if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then
echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
exit 0
fi
rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args
touch $OBJ/keys-command-args
chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args
-expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub`
-expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub`
+expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
# Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have
# acceptable directory permissions.
-KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}"
+KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}.$$"
+trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${KEY_COMMAND}" 0
cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
#!/bin/sh
echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args
echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7
test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
if test $# -eq 6 ; then
test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2
test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3
test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4
test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5
test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6
fi
exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
_EOF
$SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $KEY_COMMAND ; then
echo "skipping: $KEY_COMMAND is unsuitable as AuthorizedKeysCommand"
$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
exit 0
fi
if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments"
(
grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah
echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "connect failed"
fi
verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments"
# Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed.
(
grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "connect failed"
fi
else
echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)"
fi
-
-$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keyscan.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keyscan.sh
index 3bde1219a605..75a14ee0eecb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keyscan.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keyscan.sh
@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.13 2020/01/22 07:31:27 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="keyscan"
-# remove DSA hostkey
-rm -f ${OBJ}/host.dsa
+for i in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+ if [ -z "$algs" ]; then
+ algs="$i"
+ else
+ algs="$algs,$i"
+ fi
+done
+echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $algs" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
start_sshd
-KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain`
-for t in $KEYTYPES; do
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
trace "keyscan type $t"
- ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
+ ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -T 15 -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
> /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r"
fi
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keytype.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keytype.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index f78a2c171fa5..f1c045183bd3
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keytype.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keytype.sh
@@ -1,68 +1,83 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.7 2018/03/12 00:54:04 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.11 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="login with different key types"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
-# Traditional and builtin key types.
-ktypes="dsa-1024 rsa-2048 rsa-3072 ed25519-512"
-# Types not present in all OpenSSL versions.
-for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
+# Construct list of key types based on what the built binaries support.
+ktypes=""
+for i in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
case "$i" in
+ ssh-dss) ktypes="$ktypes dsa-1024" ;;
+ ssh-rsa) ktypes="$ktypes rsa-2048 rsa-3072" ;;
+ ssh-ed25519) ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-512" ;;
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;;
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;;
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519*) ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-sk" ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256*) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-sk" ;;
esac
done
for kt in $ktypes; do
rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt
- bits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
- type=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
+ xbits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
+ xtype=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
+ case "$kt" in
+ *sk) type="$kt"; bits="n/a"; bits_arg="";;
+ *) type=$xtype; bits=$xbits; bits_arg="-b $bits";;
+ esac
verbose "keygen $type, $bits bits"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} $bits_arg -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt || \
fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed"
done
+kname_to_ktype() {
+ case $1 in
+ dsa-1024) echo ssh-dss;;
+ ecdsa-256) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;;
+ ecdsa-384) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;;
+ ecdsa-521) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;;
+ ed25519-512) echo ssh-ed25519;;
+ rsa-*) echo rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa;;
+ ed25519-sk) echo sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com;;
+ ecdsa-sk) echo sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com;;
+ esac
+}
+
tries="1 2 3"
for ut in $ktypes; do
- htypes=$ut
+ user_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ut"`
+ htypes="$ut"
#htypes=$ktypes
for ht in $htypes; do
- case $ht in
- dsa-1024) t=ssh-dss;;
- ecdsa-256) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;;
- ecdsa-384) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;;
- ecdsa-521) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;;
- ed25519-512) t=ssh-ed25519;;
- rsa-*) t=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa;;
- esac
+ host_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ht"`
trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht"
(
grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht
- echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
- echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+ echo PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms $user_type
+ echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut
- echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
- echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+ echo PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms $user_type
+ echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
(
printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts
cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for i in $tries; do
verbose "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed"
fi
done
done
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/knownhosts-command.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/knownhosts-command.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f15df670b0c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/knownhosts-command.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# $OpenBSD: knownhosts-command.sh,v 1.2 2020/12/22 06:47:24 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="known hosts command "
+
+rm -f $OBJ/knownhosts_command $OBJ/ssh_proxy_khc
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_orig
+
+( grep -vi GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_orig | \
+ grep -vi UserKnownHostsFile;
+ echo "GlobalKnownHostsFile none" ;
+ echo "UserKnownHostsFile none" ;
+ echo "KnownHostsCommand $OBJ/knownhosts_command '%t' '%K' '%u'" ;
+) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+verbose "simple connection"
+cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+cat $OBJ/known_hosts
+_EOF
+chmod a+x $OBJ/knownhosts_command
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x true || fail "ssh connect failed"
+
+verbose "no keys"
+cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+exit 0
+_EOF
+chmod a+x $OBJ/knownhosts_command
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x true && fail "ssh connect succeeded with no keys"
+
+verbose "bad exit status"
+cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+cat $OBJ/known_hosts
+exit 1
+_EOF
+chmod a+x $OBJ/knownhosts_command
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x true && fail "ssh connect succeeded with bad exit"
+
+for keytype in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES} ; do
+ test "x$keytype" = "xssh-dss" && continue
+ verbose "keytype $keytype"
+ cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+die() { echo "\$@" 1>&2 ; exit 1; }
+test "x\$1" = "x$keytype" || die "wrong keytype \$1 (expected $keytype)"
+test "x\$3" = "x$LOGNAME" || die "wrong username \$3 (expected $LOGNAME)"
+grep -- "\$1.*\$2" $OBJ/known_hosts
+_EOF
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$keytype x true ||
+ fail "ssh connect failed for keytype $x"
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/krl.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/krl.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index a70c79c66fd4..c381225ed7cd
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/krl.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/krl.sh
@@ -1,204 +1,217 @@
-# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.7 2018/09/12 01:23:48 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="key revocation lists"
-# If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower.
-ECDSA=ecdsa
-if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then
- ECDSA=rsa
-fi
+# Use ed25519 by default since it's fast and it's supported when building
+# w/out OpenSSL. Populate ktype[2-4] with the other types if supported.
+ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519;
+ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519;
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+ case "$t" in
+ ecdsa*) ktype2=ecdsa ;;
+ ssh-rsa) ktype3=rsa ;;
+ ssh-dss) ktype4=dsa ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) ktype5=ed25519-sk ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com) ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;;
+ esac
+done
# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
# Generate a CA key
-$SSHKEYGEN -t $ECDSA -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+$SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
-$SSHKEYGEN -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2 -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+$SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2 -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA2 failed"
# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and
# bitmap sections.
cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials
serial: 1-4
serial: 10
serial: 15
serial: 30
serial: 50
+serial: 90
serial: 999
# The following sum to 500-799
serial: 500
serial: 501
serial: 502
serial: 503-600
serial: 700-797
serial: 798
serial: 799
serial: 599-701
# Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges
serial: 10000-20000
serial: 30000-40000
EOF
# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
-for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
+for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 90 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
test "x$n" = "x499" && continue
# Fill in by-ID revocation spec.
echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid
done
keygen() {
N=$1
f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
- # Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far.
- keytype=$ECDSA
+ # Vary the keytype. We use mostly ed25519 since this is fast and well
+ # supported.
+ keytype=$ktype1
case $N in
- 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=rsa;;
- 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=ed25519;;
+ 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=$ktype2 ;;
+ 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=$ktype3 ;;
+ 8 | 50 | 530 | 1003) keytype=$ktype4 ;;
+ 16 | 70 | 540 | 1004) keytype=$ktype5 ;;
+ 32 | 90 | 550 | 1005) keytype=$ktype6 ;;
esac
$SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \
|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed"
# Sign cert
$SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed"
echo $f
}
# Generate some keys.
verbose "$tid: generating test keys"
-REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999"
+REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 90 500 510 520 550 799 999"
for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do
f=`keygen $n`
RKEYS="$RKEYS ${f}.pub"
RCERTS="$RCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
done
UNREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 49 51 499 800 1010 1011"
UNREVOKED=""
for n in $UNREVOKED_SERIALS ; do
f=`keygen $n`
UKEYS="$UKEYS ${f}.pub"
UCERTS="$UCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
done
# Specifications that revoke keys by hash.
touch $OBJ/revoked-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-hash
for rkey in $RKEYS; do
(printf "sha1: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha1
(printf "sha256: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha256
(printf "hash: "; $SSHKEYGEN -lf $rkey | \
awk '{ print $2 }') >> $OBJ/revoked-hash
done
genkrls() {
OPTS=$1
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - </dev/null \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $RKEYS \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $RCERTS \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $RKEYS $RCERTS \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha1 \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-hash $OBJ/revoked-hash \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
# This should fail as KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \
>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
# These should succeed; they specify an explicit CA key.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca \
$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
$OBJ/revoked-keyid >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
# These should succeed; they specify an wildcard CA key.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-serials \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
# Revoke the same serials with the second CA key to ensure a multi-CA
# KRL is generated.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -u -s $OBJ/revoked-ca2 \
$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
}
## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials
## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc.
verbose "$tid: generating KRLs"
genkrls
check_krl() {
KEY=$1
KRL=$2
EXPECT_REVOKED=$3
TAG=$4
$SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null
result=$?
if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xy" -a $result -eq 0 ; then
fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xn" -a $result -ne 0 ; then
fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
fi
}
test_rev() {
FILES=$1
TAG=$2
KEYS_RESULT=$3
ALL_RESULT=$4
HASH_RESULT=$5
SERIAL_RESULT=$6
KEYID_RESULT=$7
CERTS_RESULT=$8
CA_RESULT=$9
SERIAL_WRESULT=$10
KEYID_WRESULT=$11
verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG"
for f in $FILES ; do
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty no "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys $KEYS_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all $ALL_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha1 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha256 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-hash $HASH_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid $KEYID_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert $CERTS_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca $CA_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $SERIAL_WRESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild $KEYID_WRESULT "$TAG"
done
}
test_all() {
# wildcard
# keys all hash sr# ID cert CA srl ID
test_rev "$RKEYS" "revoked keys" y y y n n n n n n
test_rev "$UKEYS" "unrevoked keys" n n n n n n n n n
test_rev "$RCERTS" "revoked certs" y y y y y y y y y
test_rev "$UCERTS" "unrevoked certs" n n n n n n y n n
}
test_all
# Check update. Results should be identical.
verbose "$tid: testing KRL update"
for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \
$OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid \
$OBJ/krl-serial-wild $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild; do
cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f
genkrls -u
done
test_all
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/limit-keytype.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/limit-keytype.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 04f11977e140..7127de007cc6
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/limit-keytype.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/limit-keytype.sh
@@ -1,98 +1,133 @@
-# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.5 2018/03/12 00:52:57 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.10 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="restrict pubkey type"
+# XXX sk-* keys aren't actually tested ATM.
+
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519;
+ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519;
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ case "$t" in
+ ssh-rsa) ktype2=rsa ;;
+ ecdsa*) ktype3=ecdsa ;; # unused
+ ssh-dss) ktype4=dsa ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) ktype5=ed25519-sk ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com) ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;;
+ esac
+done
+
# Create a CA key
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Make some keys and a certificate.
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype4 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype5 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype6 -f $OBJ/user_key6 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1"
# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
# it is offered.
mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub
grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
certopts="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
prepare_config() {
(
grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "Protocol 2"
echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
for x in "$@" ; do
echo "$x"
done
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
}
+# Return the required parameter for PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms corresponding to
+# the supplied key type.
+keytype() {
+ case "$1" in
+ ecdsa) printf "ecdsa-sha2-*" ;;
+ ed25519) printf "ssh-ed25519" ;;
+ dsa) printf "ssh-dss" ;;
+ rsa) printf "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa" ;;
+ sk-ecdsa) printf "sk-ecdsa-*" ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519) printf "sk-ssh-ed25519-*" ;;
+ esac
+}
+
prepare_config
# Check we can log in with all key types.
${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
# Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail.
-verbose "allow rsa,ed25519"
+verbose "allow $ktype2,$ktype1"
prepare_config \
- "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa,ssh-ed25519"
+ "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype2`,`keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
# Allow Ed25519 only.
-verbose "allow ed25519"
-prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-ed25519"
+verbose "allow $ktype1"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
-${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then
+ ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+fi
# Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail.
verbose "allow cert only"
-prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms *-cert-v01@openssh.com"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
# Allow RSA in main config, Ed25519 for non-existent user.
verbose "match w/ no match"
-prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa" \
- "Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype2`" \
+ "Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +`keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
-${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
+if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then
+ ${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
+fi
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
# Allow only DSA in main config, Ed25519 for user.
verbose "match w/ matching"
-prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-dss" \
- "Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype4`" \
+ "Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +`keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key4 proxy true && fatal "key4 succeeded"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/localcommand.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/localcommand.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/Makefile
index 14c0c279f7ac..b9149f2879eb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-SUBDIR= kexfuzz
+SUBDIR= sk-dummy
.include <bsd.subdir.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
index a2aa4441f97e..e879fcdae297 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
@@ -1,25 +1,52 @@
# NB. libssh and libopenbsd-compat should be built with the same sanitizer opts.
-CXX=clang++-3.9
-FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,undefined -fsanitize-coverage=edge
+CC=clang-11
+CXX=clang++-11
+FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,fuzzer -fno-omit-frame-pointer
FUZZ_LIBS=-lFuzzer
-CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
+CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
+CFLAGS=$(CXXFLAGS)
LDFLAGS=-L ../../.. -L ../../../openbsd-compat -g $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
-LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(FUZZ_LIBS)
+LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto -lfido2 -lcbor $(FUZZ_LIBS)
+SK_NULL_OBJS=ssh-sk-null.o
+COMMON_DEPS=../../../libssh.a
-all: pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz
+TARGETS=pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz sshsig_fuzz \
+ sshsigopt_fuzz privkey_fuzz kex_fuzz agent_fuzz
+
+all: $(TARGETS)
.cc.o:
$(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
-pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+authopt_fuzz: authopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ authopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) ../../../auth-options.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+sshsig_fuzz: sshsig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ sshsig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+sshsigopt_fuzz: sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+privkey_fuzz: privkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ privkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+kex_fuzz: kex_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ kex_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) -lz
+
+agent_fuzz: agent_fuzz.o agent_fuzz_helper.o sk-dummy.o ../../../ssh-sk.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ agent_fuzz.o agent_fuzz_helper.o sk-dummy.o ../../../ssh-sk.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) -lz
-sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+agent_fuzz_helper.o: agent_fuzz_helper.c ../../../ssh-agent.c
-authopt_fuzz: authopt_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ authopt_fuzz.o ../../../auth-options.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+sk-dummy.o: ../sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ ../sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c -DSK_DUMMY_INTEGRATE=1 $(LDFLAGS)
clean:
- -rm -f *.o pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz
+ -rm -f *.o $(TARGETS)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ad85b2f9a297
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// cc_fuzz_target test for ssh-agent.
+extern "C" {
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+extern void test_one(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen);
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen)
+{
+ test_one(s, slen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1d419820cc5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+#include "fixed-keys.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define main(ac, av) xxxmain(ac, av)
+#include "../../../ssh-agent.c"
+
+void test_one(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen);
+
+static int
+devnull_or_die(void)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ if ((fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ error_f("open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno));
+ abort();
+ }
+ return fd;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pubkey_or_die(const char *s)
+{
+ char *tmp, *cp;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey;
+ int r;
+
+ tmp = cp = xstrdup(s);
+ if ((pubkey = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(pubkey, &cp)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
+ abort();
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+ return pubkey;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+privkey_or_die(const char *s)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshkey *privkey;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(s, strlen(s))) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_from failed");
+ abort();
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
+ abort();
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return privkey;
+}
+
+static void
+add_key(const char *privkey, const char *certpath)
+{
+ Identity *id;
+ int r;
+ struct sshkey *cert;
+
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+ idtab->nentries++;
+ id->key = privkey_or_die(privkey);
+ id->comment = xstrdup("rhododaktulos Eos");
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
+ id->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+
+ /* Now the cert too */
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+ idtab->nentries++;
+ id->key = privkey_or_die(privkey);
+ cert = pubkey_or_die(certpath);
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(id->key)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified");
+ abort();
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, id->key)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy");
+ abort();
+ }
+ sshkey_free(cert);
+ id->comment = xstrdup("outis");
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
+ id->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_idtab(void)
+{
+ Identity *id;
+
+ if (idtab == NULL) return;
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
+ id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+ free_identity(id);
+ }
+ free(idtab);
+ idtab = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+reset_idtab(void)
+{
+ cleanup_idtab();
+ idtab_init();
+ // Load keys.
+ add_key(PRIV_RSA, CERT_RSA);
+ add_key(PRIV_DSA, CERT_DSA);
+ add_key(PRIV_ECDSA, CERT_ECDSA);
+ add_key(PRIV_ED25519, CERT_ED25519);
+ add_key(PRIV_ECDSA_SK, CERT_ECDSA_SK);
+ add_key(PRIV_ED25519_SK, CERT_ED25519_SK);
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_sockettab(void)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+ if (sockets[i].type != AUTH_UNUSED)
+ close_socket(sockets + i);
+ }
+ free(sockets);
+ sockets = NULL;
+ sockets_alloc = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+reset_sockettab(int devnull)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ cleanup_sockettab();
+ if ((fd = dup(devnull)) == -1) {
+ error_f("dup: %s", strerror(errno));
+ abort();
+ }
+ new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
+ assert(sockets[0].type == AUTH_CONNECTION);
+ assert(sockets[0].fd == fd);
+}
+
+#define MAX_MESSAGES 256
+void
+test_one(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen)
+{
+ static int devnull = -1;
+ size_t i, olen, nlen;
+
+ if (devnull == -1) {
+ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ devnull = devnull_or_die();
+ allowed_providers = xstrdup("");
+ setenv("DISPLAY", "", 1); /* ban askpass */
+ }
+
+ reset_idtab();
+ reset_sockettab(devnull);
+ (void)sshbuf_put(sockets[0].input, s, slen);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_MESSAGES; i++) {
+ olen = sshbuf_len(sockets[0].input);
+ process_message(0);
+ nlen = sshbuf_len(sockets[0].input);
+ if (nlen == 0 || nlen == olen)
+ break;
+ }
+ cleanup_idtab();
+ cleanup_sockettab();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/fixed-keys.h b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/fixed-keys.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c6e7c6cc1828
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/fixed-keys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Some keys used by fuzzers
+ */
+
+#define PRIV_RSA \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABFwAAAAdzc2gtcn\n"\
+"NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAQEA3+epf+VGKoGPaAZXrf6S0cyumQnddkGBnVFX0A5eh37RtLug0qY5\n"\
+"thxsBUbGGVr9mTd2QXwLujBwYg5l1MP/Fmg+5312Zgx9pHmS+qKULbar0hlNgptNEb+aNU\n"\
+"d3o9qg3aXqXm7+ZnjAV05ef/mxNRN2ZvuEkw7cRppTJcbBI+vF3lXuCXnX2klDI95Gl2AW\n"\
+"3WHRtanqLHZXuBkjjRBDKc7MUq/GP1hmLiAd95dvU7fZjRlIEsP84zGEI1Fb0L/kmPHcOt\n"\
+"iVfHft8CtmC9v6+94JrOiPBBNScV+dyrgAGPsdKdr/1vIpQmCNiI8s3PCiD8J7ZiBaYm0I\n"\
+"8fq5G/qnUwAAA7ggw2dXIMNnVwAAAAdzc2gtcnNhAAABAQDf56l/5UYqgY9oBlet/pLRzK\n"\
+"6ZCd12QYGdUVfQDl6HftG0u6DSpjm2HGwFRsYZWv2ZN3ZBfAu6MHBiDmXUw/8WaD7nfXZm\n"\
+"DH2keZL6opQttqvSGU2Cm00Rv5o1R3ej2qDdpepebv5meMBXTl5/+bE1E3Zm+4STDtxGml\n"\
+"MlxsEj68XeVe4JedfaSUMj3kaXYBbdYdG1qeosdle4GSONEEMpzsxSr8Y/WGYuIB33l29T\n"\
+"t9mNGUgSw/zjMYQjUVvQv+SY8dw62JV8d+3wK2YL2/r73gms6I8EE1JxX53KuAAY+x0p2v\n"\
+"/W8ilCYI2Ijyzc8KIPwntmIFpibQjx+rkb+qdTAAAAAwEAAQAAAQEArWm5B4tFasppjUHM\n"\
+"SsAuajtCxtizI1Hc10EW59cZM4vvUzE2f6+qZvdgWj3UU/L7Et23w0QVuSCnCerox379ZB\n"\
+"ddEOFFAAiQjwBx65hbd4RRUymxtIQfjq18++LcMJW1nbVQ7c69ThQbtALIggmbS+ZE/8Gx\n"\
+"jkwmIrCH0Ww8TlpsPe+mNHuyNk7UEZoXLm22lNLqq5qkIL5JgT6M2iNJpMOJy9/CKi6kO4\n"\
+"JPuVwjdG4C5pBPaMN3KJ1IvAlSlLGNaXnfXcn85gWfsCjsZmH3liey2NJamqp/w83BrKUg\n"\
+"YZvMR2qeWZaKkFTahpzN5KRK1BFeB37O0P84Dzh1biDX8QAAAIEAiWXW8ePYFwLpa2mFIh\n"\
+"VvRTdcrN70rVK5eWVaL3pyS4vGA56Jixq86dHveOnbSY+iNb1jQidtXc8SWUt2wtHqZ32h\n"\
+"Lji9/hMSKqe9SEP3xvDRDmUJqsVw0ySyrFrzm4160QY6RKU3CIQCVFslMZ9fxmrfZ/hxoU\n"\
+"0X3FVsxmC4+kwAAACBAPOc1YERpV6PjANBrGR+1o1RCdACbm5myc42QzSNIaOZmgrYs+Gt\n"\
+"7+EcoqSdbJzHJNCNQfF+A+vjbIkFiuZqq/5wwr59qXx5OAlijLB/ywwKmTWq6lp//Zxny+\n"\
+"ka3sIGNO14eQvmxNDnlLL+RIZleCTEKBXSW6CZhr+uHMZFKKMtAAAAgQDrSkm+LbILB7H9\n"\
+"jxEBZLhv53aAn4u81kFKQOJ7PzzpBGSoD12i7oIJu5siSD5EKDNVEr+SvCf0ISU3BuMpzl\n"\
+"t3YrPrHRheOFhn5e3j0e//zB8rBC0DGB4CtTDdeh7rOXUL4K0pz+8wEpNkV62SWxhC6NRW\n"\
+"I79JhtGkh+GtcnkEfwAAAAAB\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_RSA \
+"ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDf56l/5UYqgY9oBlet/pLRzK6ZCd12QYGdUVfQDl6HftG0u6DSpjm2HGwFRsYZWv2ZN3ZBfAu6MHBiDmXUw/8WaD7nfXZmDH2keZL6opQttqvSGU2Cm00Rv5o1R3ej2qDdpepebv5meMBXTl5/+bE1E3Zm+4STDtxGmlMlxsEj68XeVe4JedfaSUMj3kaXYBbdYdG1qeosdle4GSONEEMpzsxSr8Y/WGYuIB33l29Tt9mNGUgSw/zjMYQjUVvQv+SY8dw62JV8d+3wK2YL2/r73gms6I8EE1JxX53KuAAY+x0p2v/W8ilCYI2Ijyzc8KIPwntmIFpibQjx+rkb+qdT"
+#define CERT_RSA \
+"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_rsa.pub"
+#define PRIV_DSA \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABsgAAAAdzc2gtZH\n"\
+"NzAAAAgQCsGTfjpQ465EOkfQXJM9BOvfRQE0fqlykAls+ncz+T7hrbeScRu8xpwzsznJNm\n"\
+"xlW8o6cUDiHmBJ5OHgamUC9N7YJeU/6fnOAZifgN8mqK6k8pKHuje8ANOiYgHLl0yiASQA\n"\
+"3//qMyzZ+W/hemoLSmLAbEqlfWVeyYx+wta1Vm+QAAABUAvWyehvUvdHvQxavYgS5p0t5Q\n"\
+"d7UAAACBAIRA9Yy+f4Kzqpv/qICPO3zk42UuP7WAhSW2nCbQdLlCiSTxcjKgcvXNRckwJP\n"\
+"44JjSHOtJy/AMtJrPIbLYG6KuWTdBlEHFiG6DafvLG+qPMSL2bPjXTOhuOMbCHIZ+5WBkW\n"\
+"THeG/Nv11iI01Of9V6tXkig23K370flkRkXFi9MdAAAAgCt6YUcQkNwG7B/e5M1FZsLP9O\n"\
+"kVB3BwLAOjmWdHpyhu3HpwSJa3XLEvhXN0i6IVI2KgPo/2GtYA6rHt14L+6u1pmhh8sAvQ\n"\
+"ksp3qZB+xh/NP+hBqf0sbHX0yYbzKOvI5SCc/kKK6yagcBZOsubM/KC8TxyVgmD5c6WzYs\n"\
+"h5TEpvAAAB2PHjRbbx40W2AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAKwZN+OlDjrkQ6R9Bckz0E699FAT\n"\
+"R+qXKQCWz6dzP5PuGtt5JxG7zGnDOzOck2bGVbyjpxQOIeYEnk4eBqZQL03tgl5T/p+c4B\n"\
+"mJ+A3yaorqTykoe6N7wA06JiAcuXTKIBJADf/+ozLNn5b+F6agtKYsBsSqV9ZV7JjH7C1r\n"\
+"VWb5AAAAFQC9bJ6G9S90e9DFq9iBLmnS3lB3tQAAAIEAhED1jL5/grOqm/+ogI87fOTjZS\n"\
+"4/tYCFJbacJtB0uUKJJPFyMqBy9c1FyTAk/jgmNIc60nL8Ay0ms8hstgboq5ZN0GUQcWIb\n"\
+"oNp+8sb6o8xIvZs+NdM6G44xsIchn7lYGRZMd4b82/XWIjTU5/1Xq1eSKDbcrfvR+WRGRc\n"\
+"WL0x0AAACAK3phRxCQ3AbsH97kzUVmws/06RUHcHAsA6OZZ0enKG7cenBIlrdcsS+Fc3SL\n"\
+"ohUjYqA+j/Ya1gDqse3Xgv7q7WmaGHywC9CSynepkH7GH80/6EGp/SxsdfTJhvMo68jlIJ\n"\
+"z+QorrJqBwFk6y5sz8oLxPHJWCYPlzpbNiyHlMSm8AAAAUUA+OGldMi76ClO/sstpdbBUE\n"\
+"lq8AAAAAAQI=\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_DSA \
+"ssh-dss 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"
+#define CERT_DSA \
+"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_dsa.pub"
+#define PRIV_ECDSA \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAaAAAABNlY2RzYS\n"\
+"1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQTDJ0VlMv+0rguNzaJ1DF2KueHaxRSQ\n"\
+"6LpIxGbulrg1a8RPbnMXwag5GcDiDllD2lDUJUuBEWyjXA0rZoZX35ELAAAAoE/Bbr5PwW\n"\
+"6+AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43N\n"\
+"onUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQ\n"\
+"sAAAAhAIhE6hCID5oOm1TDktc++KFKyScjLifcZ6Cgv5xSSyLOAAAAAAECAwQFBgc=\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ECDSA \
+"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43NonUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQs="
+#define CERT_ECDSA \
+"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_ecdsa.pub"
+#define PRIV_ED25519 \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW\n"\
+"QyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAwAAAIhWlP99VpT/\n"\
+"fQAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAw\n"\
+"AAAEDE1rlcMC0s0X3TKVZAOVavZOywwkXw8tO5dLObxaCMEDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgP\n"\
+"Dkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMDAAAAAAECAwQF\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ED25519 \
+"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMD"
+#define CERT_ED25519 \
+"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_ed25519.pub"
+#define PRIV_ECDSA_SK \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAfwAAACJzay1lY2\n"\
+"RzYS1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQTYyU76zop1\n"\
+"VOb4DfKWYnR5b0TOC3zw8DzObAfHWB5o6xls+tOYiEleXvIEi00Da2iCK47habZTOhLyeB\n"\
+"X2Avu5AAAABHNzaDoAAAGYqUAQSKlAEEgAAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBv\n"\
+"cGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEE2MlO+s6KdVTm+A3ylmJ0eW9Ezgt88PA8zm\n"\
+"wHx1geaOsZbPrTmIhJXl7yBItNA2togiuO4Wm2UzoS8ngV9gL7uQAAAARzc2g6AQAAAOMt\n"\
+"LS0tLUJFR0lOIEVDIFBSSVZBVEUgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUhjQ0FRRUVJSHFsZjNsWTkxZFhwUn\n"\
+"dYZDBrS0lYWmNpeDRRcDBNSU15Ny9JMUxXSTFuWG9Bb0dDQ3FHU000OQpBd0VIb1VRRFFn\n"\
+"QUUyTWxPK3M2S2RWVG0rQTN5bG1KMGVXOUV6Z3Q4OFBBOHptd0h4MWdlYU9zWmJQclRtSW\n"\
+"hKClhsN3lCSXROQTJ0b2dpdU80V20yVXpvUzhuZ1Y5Z0w3dVE9PQotLS0tLUVORCBFQyBQ\n"\
+"UklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCgAAAAAAAAAbZGptQGRqbS5zeWQuY29ycC5nb29nbGUuY29tAQ\n"\
+"IDBAUG\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ECDSA_SK \
+"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBNjJTvrOinVU5vgN8pZidHlvRM4LfPDwPM5sB8dYHmjrGWz605iISV5e8gSLTQNraIIrjuFptlM6EvJ4FfYC+7kAAAAEc3NoOg=="
+#define CERT_ECDSA_SK \
+"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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"
+#define PRIV_ED25519_SK \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2\n"\
+"gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACCTJtH10vWhIDxd62edvMLg9u2cwYKyqa7332je\n"\
+"RArHjAAAAARzc2g6AAAAwN7vvE3e77xNAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2\n"\
+"9tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQEsS\n"\
+"xLFiVzfpH2mt9xh8i/zmHV646Hud4QruNBAGNl8gkybR9dL1oSA8XetnnbzC4PbtnMGCsq\n"\
+"mu999o3kQKx4wAAAAAAAAAG2RqbUBkam0uc3lkLmNvcnAuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbQECAwQFBg==\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ED25519_SK \
+"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDo="
+#define CERT_ED25519_SK \
+"sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAI3NrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJiT+C/VLMWholFZ4xhOyJr0nSLZSFRIM3I07wUNTRPaAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDoAAAAAAAAD7AAAAAEAAAAHdWx5c3NlcwAAABcAAAAHdWx5c3NlcwAAAAhvZHlzc2V1cwAAAAAAAAAA//////////8AAAAAAAAAggAAABVwZXJtaXQtWDExLWZvcndhcmRpbmcAAAAAAAAAF3Blcm1pdC1hZ2VudC1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAABZwZXJtaXQtcG9ydC1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAAApwZXJtaXQtcHR5AAAAAAAAAA5wZXJtaXQtdXNlci1yYwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAX0Pu13B94pVR3qq8MJQGkOS1Cd7AAM1k6O2VSwyDPM/LfsWIQ4ywgxDmk3hjXWOY7BqljuMxo5VO4JymEIhQBA=="
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4740a7cb04c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+// libfuzzer driver for key exchange fuzzing.
+
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "fixed-keys.h"
+
+// Define if you want to generate traces.
+/* #define STANDALONE 1 */
+
+static int prepare_key(struct shared_state *st, int keytype, int bits);
+
+struct shared_state {
+ size_t nkeys;
+ struct sshkey **privkeys, **pubkeys;
+};
+
+struct test_state {
+ struct sshbuf *smsgs, *cmsgs; /* output, for standalone mode */
+ struct sshbuf *sin, *cin; /* input; setup per-test in do_kex_with_key */
+ struct sshbuf *s_template, *c_template; /* main copy of input */
+};
+
+static int
+do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to,
+ struct sshbuf *store, int clobber, size_t *n)
+{
+ u_char type;
+ size_t len;
+ const u_char *buf;
+ int r;
+
+ for (*n = 0;; (*n)++) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "ssh_packet_next");
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (type != 0)
+ return 0;
+ buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len);
+ debug_f("%zu%s", len, clobber ? " ignore" : "");
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "ssh_output_consume");
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (store != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(store, buf, len)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (!clobber && (r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "ssh_input_append");
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+run_kex(struct test_state *ts, struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+ size_t cn, sn;
+
+ /* If fuzzing, replace server/client input */
+ if (ts->sin != NULL) {
+ if ((r = ssh_input_append(server, sshbuf_ptr(ts->sin),
+ sshbuf_len(ts->sin))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "ssh_input_append");
+ return r;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(ts->sin);
+ }
+ if (ts->cin != NULL) {
+ if ((r = ssh_input_append(client, sshbuf_ptr(ts->cin),
+ sshbuf_len(ts->cin))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "ssh_input_append");
+ return r;
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(ts->cin);
+ }
+ while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) {
+ cn = sn = 0;
+ debug_f("S:");
+ if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client,
+ ts->smsgs, ts->cin != NULL, &sn)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "S->C");
+ break;
+ }
+ debug_f("C:");
+ if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server,
+ ts->cmsgs, ts->sin != NULL, &cn)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "C->S");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (cn == 0 && sn == 0) {
+ debug_f("kex stalled");
+ r = SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ debug_fr(r, "done");
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void
+store_key(struct shared_state *st, struct sshkey *pubkey,
+ struct sshkey *privkey)
+{
+ if (st == NULL || pubkey->type < 0 || pubkey->type > INT_MAX ||
+ privkey->type != pubkey->type ||
+ ((size_t)pubkey->type < st->nkeys &&
+ st->pubkeys[pubkey->type] != NULL))
+ abort();
+ if ((size_t)pubkey->type >= st->nkeys) {
+ st->pubkeys = (struct sshkey **)xrecallocarray(st->pubkeys,
+ st->nkeys, pubkey->type + 1, sizeof(*st->pubkeys));
+ st->privkeys = (struct sshkey **)xrecallocarray(st->privkeys,
+ st->nkeys, privkey->type + 1, sizeof(*st->privkeys));
+ st->nkeys = privkey->type + 1;
+ }
+ debug_f("store %s at %d", sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), pubkey->type);
+ st->pubkeys[pubkey->type] = pubkey;
+ st->privkeys[privkey->type] = privkey;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_keys(struct shared_state *st)
+{
+ if (prepare_key(st, KEY_RSA, 2048) != 0 ||
+ prepare_key(st, KEY_DSA, 1024) != 0 ||
+ prepare_key(st, KEY_ECDSA, 256) != 0 ||
+ prepare_key(st, KEY_ED25519, 256) != 0) {
+ error_f("key prepare failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_pubkey(struct shared_state *st, int keytype)
+{
+ if (st == NULL || keytype < 0 || (size_t)keytype >= st->nkeys ||
+ st->pubkeys == NULL || st->pubkeys[keytype] == NULL)
+ abort();
+ return st->pubkeys[keytype];
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_privkey(struct shared_state *st, int keytype)
+{
+ if (st == NULL || keytype < 0 || (size_t)keytype >= st->nkeys ||
+ st->privkeys == NULL || st->privkeys[keytype] == NULL)
+ abort();
+ return st->privkeys[keytype];
+}
+
+static int
+do_kex_with_key(struct shared_state *st, struct test_state *ts,
+ const char *kex, int keytype)
+{
+ struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *state = NULL;
+ struct kex_params kex_params;
+ const char *ccp, *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {0}, *keyname = NULL;
+ int i, r;
+
+ ts->cin = ts->sin = NULL;
+ if (ts->c_template != NULL &&
+ (ts->cin = sshbuf_fromb(ts->c_template)) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ if (ts->s_template != NULL &&
+ (ts->sin = sshbuf_fromb(ts->s_template)) == NULL)
+ abort();
+
+ pubkey = get_pubkey(st, keytype);
+ privkey = get_privkey(st, keytype);
+ keyname = xstrdup(sshkey_ssh_name(privkey));
+ if (ts->cin != NULL) {
+ debug_f("%s %s clobber client %zu", kex, keyname,
+ sshbuf_len(ts->cin));
+ } else if (ts->sin != NULL) {
+ debug_f("%s %s clobber server %zu", kex, keyname,
+ sshbuf_len(ts->sin));
+ } else
+ debug_f("%s %s noclobber", kex, keyname);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+ ccp = proposal[i];
+#ifdef CIPHER_NONE_AVAIL
+ if (i == PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS || i == PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC)
+ ccp = "none";
+#endif
+ if (i == PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS)
+ ccp = keyname;
+ else if (i == PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS && kex != NULL)
+ ccp = kex;
+ if ((myproposal[i] = strdup(ccp)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("strdup prop %d", i);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ if ((r = ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "init client");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "init server");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_add_hostkey(server, privkey)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_add_hostkey(client, pubkey)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "add hostkeys");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((r = run_kex(ts, client, server)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "kex");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* XXX rekex, set_state, etc */
+ fail:
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+ free(myproposal[i]);
+ sshbuf_free(ts->sin);
+ sshbuf_free(ts->cin);
+ sshbuf_free(state);
+ ssh_free(client);
+ ssh_free(server);
+ free(keyname);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_key(struct shared_state *st, int kt, int bits)
+{
+ const char *pubstr = NULL;
+ const char *privstr = NULL;
+ char *tmp, *cp;
+ struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ switch (kt) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ pubstr = PUB_RSA;
+ privstr = PRIV_RSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ pubstr = PUB_DSA;
+ privstr = PRIV_DSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ pubstr = PUB_ECDSA;
+ privstr = PRIV_ECDSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ pubstr = PUB_ED25519;
+ privstr = PRIV_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ abort();
+ }
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(privstr, strlen(privstr))) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "priv %d", kt);
+ abort();
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ tmp = cp = xstrdup(pubstr);
+ if ((pubkey = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(pubkey, &cp)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "pub %d", kt);
+ abort();
+ }
+ free(tmp);
+
+ store_key(st, pubkey, privkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(STANDALONE)
+
+#if 0 /* use this if generating new keys to embed above */
+static int
+prepare_key(struct shared_state *st, int keytype, int bits)
+{
+ struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(keytype, bits, &privkey)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "generate");
+ abort();
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(privkey, &pubkey)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "make pubkey");
+ abort();
+ }
+ store_key(st, pubkey, privkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ static struct shared_state *st;
+ struct test_state *ts;
+ const int keytypes[] = { KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, -1 };
+ const char *kextypes[] = {
+ "sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com",
+ "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org",
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256",
+ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1",
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1",
+ NULL,
+ };
+ int i, j;
+ char *path;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ log_init("kex_fuzz", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+
+ if (st == NULL) {
+ st = (struct shared_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*st));
+ prepare_keys(st);
+ }
+ /* Run each kex method for each key and save client/server packets */
+ for (i = 0; keytypes[i] != -1; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; kextypes[j] != NULL; j++) {
+ ts = (struct test_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ts));
+ ts->smsgs = sshbuf_new();
+ ts->cmsgs = sshbuf_new();
+ do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kextypes[j], keytypes[i]);
+ xasprintf(&path, "S2C-%s-%s",
+ kextypes[j], sshkey_type(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+ debug_f("%s", path);
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "wb+")) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(ts->smsgs), 1,
+ sshbuf_len(ts->smsgs), f) != sshbuf_len(ts->smsgs))
+ abort();
+ fclose(f);
+ free(path);
+ //sshbuf_dump(ts->smsgs, stderr);
+ xasprintf(&path, "C2S-%s-%s",
+ kextypes[j], sshkey_type(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+ debug_f("%s", path);
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "wb+")) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(ts->cmsgs), 1,
+ sshbuf_len(ts->cmsgs), f) != sshbuf_len(ts->cmsgs))
+ abort();
+ fclose(f);
+ free(path);
+ //sshbuf_dump(ts->cmsgs, stderr);
+ sshbuf_free(ts->smsgs);
+ sshbuf_free(ts->cmsgs);
+ free(ts);
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; keytypes[i] != -1; i++) {
+ xasprintf(&path, "%s.priv",
+ sshkey_type(st->privkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+ debug_f("%s", path);
+ if (sshkey_save_private(st->privkeys[keytypes[i]], path,
+ "", "", SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH, NULL, 0) != 0)
+ abort();
+ free(path);
+ xasprintf(&path, "%s.pub",
+ sshkey_type(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+ debug_f("%s", path);
+ if (sshkey_save_public(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]], path, "") != 0)
+ abort();
+ free(path);
+ }
+}
+#else /* !STANDALONE */
+static void
+do_kex(struct shared_state *st, struct test_state *ts, const char *kex)
+{
+ do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_RSA);
+ do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_DSA);
+ do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_ECDSA);
+ do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_ED25519);
+}
+
+static void
+kex_tests(struct shared_state *st, struct test_state *ts)
+{
+ do_kex(st, ts, "sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com");
+ do_kex(st, ts, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+ do_kex(st, ts, "ecdh-sha2-nistp256");
+ do_kex(st, ts, "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1");
+ do_kex(st, ts, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+}
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+ static struct shared_state *st;
+ struct test_state *ts;
+ u_char crbuf[SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES * 4];
+ u_char zbuf[4096] = {0};
+ static LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+
+ if (st == NULL) {
+ if (getenv("DEBUG") != NULL || getenv("KEX_FUZZ_DEBUG") != NULL)
+ loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3;
+ log_init("kex_fuzz",
+ loglevel, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ st = (struct shared_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*st));
+ prepare_keys(st);
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure that we can complete (fail) banner exchange at least */
+ memset(crbuf, '\n', sizeof(crbuf));
+
+ ts = (struct test_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ts));
+ if ((ts->s_template = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ sshbuf_put(ts->s_template, data, size) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(ts->s_template, crbuf, sizeof(crbuf)) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(ts->s_template, zbuf, sizeof(zbuf)) != 0)
+ abort();
+ kex_tests(st, ts);
+ sshbuf_free(ts->s_template);
+ free(ts);
+
+ ts = (struct test_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ts));
+ if ((ts->c_template = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ sshbuf_put(ts->c_template, data, size) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(ts->c_template, crbuf, sizeof(crbuf)) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(ts->c_template, zbuf, sizeof(zbuf)) != 0)
+ abort();
+ kex_tests(st, ts);
+ sshbuf_free(ts->c_template);
+ free(ts);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* STANDALONE */
+} /* extern "C" */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ff0b0f7769dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *b = sshbuf_from(data, size);
+ int r = sshkey_private_deserialize(b, &k);
+ if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
index dd1fda091f49..b32502ba023f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
@@ -1,50 +1,62 @@
// cc_fuzz_target test for public key parsing.
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
extern "C" {
#include "includes.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
static struct sshkey *generate_or_die(int type, unsigned bits) {
int r;
struct sshkey *ret;
if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "generate(%d, %u): %s", type, bits, ssh_err(r));
abort();
}
return ret;
}
int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static struct sshkey *rsa = generate_or_die(KEY_RSA, 2048);
static struct sshkey *dsa = generate_or_die(KEY_DSA, 1024);
static struct sshkey *ecdsa256 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 256);
static struct sshkey *ecdsa384 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 384);
static struct sshkey *ecdsa521 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 521);
#endif
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
static struct sshkey *ed25519 = generate_or_die(KEY_ED25519, 0);
static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had "
"run away, I don’t know how it would all end";
static const size_t dlen = strlen(data);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
+ sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
#endif
- sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
+ sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
return 0;
}
} // extern
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc
similarity index 51%
copy from crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c
copy to crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc
index c6ccd623eab9..199af11217e8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc
@@ -1,53 +1,51 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.5 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+extern "C" {
+
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "log.h"
-#include "sftp.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-void
-cleanup_exit(int i)
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
{
- sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
}
int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin)
{
- struct passwd *user_pw;
-
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
- /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n",
- (u_long)getuid());
- return 1;
- }
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
}
+
+};
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..02211a096b24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// cc_fuzz_target test for sshsig verification.
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
+{
+ static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had "
+ "run away, I don’t know how it would all end";
+ struct sshbuf *signature = sshbuf_from(sig, slen);
+ struct sshbuf *message = sshbuf_from(data, strlen(data));
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+ sshsig_verifyb(signature, message, "castle", &k, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ sshbuf_free(signature);
+ sshbuf_free(message);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsigopt_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsigopt_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7424fcbe358e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsigopt_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "sshsig.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+ char *cp = (char *)malloc(size + 1);
+ struct sshsigopt *opts = NULL;
+
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ memcpy(cp, data, size);
+ cp[size] = '\0';
+ if ((opts = sshsigopt_parse(cp, "libfuzzer", 0, NULL)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ out:
+ free(cp);
+ sshsigopt_free(opts);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern "C"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/README b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..752053001ac4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/README
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+This is preparatory data for fuzzing testing including scripts and test keys,
+corresponding to ../fixed-keys that are used in the fuzz tests and consequent
+fuzzing seed corpora. They should not be changed unless the affected seed
+corpora are also regenerated.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/create-agent-corpus.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/create-agent-corpus.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..1043b9ff47d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/create-agent-corpus.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Exercise ssh-agent to generate fuzzing corpus
+
+# XXX assumes agent hacked up with sk-dummy.o and ssh-sk.o linked directly
+# and dumping of e->request for each message.
+
+set -xe
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$PWD/sock
+rm -f agent-[0-9]* $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+export SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+../../../../ssh-agent -D -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK &
+sleep 1
+AGENT_PID=$!
+trap "kill $AGENT_PID" EXIT
+
+PRIV="id_dsa id_ecdsa id_ecdsa_sk id_ed25519 id_ed25519_sk id_rsa"
+
+# add keys
+ssh-add $PRIV
+
+# sign
+ssh-add -T *.pub
+
+# list
+ssh-add -l
+
+# remove individually
+ssh-add -d $PRIV
+
+# re-add with constraints
+ssh-add -c -t 3h $PRIV
+
+# delete all
+ssh-add -D
+
+# attempt to add a PKCS#11 token
+ssh-add -s /fake || :
+
+# attempt to delete PKCS#11
+ssh-add -e /fake || :
+
+ssh-add -L
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..88bf5566c93b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3afb87fe62f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_dsa.pub
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6f91c4e07336
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c1a96c6f9eaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAaAAAABNlY2RzYS
+1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQTDJ0VlMv+0rguNzaJ1DF2KueHaxRSQ
+6LpIxGbulrg1a8RPbnMXwag5GcDiDllD2lDUJUuBEWyjXA0rZoZX35ELAAAAoE/Bbr5PwW
+6+AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43N
+onUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQ
+sAAAAhAIhE6hCID5oOm1TDktc++KFKyScjLifcZ6Cgv5xSSyLOAAAAAAECAwQFBgc=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9de599917de6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_ecdsa.pub
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..30a7cc23b228
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43NonUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQs=
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5a364ed39f1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAfwAAACJzay1lY2
+RzYS1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQTYyU76zop1
+VOb4DfKWYnR5b0TOC3zw8DzObAfHWB5o6xls+tOYiEleXvIEi00Da2iCK47habZTOhLyeB
+X2Avu5AAAABHNzaDoAAAGYqUAQSKlAEEgAAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBv
+cGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEE2MlO+s6KdVTm+A3ylmJ0eW9Ezgt88PA8zm
+wHx1geaOsZbPrTmIhJXl7yBItNA2togiuO4Wm2UzoS8ngV9gL7uQAAAARzc2g6AQAAAOMt
+LS0tLUJFR0lOIEVDIFBSSVZBVEUgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUhjQ0FRRUVJSHFsZjNsWTkxZFhwUn
+dYZDBrS0lYWmNpeDRRcDBNSU15Ny9JMUxXSTFuWG9Bb0dDQ3FHU000OQpBd0VIb1VRRFFn
+QUUyTWxPK3M2S2RWVG0rQTN5bG1KMGVXOUV6Z3Q4OFBBOHptd0h4MWdlYU9zWmJQclRtSW
+hKClhsN3lCSXROQTJ0b2dpdU80V20yVXpvUzhuZ1Y5Z0w3dVE9PQotLS0tLUVORCBFQyBQ
+UklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCgAAAAAAAAAbZGptQGRqbS5zeWQuY29ycC5nb29nbGUuY29tAQ
+IDBAUG
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..14040fad7aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1b5e829b7418
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBNjJTvrOinVU5vgN8pZidHlvRM4LfPDwPM5sB8dYHmjrGWz605iISV5e8gSLTQNraIIrjuFptlM6EvJ4FfYC+7kAAAAEc3NoOg== djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519 b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a7fbac929d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAwAAAIhWlP99VpT/
+fQAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAw
+AAAEDE1rlcMC0s0X3TKVZAOVavZOywwkXw8tO5dLObxaCMEDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgP
+Dkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMDAAAAAAECAwQF
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a95fed2ac80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIMDQjYH6XRzH3j3MW1DdjCoAfvrHfgjnVGF+sLK0pBfqAAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMDAAAAAAAAA+sAAAABAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAXAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAIb2R5c3NldXMAAAAAAAAAAP//////////AAAAAAAAAIIAAAAVcGVybWl0LVgxMS1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAABdwZXJtaXQtYWdlbnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAWcGVybWl0LXBvcnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAKcGVybWl0LXB0eQAAAAAAAAAOcGVybWl0LXVzZXItcmMAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgM9BeYRUxUuZ4VHJp8oxVaA8OS/z+5EFPCZwQNq1nMwMAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQBj0og+s09/HpwdHZbzN0twooKPDWWrxGfnP1Joy6cDnY2BCSQ7zg9vbq11kLF8H/sKOTZWAQrUZ7LlChOu9Ogw= id_ed25519.pub
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..87b61744701f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519.pub
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMD
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9dcda6c4626f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACCTJtH10vWhIDxd62edvMLg9u2cwYKyqa7332je
+RArHjAAAAARzc2g6AAAAwN7vvE3e77xNAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQEsS
+xLFiVzfpH2mt9xh8i/zmHV646Hud4QruNBAGNl8gkybR9dL1oSA8XetnnbzC4PbtnMGCsq
+mu999o3kQKx4wAAAAAAAAAG2RqbUBkam0uc3lkLmNvcnAuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbQECAwQFBg==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9e41eec00df4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..38d198444b79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDo= djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..574fecf47008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..01761a38fa0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_rsa.pub
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..05015e12bfaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDf56l/5UYqgY9oBlet/pLRzK6ZCd12QYGdUVfQDl6HftG0u6DSpjm2HGwFRsYZWv2ZN3ZBfAu6MHBiDmXUw/8WaD7nfXZmDH2keZL6opQttqvSGU2Cm00Rv5o1R3ej2qDdpepebv5meMBXTl5/+bE1E3Zm+4STDtxGmlMlxsEj68XeVe4JedfaSUMj3kaXYBbdYdG1qeosdle4GSONEEMpzsxSr8Y/WGYuIB33l29Tt9mNGUgSw/zjMYQjUVvQv+SY8dw62JV8d+3wK2YL2/r73gms6I8EE1JxX53KuAAY+x0p2v/W8ilCYI2Ijyzc8KIPwntmIFpibQjx+rkb+qdT
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index a7bb6b70d211..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2017/12/21 05:46:35 djm Exp $
-
-.include <bsd.own.mk>
-.include <bsd.obj.mk>
-
-# XXX detect from ssh binary?
-SSH1?= no
-OPENSSL?= yes
-
-PROG= kexfuzz
-SRCS= kexfuzz.c
-
-SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh
-.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
-# From usr.bin/ssh
-SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
-SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
-SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
-SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c
-SRCS+=kex.c kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c
-SRCS+=kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c
-SRCS+=dh.c compat.c
-SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
-SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
-SRCS+=smult_curve25519_ref.c
-
-SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
-#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
-
-NOMAN= 1
-
-.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
-CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL
-.else
-# SSH v.1 requires OpenSSL.
-SSH1= no
-.endif
-
-.if (${SSH1:L} == "yes")
-CFLAGS+= -DWITH_SSH1
-.endif
-
-# enable warnings
-WARNINGS=Yes
-
-DEBUG=-g
-CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all
-CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter
-.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3"
-CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition
-.endif
-
-
-CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
-
-LDADD+= -lutil -lz
-DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL} ${LIBZ}
-
-.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
-LDADD+= -lcrypto
-DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
-.endif
-
-.include <bsd.prog.mk>
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/README b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/README
deleted file mode 100644
index 504c26f3bed3..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/README
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-This is a harness to help with fuzzing KEX.
-
-To use it, you first set it to count packets in each direction:
-
-./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key -c
-S2C: 29
-C2S: 31
-
-Then get it to record a particular packet (in this case the 4th
-packet from client->server):
-
-./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key \
- -d -D C2S -i 3 -f packet_3
-
-Fuzz the packet somehow:
-
-dd if=/dev/urandom of=packet_3 bs=32 count=1 # Just for example
-
-Then re-run the key exchange substituting the modified packet in
-its original sequence:
-
-./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key \
- -r -D C2S -i 3 -f packet_3
-
-A comprehensive KEX fuzz run would fuzz every packet in both
-directions for each key exchange type and every hostkey type.
-This will take some time.
-
-Limitations: kexfuzz can't change the ordering of packets at
-present. It is limited to replacing individual packets with
-fuzzed variants with the same type. It really should allow
-insertion, deletion on replacement of packets too.
-
-$OpenBSD: README,v 1.3 2017/10/20 02:13:41 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 3e2c481606c0..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,459 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexfuzz.c,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Fuzz harness for KEX code
- *
- * Placed in the public domain
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-# include <stdint.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
-# include <err.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "ssherr.h"
-#include "ssh_api.h"
-#include "sshbuf.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "myproposal.h"
-#include "authfile.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX - needed for linking */
-
-void kex_tests(void);
-static int do_debug = 0;
-
-enum direction { S2C, C2S };
-
-struct hook_ctx {
- struct ssh *client, *server, *server2;
- int *c2s, *s2c;
- int trigger_direction, packet_index;
- const char *dump_path;
- struct sshbuf *replace_data;
-};
-
-static int
-packet_hook(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *packet, u_char *typep, void *_ctx)
-{
- struct hook_ctx *ctx = (struct hook_ctx *)_ctx;
- int mydirection = ssh == ctx->client ? S2C : C2S;
- int *packet_count = mydirection == S2C ? ctx->s2c : ctx->c2s;
- FILE *dumpfile;
- int r;
-
- if (do_debug) {
- printf("%s packet %d type %u:\n",
- mydirection == S2C ? "s2c" : "c2s",
- *packet_count, *typep);
- sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout);
- }
- if (mydirection == ctx->trigger_direction &&
- ctx->packet_index == *packet_count) {
- if (ctx->replace_data != NULL) {
- sshbuf_reset(packet);
- /* Type is first byte of packet */
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(ctx->replace_data,
- typep)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_putb(packet, ctx->replace_data)) != 0)
- return r;
- if (do_debug) {
- printf("***** replaced packet type %u\n",
- *typep);
- sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout);
- }
- } else if (ctx->dump_path != NULL) {
- if ((dumpfile = fopen(ctx->dump_path, "w+")) == NULL)
- err(1, "fopen %s", ctx->dump_path);
- /* Write { type, packet } */
- if (fwrite(typep, 1, 1, dumpfile) != 1)
- err(1, "fwrite type %s", ctx->dump_path);
- if (sshbuf_len(packet) != 0 &&
- fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(packet), sshbuf_len(packet),
- 1, dumpfile) != 1)
- err(1, "fwrite body %s", ctx->dump_path);
- if (do_debug) {
- printf("***** dumped packet type %u len %zu\n",
- *typep, sshbuf_len(packet));
- }
- fclose(dumpfile);
- /* No point in continuing */
- exit(0);
- }
- }
- (*packet_count)++;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to)
-{
- u_char type;
- size_t len;
- const u_char *buf;
- int r;
-
- for (;;) {
- if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
- return r;
- }
-
- if (type != 0)
- return 0;
- buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len);
- if (len == 0)
- return 0;
- if ((r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) {
- debug("ssh_input_append: %s", ssh_err(r));
- return r;
- }
- if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0) {
- debug("ssh_output_consume: %s", ssh_err(r));
- return r;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/* Minimal test_helper.c scaffholding to make this standalone */
-const char *in_test = NULL;
-#define TEST_START(a) \
- do { \
- in_test = (a); \
- if (do_debug) \
- fprintf(stderr, "test %s starting\n", in_test); \
- } while (0)
-#define TEST_DONE() \
- do { \
- if (do_debug) \
- fprintf(stderr, "test %s done\n", \
- in_test ? in_test : "???"); \
- in_test = NULL; \
- } while(0)
-#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a, b) \
- do { \
- if ((int)(a) != (int)(b)) { \
- fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \
- "%s (%d) != expected %s (%d)\n", \
- in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \
- __func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \
- exit(2); \
- } \
- } while (0)
-#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a, b) \
- do { \
- if ((int)(a) < (int)(b)) { \
- fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \
- "%s (%d) < expected %s (%d)\n", \
- in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \
- __func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \
- exit(2); \
- } \
- } while (0)
-#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a, b) \
- do { \
- if ((a) == (b)) { \
- fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \
- "%s (%p) != expected %s (%p)\n", \
- in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \
- __func__, __LINE__, #a, (a), #b, (b)); \
- exit(2); \
- } \
- } while (0)
-
-
-static void
-run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server)
-{
- int r = 0;
-
- while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) {
- if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client)) != 0) {
- debug("do_send_and_receive S2C: %s", ssh_err(r));
- break;
- }
- if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server)) != 0) {
- debug("do_send_and_receive C2S: %s", ssh_err(r));
- break;
- }
- }
- if (do_debug)
- printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1);
-}
-
-static void
-do_kex_with_key(const char *kex, struct sshkey *prvkey, int *c2s, int *s2c,
- int direction, int packet_index,
- const char *dump_path, struct sshbuf *replace_data)
-{
- struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL;
- struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
- struct sshbuf *state;
- struct kex_params kex_params;
- char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- char *keyname = NULL;
- struct hook_ctx hook_ctx;
-
- TEST_START("sshkey_from_private");
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(prvkey, &pubkey), 0);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("ssh_init");
- memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
- if (kex != NULL)
- kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = strdup(kex);
- keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(prvkey));
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
- kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- hook_ctx.c2s = c2s;
- hook_ctx.s2c = s2c;
- hook_ctx.trigger_direction = direction;
- hook_ctx.packet_index = packet_index;
- hook_ctx.dump_path = dump_path;
- hook_ctx.replace_data = replace_data;
- hook_ctx.client = client;
- hook_ctx.server = server;
- hook_ctx.server2 = server2;
- ssh_packet_set_input_hook(client, packet_hook, &hook_ctx);
- ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server, packet_hook, &hook_ctx);
- ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server2, packet_hook, &hook_ctx);
-
- TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey");
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, prvkey), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, pubkey), 0);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("kex");
- run_kex(client, server);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("rekeying client");
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
- run_kex(client, server);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("rekeying server");
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0);
- run_kex(client, server);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state");
- state = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state");
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, prvkey), 0);
- kex_free(server2->kex); /* XXX or should ssh_packet_set_state()? */
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0);
- sshbuf_free(state);
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL);
- /* XXX we need to set the callbacks */
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
-# endif
-#endif
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
- server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key;
- server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key;
- server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign;
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("rekeying server2");
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0);
- run_kex(client, server2);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
- run_kex(client, server2);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("cleanup");
- sshkey_free(pubkey);
- ssh_free(client);
- ssh_free(server);
- ssh_free(server2);
- free(keyname);
- TEST_DONE();
-}
-
-static void
-usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Usage: kexfuzz [-hcdrv] [-D direction] [-f data_file]\n"
- " [-K kex_alg] [-k private_key] [-i packet_index]\n"
- "\n"
- "Options:\n"
- " -h Display this help\n"
- " -c Count packets sent during KEX\n"
- " -d Dump mode: record KEX packet to data file\n"
- " -r Replace mode: replace packet with data file\n"
- " -v Turn on verbose logging\n"
- " -D S2C|C2S Packet direction for replacement or dump\n"
- " -f data_file Path to data file for replacement or dump\n"
- " -K kex_alg Name of KEX algorithm to test (see below)\n"
- " -k private_key Path to private key file\n"
- " -i packet_index Index of packet to replace or dump (from 0)\n"
- "\n"
- "Available KEX algorithms: %s\n", kex_alg_list(' '));
-}
-
-static void
-badusage(const char *bad)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "Invalid options\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", bad);
- usage();
- exit(1);
-}
-
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int ch, fd, r;
- int count_flag = 0, dump_flag = 0, replace_flag = 0;
- int packet_index = -1, direction = -1;
- int s2c = 0, c2s = 0; /* packet counts */
- const char *kex = NULL, *kpath = NULL, *data_path = NULL;
- struct sshkey *key = NULL;
- struct sshbuf *replace_data = NULL;
-
- setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hcdrvD:f:K:k:i:")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- case 'h':
- usage();
- return 0;
- case 'c':
- count_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'd':
- dump_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'r':
- replace_flag = 1;
- break;
- case 'v':
- do_debug = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'D':
- if (strcasecmp(optarg, "s2c") == 0)
- direction = S2C;
- else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "c2s") == 0)
- direction = C2S;
- else
- badusage("Invalid direction (-D)");
- break;
- case 'f':
- data_path = optarg;
- break;
- case 'K':
- kex = optarg;
- break;
- case 'k':
- kpath = optarg;
- break;
- case 'i':
- packet_index = atoi(optarg);
- if (packet_index < 0)
- badusage("Invalid packet index");
- break;
- default:
- badusage("unsupported flag");
- }
- }
- argc -= optind;
- argv += optind;
-
- log_init(argv[0], do_debug ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
- SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
-
- /* Must select a single mode */
- if ((count_flag + dump_flag + replace_flag) != 1)
- badusage("Must select one mode: -c, -d or -r");
- /* KEX type is mandatory */
- if (kex == NULL || !kex_names_valid(kex) || strchr(kex, ',') != NULL)
- badusage("Missing or invalid kex type (-K flag)");
- /* Valid key is mandatory */
- if (kpath == NULL)
- badusage("Missing private key (-k flag)");
- if ((fd = open(kpath, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- err(1, "open %s", kpath);
- if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL,
- &key, NULL)) != 0)
- errx(1, "Unable to load key %s: %s", kpath, ssh_err(r));
- close(fd);
- /* XXX check that it is a private key */
- /* XXX support certificates */
- if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
- badusage("Invalid key file (-k flag)");
-
- /* Replace (fuzz) mode */
- if (replace_flag) {
- if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL)
- badusage("Replace (-r) mode must specify direction "
- "(-D) packet index (-i) and data path (-f)");
- if ((fd = open(data_path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- err(1, "open %s", data_path);
- replace_data = sshbuf_new();
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, replace_data)) != 0)
- errx(1, "read %s: %s", data_path, ssh_err(r));
- close(fd);
- }
-
- /* Dump mode */
- if (dump_flag) {
- if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL)
- badusage("Dump (-d) mode must specify direction "
- "(-D), packet index (-i) and data path (-f)");
- }
-
- /* Count mode needs no further flags */
-
- do_kex_with_key(kex, key, &c2s, &s2c,
- direction, packet_index,
- dump_flag ? data_path : NULL,
- replace_flag ? replace_data : NULL);
- sshkey_free(key);
- sshbuf_free(replace_data);
-
- if (count_flag) {
- printf("S2C: %d\n", s2c);
- printf("C2S: %d\n", c2s);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c6e4b5d6fa71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* public domain */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+sshfatal(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+ LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ if (showfunc)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", func);
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (suffix != NULL)
+ fprintf(stderr, ": %s", suffix);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ _exit(1);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4003362d7960
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
+
+/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
+ do { \
+ (*pr) = sig->r; \
+ (*ps) = sig->s; \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#if SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR != 0x00070000
+# error SK API has changed, sk-dummy.c needs an update
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SK_DUMMY_INTEGRATE
+# define sk_api_version ssh_sk_api_version
+# define sk_enroll ssh_sk_enroll
+# define sk_sign ssh_sk_sign
+# define sk_load_resident_keys ssh_sk_load_resident_keys
+#endif /* !SK_STANDALONE */
+
+static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if defined(SK_DEBUG)
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ fprintf(stderr, "sk-dummy %s: ", func);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(ap);
+#else
+ (void)func; /* XXX */
+ (void)fmt; /* XXX */
+#endif
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sk_api_version(void)
+{
+ return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_key_ecdsa(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ EC_KEY *key = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *g;
+ const EC_POINT *q;
+ int ret = -1;
+ long privlen;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ char *privptr;
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+ response->key_handle = NULL;
+ response->key_handle_len = 0;
+
+ if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(key) != 1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_generate_key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(key, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
+ (g = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL ||
+ (q = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "couldn't get key parameters");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
+ response->public_key_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Key handle contains PEM encoded private key */
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((privlen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &privptr)) <= 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "BIO_get_mem_data failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response->key_handle = malloc(privlen)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->key_handle_len = (size_t)privlen;
+ memcpy(response->key_handle, privptr, response->key_handle_len);
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (response->public_key != NULL) {
+ memset(response->public_key, 0,
+ response->public_key_len);
+ free(response->public_key);
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (response->key_handle != NULL) {
+ memset(response->key_handle, 0,
+ response->key_handle_len);
+ free(response->key_handle);
+ response->key_handle = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ EC_KEY_free(key);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+pack_key_ed25519(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ u_char pk[crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
+ u_char sk[crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES];
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+ response->key_handle = NULL;
+ response->key_handle_len = 0;
+
+ memset(pk, 0, sizeof(pk));
+ memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk));
+ crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(pk, sk);
+
+ response->public_key_len = sizeof(pk);
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->public_key, pk, sizeof(pk));
+ /* Key handle contains sk */
+ response->key_handle_len = sizeof(sk);
+ if ((response->key_handle = malloc(response->key_handle_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->key_handle, sk, sizeof(sk));
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ free(response->public_key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (options == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+ options[i]->name);
+ if (options[i]->required) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+{
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+
+ (void)flags; /* XXX; unused */
+
+ if (enroll_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *enroll_response = NULL;
+ if (check_options(options) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch(alg) {
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ if (pack_key_ecdsa(response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ if (pack_key_ed25519(response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Have to return something here */
+ if ((response->signature = calloc(1, 1)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->signature_len = 0;
+
+ *enroll_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->public_key);
+ free(response->key_handle);
+ free(response->signature);
+ free(response->attestation_cert);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+dump(const char *preamble, const void *sv, size_t l)
+{
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+ const u_char *s = (const u_char *)sv;
+ size_t i;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s (len %zu):\n", preamble, l);
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ if (i % 16 == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%04zu: ", i);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s[i]);
+ if (i % 16 == 15 || i == l - 1)
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+sig_ecdsa(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+ uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t sighash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t countbuf[4];
+
+ /* Decode EC_KEY from key handle */
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
+ BIO_write(bio, key_handle, key_handle_len) != (int)key_handle_len) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "BIO setup failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, "")) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "Not an EC key: %d", EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
+ if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Prepare data to be signed */
+ dump("message", message, message_len);
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application));
+ SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx);
+ dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ countbuf[0] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
+ countbuf[1] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
+ countbuf[2] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
+ countbuf[3] = counter & 0xff;
+ dump("countbuf", countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
+ dump("flags", &flags, sizeof(flags));
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, &flags, sizeof(flags));
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, message, message_len);
+ SHA256_Final(sighash, &ctx);
+ dump("sighash", sighash, sizeof(sighash));
+ /* create and encode signature */
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(sighash, sizeof(sighash), ec)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "ECDSA_do_sign failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+ response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
+ (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+ explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ explicit_bzero(&sighash, sizeof(sighash));
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ response->sig_s = NULL;
+ }
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ size_t o;
+ int ret = -1;
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+ uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t signbuf[sizeof(apphash) + sizeof(flags) +
+ sizeof(counter) + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t sig[crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES + sizeof(signbuf)];
+ unsigned long long smlen;
+
+ if (key_handle_len != crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad key handle length %zu", key_handle_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
+ if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Prepare data to be signed */
+ dump("message", message, message_len);
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application));
+ SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx);
+ dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+
+ memcpy(signbuf, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ o = sizeof(apphash);
+ signbuf[o++] = flags;
+ signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
+ signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
+ signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
+ signbuf[o++] = counter & 0xff;
+ memcpy(signbuf + o, message, message_len);
+ o += message_len;
+ if (o != sizeof(signbuf)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad sign buf len %zu, expected %zu",
+ o, sizeof(signbuf));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dump("signbuf", signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
+ /* create and encode signature */
+ smlen = sizeof(signbuf);
+ if (crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, signbuf, sizeof(signbuf),
+ key_handle) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "crypto_sign_ed25519 failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (smlen <= sizeof(signbuf)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad sign smlen %llu, expected min %zu",
+ smlen, sizeof(signbuf) + 1);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->sig_r_len = (size_t)(smlen - sizeof(signbuf));
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->sig_r, sig, response->sig_r_len);
+ dump("sig_r", response->sig_r, response->sig_r_len);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+ explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ explicit_bzero(&signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
+ explicit_bzero(&sig, sizeof(sig));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
+{
+ struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+ uint8_t message[32];
+
+ if (sign_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sign_response = NULL;
+ if (check_options(options) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, datalen);
+ SHA256_Final(message, &ctx);
+ response->flags = flags;
+ response->counter = 0x12345678;
+ switch(alg) {
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ if (sig_ecdsa(message, sizeof(message), application,
+ response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
+ response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ if (sig_ed25519(message, sizeof(message), application,
+ response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
+ response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *sign_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(message, sizeof(message));
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+{
+ return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/modpipe.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/modpipe.c
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh
index a6fad8eb820c..4744fa3d97d6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -1,191 +1,199 @@
-# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.28 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.33 2020/06/24 15:16:23 markus Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
make_tmpdir
CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock
tid="connection multiplexing"
-NC=$OBJ/netcat
-
trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
fi
P=3301 # test port
wait_for_mux_master_ready()
{
- for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+ for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9; do
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
>/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
sleep $i
done
fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
}
start_sshd
start_mux_master()
{
trace "start master, fork to background"
${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \
-E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
# NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors.
SSH_PID=$!
wait_for_mux_master_ready
}
start_mux_master
verbose "test $tid: envpass"
trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
EOF
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "environment not found"
fi
verbose "test $tid: transfer"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \
${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "test $tid: forward"
trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result"
$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
netcat_pid=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
$NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY}
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
trace "forward over UNIX and check result"
$NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
netcat_pid=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
-$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY} 2>/dev/null
+sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
+$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY}
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
- trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection"
- verbose "test $tid: status $s"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s
+ for mode in "" "-Oproxy"; do
+ trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection ($mode)"
+ verbose "test $tid: status $s ($mode)"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL $mode otherhost exit $s
r=$?
if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s"
fi
# same with early close of stdout/err
- trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection"
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \
+ trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection ($mode)"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n $mode otherhost \
exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
r=$?
if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s"
fi
+ done
done
verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "check command failed"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request local forward failed"
+sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
|| fail "connect to local forward port failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel local forward failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
&& fail "local forward port still listening"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request remote forward failed"
+sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
|| fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel remote forward failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
&& fail "remote forward port still listening"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request local forward failed"
-echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
+ grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "connect to local forward path failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel local forward failed"
N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request remote forward failed"
-echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
+ grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel remote forward failed"
N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "send exit command failed"
# Wait for master to exit
wait $SSH_PID
kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
trace "restart master, fork to background"
start_mux_master
# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
SLEEP_PID=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "send stop command failed"
# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
wait $SLEEP_PID
[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
wait $SSH_PID
[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed"
SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/multipubkey.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/multipubkey.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index e9d15306ff2f..8cdda1a9ae0d
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/multipubkey.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/multipubkey.sh
@@ -1,66 +1,75 @@
-# $OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.1 2014/12/22 08:06:03 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.4 2021/06/07 01:16:34 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="multiple pubkey"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
# Create a CA key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Make some keys and a certificate.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fail "couldn't sign user_key1"
# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
# it is offered.
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1.pub
cp -p $OBJ/user_key1 $OBJ/cert_user_key1
grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
opts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
-for privsep in no yes; do
+for match in no yes ; do
(
- grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "Protocol 2"
- echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
- echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ if test "$match" = "yes" ; then
+ echo "AuthenticationMethods none" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "PubkeyAuthentication no" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "Match all" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "PubkeyAuthentication yes" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ fi
+ echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Single key should fail.
+ trace "match $match single key"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key"
# Single key with same-public cert should fail.
+ trace "match $match pubkey + identical cert"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key+cert"
# Multiple plain keys should succeed.
+ trace "match $match multiple public"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub $OBJ/user_key2.pub > \
$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with multiple keys"
# Cert and different key should succeed
# Key and different-public cert should succeed.
+ trace "match $match pubkey + different cert"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with key/cert"
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c
index 56bd09de5485..20ec3f5954fa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c
@@ -1,1664 +1,1686 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.131 2015/09/03 23:06:28 sobrado Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson <ericj@monkey.org>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by
* *Hobbit* <hobbit@avian.org>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
# include <err.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H
+# include <sys/byteorder.h>
+#endif
+
+/* rename to avoid collision in libssh */
+#define timeout_connect netcat_timeout_connect
/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */
#define IAC 255
#define DONT 254
#define DO 253
#define WONT 252
#define WILL 251
#ifndef SUN_LEN
#define SUN_LEN(su) \
(sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path))
#endif
#define PORT_MAX 65535
#define PORT_MAX_LEN 6
#define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE 19
#define POLL_STDIN 0
#define POLL_NETOUT 1
#define POLL_NETIN 2
#define POLL_STDOUT 3
#define BUFSIZE 16384
/* Command Line Options */
int dflag; /* detached, no stdin */
int Fflag; /* fdpass sock to stdout */
unsigned int iflag; /* Interval Flag */
int kflag; /* More than one connect */
int lflag; /* Bind to local port */
int Nflag; /* shutdown() network socket */
int nflag; /* Don't do name look up */
char *Pflag; /* Proxy username */
char *pflag; /* Localport flag */
int rflag; /* Random ports flag */
char *sflag; /* Source Address */
int tflag; /* Telnet Emulation */
int uflag; /* UDP - Default to TCP */
int vflag; /* Verbosity */
int xflag; /* Socks proxy */
int zflag; /* Port Scan Flag */
int Dflag; /* sodebug */
int Iflag; /* TCP receive buffer size */
int Oflag; /* TCP send buffer size */
int Sflag; /* TCP MD5 signature option */
int Tflag = -1; /* IP Type of Service */
int rtableid = -1;
int timeout = -1;
int family = AF_UNSPEC;
char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1];
char *unix_dg_tmp_socket;
void atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int);
void build_ports(char *);
void help(void);
int local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo);
void readwrite(int);
void fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn));
int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *);
int udptest(int);
int unix_bind(char *);
int unix_connect(char *);
int unix_listen(char *);
-void set_common_sockopts(int);
+void set_common_sockopts(int, int);
int map_tos(char *, int *);
void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
void usage(int);
ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ch, s, ret, socksv;
char *host, *uport;
struct addrinfo hints;
struct servent *sv;
socklen_t len;
struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr;
char *proxy = NULL;
const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL;
struct addrinfo proxyhints;
char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE];
ret = 1;
s = 0;
socksv = 5;
host = NULL;
uport = NULL;
sv = NULL;
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case '4':
family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'U':
family = AF_UNIX;
break;
case 'X':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0)
socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0)
socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */
else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0)
socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */
else
errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol");
break;
case 'd':
dflag = 1;
break;
case 'F':
Fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
help();
break;
case 'i':
iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'k':
kflag = 1;
break;
case 'l':
lflag = 1;
break;
case 'N':
Nflag = 1;
break;
case 'n':
nflag = 1;
break;
case 'P':
Pflag = optarg;
break;
case 'p':
pflag = optarg;
break;
case 'r':
rflag = 1;
break;
case 's':
sflag = optarg;
break;
case 't':
tflag = 1;
break;
case 'u':
uflag = 1;
break;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
case 'V':
rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0,
RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
break;
#endif
case 'v':
vflag = 1;
break;
case 'w':
timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
timeout *= 1000;
break;
case 'x':
xflag = 1;
if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL)
errx(1, "strdup");
break;
case 'z':
zflag = 1;
break;
case 'D':
Dflag = 1;
break;
case 'I':
Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s",
errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'O':
Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s",
errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'S':
Sflag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
errstr = NULL;
errno = 0;
if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag))
break;
if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' &&
optarg[1] == 'x')
Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16);
else
Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255,
&errstr);
if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno)
errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg);
break;
default:
usage(1);
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
/* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */
if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) {
host = argv[0];
uport = NULL;
} else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) {
if (!lflag)
usage(1);
uport = argv[0];
host = NULL;
} else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) {
host = argv[0];
uport = argv[1];
} else
usage(1);
if (lflag && sflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l");
if (lflag && pflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l");
if (lflag && zflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l");
if (!lflag && kflag)
errx(1, "must use -l with -k");
/* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */
if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) {
if (sflag) {
unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag;
} else {
strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX",
UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE);
if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL)
err(1, "mktemp");
unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf;
}
}
/* Initialize addrinfo structure. */
if (family != AF_UNIX) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_family = family;
hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
if (nflag)
hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
}
if (xflag) {
if (uflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode");
if (lflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for listen");
if (family == AF_UNIX)
errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets");
/* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */
if (family == AF_INET6)
errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6");
if (sflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address");
proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":");
proxyport = proxy;
memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
proxyhints.ai_family = family;
proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
if (nflag)
proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
}
if (lflag) {
int connfd;
ret = 0;
if (family == AF_UNIX) {
if (uflag)
s = unix_bind(host);
else
s = unix_listen(host);
}
/* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */
for (;;) {
if (family != AF_UNIX)
s = local_listen(host, uport, hints);
if (s < 0)
err(1, "local_listen");
/*
* For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it
* receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs.
*/
if (uflag && kflag)
readwrite(s);
/*
* For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially
* to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions
* to talk to the caller.
*/
else if (uflag && !kflag) {
int rv, plen;
char buf[16384];
struct sockaddr_storage z;
len = sizeof(z);
plen = 2048;
rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK,
(struct sockaddr *)&z, &len);
if (rv < 0)
err(1, "recvfrom");
rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
if (rv < 0)
err(1, "connect");
if (vflag)
report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
readwrite(s);
} else {
len = sizeof(cliaddr);
connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr,
&len);
if (connfd == -1) {
/* For now, all errnos are fatal */
err(1, "accept");
}
if (vflag)
report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len);
readwrite(connfd);
close(connfd);
}
if (family != AF_UNIX)
close(s);
else if (uflag) {
if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0)
err(1, "connect");
}
if (!kflag)
break;
}
} else if (family == AF_UNIX) {
ret = 0;
if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) {
readwrite(s);
close(s);
} else
ret = 1;
if (uflag)
unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket);
exit(ret);
} else {
int i = 0;
/* Construct the portlist[] array. */
build_ports(uport);
/* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */
for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (s)
close(s);
if (xflag)
s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints,
proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv,
Pflag);
else
s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints);
if (s < 0)
continue;
ret = 0;
if (vflag || zflag) {
/* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */
if (uflag) {
if (udptest(s) == -1) {
ret = 1;
continue;
}
}
/* Don't look up port if -n. */
if (nflag)
sv = NULL;
else {
sv = getservbyport(
ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])),
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
}
fprintf(stderr,
"Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] "
"succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i],
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp",
sv ? sv->s_name : "*");
}
if (Fflag)
fdpass(s);
else if (!zflag)
readwrite(s);
}
}
if (s)
close(s);
exit(ret);
}
/*
* unix_bind()
* Returns a unix socket bound to the given path
*/
int
unix_bind(char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
int s;
/* Create unix domain socket. */
if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM,
0)) < 0)
return (-1);
memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
close(s);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return (-1);
}
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* unix_connect()
* Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
unix_connect(char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
int s;
if (uflag) {
if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0)
return (-1);
} else {
if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
return (-1);
}
(void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
close(s);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return (-1);
}
if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* unix_listen()
* Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it.
*/
int
unix_listen(char *path)
{
int s;
if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0)
return (-1);
if (listen(s, 5) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* remote_connect()
* Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local
* port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
{
struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
int s, error;
#if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY)
int on = 1;
#endif
if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
res0 = res;
do {
if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
continue;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
#endif
/* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */
if (sflag || pflag) {
struct addrinfo ahints, *ares;
#ifdef SO_BINDANY
/* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */
setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on));
#endif
memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family;
ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr,
ares->ai_addrlen) < 0)
err(1, "bind failed");
freeaddrinfo(ares);
}
- set_common_sockopts(s);
+ set_common_sockopts(s, res0->ai_family);
if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
break;
else if (vflag)
warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port,
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
close(s);
s = -1;
} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (s);
}
int
timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
socklen_t optlen;
int flags = 0, optval;
int ret;
if (timeout != -1) {
flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0);
if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1)
err(1, "set non-blocking mode");
}
if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) {
pfd.fd = s;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) {
optlen = sizeof(optval);
if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR,
&optval, &optlen)) == 0) {
errno = optval;
ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
} else if (ret == 0) {
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
ret = -1;
} else
err(1, "poll failed");
}
if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
err(1, "restoring flags");
return (ret);
}
/*
* local_listen()
* Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source
* address. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
{
struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
int s, ret, x = 1;
int error;
/* Allow nodename to be null. */
hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
/*
* In the case of binding to a wildcard address
* default to binding to an ipv4 address.
*/
if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
res0 = res;
do {
if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
continue;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
#endif
#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ret == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEPORT");
#endif
#ifdef SO_REUSEADDR
ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ret == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR");
#endif
- set_common_sockopts(s);
+ set_common_sockopts(s, res0->ai_family);
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr,
res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
break;
close(s);
s = -1;
} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
if (!uflag && s != -1) {
if (listen(s, 1) < 0)
err(1, "listen");
}
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (s);
}
/*
* readwrite()
* Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin.
*/
void
readwrite(int net_fd)
{
struct pollfd pfd[4];
int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE];
size_t netinbufpos = 0;
unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE];
size_t stdinbufpos = 0;
int n, num_fds;
ssize_t ret;
/* don't read from stdin if requested */
if (dflag)
stdin_fd = -1;
/* stdin */
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd;
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
/* network out */
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd;
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
/* network in */
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd;
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
/* stdout */
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd;
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
while (1) {
/* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
&& stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */
if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
&& stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and
* write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start
* scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */
if (iflag)
sleep(iflag);
/* poll */
num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout);
/* treat poll errors */
if (num_fds == -1) {
close(net_fd);
err(1, "polling error");
}
/* timeout happened */
if (num_fds == 0)
return;
/* treat socket error conditions */
for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) {
pfd[n].fd = -1;
}
}
/* reading is possible after HUP */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN &&
pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN))
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN &&
pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN))
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) {
if (Nflag)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
}
/* if HUP, stop watching stdout */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
/* if no net out, stop watching stdin */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
/* if no stdout, stop watching net in */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
}
/* try to read from stdin */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf,
&stdinbufpos);
/* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */
if (ret == 0 || ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
/* read something - poll net out */
if (stdinbufpos > 0)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT;
/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0;
}
/* try to write to network */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) {
ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf,
&stdinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
if (stdinbufpos == 0)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
/* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */
if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
}
/* try to read from network */
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
&netinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
/* eof on net in - remove from pfd */
if (ret == 0) {
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
}
/* read something - poll stdout */
if (netinbufpos > 0)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT;
/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0;
/* handle telnet */
if (tflag)
atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
netinbufpos);
}
/* try to write to stdout */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) {
ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf,
&netinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
if (netinbufpos == 0)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
/* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */
if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
}
/* stdin gone and queue empty? */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) {
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
}
/* net in gone and queue empty? */
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) {
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
}
}
}
ssize_t
drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
{
ssize_t n;
ssize_t adjust;
n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos);
/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
n = -2;
if (n <= 0)
return n;
/* adjust buffer */
adjust = *bufpos - n;
if (adjust > 0)
memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust);
*bufpos -= n;
return n;
}
ssize_t
fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
{
size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos;
ssize_t n;
n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num);
/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
n = -2;
if (n <= 0)
return n;
*bufpos += n;
return n;
}
/*
* fdpass()
* Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit.
*/
void
fdpass(int nfd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
struct msghdr msg;
#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
union {
struct cmsghdr hdr;
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
} cmsgbuf;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
#endif
struct iovec vec;
char ch = '\0';
struct pollfd pfd;
ssize_t r;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd;
msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd);
#else
memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd;
#endif
vec.iov_base = &ch;
vec.iov_len = 1;
msg.msg_iov = &vec;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+ pfd.events = POLLOUT;
for (;;) {
r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0);
if (r == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) {
- pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1)
err(1, "poll");
continue;
}
err(1, "sendmsg");
- } else if (r == -1)
+ } else if (r != 1)
errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r);
else
break;
}
exit(0);
#else
errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
#endif
}
/* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */
void
atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size)
{
unsigned char *p, *end;
unsigned char obuf[4];
if (size < 3)
return;
end = buf + size - 2;
for (p = buf; p < end; p++) {
if (*p != IAC)
continue;
obuf[0] = IAC;
p++;
if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT))
obuf[1] = DONT;
else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT))
obuf[1] = WONT;
else
continue;
p++;
obuf[2] = *p;
if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3)
warn("Write Error!");
}
}
/*
* build_ports()
* Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port
* that we should try to connect to.
*/
void
build_ports(char *p)
{
const char *errstr;
char *n;
int hi, lo, cp;
int x = 0;
if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) {
*n = '\0';
n++;
/* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */
hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n);
lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
if (lo > hi) {
cp = hi;
hi = lo;
lo = cp;
}
/* Load ports sequentially. */
for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) {
portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN);
if (portlist[x] == NULL)
errx(1, "calloc");
snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp);
x++;
}
/* Randomly swap ports. */
if (rflag) {
int y;
char *c;
for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) {
y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo);
c = portlist[x];
portlist[x] = portlist[y];
portlist[y] = c;
}
}
} else {
hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
portlist[0] = strdup(p);
if (portlist[0] == NULL)
errx(1, "strdup");
}
}
/*
* udptest()
* Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there.
* Fails once PF state table is full.
*/
int
udptest(int s)
{
int i, ret;
for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) {
if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1)
ret = 1;
else
ret = -1;
}
return (ret);
}
void
-set_common_sockopts(int s)
+set_common_sockopts(int s, int af)
{
int x = 1;
#ifdef TCP_MD5SIG
if (Sflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG,
&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt");
}
#endif
if (Dflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG,
&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt");
}
+#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(IPV6_TCLASS)
if (Tflag != -1) {
- if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
- &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
+ int proto, option;
+
+ if (af == AF_INET6) {
+ proto = IPPROTO_IPV6;
+ option = IPV6_TCLASS;
+ } else {
+ proto = IPPROTO_IP;
+ option = IP_TOS;
+ }
+
+ if (setsockopt(s, proto, option, &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set IP ToS");
}
+#endif
if (Iflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
&Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size");
}
if (Oflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF,
&Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set TCP send buffer size");
}
}
int
map_tos(char *s, int *val)
{
+#ifdef IP_TOS
/* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */
const struct toskeywords {
const char *keyword;
int val;
} *t, toskeywords[] = {
{ "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
{ "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
{ "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
{ "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
{ "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
{ "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
{ "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
{ "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
{ "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
{ "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
{ "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
{ "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
{ "critical", IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP },
{ "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
{ "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
{ "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
{ "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
{ "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
{ "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
{ "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
{ "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
{ "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
{ "inetcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL },
{ "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
{ "netcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL },
{ "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
{ "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
{ NULL, -1 },
};
for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) {
if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) {
*val = t->val;
return (1);
}
}
+#endif
return (0);
}
void
report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen)
{
char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST];
char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
int herr;
int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV;
if (nflag)
flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST;
if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen,
remote_host, sizeof(remote_host),
remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
flags)) != 0) {
if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM)
err(1, "getnameinfo");
else
errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr));
}
fprintf(stderr,
"Connection from %s %s "
"received!\n", remote_host, remote_port);
}
void
help(void)
{
usage(0);
fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\
\t-4 Use IPv4\n\
\t-6 Use IPv6\n\
\t-D Enable the debug socket option\n\
\t-d Detach from stdin\n\
\t-F Pass socket fd\n\
\t-h This help text\n\
\t-I length TCP receive buffer length\n\
\t-i secs\t Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\
\t-k Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\
\t-l Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\
\t-N Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\
\t-n Suppress name/port resolutions\n\
\t-O length TCP send buffer length\n\
\t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\
\t-p port\t Specify local port for remote connects\n\
\t-r Randomize remote ports\n\
\t-S Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\
\t-s addr\t Local source address\n\
\t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\
\t-t Answer TELNET negotiation\n\
\t-U Use UNIX domain socket\n\
\t-u UDP mode\n\
\t-V rtable Specify alternate routing table\n\
\t-v Verbose\n\
\t-w secs\t Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\
\t-X proto Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\
\t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\
\t-z Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\
Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n");
exit(1);
}
void
usage(int ret)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n"
- "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n"
+ "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T toskeyword]\n"
"\t [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n"
"\t [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n");
if (ret)
exit(1);
}
/* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */
/* $OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#define SOCKS_PORT "1080"
#define HTTP_PROXY_PORT "3128"
#define HTTP_MAXHDRS 64
#define SOCKS_V5 5
#define SOCKS_V4 4
#define SOCKS_NOAUTH 0
#define SOCKS_NOMETHOD 0xff
#define SOCKS_CONNECT 1
#define SOCKS_IPV4 1
#define SOCKS_DOMAIN 3
#define SOCKS_IPV6 4
int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int,
const char *);
static int
decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr,
socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric)
{
int r;
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res);
/* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */
if (r != 0) {
if (!numeric) {
errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p,
gai_strerror(r));
}
return (-1);
}
if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) {
freeaddrinfo(res);
errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen");
}
memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (0);
}
static int
proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz)
{
size_t off;
for(off = 0;;) {
if (off >= bufsz)
errx(1, "proxy read too long");
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1)
err(1, "proxy read");
/* Skip CR */
if (buf[off] == '\r')
continue;
if (buf[off] == '\n') {
buf[off] = '\0';
break;
}
off++;
}
return (off);
}
static const char *
getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost)
{
char prompt[512];
static char pw[256];
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ",
proxyuser, proxyhost);
if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase");
return (pw);
}
int
socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port,
struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)),
const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints,
int socksv, const char *proxyuser)
{
int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0;
size_t hlen, wlen = 0;
unsigned char buf[1024];
size_t cnt;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
in_port_t serverport;
const char *proxypass = NULL;
if (proxyport == NULL)
proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT;
/* Abuse API to lookup port */
if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1)
errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port);
serverport = in4->sin_port;
again:
if (authretry++ > 3)
errx(1, "Too many authentication failures");
proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints);
if (proxyfd < 0)
return (-1);
if (socksv == 5) {
if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1)
addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */
/* Version 5, one method: no authentication */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = 1;
buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH;
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3);
if (cnt != 3)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2);
if (cnt != 2)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD)
errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed");
switch (addr.ss_family) {
case 0:
/* Version 5, connect: domain name */
/* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */
hlen = strlen(host);
if (hlen > 255)
errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5");
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN;
buf[4] = hlen;
memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen);
memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport);
wlen = 7 + hlen;
break;
case AF_INET:
/* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4;
memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
wlen = 10;
break;
case AF_INET6:
/* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6;
memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr);
memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port,
sizeof in6->sin6_port);
wlen = 22;
break;
default:
errx(1, "internal error: silly AF");
}
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
if (cnt != wlen)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4);
if (cnt != 4)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt);
if (buf[1] != 0)
errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
switch (buf[3]) {
case SOCKS_IPV4:
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6);
if (cnt != 6)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt);
break;
case SOCKS_IPV6:
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18);
if (cnt != 18)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt);
break;
default:
errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type");
}
} else if (socksv == 4) {
/* This will exit on lookup failure */
decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 1, 0);
/* Version 4 */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V4;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; /* connect */
memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
buf[8] = 0; /* empty username */
wlen = 9;
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
if (cnt != wlen)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8);
if (cnt != 8)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt);
if (buf[1] != 90)
errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
} else if (socksv == -1) {
/* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
/* Disallow bad chars in hostname */
if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host))
errx(1, "Invalid hostname");
/* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */
if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
host, ntohs(serverport));
} else {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
host, ntohs(serverport));
}
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
errx(1, "hostname too long");
r = strlen(buf);
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r);
if (cnt != (size_t)r)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
if (authretry > 1) {
char resp[1024];
proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost);
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s",
proxyuser, proxypass);
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) ||
b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp,
sizeof(resp)) == -1)
errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long");
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: "
"Basic %s\r\n", resp);
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long");
r = strlen(buf);
if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
}
/* Terminate headers */
if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2)
err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r);
/* Read status reply */
proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (proxyuser != NULL &&
strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) {
if (authretry > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication "
"failed\n");
}
close(proxyfd);
goto again;
} else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 &&
strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0)
errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf);
/* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */
for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) {
proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (*buf == '\0')
break;
}
if (*buf != '\0')
errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received");
} else
errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv);
return (proxyfd);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/percent.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/percent.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7ed41845b5cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/percent.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# $OpenBSD: percent.sh,v 1.13 2021/07/25 12:13:03 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="percent expansions"
+
+if [ -x "/usr/xpg4/bin/id" ]; then
+ PATH=/usr/xpg4/bin:$PATH
+ export PATH
+fi
+
+USER=`id -u -n`
+USERID=`id -u`
+HOST=`hostname | cut -f1 -d.`
+HOSTNAME=`hostname`
+
+# Localcommand is evaluated after connection because %T is not available
+# until then. Because of this we use a different method of exercising it,
+# and we can't override the remote user otherwise authentication will fail.
+# We also have to explicitly enable it.
+echo "permitlocalcommand yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+trial()
+{
+ opt="$1"; arg="$2"; expect="$3"
+
+ trace "test $opt=$arg $expect"
+ rm -f $OBJ/actual
+ got=""
+ case "$opt" in
+ localcommand)
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="echo '$arg' >$OBJ/actual" \
+ somehost true
+ got=`cat $OBJ/actual`
+ ;;
+ userknownhostsfile)
+ # Move the userknownhosts file to what the expansion says,
+ # make sure ssh works then put it back.
+ mv "$OBJ/known_hosts" "$OBJ/$expect"
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="$OBJ/$arg" somehost true && \
+ got="$expect"
+ mv "$OBJ/$expect" "$OBJ/known_hosts"
+ ;;
+ matchexec)
+ (cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy && \
+ echo "Match Exec \"echo '$arg' >$OBJ/actual\"") \
+ >$OBJ/ssh_proxy_match
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_match remuser@somehost true || true
+ got=`cat $OBJ/actual`
+ ;;
+ *forward)
+ # LocalForward and RemoteForward take two args and only
+ # operate on Unix domain socket paths
+ got=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="/$arg /$arg" -G \
+ remuser@somehost | awk '$1=="'$opt'"{print $2" "$3}'`
+ expect="/$expect /$expect"
+ ;;
+ *)
+ got=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="$arg" -G \
+ remuser@somehost | awk '$1=="'$opt'"{print $2}'`
+ esac
+ if [ "$got" != "$expect" ]; then
+ fail "$opt=$arg expect $expect got $got"
+ fi
+}
+
+for i in matchexec localcommand remotecommand controlpath identityagent \
+ forwardagent localforward remoteforward userknownhostsfile; do
+ verbose $tid $i percent
+ case "$i" in
+ localcommand|userknownhostsfile)
+ # Any test that's going to actually make a connection needs
+ # to use the real username.
+ REMUSER=$USER ;;
+ *)
+ REMUSER=remuser ;;
+ esac
+ if [ "$i" = "$localcommand" ]; then
+ trial $i '%T' NONE
+ fi
+ # Matches implementation in readconf.c:ssh_connection_hash()
+ HASH=`printf "${HOSTNAME}127.0.0.1${PORT}$REMUSER" |
+ $OPENSSL_BIN sha1 | cut -f2 -d' '`
+ trial $i '%%' '%'
+ trial $i '%C' $HASH
+ trial $i '%i' $USERID
+ trial $i '%h' 127.0.0.1
+ trial $i '%L' $HOST
+ trial $i '%l' $HOSTNAME
+ trial $i '%n' somehost
+ trial $i '%k' localhost-with-alias
+ trial $i '%p' $PORT
+ trial $i '%r' $REMUSER
+ trial $i '%u' $USER
+ # We can't specify a full path outside the regress dir, so skip tests
+ # containing %d for UserKnownHostsFile
+ if [ "$i" != "userknownhostsfile" ]; then
+ trial $i '%d' $HOME
+ trial $i '%%/%C/%i/%h/%d/%L/%l/%n/%p/%r/%u' \
+ "%/$HASH/$USERID/127.0.0.1/$HOME/$HOST/$HOSTNAME/somehost/$PORT/$REMUSER/$USER"
+ fi
+done
+
+# Subset of above since we don't expand shell-style variables on anything that
+# runs a command because the shell will expand those.
+for i in controlpath identityagent forwardagent localforward remoteforward \
+ userknownhostsfile; do
+ verbose $tid $i dollar
+ FOO=bar
+ export FOO
+ trial $i '${FOO}' $FOO
+done
+
+
+# A subset of options support tilde expansion
+for i in controlpath identityagent forwardagent; do
+ verbose $tid $i tilde
+ trial $i '~' $HOME/
+ trial $i '~/.ssh' $HOME/.ssh
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/portnum.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/portnum.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index bcc68e80bca6..5e535c133464
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh
@@ -1,168 +1,174 @@
-# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="authorized principals command"
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then
echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
exit 0
fi
+case "$SSH_KEYTYPES" in
+ *ssh-rsa*) userkeytype=rsa ;;
+ *) userkeytype=ed25519 ;;
+esac
+
SERIAL=$$
# Create a CA key and a user certificate.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
-${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${userkeytype} -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "Joanne User" \
-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key"
CERT_BODY=`cat $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
CA_BODY=`cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
CERT_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
CA_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have
# acceptable directory permissions.
-PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}"
+PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}.$$"
+trap "$SUDO rm -f ${PRINCIPALS_COMMAND}" 0
cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'"
#!/bin/sh
test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
-test "x\$2" != "xssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" && exit 1
+test "x\$2" != "xssh-${userkeytype}-cert-v01@openssh.com" && exit 1
test "x\$3" != "xssh-ed25519" && exit 1
test "x\$4" != "xJoanne User" && exit 1
test "x\$5" != "x${SERIAL}" && exit 1
test "x\$6" != "x${CA_FP}" && exit 1
test "x\$7" != "x${CERT_FP}" && exit 1
test "x\$8" != "x${CERT_BODY}" && exit 1
test "x\$9" != "x${CA_BODY}" && exit 1
test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" &&
exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}"
_EOF
test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command"
$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND"
if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ; then
echo "skipping: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND is unsuitable as " \
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand"
$SUDO rm -f $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND
exit 0
fi
if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then
# Test explicitly-specified principals
- for privsep in yes no ; do
+ for privsep in yes ; do
_prefix="privsep $privsep"
# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" \
"%u %t %T %i %s %F %f %k %K"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# XXX test missing command
# XXX test failing command
# Empty authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Wrong authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# authorized_principals with bad key option
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=false
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=true
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# Setup for principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Wrong principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
else
echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \
"(/var/run mounted noexec?)"
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/proxy-connect.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/proxy-connect.sh
index 39bbd3c96e76..8847fe0c664b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/proxy-connect.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/proxy-connect.sh
@@ -1,21 +1,27 @@
-# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.11 2017/09/26 22:39:25 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.12 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="proxy connect"
-for c in no yes; do
+if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then
+ comp="no"
+else
+ comp="no yes"
+fi
+
+for c in $comp; do
verbose "plain username comp=$c"
opts="-oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh proxyconnect comp=$c failed"
fi
if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION comp=$c: " \
"$SSH_CONNECTION"
fi
done
verbose "username with style"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \
fail "ssh proxyconnect failed"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 191a2bda8d35..708c288d73ae
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.6 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 03:35:07 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="putty ciphers"
if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
exit 0
fi
-for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do
+for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr chacha20 ; do
verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
rm -f ${COPY}
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
rm -f ${COPY}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 71c09701b2c8..686d0e1af2e5
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
-# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.4 2016/11/25 03:02:01 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.5 2020/01/23 03:24:38 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="putty KEX"
if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
exit 0
fi
-for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ; do
+for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ecdh ; do
verbose "$tid: kex $k"
cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "KEX $k failed"
fi
done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index 4928d4533f6b..14b41022f8a6
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh
@@ -1,38 +1,44 @@
-# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.6 2018/02/23 03:03:00 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="putty transfer data"
if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
exit 0
fi
-for c in 0 1 ; do
+if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then
+ comp="0"
+else
+ comp="0 1"
+fi
+
+for c in $comp; do
verbose "$tid: compression $c"
rm -f ${COPY}
cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c
echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \
-i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
trace "compression $c dd-size ${s}"
rm -f ${COPY}
dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \
-batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
"cat > ${COPY}"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
done
rm -f ${COPY}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/reconfigure.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/reconfigure.sh
index dd15eddb2a24..d5b4e9808fcc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/reconfigure.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/reconfigure.sh
@@ -1,43 +1,65 @@
-# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.9 2021/06/10 09:46:28 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="simple connect after reconfigure"
# we need the full path to sshd for -HUP
if test "x$USE_VALGRIND" = "x" ; then
case $SSHD in
/*)
# full path is OK
;;
*)
# otherwise make fully qualified
SSHD=$OBJ/$SSHD
esac
fi
start_sshd
trace "connect before restart"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed before reconfigure"
fi
PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
rm -f $PIDFILE
$SUDO kill -HUP $PID
trace "wait for sshd to restart"
i=0;
while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
i=`expr $i + 1`
sleep $i
done
test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart"
trace "connect after restart"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed after reconfigure"
fi
+
+trace "reconfigure with active clients"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost sleep 10 # authenticated client
+${NC} -d 127.0.0.1 $PORT >/dev/null & # unauthenticated client
+PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+$SUDO kill -HUP $PID
+
+trace "wait for sshd to restart"
+i=0;
+while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+ i=`expr $i + 1`
+ sleep $i
+done
+
+test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart"
+
+trace "connect after restart with active clients"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh connect with failed after reconfigure"
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/reexec.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/reexec.sh
index 2192456cd85e..8966ba524e60 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/reexec.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/reexec.sh
@@ -1,54 +1,57 @@
# $OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.12 2017/08/07 03:52:55 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="reexec tests"
SSHD_ORIG=$SSHD
SSHD_COPY=$OBJ/sshd
# Start a sshd and then delete it
start_sshd_copy ()
{
- cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY
+ # NB. prefer ln to cp here. On some OSX 19.4 configurations,
+ # djm has seen failure after fork() when the executable image
+ # has been removed from the filesystem.
+ ln $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY || cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY
SSHD=$SSHD_COPY
start_sshd
SSHD=$SSHD_ORIG
}
# Do basic copy tests
copy_tests ()
{
rm -f ${COPY}
${SSH} -nq -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \
cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
rm -f ${COPY}
}
verbose "test config passing"
cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
start_sshd
echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
copy_tests
stop_sshd
cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
# cygwin can't fork a deleted binary
if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
verbose "test reexec fallback"
start_sshd_copy
rm -f $SSHD_COPY
copy_tests
stop_sshd
fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh
index fd6a02cc7a62..61723cd86608 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh
@@ -1,172 +1,172 @@
-# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.18 2018/04/10 00:14:10 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.19 2021/07/19 05:08:54 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="rekey"
LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
rm -f ${LOG}
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
# Test rekeying based on data volume only.
# Arguments will be passed to ssh.
ssh_data_rekeying()
{
_kexopt=$1 ; shift
_opts="$@"
if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
_opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt"
fi
rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
_opts="$_opts -oCompression=no"
${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh failed ($@)"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy ($@)"
n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
n=`expr $n - 1`
trace "$n rekeying(s)"
if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
fail "no rekeying occurred ($@)"
fi
}
increase_datafile_size 300
opts=""
for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
done
for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
opts="$opts Ciphers=$i"
done
for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
opts="$opts MACs=$i"
done
for opt in $opts; do
verbose "client rekey $opt"
ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k
done
# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms
if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c
done
done
fi
for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}"
ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s
done
for s in 5 10; do
verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}"
rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
- $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3"
+ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 10"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
n=`expr $n - 1`
trace "$n rekeying(s)"
if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
fail "no rekeying occurred"
fi
done
for s in 5 10; do
verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
- $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
+ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 10"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh failed"
fi
n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
n=`expr $n - 1`
trace "$n rekeying(s)"
if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
fail "no rekeying occurred"
fi
done
for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
verbose "server rekeylimit ${s}"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "rekeylimit ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat ${DATA}" \
> ${COPY}
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
n=`expr $n - 1`
trace "$n rekeying(s)"
if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
fail "no rekeying occurred"
fi
done
for s in 5 10; do
verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "rekeylimit default ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
- ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3"
+ ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 10"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh failed"
fi
n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
n=`expr $n - 1`
trace "$n rekeying(s)"
if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
fail "no rekeying occurred"
fi
done
verbose "rekeylimit parsing"
for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G 4G 8G; do
for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do
case $size in
16) bytes=16 ;;
1k|1K) bytes=1024 ;;
1m|1M) bytes=1048576 ;;
1g|1G) bytes=1073741824 ;;
4g|4G) bytes=4294967296 ;;
8g|8G) bytes=8589934592 ;;
esac
case $time in
1) seconds=1 ;;
1m|1M) seconds=60 ;;
1h|1H) seconds=3600 ;;
1d|1D) seconds=86400 ;;
1w|1W) seconds=604800 ;;
esac
b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'`
s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'`
if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then
fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b"
fi
if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then
fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s"
fi
done
done
rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
index 59f1ff63e6da..7fb21f424ebd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
@@ -1,59 +1,71 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.3 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.4 2019/07/19 03:45:44 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
printname () {
NAME=$1
save_IFS=$IFS
IFS=/
set -- `echo "$NAME"`
IFS="$save_IFS"
while [ $# -ge 1 ] ; do
if [ "x$1" != "x" ]; then
echo "D0755 0 $1"
fi
shift;
done
}
# Discard all but last argument. We use arg later.
while test "x$1" != "x"; do
arg="$1"
shift
done
BAD="../../../../../../../../../../../../../${DIR}/dotpathdir"
case "$SCPTESTMODE" in
badserver_0)
echo "D0755 0 /${DIR}/rootpathdir"
echo "C755 2 rootpathfile"
echo "X"
;;
badserver_1)
echo "D0755 0 $BAD"
echo "C755 2 file"
echo "X"
;;
badserver_2)
echo "D0755 0 $BAD"
echo "C755 2 file"
echo "X"
;;
badserver_3)
printname $BAD
echo "C755 2 file"
echo "X"
;;
badserver_4)
printname $BAD
echo "D0755 0 .."
echo "C755 2 file"
echo "X"
;;
+badserver_5)
+ echo "D0555 0 "
+ echo "X"
+ ;;
+badserver_6)
+ echo "D0555 0 ."
+ echo "X"
+ ;;
+badserver_7)
+ echo "C0755 2 extrafile"
+ echo "X"
+ ;;
*)
set -- $arg
shift
exec $SCP "$@"
;;
esac
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-uri.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-uri.sh
index c03d8bbe0761..20ac3c89ec26 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-uri.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp-uri.sh
@@ -1,70 +1,77 @@
-# $OpenBSD: scp-uri.sh,v 1.2 2017/12/11 11:41:56 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: scp-uri.sh,v 1.4 2021/08/10 03:35:45 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="scp-uri"
#set -x
COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
DIR=${COPY}.dd
DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
-scpopts="-q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp"
export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
scpclean() {
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
}
# Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI
cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig
egrep -v '^ +(Port|User) +.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config
-verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote file"
-scpclean
-$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+for mode in scp sftp ; do
+ tag="$tid: $mode mode"
+ if test $mode = scp ; then
+ scpopts="-O -q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp"
+ else
+ scpopts="-s -D ${SFTPSERVER}"
+ fi
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote file"
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local file"
-scpclean
-$SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local file"
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote dir"
-scpclean
-cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
-$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote dir"
+ scpclean
+ cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+ $SCP $scpopts ${COPY} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local dir"
-scpclean
-cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
-$SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local dir"
+ scpclean
+ cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+ $SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to remote dir"
-scpclean
-rm -rf ${DIR2}
-cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
-$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR2}" || fail "copy failed"
-for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do
- cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy"
-done
+ verbose "$tag: recursive local dir to remote dir"
+ scpclean
+ rm -rf ${DIR2}
+ cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+ $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR2}" || fail "copy failed"
+ for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do
+ cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy"
+ done
-verbose "$tid: recursive remote dir to local dir"
-scpclean
-rm -rf ${DIR2}
-cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
-$SCP $scpopts -r "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
-for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do
- cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy"
-done
+ verbose "$tag: recursive remote dir to local dir"
+ scpclean
+ rm -rf ${DIR2}
+ cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+ $SCP $scpopts -r "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do
+ cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy"
+ done
-# TODO: scp -3
+ # TODO: scp -3
+done
scpclean
rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.exe
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh
index 57cc77066064..358a8df66b1c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp.sh
@@ -1,126 +1,143 @@
-# $OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.10 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.13 2021/08/10 03:35:45 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="scp"
#set -x
# Figure out if diff understands "-N"
if diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then
DIFFOPT="-rN"
else
DIFFOPT="-r"
fi
COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
DIR=${COPY}.dd
DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
-scpopts="-q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp"
export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
scpclean() {
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+ chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
}
-verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file"
-scpclean
-$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-
-verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote file"
-scpclean
-$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-
-verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local file"
-scpclean
-$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-
-verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote dir"
-scpclean
-cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
-$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} somehost:${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+for mode in scp sftp ; do
+ tag="$tid: $mode mode"
+ if test $mode = scp ; then
+ scpopts="-O -q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp"
+ else
+ scpopts="-s -D ${SFTPSERVER}"
+ fi
+ verbose "tid: simple copy local file to local file"
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local dir"
-scpclean
-cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
-$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote file"
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local dir"
-scpclean
-cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
-$SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
-cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local file"
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to remote dir"
-scpclean
-rm -rf ${DIR2}
-cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
-$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
-diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote dir"
+ scpclean
+ cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+ $SCP $scpopts ${COPY} somehost:${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to local dir"
-scpclean
-rm -rf ${DIR2}
-cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
-$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
-diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to local dir"
+ scpclean
+ cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+ $SCP $scpopts ${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: recursive remote dir to local dir"
-scpclean
-rm -rf ${DIR2}
-cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
-$SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
-diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local dir"
+ scpclean
+ cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+ $SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
-verbose "$tid: shell metacharacters"
-scpclean
-(cd ${DIR} && \
-touch '`touch metachartest`' && \
-$SCP $scpopts *metachar* ${DIR2} 2>/dev/null; \
-[ ! -f metachartest ] ) || fail "shell metacharacters"
+ verbose "$tag: recursive local dir to remote dir"
+ scpclean
+ rm -rf ${DIR2}
+ cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+ $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
-if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
- verbose "$tid: skipped file after scp -p with failed chown+utimes"
+ verbose "$tag: recursive local dir to local dir"
scpclean
- cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
- cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy2
- cp ${DATA} ${DIR2}/copy
- chmod 660 ${DIR2}/copy
- $SUDO chown root ${DIR2}/copy
- $SCP -p $scpopts somehost:${DIR}/\* ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>&1
- $SUDO diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
- $SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
-fi
+ rm -rf ${DIR2}
+ cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+ $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
-for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
- verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i"
- SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
- export DIR SCPTESTMODE
+ verbose "$tag: recursive remote dir to local dir"
scpclean
- $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
- [ -d {$DIR}/rootpathdir ] && fail "allows dir relative to root dir"
- [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation in non-recursive mode"
+ rm -rf ${DIR2}
+ cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+ $SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ verbose "$tag: shell metacharacters"
scpclean
- $SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
- [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
+ (cd ${DIR} && \
+ touch '`touch metachartest`' && \
+ $SCP $scpopts *metachar* ${DIR2} 2>/dev/null; \
+ [ ! -f metachartest ] ) || fail "shell metacharacters"
+
+ if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
+ verbose "$tag: skipped file after scp -p with failed chown+utimes"
+ scpclean
+ cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+ cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy2
+ cp ${DATA} ${DIR2}/copy
+ chmod 660 ${DIR2}/copy
+ $SUDO chown root ${DIR2}/copy
+ $SCP -p $scpopts somehost:${DIR}/\* ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>&1
+ $SUDO diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ $SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
+ fi
+
+ for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
+ verbose "$tag: disallow bad server #$i"
+ SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
+ export DIR SCPTESTMODE
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+ [ -d {$DIR}/rootpathdir ] && fail "allows dir relative to root dir"
+ [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation in non-recursive mode"
+
+ scpclean
+ $SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+ [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
+
+ scpclean
+ $SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+ [ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change"
+
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+ [ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows unauth object creation"
+ rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile
+ done
+
+ verbose "$tag: detect non-directory target"
+ scpclean
+ echo a > ${COPY}
+ echo b > ${COPY2}
+ $SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2}
+ cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
done
-verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target"
-scpclean
-echo a > ${COPY}
-echo b > ${COPY2}
-$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2}
-cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
-
scpclean
rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/scp3.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp3.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f71b1567755b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/scp3.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# $OpenBSD: scp3.sh,v 1.3 2021/08/10 03:35:45 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="scp3"
+
+#set -x
+
+COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
+DIR=${COPY}.dd
+DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+
+scpclean() {
+ rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+ mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+ chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+}
+
+for mode in scp sftp ; do
+ scpopts="-F${OBJ}/ssh_proxy -S ${SSH} -q"
+ tag="$tid: $mode mode"
+ if test $mode = scp ; then
+ scpopts="$scpopts -O"
+ else
+ scpopts="-s -D ${SFTPSERVER}"
+ fi
+
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to remote file"
+ scpclean
+ $SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${DATA} hostB:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+ verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to remote dir"
+ scpclean
+ cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+ $SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${COPY} hostB:${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+ verbose "$tag: recursive remote dir to remote dir"
+ scpclean
+ rm -rf ${DIR2}
+ cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+ $SCP $scpopts -3r hostA:${DIR} hostB:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ diff -r ${DIR2} ${DIR} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+ verbose "$tag: detect non-directory target"
+ scpclean
+ echo a > ${COPY}
+ echo b > ${COPY2}
+ $SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${DATA} hostA:${COPY} hostB:${COPY2}
+ cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+done
+
+scpclean
+rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.exe
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/servcfginclude.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..518a703d100e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/servcfginclude.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="server config include"
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Match host a
+ Banner /aa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bb
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
+
+Match host c
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
+ Banner /cc
+
+Match host m
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /dd # comment
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /ee
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host f
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+ Banner /ff
+
+Match Host n
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bbb
+
+Match host c
+ Banner /ccc
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /ddd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /eee
+
+Match Host f
+ Banner /fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaaa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bbbb
+
+Match host c # comment
+ Banner /cccc
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /dddd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /eeee
+
+Match Host f
+ Banner /ffff
+
+Match all
+ Banner /xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+ _host="$1"
+ _exp="$2"
+ _desc="$3"
+ test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
+ trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+ ${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+ -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
+ fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+ _got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+ if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+ fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+ fi
+}
+
+trial a /aa
+trial b /bb
+trial c /ccc
+trial d /dd
+trial e /ee
+trial f /fff
+trial m /xxxx
+trial n /xxxx
+trial x none
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Banner xxxx
+ Junk
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+ -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
+
+# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Include
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
+
+# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Banner /xx
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaaa
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trace "Include before match blocks"
+trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
+
+# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Port 7722
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+_EOF
+
+trace "Port after included files"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
+ fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
+_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
+ fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
+fi
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh
index 7f85c4f229ca..5b016d558b3f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh
@@ -1,65 +1,65 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sftp-badcmds.sh,v 1.6 2013/05/17 10:26:26 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sftp-badcmds.sh,v 1.7 2020/03/13 03:18:45 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="sftp invalid commands"
DATA2=/bin/sh${EXEEXT}
NONEXIST=/NONEXIST.$$
GLOBFILES=`(cd /bin;echo l*)`
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: get nonexistent"
echo "get $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get nonexistent failed"
test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob get to nonexistent directory"
echo "get /bin/l* $NONEXIST" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get nonexistent failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent"
done
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: put nonexistent"
echo "put $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "put nonexistent failed"
test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after put nonexistent"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob put to nonexistent directory"
echo "put /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "put nonexistent failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after nonexistent"
done
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: rename nonexistent"
echo "rename $NONEXIST ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "rename nonexist failed"
test -f ${COPY}.1 && fail "file exists after rename nonexistent"
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.dd
cp $DATA $COPY
mkdir ${COPY}.dd
verbose "$tid: rename target exists (directory)"
echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "rename target exists (directory) failed"
test -f ${COPY} || fail "oldname missing after rename target exists (directory)"
test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "newname missing after rename target exists (directory)"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted oldname after rename target exists (directory)"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
rm -rf ${COPY}
cp ${DATA2} ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: glob put files to local file"
echo "put /bin/l* $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1
-cmp ${DATA2} ${COPY} || fail "put successed when it should have failed"
+cmp ${DATA2} ${COPY} || fail "put succeeded when it should have failed"
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
index ba5bd1efb30e..5acc4d2de4a6
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
@@ -1,32 +1,31 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.6 2018/02/09 03:42:57 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.7 2018/11/22 08:48:32 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="sftp in chroot"
CHROOT=/var/run
-FILENAME=testdata_${USER}
+FILENAME=testdata_${USER}.$$
PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME}
+trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${PRIVDATA}" 0
if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then
echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
echo SKIPPED
exit 0
fi
if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m chroot "$CHROOT" ; then
echo "skipped: $CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory"
exit 0
fi
$SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \
fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed"
start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /"
verbose "test $tid: get"
${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \
fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed"
cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ"
-
-$SUDO rm $PRIVDATA
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-cmds.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
index aad7fcac2325..1289c4089c6c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
@@ -1,232 +1,228 @@
# $OpenBSD: sftp-cmds.sh,v 1.14 2013/06/21 02:26:26 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
# XXX - TODO:
# - chmod / chown / chgrp
# - -p flag for get & put
tid="sftp commands"
# test that these files are readable!
for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)`
do
if [ -r $i ]; then
GLOBFILES="$GLOBFILES $i"
fi
done
# Path with embedded quote
QUOTECOPY=${COPY}".\"blah\""
QUOTECOPY_ARG=${COPY}'.\"blah\"'
# File with spaces
SPACECOPY="${COPY} this has spaces.txt"
SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ spaces.txt"
# File with glob metacharacters
GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt"
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
mkdir ${COPY}.dd
verbose "$tid: lls"
(echo "lcd ${OBJ}" ; echo "lls") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls failed"
verbose "$tid: lls w/path"
echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls w/path failed"
verbose "$tid: ls"
echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "ls failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: shell"
echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "shell failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: pwd"
echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "pwd failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: lpwd"
echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "lpwd failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: quit"
echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "quit failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: help"
echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "help failed"
# XXX always successful
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: get"
echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: get quoted"
echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
-if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY}
verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes"
echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes"
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY}
-fi
rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY}
cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY"
verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces"
echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces"
rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY}
cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY"
verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters"
echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \
${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \
fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: get to directory"
echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob get to directory"
echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
done
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: get to local dir"
(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get $DATA" ) | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir"
(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get /bin/l*") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "get failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
done
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: put"
echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \
${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
-if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes"
echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \
${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes"
-fi
rm -f "$SPACECOPY"
verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces"
echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \
${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: put to directory"
echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob put to directory"
echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "put failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
done
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: put to local dir"
(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put $DATA") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put"
rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir"
(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put /bin/l?") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "put failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
done
verbose "$tid: rename"
echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "rename failed"
test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename"
verbose "$tid: rename directory"
echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \
${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fail "rename directory failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory"
test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory"
verbose "$tid: ln"
echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed"
test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln"
cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln"
verbose "$tid: ln -s"
rm -f ${COPY}.2
echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed"
test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s"
verbose "$tid: mkdir"
echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "mkdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir"
# XXX do more here
verbose "$tid: chdir"
echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "chdir failed"
verbose "$tid: rmdir"
echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "rmdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir"
verbose "$tid: lmkdir"
echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "lmkdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir"
# XXX do more here
verbose "$tid: lchdir"
echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "lchdir failed"
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-perm.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-perm.sh
index 304ca0ac5877..de96a14da8e8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-perm.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-perm.sh
@@ -1,269 +1,271 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sftp-perm.sh,v 1.2 2013/10/17 22:00:18 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sftp-perm.sh,v 1.3 2021/03/31 21:59:26 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="sftp permissions"
SERVER_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp-server.log
CLIENT_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp.log
TEST_SFTP_SERVER=${OBJ}/sftp-server.sh
prepare_server() {
printf "#!/bin/sh\nexec $SFTPSERVER -el debug3 $* 2>$SERVER_LOG\n" \
> $TEST_SFTP_SERVER
chmod a+x $TEST_SFTP_SERVER
}
run_client() {
echo "$@" | ${SFTP} -D ${TEST_SFTP_SERVER} -vvvb - >$CLIENT_LOG 2>&1
}
prepare_files() {
_prep="$1"
rm -f ${COPY} ${COPY}.1
test -d ${COPY}.dd && { rmdir ${COPY}.dd || fatal "rmdir ${COPY}.dd"; }
test -z "$_prep" && return
sh -c "$_prep" || fail "preparation failed: \"$_prep\""
}
postcondition() {
_title="$1"
_check="$2"
test -z "$_check" && return
${TEST_SHELL} -c "$_check" || fail "postcondition check failed: $_title"
}
ro_test() {
_desc=$1
_cmd="$2"
_prep="$3"
_expect_success_post="$4"
_expect_fail_post="$5"
verbose "$tid: read-only $_desc"
# Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good)
prepare_files "$_prep"
prepare_server
run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_desc failed"
postcondition "$_desc no-readonly" "$_expect_success_post"
# Read-only enabled
prepare_files "$_prep"
prepare_server -R
run_client "$_cmd" && fail "read-only $_desc succeeded"
postcondition "$_desc readonly" "$_expect_fail_post"
}
perm_test() {
_op=$1
_whitelist_ops=$2
_cmd="$3"
_prep="$4"
_expect_success_post="$5"
_expect_fail_post="$6"
verbose "$tid: explicit $_op"
# Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good)
prepare_files "$_prep"
prepare_server
run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_op failed"
postcondition "$_op no white/blacklists" "$_expect_success_post"
# Whitelist
prepare_files "$_prep"
prepare_server -p $_op,$_whitelist_ops
run_client "$_cmd" || fail "whitelisted $_op failed"
postcondition "$_op whitelisted" "$_expect_success_post"
# Blacklist
prepare_files "$_prep"
prepare_server -P $_op
run_client "$_cmd" && fail "blacklisted $_op succeeded"
postcondition "$_op blacklisted" "$_expect_fail_post"
# Whitelist with op missing.
prepare_files "$_prep"
prepare_server -p $_whitelist_ops
run_client "$_cmd" && fail "no whitelist $_op succeeded"
postcondition "$_op not in whitelist" "$_expect_fail_post"
}
ro_test \
"upload" \
"put $DATA $COPY" \
"" \
"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
"test ! -f $COPY"
ro_test \
"setstat" \
"chmod 0700 $COPY" \
"touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \
"test -x $COPY" \
"test ! -x $COPY"
ro_test \
"rm" \
"rm $COPY" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test ! -f $COPY" \
"test -f $COPY"
ro_test \
"mkdir" \
"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
"" \
"test -d ${COPY}.dd" \
"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd"
ro_test \
"rmdir" \
"rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \
"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \
"test -d ${COPY}.dd"
ro_test \
"posix-rename" \
"rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
ro_test \
"oldrename" \
"rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
ro_test \
"symlink" \
"ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test -h ${COPY}.1" \
"test ! -h ${COPY}.1"
ro_test \
"hardlink" \
"ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test -f ${COPY}.1" \
"test ! -f ${COPY}.1"
# Test explicit permissions
perm_test \
"open" \
"realpath,stat,lstat,read,close" \
"get $DATA $COPY" \
"" \
"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
perm_test \
"read" \
"realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \
"get $DATA $COPY" \
"" \
"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
perm_test \
"write" \
"realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \
"put $DATA $COPY" \
"" \
"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
perm_test \
"lstat" \
"realpath,stat,open,read,close" \
"get $DATA $COPY" \
"" \
"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
perm_test \
"opendir" \
"realpath,readdir,stat,lstat" \
"ls -ln $OBJ"
perm_test \
"readdir" \
"realpath,opendir,stat,lstat" \
"ls -ln $OBJ"
perm_test \
"setstat" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"chmod 0700 $COPY" \
"touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \
"test -x $COPY" \
"test ! -x $COPY"
perm_test \
"remove" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"rm $COPY" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test ! -f $COPY" \
"test -f $COPY"
perm_test \
"mkdir" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
"" \
"test -d ${COPY}.dd" \
"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd"
perm_test \
"rmdir" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \
"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \
"test -d ${COPY}.dd"
-perm_test \
- "posix-rename" \
- "realpath,stat,lstat" \
- "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
- "touch $COPY" \
- "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
- "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+# Can't readily test this because the client falls back to traditional rename.
+# XXX maybe there is a behaviorial difference we can test for?
+#perm_test \
+# "posix-rename" \
+# "realpath,stat,lstat" \
+# "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+# "touch $COPY" \
+# "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+# "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
perm_test \
"rename" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
perm_test \
"symlink" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test -h ${COPY}.1" \
"test ! -h ${COPY}.1"
perm_test \
"hardlink" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
"touch $COPY" \
"test -f ${COPY}.1" \
"test ! -f ${COPY}.1"
perm_test \
"statvfs" \
"realpath,stat,lstat" \
"df /"
# XXX need good tests for:
# fstat
# fsetstat
# realpath
# stat
# readlink
# fstatvfs
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.dd
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh
index bcf83afe9e9e..9b08310391ca 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh
@@ -1,34 +1,36 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.9 2021/07/25 12:13:03 dtucker Exp $
if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then
echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key"
exit 1
fi
HOST=$1
PORT=$2
KEYFILE=$3
+OPENSSL_BIN="${OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl}"
+
# XXX - support DSA keys too
if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
:
else
echo "Unsupported private key format"
exit 1
fi
public_exponent=`
- openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
+ $OPENSSL_BIN rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//'
`
test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
modulus=`
- openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
+ $OPENSSL_BIN rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z
`
test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshcfgparse.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
index e0ce568d71c4..504853d32db5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
@@ -1,89 +1,119 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.4 2018/07/04 13:51:12 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.9 2021/06/08 07:05:27 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="ssh config parse"
+dsa=0
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+ case "$t" in
+ ssh-dss) dsa=1 ;;
+ esac
+done
+
expect_result_present() {
_str="$1" ; shift
for _expect in "$@" ; do
echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
fail "missing expected \"$_expect\" from \"$_str\""
fi
done
}
expect_result_absent() {
_str="$1" ; shift
for _expect in "$@" ; do
echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null
if test $? -eq 0 ; then
fail "unexpected \"$_expect\" present in \"$_str\""
fi
done
}
verbose "reparse minimal config"
(${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.1 &&
${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config.1 somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.2 &&
- diff $OBJ/ssh_config.1 $OBJ/ssh_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config"
+ diff $OBJ/ssh_config.1 $OBJ/ssh_config.2) || fail "failed to reparse minimal"
verbose "ssh -W opts"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure default"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "yes" || fail "exitonforwardfailure enable"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o exitonforwardfailure=no h | \
awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure override"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings default"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "yes" || fail "clearallforwardings enable"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o clearallforwardings=no h | \
awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings override"
verbose "user first match"
user=`awk '$1=="User" {print $2}' $OBJ/ssh_config`
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "$user" || fail "user from config, expected '$user' got '$f'"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "foo" || fail "user first match -oUser, expected 'foo' got '$f' "
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -lbar baz@host user=foo baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "bar" || fail "user first match -l, expected 'bar' got '$f'"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config baz@host -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "baz" || fail "user first match user@host, expected 'baz' got '$f'"
-verbose "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes"
+verbose "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms"
# Default set
-f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
+f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss"
# Explicit override
-f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=ssh-ed25519 host | \
- awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=ssh-ed25519 host | \
+ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
# Removal from default set
-f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519-cert* host | \
- awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=-ssh-ed25519-cert* host | \
+ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
-f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519 host | \
- awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=-ssh-ed25519 host | \
+ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss"
# Append to default set.
-# XXX this will break for !WITH_OPENSSL
-f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss-cert* host | \
- awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
-expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
-expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss"
-f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss host | \
- awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
-expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
-expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
+# This is not tested when built !WITH_OPENSSL
+if [ "$dsa" = "1" ]; then
+ f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=+ssh-dss-cert* host | \
+ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+ expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
+ expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss"
+ f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=+ssh-dss host | \
+ awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+ expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
+ expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
+fi
+
+verbose "agentforwarding"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "no"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=no host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "no"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=yes host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "yes"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none '-oforwardagent=SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward' host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward"
+
+verbose "command line override"
+cat >$OBJ/ssh_config.0 <<EOD
+Host *
+ IPQoS af21 cs1
+ TunnelDevice 1:2
+EOD
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config.0 -oipqos=cs1 host | awk '/^ipqos /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "cs1"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config.0 -otunneldevice=3:4 host | awk '/^tunneldevice /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "3:4"
# cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.[012]
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshfp-connect.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshfp-connect.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..06e91cdbb851
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshfp-connect.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# $OpenBSD: sshfp-connect.sh,v 1.2 2021/07/19 08:48:33 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+# This test requires external setup and thus is skipped unless
+# TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN is set. It requires:
+# 1) A DNSSEC-enabled domain, which TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN points to.
+# 2) A DNSSEC-validating resolver such as unwind(8).
+# 3) The following SSHFP records with fingerprints from rsa_openssh.pub
+# in that domain that are expected to succeed:
+# sshtest: valid sha1 and sha256 fingerprints.
+# sshtest-sha{1,256}, : valid fingerprints for that type only.
+# and the following records that are expected to fail:
+# sshtest-bad: invalid sha1 fingerprint and good sha256 fingerprint
+# sshtest-sha{1,256}-bad: invalid fingerprints for that type only.
+#
+# sshtest IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929
+# sshtest IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6
+# sshtest-sha1 IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929
+# sshtest-sha256 IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6
+# sshtest-bad IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6
+# sshtest-bad IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B928
+# sshtest-sha1-bad IN SSHFP 1 1 99D79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929
+# sshtest-sha256-bad IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B5
+
+tid="sshfp connect"
+
+if [ ! -z "${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}" ] && \
+ $SSH -Q key-plain | grep ssh-rsa >/dev/null; then
+
+ # Set RSA host key to match fingerprints above.
+ mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ $SUDO cp $SRC/rsa_openssh.prv $OBJ/host.ssh-rsa
+ $SUDO chmod 600 $OBJ/host.ssh-rsa
+ sed -e "s|$OBJ/ssh-rsa|$OBJ/host.ssh-rsa|" \
+ $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+ # Zero out known hosts and key aliases to force use of SSHFP records.
+ > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+ sed -e "/HostKeyAlias.*localhost-with-alias/d" \
+ -e "/Hostname.*127.0.0.1/d" \
+ $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+ for n in sshtest sshtest-sha1 sshtest-sha256; do
+ trace "sshfp connect $n good fingerprint"
+ host="${n}.dtucker.net"
+ opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes "
+ opts="$opts -o HostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa"
+ host="${n}.${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}"
+ SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts $host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh sshfp connect failed"
+ fi
+ if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+ fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION: $SSH_CONNECTION"
+ fi
+
+ trace "sshfp connect $n bad fingerprint"
+ host="${n}-bad.${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}"
+ if ${SSH} $opts ${host} true; then
+ fail "sshfp-connect succeeded with bad SSHFP record"
+ fi
+ done
+else
+ echo SKIPPED: TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN not set.
+fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshsig.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshsig.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fc300a8dc3ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshsig.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+# $OpenBSD: sshsig.sh,v 1.7 2021/08/11 08:55:04 djm Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshsig"
+
+DATA2=$OBJ/${DATANAME}.2
+cat ${DATA} ${DATA} > ${DATA2}
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshsig-*.sig $OBJ/wrong-key* $OBJ/sigca-key*
+
+sig_namespace="test-$$"
+sig_principal="user-$$@example.com"
+
+# Make a "wrong key"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/wrong-key \
+ -C "wrong trousers, Grommit" -N '' \
+ || fatal "couldn't generate key"
+WRONG=$OBJ/wrong-key.pub
+
+# Make a CA key.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/sigca-key -C "CA" -N '' \
+ || fatal "couldn't generate key"
+CA_PRIV=$OBJ/sigca-key
+CA_PUB=$OBJ/sigca-key.pub
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+SIGNKEYS="$SSH_KEYTYPES"
+verbose "$tid: make certificates"
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $CA_PRIV -z $$ \
+ -I "regress signature key for $USER" \
+ -n $sig_principal $OBJ/${t} || \
+ fatal "couldn't sign ${t}"
+ SIGNKEYS="$SIGNKEYS ${t}-cert.pub"
+done
+
+for t in $SIGNKEYS; do
+ verbose "$tid: check signature for $t"
+ keybase=`basename $t .pub`
+ privkey=${OBJ}/`basename $t -cert.pub`
+ sigfile=${OBJ}/sshsig-${keybase}.sig
+ sigfile_agent=${OBJ}/sshsig-agent-${keybase}.sig
+ pubkey=${OBJ}/${keybase}.pub
+
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f ${OBJ}/$t -n $sig_namespace \
+ < $DATA > $sigfile 2>/dev/null || fail "sign using $t failed"
+
+ (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "failed signature for $t key"
+
+ (printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"$sig_namespace,whatever\" ";
+ cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "failed signature for $t key w/ limited namespace"
+
+ (printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"$sig_namespace,whatever\" ";
+ cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ -O print-pubkey \
+ < $DATA | cut -d' ' -f1-2 > ${OBJ}/${keybase}-fromsig.pub || \
+ fail "failed signature for $t key w/ print-pubkey"
+ cut -d' ' -f1-2 ${OBJ}/${keybase}.pub > ${OBJ}/${keybase}-strip.pub
+ diff -r ${OBJ}/${keybase}-strip.pub ${OBJ}/${keybase}-fromsig.pub || \
+ fail "print-pubkey differs from signature key"
+
+ # Invalid option
+ (printf "$sig_principal octopus " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t key with bad signers option"
+
+ # Wrong key trusted.
+ (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $WRONG) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong key trusted"
+
+ # incorrect data
+ (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "passed signature for wrong data with $t key"
+
+ # wrong principal in signers
+ (printf "josef.k@example.com " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong principal"
+
+ # wrong namespace
+ (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n COWS_COWS_COWS \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong namespace"
+
+ # namespace excluded by option
+ (printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ;
+ cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t key with excluded namespace"
+
+ ( printf "$sig_principal " ;
+ printf "valid-after=\"19800101\",valid-before=\"19900101\" " ;
+ cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+
+ # key lifespan valid
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ -Overify-time=19850101 \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "failed signature for $t key with valid expiry interval"
+ # key not yet valid
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ -Overify-time=19790101 \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "failed signature for $t not-yet-valid key"
+ # key expired
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ -Overify-time=19910101 \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "failed signature for $t with expired key"
+ # NB. assumes we're not running this test in the 1980s
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "failed signature for $t with expired key"
+
+ # public key in revoked keys file
+ cat $pubkey > $OBJ/revoked_keys
+ (printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ;
+ cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ -r $OBJ/revoked_keys \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t key, but key is in revoked_keys"
+
+ # public key not revoked, but others are present in revoked_keysfile
+ cat $WRONG > $OBJ/revoked_keys
+ (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ -r $OBJ/revoked_keys \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "couldn't verify signature for $t key, but key not in revoked_keys"
+
+ # check-novalidate with valid data
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key"
+
+ # check-novalidate with invalid data
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ < $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "succeeded checking signature for $t key with invalid data"
+
+ # Check signing keys using ssh-agent.
+ ${SSHADD} -D >/dev/null 2>&1 # Remove all previously-loaded keys.
+ ${SSHADD} ${privkey} > /dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ssh-add failed"
+
+ # Move private key to ensure agent key is used
+ mv ${privkey} ${privkey}.tmp
+
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f $pubkey -n $sig_namespace \
+ < $DATA > $sigfile_agent 2>/dev/null || \
+ fail "ssh-agent based sign using $pubkey failed"
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile_agent \
+ -n $sig_namespace < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key"
+
+ # Move private key back
+ mv ${privkey}.tmp ${privkey}
+
+ # Remaining tests are for certificates only.
+ case "$keybase" in
+ *-cert) ;;
+ *) continue ;;
+ esac
+
+
+ # correct CA key
+ (printf "$sig_principal cert-authority " ;
+ cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ fail "failed signature for $t cert"
+
+ # signing key listed as cert-authority
+ (printf "$sig_principal cert-authority " ;
+ cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature with $t key listed as CA"
+
+ # CA key not flagged cert-authority
+ (printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t cert with CA not marked"
+
+ # mismatch between cert principal and file
+ (printf "josef.k@example.com cert-authority " ;
+ cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+ -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+ < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ fail "accepted signature for $t cert with wrong principal"
+done
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh
index 40d46e3cd4ca..db6d6161aa2b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh
@@ -1,593 +1,735 @@
-# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.64 2018/08/10 01:35:49 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.86 2021/08/08 08:27:28 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
#SUDO=sudo
-# Unbreak GNU head(1)
-_POSIX2_VERSION=199209
-export _POSIX2_VERSION
-
-case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in
-OSF1*)
- BIN_SH=xpg4
- export BIN_SH
- ;;
-CYGWIN_NT-5.0)
- os=cygwin
- TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
- ;;
-CYGWIN*)
- os=cygwin
- ;;
-esac
+if [ ! -x "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then
+ STARTTIME=`date '+%s'`
+fi
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then
PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT"
else
PORT=4242
fi
-if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
- USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
-elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- USER=`whoami`
-elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then
- USER=`logname`
-else
- USER=`id -un`
-fi
-
OBJ=$1
if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then
echo '$OBJ not defined'
exit 2
fi
if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then
echo "not a directory: $OBJ"
exit 2
fi
SCRIPT=$2
if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then
echo '$SCRIPT not defined'
exit 2
fi
if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then
echo "not a file: $SCRIPT"
exit 2
fi
if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then
true
else
echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT"
exit 2
fi
unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+# Portable-specific settings.
+
+if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
+ USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
+elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ USER=`whoami`
+elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ USER=`logname`
+else
+ USER=`id -un`
+fi
+if test -z "$LOGNAME"; then
+ LOGNAME="${USER}"
+ export LOGNAME
+fi
+
+# Unbreak GNU head(1)
+_POSIX2_VERSION=199209
+export _POSIX2_VERSION
+
+case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in
+OSF1*)
+ BIN_SH=xpg4
+ export BIN_SH
+ ;;
+CYGWIN*)
+ os=cygwin
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# If configure tells us to use a different egrep, create a wrapper function
+# to call it. This means we don't need to change all the tests that depend
+# on a good implementation.
+if test "x${EGREP}" != "x"; then
+ egrep ()
+{
+ ${EGREP} "$@"
+}
+fi
+
SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
# defaults
SSH=ssh
SSHD=sshd
SSHAGENT=ssh-agent
SSHADD=ssh-add
SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen
SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan
SFTP=sftp
SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
SCP=scp
# Set by make_tmpdir() on demand (below).
SSH_REGRESS_TMP=
# Interop testing
PLINK=plink
PUTTYGEN=puttygen
CONCH=conch
+# Tools used by multiple tests
+NC=$OBJ/netcat
+OPENSSL_BIN="${OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl}"
+
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then
SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then
SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then
SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then
SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then
SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then
SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then
SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then
SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then
SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then
# Find real binary, if it exists
case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in
/*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;;
*) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;;
esac
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then
# Find real binary, if it exists
case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in
/*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;;
*) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;;
esac
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then
# Find real binary, if it exists
case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in
/*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;;
*) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;;
esac
fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+ SSH_SK_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_OPENSSL" != "x" ]; then
+ OPENSSL_BIN="${TEST_SSH_OPENSSL}"
+fi
# Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec
case "$SSHD" in
/*) ;;
*) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;;
esac
case "$SSHAGENT" in
/*) ;;
*) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;;
esac
# Record the actual binaries used.
SSH_BIN=${SSH}
SSHD_BIN=${SSHD}
SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT}
SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD}
SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN}
SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN}
SFTP_BIN=${SFTP}
SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER}
SCP_BIN=${SCP}
if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
- mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out
+ rm -rf $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
+ mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
+ # When using sudo ensure low-priv tests can write pipes and logs.
+ if [ "x$SUDO" != "x" ]; then
+ chmod 777 $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
+ fi
VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh`
# Some tests are difficult to fix.
case "$VG_TEST" in
- connect-privsep|reexec)
+ reexec)
VG_SKIP=1 ;;
+ sftp-chroot)
+ if [ "x${SUDO}" != "x" ]; then
+ VG_SKIP=1
+ fi ;;
esac
if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then
VG_LEAK="--leak-check=no"
if [ x"$VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS" != "x" ]; then
VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full"
fi
VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*"
VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}."
VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK"
VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}"
+ VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --vgdb-prefix=$OBJ/valgrind-vgdb/"
VG_PATH="valgrind"
if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
fi
VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS"
SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH"
SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD"
SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT"
SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD"
SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN"
SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN"
SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}"
SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP"
cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF
#!/bin/sh
exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@"
EOF
chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh
SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh"
fi
fi
# Logfiles.
# SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only
# SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only
# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log
fi
if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log
fi
# truncate logfiles
>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
# Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..."
-# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments.
+# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments. scp and sftp like
+# to use -q so we remove those to preserve our debug logging. In the rare
+# instance where -q is desirable -qq is equivalent and is not removed.
SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
-echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP
-echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP
+cat >$SSHLOGWRAP <<EOD
+#!/bin/sh
+for i in "\$@";do shift;case "\$i" in -q):;; *) set -- "\$@" "\$i";;esac;done
+exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "\$@"
+EOD
chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
REAL_SSH="$SSH"
+REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
# Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
# The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does
# not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size
# [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large.
DATANAME=data
DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME}
cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA}
chmod u+w ${DATA}
COPY=$OBJ/copy
rm -f ${COPY}
increase_datafile_size()
{
while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do
cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA}
done
}
# these should be used in tests
export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP
+export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER SSH_SK_HELPER
#echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP
# Portable specific functions
have_prog()
{
saved_IFS="$IFS"
IFS=":"
for i in $PATH
do
if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then
IFS="$saved_IFS"
return 0
fi
done
IFS="$saved_IFS"
return 1
}
jot() {
awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
}
# Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h.
config_defined ()
{
str=$1
while test "x$2" != "x" ; do
str="$str|$2"
shift
done
egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1
}
md5 () {
if have_prog md5sum; then
md5sum
elif have_prog openssl; then
openssl md5
elif have_prog cksum; then
cksum
elif have_prog sum; then
sum
+ elif [ -x ${OPENSSL_BIN} ]; then
+ ${OPENSSL_BIN} md5
else
wc -c
fi
}
+
+# Some platforms don't have hostname at all, but on others uname -n doesn't
+# provide the fully qualified name we need, so in the former case we create
+# our own hostname function.
+if ! have_prog hostname; then
+ hostname() {
+ uname -n
+ }
+fi
+
+make_tmpdir ()
+{
+ SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \
+ fatal "failed to create temporary directory"
+}
# End of portable specific functions
stop_sshd ()
{
if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then
pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then
echo no sshd running
else
if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then
echo bad pid for sshd: $pid
else
$SUDO kill $pid
trace "wait for sshd to exit"
i=0;
while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do
i=`expr $i + 1`
sleep $i
done
if test -f $PIDFILE; then
if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then
echo "sshd didn't exit " \
"port $PORT pid $pid"
else
echo "sshd died without cleanup"
fi
exit 1
fi
fi
fi
fi
}
-make_tmpdir ()
-{
- SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \
- fatal "failed to create temporary directory"
-}
-
# helper
cleanup ()
{
if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then
if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then
echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID
else
kill $SSH_PID
fi
fi
if [ "x$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" != "x" ]; then
rm -rf "$SSH_REGRESS_TMP"
fi
stop_sshd
+ if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then
+ now=`date '+%s'`
+ elapsed=$(($now - $STARTTIME))
+ echo elapsed $elapsed `basename $SCRIPT .sh`
+ fi
}
start_debug_log ()
{
echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
}
save_debug_log ()
{
echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
(cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log
(cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log
(cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log
}
trace ()
{
start_debug_log $@
if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then
echo "$@"
fi
}
verbose ()
{
start_debug_log $@
if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then
echo "$@"
fi
}
-warn ()
-{
- echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
- echo "WARNING: $@"
-}
-
fail ()
{
save_debug_log "FAIL: $@"
RESULT=1
echo "$@"
if test "x$TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL" != "x" ; then
cleanup
exit $RESULT
fi
}
fatal ()
{
save_debug_log "FATAL: $@"
printf "FATAL: "
fail "$@"
cleanup
exit $RESULT
}
RESULT=0
PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile
trap fatal 3 2
# create server config
cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config
StrictModes no
Port $PORT
AddressFamily inet
ListenAddress 127.0.0.1
#ListenAddress ::1
PidFile $PIDFILE
AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u
LogLevel DEBUG3
AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_*
AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST
Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER
EOF
# This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable,
# but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could
# be abused to locally escalate privileges.
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then
- echo "StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+ echo " StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+else
+ # check and warn if excessive permissions are likely to cause failures.
+ unsafe=""
+ dir="${OBJ}"
+ while test ${dir} != "/"; do
+ if test -d "${dir}" && ! test -h "${dir}"; then
+ perms=`ls -ld ${dir}`
+ case "${perms}" in
+ ?????w????*|????????w?*) unsafe="${unsafe} ${dir}" ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ dir=`dirname ${dir}`
+ done
+ if ! test -z "${unsafe}"; then
+ cat <<EOD
+
+WARNING: Unsafe (group or world writable) directory permissions found:
+${unsafe}
+
+These could be abused to locally escalate privileges. If you are
+sure that this is not a risk (eg there are no other users), you can
+bypass this check by setting TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
+
+EOD
+ fi
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE" ]; then
+ trace "adding modulifile='$TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE' to sshd_config"
+ echo " ModuliFile '$TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE'" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
fi
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then
trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
fi
# server config for proxy connects
cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode
echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# create client config
cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config
Host *
Hostname 127.0.0.1
HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias
Port $PORT
User $USER
GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
PubkeyAuthentication yes
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
HostbasedAuthentication no
PasswordAuthentication no
BatchMode yes
StrictHostKeyChecking yes
LogLevel DEBUG3
EOF
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then
trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS"
echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
fi
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa ed25519"
+SSH_SK_PROVIDER=
+if ! config_defined ENABLE_SK; then
+ trace skipping sk-dummy
+elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then
+ SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so"
+elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then
+ SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so"
+fi
+export SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+
+if ! test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"; then
+ EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS='-P/*' # XXX want realpath(1)...
+ echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+ echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+ echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+fi
+export EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS
+
+maybe_filter_sk() {
+ if test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER" ; then
+ grep -v ^sk
+ else
+ cat
+ fi
+}
+
+SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
-trace "generate keys"
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
# generate user key
if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then
+ trace "generating key type $t"
rm -f $OBJ/$t
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\
fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed"
+ else
+ trace "using cached key type $t"
fi
+ # setup authorized keys
+ cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+done
+
+for t in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES}; do
# known hosts file for client
(
printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
cat $OBJ/$t.pub
) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
- # setup authorized keys
- cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
-
# use key as host key, too
- $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t
+ (umask 077; $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t)
echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
# don't use SUDO for proxy connect
echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
done
chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present
REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
if test -x "$CONCH" ; then
REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes
fi
-# If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and
-# configuration
+# If PuTTY is present, new enough and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare
+# keys and configuration.
REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no
-if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then
+if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" &&
+ "$PUTTYGEN" --help 2>&1 | grep -- --new-passphrase >/dev/null; then
REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
fi
case "$SCRIPT" in
*putty*) ;;
*) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;;
esac
if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then
mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty
# Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys
rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2
- if ! puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+ if ! "$PUTTYGEN" -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
--random-device=/dev/urandom \
--new-passphrase /dev/null < /dev/null > /dev/null; then
- echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase; trying without (may require manual interaction) ..." >&2
- puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null
+ echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase, skipping test" >&2
+ exit 1
fi
- puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+ "$PUTTYGEN" -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
>> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format
- cp $OBJ/rsa $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null
- ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt > \
+ cp $OBJ/ssh-rsa $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null
+ ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt > \
${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
- ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt >> \
+ ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >> \
${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
- rm -f $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt
+ rm -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt
# Setup proxied session
mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions
rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "Protocol=ssh" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "HostName=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "ProxyLocalhost=1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
PUTTYDIR=${OBJ}/.putty
export PUTTYDIR
-
- REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
fi
# create a proxy version of the client config
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_config
- echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo proxycommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# check proxy config
${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken"
start_sshd ()
{
# start sshd
$SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken"
- $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+ $SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" \
+ ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
trace "wait for sshd"
i=0;
while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
i=`expr $i + 1`
sleep $i
done
test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT"
}
# source test body
. $SCRIPT
# kill sshd
cleanup
+
+if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
+ # wait for any running process to complete
+ wait; sleep 1
+ VG_RESULTS=$(find $OBJ/valgrind-out -type f -print)
+ VG_RESULT_COUNT=0
+ VG_FAIL_COUNT=0
+ for i in $VG_RESULTS; do
+ if grep "ERROR SUMMARY" $i >/dev/null; then
+ VG_RESULT_COUNT=$(($VG_RESULT_COUNT + 1))
+ if ! grep "ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors" $i >/dev/null; then
+ VG_FAIL_COUNT=$(($VG_FAIL_COUNT + 1))
+ RESULT=1
+ verbose valgrind failure $i
+ cat $i
+ fi
+ fi
+ done
+ if [ x"$VG_SKIP" != "x" ]; then
+ verbose valgrind skipped
+ else
+ verbose valgrind results $VG_RESULT_COUNT failures $VG_FAIL_COUNT
+ fi
+fi
+
if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then
verbose ok $tid
else
echo failed $tid
fi
exit $RESULT
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile
index e464b085adc8..4d26b74770e2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.10 2018/03/03 03:16:17 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.12 2020/06/19 04:34:21 djm Exp $
REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes
SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion
-SUBDIR+=authopt
+SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig
.include <bsd.subdir.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
index b509f4452500..370224aa5e36 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
@@ -1,53 +1,89 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.12 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.14 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $
+
+REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes
.include <bsd.own.mk>
.include <bsd.obj.mk>
+# User-settable options
+UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing).
+UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing).
+UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names).
+
+MALLOC_OPTIONS?= CFGJRSUX
+TEST_ENV?= MALLOC_OPTIONS=${MALLOC_OPTIONS}
+
+# XXX detect from ssh binary?
+OPENSSL?= yes
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
+CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL
+.endif
+
# enable warnings
WARNINGS=Yes
DEBUG=-g
CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all
CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter
.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3"
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition
.endif
SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh
CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
.if exists(${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir})
LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir} -ltest_helper
DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}/libtest_helper.a
.else
LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -ltest_helper
DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/libtest_helper.a
.endif
.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
+LDADD+= -lutil
+DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL}
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
LDADD+= -lcrypto
DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
+.endif
+
+LDADD+= -lfido2 -lcbor -lusbhid
+DPADD+= ${LIBFIDO2} ${LIBCBOR} ${LIBUSBHID}
+
+UNITTEST_ARGS?=
+
+.if (${UNITTEST_VERBOSE:L} != "no")
+UNITTEST_ARGS+= -v
+.endif
+.if (${UNITTEST_FAST:L} != "no")
+UNITTEST_ARGS+= -f
+.elif (${UNITTEST_SLOW:L} != "no")
+UNITTEST_ARGS+= -F
+.endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
index 0e8aacb91699..9873c09c6545 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
@@ -1,573 +1,579 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2018/03/03 03:16:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.2 2021/07/24 01:54:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for keys options functions.
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include "test_helper.h"
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
static struct sshkey *
load_key(const char *name)
{
struct sshkey *ret;
int r;
r = sshkey_load_public(test_data_file(name), &ret, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
return ret;
}
static struct sshauthopt *
default_authkey_opts(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 1;
ret->permit_user_rc = 1;
return ret;
}
static struct sshauthopt *
default_authkey_restrict_opts(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 0;
ret->permit_user_rc = 0;
ret->restricted = 1;
return ret;
}
static char **
commasplit(const char *s, size_t *np)
{
char *ocp, *cp, *cp2, **ret = NULL;
size_t n;
ocp = cp = strdup(s);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
for (n = 0; (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) != NULL;) {
ret = recallocarray(ret, n, n + 1, sizeof(*ret));
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
cp2 = strdup(cp2);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp2, NULL);
ret[n++] = cp2;
}
free(ocp);
*np = n;
return ret;
}
static void
compare_opts(const struct sshauthopt *opts,
const struct sshauthopt *expected)
{
size_t i;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(opts, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, opts); /* bozo :) */
#define FLAG_EQ(x) ASSERT_INT_EQ(opts->x, expected->x)
FLAG_EQ(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
FLAG_EQ(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
FLAG_EQ(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
FLAG_EQ(permit_pty_flag);
FLAG_EQ(permit_user_rc);
FLAG_EQ(restricted);
FLAG_EQ(cert_authority);
#undef FLAG_EQ
#define STR_EQ(x) \
do { \
if (expected->x == NULL) \
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \
else \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \
} while (0)
STR_EQ(cert_principals);
STR_EQ(force_command);
STR_EQ(required_from_host_cert);
STR_EQ(required_from_host_keys);
#undef STR_EQ
#define ARRAY_EQ(nx, x) \
do { \
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(opts->nx, expected->nx); \
if (expected->nx == 0) \
break; \
for (i = 0; i < expected->nx; i++) \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x[i], expected->x[i]); \
} while (0)
ARRAY_EQ(nenv, env);
ARRAY_EQ(npermitopen, permitopen);
#undef ARRAY_EQ
}
static void
test_authkeys_parse(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected;
const char *errstr;
#define FAIL_TEST(label, keywords) \
do { \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse invalid " label); \
opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(errstr, NULL); \
TEST_DONE(); \
} while (0)
#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \
do { \
if (errstr != NULL) \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \
compare_opts(opts, expected); \
sshauthopt_free(expected); \
sshauthopt_free(opts); \
} while (0)
/* Basic tests */
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse empty");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
opts = sshauthopt_parse("", &errstr);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse trailing whitespace");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
opts = sshauthopt_parse(" ", &errstr);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse restrict");
expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts();
opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict", &errstr);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
/* Invalid syntax */
FAIL_TEST("trailing comma", "restrict,");
FAIL_TEST("bare comma", ",");
FAIL_TEST("unknown option", "BLAH");
FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing comma", "BLAH,");
FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing whitespace", "BLAH ");
/* force_tun_device */
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel explicit");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->force_tun_device = 1;
opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"1\"", &errstr);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel any");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->force_tun_device = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"any\"", &errstr);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
FAIL_TEST("tunnel", "tunnel=\"blah\"");
/* Flag options */
#define FLAG_TEST(keyword, var, val) \
do { \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \
expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
expected->var = val; \
opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword, &errstr); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \
expected->var = val; \
opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict,"keyword, &errstr); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
TEST_DONE(); \
} while (0)
/* Positive flags */
FLAG_TEST("cert-authority", cert_authority, 1);
FLAG_TEST("port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 1);
FLAG_TEST("agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 1);
FLAG_TEST("x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 1);
FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag, 1);
FLAG_TEST("user-rc", permit_user_rc, 1);
/* Negative flags */
FLAG_TEST("no-port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 0);
FLAG_TEST("no-agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 0);
FLAG_TEST("no-x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 0);
FLAG_TEST("no-pty", permit_pty_flag, 0);
FLAG_TEST("no-user-rc", permit_user_rc, 0);
#undef FLAG_TEST
FAIL_TEST("no-cert-authority", "no-cert-authority");
/* String options */
#define STRING_TEST(keyword, var, val) \
do { \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \
expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
expected->var = strdup(val); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword "=" #val, &errstr); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \
expected->var = strdup(val); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
opts = sshauthopt_parse( \
"restrict," keyword "=" #val ",restrict", &errstr); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
TEST_DONE(); \
} while (0)
STRING_TEST("command", force_command, "/bin/true");
STRING_TEST("principals", cert_principals, "gregor,josef,K");
STRING_TEST("from", required_from_host_keys, "127.0.0.0/8");
#undef STRING_TEST
FAIL_TEST("unquoted command", "command=oops");
FAIL_TEST("unquoted principals", "principals=estragon");
FAIL_TEST("unquoted from", "from=127.0.0.1");
/* String array option tests */
#define ARRAY_TEST(label, keywords, var, nvar, val) \
do { \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " label); \
expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \
expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
opts = sshauthopt_parse( \
"restrict," keywords ",restrict", &errstr); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
TEST_DONE(); \
} while (0)
ARRAY_TEST("environment", "environment=\"foo=1\",environment=\"bar=2\"",
env, nenv, "foo=1,bar=2");
+ ARRAY_TEST("environment", "environment=\"foo=1\",environment=\"foo=2\"",
+ env, nenv, "foo=1");
ARRAY_TEST("permitopen", "permitopen=\"foo:123\",permitopen=\"bar:*\"",
permitopen, npermitopen, "foo:123,bar:*");
#undef ARRAY_TEST
FAIL_TEST("environment", "environment=\",=bah\"");
FAIL_TEST("permitopen port", "foo:bar");
FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port", "foo:");
FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port specification", "foo");
FAIL_TEST("permitopen invalid host", "[:");
#undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP
#undef FAIL_TEST
}
static void
test_cert_parse(void)
{
struct sshkey *cert;
struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected;
#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \
do { \
compare_opts(opts, expected); \
sshauthopt_free(expected); \
sshauthopt_free(opts); \
sshkey_free(cert); \
} while (0)
#define FLAG_TEST(keybase, var) \
do { \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert no_" keybase); \
cert = load_key("no_" keybase ".cert"); \
expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
expected->var = 0; \
opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
TEST_DONE(); \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert only_" keybase); \
cert = load_key("only_" keybase ".cert"); \
expected = sshauthopt_new(); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \
expected->var = 1; \
opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
TEST_DONE(); \
} while (0)
FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
FLAG_TEST("portfwd", permit_port_forwarding_flag);
FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag);
FLAG_TEST("user_rc", permit_user_rc);
FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
#undef FLAG_TEST
TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert all permitted");
cert = load_key("all_permit.cert");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert nothing permitted");
cert = load_key("no_permit.cert");
expected = sshauthopt_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL);
opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert force-command");
cert = load_key("force_command.cert");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->force_command = strdup("foo");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert source-address");
cert = load_key("sourceaddr.cert");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL);
opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
#undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP
#define FAIL_TEST(keybase) \
do { \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert " keybase); \
cert = load_key(keybase ".cert"); \
opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \
sshkey_free(cert); \
TEST_DONE(); \
} while (0)
FAIL_TEST("host");
FAIL_TEST("bad_sourceaddr");
FAIL_TEST("unknown_critical");
#undef FAIL_TEST
}
static void
test_merge(void)
{
struct sshkey *cert;
struct sshauthopt *key_opts, *cert_opts, *merge_opts, *expected;
const char *errstr;
/*
* Prepare for a test by making some key and cert options and
* attempting to merge them.
*/
#define PREPARE(label, keyname, keywords) \
do { \
expected = NULL; \
TEST_START("sshauthopt_merge " label); \
cert = load_key(keyname ".cert"); \
cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cert_opts, NULL); \
key_opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \
if (errstr != NULL) \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(key_opts, NULL); \
merge_opts = sshauthopt_merge(key_opts, \
cert_opts, &errstr); \
} while (0)
/* Cleanup stuff allocated by PREPARE() */
#define CLEANUP() \
do { \
sshauthopt_free(expected); \
sshauthopt_free(merge_opts); \
sshauthopt_free(key_opts); \
sshauthopt_free(cert_opts); \
sshkey_free(cert); \
} while (0)
/* Check the results of PREPARE() against expectation; calls CLEANUP */
#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \
do { \
if (errstr != NULL) \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \
compare_opts(merge_opts, expected); \
CLEANUP(); \
} while (0)
/* Check a single case of merging of flag options */
#define FLAG_CASE(keybase, label, keyname, keywords, mostly_off, var, val) \
do { \
PREPARE(keybase " " label, keyname, keywords); \
expected = mostly_off ? \
sshauthopt_new() : default_authkey_opts(); \
expected->var = val; \
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
TEST_DONE(); \
} while (0)
/*
* Fairly exhaustive exercise of a flag option. Tests
* option both set and clear in certificate, set and clear in
* authorized_keys and set and cleared via restrict keyword.
*/
#define FLAG_TEST(keybase, keyword, var) \
do { \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:default,no", \
"no_" keybase, keyword, 0, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:default,no", \
"no_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:default,no", \
"no_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:default,no", \
"no_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
\
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*,yes", \
"only_" keybase, keyword, 1, var, 1); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*,yes", \
"only_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*,yes", \
"only_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*,yes", \
"only_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
\
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*", \
"no_permit", keyword, 1, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*", \
"no_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*", \
"no_permit", "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*", \
"no_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
\
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:*", \
"all_permit", keyword, 0, var, 1); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:*", \
"all_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:*", \
"all_permit", "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \
FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:*", \
"all_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
\
} while (0)
FLAG_TEST("portfwd", "port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag);
FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", "agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
FLAG_TEST("pty", "pty", permit_pty_flag);
FLAG_TEST("user_rc", "user-rc", permit_user_rc);
FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", "x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
#undef FLAG_TEST
PREPARE("source-address both", "sourceaddr", "from=\"127.0.0.1\"");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL);
expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("source-address none", "all_permit", "");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("source-address keys", "all_permit", "from=\"127.0.0.1\"");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("source-address cert", "sourceaddr", "");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("force-command both", "force_command", "command=\"foo\"");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->force_command = strdup("foo");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("force-command none", "all_permit", "");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("force-command keys", "all_permit", "command=\"bar\"");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->force_command = strdup("bar");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("force-command cert", "force_command", "");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->force_command = strdup("foo");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("force-command mismatch", "force_command", "command=\"bar\"");
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(merge_opts, NULL);
CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("tunnel", "all_permit", "tunnel=\"6\"");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->force_tun_device = 6;
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("permitopen", "all_permit",
"permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:*\",permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:123\"");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->permitopen = commasplit("127.0.0.1:*,127.0.0.1:123",
&expected->npermitopen);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
PREPARE("environment", "all_permit",
"environment=\"foo=a\",environment=\"bar=b\"");
expected = default_authkey_opts();
expected->env = commasplit("foo=a,bar=b", &expected->nenv);
CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
TEST_DONE();
}
void
tests(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
LogLevel ll = test_is_verbose() ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
/* test_cert_parse() are a bit spammy to error() by default... */
log_init(__progname, ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
test_authkeys_parse();
test_cert_parse();
test_merge();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c
index 23025f90af82..f66a4ce46a56 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c
@@ -1,135 +1,139 @@
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/01/15 07:36:28 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for bitmap.h bitmap API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "bitmap.h"
#define NTESTS 131
void
tests(void)
{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
struct bitmap *b;
BIGNUM *bn;
size_t len;
int i, j, k, n;
u_char bbuf[1024], bnbuf[1024];
int r;
TEST_START("bitmap_new");
b = bitmap_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
bn = BN_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("bitmap_set_bit / bitmap_test_bit");
for (i = -1; i < NTESTS; i++) {
for (j = -1; j < NTESTS; j++) {
for (k = -1; k < NTESTS; k++) {
bitmap_zero(b);
BN_clear(bn);
test_subtest_info("set %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
/* Set bits */
if (i >= 0) {
ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, i), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, i), 1);
}
if (j >= 0) {
ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, j), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, j), 1);
}
if (k >= 0) {
ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, k), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, k), 1);
}
/* Check perfect match between bitmap and bn */
test_subtest_info("match %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
}
/* Test length calculations */
test_subtest_info("length %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(bn),
(int)bitmap_nbits(b));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bytes(bn),
(int)bitmap_nbytes(b));
/* Test serialisation */
test_subtest_info("serialise %d/%d/%d",
i, j, k);
len = bitmap_nbytes(b);
memset(bbuf, 0xfc, sizeof(bbuf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_to_string(b, bbuf,
sizeof(bbuf)), 0);
for (n = len; n < (int)sizeof(bbuf); n++)
ASSERT_U8_EQ(bbuf[n], 0xfc);
r = BN_bn2bin(bn, bnbuf);
ASSERT_INT_GE(r, 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, (int)len);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(bbuf, bnbuf, len);
/* Test deserialisation */
test_subtest_info("deserialise %d/%d/%d",
i, j, k);
bitmap_zero(b);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_from_string(b, bnbuf,
len), 0);
for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
}
/* Test clearing bits */
test_subtest_info("clear %d/%d/%d",
i, j, k);
for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, n), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, n), 1);
}
if (i >= 0) {
bitmap_clear_bit(b, i);
BN_clear_bit(bn, i);
}
if (j >= 0) {
bitmap_clear_bit(b, j);
BN_clear_bit(bn, j);
}
if (k >= 0) {
bitmap_clear_bit(b, k);
BN_clear_bit(bn, k);
}
for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
}
}
}
}
bitmap_free(b);
BN_free(bn);
TEST_DONE();
+#endif
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
index 8b2a09cc39fe..5793c4934845 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2021/01/09 12:24:30 dtucker Exp $
PROG=test_conversion
SRCS=tests.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
SRCS+=atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c uidswap.c cleanup.c fatal.c ssherr.c
+SRCS+=match.c addr.c addrmatch.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
index 6dd77ef42548..bbdc5f5a7cb1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
@@ -1,51 +1,53 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2021/01/18 11:43:34 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for conversions
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "misc.h"
void
tests(void)
{
char buf[1024];
TEST_START("conversion_convtime");
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1);
/* from the examples in the comment above the function */
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800);
/* negative time is not allowed */
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1);
/* overflow */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX + 1);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)INT_MAX);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), INT_MAX);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)INT_MAX + 1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
/* overflow with multiplier */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX/60 + 1);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
- ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)INT_MAX/60 + 1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1);
TEST_DONE();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
index 3368851225c5..9a53423eeac0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
@@ -1,23 +1,25 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2021/01/09 12:24:30 dtucker Exp $
PROG=test_hostkeys
SRCS=tests.c test_iterate.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
-SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
-SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c hostfile.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c hostfile.c
SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
-SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh
old mode 100755
new mode 100644
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c
index d6963bd2a30f..a5b17d7e4056 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c
@@ -1,1047 +1,1118 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.6 2018/07/16 03:09:59 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.7 2020/12/21 01:31:06 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach()
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
struct expected {
const char *key_file; /* Path for key, NULL for none */
int no_parse_status; /* Expected status w/o key parsing */
int no_parse_keytype; /* Expected keytype w/o key parsing */
int match_host_p; /* Match 'prometheus.example.com' */
int match_host_s; /* Match 'sisyphus.example.com' */
int match_ipv4; /* Match '192.0.2.1' */
int match_ipv6; /* Match '2001:db8::1' */
int match_flags; /* Expected flags from match */
struct hostkey_foreach_line l; /* Expected line contents */
};
struct cbctx {
const struct expected *expected;
size_t nexpected;
size_t i;
int flags;
int match_host_p;
int match_host_s;
int match_ipv4;
int match_ipv6;
};
/*
* hostkeys_foreach() iterator callback that verifies the line passed
* against an array of expected entries.
*/
static int
check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct cbctx *ctx = (struct cbctx *)_ctx;
const struct expected *expected;
int parse_key = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0;
const int matching = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0;
u_int expected_status, expected_match;
- int expected_keytype;
+ int expected_keytype, skip = 0;
test_subtest_info("entry %zu/%zu, file line %ld",
ctx->i + 1, ctx->nexpected, l->linenum);
for (;;) {
ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(ctx->i, ctx->nexpected);
expected = ctx->expected + ctx->i++;
/* If we are matching host/IP then skip entries that don't */
if (!matching)
break;
if (ctx->match_host_p && expected->match_host_p)
break;
if (ctx->match_host_s && expected->match_host_s)
break;
if (ctx->match_ipv4 && expected->match_ipv4)
break;
if (ctx->match_ipv6 && expected->match_ipv6)
break;
}
expected_status = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_status < 0) ?
expected->l.status : (u_int)expected->no_parse_status;
expected_match = expected->l.match;
#define UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(x) do { \
if (ctx->x && expected->x) { \
expected_match |= expected->x; \
if (expected_status == HKF_STATUS_OK) \
expected_status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; \
} \
} while (0)
expected_keytype = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_keytype < 0) ?
expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA ||
- expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA) {
+ expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA)
+ skip = 1;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_DSA ||
+ expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_DSA ||
+ expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA ||
+ expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA ||
+ expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA ||
+ expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA)
+ skip = 1;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ if (skip) {
expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
parse_key = 0;
}
-#endif
-
UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_p);
UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_s);
UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv4);
UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv6);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->path, NULL); /* Don't care about path */
ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(l->linenum, expected->l.linenum);
ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->status, expected_status);
ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->match, expected_match);
/* Not all test entries contain fulltext */
if (expected->l.line != NULL)
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->line, expected->l.line);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->marker, expected->l.marker);
/* XXX we skip hashed hostnames for now; implement checking */
if (expected->l.hosts != NULL)
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->hosts, expected->l.hosts);
/* Not all test entries contain raw keys */
if (expected->l.rawkey != NULL)
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->rawkey, expected->l.rawkey);
/* XXX synthesise raw key for cases lacking and compare */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->keytype, expected_keytype);
if (parse_key) {
if (expected->l.key == NULL)
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(l->key, NULL);
if (expected->l.key != NULL) {
ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->key, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(l->key, expected->l.key), 1);
}
}
if (parse_key && !(l->comment == NULL && expected->l.comment == NULL))
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->comment, expected->l.comment);
return 0;
}
/* Loads public keys for a set of expected results */
static void
prepare_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (expected[i].key_file == NULL)
continue;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA)
continue;
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+ switch (expected[i].l.keytype) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(
test_data_file(expected[i].key_file), &expected[i].l.key,
NULL), 0);
}
}
static void
cleanup_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
sshkey_free(expected[i].l.key);
expected[i].l.key = NULL;
}
}
struct expected expected_full[] = {
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL, /* path, don't care */
1, /* line number */
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, /* status */
0, /* match flags */
"# Plain host keys, plain host names", /* full line, optional */
MRK_NONE, /* marker (CA / revoked) */
NULL, /* hosts text */
NULL, /* raw key, optional */
KEY_UNSPEC, /* key type */
NULL, /* deserialised key */
NULL, /* comment */
+ 0, /* note */
} },
{ "dsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
2,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #1",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
3,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #1",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
4,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #1",
+ 0,
} },
{ "rsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
5,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_RSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"RSA #1",
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
6,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
7,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ "dsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
8,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #2",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
9,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #2",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
10,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #2",
+ 0,
} },
{ "rsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
11,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
NULL,
KEY_RSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"RSA #2",
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
12,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
13,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ "dsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
14,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #3",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
15,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #3",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
16,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #3",
+ 0,
} },
{ "rsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
NULL,
17,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
NULL,
KEY_RSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"RSA #3",
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
18,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
19,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"# Hashed hostname and address entries",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ "dsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
20,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #5",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
21,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #5",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
22,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #5",
+ 0,
} },
{ "rsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
23,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_RSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"RSA #5",
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
24,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
/*
* The next series have each key listed multiple times, as the
* hostname and addresses in the pre-hashed known_hosts are split
* to separate lines.
*/
{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
25,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
NULL,
26,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
NULL,
27,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
28,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
NULL,
29,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
NULL,
30,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
31,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
NULL,
32,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
NULL,
33,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
34,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_RSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"RSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
NULL,
35,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_RSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"RSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
NULL,
36,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_RSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"RSA #6",
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
37,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
38,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
39,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"# Revoked and CA keys",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ "ed25519_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
40,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_REVOKE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_ED25519,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ED25519 #4",
+ 0,
} },
{ "ecdsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
41,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_CA,
"prometheus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_ECDSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"ECDSA #4",
+ 0,
} },
{ "dsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
42,
HKF_STATUS_OK,
0,
NULL,
MRK_CA,
"*.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_DSA,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
"DSA #4",
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
43,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
44,
HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
0,
"# Some invalid lines",
MRK_NONE,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
45,
HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
0,
NULL,
MRK_ERROR,
NULL,
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
46,
HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
47,
HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"prometheus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
48,
HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL,
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
49,
HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"sisyphus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
{ NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
NULL,
50,
HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */
0,
NULL,
MRK_NONE,
"prometheus.example.com",
NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL, /* filled at runtime */
NULL,
+ 0,
} },
};
void test_iterate(void);
void
test_iterate(void)
{
struct cbctx ctx;
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all with key parse");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all without key parse");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 1");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
ctx.match_host_p = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
ctx.match_host_s = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
ctx.match_host_p = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 2");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
ctx.match_host_s = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host missing");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host missing");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv4");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv6");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1",
+ ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv4");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv6");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1",
+ ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify addr missing");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.168.0.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.168.0.1",
+ ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match addr missing");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "::1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = 0;
ctx.match_host_s = 1;
ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
ctx.match_host_p = 1;
ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com",
- "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4 w/ key parse");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
ctx.match_host_s = 1;
ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
- check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6 w/ key parse");
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.expected = expected_full;
ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
ctx.match_host_p = 1;
ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com",
- "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0);
+ "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
TEST_DONE();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
index 5c61307a325a..50b117c07851 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
@@ -1,29 +1,40 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.12 2021/01/09 12:24:30 dtucker Exp $
PROG=test_kex
SRCS=tests.c test_kex.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
-SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
-SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c
-SRCS+=kex.c kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c
-SRCS+=kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c
-SRCS+=dh.c compat.c
-SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
-SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
-SRCS+=smult_curve25519_ref.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c
+SRCS+=compat.c ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+= kex.c
+SRCS+= dh.c
+SRCS+= kexdh.c
+SRCS+= kexecdh.c
+SRCS+= kexgex.c
+SRCS+= kexgexc.c
+SRCS+= kexgexs.c
+SRCS+= kexc25519.c
+SRCS+= smult_curve25519_ref.c
+SRCS+= kexgen.c
+SRCS+= kexsntrup761x25519.c
+SRCS+= sntrup761.c
+SRCS+= utf8.c
SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
LDADD+=-lz
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
index 6e5999bb9edd..3bd71a9f4d56 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
@@ -1,202 +1,209 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_kex.c,v 1.2 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_kex.c,v 1.5 2020/12/29 01:02:15 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test KEX
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
-struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX - needed for linking */
-
void kex_tests(void);
static int do_debug = 0;
static int
do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to)
{
u_char type;
size_t len;
const u_char *buf;
int r;
for (;;) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
if (type != 0)
return 0;
buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len);
if (do_debug)
printf("%zu", len);
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
}
}
static void
run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server)
{
int r = 0;
while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) {
if (do_debug)
printf(" S:");
if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client)))
break;
if (do_debug)
printf(" C:");
if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server)))
break;
}
if (do_debug)
printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1);
}
static void
do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
{
struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL;
struct sshkey *private, *public;
struct sshbuf *state;
struct kex_params kex_params;
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *keyname = NULL;
TEST_START("sshkey_generate");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(keytype, bits, &private), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshkey_from_private");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(private, &public), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ssh_init");
memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
if (kex != NULL)
kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, private), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, public), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("kex");
run_kex(client, server);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("rekeying client");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
run_kex(client, server);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("rekeying server");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0);
run_kex(client, server);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state");
state = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0);
ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state");
server2 = NULL;
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, private), 0);
- kex_free(server2->kex); /* XXX or should ssh_packet_set_state()? */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0);
sshbuf_free(state);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL);
/* XXX we need to set the callbacks */
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
-#endif
- server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+ server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key;
server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key;
server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign;
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("rekeying server2");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0);
run_kex(client, server2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
run_kex(client, server2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("cleanup");
sshkey_free(private);
sshkey_free(public);
ssh_free(client);
ssh_free(server);
ssh_free(server2);
free(keyname);
TEST_DONE();
}
static void
do_kex(char *kex)
{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ED25519, 256);
}
void
kex_tests(void)
{
do_kex("curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp256");
do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp384");
do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp521");
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
do_kex("diffie-hellman-group14-sha1");
do_kex("diffie-hellman-group1-sha1");
+# ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+ do_kex("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com");
+# endif /* USE_SNTRUP761X25519 */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/Makefile
index 87e75826ac27..939163d30ef5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/Makefile
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 03:01:49 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2021/01/09 12:24:31 dtucker Exp $
PROG=test_match
SRCS=tests.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
SRCS+=match.c misc.c log.c uidswap.c fatal.c ssherr.c addrmatch.c xmalloc.c
-SRCS+=cleanup.c atomicio.c
+SRCS+=cleanup.c atomicio.c addr.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
index 3d9af55f2849..4fefaf4f3756 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
@@ -1,132 +1,132 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.5 2018/07/04 13:51:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.7 2020/07/15 06:43:16 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for matching functions
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "match.h"
void
tests(void)
{
TEST_START("match_pattern");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", ""), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "aaa"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", ""), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", "aaaa"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaaa", "aaa"), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("match_pattern wildcard");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "?"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a?"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "**"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?a"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "*a"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a?"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a*"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "?a"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "*a"), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("match_pattern_list");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "", 0), 0); /* no patterns */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!a,*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*,!a", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "a,!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*,a", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "", 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a", 0), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!b", 0), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a,*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!a,*", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*,!a", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "*,!a", 0), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!*", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!a", 0), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!a", 0), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*,a", 0), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!*,a", 0), -1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("match_pattern_list lowercase");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 1), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 1), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("addr_match_list");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1/44"), -2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "127.0.0.1/44"), -2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("a", "*"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "*"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "*"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1"), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2"), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.255", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.1.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.1.0/24"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.0/24"), -1);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.1.0/24"), 1); */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.1"), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1,10.0.0.1"), -1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,127.0.0.2"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 0);
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.2"), 1); */
/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */
TEST_DONE();
#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \
do { \
- char *result = match_filter_blacklist((string), (filter)); \
+ char *result = match_filter_denylist((string), (filter)); \
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \
free(result); \
} while (0)
TEST_START("match_filter_list");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", "");
CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", "");
TEST_DONE();
/*
* XXX TODO
* int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
* int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
* char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
* int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
*/
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2cfebf2d9588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: test_argv.c,v 1.3 2021/06/08 07:40:12 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc argv handling functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_argv(void);
+
+void
+test_argv(void)
+{
+ char **av = NULL;
+ int ac = 0;
+
+#define RESET_ARGV() \
+ do { \
+ argv_free(av, ac); \
+ av = NULL; \
+ ac = -1; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ TEST_START("empty args");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[0], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split(" ", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[0], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("trivial args");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley leamas", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "leamas");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("quoted");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"smiley\"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas \" smiley \"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], " smiley ");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"smiley leamas\"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley leamas");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley\" leamas\" liz", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley leamas");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "liz");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("escaped");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\\\"smiley\\'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "\"smiley'");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("'\\'smiley\\\"'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "'smiley\"");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley\\'s leamas\\'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley's");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "leamas'");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas\\\\smiley", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas\\smiley");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas\\\\ \\\\smiley", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas\\");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "\\smiley");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley\\ leamas", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley leamas");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("quoted escaped");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("'smiley\\ leamas'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley\\ leamas");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"smiley\\ leamas\"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley\\ leamas");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("comments");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("# gold", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "#");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "gold");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("# gold", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[0], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas#gold", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas#gold");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"leamas # gold\"", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas # gold");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"leamas\"#gold", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas#gold");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+ RESET_ARGV();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ /* XXX test char *argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv) */
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8f9be89ff900
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: test_convtime.c,v 1.1 2021/03/19 03:25:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc time conversion functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_convtime(void);
+
+void
+test_convtime(void)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ TEST_START("misc_convtime");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("2s"), 2);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3m"), 180);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1m30"), 90);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1m30s"), 90);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1h1s"), 3601);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 90 * 60);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1d"), 24 * 60 * 60);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w"), 7 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w2d3h4m5"), 788645);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w2d3h4m5s"), 788645);
+ /* any negative number or error returns -1 */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-1"), -1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(""), -1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("trout"), -1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-77"), -1);
+ /* boundary conditions */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (long long unsigned)INT_MAX);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), INT_MAX);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (long long unsigned)INT_MAX + 1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3550w5d3h14m7s"), 2147483647);
+#if INT_MAX == 2147483647
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3550w5d3h14m8s"), -1);
+#endif
+ TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..513c69bce4e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: test_expand.c,v 1.2 2021/04/06 09:07:33 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc string expansion functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_expand(void);
+
+void
+test_expand(void)
+{
+ int parseerr;
+ char *ret;
+
+ TEST_START("dollar_expand");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(setenv("FOO", "bar", 1), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(setenv("BAR", "baz", 1), 0);
+ (void)unsetenv("BAZ");
+#define ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(x, y) do { \
+ char *str = dollar_expand(NULL, (x)); \
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, (y)); \
+ free(str); \
+} while(0)
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}", "bar");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO}", " bar");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO} ", "bar ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ", " bar ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}${BAR}", "barbaz");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ${BAR}", " bar baz");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}${BAR} ", "barbaz ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ${BAR} ", " bar baz ");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("$", "$");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" $", " $");
+ ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("$ ", "$ ");
+
+ /* suppress error messages for error handing tests */
+ log_init("test_misc", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ /* error checking, non existent variable */
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "a${BAZ}");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${BAZ}b");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "a${BAZ}b");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+ /* invalid format */
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${F");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${FO");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ /* empty variable name */
+ ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${}");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+ /* restore loglevel to default */
+ log_init("test_misc", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("percent_expand");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%%", "%h", "foo", NULL), "%");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%h", "h", "foo", NULL), "foo");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%h ", "h", "foo", NULL), "foo ");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %h", "h", "foo", NULL), " foo");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %h ", "h", "foo", NULL), " foo ");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %a%b ", "a", "foo", "b", "bar", NULL),
+ " foobar ");
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("percent_dollar_expand");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_dollar_expand("%h${FOO}", "h", "foo", NULL),
+ "foobar");
+ TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..727ff3dea9d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: test_parse.c,v 1.1 2021/03/19 03:25:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc user/host/URI parsing functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_parse(void);
+
+void
+test_parse(void)
+{
+ int port;
+ char *user, *host, *path;
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_host_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@some.host:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv4_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@1.22.33.144:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_nopath");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, ".");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv6_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[::1]:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "::1");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_uri");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_uri("ssh", "ssh://someuser@some.host:22/some/path",
+ &user, &host, &port, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(port, 22);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1d9133d4b31b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.c
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: test_strdelim.c,v 1.2 2021/05/21 03:59:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc strdelim() and co
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+void test_strdelim(void);
+
+void
+test_strdelim(void)
+{
+ char *orig, *str, *cp;
+
+#define START_STRING(x) orig = str = xstrdup(x)
+#define DONE_STRING() free(orig)
+
+ TEST_START("empty");
+ START_STRING("");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, ""); /* XXX arguable */
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("whitespace");
+ START_STRING(" ");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, ""); /* XXX better as NULL */
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "");
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("trivial");
+ START_STRING("blob");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("trivial whitespace");
+ START_STRING("blob ");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, ""); /* XXX better as NULL */
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("multi");
+ START_STRING("blob1 blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("multi whitespace");
+ START_STRING("blob1 blob2 ");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2 ");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, ""); /* XXX better as NULL */
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("multi equals");
+ START_STRING("blob1=blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("multi too many equals");
+ START_STRING("blob1==blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1"); /* XXX better returning NULL early */
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "=blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2"); /* XXX should (but can't) reject */
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("multi equals strdelimw");
+ START_STRING("blob1=blob2");
+ cp = strdelimw(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1=blob2");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ cp = strdelimw(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("quoted");
+ START_STRING("\"blob\"");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, ""); /* XXX better as NULL */
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("quoted multi");
+ START_STRING("\"blob1\" blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("quoted multi reverse");
+ START_STRING("blob1 \"blob2\"");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "\"blob2\"");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, ""); /* XXX better as NULL */
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("quoted multi middle");
+ START_STRING("blob1 \"blob2\" blob3");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob3");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("badquote");
+ START_STRING("\"blob");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("oops quote");
+ START_STRING("\"blob\\\"");
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob\\"); /* XXX wrong */
+ cp = strdelim(&str);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");
+ DONE_STRING();
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b0b7cd4332e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.7 2021/05/21 03:48:07 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc helper functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_parse(void);
+void test_convtime(void);
+void test_expand(void);
+void test_argv(void);
+void test_strdelim(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+ test_parse();
+ test_convtime();
+ test_expand();
+ test_argv();
+ test_strdelim();
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
index 81d4f27a6132..a8ddfaf7ed24 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.6 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.10 2021/01/09 12:24:31 dtucker Exp $
-.include <bsd.regress.mk>
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
PROG=test_sshbuf
SRCS=tests.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_misc.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fixed.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c fatal.c ssherr.c cleanup.c
+SRCS+=match.c addr.c addrmatch.c
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
- env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
-
+ env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
index c52376b531a3..e236c82f96fc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
@@ -1,127 +1,132 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fuzz.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fuzz.c,v 1.2 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#define NUM_FUZZ_TESTS (1 << 18)
void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void);
void
sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void)
{
struct sshbuf *p1;
u_char *dp;
- size_t sz, sz2, i;
+ size_t sz, sz2, i, ntests = NUM_FUZZ_TESTS;
u_int32_t r;
int ret;
+ if (test_is_fast())
+ ntests >>= 2;
+ if (test_is_slow())
+ ntests <<= 2;
+
/* NB. uses sshbuf internals */
TEST_START("fuzz alloc/dealloc");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 16 * 1024), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
for (i = 0; i < NUM_FUZZ_TESTS; i++) {
r = arc4random_uniform(10);
if (r == 0) {
/* 10% chance: small reserve */
r = arc4random_uniform(10);
fuzz_reserve:
sz = sshbuf_avail(p1);
sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1);
ret = sshbuf_reserve(p1, r, &dp);
if (ret < 0) {
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz, r);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2);
} else {
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz, r);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - r);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 + r);
memset(dp, arc4random_uniform(255) + 1, r);
}
} else if (r < 3) {
/* 20% chance: big reserve */
r = arc4random_uniform(8 * 1024);
goto fuzz_reserve;
} else if (r == 3) {
/* 10% chance: small consume */
r = arc4random_uniform(10);
fuzz_consume:
sz = sshbuf_avail(p1);
sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1);
/* 50% change consume from end, otherwise start */
ret = ((arc4random() & 1) ?
sshbuf_consume : sshbuf_consume_end)(p1, r);
if (ret < 0) {
ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz2, r);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2);
} else {
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz2, r);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz + r);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 - r);
}
} else if (r < 8) {
/* 40% chance: big consume */
r = arc4random_uniform(2 * 1024);
goto fuzz_consume;
} else if (r == 8) {
/* 10% chance: reset max size */
r = arc4random_uniform(16 * 1024);
sz = sshbuf_max_size(p1);
if (sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, r) < 0)
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz);
else
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), r);
} else {
if (arc4random_uniform(8192) == 0) {
/* tiny chance: new buffer */
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
sshbuf_free(p1);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1,
16 * 1024), 0);
} else {
/* Almost 10%: giant reserve */
/* use arc4random_buf for r > 2^32 on 64 bit */
arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r));
while (r < SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 2) {
r <<= 1;
r |= arc4random() & 1;
}
goto fuzz_reserve;
}
}
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 16 * 1024);
}
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
index 966e8432b2d6..bea89881a463 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
@@ -1,484 +1,713 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c,v 1.2 2019/07/14 23:33:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void);
void
sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void)
{
struct sshbuf *p1, *p2;
const u_char *cd;
u_char *d, d2[32], x[] = {
0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x00, 0x99
};
u_int64_t v64;
u_int32_t v32;
u_int16_t v16;
u_char v8;
size_t s;
char *s2;
int r;
u_char bn1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
u_char bn2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02 };
u_char bn3[] = { 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 };
u_char bn_exp1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
u_char bn_exp2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 };
u_char bn_exp3[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 };
TEST_START("PEEK_U64");
ASSERT_U64_EQ(PEEK_U64(x), 0x1122334455667788ULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("PEEK_U32");
ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(x), 0x11223344);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("PEEK_U16");
ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(x), 0x1122);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("POKE_U64");
bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
POKE_U64(d2, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 8);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("POKE_U32");
bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
POKE_U32(d2, 0x11223344);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("POKE_U16");
bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
POKE_U16(d2, 0x1122);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5);
cd = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cd, NULL);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[0], 0x11);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[1], 0x22);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[2], 0x33);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[3], 0x44);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[4], 0x55);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4), 0);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get truncated");
r = sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put truncated");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0);
r = sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64), 0);
ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64 truncated");
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
r = sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0);
ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 6);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0);
ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x55667788);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32 truncated");
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
r = sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 9), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 9);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 7);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x3344);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x5566);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x7788);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16 truncated");
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
r = sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 2), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x22);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8 truncated");
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
r = sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 exact");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 8), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 limited");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 7), 0);
r = sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 exact");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 limited");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 3), 0);
r = sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16 limited");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1), 0);
r = sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 + 4);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x));
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
free(d);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string exact");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x));
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
free(d);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string truncated");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3);
r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string giant");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring giant");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring embedded \\0");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring trailing \\0");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x) - 1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x) - 1), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 - 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x) - 1);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(s2, x, s);
free(s2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), sizeof(x));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, x, sizeof(x));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string limited");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4 - 1), 0);
r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string giant");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, (void *)0x01, 0xfffffffc);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_putf");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
r = sshbuf_putf(p1, "%s %d %x", "hello", 23, 0x5f);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 11);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), "hello 23 5f", 11);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_putb");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
p2 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "blahblahblah", 12), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(p2, p1), 0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 12);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), "blahblahblah", 12);
sshbuf_free(p2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes empty buf");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes all zeroes");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn1, sizeof(bn1)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes simple");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2+2, sizeof(bn2)-2), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes leading zero");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2, sizeof(bn2)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3+1, sizeof(bn3)-1), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg and leading zero");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3, sizeof(bn3)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3));
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u64");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 0, &v64), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 2, &v64), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x3344556677880099ULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 3, &v64), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, sizeof(x), &v64),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 1000, &v64),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u32");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 0, &v32), 0);
+ ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 6, &v32), 0);
+ ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x77880099);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 7, &v32), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, sizeof(x), &v32),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 1000, &v32),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u16");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 0, &v16), 0);
+ ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 8, &v16), 0);
+ ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x99);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 9, &v16), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, sizeof(x), &v16),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 1000, &v16),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u8");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 0, &v8), 0);
+ ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 9, &v8), 0);
+ ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x99);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, sizeof(x), &v8),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 1000, &v8),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u64");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke at start of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 0, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b2c3d4e5f607180000");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 2, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000a1b2c3d4e5f60718");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke past end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 3, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 10, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u32");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke at start of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 0, 0xa1b2c3d4), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b2c3d4000000000000");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 6, 0xa1b2c3d4), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "000000000000a1b2c3d4");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke past end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 7, 0xa1b2c3d4),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 10, 0xa1b2c3d4),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2c3d4),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u16");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke at start of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 0, 0xa1b2), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b20000000000000000");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 8, 0xa1b2), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000000000000000a1b2");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke past end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 9, 0xa1b2),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 10, 0xa1b2),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u8");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke at start of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 0, 0xa1), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1000000000000000000");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 9, 0xa1), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "000000000000000000a1");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke past end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 10, 0xa1), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 1000, 0xa1), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_poke");
+ p1 = sshbuf_new();
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke at start of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 0, "hello!", 6), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "68656c6c6f2100000000");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 4, "hello!", 6), 0);
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000000068656c6c6f21");
+ free(s2);
+ sshbuf_reset(p1);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+ /* poke past end of buffer */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 7, "hello!", 6),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 10, "hello!", 6),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 1000, "hello!", 6),
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+ /* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+ s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+ sshbuf_free(p1);
+ TEST_DONE();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
index a68e1329e40b..492b3bdf0627 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
@@ -1,409 +1,281 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c,v 1.2 2019/01/21 12:29:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void);
void
sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void)
{
struct sshbuf *p1;
BIGNUM *bn, *bn2;
- /* This one has num_bits != num_bytes * 8 to test bignum1 encoding */
const char *hexbn1 = "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10";
/* This one has MSB set to test bignum2 encoding negative-avoidance */
const char *hexbn2 = "f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010007fff11";
u_char expbn1[] = {
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
};
u_char expbn2[] = {
0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80,
0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00,
0x7f, 0xff, 0x11
};
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
const u_char *d;
size_t s;
BIGNUM *bn_x, *bn_y;
int ec256_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
char *ec256_x = "0C828004839D0106AA59575216191357"
"34B451459DADB586677EF9DF55784999";
char *ec256_y = "4D196B50F0B4E94B3C73E3A9D4CD9DF2"
"C8F9A35E42BDD047550F69D80EC23CD4";
u_char expec256[] = {
0x04,
0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06,
0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57,
0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86,
0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99,
0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b,
0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2,
0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47,
0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4
};
EC_KEY *eck;
EC_POINT *ecp;
#endif
int r;
#define MKBN(b, bnn) \
do { \
bnn = NULL; \
ASSERT_INT_GT(BN_hex2bn(&bnn, b), 0); \
} while (0)
- TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1");
- MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 2);
- ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn));
- ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1));
- BN_free(bn);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 limited");
- MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0);
- r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
- BN_free(bn);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2");
- MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 2);
- ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn));
- ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2));
- BN_free(bn);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2 limited");
- MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0);
- r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
- BN_free(bn);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2");
MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 4);
ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1));
BN_free(bn);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 limited");
MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 3), 0);
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
BN_free(bn);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2");
MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4 + 1); /* MSB */
ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4), 0x00);
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2));
BN_free(bn);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2 limited");
MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn2) + 3), 0);
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
BN_free(bn);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
- TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1");
- MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1));
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0);
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
- BN_free(bn);
- BN_free(bn2);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 truncated");
- MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1);
- BN_free(bn);
- BN_free(bn2);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 giant");
- MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xffff), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, (0xffff + 7) / 8, NULL), 0);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8));
- bn2 = BN_new();
- r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8));
- BN_free(bn);
- BN_free(bn2);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2");
- MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2));
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0);
- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
- BN_free(bn);
- BN_free(bn2);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
- TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2 truncated");
- MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
- p1 = sshbuf_new();
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
- ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1);
- BN_free(bn);
- BN_free(bn2);
- sshbuf_free(p1);
- TEST_DONE();
-
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2");
MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + sizeof(expbn1));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0);
+ bn2 = NULL;
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2), 0);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
BN_free(bn);
BN_free(bn2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 truncated");
MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+ bn2 = NULL;
+ r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 3);
BN_free(bn);
BN_free(bn2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 giant");
MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 65536), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 65536, NULL), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+ bn2 = NULL;
+ r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 65536 + 4);
BN_free(bn);
BN_free(bn2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2");
MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); /* MSB */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + 1 + sizeof(expbn2));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0);
+ bn2 = NULL;
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2), 0);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
BN_free(bn);
BN_free(bn2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 truncated");
MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+ bn2 = NULL;
+ r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 1 + 4 - 1);
BN_free(bn);
BN_free(bn2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 negative");
MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
- bn2 = BN_new();
- r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2);
+ bn2 = NULL;
+ r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4);
BN_free(bn);
BN_free(bn2);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
TEST_START("sshbuf_put_ec");
eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
ecp = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(eck));
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ecp, NULL);
MKBN(ec256_x, bn_x);
MKBN(ec256_y, bn_y);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), ecp, bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_public_key(eck, ecp), 1);
BN_free(bn_x);
BN_free(bn_y);
EC_POINT_free(ecp);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_eckey(p1, eck), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string_direct(p1, &d, &s), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(expec256));
ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, expec256, sizeof(expec256));
sshbuf_free(p1);
EC_KEY_free(eck);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_get_ec");
eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, expec256, sizeof(expec256)), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expec256) + 4);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck), 0);
bn_x = BN_new();
bn_y = BN_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_x, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_y, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eck),
bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1);
MKBN(ec256_x, bn);
MKBN(ec256_y, bn2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_x, bn), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_y, bn2), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
sshbuf_free(p1);
EC_KEY_free(eck);
BN_free(bn_x);
BN_free(bn_y);
BN_free(bn);
BN_free(bn2);
TEST_DONE();
#endif
}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
index c6b5c29d176b..1ca30be973ce 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
@@ -1,130 +1,131 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c,v 1.2 2014/05/02 02:54:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c,v 1.4 2019/01/21 12:29:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void);
static void
attempt_parse_blob(u_char *blob, size_t len)
{
struct sshbuf *p1;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *bn;
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
EC_KEY *eck;
-#endif
+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
u_char *s;
size_t l;
u_int8_t u8;
u_int16_t u16;
u_int32_t u32;
u_int64_t u64;
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, blob, len), 0);
sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &u8);
sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &u16);
sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &u32);
sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &u64);
if (sshbuf_get_string(p1, &s, &l) == 0) {
bzero(s, l);
free(s);
}
- bn = BN_new();
- sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn);
- BN_clear_free(bn);
- bn = BN_new();
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ bn = NULL;
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn);
BN_clear_free(bn);
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck);
EC_KEY_free(eck);
-#endif
+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
sshbuf_free(p1);
}
static void
onerror(void *fuzz)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
}
void
sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void)
{
u_char blob[] = {
/* u8 */
0xd0,
/* u16 */
0xc0, 0xde,
/* u32 */
0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad,
/* u64 */
0xfe, 0xed, 0xac, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x1c, 0xbe, 0xef,
/* string */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09,
'O', ' ', 'G', 'o', 'r', 'g', 'o', 'n', '!',
- /* bignum1 */
- 0x79,
- 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
- 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
/* bignum2 */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14,
0x00,
0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80,
0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00,
0x7f, 0xff, 0x11,
/* EC point (NIST-256 curve) */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41,
0x04,
0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06,
0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57,
0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86,
0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99,
0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b,
0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2,
0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47,
0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4,
};
struct fuzz *fuzz;
+ u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP |
+ FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
+ FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
+
+ if (test_is_fast())
+ fuzzers &= ~(FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP|FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP);
TEST_START("fuzz blob parsing");
- fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP |
- FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
- FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, blob, sizeof(blob));
+ fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, blob, sizeof(blob));
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz))
attempt_parse_blob(blob, sizeof(blob));
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_ONERROR(NULL, NULL);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c
index 762a6c31c037..c53db937f2f1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c
@@ -1,167 +1,218 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_misc.c,v 1.2 2016/05/03 13:48:33 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_misc.c,v 1.4 2019/07/16 22:16:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
void sshbuf_misc_tests(void);
void
sshbuf_misc_tests(void)
{
struct sshbuf *p1;
- char tmp[512], *p;
+ char tmp[512], msg[] = "imploring ping silence ping over", *p;
FILE *out;
size_t sz;
TEST_START("sshbuf_dump");
out = tmpfile();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(out, NULL);
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
sshbuf_dump(p1, out);
fflush(out);
rewind(out);
sz = fread(tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), out);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ferror(out), 0);
ASSERT_INT_NE(feof(out), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sz, 0);
tmp[sz] = '\0';
ASSERT_PTR_NE(strstr(tmp, "12 34 56 78"), NULL);
fclose(out);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob16");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
p = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "12345678");
free(p);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
- TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 1");
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 1");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
- p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+ p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "EQ==");
free(p);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
- TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 2");
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 2");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0);
- p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+ p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESI=");
free(p);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
- TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 3");
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 3");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x33), 0);
- p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+ p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESIz");
free(p);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
- TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 8191");
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 8191");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 8192, NULL), 0);
bzero(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), 8192);
- p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1);
+ p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), ((8191 + 2) / 3) * 4);
free(p);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 1");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A=="), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
ASSERT_U8_EQ(*sshbuf_ptr(p1), 0xd0);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 2");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A8="), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00f);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 4");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A/QDw=="), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00fd00f);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sshbuf_dup_string");
p1 = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
/* Check empty buffer */
p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), 0);
free(p);
/* Check buffer with string */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad1", strlen("quad1")), 0);
p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1"));
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1");
free(p);
/* Check buffer with terminating nul */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "\0", 1), 0);
p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1"));
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1");
free(p);
/* Check buffer with data after nul (expect failure) */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad2", strlen("quad2")), 0);
p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p, NULL);
sshbuf_free(p1);
TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_cmp");
+ p1 = sshbuf_from(msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "i", 1), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "j", 1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "imploring", 9), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "implored", 9), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 10, "ping", 4), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 10, "ring", 4), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "over", 4), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "rove", 4), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "overt", 5),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 32, "ping", 4),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 1000, "silence", 7),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1), 0);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("sshbuf_find");
+ p1 = sshbuf_from(msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "i", 1, &sz), 0);
+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "j", 1, &sz), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "imploring", 9, &sz), 0);
+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "implored", 9, &sz),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 3, "ping", 4, &sz), 0);
+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 10);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 11, "ping", 4, &sz), 0);
+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 23);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 20, "over", 4, &sz), 0);
+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 28);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "over", 4, &sz), 0);
+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 28);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "rove", 4, &sz),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "overt", 5, &sz),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 32, "ping", 4, &sz),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 1000, "silence", 7, &sz),
+ SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, msg + 1, sizeof(msg) - 2, &sz), 0);
+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 1);
+ TEST_DONE();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c
index 1557e43421ac..29916a10bc5b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c
@@ -1,28 +1,30 @@
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
void sshbuf_tests(void);
void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void);
void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void);
void sshbuf_misc_tests(void);
void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void);
void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void);
void sshbuf_fixed(void);
void
tests(void)
{
sshbuf_tests();
sshbuf_getput_basic_tests();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests();
+#endif
sshbuf_misc_tests();
sshbuf_fuzz_tests();
sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests();
sshbuf_fixed();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
index 1c940bec640b..d4a892375bd7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
@@ -1,24 +1,26 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.11 2021/01/09 12:24:31 dtucker Exp $
PROG=test_sshkey
SRCS=tests.c test_sshkey.c test_file.c test_fuzz.c common.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
-SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
-SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c
SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
-SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
- env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+ env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
index e63465c47f7b..effea578c094 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
@@ -1,163 +1,164 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.3 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.4 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Helpers for key API tests
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "common.h"
struct sshbuf *
load_file(const char *name)
{
- int fd;
- struct sshbuf *ret;
+ struct sshbuf *ret = NULL;
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_NE(fd = open(test_data_file(name), O_RDONLY), -1);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_file(fd, ret), 0);
- close(fd);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_load_file(test_data_file(name), &ret), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
return ret;
}
struct sshbuf *
load_text_file(const char *name)
{
struct sshbuf *ret = load_file(name);
const u_char *p;
/* Trim whitespace at EOL */
for (p = sshbuf_ptr(ret); sshbuf_len(ret) > 0;) {
if (p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\r' ||
p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\t' ||
p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == ' ' ||
p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\n')
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(ret, 1), 0);
else
break;
}
/* \0 terminate */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(ret, 0), 0);
return ret;
}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *
load_bignum(const char *name)
{
BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
struct sshbuf *buf;
buf = load_text_file(name);
ASSERT_INT_NE(BN_hex2bn(&ret, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return ret;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_n(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *n = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
return n;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_e(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *e = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, &e, NULL);
return e;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_p(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *p = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, NULL);
return p;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_q(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *q = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, NULL, &q);
return q;
}
const BIGNUM *
dsa_g(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *g = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g);
return g;
}
const BIGNUM *
dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
return pub_key;
}
const BIGNUM *
dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
return priv_key;
}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
index 93da34c64671..fcd78e990e8b 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
@@ -1,177 +1,222 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.7 2018/09/12 01:36:45 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.11 2020/06/19 03:48:49 djm Exp $
PW=mekmitasdigoat
rsa_params() {
_in="$1"
_outbase="$2"
set -e
openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^modulus:$/,/^publicExponent:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n
openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^prime1:$/,/^prime2:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.p
openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^prime2:$/,/^exponent1:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.q
for x in n p q ; do
echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
cat ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============
done
}
dsa_params() {
_in="$1"
_outbase="$2"
set -e
openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^pub:/,/^P:/' | #\
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^G:/,0' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.g
for x in priv pub g ; do
echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
cat ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============
done
}
ecdsa_params() {
_in="$1"
_outbase="$2"
set -e
openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
awk '/^pub:/,/^ASN1 OID:/' | #\
grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
- grep "ASN1 OID:" | tr -d '\n' | \
- sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' > ${_outbase}.curve
+ grep "ASN1 OID:" | \
+ sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' | tr -d '\n' > ${_outbase}.curve
for x in priv pub curve ; do
echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
cat ${_outbase}.$x
echo ============
done
}
set -ex
cd testdata
+if [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+elif [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so
+else
+ echo "Can't find sk-dummy.so" 1>&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
rm -f rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1
rm -f rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2
rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys
rm -f rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw
rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw
rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb
-ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1
-ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1
-ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1 -m PEM
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key #1" \
+ -N "" -f ecdsa_sk1
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key #1" \
+ -N "" -f ed25519_sk1
+
-ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2
-ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2
-ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2
-ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_2
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #2" -N "" -f ed25519_2
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key #2" \
+ -N "" -f ecdsa_sk2
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key #2" \
+ -N "" -f ed25519_sk2
cp rsa_1 rsa_n
cp dsa_1 dsa_n
cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa_n -N ""
+ssh-keygen -pf dsa_n -N ""
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_n -N ""
+
cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw
cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw
cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw
cp ed25519_1 ed25519_1_pw
+cp ecdsa_sk1 ecdsa_sk1_pw
+cp ed25519_sk1 ed25519_sk1_pw
cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw
cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw
cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw
-ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -N "$PW"
-ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -N "$PW"
-ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_1_pw -N "$PW"
-ssh-keygen -opf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
-ssh-keygen -opf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
-ssh-keygen -opf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_sk1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_sk1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param
rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param
dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
ecdsa_params ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1.param
ecdsa_params ecdsa_2 ecdsa_2.param
-# XXX ed25519 params
+# XXX ed25519, *sk params
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 2 dsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 3 ecdsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ecdsa_sk1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+ -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_sk1.pub
+
# Make a few RSA variant signature too.
cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha1
cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha512
cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha1.pub
cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha512.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t ssh-rsa \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha1.pub
ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t rsa-sha2-512 \
-Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha512.pub
ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 5 rsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 6 dsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_1.pub
ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
-V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_sk1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_sk1.pub
ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1.fp
ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp
ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp
-ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb
ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp.bb
-
-# XXX Extend ssh-keygen to do detached signatures (better to test/fuzz against)
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
echo "$PW" > pw
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
index 65610dacc7f6..7d767336ef47 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
@@ -1,421 +1,558 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.8 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.9 2020/06/19 03:48:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "common.h"
void sshkey_file_tests(void);
void
sshkey_file_tests(void)
{
struct sshkey *k1, *k2;
struct sshbuf *buf, *pw;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+#endif
char *cp;
TEST_START("load passphrase");
pw = load_text_file("pw");
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("parse RSA from private");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n");
b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p");
c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q");
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_n(k1), a);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_p(k1), b);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_q(k1), c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format");
buf = load_file("rsa_n");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load RSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_START("parse DSA from private");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g");
b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv");
c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub");
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_g(k1), a);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), b);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_pub_key(k1), c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format");
buf = load_file("dsa_n");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load DSA from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load DSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve");
ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf),
OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid));
sshbuf_free(buf);
a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv");
b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub");
c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a);
ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load ECDSA from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load ECDSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
/* XXX check key contents */
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
(const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint");
buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb");
cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
sshbuf_free(buf);
free(cp);
TEST_DONE();
sshkey_free(k1);
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ TEST_START("parse ECDSA-SK from private");
+ buf = load_file("ecdsa_sk1");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA_SK);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("parse ECDSA-SK from private w/ passphrase");
+ buf = load_file("ecdsa_sk1_pw");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+ (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load ECDSA-SK from public");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_sk1.pub"), &k2,
+ NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load ECDSA-SK cert");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_sk1"), &k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("ECDSA-SK key hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("ECDSA-SK cert hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("ECDSA-SK key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("parse Ed25519-SK from private");
+ buf = load_file("ed25519_sk1");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519_SK);
+ /* XXX check key contents */
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("parse Ed25519-SK from private w/ passphrase");
+ buf = load_file("ed25519_sk1_pw");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+ (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load Ed25519-SK from public");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_sk1.pub"),
+ &k2, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("load Ed25519-SK cert");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_sk1"), &k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("Ed25519-SK key hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("Ed25519-SK cert hex fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1-cert.fp");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ sshkey_free(k2);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("Ed25519-SK key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+ buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1.fp.bb");
+ cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ free(cp);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ sshkey_free(k1);
+
sshbuf_free(pw);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
index d3b0c92b47a0..f111446a9398 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
@@ -1,360 +1,390 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.8 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.12 2020/08/27 03:55:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Fuzz tests for key parsing
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "common.h"
void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
static void
onerror(void *fuzz)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
}
static void
public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshkey *k1;
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct fuzz *fuzz;
+ u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP |
+ FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
+ if (test_is_fast())
+ fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP;
+ if (test_is_slow())
+ fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0);
- /* XXX need a way to run the tests in "slow, but complete" mode */
- fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */
- FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | */
- FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END,
- sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+ fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf),
&k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
}
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
static void
sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg)
{
struct fuzz *fuzz;
u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed";
size_t l;
+ u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
+ FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), sig_alg, 0), 0);
+ if (test_is_fast())
+ fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
+ if (test_is_slow())
+ fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP;
+
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c),
+ sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0);
- fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */
- FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
- FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sig, l);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0);
+ fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sig, l);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
free(sig);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
/* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */
if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz))
continue;
ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz),
- c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0);
+ c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
}
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
+#define NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS 1024
+
void
sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
{
struct sshkey *k1;
struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed;
struct fuzz *fuzz;
- int r;
-
+ int r, i;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA private");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
- for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+ for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+ if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+ break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("rsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
- for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+ for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+ if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+ break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA private");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
- for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+ for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+ if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+ break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("dsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
- for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+ for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+ if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+ break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
- for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+ for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+ if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+ break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
- for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+ for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+ if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+ break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
- for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+ for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+ if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+ break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA public");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA public");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA512 sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
/* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */
+/* XXX fuzz XMSS too */
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
index 47a03fad4fd2..7dc20cc857a5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
@@ -1,508 +1,527 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.17 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.21 2020/08/27 03:55:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
void sshkey_tests(void);
static void
put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value)
{
struct sshbuf *sect;
sect = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0);
if (value != NULL)
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0);
sshbuf_free(sect);
}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static void
-build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, const struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
- const struct sshkey *sign_key, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
+build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ struct sshkey *sign_key, struct sshkey *ca_key,
const char *sig_alg)
{
struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts;
u_char *sigblob;
size_t siglen;
ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
/*
* Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping
* the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/
*/
pk = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0);
principals = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0);
critopts = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL);
put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack");
put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1");
exts = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL);
put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, 0), 0);
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
free(sigblob);
sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
sshbuf_free(exts);
sshbuf_free(critopts);
sshbuf_free(principals);
sshbuf_free(pk);
}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static void
signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
const u_char *d, size_t l)
{
size_t len;
u_char *sig;
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+ NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
- ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
free(sig);
}
static void
banana(u_char *s, size_t l)
{
size_t o;
const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' };
for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) {
if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) {
memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o);
break;
}
memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana));
}
}
static void
signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg)
{
u_char i, buf[2049];
size_t lens[] = {
1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129,
255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049
};
for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) {
test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu",
sshkey_type(k), lens[i]);
banana(buf, lens[i]);
signature_test(k, bad, sig_alg, buf, lens[i]);
}
}
static struct sshkey *
get_private(const char *n)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *ret;
b = load_file(n);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &ret, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
void
sshkey_tests(void)
{
- struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *k4, *kr, *kd, *kf;
+ struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *kf;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ struct sshkey *k4, *kr, *kd;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
struct sshkey *ke;
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
struct sshbuf *b;
TEST_START("new invalid");
k1 = sshkey_new(-42);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif
TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
/* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_p(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(rsa_n(kr)), 1024);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(kd), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_priv_key(kd), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kr, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(rsa_p(k1), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kd, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(ke, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kf, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("equal mismatched key types");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0);
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0);
TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("equal different keys");
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
sshkey_free(kr);
sshkey_free(kd);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
sshkey_free(ke);
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
sshkey_free(kf);
TEST_START("certify key");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"),
&k1, NULL), 0);
k2 = get_private("ed25519_2");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL);
k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
k1->cert->serial = 1234;
k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL);
k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals));
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL);
k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon");
k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir");
k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo");
k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL);
k1->cert->nprincipals = 4;
k1->cert->valid_after = 0;
k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1;
sshbuf_free(k1->cert->critical);
k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL);
sshbuf_free(k1->cert->extensions);
k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL);
put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true");
put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1");
put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL, NULL, NULL), 0);
b = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
sshkey_free(k3);
sshbuf_reset(b);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA256");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-256");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA512");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify DSA");
k1 = get_private("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA");
k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
-#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519");
k1 = get_private("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("nested certificate");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
sshkey_free(k3);
sshbuf_free(b);
TEST_DONE();
-
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n
index d3f24824f8d5..657624e0e72f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n
@@ -1,12 +1,21 @@
------BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-MIIBvAIBAAKBgQD6kutNFRsHTwEAv6d39Lhsqy1apdHBZ9c2HfyRr7WmypyGIy2m
-Ka43vzXI8CNwmRSYs+A6d0vJC7Pl+f9QzJ/04NWOA+MiwfurwrR3CRe61QRYb8Py
-mcHOxueHs95IcjrbIPNn86cjnPP5qvv/guUzCjuww4zBdJOXpligrGt2XwIVAKMD
-/50qQy7j8JaMk+1+Xtg1pK01AoGBAO7l9QVVbSSoy5lq6cOtvpf8UlwOa6+zBwbl
-o4gmFd1RwX1yWkA8kQ7RrhCSg8Hc6mIGnKRgKRli/3LgbSfZ0obFJehkRtEWtN4P
-h8fVUeS74iQbIwFQeKlYHIlNTRoGtAbdi3nHdV+BBkEQc1V3rjqYqhjOoz/yNsgz
-LND26HrdAoGBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb
-OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joo
-t+LK84ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAhRYIbQ5
-KfXsZuBPuWe5FJz3ldaEgw==
------END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n
index 80382b62d2db..9694f32e4407 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
------BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
-MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49
-AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/
-kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw==
------END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAaAAAABNlY2RzYS
+1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQQMWVuWQ6tb3J0pWG0z70Bjdz2xoETt
+IbeUXHfycFq+QAMNoj2OHf+S8b8m32+mbbarCiSVMIYN/MKReQgppaUHAAAAoFrmmZBa5p
+mQAAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlY
+bTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvybfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQ
+cAAAAhAPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMAAAAAAECAwQFBgc=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1 b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b51fb73d6386
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1921451d740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:Go7HO0CVPYG+BSDSk9ZUJBKGSrtBExp6obTa9iqzIUo
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9586c61a7d69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ECDSA-SK test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d1921451d740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:Go7HO0CVPYG+BSDSk9ZUJBKGSrtBExp6obTa9iqzIUo
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cb9f4dd0dc8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xovem-sacac-dageg-vovoc-symyz-bozal-cibiv-cyvat-vylyn-romib-hoxax
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c3b21e02b1f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBGdVPkKOLUMZ7b6rZfS8BOHotic4NX4MmuyEmiuvkaeKlbb1F+5oNezRYHpcF6P104trNVEONCu1XX1CA7px+QUAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4fa23a7383e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2 b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..19db5a3f5690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1bc99ea0d7a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:pz8VkgtRY3r50F4zSuzRlmq9c6vPTpJXLKKOgkyUcKE
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bfee7658a606
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xobel-gavur-gorym-pedop-rarob-bunek-gucer-lofeg-syhaf-fylur-zoxix
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2629d9509ed2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJOX5JHqtOCU5mZxCQK0nc936VaKd7Oj+AeTihl1lxNCyYRizvroGVYa4HYHPepBEtrpxew/7gr2QCMAnvN2gVQAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key #2
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw
index c3b7ae7f811b..da94d2b8e2e4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
-b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABCus+kaow
-AUjHphacvRp98dAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFv
-PwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAoJaqqgiYQuElraJAmYOm7Tb4nJ3eI4oj9mQ52M
-/Yd+ION2Ur1v8BDewpDX+LHEYgKHo3Mlmcn2UyF+QJ+7xUCW7QCtk/4szrJzw74DlEl6mH
-T8PT/f/av7PpECBD/YD3NoDlB9OWm/Q4sHcxfBEKfTGD7s2Onn71HgrdEOPqd4Sj/IQigR
-drfjtXEMlD32k9n3dd2eS9x7AHWYaGFEMkOcY=
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABDKT56mBA
+tXIMsWqmuuA2gdAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFv
+PwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAoC13U47yfUOSZJePNUAwWXuFOk3aOKwPM5PMvK
+0zwRnMZZjgn+tsMAYPwhsT3Mx3h5QzvVGFyFEqsiK7j4vAotD+LVQeBN5TwWbUBx4lnoGs
+3iAfYVDakO/gNvVBDDGOqv5kdCc4cgn5HacjHQLKOAx6KzHe7JFn7uCywMdVVQjlpI6LHb
+mHkaKiVX/C2oiRnsoe17HZ8Fxyt3vd1qNM8BE=
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1 b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4196d9c6a2de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACAhaP5OS1PPOt7uumAvXlDtte9EHbqIT1EZEJ2y
+2v3XMwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuBocY6UaHGOlAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQJYq
+lGHhFoA25/q8X/rdTqDAb7dhqs4ehhd/w8x99CwiIWj+TktTzzre7rpgL15Q7bXvRB26iE
+9RGRCdstr91zMAAAAAAAAAFkVEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAgM=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a6bb1a99cb32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:6WZVJ44bqhAWLVP4Ns0TDkoSQSsZo/h2K+mEvOaNFbw
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3c72c268df94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAI3NrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJr7CuMntQKvHoUshx374fJLFEkyxKsEOBA1H6hk5scoAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoAAAAAAAAACAAAAAIAAAAGanVsaXVzAAAAEgAAAAVob3N0MQAAAAVob3N0MgAAAAA2i4NgAAAAAE0d4eAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOo/0xneV3iM2qWEo5RUwvUYa2bjff292T5vvuXRomGQAAAAUwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAAECgsRGLDh1SI3m66MRp9D2iLP4wabQ0OrDgGidk7LsVn2XZHV5jBZN1RtNfe6PBMeVzfRtGUzOg18sO7H7uU+EC ED25519-SK test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a6bb1a99cb32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:6WZVJ44bqhAWLVP4Ns0TDkoSQSsZo/h2K+mEvOaNFbw
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1bfe20a4803a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xucac-vusip-tydoz-dudad-nerif-raran-tezun-cogyd-pamoh-bahef-ruxix
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..60fe00c3949b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1c29ff07fe5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABDr5R9Yf/
+ucEh0Ns6c34tcIAAAAEAAAAAEAAABKAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29t
+AAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoAAADA2T6owx
+OSgKz4DvLnS3UJ/renbuew5mbkIWB1/y8xd3y5Usm08iUCAlKxep9dVRQvmyoTrc/7rHOM
+DkokNw+WgKambnlYT/9QfqViZ9iCBtbdmhLM6ksUCgQefvquRyXoJxlWstjXUll6Ru+ZbT
+H//Ss8C1bYtAiXR68OQ+rhDrvQxA9P8J1sGIlkuV3h8YXddSpyBW2Sn0LTHHBXYZo86cXZ
+G4Lnc8aGYm65eqdHgkfRmht3eS8DTdzEBfBNH5Ml
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2 b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b9b748966bca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACAV8fu1Sc31QLK2R/zGPdN3ve5xuFvDc7mEAWxb
+aI+YcwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuJCMX5uQjF+bAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIBXx+7VJzfVAsrZH/MY903e97nG4W8NzuYQBbFtoj5hzAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQObE
+PajcKI1W30EKOhBb6u+Fgx464kf7EjnqDSg4l7gAFfH7tUnN9UCytkf8xj3Td73ucbhbw3
+O5hAFsW2iPmHMAAAAAAAAAFkVEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzIBAgM=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1c4369a00768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:b9BVPS5vuU4yu/FgweojLLg6zbfmBBoWLUgibdxxsoo
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f5fd9efd8f9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xemac-tizim-dihep-supar-zupib-cukak-pasis-febeg-dyguv-hutec-dyxox
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c7ed9f524a49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIBXx+7VJzfVAsrZH/MY903e97nG4W8NzuYQBbFtoj5hzAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key #2
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1
deleted file mode 100644
index 161cc04dc700..000000000000
Binary files a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp
deleted file mode 100644
index 21b3d1a9a128..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-SHA256:/kk7K9S9kwYFiFilnZYFwCsQJweI/SGQVR2nIa8VBhE
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb
deleted file mode 100644
index 62991b3e0bbe..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-xilil-nabyf-gynih-duheb-gokyp-bofet-nekac-bosod-lozin-kuvyh-poxix
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n
deleted file mode 100644
index 9a2549bbbd15..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-00ce8ca77a556eba887f9a866c084a6402785354a81c10854d343181fa09351223a65f99915f8433d11a9c41677d307c03c3a39865b83e7172d2c1d878333c980438d6e4462106a0065cd75cfea7ca7f21538bf2f43f2af49cacee51b22e3bdcc5e87b59cc691f7c6942a77ef13bfdfb24300777b727348d0ba7900ba06b886729
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
deleted file mode 100644
index f665b0d64d1e..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1024 65537 145043942670517902781741650890610683756045780348507433188994725700923246927874581962206512480287863636935077725837494808988986557337885675565086448774391442851909709751605441036910145362277967349042489937363543710406342212883803780768870873303921572812138116796733586484633244057911618360651775855949808953129 RSA1 test key #1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw
deleted file mode 100644
index e73c6794ade5..000000000000
Binary files a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2
deleted file mode 100644
index 1d672ddea393..000000000000
Binary files a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp
deleted file mode 100644
index 00516d521fba..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-SHA256:JaOeRCnLl/TLe7vn1+aQ4ONyKZCUhK5x3k4VHilmbpE
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb
deleted file mode 100644
index b4989a588d88..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-xipag-zohut-zepuk-pisyv-kamog-pupus-netud-tudis-melup-cynov-gaxox
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n
deleted file mode 100644
index 25d438d06207..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-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
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
deleted file mode 100644
index acab6dda6e62..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-2048 65537 25587207108642486834576012232250034427766229965612147538722032399009467293691448851087324679403117563681753304072089087252850866332601294130674473984011813227791089686736237645788471744456489819306046398653719249100878753563464696688916667605969658659855996383142110932332560049231682024775766802333675397528993897914717996946881193454997890776063024953924432026083898531677702536941151535135950834711001926404724453460085864892836473957600610133803037286539329764689125111700732309717375455919436557475211197800228646235077584780367991159670572954337165006813357814232200750568307753718414790655085790471723847208627 RSA1 test key #2
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n
index 5de3f8422e89..b8e585e5188a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n
@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
------BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u
-d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd
-NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB
-AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ
-GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj
-Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv
-Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i
-PF3RefWDAkEA1CVBzAFL4mNwpleVPzrfy69xP3gWOa26MxM/GE6zx9jC7HgQ3KPa
-WKdG/FuHs085aTRDaDLmGcZ8IvMuu7NgKQJAcIOKmxR0Gd8IN7NZugjqixggb0Pj
-mLKXXwESGiJyYtHL0zTj4Uqyi6Ya2GJ66o7UXscmnmYz828fJtTtZBdbRwJBALfi
-C2QvA32Zv/0PEXibKXy996WSC4G3ShwXZKtHHKHvCxY5BDSbehk59VesZrVPyG2e
-NYdOBxD0cIlCzJE56/ECQAndVkxvO8hwyEFGGwF3faHIAe/OxVb+MjaU25//Pe1/
-h/e6tlCk4w9CODpyV685gV394eYwMcGDcIkipTNUDZs=
------END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c
index 13f265cdb91b..78aa9223d42b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c
@@ -1,27 +1,22 @@
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
void sshkey_tests(void);
void sshkey_file_tests(void);
void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
void
tests(void)
{
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
-
sshkey_tests();
sshkey_file_tests();
sshkey_fuzz_tests();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..65564d1b278b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2021/01/09 12:24:31 dtucker Exp $
+
+PROG=test_sshsig
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c sshsig.c
+SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
+#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+ env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..d2300f9c6ee1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.1 2020/06/19 04:32:09 djm Exp $
+
+NAMESPACE=unittest
+
+set -ex
+
+cd testdata
+
+if [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+elif [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+ SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so
+else
+ echo "Can't find sk-dummy.so" 1>&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+rm -f signed-data namespace
+rm -f rsa dsa ecdsa ed25519 ecdsa_sk ed25519_sk
+rm -f rsa.sig dsa.sig ecdsa.sig ed25519.sig ecdsa_sk.sig ed25519_sk.sig
+
+printf "This is a test, this is only a test" > signed-data
+printf "$NAMESPACE" > namespace
+
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -C "RSA test" -N "" -f rsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -C "DSA test" -N "" -f dsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -C "ECDSA test" -N "" -f ecdsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key" -N "" -f ed25519
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key" \
+ -N "" -f ecdsa_sk
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key" \
+ -N "" -f ed25519_sk
+
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f rsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > rsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f dsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > dsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ecdsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ecdsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ed25519 -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ed25519.sig
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" \
+ -Y sign -f ecdsa_sk -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ecdsa_sk.sig
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" \
+ -Y sign -f ed25519_sk -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ed25519_sk.sig
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7c0063efcdf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e77aa7ef41a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA test
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0b14ad6b8a7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----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+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..55fb440e01d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIFg0ZCSEB5LNeLsXYL25g3kqEWsqh52DR+yNOjyQJqyZoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAE3sud88FV0N8FPspZSV7LWqj6uPPLRZiSsenNuEYAteWPyDgrZsWb
+LzXBuUJucepaCNuW/QWgHBRbrjWj3ERm3A==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..14ec6cf1230c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBN7LnfPBVdDfBT7KWUley1qo+rjzy0WYkrHpzbhGALXlj8g4K2bFmy81wblCbnHqWgjblv0FoBwUW641o9xEZtw= ECDSA test
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79781570cda1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAGgAAAATZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NgAAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAE
+EE3sud88FV0N8FPspZSV7LWqj6uPPLRZiSsenNuEYAteWPyDgrZsWbLzXBuUJucepaCNuW
+/QWgHBRbrjWj3ERm3AAAAAh1bml0dGVzdAAAAAAAAAAGc2hhNTEyAAAAZQAAABNlY2RzYS
+1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAASgAAACEAycVNsTlE+XEZYyYiDxWZlliruf/pPMhEEMR/XLdQ
+a4MAAAAhALQt+5gES7L3uKGptHB6UZQMuZ2WyI0C6FJs4v6AtMIU
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..62ae44cb09ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..385ebf15b142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBKDVa5jRcT5V7E6ysmwVi7HJWh7p5D+hebLPakQcpnD2ajJZ6G/4WzuhlYWnclWY63JspDp299Rlhq5AT86/g8AAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..86de36063174
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAH8AAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQ
+AAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEEoNVrmNFxPlXsTrKybBWLsclaHunkP6F5ss9qRBymcPZqMlno
+b/hbO6GVhadyVZjrcmykOnb31GWGrkBPzr+DwAAAAARzc2g6AAAACHVuaXR0ZXN0AAAAAA
+AAAAZzaGE1MTIAAAB3AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20A
+AABIAAAAIHohGwyy8iKT3zwd1TYA9V/Ioo7h/3zCJUtyq/Qigt/HAAAAIGzidTwq7D/kFa
+7Xjcp/KkdbIs4MfQpfAW/0OciajlpzARI0Vng=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1597302ce70d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBBRGwDjs4HhJFcn4tJ5Gr72KcmRmCS1OirETxaXvnsNApgoOLF1a/7rxldfSMHm73eT1nhHe97W8qicPPEAKDJQAAAALbWluZHJvdC5vcmc=
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4bdd8edc681a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----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=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519 b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b44a63d3ea60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACCJYs0iDdw0Fe/FTzY1b78I4H/j+R6mz2AmLtwTjHYwBAAAAJjpGas/6Rmr
+PwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACCJYs0iDdw0Fe/FTzY1b78I4H/j+R6mz2AmLtwTjHYwBA
+AAAEDpSKRA1QKW6kYiQftGRWh+H0fNekzYLG6c3bzseoCpEolizSIN3DQV78VPNjVvvwjg
+f+P5HqbPYCYu3BOMdjAEAAAAEEVEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkBAgMEBQ==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b078e4516fbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIlizSIN3DQV78VPNjVvvwjgf+P5HqbPYCYu3BOMdjAE ED25519 test key
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8e8ff2a8ac19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgiWLNIg3cNBXvxU82NW+/COB/4/
+keps9gJi7cE4x2MAQAAAAIdW5pdHRlc3QAAAAAAAAABnNoYTUxMgAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVk
+MjU1MTkAAABAihQsbUzuNEFflk5Tw1+H9aLS7tZQk0RG8KW1DtOmDYYnWe3D3UKiG3fcJa
+DNg4vBWp1j1gLRiBMOF+gwYNegDg==
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3a434ecb9417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACCbGg2F0GK7nOm4pQmAyCuGEjnhvs5q0TtjPbdN
+//+yxwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuBw56jAcOeowAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIJsaDYXQYruc6bilCYDIK4YSOeG+zmrRO2M9t03//7LHAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQFXc
+6dCwWewIk1EBofAouGZApW8+s0XekXenxtb78+x0mxoNhdBiu5zpuKUJgMgrhhI54b7Oat
+E7Yz23Tf//sscAAAAAAAAAE0VEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkBAgMEBQY=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..71051ec3b217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJsaDYXQYruc6bilCYDIK4YSOeG+zmrRO2M9t03//7LHAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..49b6818da59f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAEoAAAAac2stc3NoLWVkMjU1MTlAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAgmxoNhd
+Biu5zpuKUJgMgrhhI54b7OatE7Yz23Tf//sscAAAAEc3NoOgAAAAh1bml0dGVzdAAAAAAA
+AAAGc2hhNTEyAAAAZwAAABpzay1zc2gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAEAi+7eTjW
+/+LQ2M+sCD+KFtH1n7VFFJon/SZFsxODyV8cWTlFKj617Ys1Ur5TV6uaEXQhck8rBA2oQI
+HTPANLIPARI0Vng=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1570cd548baa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+unittest
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..228fad7978e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIG4wIBAAKCAYEA386lmjRHtJpyj87BrS+ssMmtvc/1SPN0gXTPs9jZ1hYAq98P
+ca3/RYVM4HaSu6COztQJ2ZnZD3Te/XeBnIU2mfuvQEl+DiwisGeNglVyRCi7787f
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+ZycSfn7HDP+WgXLXXBUI9wVM1Tif1f+9MX08xIsvCvGzo7yLgbbTFLSGr5SkA+tO
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+Yb5BuWXVEkSeRWI23SpuZbmfNTtVgiRoRqOvqM4G88LkhYjZ6xpDggxQwJiShiiD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+AjTW2naO/aniz1KZiQ0v8PNv2Eh/Gx4+AtDCjpwM5bLOnfLLaEp9dK1JttqXgGnP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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..30142ac0aee3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABgQDfzqWaNEe0mnKPzsGtL6ywya29z/VI83SBdM+z2NnWFgCr3w9xrf9FhUzgdpK7oI7O1AnZmdkPdN79d4GchTaZ+69ASX4OLCKwZ42CVXJEKLvvzt88UV9zHNl8NrsQHapjxLehpIZkrxCrO4bCYYAiaOVBfPon4cJ394P/nwagJJKKsgQIVYIC3642s4L8SaADOxt9x9ohttXMDjS2WBTeE7YnjaR13PwKKwNO0MpAAEVw5pBnJxJ+fscM/5aBctdcFQj3BUzVOJ/V/70xfTzEiy8K8bOjvIuBttMUtIavlKQD606ti6gDtXx+B7SJ3/emdW0bVSLcju96N4DB/Qdmq0V4ESc7CQgkWZl4y0V45V/7iSLiHWsOoC9Kxw28y0uno5elsABMBMC4RYSQhAGXWueCcR7SIL2JT2K0oxbqongW0hvgAIfUShTXHy+qsV5yDaG+p+TkJkEkhtXbwkW4aNpzc7EFnXsWpvyWOiZSKvUasRPbPro0yBvlOMMPsFU= RSA test
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..15a032e0100b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----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+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7df4bedd135c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+This is a test, this is only a test
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf59d58d157e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.2 2020/06/22 06:00:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+load_file(const char *name)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *ret = NULL;
+
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_load_file(test_data_file(name), &ret), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_key(const char *name)
+{
+ struct sshkey *ret = NULL;
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file(name), &ret, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+check_sig(const char *keyname, const char *signame, const struct sshbuf *msg,
+ const char *namespace)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k, *sign_key;
+ struct sshbuf *sig, *rawsig;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details;
+
+ k = load_key(keyname);
+ sig = load_file(signame);
+ sign_key = NULL;
+ sig_details = NULL;
+ rawsig = NULL;
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshsig_dearmor(sig, &rawsig), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshsig_verifyb(rawsig, msg, namespace,
+ &sign_key, &sig_details), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k, sign_key), 1);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+ sshbuf_free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(rawsig);
+}
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ char *namespace;
+
+#if 0
+ log_init("test_sshsig", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("load data");
+ msg = load_file("namespace");
+ namespace = sshbuf_dup_string(msg);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(namespace, NULL);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ msg = load_file("signed-data");
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ TEST_START("check RSA signature");
+ check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("check DSA signature");
+ check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
+ check_sig("ecdsa.pub", "ecdsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("check ED25519 signature");
+ check_sig("ed25519.pub", "ed25519.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ TEST_START("check ECDSA-SK signature");
+ check_sig("ecdsa_sk.pub", "ecdsa_sk.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+ TEST_START("check ED25519-SK signature");
+ check_sig("ed25519_sk.pub", "ed25519_sk.sig", msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+ TEST_START("check ECDSA-SK webauthn signature");
+ check_sig("ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub", "ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig",
+ msg, namespace);
+ TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ free(namespace);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1869c8b373cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html
@@ -0,0 +1,766 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"/>
+<title>webauthn test</title>
+</head>
+<body onload="init()">
+<h1>webauthn test</h1>
+<p>
+This is a demo/test page for generating FIDO keys and signatures in SSH
+formats. The page initially displays a form to generate a FIDO key and
+convert it to a SSH public key.
+</p>
+<p>
+Once a key has been generated, an additional form will be displayed to
+allow signing of data using the just-generated key. The data may be signed
+as either a raw SSH signature or wrapped in a sshsig message (the latter is
+easier to test using command-line tools.
+</p>
+<p>
+Lots of debugging is printed along the way.
+</p>
+<h2>Enroll</h2>
+<span id="error" style="color: #800; font-weight: bold; font-size: 150%;"></span>
+<form id="enrollform">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Username:</b></td>
+<td><input id="username" type="text" size="20" name="user" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td></td><td><input id="assertsubmit" type="submit" value="submit" /></td></tr>
+</table>
+</form>
+<span id="enrollresult" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>clientData</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultjson" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>attestationObject raw</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>attestationObject</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultattestobj" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>key handle</h2>
+<pre id="keyhandle" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authData raw</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultauthdataraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authData</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultauthdata" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH pubkey blob</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultpkblob" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH pubkey string</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultpk" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH private key string</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultprivkey" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+</span>
+<span id="assertsection" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>Assert</h2>
+<form id="assertform">
+<span id="asserterror" style="color: #800; font-weight: bold;"></span>
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Data to sign:</b></td>
+<td><input id="message" type="text" size="20" name="message" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><input id="message_sshsig" type="checkbox" checked /> use sshsig format</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Signature namespace:</b></td>
+<td><input id="message_namespace" type="text" size="20" name="namespace" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td></td><td><input type="submit" value="submit" /></td></tr>
+</table>
+</form>
+</span>
+<span id="assertresult" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>clientData</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultjson" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature raw</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsigraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authenticatorData raw</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultauthdataraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authenticatorData</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultauthdata" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature in SSH format</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsshsigraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature in SSH format (base64 encoded)</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsshsigb64" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+</span>
+</body>
+<script>
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// a crappy CBOR decoder - 20200401 djm@openbsd.org
+
+var CBORDecode = function(buffer) {
+ this.buf = buffer
+ this.v = new DataView(buffer)
+ this.offset = 0
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.empty = function() {
+ return this.offset >= this.buf.byteLength
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU8 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint8(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 1
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU16 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint16(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 2
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU32 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint32(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 4
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU64 = function() {
+ let r = this.v.getUint64(this.offset)
+ this.offset += 8
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getCBORTypeLen = function() {
+ let tl, t, l
+ tl = this.getU8()
+ t = (tl & 0xe0) >> 5
+ l = tl & 0x1f
+ return [t, this.decodeInteger(l)]
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeInteger = function(len) {
+ switch (len) {
+ case 0x18: return this.getU8()
+ case 0x19: return this.getU16()
+ case 0x20: return this.getU32()
+ case 0x21: return this.getU64()
+ default:
+ if (len <= 23) {
+ return len
+ }
+ throw new Error("Unsupported int type 0x" + len.toString(16))
+ }
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeNegint = function(len) {
+ let r = -(this.decodeInteger(len) + 1)
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeByteString = function(len) {
+ let r = this.buf.slice(this.offset, this.offset + len)
+ this.offset += len
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeTextString = function(len) {
+ let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+ r = u8dec.decode(this.decodeByteString(len))
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeArray = function(len, level) {
+ let r = []
+ for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ let v = this.decodeInternal(level)
+ r.push(v)
+ // console.log("decodeArray level " + level.toString() + " index " + i.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(v))
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeMap = function(len, level) {
+ let r = {}
+ for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ let k = this.decodeInternal(level)
+ let v = this.decodeInternal(level)
+ r[k] = v
+ // console.log("decodeMap level " + level.toString() + " key " + k.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(v))
+ // XXX check string keys, duplicates
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodePrimitive = function(t) {
+ switch (t) {
+ case 20: return false
+ case 21: return true
+ case 22: return null
+ case 23: return undefined
+ default:
+ throw new Error("Unsupported primitive 0x" + t.toString(2))
+ }
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeInternal = function(level) {
+ if (level > 256) {
+ throw new Error("CBOR nesting too deep")
+ }
+ let t, l, r
+ [t, l] = this.getCBORTypeLen()
+ // console.log("decode level " + level.toString() + " type " + t.toString() + " len " + l.toString())
+ switch (t) {
+ case 0:
+ r = this.decodeInteger(l)
+ break
+ case 1:
+ r = this.decodeNegint(l)
+ break
+ case 2:
+ r = this.decodeByteString(l)
+ break
+ case 3:
+ r = this.decodeTextString(l)
+ break
+ case 4:
+ r = this.decodeArray(l, level + 1)
+ break
+ case 5:
+ r = this.decodeMap(l, level + 1)
+ break
+ case 6:
+ console.log("XXX ignored semantic tag " + this.decodeInteger(l).toString())
+ break;
+ case 7:
+ r = this.decodePrimitive(l)
+ break
+ default:
+ throw new Error("Unsupported type 0x" + t.toString(2) + " len " + l.toString())
+ }
+ // console.log("decode level " + level.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(r))
+ return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decode = function() {
+ return this.decodeInternal(0)
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// a crappy SSH message packer - 20200401 djm@openbsd.org
+
+var SSHMSG = function() {
+ this.r = []
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.length = function() {
+ let len = 0
+ for (buf of this.r) {
+ len += buf.length
+ }
+ return len
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.serialise = function() {
+ let r = new ArrayBuffer(this.length())
+ let v = new Uint8Array(r)
+ let offset = 0
+ for (buf of this.r) {
+ v.set(buf, offset)
+ offset += buf.length
+ }
+ if (offset != r.byteLength) {
+ throw new Error("djm can't count")
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.serialiseBase64 = function(v) {
+ let b = this.serialise()
+ return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(b)));
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putU8 = function(v) {
+ this.r.push(new Uint8Array([v]))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putU32 = function(v) {
+ this.r.push(new Uint8Array([
+ (v >> 24) & 0xff,
+ (v >> 16) & 0xff,
+ (v >> 8) & 0xff,
+ (v & 0xff)
+ ]))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.put = function(v) {
+ this.r.push(new Uint8Array(v))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putStringRaw = function(v) {
+ let enc = new TextEncoder();
+ let venc = enc.encode(v)
+ this.put(venc)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putString = function(v) {
+ let enc = new TextEncoder();
+ let venc = enc.encode(v)
+ this.putU32(venc.length)
+ this.put(venc)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putSSHMSG = function(v) {
+ let msg = v.serialise()
+ this.putU32(msg.byteLength)
+ this.put(msg)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putBytes = function(v) {
+ this.putU32(v.byteLength)
+ this.put(v)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putECPoint = function(x, y) {
+ let x8 = new Uint8Array(x)
+ let y8 = new Uint8Array(y)
+ this.putU32(1 + x8.length + y8.length)
+ this.putU8(0x04) // Uncompressed point format.
+ this.put(x8)
+ this.put(y8)
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// webauthn to SSH glue - djm@openbsd.org 20200408
+
+function error(msg, ...args) {
+ document.getElementById("error").innerText = msg
+ console.log(msg)
+ for (const arg of args) {
+ console.dir(arg)
+ }
+}
+function hexdump(buf) {
+ const hex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf)).map(
+ b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
+ const fmt = new Array()
+ for (let i = 0; i < hex.length; i++) {
+ if ((i % 16) == 0) {
+ // Prepend length every 16 bytes.
+ fmt.push(i.toString(16).padStart(4, "0"))
+ fmt.push(" ")
+ }
+ fmt.push(hex[i])
+ fmt.push(" ")
+ if ((i % 16) == 15) {
+ fmt.push("\n")
+ }
+ }
+ return fmt.join("")
+}
+function enrollform_submit(event) {
+ event.preventDefault();
+ console.log("submitted")
+ username = event.target.elements.username.value
+ if (username === "") {
+ error("no username specified")
+ return false
+ }
+ enrollStart(username)
+}
+function enrollStart(username) {
+ let challenge = new Uint8Array(32)
+ window.crypto.getRandomValues(challenge)
+ let userid = new Uint8Array(8)
+ window.crypto.getRandomValues(userid)
+
+ console.log("challenge:" + btoa(challenge))
+ console.log("userid:" + btoa(userid))
+
+ let pkopts = {
+ challenge: challenge,
+ rp: {
+ name: "mindrot.org",
+ id: "mindrot.org",
+ },
+ user: {
+ id: userid,
+ name: username,
+ displayName: username,
+ },
+ authenticatorSelection: {
+ authenticatorAttachment: "cross-platform",
+ userVerification: "discouraged",
+ },
+ pubKeyCredParams: [{alg: -7, type: "public-key"}], // ES256
+ timeout: 30 * 1000,
+ };
+ console.dir(pkopts)
+ window.enrollOpts = pkopts
+ let credpromise = navigator.credentials.create({ publicKey: pkopts });
+ credpromise.then(enrollSuccess, enrollFailure)
+}
+function enrollFailure(result) {
+ error("Enroll failed", result)
+}
+function enrollSuccess(result) {
+ console.log("Enroll succeeded")
+ console.dir(result)
+ window.enrollResult = result
+ document.getElementById("enrollresult").style.visibility = "visible"
+
+ // Show the clientData
+ let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+ clientData = u8dec.decode(result.response.clientDataJSON)
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultjson").innerText = clientData
+
+ // Show the raw key handle.
+ document.getElementById("keyhandle").innerText = hexdump(result.rawId)
+
+ // Decode and show the attestationObject
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.attestationObject)
+ let aod = new CBORDecode(result.response.attestationObject)
+ let attestationObject = aod.decode()
+ console.log("attestationObject")
+ console.dir(attestationObject)
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultattestobj").innerText = JSON.stringify(attestationObject)
+
+ // Decode and show the authData
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultauthdataraw").innerText = hexdump(attestationObject.authData)
+ let authData = decodeAuthenticatorData(attestationObject.authData, true)
+ console.log("authData")
+ console.dir(authData)
+ window.enrollAuthData = authData
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultauthdata").innerText = JSON.stringify(authData)
+
+ // Reformat the pubkey as a SSH key for easy verification
+ window.rawKey = reformatPubkey(authData.attestedCredentialData.credentialPublicKey, window.enrollOpts.rp.id)
+ console.log("SSH pubkey blob")
+ console.dir(window.rawKey)
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultpkblob").innerText = hexdump(window.rawKey)
+ let pk64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(window.rawKey)));
+ let pk = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com " + pk64
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultpk").innerText = pk
+
+ // Format a private key too.
+ flags = 0x01 // SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD
+ window.rawPrivkey = reformatPrivkey(authData.attestedCredentialData.credentialPublicKey, window.enrollOpts.rp.id, result.rawId, flags)
+ let privkeyFileBlob = privkeyFile(window.rawKey, window.rawPrivkey, window.enrollOpts.user.name, window.enrollOpts.rp.id)
+ let privk64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(privkeyFileBlob)));
+ let privkey = "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + wrapString(privk64, 70) + "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+ document.getElementById("enrollresultprivkey").innerText = privkey
+
+ // Success: show the assertion form.
+ document.getElementById("assertsection").style.visibility = "visible"
+}
+
+function decodeAuthenticatorData(authData, expectCred) {
+ let r = new Object()
+ let v = new DataView(authData)
+
+ r.rpIdHash = authData.slice(0, 32)
+ r.flags = v.getUint8(32)
+ r.signCount = v.getUint32(33)
+
+ // Decode attestedCredentialData if present.
+ let offset = 37
+ let acd = new Object()
+ if (expectCred) {
+ acd.aaguid = authData.slice(offset, offset+16)
+ offset += 16
+ let credentialIdLength = v.getUint16(offset)
+ offset += 2
+ acd.credentialIdLength = credentialIdLength
+ acd.credentialId = authData.slice(offset, offset+credentialIdLength)
+ offset += credentialIdLength
+ r.attestedCredentialData = acd
+ }
+ console.log("XXXXX " + offset.toString())
+ let pubkeyrest = authData.slice(offset, authData.byteLength)
+ let pkdecode = new CBORDecode(pubkeyrest)
+ if (expectCred) {
+ // XXX unsafe: doesn't mandate COSE canonical format.
+ acd.credentialPublicKey = pkdecode.decode()
+ }
+ if (!pkdecode.empty()) {
+ // Decode extensions if present.
+ r.extensions = pkdecode.decode()
+ }
+ return r
+}
+
+function wrapString(s, l) {
+ ret = ""
+ for (i = 0; i < s.length; i += l) {
+ ret += s.slice(i, i + l) + "\n"
+ }
+ return ret
+}
+
+function checkPubkey(pk) {
+ // pk is in COSE format. We only care about a tiny subset.
+ if (pk[1] != 2) {
+ console.dir(pk)
+ throw new Error("pubkey is not EC")
+ }
+ if (pk[-1] != 1) {
+ throw new Error("pubkey is not in P256")
+ }
+ if (pk[3] != -7) {
+ throw new Error("pubkey is not ES256")
+ }
+ if (pk[-2].byteLength != 32 || pk[-3].byteLength != 32) {
+ throw new Error("pubkey EC coords have bad length")
+ }
+}
+
+function reformatPubkey(pk, rpid) {
+ checkPubkey(pk)
+ let msg = new SSHMSG()
+ msg.putString("sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") // Key type
+ msg.putString("nistp256") // Key curve
+ msg.putECPoint(pk[-2], pk[-3]) // EC key
+ msg.putString(rpid) // RP ID
+ return msg.serialise()
+}
+
+function reformatPrivkey(pk, rpid, kh, flags) {
+ checkPubkey(pk)
+ let msg = new SSHMSG()
+ msg.putString("sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") // Key type
+ msg.putString("nistp256") // Key curve
+ msg.putECPoint(pk[-2], pk[-3]) // EC key
+ msg.putString(rpid) // RP ID
+ msg.putU8(flags) // flags
+ msg.putBytes(kh) // handle
+ msg.putString("") // reserved
+ return msg.serialise()
+}
+
+function privkeyFile(pub, priv, user, rp) {
+ let innerMsg = new SSHMSG()
+ innerMsg.putU32(0xdeadbeef) // check byte
+ innerMsg.putU32(0xdeadbeef) // check byte
+ innerMsg.put(priv) // privkey
+ innerMsg.putString("webauthn.html " + user + "@" + rp) // comment
+ // Pad to cipher blocksize (8).
+ p = 1
+ while (innerMsg.length() % 8 != 0) {
+ innerMsg.putU8(p++)
+ }
+ let msg = new SSHMSG()
+ msg.putStringRaw("openssh-key-v1") // Magic
+ msg.putU8(0) // \0 terminate
+ msg.putString("none") // cipher
+ msg.putString("none") // KDF
+ msg.putString("") // KDF options
+ msg.putU32(1) // nkeys
+ msg.putBytes(pub) // pubkey
+ msg.putSSHMSG(innerMsg) // inner
+ //msg.put(innerMsg.serialise()) // inner
+ return msg.serialise()
+}
+
+async function assertform_submit(event) {
+ event.preventDefault();
+ console.log("submitted")
+ message = event.target.elements.message.value
+ if (message === "") {
+ error("no message specified")
+ return false
+ }
+ let enc = new TextEncoder()
+ let encmsg = enc.encode(message)
+ window.assertSignRaw = !event.target.elements.message_sshsig.checked
+ console.log("using sshsig ", !window.assertSignRaw)
+ if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+ assertStart(encmsg)
+ return
+ }
+ // Format a sshsig-style message.
+ window.sigHashAlg = "sha512"
+ let msghash = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-512", encmsg);
+ console.log("raw message hash")
+ console.dir(msghash)
+ window.sigNamespace = event.target.elements.message_namespace.value
+ let sigbuf = new SSHMSG()
+ sigbuf.put(enc.encode("SSHSIG"))
+ sigbuf.putString(window.sigNamespace)
+ sigbuf.putU32(0) // Reserved string
+ sigbuf.putString(window.sigHashAlg)
+ sigbuf.putBytes(msghash)
+ let msg = sigbuf.serialise()
+ console.log("sigbuf")
+ console.dir(msg)
+ assertStart(msg)
+}
+
+function assertStart(message) {
+ let assertReqOpts = {
+ challenge: message,
+ rpId: "mindrot.org",
+ allowCredentials: [{
+ type: 'public-key',
+ id: window.enrollResult.rawId,
+ }],
+ userVerification: "discouraged",
+ timeout: (30 * 1000),
+ }
+ console.log("assertReqOpts")
+ console.dir(assertReqOpts)
+ window.assertReqOpts = assertReqOpts
+ let assertpromise = navigator.credentials.get({
+ publicKey: assertReqOpts
+ });
+ assertpromise.then(assertSuccess, assertFailure)
+}
+function assertFailure(result) {
+ error("Assertion failed", result)
+}
+function linewrap(s) {
+ const linelen = 70
+ let ret = ""
+ for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += linelen) {
+ end = i + linelen
+ if (end > s.length) {
+ end = s.length
+ }
+ if (i > 0) {
+ ret += "\n"
+ }
+ ret += s.slice(i, end)
+ }
+ return ret + "\n"
+}
+function assertSuccess(result) {
+ console.log("Assertion succeeded")
+ console.dir(result)
+ window.assertResult = result
+ document.getElementById("assertresult").style.visibility = "visible"
+
+ // show the clientData.
+ let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+ clientData = u8dec.decode(result.response.clientDataJSON)
+ document.getElementById("assertresultjson").innerText = clientData
+
+ // show the signature.
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsigraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.signature)
+
+ // decode and show the authData.
+ document.getElementById("assertresultauthdataraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.authenticatorData)
+ authData = decodeAuthenticatorData(result.response.authenticatorData, false)
+ document.getElementById("assertresultauthdata").innerText = JSON.stringify(authData)
+
+ // Parse and reformat the signature to an SSH style signature.
+ let sshsig = reformatSignature(result.response.signature, clientData, authData)
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigraw").innerText = hexdump(sshsig)
+ let sig64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(sshsig)));
+ if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigb64").innerText = sig64
+ } else {
+ document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigb64").innerText =
+ "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n" + linewrap(sig64) +
+ "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----\n";
+ }
+}
+
+function reformatSignature(sig, clientData, authData) {
+ if (sig.byteLength < 2) {
+ throw new Error("signature is too short")
+ }
+ let offset = 0
+ let v = new DataView(sig)
+ // Expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE that exactly spans the signature.
+ if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x30) {
+ throw new Error("signature not an ASN.1 sequence")
+ }
+ offset++
+ let seqlen = v.getUint8(offset)
+ offset++
+ if ((seqlen & 0x80) != 0 || seqlen != sig.byteLength - offset) {
+ throw new Error("signature has unexpected length " + seqlen.toString() + " vs expected " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+ }
+
+ // Parse 'r' INTEGER value.
+ if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x02) {
+ throw new Error("signature r not an ASN.1 integer")
+ }
+ offset++
+ let rlen = v.getUint8(offset)
+ offset++
+ if ((rlen & 0x80) != 0 || rlen > sig.byteLength - offset) {
+ throw new Error("signature r has unexpected length " + rlen.toString() + " vs buffer " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+ }
+ let r = sig.slice(offset, offset + rlen)
+ offset += rlen
+ console.log("sig_r")
+ console.dir(r)
+
+ // Parse 's' INTEGER value.
+ if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x02) {
+ throw new Error("signature r not an ASN.1 integer")
+ }
+ offset++
+ let slen = v.getUint8(offset)
+ offset++
+ if ((slen & 0x80) != 0 || slen > sig.byteLength - offset) {
+ throw new Error("signature s has unexpected length " + slen.toString() + " vs buffer " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+ }
+ let s = sig.slice(offset, offset + slen)
+ console.log("sig_s")
+ console.dir(s)
+ offset += slen
+
+ if (offset != sig.byteLength) {
+ throw new Error("unexpected final offset during signature parsing " + offset.toString() + " expected " + sig.byteLength.toString())
+ }
+
+ // Reformat as an SSH signature.
+ let clientDataParsed = JSON.parse(clientData)
+ let innersig = new SSHMSG()
+ innersig.putBytes(r)
+ innersig.putBytes(s)
+
+ let rawsshsig = new SSHMSG()
+ rawsshsig.putString("webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com")
+ rawsshsig.putSSHMSG(innersig)
+ rawsshsig.putU8(authData.flags)
+ rawsshsig.putU32(authData.signCount)
+ rawsshsig.putString(clientDataParsed.origin)
+ rawsshsig.putString(clientData)
+ if (authData.extensions == undefined) {
+ rawsshsig.putU32(0)
+ } else {
+ rawsshsig.putBytes(authData.extensions)
+ }
+
+ if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+ return rawsshsig.serialise()
+ }
+ // Format as SSHSIG.
+ let enc = new TextEncoder()
+ let sshsig = new SSHMSG()
+ sshsig.put(enc.encode("SSHSIG"))
+ sshsig.putU32(0x01) // Signature version.
+ sshsig.putBytes(window.rawKey)
+ sshsig.putString(window.sigNamespace)
+ sshsig.putU32(0) // Reserved string
+ sshsig.putString(window.sigHashAlg)
+ sshsig.putBytes(rawsshsig.serialise())
+ return sshsig.serialise()
+}
+
+function toggleNamespaceVisibility() {
+ const assertsigtype = document.getElementById('message_sshsig');
+ const assertsignamespace = document.getElementById('message_namespace');
+ assertsignamespace.disabled = !assertsigtype.checked;
+}
+
+function init() {
+ if (document.location.protocol != "https:") {
+ error("This page must be loaded via https")
+ const assertsubmit = document.getElementById('assertsubmit')
+ assertsubmit.disabled = true
+ }
+ const enrollform = document.getElementById('enrollform');
+ enrollform.addEventListener('submit', enrollform_submit);
+ const assertform = document.getElementById('assertform');
+ assertform.addEventListener('submit', assertform_submit);
+ const assertsigtype = document.getElementById('message_sshsig');
+ assertsigtype.onclick = toggleNamespaceVisibility;
+}
+</script>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
index 4cc70852c044..9014ce8e4d02 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
@@ -1,548 +1,594 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.8 2018/02/08 08:46:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.12 2019/08/02 01:41:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
+#include "entropy.h"
#include "test_helper.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#define TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred) do { \
switch (pred) { \
case TEST_EQ: \
if (r == 0) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_NE: \
if (r != 0) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_LT: \
if (r < 0) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_LE: \
if (r <= 0) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_GT: \
if (r > 0) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_GE: \
if (r >= 0) \
return; \
break; \
default: \
abort(); \
} \
} while (0)
#define TEST_CHECK(x1, x2, pred) do { \
switch (pred) { \
case TEST_EQ: \
if (x1 == x2) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_NE: \
if (x1 != x2) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_LT: \
if (x1 < x2) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_LE: \
if (x1 <= x2) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_GT: \
if (x1 > x2) \
return; \
break; \
case TEST_GE: \
if (x1 >= x2) \
return; \
break; \
default: \
abort(); \
} \
} while (0)
extern char *__progname;
static int verbose_mode = 0;
static int quiet_mode = 0;
static char *active_test_name = NULL;
static u_int test_number = 0;
static test_onerror_func_t *test_onerror = NULL;
static void *onerror_ctx = NULL;
static const char *data_dir = NULL;
static char subtest_info[512];
+static int fast = 0;
+static int slow = 0;
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int ch;
+ seed_rng();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
+#endif
+
/* Handle systems without __progname */
if (__progname == NULL) {
__progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
if (__progname == NULL || __progname[1] == '\0')
__progname = argv[0];
else
__progname++;
if ((__progname = strdup(__progname)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "strdup failed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vqd:")) != -1) {
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "Ffvqd:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
+ case 'F':
+ slow = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ fast = 1;
+ break;
case 'd':
data_dir = optarg;
break;
case 'q':
verbose_mode = 0;
quiet_mode = 1;
break;
case 'v':
verbose_mode = 1;
quiet_mode = 0;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognised command line option\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
exit(1);
}
}
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
if (!quiet_mode)
printf("%s: ", __progname);
if (verbose_mode)
printf("\n");
tests();
if (!quiet_mode)
printf(" %u tests ok\n", test_number);
return 0;
}
int
-test_is_verbose()
+test_is_verbose(void)
{
return verbose_mode;
}
int
-test_is_quiet()
+test_is_quiet(void)
{
return quiet_mode;
}
+int
+test_is_fast(void)
+{
+ return fast;
+}
+
+int
+test_is_slow(void)
+{
+ return slow;
+}
+
const char *
test_data_file(const char *name)
{
static char ret[PATH_MAX];
if (data_dir != NULL)
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", data_dir, name);
else
strlcpy(ret, name, sizeof(ret));
if (access(ret, F_OK) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot access data file %s: %s\n",
ret, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
return ret;
}
void
test_info(char *s, size_t len)
{
snprintf(s, len, "In test %u: \"%s\"%s%s\n", test_number,
active_test_name == NULL ? "<none>" : active_test_name,
*subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info);
}
static void
siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__)))
{
char buf[256];
test_info(buf, sizeof(buf));
atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf));
}
void
test_start(const char *n)
{
assert(active_test_name == NULL);
assert((active_test_name = strdup(n)) != NULL);
*subtest_info = '\0';
if (verbose_mode)
printf("test %u - \"%s\": ", test_number, active_test_name);
test_number++;
#ifdef SIGINFO
signal(SIGINFO, siginfo);
#endif
signal(SIGUSR1, siginfo);
}
void
set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx)
{
test_onerror = f;
onerror_ctx = ctx;
}
void
test_done(void)
{
*subtest_info = '\0';
assert(active_test_name != NULL);
free(active_test_name);
active_test_name = NULL;
if (verbose_mode)
printf("OK\n");
else if (!quiet_mode) {
printf(".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
void
test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vsnprintf(subtest_info, sizeof(subtest_info), fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
void
ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line)
{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
long openssl_error = ERR_get_error();
if (openssl_error == 0)
return;
fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error: %s",
file, line, ERR_error_string(openssl_error, NULL));
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error ",
+ file, line);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
abort();
}
static const char *
pred_name(enum test_predicate p)
{
switch (p) {
case TEST_EQ:
return "EQ";
case TEST_NE:
return "NE";
case TEST_LT:
return "LT";
case TEST_LE:
return "LE";
case TEST_GT:
return "GT";
case TEST_GE:
return "GE";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
static void
test_die(void)
{
if (test_onerror != NULL)
test_onerror(onerror_ctx);
abort();
}
static void
test_header(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
const char *name, enum test_predicate pred)
{
fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d test #%u \"%s\"%s%s\n",
file, line, test_number, active_test_name,
*subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info);
fprintf(stderr, "ASSERT_%s_%s(%s%s%s) failed:\n",
name, pred_name(pred), a1,
a2 != NULL ? ", " : "", a2 != NULL ? a2 : "");
}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
void
assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
int r = BN_cmp(aa1, aa2);
TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "BIGNUM", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a1, BN_bn2hex(aa1));
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a2, BN_bn2hex(aa2));
test_die();
}
+#endif
void
assert_string(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
int r;
/* Verify pointers are not NULL */
assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE);
r = strcmp(aa1, aa2);
TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1, strlen(aa1));
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2, strlen(aa2));
test_die();
}
static char *
tohex(const void *_s, size_t l)
{
u_int8_t *s = (u_int8_t *)_s;
size_t i, j;
const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
char *r = malloc((l * 2) + 1);
assert(r != NULL);
for (i = j = 0; i < l; i++) {
r[j++] = hex[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
r[j++] = hex[s[i] & 0xf];
}
r[j] = '\0';
return r;
}
void
assert_mem(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred)
{
int r;
+ char *aa1_tohex = NULL;
+ char *aa2_tohex = NULL;
if (l == 0)
return;
/* If length is >0, then verify pointers are not NULL */
assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE);
r = memcmp(aa1, aa2, l);
TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred);
- fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 256)), l);
- fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, tohex(aa2, MIN(l, 256)), l);
+ aa1_tohex = tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 256));
+ aa2_tohex = tohex(aa2, MIN(l, 256));
+ fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1_tohex, l);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2_tohex, l);
+ free(aa1_tohex);
+ free(aa2_tohex);
test_die();
}
static int
memvalcmp(const u_int8_t *s, u_char v, size_t l, size_t *where)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
if (s[i] != v) {
*where = i;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
void
assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, const char *a1,
const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred)
{
size_t where = -1;
int r;
char tmp[64];
+ char *aa1_tohex = NULL;
if (l == 0)
return;
/* If length is >0, then verify the pointer is not NULL */
assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
r = memvalcmp(aa1, v, l, &where);
TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, NULL, "MEM_ZERO", pred);
+ aa1_tohex = tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 20));
fprintf(stderr, "%20s = %s%s (len %zu)\n", a1,
- tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 20)), l > 20 ? "..." : "", l);
+ aa1_tohex, l > 20 ? "..." : "", l);
+ free(aa1_tohex);
snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "(%s)[%zu]", a1, where);
fprintf(stderr, "%20s = 0x%02x (expected 0x%02x)\n", tmp,
((u_char *)aa1)[where], v);
test_die();
}
void
assert_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "INT", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "SIZE_T", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U_INT", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG LONG", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_char(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
char buf[8];
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "CHAR", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1,
vis(buf, aa1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1,
vis(buf, aa2, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_u8(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U8", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_u16(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U16", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_u32(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U32", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_u64(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U64", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a1,
(unsigned long long)aa1, (unsigned long long)aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a2,
(unsigned long long)aa2, (unsigned long long)aa2);
test_die();
}
void
assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
{
TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "PTR", pred);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a1, aa1);
fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a2, aa2);
test_die();
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
index 6da0066e907a..66302201cec3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
@@ -1,320 +1,326 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.8 2018/02/08 08:46:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.9 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */
#ifndef _TEST_HELPER_H
#define _TEST_HELPER_H
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
enum test_predicate {
TEST_EQ, TEST_NE, TEST_LT, TEST_LE, TEST_GT, TEST_GE
};
typedef void (test_onerror_func_t)(void *);
/* Supplied by test suite */
void tests(void);
const char *test_data_file(const char *name);
void test_start(const char *n);
void test_info(char *s, size_t len);
void set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx);
void test_done(void);
int test_is_verbose(void);
int test_is_quiet(void);
+int test_is_fast(void);
+int test_is_slow(void);
void test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
void ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
void assert_bignum(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+#endif
void assert_string(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_mem(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1,
const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_int(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_long(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_char(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_ptr(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_u8(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_u16(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_u32(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
const char *a1, const char *a2,
u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
#define TEST_START(n) test_start(n)
#define TEST_DONE() test_done()
#define TEST_ONERROR(f, c) set_onerror_func(f, c)
#define SSL_ERR_CHECK() ssl_err_check(__FILE__, __LINE__)
#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a1, a2, l) \
assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(a1, c, l) \
assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, c, l, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_EQ(a1, l) \
assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_U8_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_U16_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_U32_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_U64_EQ(a1, a2) \
assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_STRING_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_MEM_NE(a1, a2, l) \
assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(a1, l) \
assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_U8_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_U16_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_U32_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_U64_NE(a1, a2) \
assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_STRING_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_MEM_LT(a1, a2, l) \
assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_PTR_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_U8_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_U16_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_U32_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_U64_LT(a1, a2) \
assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_STRING_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_MEM_LE(a1, a2, l) \
assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_PTR_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_U8_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_U16_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_U32_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_U64_LE(a1, a2) \
assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_STRING_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_MEM_GT(a1, a2, l) \
assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_PTR_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_U8_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_U16_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_U32_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_U64_GT(a1, a2) \
assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_STRING_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_MEM_GE(a1, a2, l) \
assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_PTR_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_U8_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_U16_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_U32_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
#define ASSERT_U64_GE(a1, a2) \
assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
/* Fuzzing support */
struct fuzz;
#define FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP 0x00000001 /* Flip one bit at a time */
#define FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP 0x00000002 /* Flip two bits at a time */
#define FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000004 /* Flip one byte at a time */
#define FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000008 /* Flip two bytes at a time */
#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START 0x00000010 /* Truncate from beginning */
#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END 0x00000020 /* Truncate from end */
#define FUZZ_BASE64 0x00000040 /* Try all base64 chars */
#define FUZZ_MAX FUZZ_BASE64
/* Start fuzzing a blob of data with selected strategies (bitmask) */
struct fuzz *fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l);
/* Free a fuzz context */
void fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz);
/* Prepare the next fuzz case in the series */
void fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz);
/*
* Check whether this fuzz case is identical to the original
* This is slow, but useful if the caller needs to ensure that all tests
* generated change the input (e.g. when fuzzing signatures).
*/
int fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz);
/* Determine whether the current fuzz sequence is exhausted (nonzero = yes) */
int fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz);
/* Return the length and a pointer to the current fuzzed case */
size_t fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz);
u_char *fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz);
/* Dump the current fuzz case to stderr */
void fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz);
#endif /* _TEST_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
index f0bbca5096f0..8cf524ddb210 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
@@ -1,102 +1,104 @@
/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/19 00:11:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for the utf8.h *mprintf() API
*
* Written by Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org> in 2016
* and placed in the public domain.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <locale.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "utf8.h"
static void
badarg(void)
{
char buf[16];
int len, width;
width = 1;
TEST_START("utf8_badarg");
len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), &width, "\377");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, -1);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, "");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, 0);
TEST_DONE();
}
static void
one(int utf8, const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
int wantwidth, int wantlen, const char *wants)
{
char buf[16];
int *wp;
int len;
if (wantlen == -2)
wantlen = strlen(wants);
(void)strlcpy(buf, utf8 ? "utf8_" : "c_", sizeof(buf));
(void)strlcat(buf, name, sizeof(buf));
TEST_START(buf);
wp = wantwidth == -2 ? NULL : &width;
len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), wp, "%s", mbs);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, wantlen);
ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, wants);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, wantwidth);
TEST_DONE();
}
void
tests(void)
{
char *loc;
TEST_START("utf8_setlocale");
loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
badarg();
one(1, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
one(1, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
one(1, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
one(1, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
one(1, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
one(1, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
one(1, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
one(1, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
one(1, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
one(1, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
one(1, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
one(1, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
one(1, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
one(1, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
one(1, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
TEST_START("C_setlocale");
loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
badarg();
one(0, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
one(0, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
one(0, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
one(0, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
one(0, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
one(0, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
one(0, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
one(0, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
one(0, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
one(0, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
one(0, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
one(0, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
one(0, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
one(0, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 7, 5, -1, "a\\343");
one(0, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 13, 13, 13, "a\\343\\201\\201");
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/valgrind-unit.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
index 4143ead4b62e..193289e6b78e 100755
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
@@ -1,22 +1,24 @@
#!/bin/sh
UNIT_BINARY="$1"
shift
UNIT_ARGS="$@"
test "x$OBJ" = "x" && OBJ=$PWD
# This mostly replicates the logic in test-exec.sh for running the
# regress tests under valgrind, except that we unconditionally enable
# leak checking because the unit tests should be clean.
VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full"
VG_TEST=`basename $UNIT_BINARY`
VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}.%p"
VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK --log-file=${VG_LOG}"
VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
VG_PATH="valgrind"
if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
fi
+mkdir -p "$OBJ/valgrind-out"
+
exec $VG_PATH $VG_OPTS $UNIT_BINARY $UNIT_ARGS
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-darwin.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-darwin.c
index a61de74951a0..59b4d286eea5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-darwin.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-darwin.c
@@ -1,99 +1,99 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_DARWIN
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sandbox.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
-#include "sandbox.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* Darwin/OS X sandbox */
struct ssh_sandbox {
pid_t child_pid;
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
/*
* Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
* to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
*/
debug3("%s: preparing Darwin sandbox", __func__);
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->child_pid = 0;
return box;
}
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
char *errmsg;
struct rlimit rl_zero;
debug3("%s: starting Darwin sandbox", __func__);
if (sandbox_init(kSBXProfilePureComputation, SANDBOX_NAMED,
&errmsg) == -1)
fatal("%s: sandbox_init: %s", __func__, errmsg);
/*
* The kSBXProfilePureComputation still allows sockets, so
* we must disable these using rlimit.
*/
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
box->child_pid = child_pid;
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_DARWIN */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c
index d28fc27274e2..302f1cfedd3d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-pledge.c
@@ -1,77 +1,77 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.1 2015/10/09 01:37:08 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.2 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2015 Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_PLEDGE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
struct ssh_sandbox {
pid_t child_pid;
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *m)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
- debug3("%s: preparing pledge sandbox", __func__);
+ debug3_f("preparing pledge sandbox");
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->child_pid = 0;
return box;
}
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s: pledge()", __func__);
+ fatal_f("pledge()");
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
- debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+ debug3_f("finished");
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
box->child_pid = child_pid;
/* Nothing to do here */
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_PLEDGE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-rlimit.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-rlimit.c
index 0bff3dfba496..26c61d264817 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-rlimit.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-rlimit.c
@@ -1,96 +1,96 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-rlimit.c,v 1.4 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-rlimit.c,v 1.5 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* Minimal sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits */
struct ssh_sandbox {
pid_t child_pid;
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
/*
* Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
* to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
*/
- debug3("%s: preparing rlimit sandbox", __func__);
+ debug3_f("preparing rlimit sandbox");
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->child_pid = 0;
return box;
}
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ strerror(errno));
#endif
#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ strerror(errno));
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ strerror(errno));
#endif
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
- debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+ debug3_f("finished");
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
box->child_pid = child_pid;
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_RLIMIT */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index 5edbc6946b07..798b24bd878f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -1,379 +1,441 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad@dataspill.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
* filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
* as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
*
* Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
* E.g.
* auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
*/
/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
/* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
/* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */
# include <asm/siginfo.h>
# define __have_siginfo_t 1
# define __have_sigval_t 1
# define __have_sigevent_t 1
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#ifdef __s390__
#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0
# define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
# define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
# define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0
#else
#error "Unknown endianness"
#endif
/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
- /* load and test first syscall argument, low word */ \
+ /* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
- /* load and test first syscall argument, high word */ \
+ /* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+/* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */
+#define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
+ /* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \
+ /* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
+ ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
/* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
#ifdef __NR_lstat
SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_lstat64
SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat
SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat64
SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstatat64
+ SC_DENY(__NR_fstatat64, EACCES),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_open
SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_openat
SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_stat
SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_stat64
SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shmget
+ SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shmat
+ SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shmdt
+ SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_ipc
+ SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_statx
+ SC_DENY(__NR_statx, EACCES),
+#endif
/* Syscalls to permit */
#ifdef __NR_brk
SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_close
SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_futex
SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_futex_time64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex_time64),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_geteuid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid32
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap),
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2),
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap2, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mprotect
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mremap
SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_munmap
SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_nanosleep
SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR__newselect
SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_poll
SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_pselect6
SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_read
SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_select
SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_shutdown
SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_time
SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_write
SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_socketcall
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES),
#endif
#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
+ /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
/*
* On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
* x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
* https://bugs.debian.org/849923
*/
SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
#endif
/* Default deny */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
};
static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
};
struct ssh_sandbox {
pid_t child_pid;
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
/*
* Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
* to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
*/
debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->child_pid = 0;
return box;
}
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx);
static void
ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
{
char msg[256];
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
__func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor);
_exit(1);
}
static void
ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
{
struct sigaction act;
sigset_t mask;
debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
sigemptyset(&mask);
sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int nnp_failed = 0;
/* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
nnp_failed = 1;
}
debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
else if (nnp_failed)
fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
"PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
box->child_pid = child_pid;
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c
index add4c46d071e..e61d581aedba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c
@@ -1,219 +1,218 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.18 2015/10/02 01:39:26 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <limits.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
struct sandbox_policy {
int syscall;
int action;
};
/* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */
static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
{ SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#ifdef SYS_kbind
{ SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#endif
{ SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_nanosleep, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#ifdef SYS_getentropy
/* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */
{ SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#else
/* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */
{ SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#endif
#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog
{ SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#endif
{ SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER },
{ -1, -1 }
};
struct ssh_sandbox {
int systrace_fd;
pid_t child_pid;
void (*osigchld)(int);
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__);
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->systrace_fd = -1;
box->child_pid = 0;
- box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
+ box->osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
return box;
}
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
debug3("%s: ready", __func__);
- signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0)
fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid());
debug3("%s: started", __func__);
}
static void
ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
{
int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status;
pid_t pid;
struct systrace_policy policy;
/* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */
debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
do {
pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
} while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);
- signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d",
__func__, WTERMSIG(status));
if (WIFEXITED(status))
fatal("%s: child exited with status %d",
__func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__);
}
debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid);
box->child_pid = child_pid;
/* Set up systracing of child */
if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__,
dev_systrace, strerror(errno));
close(dev_systrace);
debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd);
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__,
box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno));
/* Allocate and assign policy */
memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy));
policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL;
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__,
box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN;
policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid;
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s",
__func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
/* Set per-syscall policy */
for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) {
found = 0;
for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) {
if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
policy.strp_code = i;
policy.strp_policy = found ?
allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL;
if (found)
debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i);
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s",
__func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
}
/* Signal the child to start running */
debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0)
fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
/* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */
close(box->systrace_fd);
free(box);
debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy);
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.1 b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
index 397e7709195a..68aac04b205c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
@@ -1,248 +1,309 @@
.\"
.\" scp.1
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.81 2018/09/20 06:58:48 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
.Dt SCP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm scp
-.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
+.Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm scp
-.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv
+.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
+.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl l Ar limit
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Fl P Ar port
.Op Fl S Ar program
.Ar source ... target
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
copies files between hosts on a network.
+.Pp
It uses
.Xr ssh 1
for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
-same security as
-.Xr ssh 1 .
+same security as a login session.
+The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
+.Xr glob 3
+pattern matching.
+.Pp
.Nm
will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
authentication.
.Pp
The
.Ar source
and
.Ar target
may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path
in the form
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc host : Op path ,
.Sm on
or a URI in the form
.Sm off
.No scp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
.Sm on
Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames
to avoid
.Nm
treating file names containing
.Sq :\&
as host specifiers.
.Pp
When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a
.Ar port
-may only be specified on the
+cannot be specified on the
.Ar target
if the
-.Fl 3
+.Fl R
option is used.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 3
Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
hosts.
-Note that this option disables the progress meter.
+Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option
+selects batch mode for the second host as
+.Nm
+cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
+This mode is the default.
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl A
+Allows forwarding of
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+to the remote system.
+The default is not to forward an authentication agent.
.It Fl B
Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
.It Fl C
Compression enable.
Passes the
.Fl C
flag to
.Xr ssh 1
to enable compression.
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+When using the SFTP protocol support via
+.Fl M ,
+connect directly to a local SFTP server program rather than a
+remote one via
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
Specifies an alternative
per-user configuration file for
.Nm ssh .
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
authentication is read.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl J Ar destination
+Connect to the target host by first making an
+.Nm
+connection to the jump host described by
+.Ar destination
+and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
+there.
+Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
+This is a shortcut to specify a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+configuration directive.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl l Ar limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+.It Fl O
+Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
+Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
+not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
+wildcard patterns.
+This mode is the default.
.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to
.Nm ssh
in the format used in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
This is useful for specifying options
for which there is no separate
.Nm scp
command-line flag.
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It BindInterface
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
-.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
+.It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
.It HostbasedAuthentication
-.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
-.It HostName
+.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
+.It KnownHostsCommand
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
-.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+.It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.El
.It Fl P Ar port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
Note that this option is written with a capital
.Sq P ,
because
.Fl p
is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
.It Fl p
Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original file.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic
messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl R
+Copies between two remote hosts are performed by connecting to the origin
+host and executing
+.Nm
+there.
+This requires that
+.Nm
+running on the origin host can authenticate to the destination host without
+requiring a password.
.It Fl r
Recursively copy entire directories.
Note that
.Nm
follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
.It Fl S Ar program
Name of
.Ar program
to use for the encrypted connection.
The program must understand
.Xr ssh 1
options.
+.It Fl s
+Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol.
+Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides
+more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol
+relied on the remote shell for expanding
+.Xr glob 3
+wildcards.
+.Pp
+A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default.
+This option will be deleted before the end of 2022.
.It Fl T
Disable strict filename checking.
By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
.Nm
checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
the server will not send unexpected filenames.
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
and
.Xr ssh 1
to print debugging messages about their progress.
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Ex -std scp
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
is based on the rcp program in
.Bx
source code from the Regents of the University of California.
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.c b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
index cbf67b69de5e..e039350c6093 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
@@ -1,1705 +1,2144 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.204 2019/02/10 11:15:52 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
*
* NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to
* do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
*
* 1995 Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Parts from:
*
* Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
#include <fnmatch.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
#include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "utf8.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
extern char *__progname;
#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384
-int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
-int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout);
+int do_cmd(char *, char *, char *, int, int, char *, int *, int *, pid_t *);
+int do_cmd2(char *, char *, int, char *, int, int);
/* Struct for addargs */
arglist args;
arglist remote_remote_args;
/* Bandwidth limit */
long long limit_kbps = 0;
struct bwlimit bwlimit;
/* Name of current file being transferred. */
char *curfile;
/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
int verbose_mode = 0;
+LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
int showprogress = 1;
/*
* This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped
* through this process.
*/
-int throughlocal = 0;
+int throughlocal = 1;
/* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */
int sshport = -1;
/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
+pid_t do_cmd_pid2 = -1;
+
+/* Needed for sftp */
+volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+ int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
}
+ if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
+ kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+ waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+ }
if (signo)
_exit(1);
exit(1);
}
static void
-suspchild(int signo)
+suspone(int pid, int signo)
{
int status;
- if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
- while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
+ if (pid > 1) {
+ kill(pid, signo);
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
errno == EINTR)
;
- kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
}
}
+static void
+suspchild(int signo)
+{
+ suspone(do_cmd_pid, signo);
+ suspone(do_cmd_pid2, signo);
+ kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
+}
+
static int
do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
{
u_int i;
int status;
pid_t pid;
if (a->num == 0)
fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
if (verbose_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pid == 0) {
execvp(a->list[0], a->list);
perror(a->list[0]);
exit(1);
}
do_cmd_pid = pid;
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
do_cmd_pid = -1;
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
return (-1);
return (0);
}
/*
* This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
* given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
* assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
*/
int
-do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
+do_cmd(char *program, char *host, char *remuser, int port, int subsystem,
+ char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, pid_t *pid)
{
int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr,
"Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
- ssh_program, host,
+ program, host,
remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
if (port == -1)
port = sshport;
/*
* Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
* descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
*/
- if (pipe(reserved) < 0)
+ if (pipe(reserved) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
- if (pipe(pin) < 0)
+ if (pipe(pin) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (pipe(pout) < 0)
+ if (pipe(pout) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Free the reserved descriptors. */
close(reserved[0]);
close(reserved[1]);
- signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
- do_cmd_pid = fork();
- if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
+ *pid = fork();
+ if (*pid == 0) {
/* Child. */
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
dup2(pin[0], 0);
dup2(pout[1], 1);
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
- replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+ replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", program);
if (port != -1) {
addargs(&args, "-p");
addargs(&args, "%d", port);
}
if (remuser != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
}
+ if (subsystem)
+ addargs(&args, "-s");
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
- execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
- perror(ssh_program);
+ execvp(program, args.list);
+ perror(program);
exit(1);
- } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) {
+ } else if (*pid == -1) {
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */
close(pin[0]);
*fdout = pin[1];
close(pout[1]);
*fdin = pout[0];
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the
* input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
* This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
*/
int
-do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout)
+do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd,
+ int fdin, int fdout)
{
- pid_t pid;
int status;
+ pid_t pid;
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr,
"Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
ssh_program, host,
remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
if (port == -1)
port = sshport;
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
dup2(fdin, 0);
dup2(fdout, 1);
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
if (port != -1) {
addargs(&args, "-p");
addargs(&args, "%d", port);
}
if (remuser != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
}
+ addargs(&args, "-oBatchMode=yes");
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
perror(ssh_program);
exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
}
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
typedef struct {
size_t cnt;
char *buf;
} BUF;
BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
void lostconn(int);
int okname(char *);
-void run_err(const char *,...);
+void run_err(const char *,...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)))
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (1)));
+int note_err(const char *,...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)));
void verifydir(char *);
struct passwd *pwd;
uid_t userid;
-int errs, remin, remout;
+int errs, remin, remout, remin2, remout2;
int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
#define CMDNEEDS 64
char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+enum scp_mode_e {
+ MODE_SCP,
+ MODE_SFTP
+};
+
int response(void);
void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
void source(int, char *[]);
-void tolocal(int, char *[]);
-void toremote(int, char *[]);
+void tolocal(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct);
+void toremote(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct);
void usage(void);
+void source_sftp(int, char *, char *, struct sftp_conn *);
+void sink_sftp(int, char *, const char *, struct sftp_conn *);
+void throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *, struct sftp_conn *,
+ char *, char *);
+
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
- char **newargv;
+ char **newargv, *argv0;
const char *errstr;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
+ enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
+ char *sftp_direct = NULL;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
+ seed_rng();
+
msetlocale();
/* Copy argv, because we modify it */
+ argv0 = argv[0];
newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
argv = newargv;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args));
args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&args, "-x");
- addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) {
+ "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
/* User-visible flags. */
case '1':
fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
/* Ignored */
break;
+ case 'A':
case '4':
case '6':
case 'C':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
break;
+ case 'D':
+ sftp_direct = optarg;
+ break;
case '3':
throughlocal = 1;
break;
+ case 'R':
+ throughlocal = 0;
+ break;
case 'o':
case 'c':
case 'i':
case 'F':
+ case 'J':
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
break;
+ case 'O':
+ mode = MODE_SCP;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ mode = MODE_SFTP;
+ break;
case 'P':
sshport = a2port(optarg);
if (sshport <= 0)
fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
break;
case 'B':
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
break;
case 'l':
limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
&errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
usage();
limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN);
break;
case 'p':
pflag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
iamrecursive = 1;
break;
case 'S':
ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'v':
addargs(&args, "-v");
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v");
+ if (verbose_mode == 0)
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
verbose_mode = 1;
break;
case 'q':
addargs(&args, "-q");
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
showprogress = 0;
break;
/* Server options. */
case 'd':
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
break;
case 'f': /* "from" */
iamremote = 1;
fflag = 1;
break;
case 't': /* "to" */
iamremote = 1;
tflag = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
setmode(0, O_BINARY);
#endif
break;
case 'T':
Tflag = 1;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
+ log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
+
+ if (iamremote)
+ mode = MODE_SCP;
+
if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
showprogress = 0;
if (pflag) {
/* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */
} else {
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec",
NULL) == -1) {
perror("pledge");
exit(1);
}
}
remin = STDIN_FILENO;
remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
if (fflag) {
/* Follow "protocol", send data. */
(void) response();
source(argc, argv);
exit(errs != 0);
}
if (tflag) {
/* Receive data. */
sink(argc, argv, NULL);
exit(errs != 0);
}
if (argc < 2)
usage();
if (argc > 2)
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
remin = remout = -1;
do_cmd_pid = -1;
/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
(void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
- (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+ (void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */
- toremote(argc, argv);
+ toremote(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct);
else {
if (targetshouldbedirectory)
verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
- tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */
+ tolocal(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct); /* Dest is local host. */
}
/*
* Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
* and no error has occurred yet
*/
if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
if (remin != -1)
(void) close(remin);
if (remout != -1)
(void) close(remout);
if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
errs = 1;
else {
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
errs = 1;
}
}
exit(errs != 0);
}
/* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */
static int
scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
{
off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
*cnt += s;
+ refresh_progress_meter(0);
if (limit_kbps > 0)
bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
return 0;
}
static int
do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb)
{
/* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */
char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2];
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n",
(unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime),
(unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime));
if (verb) {
fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n",
(long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime);
fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf);
}
(void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf));
return (response());
}
static int
parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp,
- char **pathp)
+ char **pathp)
{
int r;
r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp);
if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL)
*pathp = xstrdup(".");
return r;
}
/* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */
static int
append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np)
{
char **tmp;
if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
return -1;
tmp[(*np)] = cp;
(*np)++;
*ap = tmp;
return 0;
}
/*
* Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern.
* returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns.
*/
static int
find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp)
{
int i;
int in_bracket, brace_level;
*startp = *endp = -1;
in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) {
switch (pattern[i]) {
case '\\':
/* skip next character */
if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0')
i++;
break;
case '[':
in_bracket = 1;
break;
case ']':
in_bracket = 0;
break;
case '{':
if (in_bracket)
break;
if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') {
/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
i++; /* skip */
break;
}
if (*startp == -1)
*startp = i;
brace_level++;
break;
case '}':
if (in_bracket)
break;
if (*startp < 0) {
/* Unbalanced brace */
return -1;
}
if (--brace_level <= 0)
*endp = i;
break;
}
}
/* unbalanced brackets/braces */
if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket))
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on
* alloc failure.
*/
static int
emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end,
int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
{
char *cp;
int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1);
if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) +
tail_len + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Pattern before initial brace */
if (brace_start > 0) {
memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start);
o = brace_start;
}
/* Current braced selection */
if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) {
memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start,
sel_end - sel_start);
o += sel_end - sel_start;
}
/* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */
if (tail_len > 0) {
memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len);
o += tail_len;
}
cp[o] = '\0';
if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) {
free(cp);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded
* patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure.
*
* Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether
* pattern was invalid via *invalid.
*/
static int
brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp,
int *expanded, int *invalid)
{
int i;
int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level;
int sel_start, sel_end;
*invalid = *expanded = 0;
if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) {
*invalid = 1;
return 0;
} else if (brace_start == -1)
return 0;
in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) {
switch (pattern[i]) {
case '{':
if (in_bracket)
break;
brace_level++;
break;
case '}':
if (in_bracket)
break;
brace_level--;
break;
case '[':
in_bracket = 1;
break;
case ']':
in_bracket = 0;
break;
case '\\':
if (i < brace_end - 1)
i++; /* skip */
break;
}
if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) {
if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0)
continue;
/* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */
/* Adjust end index for last selection */
sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i;
if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end,
sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0)
return -1;
/* move on to the next selection */
sel_start = i + 1;
continue;
}
}
if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) {
*invalid = 1;
return 0;
}
/* success */
*expanded = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */
static int
brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
{
char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL;
size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0;
int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0;
*patternsp = NULL;
*npatternsp = 0;
/* Start the worklist with the original pattern */
if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL)
return -1;
if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) {
free(cp);
return -1;
}
while (nactive > 0) {
cp = active[nactive - 1];
nactive--;
if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive,
&expanded, &invalid) == -1) {
free(cp);
goto fail;
}
if (invalid)
- fatal("%s: invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", __func__, cp);
+ fatal_f("invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", cp);
if (expanded) {
/*
* Current entry expanded to new entries on the
* active list; discard the progenitor pattern.
*/
free(cp);
continue;
}
/*
* Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to
* the completed list
*/
if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
*cp2++ = '\0';
else
cp2 = cp;
if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) {
free(cp);
goto fail;
}
free(cp);
}
/* success */
*patternsp = done;
*npatternsp = ndone;
done = NULL;
ndone = 0;
ret = 0;
fail:
for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++)
free(active[i]);
free(active);
for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++)
free(done[i]);
free(done);
return ret;
}
+static struct sftp_conn *
+do_sftp_connect(char *host, char *user, int port, char *sftp_direct,
+ int *reminp, int *remoutp, int *pidp)
+{
+ if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
+ if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, user, port, 1, "sftp",
+ reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ } else {
+ args.list = NULL;
+ addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
+ if (do_cmd(sftp_direct, host, NULL, -1, 0, "sftp",
+ reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return do_init(*reminp, *remoutp, 32768, 64, limit_kbps);
+}
+
void
-toremote(int argc, char **argv)
+toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
{
char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL;
char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ;
int sport = -1, tport = -1;
+ struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL, *conn2 = NULL;
arglist alist;
- int i, r;
+ int i, r, status;
u_int j;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
/* Parse target */
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]);
++errs;
goto out;
}
if (r != 0) {
if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost,
&targ) == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]);
++errs;
goto out;
}
}
- if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
- ++errs;
- goto out;
- }
/* Parse source files */
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (r != 0) {
parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
}
if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
++errs;
continue;
}
if (host && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */
- xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd,
- *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
- if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0)
- exit(1);
- free(bp);
- xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
- *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
- if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp, remin, remout) < 0)
- exit(1);
- free(bp);
- (void) close(remin);
- (void) close(remout);
- remin = remout = -1;
+ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) {
+ if (remin == -1) {
+ /* Connect to dest now */
+ conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser,
+ tport, sftp_direct,
+ &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid);
+ if (conn == NULL) {
+ fatal("Unable to open "
+ "destination connection");
+ }
+ debug3_f("origin in %d out %d pid %ld",
+ remin, remout, (long)do_cmd_pid);
+ }
+ /*
+ * XXX remember suser/host/sport and only
+ * reconnect if they change between arguments.
+ * would save reconnections for cases like
+ * scp -3 hosta:/foo hosta:/bar hostb:
+ */
+ /* Connect to origin now */
+ conn2 = do_sftp_connect(host, suser,
+ sport, sftp_direct,
+ &remin2, &remout2, &do_cmd_pid2);
+ if (conn2 == NULL) {
+ fatal("Unable to open "
+ "source connection");
+ }
+ debug3_f("destination in %d out %d pid %ld",
+ remin2, remout2, (long)do_cmd_pid2);
+ throughlocal_sftp(conn2, conn, src, targ);
+ (void) close(remin2);
+ (void) close(remout2);
+ remin2 = remout2 = -1;
+ if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, &status, 0) == -1)
+ ++errs;
+ else if (!WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+ ++errs;
+ do_cmd_pid2 = -1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd,
+ *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
+ if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0,
+ bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(bp);
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
+ *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
+ if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp,
+ remin, remout) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ free(bp);
+ (void) close(remin);
+ (void) close(remout);
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ }
} else if (host) { /* standard remote to remote */
+ /*
+ * Second remote user is passed to first remote side
+ * via scp command-line. Ensure it contains no obvious
+ * shell characters.
+ */
+ if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
+ ++errs;
+ continue;
+ }
if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
/* This would require the remote support URIs */
fatal("target port not supported with two "
- "remote hosts without the -3 option");
+ "remote hosts and the -R option");
}
freeargs(&alist);
addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&alist, "-x");
addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
addargs(&alist, "-n");
for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
addargs(&alist, "%s",
remote_remote_args.list[j]);
}
if (sport != -1) {
addargs(&alist, "-p");
addargs(&alist, "%d", sport);
}
if (suser) {
addargs(&alist, "-l");
addargs(&alist, "%s", suser);
}
addargs(&alist, "--");
addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
thost, targ);
if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
errs = 1;
} else { /* local to remote */
+ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) {
+ if (remin == -1) {
+ /* Connect to remote now */
+ conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser,
+ tport, sftp_direct,
+ &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid);
+ if (conn == NULL) {
+ fatal("Unable to open sftp "
+ "connection");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* The protocol */
+ source_sftp(1, argv[i], targ, conn);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* SCP */
if (remin == -1) {
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
*targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
- if (do_cmd(thost, tuser, tport, bp, &remin,
- &remout) < 0)
+ if (do_cmd(ssh_program, thost, tuser, tport, 0,
+ bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0)
exit(1);
if (response() < 0)
exit(1);
free(bp);
}
source(1, argv + i);
}
}
out:
+ if (mode == MODE_SFTP)
+ free(conn);
free(tuser);
free(thost);
free(targ);
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
}
void
-tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
+tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
{
char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL;
arglist alist;
+ struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL;
int i, r, sport = -1;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (r != 0)
parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
++errs;
continue;
}
if (!host) { /* Local to local. */
freeargs(&alist);
addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP);
if (iamrecursive)
addargs(&alist, "-r");
if (pflag)
addargs(&alist, "-p");
addargs(&alist, "--");
addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]);
addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]);
if (do_local_cmd(&alist))
++errs;
continue;
}
/* Remote to local. */
+ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) {
+ conn = do_sftp_connect(host, suser, sport,
+ sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid);
+ if (conn == NULL) {
+ error("Couldn't make sftp connection "
+ "to server");
+ ++errs;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* The protocol */
+ sink_sftp(1, argv[argc - 1], src, conn);
+
+ free(conn);
+ (void) close(remin);
+ (void) close(remout);
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* SCP */
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s",
cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
- if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
+ if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0, bp,
+ &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) {
free(bp);
++errs;
continue;
}
free(bp);
sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
(void) close(remin);
remin = remout = -1;
}
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
}
+/* Prepare remote path, handling ~ by assuming cwd is the homedir */
+static char *
+prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ /* Handle ~ prefixed paths */
+ if (*path != '~')
+ return xstrdup(path);
+ if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0)
+ return xstrdup(".");
+ if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0)
+ return xstrdup(path + 2);
+ if (can_expand_path(conn))
+ return do_expand_path(conn, path);
+ /* No protocol extension */
+ error("~user paths are not currently supported");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+ char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
+ int target_is_dir;
+
+ if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
+ fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
+ * the expansions
+ */
+ if ((target = prepare_remote_path(conn, targ)) == NULL)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target);
+ if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) {
+ fatal("Target is not a directory, but more files selected "
+ "for upload");
+ }
+ if (target_is_dir)
+ abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
+ else {
+ abs_dst = target;
+ target = NULL;
+ }
+ debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst);
+
+ if (local_is_dir(src) && iamrecursive) {
+ if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+ SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
+ fatal("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ src, abs_dst);
+ }
+ } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0)
+ fatal("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
+
+ free(abs_dst);
+ free(target);
+}
+
void
source(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct stat stb;
static BUF buffer;
BUF *bp;
off_t i, statbytes;
size_t amt, nr;
int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
- char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX];
+ char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX];
int len;
for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
name = argv[indx];
statbytes = 0;
len = strlen(name);
while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
name[--len] = '\0';
- if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0)
+ if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) == -1)
goto syserr;
if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
name = encname;
}
- if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+ if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
goto next;
}
if (stb.st_size < 0) {
run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size");
goto next;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
break;
case S_IFDIR:
if (iamrecursive) {
rsource(name, &stb);
goto next;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
goto next;
}
if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
last = name;
else
++last;
curfile = last;
if (pflag) {
if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0)
goto next;
}
#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
(u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
(long long)stb.st_size, last);
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
if (response() < 0)
goto next;
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
next: if (fd != -1) {
(void) close(fd);
fd = -1;
}
continue;
}
if (showprogress)
start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
set_nonblock(remout);
for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
amt = bp->cnt;
if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
amt = stb.st_size - i;
if (!haderr) {
if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd,
bp->buf, amt)) != amt) {
haderr = errno;
memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr);
}
}
/* Keep writing after error to retain sync */
if (haderr) {
(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
memset(bp->buf, 0, amt);
continue;
}
if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio,
&statbytes) != amt)
haderr = errno;
}
unset_nonblock(remout);
if (fd != -1) {
- if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr)
+ if (close(fd) == -1 && !haderr)
haderr = errno;
fd = -1;
}
if (!haderr)
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
else
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
(void) response();
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
}
}
void
rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
{
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX];
if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
return;
}
last = strrchr(name, '/');
if (last == NULL)
last = name;
else
last++;
if (pflag) {
if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
return;
}
}
(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
(u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
if (response() < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
return;
}
while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
if (dp->d_ino == 0)
continue;
if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
continue;
if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
continue;
}
(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
vect[0] = path;
source(1, vect);
}
(void) closedir(dirp);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
(void) response();
}
+void
+sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const char *src, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+ char *abs_src = NULL;
+ char *abs_dst = NULL;
+ glob_t g;
+ char *filename, *tmp = NULL;
+ int i, r, err = 0;
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+ /*
+ * Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell
+ * expansions
+ */
+
+ if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ debug3_f("copying remote %s to local %s", abs_src, dst);
+ if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) {
+ if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE)
+ error("Too many glob matches for \"%s\".", abs_src);
+ else
+ error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !local_is_dir(dst)) {
+ error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
+ "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+ error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (local_is_dir(dst))
+ abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+ else
+ abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+
+ debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
+ if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ } else {
+ if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ pflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ }
+ free(abs_dst);
+ abs_dst = NULL;
+ free(tmp);
+ tmp = NULL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ free(abs_src);
+ free(tmp);
+ globfree(&g);
+ if (err == -1) {
+ fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src);
+ }
+}
+
+
#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \
((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \
(sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \
(sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
void
sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
{
static BUF buffer;
struct stat stb;
- enum {
- YES, NO, DISPLAYED
- } wrerr;
BUF *bp;
off_t i;
size_t j, count;
int amt, exists, first, ofd;
mode_t mode, omode, mask;
off_t size, statbytes;
unsigned long long ull;
- int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+ int setimes, targisdir, wrerr;
char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
char **patterns = NULL;
size_t n, npatterns = 0;
struct timeval tv[2];
#define atime tv[0]
#define mtime tv[1]
#define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; }
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0))
SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size");
setimes = targisdir = 0;
mask = umask(0);
if (!pflag)
(void) umask(mask);
if (argc != 1) {
run_err("ambiguous target");
exit(1);
}
targ = *argv;
if (targetshouldbedirectory)
verifydir(targ);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
targisdir = 1;
if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
/*
* Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
* the requested destination file glob.
*/
if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0)
- fatal("%s: could not expand pattern", __func__);
+ fatal_f("could not expand pattern");
}
for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
cp = buf;
if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
goto done;
if (*cp++ == '\n')
SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
do {
if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
SCREWUP("lost connection");
*cp++ = ch;
} while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
*cp = 0;
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf);
if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
if (iamremote == 0) {
(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
NULL, "%s", buf + 1);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
}
if (buf[0] == '\02')
exit(1);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (buf[0] == 'E') {
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
goto done;
}
if (ch == '\n')
*--cp = 0;
cp = buf;
if (*cp == 'T') {
setimes++;
cp++;
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
setimes = 0; /* out of range */
mtime.tv_sec = ull;
mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 ||
mtime.tv_usec > 999999)
SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("atime.sec not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
setimes = 0; /* out of range */
atime.tv_sec = ull;
atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 ||
atime.tv_usec > 999999)
SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
continue;
}
if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
/*
* Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
* In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
* by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
* executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
* followed.
*/
if (first) {
run_err("%s", cp);
exit(1);
}
SCREWUP("expected control record");
}
mode = 0;
for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
SCREWUP("bad mode");
mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
}
if (!pflag)
mode &= ~mask;
if (*cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("size not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("size not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull))
SCREWUP("size out of range");
size = (off_t)ull;
if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
exit(1);
}
if (npatterns > 0) {
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) {
if (fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0)
break;
}
if (n >= npatterns)
SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
}
if (targisdir) {
static char *namebuf;
static size_t cursize;
size_t need;
need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
if (need > cursize) {
free(namebuf);
namebuf = xmalloc(need);
cursize = need;
}
(void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp);
np = namebuf;
} else
np = targ;
curfile = cp;
exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
if (buf[0] == 'D') {
int mod_flag = pflag;
if (!iamrecursive)
SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
if (exists) {
if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
errno = ENOTDIR;
goto bad;
}
if (pflag)
(void) chmod(np, mode);
} else {
- /* Handle copying from a read-only
- directory */
+ /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */
mod_flag = 1;
- if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0)
+ if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) == -1)
goto bad;
}
vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
sink(1, vect, src);
if (setimes) {
setimes = 0;
- if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
- run_err("%s: set times: %s",
- vect[0], strerror(errno));
+ (void) utimes(vect[0], tv);
}
if (mod_flag)
(void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
free(vect[0]);
continue;
}
omode = mode;
mode |= S_IWUSR;
- if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+ if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
(void) close(ofd);
continue;
}
cp = bp->buf;
- wrerr = NO;
+ wrerr = 0;
+ /*
+ * NB. do not use run_err() unless immediately followed by
+ * exit() below as it may send a spurious reply that might
+ * desyncronise us from the peer. Use note_err() instead.
+ */
statbytes = 0;
if (showprogress)
start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
set_nonblock(remin);
for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
amt = bp->cnt;
if (i + amt > size)
amt = size - i;
count += amt;
do {
j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt,
scpio, &statbytes);
if (j == 0) {
run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ?
strerror(errno) :
"dropped connection");
exit(1);
}
amt -= j;
cp += j;
} while (amt > 0);
if (count == bp->cnt) {
/* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
- if (wrerr == NO) {
+ if (!wrerr) {
if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
count) != count) {
- wrerr = YES;
- wrerrno = errno;
+ note_err("%s: %s", np,
+ strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = 1;
}
}
count = 0;
cp = bp->buf;
}
}
unset_nonblock(remin);
- if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
+ if (count != 0 && !wrerr &&
atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
- wrerr = YES;
- wrerrno = errno;
- }
- if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
- ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
- run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ note_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = 1;
}
+ if (!wrerr && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
+ ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0)
+ note_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
if (pflag) {
if (exists || omode != mode)
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) {
#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
if (chmod(np, omode)) {
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
- run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+ note_err("%s: set mode: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
} else {
if (!exists && omode != mode)
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) {
#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) {
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
- run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+ note_err("%s: set mode: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
}
- if (close(ofd) == -1) {
- wrerr = YES;
- wrerrno = errno;
- }
+ if (close(ofd) == -1)
+ note_err("%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno));
(void) response();
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
- if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
+ if (setimes && !wrerr) {
setimes = 0;
- if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
- run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+ if (utimes(np, tv) == -1) {
+ note_err("%s: set times: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
- wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
}
- switch (wrerr) {
- case YES:
- run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno));
- break;
- case NO:
+ /* If no error was noted then signal success for this file */
+ if (note_err(NULL) == 0)
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- break;
- case DISPLAYED:
- break;
- }
}
done:
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
free(patterns[n]);
free(patterns);
return;
screwup:
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
free(patterns[n]);
free(patterns);
run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
exit(1);
}
+void
+throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ char *src, char *targ)
+{
+ char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
+ char *abs_src = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+ glob_t g;
+ int i, r, targetisdir, err = 0;
+
+ if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
+ fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno));
+
+ if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(from, src)) == NULL ||
+ (target = prepare_remote_path(to, targ)) == NULL)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+ targetisdir = remote_is_dir(to, target);
+ if (!targetisdir && targetshouldbedirectory) {
+ error("Destination path \"%s\" is not a directory", target);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ debug3_f("copying remote %s to remote %s", abs_src, target);
+ if ((r = remote_glob(from, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) {
+ if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE)
+ error("Too many glob matches for \"%s\".", abs_src);
+ else
+ error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+ tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+ error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (targetisdir)
+ abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
+ else
+ abs_dst = xstrdup(target);
+
+ debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
+ if (crossload_dir(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ NULL, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 1) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ } else {
+ if (do_crossload(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ pflag) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ }
+ free(abs_dst);
+ abs_dst = NULL;
+ free(tmp);
+ tmp = NULL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ free(abs_src);
+ free(abs_dst);
+ free(target);
+ free(tmp);
+ globfree(&g);
+ if (err == -1)
+ fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src);
+}
+
int
response(void)
{
char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048];
if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
lostconn(0);
cp = rbuf;
switch (resp) {
case 0: /* ok */
return (0);
default:
*cp++ = resp;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */
case 2: /* fatal error, "" */
do {
if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
lostconn(0);
*cp++ = ch;
} while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
if (!iamremote) {
cp[-1] = '\0';
(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
NULL, "%s\n", rbuf);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
}
++errs;
if (resp == 1)
return (-1);
exit(1);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
void
usage(void)
{
(void) fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: scp [-346BCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
- " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
+ "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
+ " [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
+ " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
exit(1);
}
void
run_err(const char *fmt,...)
{
static FILE *fp;
va_list ap;
++errs;
if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
(void) fflush(fp);
}
if (!iamremote) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
+/*
+ * Notes a sink error for sending at the end of a file transfer. Returns 0 if
+ * no error has been noted or -1 otherwise. Use note_err(NULL) to flush
+ * any active error at the end of the transfer.
+ */
+int
+note_err(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ static char *emsg;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ /* Replay any previously-noted error */
+ if (fmt == NULL) {
+ if (emsg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ run_err("%s", emsg);
+ free(emsg);
+ emsg = NULL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ errs++;
+ /* Prefer first-noted error */
+ if (emsg != NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vasnmprintf(&emsg, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return -1;
+}
+
void
verifydir(char *cp)
{
struct stat stb;
if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
return;
errno = ENOTDIR;
}
run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
killchild(0);
}
int
okname(char *cp0)
{
int c;
char *cp;
cp = cp0;
do {
c = (int)*cp;
if (c & 0200)
goto bad;
if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) {
switch (c) {
case '\'':
case '"':
case '`':
case ' ':
case '#':
goto bad;
default:
break;
}
}
} while (*++cp);
return (1);
bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
return (0);
}
BUF *
allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
{
size_t size;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
struct stat stb;
- if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+ if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize);
if (size == 0)
size = blksize;
#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
size = blksize;
#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
if (bp->cnt >= size)
return (bp);
bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1);
bp->cnt = size;
return (bp);
}
void
lostconn(int signo)
{
if (!iamremote)
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
if (signo)
_exit(1);
else
exit(1);
}
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ if (remin > 0)
+ close(remin);
+ if (remout > 0)
+ close(remout);
+ if (remin2 > 0)
+ close(remin2);
+ if (remout2 > 0)
+ close(remout2);
+ if (do_cmd_pid > 0)
+ waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ if (do_cmd_pid2 > 0)
+ waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+ exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
index 8b07e4b923ae..2dac50232478 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -1,2715 +1,3058 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.342 2018/09/20 23:40:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.381 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
#include <net/route.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "version.h"
static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
+static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
+ const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
/* Use of privilege separation or not */
extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
void
initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
/* Portable-specific options */
options->use_pam = -1;
/* Standard Options */
options->num_ports = 0;
options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
options->listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_listen_addrs = 0;
options->address_family = -1;
options->routing_domain = NULL;
options->num_host_key_files = 0;
options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
options->host_key_agent = NULL;
options->pid_file = NULL;
options->login_grace_time = -1;
options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
options->print_motd = -1;
options->print_lastlog = -1;
options->x11_forwarding = -1;
options->x11_display_offset = -1;
options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
options->permit_tty = -1;
options->permit_user_rc = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->strict_modes = -1;
options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+ options->num_log_verbose = 0;
+ options->log_verbose = NULL;
options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
- options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
+ options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
+ options->pubkey_auth_options = -1;
+ options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
options->gss_authentication=-1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
options->permit_user_env = -1;
- options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL;
+ options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL;
options->compression = -1;
options->rekey_limit = -1;
options->rekey_interval = -1;
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1;
options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
options->num_allow_users = 0;
options->num_deny_users = 0;
options->num_allow_groups = 0;
options->num_deny_groups = 0;
options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
options->num_subsystems = 0;
options->max_startups_begin = -1;
options->max_startups_rate = -1;
options->max_startups = -1;
+ options->per_source_max_startups = -1;
+ options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = -1;
+ options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = -1;
options->max_authtries = -1;
options->max_sessions = -1;
options->banner = NULL;
options->use_dns = -1;
options->client_alive_interval = -1;
options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
options->num_authkeys_files = 0;
options->num_accept_env = 0;
options->num_setenv = 0;
options->permit_tun = -1;
options->permitted_opens = NULL;
options->permitted_listens = NULL;
options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
options->chroot_directory = NULL;
options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+ options->sk_provider = NULL;
options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->version_addendum = NULL;
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
options->disable_forwarding = -1;
options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
options->use_blacklist = -1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
static int
option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
{
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
}
static void
assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
{
char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
+ char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
int r;
all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+ def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
do { \
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "%s", #what); \
} while (0)
- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
- ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
+ ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
free(all_cipher);
free(all_mac);
free(all_kex);
free(all_key);
free(all_sig);
-}
-
-static void
-array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
- char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s)
-{
-
- if (*lp >= INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive);
-
- *array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array));
- (*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s);
- (*lp)++;
+ free(def_cipher);
+ free(def_mac);
+ free(def_kex);
+ free(def_key);
+ free(def_sig);
}
static const char *defaultkey = "[default]";
void
servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line,
- ServerOptions *options, const char *path)
+ ServerOptions *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
{
char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
if (file == defaultkey && access(path, R_OK) != 0)
return;
- array_append(file, line, "HostKey",
- &options->host_key_files, &options->num_host_key_files, apath);
+ opt_array_append2(file, line, "HostKey",
+ &options->host_key_files, &options->host_key_file_userprovided,
+ &options->num_host_key_files, apath, userprovided);
free(apath);
}
void
servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line,
ServerOptions *options, const char *path)
{
char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
- array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate",
+ opt_array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate",
&options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath);
free(apath);
}
void
fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
u_int i;
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
options->use_pam = 1;
/* Standard Options */
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options,
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE);
- servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options,
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE);
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options,
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE);
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
#endif
servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options,
- _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE);
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 0);
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options,
- _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE);
+ _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 0);
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
}
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0)
fatal("No host key files found");
/* No certificates by default */
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (options->pid_file == NULL)
options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
+ if (options->moduli_file == NULL)
+ options->moduli_file = xstrdup(_PATH_DH_MODULI);
if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
options->login_grace_time = 120;
if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO;
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
options->print_lastlog = 1;
if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
options->x11_forwarding = 1;
if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
options->x11_display_offset = 10;
if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
if (options->permit_tty == -1)
options->permit_tty = 1;
if (options->permit_user_rc == -1)
options->permit_user_rc = 1;
if (options->strict_modes == -1)
options->strict_modes = 1;
if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->pubkey_auth_options == -1)
+ options->pubkey_auth_options = 0;
if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 0;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
- if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
if (options->permit_user_env == -1) {
options->permit_user_env = 0;
- options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL;
+ options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL;
}
if (options->compression == -1)
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
+#else
+ options->compression = COMP_NONE;
+#endif
+
if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = 0;
if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
options->rekey_interval = 0;
if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->max_startups == -1)
options->max_startups = 100;
if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */
if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
options->max_startups_begin = 10;
+ if (options->per_source_max_startups == -1)
+ options->per_source_max_startups = INT_MAX;
+ if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 == -1)
+ options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = 32;
+ if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 == -1)
+ options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = 128;
if (options->max_authtries == -1)
options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
if (options->max_sessions == -1)
options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
if (options->use_dns == -1)
options->use_dns = 1;
if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
options->client_alive_interval = 0;
if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
- array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
+ opt_array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files,
_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
- array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
+ opt_array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files,
_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2);
}
if (options->permit_tun == -1)
options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD);
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
if (options->disable_forwarding == -1)
options->disable_forwarding = 0;
if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
+ if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
if (options->use_blacklist == -1)
options->use_blacklist = 0;
assemble_algorithms(options);
/* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
if (use_privsep == -1)
use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
free(v); \
v = NULL; \
} \
} while(0)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]);
#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE
/* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */
if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 &&
strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
free(options->auth_methods[0]);
options->auth_methods[0] = NULL;
options->num_auth_methods = 0;
}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_MMAP
- if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
- error("This platform does not support both privilege "
- "separation and compression");
- error("Compression disabled");
- options->compression = 0;
- }
-#endif
-
}
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
/* Portable-specific options */
sUsePAM,
/* Standard Options */
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
- sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile,
- sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile, sModuliFile,
+ sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms,
sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
- sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
+ sHostCertificate, sInclude,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
- sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain,
+ sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
sUseBlacklist,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
-#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
-#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
-#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH 0x04 /* Match never matches; internal only */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY 0x08 /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
static struct {
const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int flags;
} keywords[] = {
/* Portable-specific options */
#ifdef USE_PAM
{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
/* Standard Options */
{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "modulifile", sModuliFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "logverbose", sLogVerbose, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */
{ "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */
+ { "pubkeyauthoptions", sPubkeyAuthOptions, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
#ifdef KRB5
{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef USE_AFS
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
#else
{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSSAPI
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "skeyauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ { "skeyauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG
{ "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
- { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */
{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "persourcemaxstartups", sPerSourceMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "persourcenetblocksize", sPerSourceNetBlockSize, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "useblacklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "useblocklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "noneenabled", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hpndisabled", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hpnbuffersize", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "tcprcvbufpoll", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
static struct {
int val;
char *text;
} tunmode_desc[] = {
{ SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" },
{ -1, NULL }
};
/* Returns an opcode name from its number */
static const char *
lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
return(keywords[i].name);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
/*
* Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
*/
static ServerOpCodes
parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
int linenum, u_int *flags)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
*flags = keywords[i].flags;
return keywords[i].opcode;
}
error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
return sBadOption;
}
char *
derelativise_path(const char *path)
{
char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX];
if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0)
return xstrdup("none");
expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid());
- if (*expanded == '/')
+ if (path_absolute(expanded))
return expanded;
if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("getcwd: %s", strerror(errno));
xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded);
free(expanded);
return ret;
}
static void
add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
u_int i;
if (port > 0)
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port);
else {
for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) {
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain,
options->ports[i]);
}
}
}
static void
add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr;
u_int i;
/* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
break;
if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0)
break;
}
if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) {
/* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */
if (i >= INT_MAX)
- fatal("%s: too many listen addresses", __func__);
+ fatal_f("too many listen addresses");
options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs,
options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1,
sizeof(*options->listen_addrs));
i = options->num_listen_addrs++;
if (rdomain != NULL)
options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain);
}
/* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
;
ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs;
options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop;
}
/* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */
static int
valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN)
return sys_valid_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
const char *errstr;
long long num;
struct rt_tableinfo info;
int mib[6];
size_t miblen = sizeof(mib);
if (name == NULL)
return 1;
num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
return 0;
/* Check whether the table actually exists */
memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib));
mib[0] = CTL_NET;
mib[1] = PF_ROUTE;
mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE;
mib[5] = (int)num;
if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform");
return 0;
#endif
}
/*
* Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports
* and AddressFamily options.
*/
static void
queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(
options->queued_listen_addrs,
options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs));
qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++];
qla->addr = xstrdup(addr);
qla->port = port;
qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain);
}
/*
* Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries.
*/
static void
process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options)
{
u_int i;
struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) {
qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i];
add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port);
free(qla->addr);
free(qla->rdomain);
}
free(options->queued_listen_addrs);
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
}
/*
* Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding
* direction (local/remote).
*/
static void
process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode,
char **opens, u_int num_opens)
{
u_int i;
int port;
- char *host, *arg, *oarg;
+ char *host, *arg, *oarg, ch;
int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE;
const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode);
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
if (num_opens == 0)
return; /* permit any */
/* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
return;
if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
return;
}
/* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
- host = hpdelim(&arg);
- if (host == NULL)
- fatal("%s: missing host in %s", __func__, what);
+ ch = '\0';
+ host = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
+ if (host == NULL || ch == '/')
+ fatal_f("missing host in %s", what);
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
- fatal("%s: bad port number in %s", __func__, what);
+ fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what);
/* Send it to channels layer */
channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
where, host, port);
free(oarg);
}
}
/*
* Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration.
*/
void
process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options)
{
process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen,
options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens);
process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen,
options->permitted_listens,
options->num_permitted_listens);
}
struct connection_info *
-get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns)
+get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
static struct connection_info ci;
- if (!populate)
+ if (ssh == NULL || !populate)
return &ci;
ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
return &ci;
}
/*
* The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
*
* The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the
* directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a
* Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
* checked for syntax only.
*
* The second time is after a connection has been established but before
* authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
* are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a
* Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
* processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any
* options set are copied into the main server config.
*
* Potential additions/improvements:
* - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers.
*
* - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
* Match Address 192.168.0.*
* Tag trusted
* Match Group wheel
* Tag trusted
* Match Tag trusted
* AllowTcpForwarding yes
* GatewayPorts clientspecified
* [...]
*
* - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
* Match Group shell
* PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
*/
static int
match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
{
int result = 0;
struct passwd *pw;
if (user == NULL)
goto out;
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
"not exist", line, user);
} else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
"at line %d", user, line);
} else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
user, grps, line);
} else {
debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user,
grps, line);
result = 1;
}
out:
ga_free();
return result;
}
static void
match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib)
{
fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection "
"test specification.", criteria, attrib);
}
/*
* All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need
* to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does
* not match.
*/
static int
match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
{
int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
if (ci == NULL)
debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
else
debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s "
"laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)",
ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)",
ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)",
ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+ /* Terminate on comment */
+ if (*attrib == '#') {
+ cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
+ break;
+ }
+ arg = NULL;
attributes++;
+ /* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
- if (attributes != 1 ||
- ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
+ if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL &&
+ *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) {
error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
"Match attributes");
return -1;
}
+ if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#')
+ cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
*condition = cp;
return 1;
}
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+ /* All other criteria require an argument */
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL ||
+ *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
return -1;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->user == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user");
- if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, 0) != 1)
+ if (match_usergroup_pattern_list(ci->user, arg) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->user == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user");
switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
result = 0;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->host == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host");
if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
"%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
+ if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid Match address argument "
+ "'%s' at line %d", arg, line);
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->address == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr");
switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) {
case 1:
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
"%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line);
break;
case 0:
case -1:
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
return -1;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
+ if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0)
+ fatal("Invalid Match localaddress "
+ "argument '%s' at line %d", arg,
+ line);
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->laddress == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress",
"laddr");
switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) {
case 1:
debug("connection from %.100s matched "
"'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d",
ci->laddress, arg, line);
break;
case 0:
case -1:
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
return -1;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
arg);
return -1;
}
- if (ci == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->lport == 0)
match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport");
/* TODO support port lists */
if (port == ci->lport)
debug("connection from %.100s matched "
"'LocalPort %d' at line %d",
ci->laddress, port, line);
else
result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL || ci->rdomain == NULL) {
+ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
+ if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
+ match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line);
} else {
error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
return -1;
}
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
return -1;
}
if (ci != NULL)
debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
*condition = cp;
return result;
}
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* Multistate option parsing */
struct multistate {
char *key;
int value;
};
static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
+static const struct multistate multistate_ignore_rhosts[] = {
+ { "yes", IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES },
+ { "no", IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO },
+ { "shosts-only", IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
{ "inet", AF_INET },
{ "inet6", AF_INET6 },
{ "any", AF_UNSPEC },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = {
{ "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
{ "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
{ "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY },
{ "yes", PERMIT_YES },
{ "no", PERMIT_NO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
{ "yes", COMP_DELAYED },
{ "delayed", COMP_DELAYED },
+#endif
{ "no", COMP_NONE },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = {
{ "clientspecified", 2 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = {
{ "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW },
{ "all", FORWARD_ALLOW },
{ "no", FORWARD_DENY },
{ "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE },
{ "local", FORWARD_LOCAL },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
-int
-process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+static int
+process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
+ struct include_list *includes)
{
- char *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
- int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
+ char ch, *str, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p, *keyword;
+ int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0;
size_t len;
long long val64;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
const char *errstr;
+ struct include_item *item;
+ glob_t gbuf;
+ char **oav = NULL, **av;
+ int oac = 0, ac;
+ int ret = -1;
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
- cp = line;
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+ str = line;
+ if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace */
- if (*arg == '\0')
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
+ if (*keyword == '\0')
+ keyword = strdelim(&str);
+ if (!keyword || !*keyword || *keyword == '#')
return 0;
+ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ return -1;
+ }
intptr = NULL;
charptr = NULL;
- opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
+ opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, &flags);
+
+ if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) {
+ error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ac = oac;
+ av = oav;
if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
- if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
- debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
+ if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
+ debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, keyword, str);
if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
if (connectinfo == NULL) {
fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
- "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
+ "within a Match block", filename, linenum, keyword);
} else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
- while (arg)
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- return 0;
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
}
}
switch (opcode) {
/* Portable-specific options */
case sUsePAM:
intptr = &options->use_pam;
goto parse_flag;
/* Standard Options */
case sBadOption:
- return -1;
+ goto out;
case sPort:
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
- if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
- return 0;
+ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) {
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
+ }
if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
filename, linenum);
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
filename, linenum);
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
filename, linenum);
break;
case sLoginGraceTime:
intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
parse_time:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sListenAddress:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
filename, linenum);
/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
&& strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
port = 0;
p = arg;
} else {
- p = hpdelim(&arg);
- if (p == NULL)
+ arg2 = NULL;
+ ch = '\0';
+ p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
+ if (p == NULL || ch == '/')
fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
filename, linenum);
p = cleanhostname(p);
if (arg == NULL)
port = 0;
else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: bad port number",
filename, linenum);
}
/* Optional routing table */
arg2 = NULL;
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL) {
+ if ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 ||
- (arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+ (arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax",
filename, linenum);
if (!valid_rdomain(arg2))
fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain",
filename, linenum);
}
-
queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port);
break;
case sAddressFamily:
intptr = &options->address_family;
multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
parse_multistate:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
break;
}
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sHostKeyFile:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
- if (*activep)
- servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum, options, arg);
+ if (*activep) {
+ servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum,
+ options, arg, 1);
+ }
break;
case sHostKeyAgent:
charptr = &options->host_key_agent;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ?
xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
break;
case sHostCertificate:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep)
servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg);
break;
case sPidFile:
charptr = &options->pid_file;
parse_filename:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = derelativise_path(arg);
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
+ case sModuliFile:
+ charptr = &options->moduli_file;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
case sPermitRootLogin:
intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin;
goto parse_multistate;
case sIgnoreRhosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
- parse_flag:
- multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts;
goto parse_multistate;
case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
- goto parse_flag;
+ parse_flag:
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ goto parse_multistate;
case sHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
goto parse_flag;
- case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes:
- charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
- parse_keytypes:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ case sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms:
+ charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos;
+ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
- !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+ arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
- goto parse_keytypes;
+ goto parse_pubkey_algos;
case sCASignatureAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
- goto parse_keytypes;
+ goto parse_pubkey_algos;
case sPubkeyAuthentication:
intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
- case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
- charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
- goto parse_keytypes;
+ case sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms:
+ charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos;
+ goto parse_pubkey_algos;
+
+ case sPubkeyAuthOptions:
+ intptr = &options->pubkey_auth_options;
+ value = 0;
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "touch-required") == 0)
+ value |= PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED;
+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "verify-required") == 0)
+ value |= PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+ else {
+ error("%s line %d: unsupported %s option %s",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
case sKerberosAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssCleanupCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssStrictAcceptor:
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
- case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
case sPrintMotd:
intptr = &options->print_motd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPrintLastLog:
intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11Forwarding:
intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11DisplayOffset:
intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
parse_int:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
- fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
- filename, linenum, errstr);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, errstr);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sX11UseLocalhost:
intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
case sXAuthLocation:
charptr = &options->xauth_location;
goto parse_filename;
case sPermitTTY:
intptr = &options->permit_tty;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserRC:
intptr = &options->permit_user_rc;
goto parse_flag;
case sStrictModes:
intptr = &options->strict_modes;
goto parse_flag;
case sTCPKeepAlive:
intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
goto parse_flag;
case sEmptyPasswd:
intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserEnvironment:
intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
- charptr = &options->permit_user_env_whitelist;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ charptr = &options->permit_user_env_allowlist;
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
value = 0;
p = NULL;
if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
value = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
value = 0;
else {
/* Pattern-list specified */
value = 1;
p = xstrdup(arg);
}
if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
*intptr = value;
*charptr = p;
p = NULL;
}
free(p);
break;
case sCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
goto parse_multistate;
case sRekeyLimit:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
val64 = 0;
} else {
if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
- filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad %s number '%s': %s",
+ filename, linenum, keyword,
+ arg, strerror(errno));
if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: %s too small",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
}
if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = val64;
- if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
- if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) {
- (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */
+ if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */
+ if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) {
+ (void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* discard */
break;
}
intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
goto parse_time;
}
break;
case sGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports;
goto parse_multistate;
case sUseDNS:
intptr = &options->use_dns;
goto parse_flag;
case sLogFacility:
log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
value = log_facility_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
break;
case sLogLevel:
log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
value = log_level_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1)
*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
break;
+ case sLogVerbose:
+ found = options->num_log_verbose == 0;
+ i = 0;
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Allow "none" only in first position */
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+ if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+ "argument must appear alone.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ i++;
+ if (!found || !*activep)
+ continue;
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+ &options->log_verbose, &options->num_log_verbose,
+ arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowAgentForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sDisableForwarding:
intptr = &options->disable_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sAllowUsers:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: "
- "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
+ chararrayptr = &options->allow_users;
+ uintptr = &options->num_allow_users;
+ parse_allowdenyusers:
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0' ||
+ match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s pattern: \"%s\"",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
if (!*activep)
continue;
- array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowUsers",
- &options->allow_users, &options->num_allow_users,
- arg);
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+ chararrayptr, uintptr, arg);
}
break;
case sDenyUsers:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: "
- "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyUsers",
- &options->deny_users, &options->num_deny_users,
- arg);
- }
- break;
+ chararrayptr = &options->deny_users;
+ uintptr = &options->num_deny_users;
+ goto parse_allowdenyusers;
case sAllowGroups:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ chararrayptr = &options->allow_groups;
+ uintptr = &options->num_allow_groups;
+ parse_allowdenygroups:
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: empty %s pattern",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (!*activep)
continue;
- array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowGroups",
- &options->allow_groups, &options->num_allow_groups,
- arg);
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+ chararrayptr, uintptr, arg);
}
break;
case sDenyGroups:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyGroups",
- &options->deny_groups, &options->num_deny_groups,
- arg);
- }
- break;
+ chararrayptr = &options->deny_groups;
+ uintptr = &options->num_deny_groups;
+ goto parse_allowdenygroups;
case sCiphers:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ if (*arg != '-' &&
+ !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->ciphers == NULL)
options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sMacs:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ if (*arg != '-' &&
+ !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->macs == NULL)
options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sKexAlgorithms:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (*arg != '-' &&
- !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+ arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sSubsystem:
if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
filename, linenum);
}
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (!*activep) {
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
- filename, linenum, arg);
+ fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' "
+ "already defined.", filename, linenum, arg);
options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
filename, linenum);
options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
/* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
p = xstrdup(arg);
len = strlen(p) + 1;
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
len += 1 + strlen(arg);
p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len);
strlcat(p, " ", len);
strlcat(p, arg, len);
}
options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
options->num_subsystems++;
break;
case sMaxStartups:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
&options->max_startups_begin,
&options->max_startups_rate,
&options->max_startups)) == 3) {
if (options->max_startups_begin >
options->max_startups ||
options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
options->max_startups_rate < 1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
} else if (n != 1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
else
options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
break;
+ case sPerSourceNetBlockSize:
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ switch (n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d", &value, &value2)) {
+ case 2:
+ if (value2 < 0 || value2 > 128)
+ n = -1;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 1:
+ if (value < 0 || value > 32)
+ n = -1;
+ }
+ if (n != 1 && n != 2)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ if (*activep) {
+ options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = value;
+ options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = value2;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sPerSourceMaxStartups:
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { /* no limit */
+ value = INT_MAX;
+ } else {
+ if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, errstr);
+ }
+ if (*activep)
+ options->per_source_max_startups = value;
+ break;
+
case sMaxAuthTries:
intptr = &options->max_authtries;
goto parse_int;
case sMaxSessions:
intptr = &options->max_sessions;
goto parse_int;
case sBanner:
charptr = &options->banner;
goto parse_filename;
/*
* These options can contain %X options expanded at
* connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
*
* AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
*/
case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
- if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- arg = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- array_append(filename, linenum,
- "AuthorizedKeysFile",
+ uvalue = options->num_authkeys_files;
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ arg2 = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
&options->authorized_keys_files,
- &options->num_authkeys_files, arg);
- free(arg);
+ &options->num_authkeys_files, arg2);
}
+ free(arg2);
}
- return 0;
+ break;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sClientAliveInterval:
intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
goto parse_time;
case sClientAliveCountMax:
intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
goto parse_int;
case sAcceptEnv:
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
- array_append(filename, linenum, "AcceptEnv",
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
&options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env,
arg);
}
break;
case sSetEnv:
uvalue = options->num_setenv;
- while ((arg = strdelimw(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep || uvalue != 0)
continue;
- array_append(filename, linenum, "SetEnv",
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
&options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg);
}
break;
case sPermitTunnel:
intptr = &options->permit_tun;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
- "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
break;
}
if (value == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
- "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad %s argument %s",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
+ case sInclude:
+ if (cmdline) {
+ fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
+ "command-line option");
+ }
+ value = 0;
+ while ((arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (*arg2 == '\0') {
+ error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ value++;
+ found = 0;
+ if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
+ xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
+ } else
+ arg = xstrdup(arg2);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't let included files clobber the containing
+ * file's Match state.
+ */
+ oactive = *activep;
+
+ /* consult cache of include files */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
+ if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (item->filename != NULL) {
+ parse_server_config_depth(options,
+ item->filename, item->contents,
+ includes, connectinfo,
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+ ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+ ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+ activep, depth + 1);
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ *activep = oactive;
+ }
+ if (found != 0) {
+ free(arg);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* requested glob was not in cache */
+ debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
+ if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" glob "
+ "failed", filename, linenum, arg);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If no entry matched then record a
+ * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
+ */
+ debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ item->selector = strdup(arg);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
+ item, entry);
+ }
+ if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
+ fatal_f("too many glob results");
+ for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
+ debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
+ filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ item->selector = strdup(arg);
+ item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ load_server_config(item->filename,
+ item->contents);
+ parse_server_config_depth(options,
+ item->filename, item->contents,
+ includes, connectinfo,
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+ ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+ ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+ activep, depth + 1);
+ *activep = oactive;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
+ }
+ globfree(&gbuf);
+ free(arg);
+ }
+ if (value == 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing filename argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ }
+ break;
+
case sMatch:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
- "option");
- value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
+ "option");
+ value = match_cfg_line(&str, linenum,
+ (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
if (value < 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
- *activep = value;
+ *activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+ /*
+ * The MATCH_ONLY flag is applicable only until the first
+ * match block.
+ */
+ *inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
+ /*
+ * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then
+ * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail.
+ */
+ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+ argv_consume(&ac);
break;
case sPermitListen:
case sPermitOpen:
if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens;
chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens;
} else {
uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens;
chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens;
}
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification",
- filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
*uintptr = 1;
*chararrayptr = xcalloc(1,
sizeof(**chararrayptr));
(*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
}
- for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
+ for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) {
if (opcode == sPermitListen &&
strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) {
/*
* Allow bare port number for PermitListen
* to indicate a wildcard listen host.
*/
xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg);
} else {
arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
- p = hpdelim(&arg);
- if (p == NULL) {
- fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s",
- filename, linenum,
- lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+ ch = '\0';
+ p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
+ if (p == NULL || ch == '/') {
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing host",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
}
p = cleanhostname(p);
}
if (arg == NULL ||
((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) {
- fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in %s",
- filename, linenum,
- lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s bad port number",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
}
if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
- array_append(filename, linenum,
- lookup_opcode_name(opcode),
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2);
}
free(arg2);
}
break;
case sForceCommand:
- if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
- options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
- return 0;
+ options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(str + len);
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case sChrootDirectory:
charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sTrustedUserCAKeys:
charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys;
goto parse_filename;
case sRevokedKeys:
charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
goto parse_filename;
+ case sSecurityKeyProvider:
+ charptr = &options->sk_provider;
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ *charptr = strcasecmp(arg, "internal") == 0 ?
+ xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
+ /* increase optional counter */
+ if (intptr != NULL)
+ *intptr = *intptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
case sIPQoS:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (arg == NULL)
value2 = value;
else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
if (*activep) {
options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
}
break;
case sVersionAddendum:
- if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
+ if (strchr(str + len, '\r') != NULL) {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s argument",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ }
+ if ((arg = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) {
+ *arg = '\0';
+ rtrim(line);
+ }
if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
- if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0)
+ if (strcasecmp(str + len, "none") == 0)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument",
- filename, linenum);
else
- options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len);
+ options->version_addendum = xstrdup(str + len);
}
- return 0;
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
- if (cp == NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
- if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
- "must be an absolute path",
- filename, linenum);
- options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+ charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command;
+ parse_command:
+ len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
+ if (str[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(str + len, "none") != 0) {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: %s must be an absolute path",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
}
- return 0;
+ if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(str + len);
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
-
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser "
- "argument.", filename, linenum);
+ parse_localuser:
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing %s argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ }
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
- if (cp == NULL)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- if (*activep &&
- options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
- if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: "
- "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
- "an absolute path", filename, linenum);
- options->authorized_principals_command =
- xstrdup(cp + len);
- }
- return 0;
+ charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command;
+ goto parse_command;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
-
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing "
- "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
+ goto parse_localuser;
case sAuthenticationMethods:
- if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
- value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
- value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
- if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
- fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" "
- "must appear alone in "
- "AuthenticationMethods",
- filename, linenum);
- }
- value = 1;
- } else if (value) {
- fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
- "alone in AuthenticationMethods",
- filename, linenum);
- } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
- "authentication method list.",
- filename, linenum);
+ found = options->num_auth_methods == 0;
+ value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
+ value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */
+ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+ if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must "
+ "appear alone in %s",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
}
- value2 = 1;
- if (!*activep)
- continue;
- array_append(filename, linenum,
- "AuthenticationMethods",
- &options->auth_methods,
- &options->num_auth_methods, arg);
- }
- if (value2 == 0) {
- fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods "
- "specified", filename, linenum);
+ value = 1;
+ } else if (value) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
+ "alone in %s", filename, linenum, keyword);
+ } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s method list.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
}
+ value2 = 1;
+ if (!found || !*activep)
+ continue;
+ opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+ &options->auth_methods,
+ &options->num_auth_methods, arg);
}
- return 0;
+ if (value2 == 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: no %s specified",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ }
+ break;
case sStreamLocalBindMask:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask "
- "argument.", filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
/* Parse mode in octal format */
value = strtol(arg, &p, 8);
if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777)
- fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (*activep)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
break;
case sStreamLocalBindUnlink:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
goto parse_flag;
case sFingerprintHash:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s algorithm \"%s\".",
+ filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
if (*activep)
options->fingerprint_hash = value;
break;
case sExposeAuthInfo:
intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info;
goto parse_flag;
case sRDomain:
+#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
+ fatal("%s line %d: setting RDomain not supported on this "
+ "platform.", filename, linenum);
+#endif
charptr = &options->routing_domain;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
- filename, linenum);
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 &&
!valid_rdomain(arg))
- fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain",
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid routing domain",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sUseBlacklist:
intptr = &options->use_blacklist;
goto parse_flag;
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum,
- opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", arg);
- while (arg)
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated",
+ keyword);
+ argv_consume(&ac);
break;
default:
fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
- filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
+ filename, linenum, keyword, opcode);
}
- if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
- fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
- return 0;
+ /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
+ if (ac > 0) {
+ error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments "
+ "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ argv_free(oav, oac);
+ return ret;
}
+int
+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
+{
+ int inc_flags = 0;
+
+ return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
+ linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
+}
+
+
/* Reads the server configuration file. */
void
load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
+ struct stat st;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
FILE *f;
int r, lineno = 0;
- debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename);
+ debug2_f("filename %s", filename);
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
sshbuf_reset(conf);
+ /* grow buffer, so realloc is avoided for large config files */
+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) == 0 && st.st_size > 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_allocate(conf, st.st_size)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "allocate");
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lineno++;
/*
- * Trim out comments and strip whitespace
+ * Strip whitespace
* NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
* line numbers later for error messages
*/
- if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL)
- memcpy(cp, "\n", 2);
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r");
if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
}
free(line);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
fclose(f);
- debug2("%s: done config len = %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(conf));
+ debug2_f("done config len = %zu", sshbuf_len(conf));
}
void
parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
{
ServerOptions mo;
initialize_server_options(&mo);
- parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo);
+ parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
+ connectinfo);
copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
}
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
{
char *p;
while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') {
if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) {
ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) {
ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) {
ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) {
ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6);
} else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) {
ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8);
} else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) {
ci->lport = a2port(p + 6);
if (ci->lport == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode"
- " specification %s\n", p+6, p);
+ " specification %s\n", p+6, p);
return -1;
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n",
- p);
+ p);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Copy any supported values that are set.
*
* If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
* array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
* do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
*/
void
copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
{
#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\
if (src->n != -1) \
dst->n = src->n; \
} while (0)
M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(ignore_rhosts);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun);
M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max);
M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
/*
* The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
* M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler
* warnings.
*/
if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) {
dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask =
src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask;
}
/* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */
#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \
free(dst->n); \
dst->n = src->n; \
} \
} while(0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\
u_int i; \
if (src->num_s != 0) { \
for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \
free(dst->s[i]); \
free(dst->s); \
dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \
for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \
dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \
dst->num_s = src->num_s; \
} \
} while(0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
/* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */
assemble_algorithms(dst);
/*
* The only things that should be below this point are string options
* which are only used after authentication.
*/
if (preauth)
return;
/* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */
M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command);
if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) {
free(dst->adm_forced_command);
dst->adm_forced_command = NULL;
}
M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) {
free(dst->chroot_directory);
dst->chroot_directory = NULL;
}
}
#undef M_CP_INTOPT
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-void
-parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
- struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
+static void
+parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
{
- int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
+ int linenum, bad_options = 0;
char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
- debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
+ if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
+ fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
+
+ debug2_f("config %s len %zu%s", filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
+ (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
- active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
linenum = 1;
while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
- if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
- linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
+ if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
+ filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
+ depth, includes) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
free(obuf);
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+ int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+ parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
+ connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
}
static const char *
fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (m[i].value == val)
return m[i].key;
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static const char *
fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
if (val == -1)
return "unset";
switch (code) {
case sAddressFamily:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
case sPermitRootLogin:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin);
case sGatewayPorts:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
case sCompression:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
+ case sIgnoreRhosts:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_ignore_rhosts);
case sFingerprintHash:
return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
default:
switch (val) {
case 0:
return "no";
case 1:
return "yes";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
}
static void
dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
static void
dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
val == NULL ? "none" : val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods)
return;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf(" %s", vals[i]);
if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0)
printf(" any");
printf("\n");
}
static char *
format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
{
int r;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV];
char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL;
/*
* ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes
* addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to
* print these in reverse order.
*/
for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r));
continue;
}
laddr2 = laddr1;
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s",
addr, port,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
laddr2);
} else {
xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s",
addr, port,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
laddr2);
}
free(laddr2);
}
return laddr1;
}
void
dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
{
char *s;
u_int i;
/* these are usually at the top of the config */
for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]);
printf("%s", s);
free(s);
}
/* integer arguments */
#ifdef USE_PAM
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
#endif
dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
/* formatted integer arguments */
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
#ifdef KRB5
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
# ifdef USE_AFS
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- o->challenge_response_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd);
#ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseBlacklist, o->use_blacklist);
/* string arguments */
dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+ dump_cfg_string(sModuliFile, o->moduli_file);
dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
- dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
+ dump_cfg_string(sSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
o->authorized_principals_file);
dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0'
? "none" : o->version_addendum);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
- dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
- o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
- dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms ?
- o->ca_sign_algorithms : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS);
- dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ?
- o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ?
- o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
- o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
+#endif
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
/* string array arguments */
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files,
o->authorized_keys_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
- o->host_key_files);
+ o->host_key_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files,
- o->host_cert_files);
+ o->host_cert_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sLogVerbose,
+ o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose);
/* other arguments */
for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i],
o->subsystem_args[i]);
printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin,
o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups);
+ printf("persourcemaxstartups ");
+ if (o->per_source_max_startups == INT_MAX)
+ printf("none\n");
+ else
+ printf("%d\n", o->per_source_max_startups);
+ printf("persourcenetblocksize %d:%d\n", o->per_source_masklen_ipv4,
+ o->per_source_masklen_ipv6);
s = NULL;
for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) {
if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) {
s = tunmode_desc[i].text;
break;
}
}
dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit,
o->rekey_interval);
printf("permitopen");
if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0)
printf(" any");
else {
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++)
printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf("permitlisten");
if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0)
printf(" any");
else {
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++)
printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]);
}
printf("\n");
- if (o->permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL) {
+ if (o->permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL) {
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
} else {
printf("permituserenvironment %s\n",
- o->permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ o->permit_user_env_allowlist);
}
+ printf("pubkeyauthoptions");
+ if (o->pubkey_auth_options == 0)
+ printf(" none");
+ if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED)
+ printf(" touch-required");
+ if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED)
+ printf(" verify-required");
+ printf("\n");
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
index 10cad3c8261e..6094e85d99ca 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
@@ -1,281 +1,314 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.137 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.155 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef SERVCONF_H
#define SERVCONF_H
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
+
#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
/* permit_root_login */
#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
#define PERMIT_NO 0
#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1
#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
#define PERMIT_YES 3
/* use_privsep */
#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0
#define PRIVSEP_ON 1
#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2
/* PermitOpen */
#define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0
#define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2
+/* IgnoreRhosts */
+#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO 0
+#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES 1
+#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS 2
+
#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp"
+/* PubkeyAuthOptions flags */
+#define PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED (1)
+#define PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED (1<<1)
+
struct ssh;
struct fwd_perm_list;
/*
* Used to store addresses from ListenAddr directives. These may be
* incomplete, as they may specify addresses that need to be merged
* with any ports requested by ListenPort.
*/
struct queued_listenaddr {
char *addr;
int port; /* <=0 if unspecified */
char *rdomain;
};
/* Resolved listen addresses, grouped by optional routing domain */
struct listenaddr {
char *rdomain;
struct addrinfo *addrs;
};
typedef struct {
u_int num_ports;
u_int ports_from_cmdline;
int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */
struct queued_listenaddr *queued_listen_addrs;
u_int num_queued_listens;
struct listenaddr *listen_addrs;
u_int num_listen_addrs;
int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */
char *routing_domain; /* Bind session to routing domain */
char **host_key_files; /* Files containing host keys. */
+ int *host_key_file_userprovided; /* Key was specified by user. */
u_int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */
char **host_cert_files; /* Files containing host certs. */
u_int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */
char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */
char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */
+ char *moduli_file; /* moduli file for DH-GEX */
int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time
* (sec). */
int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */
int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
* for RhostsRsaAuth */
int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */
int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */
int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
* searching at */
int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
+ u_int num_log_verbose; /* Verbose log overrides */
+ char **log_verbose;
int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
- char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */
+ char *hostbased_accepted_algos; /* Algos allowed for hostbased */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */
char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
- char *pubkey_key_types; /* Key types allowed for public key */
+ char *pubkey_accepted_algos; /* Signature algos allowed for pubkey */
+ int pubkey_auth_options; /* -1 or mask of PUBKEYAUTH_* flags */
int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos
* authentication. */
int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos
* and any other password
* authentication mechanism,
* such as SecurID or
* /etc/passwd */
int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
* file on logout. */
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
- int challenge_response_authentication;
int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
* passwords. */
int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
- char *permit_user_env_whitelist; /* pattern-list whitelist */
+ char *permit_user_env_allowlist; /* pattern-list of allowed env names */
int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */
int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_agent_forwarding;
int disable_forwarding;
u_int num_allow_users;
char **allow_users;
u_int num_deny_users;
char **deny_users;
u_int num_allow_groups;
char **allow_groups;
u_int num_deny_groups;
char **deny_groups;
u_int num_subsystems;
char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
u_int num_accept_env;
char **accept_env;
u_int num_setenv;
char **setenv;
int max_startups_begin;
int max_startups_rate;
int max_startups;
+ int per_source_max_startups;
+ int per_source_masklen_ipv4;
+ int per_source_masklen_ipv6;
int max_authtries;
int max_sessions;
char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
int use_dns;
int client_alive_interval; /*
* poke the client this often to
* see if it's still there
*/
int client_alive_count_max; /*
* If the client is unresponsive
* for this many intervals above,
* disconnect the session
*/
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
char **authorized_keys_files;
char *adm_forced_command;
int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
int permit_tun;
char **permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_opens;
char **permitted_listens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_listens;
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
char *authorized_keys_command;
char *authorized_keys_command_user;
char *authorized_principals_file;
char *authorized_principals_command;
char *authorized_principals_command_user;
int64_t rekey_limit;
int rekey_interval;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
u_int num_auth_methods;
char **auth_methods;
int fingerprint_hash;
int expose_userauth_info;
u_int64_t timing_secret;
+ char *sk_provider;
int use_blacklist;
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
struct connection_info {
const char *user;
const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */
- const char *address; /* remote address */
+ const char *address; /* remote address */
const char *laddress; /* local address */
int lport; /* local port */
const char *rdomain; /* routing domain if available */
+ int test; /* test mode, allow some attributes to be
+ * unspecified */
};
+/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
+struct include_item {
+ char *selector;
+ char *filename;
+ struct sshbuf *contents;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+
/*
* These are string config options that must be copied between the
* Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the
- * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
+ * privsep child to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
* the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order.
*
* NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or
* COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both.
*/
#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \
M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
- M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \
- M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_accepted_algos); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_accepted_algos); \
M_CP_STROPT(ca_sign_algorithms); \
M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
- M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_whitelist); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(setenv, num_setenv); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_listens, num_permitted_listens); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(log_verbose, num_log_verbose); \
} while (0)
-struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int);
+struct connection_info *get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int);
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
- int *, struct connection_info *);
+ int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
- struct connection_info *);
-void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
+void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
void dump_config(ServerOptions *);
char *derelativise_path(const char *);
void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *, const int,
- ServerOptions *, const char *path);
+ ServerOptions *, const char *path, int);
void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *, const int,
ServerOptions *, const char *path);
#endif /* SERVCONF_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
index 7be83e2d338a..e8cfb9205a48 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -1,921 +1,927 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.209 2018/07/27 05:13:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.228 2021/07/16 09:00:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
/* XXX */
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
extern int use_privsep;
static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
-/*
- * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server
- * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated.
- */
-
static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */
/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
/* prototypes */
-static void server_init_dispatch(void);
+static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *);
/* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */
char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL;
/* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */
static int
bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid)
{
if (use_privsep)
return 1; /* allow system to decide */
if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
-/*
- * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
- * the race between select() and child_terminated
- */
-static int notify_pipe[2];
-static void
-notify_setup(void)
-{
- if (pipe(notify_pipe) < 0) {
- error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
- } else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) ||
- (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) {
- error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno));
- close(notify_pipe[0]);
- close(notify_pipe[1]);
- } else {
- set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
- set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
- return;
- }
- notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */
- notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */
-}
-static void
-notify_parent(void)
-{
- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
- (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
-}
-static void
-notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
-{
- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
- FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
-}
-static void
-notify_done(fd_set *readset)
-{
- char c;
-
- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
- debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
-}
-
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
- int save_errno = errno;
child_terminated = 1;
- notify_parent();
- errno = save_errno;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
received_sigterm = sig;
}
static void
client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- int channel_id;
char remote_id[512];
+ int r, channel_id;
/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
- if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) {
+ if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
+ ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
+ options.client_alive_count_max) {
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply",
* we should get back a failure
*/
if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com");
- packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com"))
+ != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* boolean: want reply */
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
} else {
channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id,
"keepalive@openssh.com", 1);
}
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send");
}
/*
- * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the
- * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
+ * Sleep in pselect() until we can do something. This will initialize the
+ * pselect masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
* have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified
* for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
*/
static void
wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
int connection_in, int connection_out,
fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
- u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms)
+ u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms, sigset_t *sigsetp)
{
- struct timeval tv, *tvp;
+ struct timespec ts, *tsp;
int ret;
time_t minwait_secs = 0;
int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
+ /* time we last heard from the client OR sent a keepalive */
static time_t last_client_time;
- /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
+ /* Allocate and update pselect() masks for channel descriptors. */
channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
nallocp, &minwait_secs);
/* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */
if (minwait_secs != 0)
max_time_ms = MINIMUM(max_time_ms, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000);
/*
* if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
* and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
* alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
*
* this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
* analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
*/
if (options.client_alive_interval) {
uint64_t keepalive_ms =
(uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
- client_alive_scheduled = 1;
- if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms)
+ if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms) {
max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
+ client_alive_scheduled = 1;
+ }
+ if (last_client_time == 0)
+ last_client_time = monotime();
}
#if 0
/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
#endif
FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
- notify_prepare(*readsetp);
/*
* If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
* descriptor.
*/
- if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+ if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh))
FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
/*
* If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
* from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
*/
- if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ if (child_terminated && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
if (max_time_ms == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
max_time_ms = 100;
if (max_time_ms == 0)
- tvp = NULL;
+ tsp = NULL;
else {
- tv.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000;
- tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_ms % 1000);
- tvp = &tv;
+ ts.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000;
+ ts.tv_nsec = 1000000 * (max_time_ms % 1000);
+ tsp = &ts;
}
/* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
- ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+ ret = pselect((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tsp, sigsetp);
if (ret == -1) {
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
if (errno != EINTR)
- error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ error("pselect: %.100s", strerror(errno));
} else if (client_alive_scheduled) {
time_t now = monotime();
- if (ret == 0) { /* timeout */
+ /*
+ * If the pselect timed out, or returned for some other reason
+ * but we haven't heard from the client in time, send keepalive.
+ */
+ if (ret == 0 || (last_client_time != 0 && last_client_time +
+ options.client_alive_interval <= now)) {
client_alive_check(ssh);
- } else if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp)) {
last_client_time = now;
- } else if (last_client_time != 0 && last_client_time +
- options.client_alive_interval <= now) {
- client_alive_check(ssh);
+ } else if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp)) {
last_client_time = now;
}
}
-
- notify_done(*readsetp);
}
/*
* Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored
* in buffers and processed later.
*/
static int
process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
{
- int len;
+ int r, len;
char buf[16384];
/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return -1;
- } else if (len < 0) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
- errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
- verbose("Read error from remote host "
- "%.100s port %d: %.100s",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- } else {
- /* Buffer any received data. */
- packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+ } else if (len == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ return 0;
+ verbose("Read error from remote host %s port %d: %s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
+ /* Buffer any received data. */
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "ssh_packet_process_incoming");
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
*/
static void
-process_output(fd_set *writeset, int connection_out)
+process_output(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *writeset, int connection_out)
{
+ int r;
+
/* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
- if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
- packet_write_poll();
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ }
}
static void
process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL);
}
static void
collect_children(struct ssh *ssh)
{
pid_t pid;
- sigset_t oset, nset;
int status;
- /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */
- sigemptyset(&nset);
- sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
- sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
if (child_terminated) {
debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
- (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+ (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
if (pid > 0)
session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status);
child_terminated = 0;
}
- sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
}
void
server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
- int max_fd;
+ int r, max_fd;
u_int nalloc = 0, connection_in, connection_out;
u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
+ sigset_t bsigset, osigset;
debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
- signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+ if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGCHLD) == -1)
+ error_f("bsigset setup: %s", strerror(errno));
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
child_terminated = 0;
- connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+ connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+ connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
if (!use_privsep) {
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
}
- notify_setup();
-
max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
- server_init_dispatch();
+ server_init_dispatch(ssh);
for (;;) {
process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) &&
- packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
channel_output_poll(ssh);
- if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
- rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000;
- else
+ if (options.rekey_interval > 0 &&
+ !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
+ rekey_timeout_ms = ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh) *
+ 1000;
+ } else {
rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children, then pass
+ * the old signal mask through to pselect() so that it'll wake
+ * up immediately if a child exits after we've called waitpid().
+ */
+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1)
+ error_f("bsigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno));
+ collect_children(ssh);
wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out,
- &readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
+ &readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms,
+ &osigset);
+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1)
+ error_f("osigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno));
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
cleanup_exit(255);
}
- collect_children(ssh);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
if (process_input(ssh, readset, connection_in) < 0)
break;
- process_output(writeset, connection_out);
+ /* A timeout may have triggered rekeying */
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "cannot start rekeying");
+ process_output(ssh, writeset, connection_out);
}
collect_children(ssh);
free(readset);
free(writeset);
/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
channel_free_all(ssh);
/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
}
static int
server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq);
/*
* reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
* even if this was generated by something other than
* the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
*/
- packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
+ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
return 0;
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- char *target, *originator;
- u_short target_port, originator_port;
-
- target = packet_get_string(NULL);
- target_port = packet_get_int();
- originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
- originator_port = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
+ char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
+ u_int target_port = 0, originator_port = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &target_port)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ if (target_port > 0xFFFF) {
+ error_f("invalid target port");
+ *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
+ error_f("invalid originator port");
+ *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
+ goto out;
+ }
- debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", __func__,
+ debug_f("originator %s port %u, target %s port %u",
originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
!options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port,
"direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
} else {
logit("refused local port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
}
+ out:
free(originator);
free(target);
-
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- char *target, *originator;
- u_short originator_port;
+ char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
+ u_int originator_port = 0;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ int r;
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__);
-
- target = packet_get_string(NULL);
- originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
- originator_port = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
+ fatal_f("no/invalid user");
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
+ error_f("invalid originator port");
+ goto out;
+ }
- debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s", __func__,
+ debug_f("originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
!options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
+out:
free(originator);
free(target);
-
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- int mode, tun, sock;
+ u_int mode, tun;
+ int r, sock;
char *tmp, *ifname = NULL;
- mode = packet_get_int();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mode)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse mode", __func__);
switch (mode) {
case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT:
case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET:
break;
default:
- packet_send_debug("Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
return NULL;
}
if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
- packet_send_debug("Server has rejected tunnel device "
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
"forwarding");
return NULL;
}
- tun = packet_get_int();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tun)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse device", __func__);
+ if (tun > INT_MAX) {
+ debug_f("invalid tun");
+ goto done;
+ }
if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
- if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && auth_opts->force_tun_device != tun)
+ if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
goto done;
tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device;
}
sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname);
if (sock < 0)
goto done;
debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
c->datagram = 1;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
#endif
/*
* Update the list of names exposed to the session
* XXX remove these if the tunnels are closed (won't matter
* much if they are already in the environment though)
*/
tmp = tun_fwd_ifnames;
xasprintf(&tun_fwd_ifnames, "%s%s%s",
tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : tun_fwd_ifnames,
tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : ",",
ifname);
free(tmp);
free(ifname);
done:
if (c == NULL)
- packet_send_debug("Failed to open the tunnel device.");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Failed to open the tunnel device.");
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
+ int r;
debug("input_session_request");
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (no_more_sessions) {
- packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session "
- "after additional sessions disabled");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Possible attack: attempt to open a "
+ "session after additional sessions disabled");
}
/*
* A server session has no fd to read or write until a
* CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
* SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all
* CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
*/
c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
-1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "server-session", 1);
if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
channel_free(ssh, c);
return NULL;
}
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
return c;
}
static int
server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
- char *ctype;
+ char *ctype = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
- int rchan, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
- u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
-
- ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
- rchan = packet_get_int();
- rwindow = packet_get_int();
- rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
-
- debug("%s: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", __func__,
+ int r, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
+ u_int rchan = 0, rmaxpack = 0, rwindow = 0;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ debug_f("ctype %s rchan %u win %u max %u",
ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
c = server_request_session(ssh);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = server_request_tun(ssh);
}
if (c != NULL) {
- debug("%s: confirm %s", __func__, ctype);
+ debug_f("confirm %s", ctype);
c->remote_id = rchan;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = rwindow;
c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+ "%s: send open confirm", __func__);
+ }
}
} else {
- debug("%s: failure %s", __func__, ctype);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(rchan);
- packet_put_int(reason);
- packet_put_cstring(errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed");
- packet_put_cstring("");
- packet_send();
+ debug_f("failure %s", ctype);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, reason)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+ "%s: send open failure", __func__);
+ }
}
free(ctype);
return 0;
}
static int
server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
{
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
const u_char *blob;
u_char *sig = 0;
size_t blen, slen;
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
- error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse key");
goto out;
}
/*
* Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys
* before attempting to sign anything with it.
*/
if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) {
- error("%s: unknown host %s key",
- __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ error_f("unknown host %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto out;
}
/*
* XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather
* than passing in public and private keys
*/
if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL &&
(key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx);
+ error_f("can't retrieve hostkey %d", ndx);
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sigbuf);
free(sig);
sig = NULL;
/*
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
- ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sigbuf,
+ ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
- (r = ssh->kex->sign(key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
+ (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
- use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+ use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
- error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "assemble signature");
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
*respp = resp;
resp = NULL; /* don't free it */
success = 1;
out:
free(sig);
sshbuf_free(resp);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshkey_free(key);
return success;
}
static int
server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
- char *rtype;
- int want_reply;
+ char *rtype = NULL;
+ u_char want_reply = 0;
int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
+ u_int port = 0;
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ struct Forward fwd;
+ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__);
+ fatal_f("no/invalid user");
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- want_reply = packet_get_char();
- debug("%s: rtype %s want_reply %d", __func__, rtype, want_reply);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ debug_f("rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
/* -R style forwarding */
if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
- struct Forward fwd;
-
- memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
- fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
- fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
- debug("%s: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d", __func__,
- fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port);
-
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse tcpip-forward", __func__);
+ debug_f("tcpip-forward listen %s port %u",
+ fwd.listen_host, port);
+ if (port <= INT_MAX)
+ fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
/* check permissions */
- if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
+ if (port > INT_MAX ||
+ (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding ||
(!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
(fwd.listen_port != 0 &&
- !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
+ !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
success = 0;
- packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled port forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the port */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts);
}
- free(fwd.listen_host);
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
if (allocated_listen_port != 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u32");
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
- struct Forward fwd;
-
- memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
- fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
- fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
- debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__,
- fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port);
-
- success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
- free(fwd.listen_host);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-tcpip-forward", __func__);
+
+ debug_f("cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d",
+ fwd.listen_host, port);
+ if (port <= INT_MAX) {
+ fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
+ success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
+ }
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
- struct Forward fwd;
-
- memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
- fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug("%s: streamlocal-forward listen path %s", __func__,
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
+ debug_f("streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
fwd.listen_path);
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
|| !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding ||
(pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
success = 0;
- packet_send_debug("Server has disabled "
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled "
"streamlocal forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the socket */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh,
&fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
}
- free(fwd.listen_path);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
- struct Forward fwd;
-
- memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
- fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__,
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
+ debug_f("cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s",
fwd.listen_path);
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
- free(fwd.listen_path);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) {
no_more_sessions = 1;
success = 1;
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) {
success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp);
}
+ /* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */
if (want_reply) {
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- if (success && resp != NULL)
- ssh_packet_put_raw(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(resp),
- sshbuf_len(resp));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (success && resp != NULL && (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, resp)) != 0) ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
+ free(fwd.listen_host);
+ free(fwd.listen_path);
free(rtype);
sshbuf_free(resp);
return 0;
}
static int
server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
- int id, reply, success = 0;
- char *rtype;
-
- id = packet_get_int();
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- reply = packet_get_char();
-
- debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d",
- id, rtype, reply);
-
- if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
- packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: "
- "unknown channel %d", id);
+ int r, success = 0;
+ char *rtype = NULL;
+ u_char want_reply = 0;
+ u_int id = 0;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %u request %s reply %d",
+ id, rtype, want_reply);
+
+ if (id >= INT_MAX || (c = channel_lookup(ssh, (int)id)) == NULL) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s: unknown channel %d",
+ __func__, id);
+ }
if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) {
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
} else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL ||
c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype);
- if (reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+ if (want_reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
- fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
- __func__, c->self);
- packet_start(success ?
- SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
- packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
- packet_send();
+ fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
free(rtype);
return 0;
}
static void
-server_init_dispatch(void)
+server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug("server_init_dispatch");
- dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
+ ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
/* client_alive */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
/* rekeying */
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index dde75920e79c..31d3bb932a50 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -1,2733 +1,2740 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.307 2018/10/04 00:10:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.329 2021/08/11 05:20:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
#include <kafs.h>
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
(!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
(c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
/* func */
Session *session_new(void);
void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
void session_proctitle(Session *);
int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *);
int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
-#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
-static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
-#endif
void do_motd(void);
int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *);
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern char *__progname;
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern int startup_pipe;
extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
/* original command from peer. */
const char *original_command = NULL;
/* data */
static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
static Session *sessions = NULL;
#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0
#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1
#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2
#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
static int is_child = 0;
static int in_chroot = 0;
/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
static void
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
{
if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
unlink(auth_sock_name);
rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
auth_sock_name = NULL;
restore_uid();
}
}
static int
auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
{
Channel *nc;
int sock = -1;
if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
return 0;
}
/* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
/* Create private directory for socket */
if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
- packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Agent forwarding disabled: "
"mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
free(auth_sock_dir);
auth_sock_dir = NULL;
goto authsock_err;
}
xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
/* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */
sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
/* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */
if (sock < 0)
goto authsock_err;
/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "auth socket", 1);
nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
return 1;
authsock_err:
free(auth_sock_name);
if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+ restore_uid();
free(auth_sock_dir);
}
if (sock != -1)
close(sock);
auth_sock_name = NULL;
auth_sock_dir = NULL;
return 0;
}
static void
display_loginmsg(void)
{
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0)
return;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
}
static void
prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
{
int fd = -1, success = 0;
if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL)
return;
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX");
if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) {
- error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info),
sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) {
- error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (close(fd) != 0) {
- error("%s: close: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("close: %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
success = 1;
out:
if (!success) {
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
free(auth_info_file);
auth_info_file = NULL;
}
restore_uid();
}
static void
set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
char *tmp, *cp, *host;
int port;
size_t i;
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) {
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL);
for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) {
tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]);
/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
+ fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim");
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: internal error: permitopen port",
- __func__);
+ fatal_f("internal error: permitopen port");
channel_add_permission(ssh,
FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port);
free(tmp);
}
}
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) {
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE);
for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]);
/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
+ fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim");
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: internal error: permitlisten port",
- __func__);
+ fatal_f("internal error: permitlisten port");
channel_add_permission(ssh,
FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port);
free(tmp);
}
}
}
void
do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0);
/* setup the channel layer */
/* XXX - streamlocal? */
set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts);
if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding) {
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
} else {
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
else
channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0)
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
else
channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
}
- auth_debug_send();
+ auth_debug_send(ssh);
prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info);
do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt);
do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt);
}
/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
static int
xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define USE_PIPES 1
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
* will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
* setting up file descriptors and such.
*/
int
do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
pid_t pid;
#ifdef USE_PIPES
int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
- if (pipe(pin) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(pin) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe in: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (pipe(pout) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(pout) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe out: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
return -1;
}
- if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(perr) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe err: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
close(pout[1]);
return -1;
}
#else
int inout[2], err[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) {
- error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) {
+ error_f("socketpair #1: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
- error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) == -1) {
+ error_f("socketpair #2: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(inout[0]);
close(inout[1]);
return -1;
}
#endif
session_proctitle(s);
/* Fork the child. */
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
- error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_PIPES
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
close(pout[1]);
close(perr[0]);
close(perr[1]);
#else
close(inout[0]);
close(inout[1]);
close(err[0]);
close(err[1]);
#endif
return -1;
case 0:
is_child = 1;
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group.
*/
- if (setsid() < 0)
+ if (setsid() == -1)
error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_PIPES
/*
* Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
* pair, and make the child side the standard input.
*/
close(pin[1]);
- if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+ if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
close(pin[0]);
/* Redirect stdout. */
close(pout[0]);
- if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+ if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
close(pout[1]);
/* Redirect stderr. */
close(perr[0]);
- if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0)
+ if (dup2(perr[1], 2) == -1)
perror("dup2 stderr");
close(perr[1]);
#else
/*
* Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
* use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
* seem to depend on it.
*/
close(inout[1]);
close(err[1]);
- if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 0) == -1) /* stdin */
perror("dup2 stdin");
- if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 1) == -1) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
perror("dup2 stdout");
close(inout[0]);
- if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */
+ if (dup2(err[0], 2) == -1) /* stderr */
perror("dup2 stderr");
close(err[0]);
#endif
/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
do_child(ssh, s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
default:
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
/* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
- packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL,
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, s->display != NULL,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
/*
* Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
* it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
* multiple copies of the login messages.
*/
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
#ifdef USE_PIPES
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
close(perr[1]);
session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
#else
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
close(inout[0]);
close(err[0]);
/*
* Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
* handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
*/
- session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
+ session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
* will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
* setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
* lastlog, and other such operations.
*/
int
do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
pid_t pid;
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
/*
* Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
* standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
* simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
* Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
* detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
*/
- if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
- error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
+ error_f("dup #1: %s", strerror(errno));
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
return -1;
}
/* we keep a reference to the pty master */
- if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) {
- error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
+ error_f("dup #2: %s", strerror(errno));
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
close(fdout);
return -1;
}
/* Fork the child. */
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
- error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(fdout);
close(ptymaster);
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
return -1;
case 0:
is_child = 1;
close(fdout);
close(ptymaster);
/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ptyfd);
/* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
/* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
- if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0)
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) == -1)
error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0)
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) == -1)
error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0)
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) == -1)
error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
do_login(ssh, s, command);
#endif
/*
* Do common processing for the child, such as execing
* the command.
*/
do_child(ssh, s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
default:
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
- packet_set_interactive(1,
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
return 0;
}
-#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
-static void
-do_pre_login(Session *s)
-{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- pid_t pid = getpid();
-
- /*
- * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
- * the address be 0.0.0.0.
- */
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- }
-
- record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
- session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
-}
-#endif
-
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
* to be forced, execute that instead.
*/
int
do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
int ret;
const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
char session_type[1024];
if (options.adm_forced_command) {
original_command = command;
command = options.adm_forced_command;
forced = "(config)";
} else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
original_command = command;
command = auth_opts->force_command;
forced = "(key-option)";
}
s->forced = 0;
if (forced != NULL) {
s->forced = 1;
if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
} else if (s->is_subsystem)
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
"forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
} else if (s->is_subsystem) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
"subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
} else if (command == NULL) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
} else {
/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
}
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
tty = s->tty;
if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty += 5;
}
verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
session_type,
tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
s->pw->pw_name,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (command != NULL)
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
}
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
else
ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command);
original_command = NULL;
/*
* Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
* it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
* multiple copies of the login messages.
*/
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
return ret;
}
/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
void
do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
pid_t pid = getpid();
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
if (!use_privsep)
record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* If password change is needed, do it now.
* This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
*/
if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
display_loginmsg();
do_pam_chauthtok();
s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
/* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
}
#endif
if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
return;
display_loginmsg();
do_motd();
}
/*
* Display the message of the day.
*/
void
do_motd(void)
{
FILE *f;
char buf[256];
if (options.print_motd) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
"/etc/motd"), "r");
#else
f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
#endif
if (f) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stdout);
fclose(f);
}
}
}
/*
* Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
*/
int
check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
{
char buf[256];
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
struct stat st;
/* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
if (command != NULL)
return 1;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
return 1;
#else
if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
return 1;
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
* into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
* Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
* and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
- * If whitelist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and
+ * If allowlist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and
* only variable names that match it will be accepted.
*/
static void
read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
- const char *filename, const char *whitelist)
+ const char *filename, const char *allowlist)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp, *value;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_int lineno = 0;
f = fopen(filename, "r");
if (!f)
return;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
if (++lineno > 1000)
fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
continue;
cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
value = strchr(cp, '=');
if (value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
filename);
continue;
}
/*
* Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
* the value string.
*/
*value = '\0';
value++;
- if (whitelist != NULL &&
- match_pattern_list(cp, whitelist, 0) != 1)
+ if (allowlist != NULL &&
+ match_pattern_list(cp, allowlist, 0) != 1)
continue;
child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
}
#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
/*
* Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
*/
static char *
child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
{
int i;
size_t len;
len = strlen(name);
for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
return(env[i] + len + 1);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Read /etc/default/login.
* We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
*/
static void
read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
{
char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
u_long mask;
/*
* We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
* so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
* interested in.
*/
read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login",
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
if (tmpenv == NULL)
return;
if (uid == 0)
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
else
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
if (var != NULL)
child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
umask((mode_t)mask);
for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
free(tmpenv[i]);
free(tmpenv);
}
#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
static void
-copy_environment_blacklist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize,
- const char *blacklist)
+copy_environment_denylist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+ const char *denylist)
{
char *var_name, *var_val;
int i;
if (source == NULL)
return;
for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
free(var_name);
continue;
}
*var_val++ = '\0';
- if (blacklist == NULL ||
- match_pattern_list(var_name, blacklist, 0) != 1) {
+ if (denylist == NULL ||
+ match_pattern_list(var_name, denylist, 0) != 1) {
debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
}
free(var_name);
}
}
+#endif /* defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) */
-void
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+static void
copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
{
- copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
+ copy_environment_denylist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
}
+#endif
static char **
do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
{
char buf[256];
size_t n;
u_int i, envsize;
char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL;
#else
extern char **environ;
char **senv, **var, *val;
#endif
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* The Windows environment contains some setting which are
* important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
*/
{
char **p;
p = fetch_windows_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_windows_environment(p);
}
#endif
if (getenv("TZ"))
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- * the childs environment as they see fit
+ * the child's environment as they see fit
*/
ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
#endif
/* Set basic environment. */
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
#ifdef _AIX
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
#endif
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", "su");
/*
* Temporarily swap out our real environment with an empty one,
* let setusercontext() apply any environment variables defined
* for the user's login class, copy those variables to the child,
* free the temporary environment, and restore the original.
*/
senv = environ;
environ = xmalloc(sizeof(*environ));
*environ = NULL;
(void)setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH);
for (var = environ; *var != NULL; ++var) {
if ((val = strchr(*var, '=')) != NULL) {
*val++ = '\0';
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, *var, val);
}
free(*var);
}
free(environ);
environ = senv;
#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
* important components pointing to the system directories,
* needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
* remains intact here.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
}
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+ if (!options.use_pam) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
+ _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+ }
+
/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
if (s->term)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
if (s->display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
/*
* Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
* must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
* SIA), so copy it to the child.
*/
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
}
#ifdef _AIX
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment",
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
}
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_sock_name);
/* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */
if (options.permit_user_env) {
for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) {
ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]);
cp = strchr(ocp, '=');
- if (*cp == '=') {
+ if (cp != NULL) {
*cp = '\0';
- /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment whitelist */
- if (options.permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL ||
+ /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment allowlist */
+ if (options.permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL ||
match_pattern_list(ocp,
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist, 0) == 1)
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist, 0) == 1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize,
ocp, cp + 1);
}
free(ocp);
}
}
/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
if (options.permit_user_env) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
- pw->pw_dir);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%s/environment",
+ pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf,
- options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* Pull in any environment variables that may have
* been set by PAM.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
char **p;
/*
- * Don't allow SSH_AUTH_INFO variables posted to PAM to leak
- * back into the environment.
+ * Don't allow PAM-internal env vars to leak
+ * back into the session environment.
*/
+#define PAM_ENV_DENYLIST "SSH_AUTH_INFO*,SSH_CONNECTION*"
p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
- copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*");
+ copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize,
+ PAM_ENV_DENYLIST);
free_pam_environment(p);
p = fetch_pam_environment();
- copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*");
+ copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize,
+ PAM_ENV_DENYLIST);
free_pam_environment(p);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Environment specified by admin */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
}
*value++ = '\0';
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
}
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
ssh_local_port(ssh));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
- laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames);
if (auth_info_file != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
if (original_command)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
original_command);
if (debug_flag) {
/* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
return env;
}
/*
* Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
* first in this order).
*/
static void
do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
- char cmd[1024];
+ char *cmd = NULL, *user_rc = NULL;
int do_xauth;
struct stat st;
do_xauth =
s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+ xasprintf(&user_rc, "%s/%s", s->pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
/* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
- stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
- shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ stat(user_rc, &st) >= 0) {
+ if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL,
+ user_rc) == -1)
+ fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
- _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ user_rc);
} else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
} else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
if (debug_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
fprintf(stderr,
"%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
}
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
- options.xauth_location);
+ if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location) == -1)
+ fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
s->auth_display);
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
cmd);
}
}
+ free(cmd);
+ free(user_rc);
}
static void
do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
const char *nl;
char buf[1024], *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
struct stat sb;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
#else
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = def_nl;
#endif
if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1)
return;
/* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stderr);
fclose(f);
}
exit(254);
}
/*
* Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
* must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
*/
static void
safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
{
const char *cp;
char component[PATH_MAX];
struct stat st;
- if (*path != '/')
+ if (!path_absolute(path))
fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
fatal("chroot path too long");
/*
* Descend the path, checking that each component is a
* root-owned directory with strict permissions.
*/
for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
else {
cp++;
memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
component[cp - path] = '\0';
}
- debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
+ debug3_f("checking '%s'", component);
if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
- fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+ fatal_f("stat(\"%s\"): %s",
component, strerror(errno));
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
- "directory %s\"%s\"",
+ "directory %s\"%s\"",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
}
if (chdir(path) == -1)
fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
"%s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chroot(path) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
- fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("chdir(/) after chroot: %s", strerror(errno));
verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
}
/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
void
do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp;
platform_setusercontext(pw);
if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
(LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
perror("unable to set user context");
exit(1);
}
#else
if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("setgid");
exit(1);
}
/* Initialize the group list. */
if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("initgroups");
exit(1);
}
endgrent();
#endif
platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
pw->pw_uid);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
free(tmp);
free(chroot_path);
/* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
free(options.chroot_directory);
options.chroot_directory = NULL;
in_chroot = 1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
exit(1);
}
/*
* FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
* own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
*/
(void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
#else
# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
/*
* In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail;
* typically because of the lack of necessary authentication
* services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so,
* ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the
* internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but
* permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest.
*/
if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0)
fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
}
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
}
static void
do_pwchange(Session *s)
{
fflush(NULL);
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
fprintf(stderr,
"You must change your password now and login again!\n");
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
setexeccon(NULL);
#endif
#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
(char *)NULL);
#else
execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
#endif
perror("passwd");
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
}
exit(1);
}
static void
child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
{
extern int auth_sock;
if (auth_sock != -1) {
close(auth_sock);
auth_sock = -1;
}
- if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
- close(packet_get_connection_in());
+ if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) ==
+ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh))
+ close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
else {
- close(packet_get_connection_in());
- close(packet_get_connection_out());
+ close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ close(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh));
}
/*
* Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
* open in the parent.
*/
/* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
channel_close_all(ssh);
/*
* Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
* descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
*/
endpwent();
+ /* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+
/*
* Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
* hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
* initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
* descriptors open.
*/
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
}
/*
* Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
* environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
* ids, and executing the command or shell.
*/
#define ARGV_MAX 10
void
do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
extern char **environ;
- char **env;
- char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
+ char **env, *argv[ARGV_MAX], remote_id[512];
const char *shell, *shell0;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
int r = 0;
+ sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data();
- packet_clear_keys();
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
do_setusercontext(pw);
child_close_fds(ssh);
do_pwchange(s);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
* switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
do_motd();
#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
if (!options.use_pam)
do_nologin(pw);
do_setusercontext(pw);
/*
* PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
* generated messages, so if this in an interactive
* login then display them too.
*/
if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
display_loginmsg();
#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) {
debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
display_loginmsg();
exit(254);
}
#endif
/*
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
/*
* Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
* even if shell is overridden from login.conf
*/
env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
#endif
/*
* Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
* the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
* that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
* closed before building the environment, as we call
* ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
*/
child_close_fds(ssh);
/*
* Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
* /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
*/
environ = env;
#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
/*
* At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
* a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
* if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
* we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
* home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
*/
if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
char cell[64];
debug("Getting AFS token");
k_setpag();
if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
}
#endif
/* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
- if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
+ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) == -1) {
/* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
#endif
if (r || !in_chroot) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
"directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
strerror(errno));
}
if (r)
exit(1);
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
+ error("Connection from %s: refusing non-sftp session",
+ remote_id);
printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
fflush(NULL);
exit(1);
} else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
extern int optind, optreset;
int i;
char *p, *args;
setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
argv[i++] = p;
argv[i] = NULL;
optind = optreset = 1;
__progname = argv[0];
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
#endif
exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
}
fflush(NULL);
/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
shell0++;
else
shell0 = shell;
/*
* If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
* name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
* this is a login shell.
*/
if (!command) {
char argv0[256];
/* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
argv0[0] = '-';
if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
>= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
errno = EINVAL;
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
/* Execute the shell. */
argv[0] = argv0;
argv[1] = NULL;
execve(shell, argv, env);
/* Executing the shell failed. */
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
* option to execute the command.
*/
argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = (char *) command;
argv[3] = NULL;
execve(shell, argv, env);
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
void
session_unused(int id)
{
- debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id);
+ debug3_f("session id %d unused", id);
if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
id >= sessions_nalloc) {
- fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
- __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
+ fatal_f("insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
+ id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
}
memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
sessions[id].self = id;
sessions[id].used = 0;
sessions[id].chanid = -1;
sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
Session *
session_new(void)
{
Session *s, *tmp;
if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
return NULL;
- debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
- __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
+ debug2_f("allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
+ sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc,
sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions));
if (tmp == NULL) {
- error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
- __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1);
+ error_f("cannot allocate %d sessions",
+ sessions_nalloc + 1);
return NULL;
}
sessions = tmp;
session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
}
if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
sessions_first_unused < 0) {
- fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
- __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
+ fatal_f("insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
+ sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
sessions_nalloc);
}
s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
- if (s->used) {
- fatal("%s: session %d already used",
- __func__, sessions_first_unused);
- }
+ if (s->used)
+ fatal_f("session %d already used", sessions_first_unused);
sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
s->used = 1;
s->next_unused = -1;
debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
return s;
}
static void
session_dump(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
- debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p "
+ debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d "
"channel %d pid %ld",
s->used,
s->next_unused,
s->self,
- s,
s->chanid,
(long)s->pid);
}
}
int
session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
{
Session *s = session_new();
debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
if (s == NULL) {
error("no more sessions");
return 0;
}
s->authctxt = authctxt;
s->pw = authctxt->pw;
if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
s->chanid = chanid;
return 1;
}
Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
return s;
}
}
debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_channel(int id)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
i, id);
return s;
}
}
debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_x11_channel(int id)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
continue;
for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
"channel %d", s->self, id);
return s;
}
}
}
debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
{
int i;
debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
return s;
}
error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static int
session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
- s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
return 1;
}
static int
session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
- u_int len;
+ int r;
if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.");
return 0;
}
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
return 0;
}
- s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
- s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
free(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
}
/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
debug("Allocating pty.");
if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
sizeof(s->tty)))) {
free(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
s->ptyfd = -1;
s->ttyfd = -1;
error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
return 0;
}
debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
if (!use_privsep)
pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
/* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
- packet_check_eom();
session_proctitle(s);
return 1;
}
static int
session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
struct stat st;
- u_int len;
- int success = 0;
+ int r, success = 0;
char *prog, *cmd;
u_int i;
- s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->subsys, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
s->pw->pw_name);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
} else {
- if (stat(prog, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(prog, &st) == -1)
debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
prog, strerror(errno));
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
}
success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0;
break;
}
}
if (!success)
logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
"subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
return success;
}
static int
session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
- int success;
+ int r, success;
+ u_char single_connection = 0;
if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
"x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
return 0;
}
- s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
- s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
- s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
- s->screen = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &single_connection)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_proto, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_data, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->screen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ s->single_connection = single_connection;
if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s);
else {
success = 0;
error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
}
if (!success) {
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->auth_data);
s->auth_proto = NULL;
s->auth_data = NULL;
}
return success;
}
static int
session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
- packet_check_eom();
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0;
}
static int
session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
- u_int len, success;
+ u_int success;
+ int r;
+ char *command = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &command, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
- char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
- packet_check_eom();
success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0;
free(command);
return success;
}
static int
session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
+ int r;
- packet_get_int(); /* ignored */
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignore */
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
- if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0)
+ if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
char *name, *val;
- u_int name_len, val_len, i;
+ u_int i;
+ int r;
- name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len);
- val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len);
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
/* Don't set too many environment variables */
if (s->num_env > 128) {
debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env,
s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env));
s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
s->num_env++;
return (1);
}
}
debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
fail:
free(name);
free(val);
return (0);
}
/*
* Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names.
* Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as
* local extension.
*/
static int
name2sig(char *name)
{
#define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x
SSH_SIG(HUP);
SSH_SIG(INT);
SSH_SIG(KILL);
SSH_SIG(QUIT);
SSH_SIG(TERM);
SSH_SIG(USR1);
SSH_SIG(USR2);
#undef SSH_SIG
#ifdef SIGINFO
if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0)
return SIGINFO;
#endif
return -1;
}
static int
session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
char *signame = NULL;
int r, sig, success = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto out;
}
if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) {
- error("%s: unsupported signal \"%s\"", __func__, signame);
+ error_f("unsupported signal \"%s\"", signame);
goto out;
}
if (s->pid <= 0) {
- error("%s: no pid for session %d", __func__, s->self);
+ error_f("no pid for session %d", s->self);
goto out;
}
if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) {
- error("%s: refusing to send signal %s to %s session", __func__,
+ error_f("refusing to send signal %s to %s session",
signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem");
goto out;
}
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) {
- error("%s: session signalling requires privilege separation",
- __func__);
+ error_f("session signalling requires privilege separation");
goto out;
}
- debug("%s: signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", __func__, signame,
- (long)s->pid, sig);
+ debug_f("signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", signame, (long)s->pid, sig);
temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
r = killpg(s->pid, sig);
restore_uid();
if (r != 0) {
- error("%s: killpg(%ld, %d): %s", __func__, (long)s->pid,
+ error_f("killpg(%ld, %d): %s", (long)s->pid,
sig, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* success */
success = 1;
out:
free(signame);
return success;
}
static int
session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
static int called = 0;
+ int r;
- packet_check_eom();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
!options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
- debug("%s: agent forwarding disabled", __func__);
+ debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
return 0;
}
if (called) {
return 0;
} else {
called = 1;
return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw);
}
}
int
session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype)
{
int success = 0;
Session *s;
if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
- logit("%s: no session %d req %.100s", __func__, c->self, rtype);
+ logit_f("no session %d req %.100s", c->self, rtype);
return 0;
}
- debug("%s: session %d req %s", __func__, s->self, rtype);
+ debug_f("session %d req %s", s->self, rtype);
/*
* a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
* or a subsystem is executed
*/
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
success = session_shell_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
success = session_exec_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
success = session_pty_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
success = session_x11_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
success = session_env_req(ssh, s);
}
}
if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
success = session_break_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) {
success = session_signal_req(ssh, s);
}
return success;
}
void
session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty)
{
/*
* now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
* we can activate our channel and register the fd's
*/
if (s->chanid == -1)
fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
fdout, fdin, fderr,
ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
}
/*
* Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
* (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
*/
void
session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
if (s == NULL) {
- error("%s: no session", __func__);
+ error_f("no session");
return;
}
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
- debug("%s: session %d release %s", __func__, s->self, s->tty);
+ debug_f("session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
/* Record that the user has logged out. */
if (s->pid != 0)
record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
if (getuid() == 0)
pty_release(s->tty);
/*
* Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
* the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
* while we're still cleaning up.
*/
- if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
void
session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
{
PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
}
static char *
sig2name(int sig)
{
#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
SSH_SIG(ABRT);
SSH_SIG(ALRM);
SSH_SIG(FPE);
SSH_SIG(HUP);
SSH_SIG(ILL);
SSH_SIG(INT);
SSH_SIG(KILL);
SSH_SIG(PIPE);
SSH_SIG(QUIT);
SSH_SIG(SEGV);
SSH_SIG(TERM);
SSH_SIG(USR1);
SSH_SIG(USR2);
#undef SSH_SIG
return "SIG@openssh.com";
}
static void
session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
- debug("%s: x11 channel %d missing", __func__, id);
+ debug_f("x11 channel %d missing", id);
} else {
/* Detach X11 listener */
- debug("%s: detach x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
+ debug_f("detach x11 channel %d", id);
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
}
}
static void
session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
Session *s;
u_int i;
- debug3("%s: channel %d", __func__, id);
+ debug3_f("channel %d", id);
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
+ fatal_f("no x11 channel %d", id);
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
- debug("%s: session %d: closing channel %d",
- __func__, s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ debug_f("session %d: closing channel %d",
+ s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
/*
* The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
* close all of its siblings.
*/
if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
}
free(s->x11_chanids);
s->x11_chanids = NULL;
free(s->display);
s->display = NULL;
free(s->auth_proto);
s->auth_proto = NULL;
free(s->auth_data);
s->auth_data = NULL;
free(s->auth_display);
s->auth_display = NULL;
}
static void
session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
{
Channel *c;
+ int r;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: session %d: no channel %d",
- __func__, s->self, s->chanid);
- debug("%s: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
- __func__, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
+ fatal_f("session %d: no channel %d", s->self, s->chanid);
+ debug_f("session %d channel %d pid %ld",
+ s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
- packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status));
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, WEXITSTATUS(status))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
- packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)));
-#ifdef WCOREDUMP
- packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0);
-#else /* WCOREDUMP */
- packet_put_char(0);
-#endif /* WCOREDUMP */
- packet_put_cstring("");
- packet_put_cstring("");
- packet_send();
+#ifndef WCOREDUMP
+# define WCOREDUMP(x) (0)
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
} else {
/* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
- packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status);
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "wait returned status %04x.", status);
}
/* disconnect channel */
- debug("%s: release channel %d", __func__, s->chanid);
+ debug_f("release channel %d", s->chanid);
/*
* Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
* the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
- * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
+ * by session_close_by_channel when the child sessions close their fds.
*/
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
/*
* emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
* interested in data we write.
* Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
* be some more data waiting in the pipe.
*/
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
void
session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
u_int i;
verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
s->pw->pw_name,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
free(s->term);
free(s->display);
free(s->x11_chanids);
free(s->auth_display);
free(s->auth_data);
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->subsys);
if (s->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
free(s->env[i].name);
free(s->env[i].val);
}
free(s->env);
}
session_proctitle(s);
session_unused(s->self);
}
void
session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status)
{
Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
if (s == NULL) {
- debug("%s: no session for pid %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
+ debug_f("no session for pid %ld", (long)pid);
return;
}
if (s->chanid != -1)
session_exit_message(ssh, s, status);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
s->pid = 0;
}
/*
* this is called when a channel dies before
* the session 'child' itself dies
*/
void
session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
u_int i;
if (s == NULL) {
- debug("%s: no session for id %d", __func__, id);
+ debug_f("no session for id %d", id);
return;
}
- debug("%s: channel %d child %ld", __func__, id, (long)s->pid);
+ debug_f("channel %d child %ld", id, (long)s->pid);
if (s->pid != 0) {
- debug("%s: channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d",
- __func__, id, s->ttyfd);
+ debug_f("channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d", id, s->ttyfd);
/*
* delay detach of session, but release pty, since
* the fd's to the child are already closed
*/
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
return;
}
/* detach by removing callback */
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid);
/* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
}
}
s->chanid = -1;
session_close(ssh, s);
}
void
session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used) {
if (closefunc != NULL)
closefunc(s);
else
session_close(ssh, s);
}
}
}
static char *
session_tty_list(void)
{
static char buf[1024];
int i;
char *cp;
buf[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
} else
cp = s->tty + 5;
if (buf[0] != '\0')
strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
}
}
if (buf[0] == '\0')
strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
return buf;
}
void
session_proctitle(Session *s)
{
if (s->pw == NULL)
error("no user for session %d", s->self);
else
setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
}
int
session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
struct stat st;
char display[512], auth_display[512];
char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
u_int i;
if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) {
- packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
return 0;
}
if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
return 0;
}
if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
(stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
- packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
return 0;
}
if (s->display != NULL) {
debug("X11 display already set.");
return 0;
}
if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
&s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i],
session_close_single_x11, 0);
}
/* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
- if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/*
* auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
* authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be
* different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
*/
if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
s->display_number, s->screen);
snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
s->display_number, s->screen);
s->display = xstrdup(display);
s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
} else {
#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
struct hostent *he;
struct in_addr my_addr;
he = gethostbyname(hostname);
if (he == NULL) {
error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
- packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
return 0;
}
memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
s->display_number, s->screen);
#else
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
s->display_number, s->screen);
#endif
s->display = xstrdup(display);
s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
}
return 1;
}
static void
do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
}
void
do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
static int called = 0;
debug("do_cleanup");
/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
if (is_child)
return;
/* avoid double cleanup */
if (called)
return;
called = 1;
if (authctxt == NULL)
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
sshpam_cleanup();
sshpam_thread_cleanup();
}
#endif
if (!authctxt->authenticated)
return;
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
authctxt->krb5_ctx)
krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
#endif
/* remove agent socket */
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
/* remove userauth info */
if (auth_info_file != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
unlink(auth_info_file);
restore_uid();
free(auth_info_file);
auth_info_file = NULL;
}
/*
* Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
}
/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
const char *
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
{
const char *remote = "";
if (utmp_size > 0)
remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
return remote;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
index 4986d6d8d291..5bfff90d187f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
@@ -1,1920 +1,2634 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.130 2018/07/31 03:07:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.154 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* XXX: memleaks */
/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */
/* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */
/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted;
extern int showprogress;
+/* Default size of buffer for up/download */
+#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768
+
+/* Default number of concurrent outstanding requests */
+#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64
+
/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
#define MIN_READ_SIZE 512
/* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
#define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64
/* Directory separator characters */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/\\"
#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/"
#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
struct sftp_conn {
int fd_in;
int fd_out;
- u_int transfer_buflen;
+ u_int download_buflen;
+ u_int upload_buflen;
u_int num_requests;
u_int version;
u_int msg_id;
#define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001
#define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002
#define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004
#define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008
#define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010
+#define SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT 0x00000020
+#define SFTP_EXT_LIMITS 0x00000040
+#define SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND 0x00000080
u_int exts;
u_int64_t limit_kbps;
struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out;
};
+/* Tracks in-progress requests during file transfers */
+struct request {
+ u_int id;
+ size_t len;
+ u_int64_t offset;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(requests, request);
+
static u_char *
get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
+static struct request *
+request_enqueue(struct requests *requests, u_int id, size_t len,
+ uint64_t offset)
+{
+ struct request *req;
+
+ req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req));
+ req->id = id;
+ req->len = len;
+ req->offset = offset;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(requests, req, tq);
+ return req;
+}
+
+static struct request *
+request_find(struct requests *requests, u_int id)
+{
+ struct request *req;
+
+ for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(requests);
+ req != NULL && req->id != id;
+ req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq))
+ ;
+ return req;
+}
+
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
{
struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
- bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
+ refresh_progress_meter(0);
+ if (bwlimit != NULL)
+ bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
return 0;
}
static void
send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char mlen[4];
struct iovec iov[2];
if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m));
/* Send length first */
put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m));
iov[0].iov_base = mlen;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen);
iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m);
iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m);
- if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2,
- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) !=
+ if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio,
+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) !=
sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
}
static void
get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_char *p;
int r;
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4,
- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) {
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+ if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio,
+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET)
fatal("Connection closed");
else
fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_u32");
if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
do_log2(initial ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
"Received message too long %u", msg_len);
fatal("Ensure the remote shell produces no output "
"for non-interactive sessions.");
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len,
- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in)
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+ if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio,
+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL)
!= msg_len) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
fatal("Connection closed");
else
fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
}
}
static void
get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
{
get_msg_extended(conn, m, 0);
}
static void
send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
u_int len)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
- debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
+ debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o",
+ conn->fd_out, code, id, a->flags, a->perm);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static u_int
get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char type;
u_int id, status;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
sshbuf_free(msg);
debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
return status;
}
static u_char *
get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
const char *errfmt, ...)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id, status;
u_char type;
u_char *handle;
char errmsg[256];
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, errfmt);
if (errfmt != NULL)
vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)",
errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
if (errfmt != NULL)
error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(NULL);
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u",
errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse handle");
sshbuf_free(msg);
return handle;
}
+/* XXX returing &static is error-prone. Refactor to fill *Attrib argument */
static Attrib *
get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id;
u_char type;
int r;
static Attrib a;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
if (quiet)
debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
else
error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(NULL);
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
}
if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
- error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "decode_attrib");
sshbuf_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
+ debug3("Recevied stat reply T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o",
+ type, id, a.flags, a.perm);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return &a;
}
static int
get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
u_int expected_id, int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char type;
u_int id;
u_int64_t flag;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
if (quiet)
debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
else
error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return -1;
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
}
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse statvfs");
st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0;
st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0;
sshbuf_free(msg);
return 0;
}
struct sftp_conn *
do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests,
u_int64_t limit_kbps)
{
u_char type;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct sftp_conn *ret;
int r;
ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->msg_id = 1;
ret->fd_in = fd_in;
ret->fd_out = fd_out;
- ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen;
- ret->num_requests = num_requests;
+ ret->download_buflen = ret->upload_buflen =
+ transfer_buflen ? transfer_buflen : DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN;
+ ret->num_requests =
+ num_requests ? num_requests : DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS;
ret->exts = 0;
ret->limit_kbps = 0;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- send_msg(ret, msg);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ send_msg(ret, msg);
get_msg_extended(ret, msg, 1);
/* Expecting a VERSION reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
type);
sshbuf_free(msg);
free(ret);
return(NULL);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version);
/* Check for extensions */
while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) {
char *name;
u_char *value;
size_t vlen;
int known = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse extension");
if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK;
known = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 &&
strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC;
known = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "lsetstat@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT;
+ known = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "limits@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LIMITS;
+ known = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "expand-path@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+ strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+ ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND;
+ known = 1;
}
if (known) {
debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s",
name, value);
} else {
debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name);
}
free(name);
free(value);
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
+ /* Query the server for its limits */
+ if (ret->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) {
+ struct sftp_limits limits;
+ if (do_limits(ret, &limits) != 0)
+ fatal_f("limits failed");
+
+ /* If the caller did not specify, find a good value */
+ if (transfer_buflen == 0) {
+ ret->download_buflen = limits.read_length;
+ ret->upload_buflen = limits.write_length;
+ debug("Using server download size %u", ret->download_buflen);
+ debug("Using server upload size %u", ret->upload_buflen);
+ }
+
+ /* Use the server limit to scale down our value only */
+ if (num_requests == 0 && limits.open_handles) {
+ ret->num_requests =
+ MINIMUM(DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS, limits.open_handles);
+ debug("Server handle limit %llu; using %u",
+ (unsigned long long)limits.open_handles,
+ ret->num_requests);
+ }
+ }
+
/* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */
- if (ret->version == 0)
- ret->transfer_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480);
+ if (ret->version == 0) {
+ ret->download_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->download_buflen, 20480);
+ ret->upload_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->upload_buflen, 20480);
+ }
ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps;
if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) {
bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps,
- ret->transfer_buflen);
+ ret->download_buflen);
bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps,
- ret->transfer_buflen);
+ ret->upload_buflen);
}
return ret;
}
u_int
sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
{
return conn->version;
}
+int
+do_limits(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_limits *limits)
+{
+ u_int id, msg_id;
+ u_char type;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) == 0) {
+ error("Server does not support limits@openssh.com extension");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "limits@openssh.com")) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message limits@openssh.com I:%u", id);
+
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &msg_id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+ debug3("Received limits reply T:%u I:%u", type, msg_id);
+ if (id != msg_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", msg_id, id);
+ if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
+ debug_f("expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
+ /* Disable the limits extension */
+ conn->exts &= ~SFTP_EXT_LIMITS;
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(limits, 0, sizeof(*limits));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->packet_length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->read_length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->write_length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->open_handles)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse limits");
+
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
{
u_int id, status;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
size_t handle_len;
u_char type, *handle;
int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
int r;
if (dir)
*dir = NULL;
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose OPENDIR");
send_msg(conn, msg);
handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
"remote readdir(\"%s\")", path);
if (handle == NULL) {
sshbuf_free(msg);
return -1;
}
if (dir) {
ents = 0;
*dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
(*dir)[0] = NULL;
}
for (; !interrupted;) {
id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose READDIR");
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int rstatus;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus);
if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF)
break;
error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus));
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse count");
if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
- fatal("%s: nonsensical number of entries", __func__);
+ fatal_f("nonsensical number of entries");
if (count == 0)
break;
debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
char *filename, *longname;
Attrib a;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename,
NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname,
NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames");
if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
- error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "couldn't decode attrib");
free(filename);
free(longname);
- sshbuf_free(msg);
- return -1;
+ goto out;
}
if (print_flag)
mprintf("%s\n", longname);
/*
* Directory entries should never contain '/'
* These can be used to attack recursive ops
* (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
*/
if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
"during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
} else if (dir) {
*dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
(*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir));
(*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
(*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a));
(*dir)[++ents] = NULL;
}
free(filename);
free(longname);
}
}
status = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
free(handle);
if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) {
/* Don't return results on error */
free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
*dir = NULL;
} else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) {
/* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */
free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
*dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
**dir = NULL;
}
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
{
return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
}
void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
{
int i;
if (s == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
free(s[i]->filename);
free(s[i]->longname);
free(s[i]);
}
free(s);
}
int
do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
u_int status, id;
debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path);
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path));
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path,
strlen(path), a);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag)
error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path,
strlen(path));
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
Attrib *
do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
{
u_int id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id,
conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT,
path, strlen(path));
return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
}
Attrib *
do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
{
u_int id;
if (conn->version == 0) {
if (quiet)
debug("Server version does not support lstat operation");
else
logit("Server version does not support lstat operation");
return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet));
}
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path,
strlen(path));
return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
}
#ifdef notyet
Attrib *
do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
int quiet)
{
u_int id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle,
handle_len);
return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
}
#endif
int
do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path,
strlen(path), a);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
Attrib *a)
{
u_int status, id;
id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle,
handle_len, a);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
-char *
-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+/* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+static char *
+do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int expected_id, count, id;
char *filename, *longname;
Attrib a;
u_char type;
int r;
+ const char *what = "SSH2_FXP_REALPATH";
- expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
- send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path,
- strlen(path));
-
+ if (expand)
+ what = "expand-path@openssh.com";
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if (expand) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
+ "expand-path@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", what);
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ } else {
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
+ path, strlen(path));
+ }
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return NULL;
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse count");
if (count != 1)
- fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count);
+ fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from %s", count, what);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse filename/attrib");
- debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename,
- (unsigned long)a.size);
+ debug3("%s %s -> %s", what, path, filename);
free(longname);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(filename);
}
+char *
+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+}
+
+int
+can_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+ return (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND) != 0;
+}
+
+char *
+do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ if (!can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+ return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+ }
+ return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
+}
+
int
do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath,
int force_legacy)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/* Send rename request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if (use_ext) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
"posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose posix-rename");
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose rename");
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose paths");
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" :
"SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
newpath, fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r;
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) {
error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension");
return -1;
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/* Send link request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
- oldpath, newpath);
+ oldpath, newpath);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
newpath, fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r;
if (conn->version < 3) {
error("This server does not support the symlink operation");
return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/* Send symlink request */
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
newpath);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
newpath, fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
int
do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int status, id;
int r;
/* Silently return if the extension is not supported */
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0)
return -1;
/* Send fsync request */
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id);
sshbuf_free(msg);
status = get_status(conn, id);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status));
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
#ifdef notyet
char *
do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int expected_id, count, id;
char *filename, *longname;
Attrib a;
u_char type;
int r;
expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path));
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (id != expected_id)
fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
u_int status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
sshbuf_free(msg);
return(NULL);
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse count");
if (count != 1)
fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames/attrib");
debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename);
free(longname);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return filename;
}
#endif
int
do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id;
int r;
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) {
error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension");
return -1;
}
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
}
#ifdef notyet
int
do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int id;
if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) {
error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension");
return -1;
}
id = conn->msg_id++;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
}
#endif
+int
+do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT) == 0) {
+ error("Server does not support lsetstat@openssh.com extension");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+ status = get_status(conn, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
+ fx2txt(status));
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
static void
send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+ send_msg(conn, msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static int
+send_open(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *tag,
+ u_int openmode, Attrib *a, u_char **handlep, size_t *handle_lenp)
+{
+ Attrib junk;
+ u_char *handle;
+ size_t handle_len;
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+ u_int id;
+
+ *handlep = NULL;
+ *handle_lenp = 0;
+
+ if (a == NULL) {
+ attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
+ a = &junk;
+ }
+ /* Send open request */
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ id = conn->msg_id++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, openmode)) != 0 ||
+ (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose %s open", tag);
send_msg(conn, msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
+ debug3("Sent %s message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s M:0x%04x",
+ tag, id, path, openmode);
+ if ((handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
+ "%s open(\"%s\")", tag, path)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ /* success */
+ *handlep = handle;
+ *handle_lenp = handle_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *
+progress_meter_path(const char *path)
+{
+ const char *progresspath;
+
+ if ((progresspath = strrchr(path, '/')) == NULL)
+ return path;
+ progresspath++;
+ if (*progresspath == '\0')
+ return path;
+ return progresspath;
}
int
do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
int fsync_flag)
{
- Attrib junk;
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char *handle;
int local_fd = -1, write_error;
- int read_error, write_errno, reordered = 0, r;
+ int read_error, write_errno, lmodified = 0, reordered = 0, r;
u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater;
u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
off_t progress_counter;
size_t handle_len;
struct stat st;
- struct request {
- u_int id;
- size_t len;
- u_int64_t offset;
- TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq;
- };
- TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests;
+ struct requests requests;
struct request *req;
u_char type;
TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
mode = a->perm & 0777;
else
mode = 0666;
if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
(!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path);
return(-1);
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
size = a->size;
else
size = 0;
- buflen = conn->transfer_buflen;
- if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-
- attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
+ buflen = conn->download_buflen;
/* Send open request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 ||
- (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- send_msg(conn, msg);
- debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
-
- handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
- "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
- if (handle == NULL) {
- sshbuf_free(msg);
- return(-1);
- }
+ if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "remote", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL,
+ &handle, &handle_len) != 0)
+ return -1;
local_fd = open(local_path,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
if (local_fd == -1) {
error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
offset = highwater = 0;
if (resume_flag) {
if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) {
error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
if (st.st_size < 0) {
error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path);
goto fail;
}
if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) {
error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
"local file is larger than remote", local_path);
fail:
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
- sshbuf_free(msg);
free(handle);
if (local_fd != -1)
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
offset = highwater = st.st_size;
}
/* Read from remote and write to local */
write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0;
max_req = 1;
progress_counter = offset;
- if (showprogress && size != 0)
- start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter);
+ if (showprogress && size != 0) {
+ start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(remote_path),
+ size, &progress_counter);
+ }
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
u_char *data;
size_t len;
/*
* Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
* allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
*/
if (interrupted) {
if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
break;
max_req = 0;
}
/* Send some more requests */
while (num_req < max_req) {
debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
(unsigned long long)offset,
(unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
num_req, max_req);
- req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req));
- req->id = conn->msg_id++;
- req->len = buflen;
- req->offset = offset;
+ req = request_enqueue(&requests, conn->msg_id++,
+ buflen, offset);
offset += buflen;
num_req++;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq);
send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset,
req->len, handle, handle_len);
}
sshbuf_reset(msg);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req);
/* Find the request in our queue */
- for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests);
- req != NULL && req->id != id;
- req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq))
- ;
- if (req == NULL)
+ if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL)
fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
read_error = 1;
max_req = 0;
TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
free(req);
num_req--;
break;
case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse data");
debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
(unsigned long long)req->offset,
(unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
if (len > req->len)
fatal("Received more data than asked for "
"%zu > %zu", len, req->len);
+ lmodified = 1;
if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) &&
!write_error) {
write_errno = errno;
write_error = 1;
max_req = 0;
}
else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater)
highwater = req->offset + len;
else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater)
reordered = 1;
progress_counter += len;
free(data);
if (len == req->len) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
free(req);
num_req--;
} else {
/* Resend the request for the missing data */
debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
"%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
(unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
(unsigned long long)req->offset +
req->len - 1, num_req);
req->id = conn->msg_id++;
req->len -= len;
req->offset += len;
send_read_request(conn, req->id,
req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len);
/* Reduce the request size */
if (len < buflen)
buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
}
if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
/* Only one request at a time
* after the expected EOF */
debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
(unsigned long long)offset,
num_req);
max_req = 1;
- } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) {
+ } else if (max_req < conn->num_requests) {
++max_req;
}
}
break;
default:
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
}
}
if (showprogress && size)
stop_progress_meter();
/* Sanity check */
if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
/* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
if (reordered && resume_flag) {
error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
"server reordered requests", local_path);
}
debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1)
error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
}
if (read_error) {
error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s",
remote_path, fx2txt(status));
status = -1;
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
} else if (write_error) {
error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(write_errno));
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
} else {
if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1)
#else
if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1)
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
if (preserve_flag &&
(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) {
struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1)
error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
}
- if (fsync_flag) {
+ if (resume_flag && !lmodified)
+ logit("File \"%s\" was not modified", local_path);
+ else if (fsync_flag) {
debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path);
if (fsync(local_fd) == -1)
error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
}
}
close(local_fd);
sshbuf_free(msg);
free(handle);
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
- int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
+ int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
{
int i, ret = 0;
SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL;
- mode_t mode = 0777;
+ mode_t mode = 0777, tmpmode = mode;
if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
return -1;
}
if (dirattrib == NULL &&
(dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src);
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
return -1;
}
- if (print_flag)
+ if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY)
mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src);
- if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777;
- else {
+ tmpmode = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
+ } else {
debug("Server did not send permissions for "
"directory \"%s\"", dst);
}
- if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) {
+ if (mkdir(dst, tmpmode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) {
error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) {
error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) {
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
filename = dir_entries[i]->filename;
new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
new_src = path_append(src, filename);
if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) {
if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
continue;
if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
- print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1)
+ print_flag, resume_flag,
+ fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
ret = -1;
- } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) {
+ } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
+ (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
+ /*
+ * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's
+ * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation
+ * and get the link target's attributes.
+ */
if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
- resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
+ S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
+ &(dir_entries[i]->a),
+ preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
new_src, new_dst);
ret = -1;
}
} else
logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src);
}
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
if (preserve_flag) {
if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime;
tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime;
tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1)
error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s",
dst, strerror(errno));
} else
debug("Server did not send times for directory "
"\"%s\"", dst);
}
+ if (mode != tmpmode && chmod(dst, mode) == -1)
+ error("Can't set final mode on \"%s\": %s", dst,
+ strerror(errno));
+
free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries);
return ret;
}
int
download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
- int fsync_flag)
+ int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
{
char *src_canon;
int ret;
if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
return -1;
}
ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
- dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag);
+ dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
+ follow_link_flag);
free(src_canon);
return ret;
}
int
do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
{
int r, local_fd;
u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
u_int id;
u_char type;
off_t offset, progress_counter;
u_char *handle, *data;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct stat sb;
Attrib a, *c = NULL;
u_int32_t startid;
u_int32_t ackid;
- struct outstanding_ack {
- u_int id;
- u_int len;
- off_t offset;
- TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq;
- };
- TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks;
- struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL;
+ struct request *ack = NULL;
+ struct requests acks;
size_t handle_len;
TAILQ_INIT(&acks);
if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) {
error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
return(-1);
}
if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) {
error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
close(local_fd);
return(-1);
}
if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
error("%s is not a regular file", local_path);
close(local_fd);
return(-1);
}
stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
a.perm &= 0777;
if (!preserve_flag)
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
if (resume) {
/* Get remote file size if it exists */
if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) {
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) {
error("destination file bigger or same size as "
- "source file");
+ "source file");
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
}
- if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-
/* Send open request */
- id = conn->msg_id++;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
- (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC))) != 0 ||
- (r = encode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- send_msg(conn, msg);
- debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
-
- sshbuf_reset(msg);
-
- handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
- "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path);
- if (handle == NULL) {
+ if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
+ (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC),
+ &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
close(local_fd);
- sshbuf_free(msg);
return -1;
}
+ id = conn->msg_id;
startid = ackid = id + 1;
- data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen);
+ data = xmalloc(conn->upload_buflen);
/* Read from local and write to remote */
offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0);
- if (showprogress)
- start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size,
- &progress_counter);
+ if (showprogress) {
+ start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(local_path),
+ sb.st_size, &progress_counter);
+ }
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (;;) {
int len;
/*
* Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF,
* thus losing the last block of the file.
* Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the
* server to drain.
*/
if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK)
len = 0;
else do
- len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen);
+ len = read(local_fd, data, conn->upload_buflen);
while ((len == -1) &&
(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK));
if (len == -1)
fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
if (len != 0) {
- ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack));
- ack->id = ++id;
- ack->offset = offset;
- ack->len = len;
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq);
-
+ ack = request_enqueue(&acks, ++id, len, offset);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle,
handle_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(conn, msg);
debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u",
id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
} else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL)
break;
if (ack == NULL)
fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id);
if (id == startid || len == 0 ||
id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) {
u_int rid;
sshbuf_reset(msg);
get_msg(conn, msg);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, "
"got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
/* Find the request in our queue */
- for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks);
- ack != NULL && ack->id != rid;
- ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq))
- ;
- if (ack == NULL)
+ if ((ack = request_find(&acks, rid)) == NULL)
fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
- debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld",
- ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset);
+ debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %zu bytes at %lld",
+ ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
++ackid;
progress_counter += ack->len;
free(ack);
}
offset += len;
if (offset < 0)
- fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__);
+ fatal_f("offset < 0");
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
free(data);
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s",
remote_path, fx2txt(status));
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
}
if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
}
/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
if (preserve_flag)
do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a);
if (fsync_flag)
(void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len);
if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
free(handle);
return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
- int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
+ int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+ int follow_link_flag)
{
int ret = 0;
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL;
struct stat sb;
Attrib a, *dirattrib;
+ u_int32_t saved_perm;
if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
return -1;
}
if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) {
error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s",
src, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
return -1;
}
- if (print_flag)
+ if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY)
mprintf("Entering %s\n", src);
attrib_clear(&a);
stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
a.perm &= 01777;
if (!preserve_flag)
a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
/*
* sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST,
* so if we get a failure back then we must check whether
- * the path already existed and is a directory.
+ * the path already existed and is a directory. Ensure we can
+ * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer.
*/
+ saved_perm = a.perm;
+ a.perm |= (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) {
if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL)
return -1;
if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst);
return -1;
}
}
+ a.perm = saved_perm;
if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) {
error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) {
if (dp->d_ino == 0)
continue;
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
filename = dp->d_name;
new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
new_src = path_append(src, filename);
if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) {
logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename,
strerror(errno));
ret = -1;
} else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
continue;
if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
- fsync_flag) == -1)
+ fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
ret = -1;
- } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+ } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) ||
+ (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) {
if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
new_src, new_dst);
ret = -1;
}
} else
logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename);
}
free(new_dst);
free(new_src);
do_setstat(conn, dst, &a);
(void) closedir(dirp);
return ret;
}
int
upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
- int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
+ int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+ int follow_link_flag)
{
char *dst_canon;
int ret;
if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
return -1;
}
ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
- print_flag, resume, fsync_flag);
+ print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag);
free(dst_canon);
return ret;
}
+static void
+handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous,
+ u_int *nreqsp, u_int *write_errorp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_char type;
+ u_int id, status;
+ int r;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ /* Try to eat replies from the upload side */
+ while (*nreqsp > 0) {
+ debug3_f("%u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
+ if (!synchronous) {
+ /* Bail out if no data is ready to be read */
+ pfd.fd = to->fd_in;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ if ((r = poll(&pfd, 1, 0)) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ break;
+ fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
+ } else if (r == 0)
+ break; /* fd not ready */
+ }
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ get_msg(to, msg);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "dest parse");
+ debug3("Received dest reply T:%u I:%u R:%u", type, id, *nreqsp);
+ if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ fatal_f("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse dest status");
+ debug3("dest SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
+ /* record first error */
+ if (*write_errorp == 0)
+ *write_errorp = status;
+ }
+ /*
+ * XXX this doesn't do full reply matching like do_upload and
+ * so cannot gracefully truncate terminated uploads at a
+ * high-water mark. ATM the only caller of this function (scp)
+ * doesn't support transfer resumption, so this doesn't matter
+ * a whole lot.
+ *
+ * To be safe, do_crossload truncates the destination file to
+ * zero length on upload failure, since we can't trust the
+ * server not to have reordered replies that could have
+ * inserted holes where none existed in the source file.
+ *
+ * XXX we could get a more accutate progress bar if we updated
+ * the counter based on the reply from the destination...
+ */
+ (*nreqsp)--;
+ }
+ debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
+}
+
+int
+do_crossload(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+ Attrib *a, int preserve_flag)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int write_error, read_error, r;
+ u_int64_t offset = 0, size;
+ u_int id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ u_int num_upload_req;
+ off_t progress_counter;
+ u_char *from_handle, *to_handle;
+ size_t from_handle_len, to_handle_len;
+ struct requests requests;
+ struct request *req;
+ u_char type;
+
+ TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
+
+ if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+ (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
+ error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", from_path);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+ size = a->size;
+ else
+ size = 0;
+
+ buflen = from->download_buflen;
+ if (buflen > to->upload_buflen)
+ buflen = to->upload_buflen;
+
+ /* Send open request to read side */
+ if (send_open(from, from_path, "origin", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL,
+ &from_handle, &from_handle_len) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Send open request to write side */
+ a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ a->perm &= 0777;
+ if (!preserve_flag)
+ a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+ if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest",
+ SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a,
+ &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) {
+ do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Read from remote "from" and write to remote "to" */
+ offset = 0;
+ write_error = read_error = num_req = num_upload_req = 0;
+ max_req = 1;
+ progress_counter = 0;
+
+ if (showprogress && size != 0) {
+ start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(from_path),
+ size, &progress_counter);
+ }
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
+ u_char *data;
+ size_t len;
+
+ /*
+ * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
+ * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
+ */
+ if (interrupted) {
+ if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
+ break;
+ max_req = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Send some more requests */
+ while (num_req < max_req) {
+ debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
+ (unsigned long long)offset,
+ (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
+ num_req, max_req);
+ req = request_enqueue(&requests, from->msg_id++,
+ buflen, offset);
+ offset += buflen;
+ num_req++;
+ send_read_request(from, req->id, req->offset,
+ req->len, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+ }
+
+ /* Try to eat replies from the upload side (nonblocking) */
+ handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 0,
+ &num_upload_req, &write_error);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ get_msg(from, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ debug3("Received origin reply T:%u I:%u R:%d",
+ type, id, max_req);
+
+ /* Find the request in our queue */
+ if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
+ read_error = 1;
+ max_req = 0;
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+ free(req);
+ num_req--;
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse data");
+ debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset,
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
+ if (len > req->len)
+ fatal("Received more data than asked for "
+ "%zu > %zu", len, req->len);
+
+ /* Write this chunk out to the destination */
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, to->msg_id++)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, to_handle,
+ to_handle_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, req->offset)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose write");
+ send_msg(to, msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%zu",
+ id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
+ num_upload_req++;
+ progress_counter += len;
+ free(data);
+
+ if (len == req->len) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+ free(req);
+ num_req--;
+ } else {
+ /* Resend the request for the missing data */
+ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
+ "%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
+ (unsigned long long)req->offset +
+ req->len - 1, num_req);
+ req->id = from->msg_id++;
+ req->len -= len;
+ req->offset += len;
+ send_read_request(from, req->id,
+ req->offset, req->len,
+ from_handle, from_handle_len);
+ /* Reduce the request size */
+ if (len < buflen)
+ buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
+ }
+ if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
+ if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
+ /* Only one request at a time
+ * after the expected EOF */
+ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
+ (unsigned long long)offset,
+ num_req);
+ max_req = 1;
+ } else if (max_req < from->num_requests) {
+ ++max_req;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
+ SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (showprogress && size)
+ stop_progress_meter();
+
+ /* Drain replies from the server (blocking) */
+ debug3_f("waiting for %u replies from destination", num_upload_req);
+ handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 1, &num_upload_req, &write_error);
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
+ fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
+ /* Truncate at 0 length on interrupt or error to avoid holes at dest */
+ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
+ debug("truncating \"%s\" at 0", to_path);
+ do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+ free(to_handle);
+ if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest",
+ SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a,
+ &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) {
+ error("truncation failed for \"%s\"", to_path);
+ to_handle = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (read_error) {
+ error("Couldn't read from origin file \"%s\" : %s",
+ from_path, fx2txt(status));
+ status = -1;
+ do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+ if (to_handle != NULL)
+ do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+ } else if (write_error) {
+ error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s",
+ to_path, fx2txt(write_error));
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+ if (to_handle != NULL)
+ do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+ } else {
+ if (do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len) != 0 ||
+ interrupted)
+ status = -1;
+ else
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ if (to_handle != NULL) {
+ /* Need to resend utimes after write */
+ if (preserve_flag)
+ do_fsetstat(to, to_handle, to_handle_len, a);
+ do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+ }
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ free(from_handle);
+ free(to_handle);
+
+ return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+crossload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+ int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+ int follow_link_flag)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
+ char *filename, *new_from_path = NULL, *new_to_path = NULL;
+ mode_t mode = 0777;
+ Attrib curdir;
+
+ if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
+ error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (dirattrib == NULL &&
+ (dirattrib = do_stat(from, from_path, 1)) == NULL) {
+ error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", from_path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+ error("\"%s\" is not a directory", from_path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY)
+ mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", from_path);
+
+ curdir = *dirattrib; /* dirattrib will be clobbered */
+ curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ if ((curdir.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) == 0) {
+ debug("Origin did not send permissions for "
+ "directory \"%s\"", to_path);
+ curdir.perm = S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR;
+ curdir.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ }
+ /* We need to be able to write to the directory while we transfer it */
+ mode = curdir.perm & 01777;
+ curdir.perm = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
+
+ /*
+ * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST,
+ * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether
+ * the path already existed and is a directory. Ensure we can
+ * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer.
+ */
+ if (do_mkdir(to, to_path, &curdir, 0) != 0) {
+ if ((dirattrib = do_stat(to, to_path, 0)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+ error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", to_path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ curdir.perm = mode;
+
+ if (do_readdir(from, from_path, &dir_entries) == -1) {
+ error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", from_path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) {
+ free(new_from_path);
+ free(new_to_path);
+
+ filename = dir_entries[i]->filename;
+ new_from_path = path_append(from_path, filename);
+ new_to_path = path_append(to_path, filename);
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) {
+ if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (crossload_dir_internal(from, to,
+ new_from_path, new_to_path,
+ depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
+ print_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
+ ret = -1;
+ } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
+ (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
+ /*
+ * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's
+ * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation
+ * and get the link target's attributes.
+ */
+ if (do_crossload(from, to, new_from_path, new_to_path,
+ S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
+ &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag) == -1) {
+ error("Transfer of file %s to %s failed",
+ new_from_path, new_to_path);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ } else
+ logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_from_path);
+
+ }
+ free(new_to_path);
+ free(new_from_path);
+
+ do_setstat(to, to_path, &curdir);
+
+ free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+ Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int follow_link_flag)
+{
+ char *from_path_canon;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
+ error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", from_path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = crossload_dir_internal(from, to, from_path_canon, to_path, 0,
+ dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, follow_link_flag);
+ free(from_path_canon);
+ return ret;
+}
+
char *
path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
{
char *ret;
size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
ret = xmalloc(len);
strlcpy(ret, p1, len);
if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/')
strlcat(ret, "/", len);
strlcat(ret, p2, len);
return(ret);
}
+char *
+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
+{
+ char *abs_str;
+
+ /* Derelativise */
+ if (p && !path_absolute(p)) {
+ abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
+ free(p);
+ return(abs_str);
+ } else
+ return(p);
+}
+
+int
+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ /* XXX: report errors? */
+ if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
+ return(0);
+ if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
+ return(0);
+ return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
+}
+
+
+int
+local_is_dir(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ /* XXX: report errors? */
+ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
+ return(0);
+
+ return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
+}
+
+/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
+int
+globpath_is_dir(const char *pathname)
+{
+ size_t l = strlen(pathname);
+
+ return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/';
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
index 14a3b8182c49..7d0bd12ae5a3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
@@ -1,142 +1,198 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.27 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.34 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */
#ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H
#define _SFTP_CLIENT_H
#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
# include <glob.h>
#else
# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
#endif
typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT;
struct SFTP_DIRENT {
char *filename;
char *longname;
Attrib a;
};
/*
* Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the
* server's native format may be larger than the client's.
*/
struct sftp_statvfs {
u_int64_t f_bsize;
u_int64_t f_frsize;
u_int64_t f_blocks;
u_int64_t f_bfree;
u_int64_t f_bavail;
u_int64_t f_files;
u_int64_t f_ffree;
u_int64_t f_favail;
u_int64_t f_fsid;
u_int64_t f_flag;
u_int64_t f_namemax;
};
+/* Used for limits response on the wire from the server */
+struct sftp_limits {
+ u_int64_t packet_length;
+ u_int64_t read_length;
+ u_int64_t write_length;
+ u_int64_t open_handles;
+};
+
+/* print flag values */
+#define SFTP_QUIET 0 /* be quiet during transfers */
+#define SFTP_PRINT 1 /* list files and show progress bar */
+#define SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY 2 /* progress bar only */
+
/*
* Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or
* a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success.
*/
struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t);
u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
+/* Query server limits */
+int do_limits(struct sftp_conn *, struct sftp_limits *);
+
/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int);
/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
/* Delete file 'path' */
int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
/* Create directory 'path' */
int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
/* Remove directory 'path' */
int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
/* Set file attributes of 'path' */
int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+/* Set file attributes of 'path', not following symlinks */
+int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+
/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+/* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+char *do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Returns non-zero if server can tilde-expand paths */
+int can_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *);
+
/* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int force_legacy);
+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int);
/* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
/* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int);
/*
* Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
* if 'pflag' is set
*/
int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
Attrib *, int, int, int);
/*
* Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
* times if 'pflag' is set
*/
int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
- Attrib *, int, int, int, int);
+ Attrib *, int, int, int, int, int);
/*
* Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
* if 'pflag' is set
*/
int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
/*
* Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
* times if 'pflag' is set
*/
int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
- int);
+ int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+ * to 'to' connection at 'to_path'.
+ */
+int
+do_crossload(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+ Attrib *a, int preserve_flag);
+
+/*
+ * Recursively download a directory from 'from_path' from the 'from'
+ * connection and upload it to 'to' connection at 'to_path'.
+ */
+int crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+ Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+ int follow_link_flag);
/* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
+/* Make absolute path if relative path and CWD is given. Does not modify
+ * original if the the path is already absolute. */
+char *make_absolute(char *, const char *);
+
+/* Check if remote path is directory */
+int remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path);
+
+/* Check if local path is directory */
+int local_is_dir(const char *path);
+
+/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
+int globpath_is_dir(const char *pathname);
+
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
index 5d743d3b2b12..3ad57673d41e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
@@ -1,258 +1,259 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.31 2018/09/13 15:23:32 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.32 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
void
attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
{
a->flags = 0;
a->size = 0;
a->uid = 0;
a->gid = 0;
a->perm = 0;
a->atime = 0;
a->mtime = 0;
}
/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */
void
stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *st, Attrib *a)
{
attrib_clear(a);
a->flags = 0;
a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
a->size = st->st_size;
a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
a->uid = st->st_uid;
a->gid = st->st_gid;
a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
a->perm = st->st_mode;
a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
a->atime = st->st_atime;
a->mtime = st->st_mtime;
}
/* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */
void
attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *a, struct stat *st)
{
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
st->st_size = a->size;
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
st->st_uid = a->uid;
st->st_gid = a->gid;
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
st->st_mode = a->perm;
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
st->st_atime = a->atime;
st->st_mtime = a->mtime;
}
}
/* Decode attributes in buffer */
int
decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, Attrib *a)
{
int r;
attrib_clear(a);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->flags)) != 0)
return r;
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &a->size)) != 0)
return r;
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->uid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->gid)) != 0)
return r;
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->perm)) != 0)
return r;
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->atime)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->mtime)) != 0)
return r;
}
/* vendor-specific extensions */
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) {
char *type;
u_char *data;
size_t dlen;
u_int i, count;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &count)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return r;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
return r;
debug3("Got file attribute \"%.100s\" len %zu",
type, dlen);
free(type);
free(data);
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Encode attributes to buffer */
int
encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, const Attrib *a)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->flags)) != 0)
return r;
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(b, a->size)) != 0)
return r;
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->uid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->gid)) != 0)
return r;
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->perm)) != 0)
return r;
}
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->atime)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->mtime)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */
const char *
fx2txt(int status)
{
switch (status) {
case SSH2_FX_OK:
return("No error");
case SSH2_FX_EOF:
return("End of file");
case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE:
return("No such file or directory");
case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED:
return("Permission denied");
case SSH2_FX_FAILURE:
return("Failure");
case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE:
return("Bad message");
case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION:
return("No connection");
case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST:
return("Connection lost");
case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED:
return("Operation unsupported");
default:
return("Unknown status");
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh
*/
char *
ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units)
{
int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
const char *user, *group;
char buf[1024], lc[8], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
time_t now;
strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
if (remote) {
snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
user = ubuf;
snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
group = gbuf;
strlcpy(lc, "?", sizeof(lc));
} else {
user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
snprintf(lc, sizeof(lc), "%u", (u_int)st->st_nlink);
}
if (ltime != NULL) {
now = time(NULL);
if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
now >= st->st_mtime)
sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime);
else
sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime);
}
if (sz == 0)
tbuf[0] = '\0';
ulen = MAXIMUM(strlen(user), 8);
glen = MAXIMUM(strlen(group), 8);
if (si_units) {
fmt_scaled((long long)st->st_size, sbuf);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s",
mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group,
sbuf, tbuf, name);
} else {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s",
mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group,
(unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name);
}
return xstrdup(buf);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
index 43a1bebadbd4..f573f98f01ec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
@@ -1,150 +1,150 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.27 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.29 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <dirent.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
struct SFTP_OPENDIR {
SFTP_DIRENT **dir;
int offset;
};
static struct {
struct sftp_conn *conn;
} cur;
static void *
fudge_opendir(const char *path)
{
struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r;
r = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r));
if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) {
free(r);
return(NULL);
}
r->offset = 0;
return((void *)r);
}
static struct dirent *
fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
{
/* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */
static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf;
#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
static int inum = 1;
#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL)
return(NULL);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
/*
* Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects
* you to hack around it.
*/
#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN);
#else
strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename,
sizeof(ret->d_name));
#endif
#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
/*
* Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with
* ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the
* source... Fake an inode number to appease it.
*/
ret->d_ino = inum++;
if (!inum)
inum = 1;
#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
return(ret);
}
static void
fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
{
free_sftp_dirents(od->dir);
free(od);
}
static int
fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
{
Attrib *a;
if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
return(-1);
attrib_to_stat(a, st);
return(0);
}
static int
fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
{
Attrib *a;
if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
return(-1);
attrib_to_stat(a, st);
return(0);
}
int
remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags,
int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob)
{
pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir;
pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir;
pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir;
pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat;
pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat;
memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
cur.conn = conn;
return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-realpath.c
similarity index 94%
rename from crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
rename to crypto/openssh/sftp-realpath.c
index a2f090e5512f..9ac40181227f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/realpath.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-realpath.c
@@ -1,229 +1,226 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.20 2015/10/13 20:55:37 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.1 2019/07/05 04:55:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
-/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/realpath.c */
-
#include "includes.h"
-#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
-
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
#endif
-/* A slightly modified copy of this file exists in libexec/ld.so */
+/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
+
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
/*
* char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
*
* Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
* components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
* in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
*/
char *
-realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
+sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
{
struct stat sb;
char *p, *q, *s;
size_t left_len, resolved_len;
unsigned symlinks;
int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
if (path[0] == '\0') {
errno = ENOENT;
return (NULL);
}
serrno = errno;
if (resolved == NULL) {
resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
if (resolved == NULL)
return (NULL);
mem_allocated = 1;
} else
mem_allocated = 0;
symlinks = 0;
if (path[0] == '/') {
resolved[0] = '/';
resolved[1] = '\0';
if (path[1] == '\0')
return (resolved);
resolved_len = 1;
left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
} else {
if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
if (mem_allocated)
free(resolved);
else
strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
return (NULL);
}
resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
}
if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto err;
}
/*
* Iterate over path components in `left'.
*/
while (left_len != 0) {
/*
* Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
* and its length.
*/
p = strchr(left, '/');
s = p ? p : left + left_len;
if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto err;
}
memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
next_token[s - left] = '\0';
left_len -= s - left;
if (p != NULL)
memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto err;
}
resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
}
if (next_token[0] == '\0')
continue;
else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
continue;
else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
/*
* Strip the last path component except when we have
* single "/"
*/
if (resolved_len > 1) {
resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
*q = '\0';
resolved_len = q - resolved;
}
continue;
}
/*
* Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
* lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
* there are no more path components left.
*/
resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto err;
}
if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
errno = serrno;
return (resolved);
}
goto err;
}
if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
errno = ELOOP;
goto err;
}
slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
if (slen < 0)
goto err;
symlink[slen] = '\0';
if (symlink[0] == '/') {
resolved[1] = 0;
resolved_len = 1;
} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
/* Strip the last path component. */
resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
*q = '\0';
resolved_len = q - resolved;
}
/*
* If there are any path components left, then
* append them to symlink. The result is placed
* in `left'.
*/
if (p != NULL) {
if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
if (slen + 1 >=
(ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto err;
}
symlink[slen] = '/';
symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
}
left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto err;
}
}
left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
}
}
/*
* Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
* is a single "/".
*/
if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
return (resolved);
err:
if (mem_allocated)
free(resolved);
return (NULL);
}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c
index c6ccd623eab9..06566d36ed84 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server-main.c
@@ -1,53 +1,54 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.5 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.6 2019/06/06 05:13:13 otto Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct passwd *user_pw;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
+ seed_rng();
+
if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n",
(u_long)getuid());
return 1;
}
return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8 b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
index c117398e8583..5311bf9299fa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
@@ -1,170 +1,170 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.27 2014/12/11 04:16:14 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.31 2021/07/27 14:14:25 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2014 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 27 2021 $
.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sftp-server
-.Nd SFTP server subsystem
+.Nd OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sftp-server
.Bk -words
.Op Fl ehR
.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
.Op Fl l Ar log_level
-.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
-.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+.Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+.Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
.Op Fl u Ar umask
.Ek
.Nm
.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
.Nm
is not intended to be called directly, but from
.Xr sshd 8
using the
.Cm Subsystem
option.
.Pp
Command-line flags to
.Nm
should be specified in the
.Cm Subsystem
declaration.
See
.Xr sshd_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
Valid options are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl d Ar start_directory
-specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
+Specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
%% is replaced by a literal '%',
%d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated,
and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
The default is to use the user's home directory.
This option is useful in conjunction with the
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm ChrootDirectory
option.
.It Fl e
Causes
.Nm
to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging.
.It Fl f Ar log_facility
Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Nm .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Fl h
Displays
.Nm
usage information.
.It Fl l Ar log_level
Specifies which messages will be logged by
.Nm .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
.Nm
performs on behalf of the client.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
The default is ERROR.
-.It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
-Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by
+.It Fl P Ar denied_requests
+Specifies a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by
the server.
.Nm
-will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure.
+will reply to any denied request with a failure.
The
.Fl Q
flag can be used to determine the supported request types.
-If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is
-applied before the whitelist.
-.It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
-Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted
+If both denied and allowed lists are specified, then the denied list is
+applied before the allowed list.
+.It Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+Specifies a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted
by the server.
-All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied
+All request types that are not on the allowed list will be logged and replied
to with a failure message.
.Pp
Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made
implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
.It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-Query protocol features supported by
+Queries protocol features supported by
.Nm .
At present the only feature that may be queried is
.Dq requests ,
-which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags
+which may be used to deny or allow specific requests (flags
.Fl P
and
.Fl p
respectively).
.It Fl R
Places this instance of
.Nm
into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
.It Fl u Ar umask
Sets an explicit
.Xr umask 2
to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
user's default mask.
.El
.Pp
On some systems,
.Nm
must be able to access
.Pa /dev/log
for logging to work, and use of
.Nm
in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
.Xr syslogd 8
establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
.%D October 2001
.%O work in progress material
.Re
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
.Ox 2.8 .
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
index ab1b063f2136..18d194911257 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
@@ -1,1710 +1,1911 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.112 2018/06/01 03:33:53 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.129 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
+
+/* Maximum data read that we are willing to accept */
+#define SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH (SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024)
+
/* Our verbosity */
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
/* Our client */
static struct passwd *pw = NULL;
static char *client_addr = NULL;
/* input and output queue */
struct sshbuf *iqueue;
struct sshbuf *oqueue;
/* Version of client */
static u_int version;
/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
static int init_done;
/* Disable writes */
static int readonly;
/* Requests that are allowed/denied */
-static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist;
+static char *request_allowlist, *request_denylist;
/* portable attributes, etc. */
typedef struct Stat Stat;
struct Stat {
char *name;
char *long_name;
Attrib attrib;
};
/* Packet handlers */
static void process_open(u_int32_t id);
static void process_close(u_int32_t id);
static void process_read(u_int32_t id);
static void process_write(u_int32_t id);
static void process_stat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id);
static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_remove(u_int32_t id);
static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id);
static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id);
static void process_rename(u_int32_t id);
static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id);
static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_limits(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id);
static void process_extended(u_int32_t id);
struct sftp_handler {
const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */
const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */
u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */
void (*handler)(u_int32_t);
int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */
};
-struct sftp_handler handlers[] = {
+static const struct sftp_handler handlers[] = {
/* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */
{ "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 },
{ "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 },
{ "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 },
{ "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 },
{ "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 },
{ "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 },
{ "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 },
{ "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 },
{ "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 },
{ "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 },
{ "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 },
{ "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 },
{ "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 },
{ "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 },
{ "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 },
{ "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 },
{ "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 },
{ "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 },
{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
/* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */
-struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = {
+static const struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = {
{ "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0,
- process_extended_posix_rename, 1 },
+ process_extended_posix_rename, 1 },
{ "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 },
{ "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 },
{ "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 },
{ "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 },
+ { "lsetstat", "lsetstat@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_lsetstat, 1 },
+ { "limits", "limits@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_limits, 0 },
+ { "expand-path", "expand-path@openssh.com", 0,
+ process_extended_expand, 0 },
{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
+static const struct sftp_handler *
+extended_handler_byname(const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(name, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0)
+ return &extended_handlers[i];
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static int
-request_permitted(struct sftp_handler *h)
+request_permitted(const struct sftp_handler *h)
{
char *result;
if (readonly && h->does_write) {
verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name);
return 0;
}
- if (request_blacklist != NULL &&
- ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+ if (request_denylist != NULL &&
+ ((result = match_list(h->name, request_denylist, NULL))) != NULL) {
free(result);
- verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name);
+ verbose("Refusing denylisted %s request", h->name);
return 0;
}
- if (request_whitelist != NULL &&
- ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+ if (request_allowlist != NULL &&
+ ((result = match_list(h->name, request_allowlist, NULL))) != NULL) {
free(result);
- debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name);
+ debug2("Permitting allowlisted %s request", h->name);
return 1;
}
- if (request_whitelist != NULL) {
- verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name);
+ if (request_allowlist != NULL) {
+ verbose("Refusing non-allowlisted %s request", h->name);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
errno_to_portable(int unixerrno)
{
int ret = 0;
switch (unixerrno) {
case 0:
ret = SSH2_FX_OK;
break;
case ENOENT:
case ENOTDIR:
case EBADF:
case ELOOP:
ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
break;
case EPERM:
case EACCES:
case EFAULT:
ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
break;
case ENAMETOOLONG:
case EINVAL:
ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
break;
case ENOSYS:
ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
break;
default:
ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
break;
}
return ret;
}
static int
flags_from_portable(int pflags)
{
int flags = 0;
if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) &&
(pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) {
flags = O_RDWR;
} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) {
flags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) {
flags = O_WRONLY;
}
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
flags |= O_APPEND;
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
flags |= O_CREAT;
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
flags |= O_TRUNC;
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
flags |= O_EXCL;
return flags;
}
static const char *
string_from_portable(int pflags)
{
static char ret[128];
*ret = '\0';
#define PAPPEND(str) { \
if (*ret != '\0') \
strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \
strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \
}
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
PAPPEND("READ")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
PAPPEND("WRITE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
PAPPEND("APPEND")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
PAPPEND("CREATE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
PAPPEND("EXCL")
return ret;
}
/* handle handles */
typedef struct Handle Handle;
struct Handle {
int use;
DIR *dirp;
int fd;
int flags;
char *name;
u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write;
int next_unused;
};
enum {
HANDLE_UNUSED,
HANDLE_DIR,
HANDLE_FILE
};
-Handle *handles = NULL;
-u_int num_handles = 0;
-int first_unused_handle = -1;
+static Handle *handles = NULL;
+static u_int num_handles = 0;
+static int first_unused_handle = -1;
static void handle_unused(int i)
{
handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle;
first_unused_handle = i;
}
static int
handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp)
{
int i;
if (first_unused_handle == -1) {
if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
return -1;
num_handles++;
handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
}
i = first_unused_handle;
first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused;
handles[i].use = use;
handles[i].dirp = dirp;
handles[i].fd = fd;
handles[i].flags = flags;
handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
return i;
}
static int
handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
{
return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type;
}
static int
handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp)
{
if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
return -1;
*stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
put_u32(*stringp, handle);
*hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen)
{
int val;
if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
return -1;
val = get_u32(handle);
if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
return val;
return -1;
}
static char *
handle_to_name(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)||
handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return handles[handle].name;
return NULL;
}
static DIR *
handle_to_dir(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR))
return handles[handle].dirp;
return NULL;
}
static int
handle_to_fd(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return handles[handle].fd;
return -1;
}
static int
handle_to_flags(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return handles[handle].flags;
return 0;
}
static void
handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes;
}
static void
handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes;
}
static u_int64_t
handle_bytes_read(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return (handles[handle].bytes_read);
return 0;
}
static u_int64_t
handle_bytes_write(int handle)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
return (handles[handle].bytes_write);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_close(int handle)
{
int ret = -1;
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
ret = close(handles[handle].fd);
free(handles[handle].name);
handle_unused(handle);
} else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) {
ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp);
free(handles[handle].name);
handle_unused(handle);
} else {
errno = ENOENT;
}
return ret;
}
static void
handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg)
{
if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
handle_to_name(handle),
(unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle),
(unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle));
} else {
logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
handle_to_name(handle));
}
}
static void
handle_log_exit(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++)
if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED)
handle_log_close(i, "forced");
}
static int
get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp)
{
u_char *handle;
int r;
size_t hlen;
*hp = -1;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (hlen < 256)
*hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen);
free(handle);
return 0;
}
/* send replies */
static void
send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
sshbuf_reset(m);
}
static const char *
status_to_message(u_int32_t status)
{
const char *status_messages[] = {
"Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */
"End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */
"No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */
"Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */
"Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */
"Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */
"No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */
"Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */
"Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
"Unknown error" /* Others */
};
return (status_messages[MINIMUM(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
}
static void
send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status);
if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE ||
(status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF))
logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status));
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
if (version >= 3) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
status_to_message(status))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose message");
}
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
{
debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
}
static void
send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
{
u_char *string;
int hlen;
handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle);
send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
free(string);
}
static void
send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int i, r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose filenames/attrib");
}
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int64_t flag;
int r;
flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0;
flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
+/*
+ * Prepare SSH2_FXP_VERSION extension advertisement for a single extension.
+ * The extension is checked for permission prior to advertisment.
+ */
+static int
+compose_extension(struct sshbuf *msg, const char *name, const char *ver)
+{
+ int r;
+ const struct sftp_handler *exthnd;
+
+ if ((exthnd = extended_handler_byname(name)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("internal error: no handler for %s", name);
+ if (!request_permitted(exthnd)) {
+ debug2_f("refusing to advertise disallowed extension %s", name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, ver)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", name);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* parse incoming */
static void
process_init(void)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
verbose("received client version %u", version);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0 ||
- /* POSIX rename extension */
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */
- /* statvfs extension */
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */
- /* fstatvfs extension */
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */
- /* hardlink extension */
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */
- /* fsync extension */
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0) /* version */
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+
+ /* extension advertisments */
+ compose_extension(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com", "1");
+ compose_extension(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com", "2");
+ compose_extension(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com", "2");
+ compose_extension(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com", "1");
+ compose_extension(msg, "fsync@openssh.com", "1");
+ compose_extension(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com", "1");
+ compose_extension(msg, "limits@openssh.com", "1");
+ compose_extension(msg, "expand-path@openssh.com", "1");
+
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process_open(u_int32_t id)
{
u_int32_t pflags;
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
(flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
fd = open(name, flags, mode);
- if (fd < 0) {
+ if (fd == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
if (handle < 0) {
close(fd);
} else {
send_handle(id, handle);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_close(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
ret = handle_close(handle);
status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
}
static void
process_read(u_int32_t id)
{
- u_char buf[64*1024];
+ static u_char *buf;
+ static size_t buflen;
u_int32_t len;
int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
u_int64_t off;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
- debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
+ debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %u",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
- if (len > sizeof buf) {
- len = sizeof buf;
- debug2("read change len %d", len);
+ if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) == -1)
+ goto out;
+ if (len > SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH) {
+ debug2("read change len %u to %u", len, SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH);
+ len = SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH;
}
- fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
- if (fd >= 0) {
- if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- error("process_read: seek failed");
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else {
- ret = read(fd, buf, len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- } else if (ret == 0) {
- status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
- } else {
- send_data(id, buf, ret);
- status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- handle_update_read(handle, ret);
- }
- }
+ if (len > buflen) {
+ debug3_f("allocate %zu => %u", buflen, len);
+ if ((buf = realloc(NULL, len)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("realloc failed");
+ buflen = len;
}
+ if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ error_f("seek \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle),
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /* weird, but not strictly disallowed */
+ ret = 0;
+ } else if ((ret = read(fd, buf, len)) == -1) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ error_f("read \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle),
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ send_data(id, buf, ret);
+ handle_update_read(handle, ret);
+ /* success */
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ out:
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
}
static void
process_write(u_int32_t id)
{
u_int64_t off;
size_t len;
int r, handle, fd, ret, status;
u_char *data;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
if (fd < 0)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
else {
if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) &&
- lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
- error("process_write: seek failed");
+ error_f("seek \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle),
+ strerror(errno));
} else {
/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
ret = write(fd, data, len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- error("process_write: write failed");
+ if (ret == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ error_f("write \"%.100s\": %s",
+ handle_to_name(handle), strerror(errno));
} else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
handle_update_write(handle, ret);
} else {
- debug2("nothing at all written");
+ debug2_f("nothing at all written");
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
}
}
}
send_status(id, status);
free(data);
}
static void
process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat)
{
Attrib a;
struct stat st;
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : "");
verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name);
r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
- if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
send_attrib(id, &a);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_stat(u_int32_t id)
{
process_do_stat(id, 0);
}
static void
process_lstat(u_int32_t id)
{
process_do_stat(id, 1);
}
static void
process_fstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
struct stat st;
int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
if (fd >= 0) {
r = fstat(fd, &st);
- if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
send_attrib(id, &a);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
}
static struct timeval *
attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
{
static struct timeval tv[2];
tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
return tv;
}
+static struct timespec *
+attrib_to_ts(const Attrib *a)
+{
+ static struct timespec ts[2];
+
+ ts[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+ ts[0].tv_nsec = 0;
+ ts[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+ ts[1].tv_nsec = 0;
+ return ts;
+}
+
static void
process_setstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
r = truncate(name, a.size);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
char buf[64];
time_t t = a.mtime;
strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
localtime(&t));
logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
(u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
int handle, fd, r;
int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle);
fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
if (fd < 0)
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
else {
char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
r = ftruncate(fd, a.size);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777);
#else
r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
#endif
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
char buf[64];
time_t t = a.mtime;
strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
localtime(&t));
logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a));
#else
r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
#endif
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
(u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid);
#else
r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
#endif
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
}
send_status(id, status);
}
static void
process_opendir(u_int32_t id)
{
DIR *dirp = NULL;
char *path;
int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: opendir", id);
logit("opendir \"%s\"", path);
dirp = opendir(path);
if (dirp == NULL) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp);
if (handle < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
} else {
send_handle(id, handle);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(path);
}
static void
process_readdir(u_int32_t id)
{
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *path;
int r, handle;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id,
handle_to_name(handle), handle);
dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
path = handle_to_name(handle);
if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
} else {
struct stat st;
char pathname[PATH_MAX];
Stat *stats;
int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat));
while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
if (count >= nstats) {
nstats *= 2;
stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
}
/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name);
- if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0)
+ if (lstat(pathname, &st) == -1)
continue;
stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib));
stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name);
stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0);
count++;
/* send up to 100 entries in one message */
/* XXX check packet size instead */
if (count == 100)
break;
}
if (count > 0) {
send_names(id, count, stats);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
free(stats[i].name);
free(stats[i].long_name);
}
} else {
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF);
}
free(stats);
}
}
static void
process_remove(u_int32_t id)
{
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: remove", id);
logit("remove name \"%s\"", name);
r = unlink(name);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_mkdir(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
a.perm & 07777 : 0777;
debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
r = mkdir(name, mode);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_rmdir(u_int32_t id)
{
char *name;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: rmdir", id);
logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name);
r = rmdir(name);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
static void
process_realpath(u_int32_t id)
{
char resolvedname[PATH_MAX];
char *path;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (path[0] == '\0') {
free(path);
path = xstrdup(".");
}
debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
- if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+ if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
} else {
Stat s;
attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
send_names(id, 1, &s);
}
free(path);
}
static void
process_rename(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
struct stat sb;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: rename", id);
logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
/* Race-free rename of regular files */
if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS
#ifdef EXDEV
|| errno == EXDEV
#endif
#ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
|| errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
#endif
) {
struct stat st;
/*
* fs doesn't support links, so fall back to
* stat+rename. This is racy.
*/
if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
status =
errno_to_portable(errno);
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
} else {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
} else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
/* clean spare link */
unlink(newpath);
} else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
} else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) {
if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_readlink(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, len;
char buf[PATH_MAX];
char *path;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: readlink", id);
verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path);
if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else {
Stat s;
buf[len] = '\0';
attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
s.name = s.long_name = buf;
send_names(id, 1, &s);
}
free(path);
}
static void
process_symlink(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
/* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
r = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id);
logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
r = rename(oldpath, newpath);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id)
{
char *path;
struct statvfs st;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: statvfs", id);
logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path);
if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else
send_statvfs(id, &st);
- free(path);
+ free(path);
}
static void
process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, handle, fd;
struct statvfs st;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) {
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else
send_statvfs(id, &st);
}
static void
process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: hardlink", id);
logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
r = link(oldpath, newpath);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
static void
process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id)
{
int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle);
verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle));
if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0)
status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
r = fsync(fd);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
}
send_status(id, status);
}
+static void
+process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ char *name;
+ int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+ debug("request %u: lsetstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+ /* nonsensical for links */
+ status = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
+ r = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, name,
+ a.perm & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ char buf[64];
+ time_t t = a.mtime;
+
+ strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+ localtime(&t));
+ logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+ r = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, name,
+ attrib_to_ts(&a), AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+ (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
+ r = fchownat(AT_FDCWD, name, a.uid, a.gid,
+ AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (r == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ out:
+ send_status(id, status);
+ free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_limits(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ int r;
+ uint64_t nfiles = 0;
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+#endif
+
+ debug("request %u: limits", id);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) != -1 && rlim.rlim_cur > 5)
+ nfiles = rlim.rlim_cur - 5; /* stdio(3) + syslog + spare */
+#endif
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+ /* max-packet-length */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) != 0 ||
+ /* max-read-length */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH)) != 0 ||
+ /* max-write-length */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024)) != 0 ||
+ /* max-open-handles */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, nfiles)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id)
+{
+ char cwd[PATH_MAX], resolvedname[PATH_MAX];
+ char *path, *npath;
+ int r;
+ Stat s;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) {
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ debug3("request %u: expand, original \"%s\"", id, path);
+ if (path[0] == '\0') {
+ /* empty path */
+ free(path);
+ path = xstrdup(".");
+ } else if (*path == '~') {
+ /* ~ expand path */
+ /* Special-case for "~" and "~/" to respect homedir flag */
+ if (strcmp(path, "~") == 0) {
+ free(path);
+ path = xstrdup(cwd);
+ } else if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
+ npath = xstrdup(path + 2);
+ free(path);
+ xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s", cwd, npath);
+ } else {
+ /* ~user expansions */
+ if (tilde_expand(path, pw->pw_uid, &npath) != 0) {
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(EINVAL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ free(path);
+ path = npath;
+ }
+ } else if (*path != '/') {
+ /* relative path */
+ xasprintf(&npath, "%s/%s", cwd, path);
+ free(path);
+ path = npath;
+ }
+ verbose("expand \"%s\"", path);
+ if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+ s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
+ send_names(id, 1, &s);
+ out:
+ free(path);
+}
+
static void
process_extended(u_int32_t id)
{
char *request;
- int i, r;
+ int r;
+ const struct sftp_handler *exthand;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
- if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) {
- if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i]))
- send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- else
- extended_handlers[i].handler(id);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ if ((exthand = extended_handler_byname(request)) == NULL) {
error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request);
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */
+ } else {
+ if (!request_permitted(exthand))
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ else
+ exthand->handler(id);
}
free(request);
}
/* stolen from ssh-agent */
static void
process(void)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_int buf_len;
u_int consumed;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int i, r;
u_int32_t id;
buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (buf_len < 5)
return; /* Incomplete message. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue);
msg_len = get_u32(cp);
if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
error("bad message from %s local user %s",
client_addr, pw->pw_name);
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11);
}
if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
return;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
buf_len -= 4;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
switch (type) {
case SSH2_FXP_INIT:
process_init();
init_done = 1;
break;
case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED:
if (!init_done)
fatal("Received extended request before init");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse extended ID");
process_extended(id);
break;
default:
if (!init_done)
fatal("Received %u request before init", type);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse ID");
for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (type == handlers[i].type) {
if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) {
send_status(id,
SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
} else {
handlers[i].handler(id);
}
break;
}
}
if (handlers[i].handler == NULL)
error("Unknown message %u", type);
}
/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) {
error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
}
consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (msg_len < consumed) {
error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed);
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (msg_len > consumed &&
(r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
}
/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */
void
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
{
if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) {
handle_log_exit();
logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]",
pw->pw_name, client_addr);
}
_exit(i);
}
static void
sftp_server_usage(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
- "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+ "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+ "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
" %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
__progname, __progname);
exit(1);
}
int
sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
{
fd_set *rset, *wset;
int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
char *cp, *homedir = NULL, uidstr[32], buf[4*4096];
long mask;
extern char *optarg;
extern char *__progname;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'Q':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
exit(1);
}
for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name);
exit(0);
break;
case 'R':
readonly = 1;
break;
case 'c':
/*
* Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a
* shell using "sftp-server -c command"
*/
skipargs = 1;
break;
case 'e':
log_stderr = 1;
break;
case 'l':
log_level = log_level_number(optarg);
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'f':
log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg);
if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'd':
cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
free(cp);
break;
case 'p':
- if (request_whitelist != NULL)
+ if (request_allowlist != NULL)
fatal("Permitted requests already set");
- request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ request_allowlist = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'P':
- if (request_blacklist != NULL)
+ if (request_denylist != NULL)
fatal("Refused requests already set");
- request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ request_denylist = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'u':
errno = 0;
mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
break;
case 'h':
default:
sftp_server_usage();
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
/*
* On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
* available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically
* imply arbitrary code execution access that will break
* restricted configurations.
*/
platform_disable_tracing(1); /* strict */
/* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */
platform_pledge_sftp_server();
if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) {
error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"",
getenv("SSH_CONNECTION"));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
}
*cp = '\0';
} else
client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
pw->pw_name, client_addr);
in = STDIN_FILENO;
out = STDOUT_FILENO;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
setmode(in, O_BINARY);
setmode(out, O_BINARY);
#endif
max = 0;
if (in > max)
max = in;
if (out > max)
max = out;
if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
rset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
wset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (homedir != NULL) {
if (chdir(homedir) != 0) {
error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir,
strerror(errno));
}
}
set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
for (;;) {
memset(rset, 0, set_size);
memset(wset, 0, set_size);
/*
* Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
* the worst-case length packet it can generate,
* otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue,
SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
FD_SET(in, rset);
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue);
if (olen > 0)
FD_SET(out, wset);
- if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2);
}
/* copy stdin to iqueue */
if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
if (len == 0) {
debug("read eof");
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0);
- } else if (len < 0) {
+ } else if (len == -1) {
error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
- } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
}
/* send oqueue to stdout */
if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen);
- if (len < 0) {
+ if (len == -1) {
error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
- } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
}
/*
* Process requests from client if we can fit the results
* into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
* and let the output queue drain.
*/
r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH);
if (r == 0)
process();
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.1 b/crypto/openssh/sftp.1
index 0fd54cae090e..7eebeeacbf3f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.1
@@ -1,631 +1,699 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.120 2018/09/20 06:58:48 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.138 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 2 2021 $
.Dt SFTP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sftp
-.Nd secure file transfer program
+.Nd OpenSSH secure file transfer
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sftp
-.Op Fl 46aCfpqrv
+.Op Fl 46AaCfNpqrv
.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size
.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl l Ar limit
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Fl P Ar port
.Op Fl R Ar num_requests
.Op Fl S Ar program
.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
.Ar destination
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a file transfer program, similar to
.Xr ftp 1 ,
which performs all operations over an encrypted
.Xr ssh 1
transport.
It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
compression.
.Pp
The
.Ar destination
may be specified either as
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc host Op : path
.Sm on
or as a URI in the form
.Sm off
.No sftp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
.Sm on
.Pp
If the
.Ar destination
includes a
.Ar path
and it is not a directory,
.Nm
will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
successful interactive authentication.
.Pp
If no
.Ar path
is specified, or if the
.Ar path
is a directory,
.Nm
will log in to the specified
.Ar host
and enter interactive command mode, changing to the remote directory
if one was specified.
An optional trailing slash can be used to force the
.Ar path
to be interpreted as a directory.
.Pp
Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host
names from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be
enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl A
+Allows forwarding of
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+to the remote system.
+The default is not to forward an authentication agent.
.It Fl a
Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
existing partial or complete copies of files.
If the partial contents differ from those being transferred,
then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.It Fl B Ar buffer_size
Specify the size of the buffer that
.Nm
uses when transferring files.
Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher
memory consumption.
The default is 32768 bytes.
.It Fl b Ar batchfile
Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
.Ar batchfile
instead of
.Em stdin .
Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with
non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password
at connection time (see
.Xr sshd 8
and
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
for details).
+.Pp
A
.Ar batchfile
of
.Sq \-
may be used to indicate standard input.
.Nm
will abort if any of the following
commands fail:
-.Ic get , put , reget , reput, rename , ln ,
+.Ic get , put , reget , reput , rename , ln ,
.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls ,
.Ic lchdir , chmod , chown ,
.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink ,
and
.Ic lmkdir .
+.Pp
Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
prefixing the command with a
.Sq \-
character (for example,
.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) .
+Echo of the command may be suppressed by prefixing the command with a
+.Sq @
+character.
+These two prefixes may be combined in any order, for example
+.Ic -@ls /bsd .
.It Fl C
Enables compression (via ssh's
.Fl C
flag).
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
Connect directly to a local sftp server
(rather than via
.Xr ssh 1 ) .
This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
Specifies an alternative
per-user configuration file for
.Xr ssh 1 .
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl f
Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer.
When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server
implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
authentication is read.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl J Ar destination
+Connect to the target host by first making an
+.Nm
+connection to the jump host described by
+.Ar destination
+and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
+there.
+Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
+This is a shortcut to specify a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+configuration directive.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl l Ar limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+.It Fl N
+Disables quiet mode, e.g. to override the implicit quiet mode set by the
+.Fl b
+flag.
.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to
.Nm ssh
in the format used in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
This is useful for specifying options
for which there is no separate
.Nm sftp
command-line flag.
For example, to specify an alternate port use:
.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It BindInterface
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
-.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
+.It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
.It HostbasedAuthentication
-.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
-.It HostName
+.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
+.It KnownHostsCommand
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
-.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+.It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.El
.It Fl P Ar port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
.It Fl p
Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original files transferred.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl R Ar num_requests
Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
but will increase memory usage.
The default is 64 outstanding requests.
.It Fl r
Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
.It Fl S Ar program
Name of the
.Ar program
to use for the encrypted connection.
The program must understand
.Xr ssh 1
options.
.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
on the remote host.
A path is useful when the remote
.Xr sshd 8
does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
.It Fl v
Raise logging level.
This option is also passed to ssh.
.El
.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Once in interactive mode,
.Nm
understands a set of commands similar to those of
.Xr ftp 1 .
Commands are case insensitive.
Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes.
Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by
.Xr glob 3
must be escaped with backslashes
.Pq Sq \e .
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ic bye
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Ic cd Op Ar path
Change remote directory to
.Ar path .
If
.Ar path
is not specified, then change directory to the one the session started in.
-.It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path
+.It Xo Ic chgrp
+.Op Fl h
+.Ar grp
+.Ar path
+.Xc
Change group of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar grp .
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Ar grp
must be a numeric GID.
-.It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+.It Xo Ic chmod
+.Op Fl h
+.Ar mode
+.Ar path
+.Xc
Change permissions of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar mode .
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
-.It Ic chown Ar own Ar path
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+.It Xo Ic chown
+.Op Fl h
+.Ar own
+.Ar path
+.Xc
Change owner of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar own .
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Ar own
must be a numeric UID.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
.It Xo Ic df
.Op Fl hi
.Op Ar path
.Xc
Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory
(or
.Ar path
if specified).
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using
"human-readable" suffixes.
The
.Fl i
flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information.
This command is only supported on servers that implement the
.Dq statvfs@openssh.com
extension.
.It Ic exit
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Xo Ic get
-.Op Fl afPpr
+.Op Fl afpR
.Ar remote-path
.Op Ar local-path
.Xc
Retrieve the
.Ar remote-path
and store it on the local machine.
If the local
path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
remote machine.
.Ar remote-path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
If it does and
.Ar local-path
is specified, then
.Ar local-path
must specify a directory.
.Pp
If the
.Fl a
flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files.
Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches
the remote copy.
If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the
resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.Pp
If the
.Fl f
flag is specified, then
.Xr fsync 2
will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file
to disk.
.Pp
-If either the
-.Fl P
-or
+If the
.Fl p
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl P
flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
copied too.
.Pp
If the
-.Fl r
+.Fl R
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl r
flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
.It Ic help
Display help text.
.It Ic lcd Op Ar path
Change local directory to
.Ar path .
If
.Ar path
is not specified, then change directory to the local user's home directory.
.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
Display local directory listing of either
.Ar path
or current directory if
.Ar path
is not specified.
.Ar ls-options
may contain any flags supported by the local system's
.Xr ls 1
command.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
Create local directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Xo Ic ln
.Op Fl s
.Ar oldpath
.Ar newpath
.Xc
Create a link from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
If the
.Fl s
flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is
a hard link.
.It Ic lpwd
Print local working directory.
.It Xo Ic ls
.Op Fl 1afhlnrSt
.Op Ar path
.Xc
Display a remote directory listing of either
.Ar path
or the current directory if
.Ar path
is not specified.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Pp
The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of
.Ic ls
accordingly:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 1
Produce single columnar output.
.It Fl a
List files beginning with a dot
.Pq Sq \&. .
.It Fl f
Do not sort the listing.
The default sort order is lexicographical.
.It Fl h
When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte,
Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce
the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
M=1048576, etc.).
.It Fl l
Display additional details including permissions
and ownership information.
.It Fl n
Produce a long listing with user and group information presented
numerically.
.It Fl r
Reverse the sort order of the listing.
.It Fl S
Sort the listing by file size.
.It Fl t
Sort the listing by last modification time.
.El
.It Ic lumask Ar umask
Set local umask to
.Ar umask .
.It Ic mkdir Ar path
Create remote directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic progress
Toggle display of progress meter.
.It Xo Ic put
-.Op Fl afPpr
+.Op Fl afpR
.Ar local-path
.Op Ar remote-path
.Xc
Upload
.Ar local-path
and store it on the remote machine.
If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
on the local machine.
.Ar local-path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
If it does and
.Ar remote-path
is specified, then
.Ar remote-path
must specify a directory.
.Pp
If the
.Fl a
flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
transfers of existing files.
Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file
matches the local copy.
If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.Pp
If the
.Fl f
flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call
.Xr fsync 2
after the file has been transferred.
Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
.Pp
-If either the
-.Fl P
-or
+If the
.Fl p
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl P
flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
copied too.
.Pp
If the
-.Fl r
+.Fl R
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl r
flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
.It Ic pwd
Display remote working directory.
.It Ic quit
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Xo Ic reget
-.Op Fl Ppr
+.Op Fl fpR
.Ar remote-path
.Op Ar local-path
.Xc
Resume download of
.Ar remote-path .
Equivalent to
.Ic get
with the
.Fl a
flag set.
.It Xo Ic reput
-.Op Fl Ppr
-.Op Ar local-path
-.Ar remote-path
+.Op Fl fpR
+.Ar local-path
+.Op Ar remote-path
.Xc
Resume upload of
-.Op Ar local-path .
+.Ar local-path .
Equivalent to
.Ic put
with the
.Fl a
flag set.
-.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+.It Ic rename Ar oldpath newpath
Rename remote file from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
.It Ic rm Ar path
Delete remote file specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic rmdir Ar path
Remove remote directory specified by
.Ar path .
-.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath newpath
Create a symbolic link from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
.It Ic version
Display the
.Nm
protocol version.
.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
Execute
.Ar command
in local shell.
.It Ic \&!
Escape to local shell.
.It Ic \&?
Synonym for help.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ftp 1 ,
.Xr ls 1 ,
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr glob 7 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
.%D January 2001
.%O work in progress material
.Re
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
index 7db86c2d3cf0..69f84cdcf1a4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
@@ -1,2567 +1,2583 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.186 2018/09/07 04:26:56 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.211 2021/08/12 09:59:00 schwarze Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
#include <libgen.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
# include <locale.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
#include <histedit.h>
#else
typedef void EditLine;
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
-#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */
-#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
-
/* File to read commands from */
FILE* infile;
/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
int batchmode = 0;
/* PID of ssh transport process */
static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1;
-/* Suppress diagnositic messages */
+/* Suppress diagnostic messages */
int quiet = 0;
/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
int showprogress = 1;
/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
int global_rflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */
int global_aflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */
int global_pflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */
int global_fflag = 0;
/* SIGINT received during command processing */
volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/
int sort_flag;
glob_t *sort_glob;
/* Context used for commandline completion */
struct complete_ctx {
struct sftp_conn *conn;
char **remote_pathp;
};
int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
extern char *__progname;
/* Separators for interactive commands */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* ls flags */
#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */
#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */
#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */
#define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */
#define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */
#define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */
#define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */
#define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */
#define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)
#define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT)
/* Commands for interactive mode */
enum sftp_command {
I_CHDIR = 1,
I_CHGRP,
I_CHMOD,
I_CHOWN,
I_DF,
I_GET,
I_HELP,
I_LCHDIR,
I_LINK,
I_LLS,
I_LMKDIR,
I_LPWD,
I_LS,
I_LUMASK,
I_MKDIR,
I_PUT,
I_PWD,
I_QUIT,
I_REGET,
I_RENAME,
I_REPUT,
I_RM,
I_RMDIR,
I_SHELL,
I_SYMLINK,
I_VERSION,
I_PROGRESS,
};
struct CMD {
const char *c;
const int n;
const int t;
};
/* Type of completion */
#define NOARGS 0
#define REMOTE 1
#define LOCAL 2
static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
{ "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
{ "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
{ "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE },
{ "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE },
{ "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE },
{ "df", I_DF, REMOTE },
{ "dir", I_LS, REMOTE },
{ "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "get", I_GET, REMOTE },
{ "help", I_HELP, NOARGS },
{ "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
{ "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
{ "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL },
{ "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL },
{ "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE },
{ "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL },
{ "ls", I_LS, REMOTE },
{ "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS },
{ "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE },
{ "mget", I_GET, REMOTE },
{ "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS },
{ "put", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE },
{ "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE },
{ "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE },
{ "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL },
{ "rm", I_RM, REMOTE },
{ "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE },
{ "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE },
{ "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS },
{ "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS },
{ "?", I_HELP, NOARGS },
{ NULL, -1, -1 }
};
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
- if (sshpid > 1) {
- kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ pid = sshpid;
+ if (pid > 1) {
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
_exit(1);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
suspchild(int signo)
{
if (sshpid > 1) {
kill(sshpid, signo);
while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
}
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
cmd_interrupt(int signo)
{
const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n";
int olderrno = errno;
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
interrupted = 1;
errno = olderrno;
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+read_interrupt(int signo)
+{
+ interrupted = 1;
+}
+
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed. \n";
/* Report if ssh transport process dies. */
while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (pid == sshpid) {
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
sshpid = -1;
}
errno = save_errno;
}
static void
help(void)
{
printf("Available commands:\n"
"bye Quit sftp\n"
"cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
- "chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
- "chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
- "chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
+ "chgrp [-h] grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
+ "chmod [-h] mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
+ "chown [-h] own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
"df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n"
" filesystem containing 'path'\n"
"exit Quit sftp\n"
- "get [-afPpRr] remote [local] Download file\n"
- "reget [-fPpRr] remote [local] Resume download file\n"
- "reput [-fPpRr] [local] remote Resume upload file\n"
+ "get [-afpR] remote [local] Download file\n"
"help Display this help text\n"
"lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n"
"lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n"
"lmkdir path Create local directory\n"
"ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n"
"lpwd Print local working directory\n"
"ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n"
"lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
"mkdir path Create remote directory\n"
"progress Toggle display of progress meter\n"
- "put [-afPpRr] local [remote] Upload file\n"
+ "put [-afpR] local [remote] Upload file\n"
"pwd Display remote working directory\n"
"quit Quit sftp\n"
+ "reget [-fpR] remote [local] Resume download file\n"
"rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n"
+ "reput [-fpR] local [remote] Resume upload file\n"
"rm path Delete remote file\n"
"rmdir path Remove remote directory\n"
"symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n"
"version Show SFTP version\n"
"!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
"! Escape to local shell\n"
"? Synonym for help\n");
}
static void
local_do_shell(const char *args)
{
int status;
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
if (!*args)
args = NULL;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pid == 0) {
/* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
if (args) {
debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
} else {
debug3("Executing %s", shell);
execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
error("Shell exited abnormally");
else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
static void
local_do_ls(const char *args)
{
if (!args || !*args)
local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
else {
int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
char *buf = xmalloc(len);
/* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
local_do_shell(buf);
free(buf);
}
}
/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
static char *
path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
{
size_t len;
if (strip == NULL)
return (xstrdup(path));
len = strlen(strip);
if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) {
if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/')
len++;
return (xstrdup(path + len));
}
return (xstrdup(path));
}
-static char *
-make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
-{
- char *abs_str;
-
- /* Derelativise */
- if (p && p[0] != '/') {
- abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
- free(p);
- return(abs_str);
- } else
- return(p);
-}
-
static int
parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc,
int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'a':
*aflag = 1;
break;
case 'f':
*fflag = 1;
break;
case 'p':
case 'P':
*pflag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
case 'R':
*rflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*sflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 's':
*sflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*lflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'l':
*lflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*lflag = LS_NAME_SORT;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case '1':
*lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW;
break;
case 'S':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT;
break;
case 'a':
*lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL;
break;
case 'f':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
break;
case 'h':
*lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS;
break;
case 'l':
*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
*lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW;
break;
case 'n':
*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
*lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW;
break;
case 'r':
*lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT;
break;
case 't':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT;
break;
default:
error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*hflag = *iflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
*hflag = 1;
break;
case 'i':
*iflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
-parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
+parse_ch_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) {
+ *hflag = 0;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "h")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
+ case 'h':
+ *hflag = 1;
+ break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
-is_dir(const char *path)
+parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
{
- struct stat sb;
-
- /* XXX: report errors? */
- if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
- return(0);
-
- return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
-}
+ extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+ int ch;
-static int
-remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
-{
- Attrib *a;
-
- /* XXX: report errors? */
- if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
- return(0);
- if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
- return(0);
- return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
-}
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ opterr = 0;
-/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
-static int
-pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
-{
- size_t l = strlen(pathname);
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ default:
+ error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
- return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/';
+ return optind;
}
static int
process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
{
char *abs_src = NULL;
char *abs_dst = NULL;
glob_t g;
char *filename, *tmp=NULL;
int i, r, err = 0;
abs_src = xstrdup(src);
abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) {
if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src);
} else {
error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
}
err = -1;
goto out;
}
/*
* If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or
* unspecified.
*/
- if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) {
+ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !local_is_dir(dst)) {
error("Multiple source paths, but destination "
"\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
free(tmp);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
- if (is_dir(dst)) {
+ if (local_is_dir(dst)) {
abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
}
} else if (dst) {
abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = xstrdup(filename);
}
free(tmp);
resume |= global_aflag;
if (!quiet && resume)
mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
else if (!quiet && !resume)
mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
- if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ /* XXX follow link flag */
+ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
}
free(abs_dst);
abs_dst = NULL;
}
out:
free(abs_src);
globfree(&g);
return(err);
}
static int
process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
{
char *tmp_dst = NULL;
char *abs_dst = NULL;
char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL;
glob_t g;
int err = 0;
int i, dst_is_dir = 1;
struct stat sb;
if (dst) {
tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
}
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
debug3("Looking up %s", src);
if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) {
error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
/* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */
if (tmp_dst != NULL)
dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst);
/* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) {
error("Multiple paths match, but destination "
"\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) {
err = -1;
error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno));
continue;
}
tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
free(tmp);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) {
/* If directory specified, append filename */
if (dst_is_dir)
abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
else
abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
} else if (tmp_dst) {
abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd);
}
free(tmp);
- resume |= global_aflag;
+ resume |= global_aflag;
if (!quiet && resume)
mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
else if (!quiet && !resume)
mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
- if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ /* XXX follow_link_flag */
+ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
}
}
out:
free(abs_dst);
free(tmp_dst);
globfree(&g);
return(err);
}
static int
sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa;
SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb;
int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename));
else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime));
else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size));
fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
}
/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
static int
do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
const char *strip_path, int lflag)
{
int n;
u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
SFTP_DIRENT **d;
if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
return (n);
if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
u_int m = 0, width = 80;
struct winsize ws;
char *tmp;
/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) {
if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename));
}
/* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */
tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path);
m += strlen(tmp);
free(tmp);
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
}
if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++)
; /* count entries */
sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp);
}
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) {
char *tmp, *fname;
if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
continue;
tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename);
fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path);
free(tmp);
if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) {
char *lname;
struct stat sb;
memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb);
lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1,
(lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
mprintf("%s\n", lname);
free(lname);
} else
mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname);
} else {
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
if (c >= columns) {
printf("\n");
c = 1;
} else
c++;
}
free(fname);
}
if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
printf("\n");
free_sftp_dirents(d);
return (0);
}
static int
sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa;
u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb;
const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a];
const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b];
const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a];
const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b];
int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
- return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <));
+ if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, ==))
+ return 0;
+ return timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <) ?
+ rmul : -rmul;
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
#else
return rmul * 1;
#endif
} else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size));
fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
}
/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
static int
do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
const char *strip_path, int lflag)
{
char *fname, *lname;
glob_t g;
int err, r;
struct winsize ws;
u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1;
u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80;
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path,
GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT,
NULL, &g)) != 0 ||
(g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) {
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path);
} else {
error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path);
}
return -1;
}
if (interrupted)
goto out;
/*
* If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory,
* then just list its contents.
*/
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL &&
S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) {
err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag);
globfree(&g);
return err;
}
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++)
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i]));
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
}
/*
* Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare
* an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual
* unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc.
*/
for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++)
; /* count entries */
indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices));
for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++)
indices[i] = i;
if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
sort_glob = &g;
sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp);
sort_glob = NULL;
}
for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) {
i = indices[j];
fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path);
if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
error("no stat information for %s", fname);
continue;
}
lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
(lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
mprintf("%s\n", lname);
free(lname);
} else {
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
if (c >= columns) {
printf("\n");
c = 1;
} else
c++;
}
free(fname);
}
if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
printf("\n");
out:
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
free(indices);
return 0;
}
static int
do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
{
struct sftp_statvfs st;
char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16];
if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
return -1;
if (st.f_files == 0)
strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
st.f_files));
}
if (st.f_blocks == 0)
strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
st.f_blocks));
}
if (iflag) {
printf(" Inodes Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)st.f_files,
(unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
(unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
(unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity);
} else if (hflag) {
strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root));
strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total));
fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used);
fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail);
fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n",
s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity);
} else {
printf(" Size Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
(st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
s_dcapacity);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping
* applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that
* does not glob it.
*/
static void
undo_glob_escape(char *s)
{
size_t i, j;
for (i = j = 0;;) {
if (s[i] == '\0') {
s[j] = '\0';
return;
}
if (s[i] != '\\') {
s[j++] = s[i++];
continue;
}
/* s[i] == '\\' */
++i;
switch (s[i]) {
case '?':
case '[':
case '*':
case '\\':
s[j++] = s[i++];
break;
case '\0':
s[j++] = '\\';
s[j] = '\0';
return;
default:
s[j++] = '\\';
s[j++] = s[i++];
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting,
* comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3)
* wildcards.
* The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for
* use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion.
*
* Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments.
*
* If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last
* argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\"").
*
* If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the
* last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise.
* This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set.
*/
-#define MAXARGS 128
+#define MAXARGS 128
#define MAXARGLEN 8192
static char **
makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
u_int *terminated)
{
int argc, quot;
size_t i, j;
static char argvs[MAXARGLEN];
static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1];
enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q;
*argcp = argc = 0;
if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) {
args_too_longs:
error("string too long");
return NULL;
}
if (terminated != NULL)
*terminated = 1;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
state = MA_START;
i = j = 0;
for (;;) {
if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
error("Too many arguments.");
return NULL;
}
if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) {
if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
/* Terminate current argument */
argvs[j++] = '\0';
argc++;
state = MA_START;
} else if (state != MA_START)
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') {
q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE;
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = q;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = arg[i];
} else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED)
state = q;
else if (state == q)
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
else
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i] == '\\') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"';
/* Unescape quote we are in */
/* XXX support \n and friends? */
if (arg[i + 1] == quot) {
i++;
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' ||
arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') {
/*
* Special case for sftp: append
* double-escaped glob sequence -
* glob will undo one level of
* escaping. NB. string can grow here.
*/
if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5)
goto args_too_longs;
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else {
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
} else {
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
}
if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' ||
arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') {
/*
* Special case for sftp: append
* escaped glob sequence -
* glob will undo one level of
* escaping.
*/
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else {
/* Unescape everything */
/* XXX support \n and friends? */
i++;
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
}
} else if (arg[i] == '#') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE)
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
else
goto string_done;
} else if (arg[i] == '\0') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
if (sloppy) {
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (terminated != NULL)
*terminated = 0;
goto string_done;
}
error("Unterminated quoted argument");
return NULL;
}
string_done:
if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
argvs[j++] = '\0';
argc++;
}
break;
} else {
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
}
if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) &&
(arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) {
/*
* Special case for sftp: escape quoted
* glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow
* here.
*/
if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3)
goto args_too_longs;
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
i++;
}
*argcp = argc;
return argv;
}
static int
-parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *aflag,
+parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *disable_echo, int *aflag,
int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag,
int *rflag, int *sflag,
unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2)
{
const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
char *cp2, **argv;
int base = 0;
- long l;
+ long long ll;
int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc;
/* Skip leading whitespace */
cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
- /* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) */
+ /*
+ * Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) and '@' (suppress
+ * command echo)
+ */
*ignore_errors = 0;
- if (*cp == '-') {
- *ignore_errors = 1;
- cp++;
- cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ *disable_echo = 0;
+ for (;*cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '-') {
+ *ignore_errors = 1;
+ } else if (*cp == '@') {
+ *disable_echo = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* all other characters terminate prefix processing */
+ break;
+ }
}
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
/* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */
if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#')
return (0);
if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Figure out which command we have */
for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
break;
}
cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
cmd = cmds[i].c;
/* Special case */
if (*cp == '!') {
cp++;
cmdnum = I_SHELL;
} else if (cmdnum == -1) {
error("Invalid command.");
return -1;
}
/* Get arguments and parse flags */
*aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0;
*rflag = *sflag = 0;
*path1 = *path2 = NULL;
optidx = 1;
switch (cmdnum) {
case I_GET:
case I_REGET:
case I_REPUT:
case I_PUT:
if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc,
aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1) {
error("You must specify at least one path after a "
"%s command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
/* Get second pathname (optional) */
if (argc - optidx > 1) {
*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
/* Destination is not globbed */
undo_glob_escape(*path2);
}
break;
case I_LINK:
if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1)
return -1;
goto parse_two_paths;
case I_RENAME:
if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
return -1;
goto parse_two_paths;
case I_SYMLINK:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
parse_two_paths:
if (argc - optidx < 2) {
error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
"command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
/* Paths are not globbed */
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
undo_glob_escape(*path2);
break;
case I_RM:
case I_MKDIR:
case I_RMDIR:
case I_LMKDIR:
path1_mandatory = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_CHDIR:
case I_LCHDIR:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1) {
if (!path1_mandatory)
break; /* return a NULL path1 */
error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
/* Only "rm" globs */
if (cmdnum != I_RM)
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
break;
case I_DF:
if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag,
iflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
if (argc - optidx < 1)
*path1 = NULL;
else {
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
}
break;
case I_LS:
if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
return(-1);
/* Path is optional */
if (argc - optidx > 0)
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
break;
case I_LLS:
/* Skip ls command and following whitespace */
cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
case I_SHELL:
/* Uses the rest of the line */
break;
case I_LUMASK:
case I_CHMOD:
base = 8;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_CHOWN:
case I_CHGRP:
- if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+ if ((optidx = parse_ch_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1)
goto need_num_arg;
errno = 0;
- l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
+ ll = strtoll(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' ||
- ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
- l < 0) {
+ ((ll == LLONG_MIN || ll == LLONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
+ ll < 0 || ll > UINT32_MAX) {
need_num_arg:
error("You must supply a numeric argument "
"to the %s command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
- *n_arg = l;
+ *n_arg = ll;
if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK)
break;
/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 2) {
error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
break;
case I_QUIT:
case I_PWD:
case I_LPWD:
case I_HELP:
case I_VERSION:
case I_PROGRESS:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
fatal("Command not implemented");
}
*cpp = cp;
return(cmdnum);
}
static int
parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
- const char *startdir, int err_abort)
+ const char *startdir, int err_abort, int echo_command)
{
+ const char *ocmd = cmd;
char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
- int ignore_errors = 0, aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0,
- iflag = 0;
+ int ignore_errors = 0, disable_echo = 1;
+ int aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0;
int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0;
int cmdnum, i;
unsigned long n_arg = 0;
Attrib a, *aa;
char path_buf[PATH_MAX];
int err = 0;
glob_t g;
path1 = path2 = NULL;
- cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag,
- &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2);
+ cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &disable_echo, &aflag, &fflag,
+ &hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg,
+ &path1, &path2);
if (ignore_errors != 0)
err_abort = 0;
+ if (echo_command && !disable_echo)
+ mprintf("sftp> %s\n", ocmd);
+
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
/* Perform command */
switch (cmdnum) {
case 0:
/* Blank line */
break;
case -1:
/* Unrecognized command */
err = -1;
break;
case I_REGET:
aflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_GET:
err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
rflag, aflag, fflag);
break;
case I_REPUT:
aflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_PUT:
err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
rflag, aflag, fflag);
break;
case I_RENAME:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag);
break;
case I_SYMLINK:
sflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_LINK:
if (!sflag)
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2);
break;
case I_RM:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_MKDIR:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
attrib_clear(&a);
a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
a.perm = 0777;
err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1);
break;
case I_RMDIR:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_rmdir(conn, path1);
break;
case I_CHDIR:
if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
err = 1;
break;
}
if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
"a directory", tmp);
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
free(*pwd);
*pwd = tmp;
break;
case I_LS:
if (!path1) {
do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
break;
}
/* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */
tmp = NULL;
- if (*path1 != '/')
+ if (!path_absolute(path1))
tmp = *pwd;
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag);
break;
case I_DF:
/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
if (path1 == NULL)
path1 = xstrdup(*pwd);
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag);
break;
case I_LCHDIR:
if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
path1 = xstrdup("~");
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid());
free(path1);
path1 = tmp;
if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
error("Couldn't change local directory to "
"\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
err = 1;
}
break;
case I_LMKDIR:
if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
error("Couldn't create local directory "
"\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
err = 1;
}
break;
case I_LLS:
local_do_ls(cmd);
break;
case I_SHELL:
local_do_shell(cmd);
break;
case I_LUMASK:
umask(n_arg);
printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
break;
case I_CHMOD:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
attrib_clear(&a);
a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
a.perm = n_arg;
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
- err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
+ err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
+ g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_CHOWN:
case I_CHGRP:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
- if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
+ if (!(aa = (hflag ? do_lstat : do_stat)(conn,
+ g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
if (err_abort) {
err = -1;
break;
} else
continue;
}
if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
error("Can't get current ownership of "
"remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
if (err_abort) {
err = -1;
break;
} else
continue;
}
aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
aa->uid = n_arg;
} else {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing group on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
aa->gid = n_arg;
}
- err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
+ err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
+ g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_PWD:
mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
break;
case I_LPWD:
if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) {
error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno));
err = -1;
break;
}
mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf);
break;
case I_QUIT:
/* Processed below */
break;
case I_HELP:
help();
break;
case I_VERSION:
printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
break;
case I_PROGRESS:
showprogress = !showprogress;
if (showprogress)
printf("Progress meter enabled\n");
else
printf("Progress meter disabled\n");
break;
default:
fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
}
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
free(path1);
free(path2);
/* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
if (err_abort && err != 0)
return (-1);
else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT)
return (1);
return (0);
}
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
static char *
prompt(EditLine *el)
{
return ("sftp> ");
}
/* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */
static void
complete_display(char **list, u_int len)
{
u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen;
struct winsize ws;
char *tmp;
/* Count entries for sort and find longest */
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y]));
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
m = m > len ? m - len : 0;
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
printf("\n");
m = 1;
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) {
llen = strlen(list[y]);
tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : "";
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp);
if (m >= columns) {
printf("\n");
m = 1;
} else
m++;
}
printf("\n");
}
/*
* Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word",
* attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next
* characters common to all entries in "list".
*/
static char *
complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count)
{
if (word == NULL)
return NULL;
if (count > 0) {
u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]);
/* Find length of common stem */
for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) {
u_int x;
for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++)
if (list[0][x] != list[y][x])
break;
matchlen = x;
}
if (matchlen > strlen(word)) {
char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]);
tmp[matchlen] = '\0';
return tmp;
}
}
return xstrdup(word);
}
/* Autocomplete a sftp command */
static int
complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
int terminated)
{
u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen;
char *tmp, **list, argterm[3];
const LineInfo *lf;
list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *));
/* No command specified: display all available commands */
if (cmd == NULL) {
for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++)
list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
list[count] = NULL;
complete_display(list, 0);
for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++)
free(list[y]);
free(list);
return count;
}
/* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */
cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) {
if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen))
list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
}
list[count] = NULL;
if (count == 0) {
free(list);
return 0;
}
/* Complete ambiguous command */
tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
if (count > 1)
complete_display(list, 0);
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
free(list[y]);
free(list);
if (tmp != NULL) {
tmplen = strlen(tmp);
cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
/* If cmd may be extended then do so */
if (tmplen > cmdlen)
if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
lf = el_line(el);
/* Terminate argument cleanly */
if (count == 1) {
y = 0;
if (!terminated)
argterm[y++] = quote;
if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')
argterm[y++] = ' ';
argterm[y] = '\0';
if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
}
free(tmp);
}
return count;
}
/*
* Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any)
* represent local or remote files.
*/
static int
complete_is_remote(char *cmd) {
int i;
if (cmd == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) {
if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c)))
return cmds[i].t;
}
return -1;
}
/* Autocomplete a filename "file" */
static int
complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated)
{
glob_t g;
char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8];
u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs;
int clen;
const LineInfo *lf;
/* Glob from "file" location */
if (file == NULL)
tmp = xstrdup("*");
else
xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file);
/* Check if the path is absolute. */
- isabs = tmp[0] == '/';
+ isabs = path_absolute(tmp);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
if (remote != LOCAL) {
tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path);
remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
} else
glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
/* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */
for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) {
/* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */
if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') {
if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
hadglob = 1;
break;
}
if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
tmplen++;
if (tmp[tmplen] == '/')
pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */
}
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
if (g.gl_matchc == 0)
goto out;
if (g.gl_matchc > 1)
complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen);
/* Don't try to extend globs */
if (file == NULL || hadglob)
goto out;
tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc);
tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path);
free(tmp2);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto out;
tmplen = strlen(tmp);
filelen = strlen(file);
/* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */
cesc = isesc = 0;
for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) {
if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){
isesc = 1;
cesc++;
} else
isesc = 0;
}
if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) {
tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc;
len = strlen(tmp2);
/* quote argument on way out */
for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) {
if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 ||
(size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2)
fatal("invalid multibyte character");
ins[0] = '\\';
memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen);
ins[clen + 1] = '\0';
switch (tmp2[i]) {
case '\'':
case '"':
case '\\':
case '\t':
case '[':
case ' ':
case '#':
case '*':
if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) {
if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr "
"failed.");
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
break;
}
}
}
lf = el_line(el);
if (g.gl_matchc == 1) {
i = 0;
if (!terminated && quote != '\0')
ins[i++] = quote;
if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' &&
(lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' '))
ins[i++] = ' ';
ins[i] = '\0';
if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
}
free(tmp);
out:
globfree(&g);
return g.gl_matchc;
}
/* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */
static unsigned char
complete(EditLine *el, int ch)
{
char **argv, *line, quote;
int argc, carg;
u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR;
const LineInfo *lf;
struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx;
lf = el_line(el);
if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0)
- fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("el_get failed");
/* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */
cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer;
line = xmalloc(cursor + 1);
memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor);
line[cursor] = '\0';
argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, &quote, &terminated);
free(line);
/* Get all the arguments on the line */
len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer;
line = xmalloc(len + 1);
memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len);
line[len] = '\0';
argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL);
/* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */
if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' &&
line[cursor] != '\n') {
free(line);
return ret;
}
if (carg == 0) {
/* Show all available commands */
complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1);
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
} else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') {
/* Handle the command parsing */
if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg,
quote, terminated) != 0)
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
} else if (carg >= 1) {
/* Handle file parsing */
int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]);
char *filematch = NULL;
if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ')
filematch = argv[carg - 1];
if (remote != 0 &&
complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn,
*complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch,
remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0)
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
}
free(line);
return ret;
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
static int
interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
{
char *remote_path;
char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL;
char cmd[2048];
int err, interactive;
EditLine *el = NULL;
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
History *hl = NULL;
HistEvent hev;
extern char *__progname;
struct complete_ctx complete_ctx;
if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise editline");
if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history");
history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100);
el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl);
el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt);
el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs");
el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL);
el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1);
el_source(el, NULL);
/* Tab Completion */
el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete",
"Context sensitive argument completion", complete);
complete_ctx.conn = conn;
complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path;
el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL);
/* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
- el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
+ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[C", "em-next-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
/* make ^w match ksh behaviour */
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL);
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
if (remote_path == NULL)
fatal("Need cwd");
startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
if (file1 != NULL) {
dir = xstrdup(file1);
dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path);
if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
- &remote_path, startdir, 1) != 0) {
+ &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0) != 0) {
free(dir);
free(startdir);
free(remote_path);
free(conn);
return (-1);
}
} else {
/* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
- &remote_path, startdir, 1);
+ &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0);
free(dir);
free(startdir);
free(remote_path);
free(conn);
return (err);
}
free(dir);
}
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
err = 0;
for (;;) {
- char *cp;
-
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
-
if (el == NULL) {
if (interactive)
printf("sftp> ");
if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
if (interactive)
printf("\n");
break;
}
- if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */
- mprintf("sftp> %s", cmd);
- if (strlen(cmd) > 0 &&
- cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n')
- printf("\n");
- }
} else {
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
const char *line;
int count = 0;
-
+ struct sigaction sa;
+
+ interrupted = 0;
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sa.sa_handler = read_interrupt;
+ if (sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+ debug3("sigaction(%s): %s",
+ strsignal(SIGINT), strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL ||
count <= 0) {
printf("\n");
- break;
+ if (interrupted)
+ continue;
+ break;
}
history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
continue;
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
}
- cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n');
- if (cp)
- *cp = '\0';
+ cmd[strcspn(cmd, "\n")] = '\0';
/* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */
interrupted = 0;
- signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path,
- startdir, batchmode);
+ startdir, batchmode, !interactive && el == NULL);
if (err != 0)
break;
}
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
free(remote_path);
free(startdir);
free(conn);
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
if (el != NULL)
el_end(el);
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
/* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
}
static void
connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out)
{
int c_in, c_out;
#ifdef USE_PIPES
int pin[2], pout[2];
if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
*in = pin[0];
*out = pout[1];
c_in = pout[0];
c_out = pin[1];
#else /* USE_PIPES */
int inout[2];
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
*in = *out = inout[0];
c_in = c_out = inout[1];
#endif /* USE_PIPES */
if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
else if (sshpid == 0) {
if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
(dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
close(*in);
close(*out);
close(c_in);
close(c_out);
/*
* The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must
* ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands,
* otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and
* kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the
* underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal.
*/
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
execvp(path, args);
fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
- signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
- signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
close(c_in);
close(c_out);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: %s [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
- " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] "
- "[-i identity_file] [-l limit]\n"
- " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] "
- "[-S program]\n"
- " [-s subsystem | sftp_server] destination\n",
+ "usage: %s [-46AaCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
+ " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
+ " [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n"
+ " [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]\n"
+ " destination\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- int in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1;
+ int in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1, noisy = 0;
char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, *file2 = NULL;
- int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2;
+ int debug_level = 0;
char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL;
const char *errstr;
LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
arglist args;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
struct sftp_conn *conn;
- size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN;
- size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS;
+ size_t copy_buffer_len = 0;
+ size_t num_requests = 0;
long long limit_kbps = 0;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
msetlocale();
+ seed_rng();
+
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
- addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
infile = stdin;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
- "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) {
+ "1246AafhNpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
/* Passed through to ssh(1) */
+ case 'A':
case '4':
case '6':
case 'C':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
/* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
case 'F':
+ case 'J':
case 'c':
case 'i':
case 'o':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
break;
case 'q':
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
quiet = 1;
showprogress = 0;
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
case 'P':
port = a2port(optarg);
if (port <= 0)
fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
break;
case 'v':
if (debug_level < 3) {
addargs(&args, "-v");
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
}
debug_level++;
break;
case '1':
- sshver = 1;
- if (sftp_server == NULL)
- sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
+ fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
- sshver = 2;
+ /* accept silently */
break;
case 'a':
global_aflag = 1;
break;
case 'B':
copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0')
fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'b':
if (batchmode)
fatal("Batch file already specified.");
/* Allow "-" as stdin */
if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
(infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
showprogress = 0;
quiet = batchmode = 1;
addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes");
break;
case 'f':
global_fflag = 1;
break;
+ case 'N':
+ noisy = 1; /* Used to clear quiet mode after getopt */
+ break;
case 'p':
global_pflag = 1;
break;
case 'D':
sftp_direct = optarg;
break;
case 'l':
limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
&errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
usage();
limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
break;
case 'r':
global_rflag = 1;
break;
case 'R':
num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0')
fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"",
optarg);
break;
case 's':
sftp_server = optarg;
break;
case 'S':
ssh_program = optarg;
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
break;
case 'h':
default:
usage();
}
}
+ /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+
if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
showprogress = 0;
+ if (noisy)
+ quiet = 0;
+
log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
usage();
argv += optind;
switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) {
case -1:
usage();
break;
case 0:
if (tmp != -1)
port = tmp;
break;
default:
+ /* Try with user, host and path. */
if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
- &file1) == -1) {
- /* Treat as a plain hostname. */
- host = xstrdup(*argv);
- host = cleanhostname(host);
- }
+ &file1) == 0)
+ break;
+ /* Try with user and host. */
+ if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
+ == 0)
+ break;
+ /* Treat as a plain hostname. */
+ host = xstrdup(*argv);
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
break;
}
file2 = *(argv + 1);
if (!*host) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
usage();
}
if (port != -1)
addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port);
if (user != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", user);
}
- addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver);
/* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
addargs(&args, "-s");
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ?
sftp_server : "sftp"));
connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out);
} else {
args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out);
}
freeargs(&args);
conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps);
if (conn == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
if (!quiet) {
if (sftp_direct == NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct);
}
err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2);
#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
#endif
close(in);
close(out);
if (batchmode)
fclose(infile);
while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s",
strerror(errno));
exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sk-api.h b/crypto/openssh/sk-api.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..74921d4c3b99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sk-api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.12 2021/02/18 02:15:07 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SK_API_H
+#define _SK_API_H 1
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Flags */
+#define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01
+#define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04
+#define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20
+
+/* Algs */
+#define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00
+#define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01
+
+/* Error codes */
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4
+
+struct sk_enroll_response {
+ uint8_t *public_key;
+ size_t public_key_len;
+ uint8_t *key_handle;
+ size_t key_handle_len;
+ uint8_t *signature;
+ size_t signature_len;
+ uint8_t *attestation_cert;
+ size_t attestation_cert_len;
+ uint8_t *authdata;
+ size_t authdata_len;
+};
+
+struct sk_sign_response {
+ uint8_t flags;
+ uint32_t counter;
+ uint8_t *sig_r;
+ size_t sig_r_len;
+ uint8_t *sig_s;
+ size_t sig_s_len;
+};
+
+struct sk_resident_key {
+ uint32_t alg;
+ size_t slot;
+ char *application;
+ struct sk_enroll_response key;
+ uint8_t flags;
+};
+
+struct sk_option {
+ char *name;
+ char *value;
+ uint8_t required;
+};
+
+#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00070000 /* current API version */
+#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000
+
+/* Return the version of the middleware API */
+uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
+
+/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+/* Sign a challenge */
+int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+/* Enumerate all resident keys */
+int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+#endif /* _SK_API_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sk-usbhid.c b/crypto/openssh/sk-usbhid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..438980889cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sk-usbhid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1267 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sk-usbhid.c,v 1.30 2021/05/31 06:48:42 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Pedro Martelletto
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+#include <sha2.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include <fido.h>
+#include <fido/credman.h>
+
+/* backwards compat for libfido2 */
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT
+#define fido_cred_prot(x) (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT
+#define fido_cred_set_prot(x, y) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT
+#define fido_dev_supports_cred_prot(x) (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN
+#define fido_dev_get_touch_begin(x) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+#define fido_dev_get_touch_status(x, y, z) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED
+#define FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED 0
+#endif
+#ifndef FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID
+#define FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SK_STANDALONE
+# include "log.h"
+# include "xmalloc.h"
+# include "misc.h"
+/*
+ * If building as part of OpenSSH, then rename exported functions.
+ * This must be done before including sk-api.h.
+ */
+# define sk_api_version ssh_sk_api_version
+# define sk_enroll ssh_sk_enroll
+# define sk_sign ssh_sk_sign
+# define sk_load_resident_keys ssh_sk_load_resident_keys
+#endif /* !SK_STANDALONE */
+
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
+
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+#define SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG FIDO_DEBUG
+#else
+#define SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG 0
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_FIDO_DEVICES 8
+#define FIDO_POLL_MS 50
+#define SELECT_MS 15000
+#define POLL_SLEEP_NS 200000000
+
+/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
+ do { \
+ (*pr) = sig->r; \
+ (*ps) = sig->s; \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+struct sk_usbhid {
+ fido_dev_t *dev;
+ char *path;
+};
+
+/* Return the version of the middleware API */
+uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
+
+/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+/* Sign a challenge */
+int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+/* Load resident keys */
+int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if !defined(SK_STANDALONE)
+ char *msg;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ debug("%s: %s", func, msg);
+ free(msg);
+#elif defined(SK_DEBUG)
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", func);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(ap);
+#else
+ (void)func; /* XXX */
+ (void)fmt; /* XXX */
+#endif
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sk_api_version(void)
+{
+ return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_open(const char *path)
+{
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk;
+ int r;
+
+ if (path == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "path == NULL");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((sk = calloc(1, sizeof(*sk))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc sk failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((sk->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "strdup path failed");
+ free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((sk->dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
+ free(sk->path);
+ free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_open(sk->dev, sk->path)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open %s failed: %s", sk->path,
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ fido_dev_free(&sk->dev);
+ free(sk->path);
+ free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return sk;
+}
+
+static void
+sk_close(struct sk_usbhid *sk)
+{
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return;
+ fido_dev_cancel(sk->dev); /* cancel any pending operation */
+ fido_dev_close(sk->dev);
+ fido_dev_free(&sk->dev);
+ free(sk->path);
+ free(sk);
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid **
+sk_openv(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs, size_t *nopen)
+{
+ const fido_dev_info_t *di;
+ struct sk_usbhid **skv;
+ size_t i;
+
+ *nopen = 0;
+ if ((skv = calloc(ndevs, sizeof(*skv))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc skv failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++) {
+ if ((di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i)) == NULL)
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_ptr failed");
+ else if ((skv[*nopen] = sk_open(fido_dev_info_path(di))) == NULL)
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_open failed");
+ else
+ (*nopen)++;
+ }
+ if (*nopen == 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++)
+ sk_close(skv[i]);
+ free(skv);
+ skv = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return skv;
+}
+
+static void
+sk_closev(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++)
+ sk_close(skv[i]);
+ free(skv);
+}
+
+static int
+sk_touch_begin(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk)
+{
+ size_t i, ok = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++)
+ if ((r = fido_dev_get_touch_begin(skv[i]->dev)) != FIDO_OK)
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_touch_begin %s failed:"
+ " %s", skv[i]->path, fido_strerr(r));
+ else
+ ok++;
+
+ return ok ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+sk_touch_poll(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk, int *touch, size_t *idx)
+{
+ struct timespec ts_pause;
+ size_t npoll, i;
+ int r;
+
+ ts_pause.tv_sec = 0;
+ ts_pause.tv_nsec = POLL_SLEEP_NS;
+ nanosleep(&ts_pause, NULL);
+ npoll = nsk;
+ for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++) {
+ if (skv[i] == NULL)
+ continue; /* device discarded */
+ skdebug(__func__, "polling %s", skv[i]->path);
+ if ((r = fido_dev_get_touch_status(skv[i]->dev, touch,
+ FIDO_POLL_MS)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_touch_status %s: %s",
+ skv[i]->path, fido_strerr(r));
+ sk_close(skv[i]); /* discard device */
+ skv[i] = NULL;
+ if (--npoll == 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "no device left to poll");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (*touch) {
+ *idx = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ *touch = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Calculate SHA256(m) */
+static int
+sha256_mem(const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ u_int mdlen;
+#endif
+
+ if (dlen != 32)
+ return -1;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ mdlen = dlen;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+ return -1;
+#else
+ SHA256Data(m, mlen, d);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check if the specified key handle exists on a given sk. */
+static int
+sk_try(const struct sk_usbhid *sk, const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+ fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+ /* generate an invalid signature on FIDO2 tokens */
+ const char *data = "";
+ uint8_t message[32];
+ int r = FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL;
+
+ if (sha256_mem(data, strlen(data), message, sizeof(message)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "hash message failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message,
+ sizeof(message))) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert, FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = fido_dev_get_assert(sk->dev, assert, NULL);
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ if (r == FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED) {
+ /* U2F tokens may return this */
+ r = FIDO_OK;
+ }
+ out:
+ fido_assert_free(&assert);
+
+ return r != FIDO_OK ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_select_by_cred(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+ struct sk_usbhid **skv, *sk;
+ size_t skvcnt, i;
+
+ if ((skv = sk_openv(devlist, ndevs, &skvcnt)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_openv failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (skvcnt == 1) {
+ sk = skv[0];
+ skv[0] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sk = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < skvcnt; i++) {
+ if (sk_try(skv[i], application, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len) == 0) {
+ sk = skv[i];
+ skv[i] = NULL;
+ skdebug(__func__, "found key in %s", sk->path);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ out:
+ sk_closev(skv, skvcnt);
+ return sk;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_select_by_touch(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs)
+{
+ struct sk_usbhid **skv, *sk;
+ struct timeval tv_start, tv_now, tv_delta;
+ size_t skvcnt, idx;
+ int touch, ms_remain;
+
+ if ((skv = sk_openv(devlist, ndevs, &skvcnt)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_openv failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sk = NULL;
+ if (skvcnt < 2) {
+ if (skvcnt == 1) {
+ /* single candidate */
+ sk = skv[0];
+ skv[0] = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+ skdebug(__func__, "libfido2 version does not support a feature needed for multiple tokens. Please upgrade to >=1.5.0");
+ goto out;
+#endif
+
+ if (sk_touch_begin(skv, skvcnt) == -1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_touch_begin failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ monotime_tv(&tv_start);
+ do {
+ if (sk_touch_poll(skv, skvcnt, &touch, &idx) == -1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sk_touch_poll failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (touch) {
+ sk = skv[idx];
+ skv[idx] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ monotime_tv(&tv_now);
+ timersub(&tv_now, &tv_start, &tv_delta);
+ ms_remain = SELECT_MS - tv_delta.tv_sec * 1000 -
+ tv_delta.tv_usec / 1000;
+ } while (ms_remain >= FIDO_POLL_MS);
+ skdebug(__func__, "timeout");
+out:
+ sk_closev(skv, skvcnt);
+ return sk;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_probe(const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle,
+ size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk;
+ fido_dev_info_t *devlist;
+ size_t ndevs;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES,
+ &ndevs)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "%zu device(s) detected", ndevs);
+ if (ndevs == 0) {
+ sk = NULL;
+ } else if (application != NULL && key_handle != NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "selecting sk by cred");
+ sk = sk_select_by_cred(devlist, ndevs, application, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len);
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "selecting sk by touch");
+ sk = sk_select_by_touch(devlist, ndevs);
+ }
+ fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+ return sk;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/*
+ * The key returned via fido_cred_pubkey_ptr() is in affine coordinates,
+ * but the API expects a SEC1 octet string.
+ */
+static int
+pack_public_key_ecdsa(const fido_cred_t *cred,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *q = NULL;
+ EC_GROUP *g = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (g = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL ||
+ (q = EC_POINT_new(g)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "libcrypto setup failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred) != 64) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len %zu",
+ fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(ptr, 32, x) == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(ptr + 32, 32, y) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "BN_bin2bn failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(g, q, x, y, NULL) != 1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
+ response->public_key_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0 && response->public_key != NULL) {
+ memset(response->public_key, 0, response->public_key_len);
+ free(response->public_key);
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ }
+ EC_POINT_free(q);
+ EC_GROUP_free(g);
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+pack_public_key_ed25519(const fido_cred_t *cred,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+
+ if ((len = fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred)) != 32) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len len %zu", len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->public_key_len = len;
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->public_key, ptr, len);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ free(response->public_key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_public_key(uint32_t alg, const fido_cred_t *cred,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ return pack_public_key_ecdsa(cred, response);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ return pack_public_key_ed25519(cred, response);
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+fidoerr_to_skerr(int fidoerr)
+{
+ switch (fidoerr) {
+ case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION:
+ case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM:
+ return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+ case FIDO_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
+ case FIDO_ERR_PIN_INVALID:
+ return SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+check_enroll_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep,
+ uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (options == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
+ if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
+ } else if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "user") == 0) {
+ if (strlcpy(user_id, options[i]->value, user_id_len) >=
+ user_id_len) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "user too long");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested user %s",
+ (char *)user_id);
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+ options[i]->name);
+ if (options[i]->required) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+{
+ fido_cred_t *cred = NULL;
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ uint8_t user_id[32], chall_hash[32];
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ int credprot;
+ int cose_alg;
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+ int r;
+ char *device = NULL;
+
+ fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
+ if (enroll_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *enroll_response = NULL;
+ memset(user_id, 0, sizeof(user_id));
+ if (check_enroll_options(options, &device, user_id,
+ sizeof(user_id)) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+
+ switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ cose_alg = COSE_ES256;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ cose_alg = COSE_EDDSA;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (device != NULL)
+ sk = sk_open(device);
+ else
+ sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "using device %s", sk->path);
+ if ((cred = fido_cred_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_type(cred, cose_alg)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_type: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sha256_mem(challenge, challenge_len,
+ chall_hash, sizeof(chall_hash)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "hash challenge failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash(cred, chall_hash,
+ sizeof(chall_hash))) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_rk(cred, (flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 ?
+ FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_OMIT)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rk: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_user(cred, user_id, sizeof(user_id),
+ "openssh", "openssh", NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_user: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_rp(cred, application, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((flags & (SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY|SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) != 0) {
+#if !defined(HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT) || \
+ !defined(HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT)
+ skdebug(__func__, "libfido2 version does not support a feature required for this operation. Please upgrade to >=1.5.0");
+ ret = SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ credprot = 0; (void)credprot; /* avoid warning */
+#endif
+ if (!fido_dev_supports_cred_prot(sk->dev)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "%s does not support credprot, "
+ "refusing to create unprotected "
+ "resident/verify-required key", sk->path);
+ ret = SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+ credprot = FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED;
+ else
+ credprot = FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID;
+
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_prot(cred, credprot)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_prot: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_make_cred(sk->dev, cred, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_make_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred) != NULL) {
+ if ((r = fido_cred_verify(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "self-attested credential");
+ if ((r = fido_cred_verify_self(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify_self: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (pack_public_key(alg, cred, response) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "pack_public_key failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_id_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
+ if ((response->key_handle = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc key handle failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->key_handle, ptr, len);
+ response->key_handle_len = len;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_sig_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_sig_len(cred);
+ if ((response->signature = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->signature, ptr, len);
+ response->signature_len = len;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_x5c_len(cred);
+ skdebug(__func__, "attestation cert len=%zu", len);
+ if ((response->attestation_cert = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc attestation cert failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->attestation_cert, ptr, len);
+ response->attestation_cert_len = len;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_authdata_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_authdata_len(cred);
+ skdebug(__func__, "authdata len=%zu", len);
+ if ((response->authdata = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc authdata failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->authdata, ptr, len);
+ response->authdata_len = len;
+ }
+ *enroll_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ free(device);
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->public_key);
+ free(response->key_handle);
+ free(response->signature);
+ free(response->attestation_cert);
+ free(response->authdata);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ sk_close(sk);
+ fido_cred_free(&cred);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+pack_sig_ecdsa(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+ const unsigned char *cp;
+ size_t sig_len;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ cp = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
+ sig_len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
+ if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, sig_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+ response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
+ (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ response->sig_s = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+pack_sig_ed25519(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ const unsigned char *ptr;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ ptr = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
+ len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
+ if (len != 64) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad length %zu", len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->sig_r_len = len;
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->sig_r, ptr, len);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_sig(uint32_t alg, fido_assert_t *assert,
+ struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ return pack_sig_ecdsa(assert, response);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ return pack_sig_ed25519(assert, response);
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Checks sk_options for sk_sign() and sk_load_resident_keys() */
+static int
+check_sign_load_resident_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (options == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
+ if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+ options[i]->name);
+ if (options[i]->required) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
+{
+ fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+ char *device = NULL;
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
+ struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
+ uint8_t message[32];
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+ int r;
+
+ fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
+ if (sign_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sign_response = NULL;
+ if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ /* hash data to be signed before it goes to the security key */
+ if ((r = sha256_mem(data, datalen, message, sizeof(message))) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "hash message failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (device != NULL)
+ sk = sk_open(device);
+ else if (pin != NULL || (flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+ sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0);
+ else
+ sk = sk_probe(application, key_handle, key_handle_len);
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message,
+ sizeof(message))) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert,
+ (flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ?
+ FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (pin == NULL && (flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) &&
+ (r = fido_assert_set_uv(assert, FIDO_OPT_TRUE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_uv: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = FIDO_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_get_assert(sk->dev, assert, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->flags = fido_assert_flags(assert, 0);
+ response->counter = fido_assert_sigcount(assert, 0);
+ if (pack_sig(alg, assert, response) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "pack_sig failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sign_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(message, sizeof(message));
+ free(device);
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ sk_close(sk);
+ fido_assert_free(&assert);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+read_rks(struct sk_usbhid *sk, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
+{
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1;
+ fido_credman_metadata_t *metadata = NULL;
+ fido_credman_rp_t *rp = NULL;
+ fido_credman_rk_t *rk = NULL;
+ size_t i, j, nrp, nrk;
+ const fido_cred_t *cred;
+ struct sk_resident_key *srk = NULL, **tmp;
+
+ if (pin == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "no PIN specified");
+ ret = SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((metadata = fido_credman_metadata_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_metadata(sk->dev, metadata, pin)) != 0) {
+ if (r == FIDO_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "device %s does not support "
+ "resident keys", sk->path);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "get metadata for %s failed: %s",
+ sk->path, fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "existing %llu, remaining %llu",
+ (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_existing(metadata),
+ (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_remaining(metadata));
+ if ((rp = fido_credman_rp_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc rp failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rp(sk->dev, rp, pin)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "get RPs for %s failed: %s",
+ sk->path, fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ nrp = fido_credman_rp_count(rp);
+ skdebug(__func__, "Device %s has resident keys for %zu RPs",
+ sk->path, nrp);
+
+ /* Iterate over RP IDs that have resident keys */
+ for (i = 0; i < nrp; i++) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "rp %zu: name=\"%s\" id=\"%s\" hashlen=%zu",
+ i, fido_credman_rp_name(rp, i), fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i),
+ fido_credman_rp_id_hash_len(rp, i));
+
+ /* Skip non-SSH RP IDs */
+ if (strncasecmp(fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), "ssh:", 4) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
+ if ((rk = fido_credman_rk_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc rk failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rk(sk->dev,
+ fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), rk, pin)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "get RKs for %s slot %zu failed: %s",
+ sk->path, i, fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ nrk = fido_credman_rk_count(rk);
+ skdebug(__func__, "RP \"%s\" has %zu resident keys",
+ fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), nrk);
+
+ /* Iterate over resident keys for this RP ID */
+ for (j = 0; j < nrk; j++) {
+ if ((cred = fido_credman_rk(rk, j)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "no RK in slot %zu", j);
+ continue;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "Device %s RP \"%s\" slot %zu: "
+ "type %d flags 0x%02x prot 0x%02x", sk->path,
+ fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), j, fido_cred_type(cred),
+ fido_cred_flags(cred), fido_cred_prot(cred));
+
+ /* build response entry */
+ if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL ||
+ (srk->key.key_handle = calloc(1,
+ fido_cred_id_len(cred))) == NULL ||
+ (srk->application = strdup(fido_credman_rp_id(rp,
+ i))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc sk_resident_key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ srk->key.key_handle_len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
+ memcpy(srk->key.key_handle, fido_cred_id_ptr(cred),
+ srk->key.key_handle_len);
+
+ switch (fido_cred_type(cred)) {
+ case COSE_ES256:
+ srk->alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+ break;
+ case COSE_EDDSA:
+ srk->alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d",
+ fido_cred_type(cred));
+ goto out; /* XXX free rk and continue */
+ }
+
+ if (fido_cred_prot(cred) == FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED)
+ srk->flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+
+ if ((r = pack_public_key(srk->alg, cred,
+ &srk->key)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "pack public key failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* append */
+ if ((tmp = recallocarray(*rksp, *nrksp, (*nrksp) + 1,
+ sizeof(**rksp))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc rksp");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *rksp = tmp;
+ (*rksp)[(*nrksp)++] = srk;
+ srk = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (srk != NULL) {
+ free(srk->application);
+ freezero(srk->key.public_key, srk->key.public_key_len);
+ freezero(srk->key.key_handle, srk->key.key_handle_len);
+ freezero(srk, sizeof(*srk));
+ }
+ fido_credman_rp_free(&rp);
+ fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
+ fido_credman_metadata_free(&metadata);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
+{
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1;
+ size_t i, nrks = 0;
+ struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
+ struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
+ char *device = NULL;
+
+ *rksp = NULL;
+ *nrksp = 0;
+
+ fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
+ if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if (device != NULL)
+ sk = sk_open(device);
+ else
+ sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", sk->path);
+ if ((r = read_rks(sk, pin, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s", sk->path);
+ ret = r;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success, unless we have no keys but a specific error */
+ if (nrks > 0 || ret == SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL)
+ ret = 0;
+ *rksp = rks;
+ *nrksp = nrks;
+ rks = NULL;
+ nrks = 0;
+ out:
+ sk_close(sk);
+ for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+ free(rks[i]->application);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
+ freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
+ }
+ free(rks);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sntrup761.c b/crypto/openssh/sntrup761.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c63e600fb5b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sntrup761.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1273 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sntrup761.c,v 1.5 2021/01/08 02:33:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Public Domain, Authors:
+ * - Daniel J. Bernstein
+ * - Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup
+ * - Tanja Lange
+ * - Christine van Vredendaal
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#define int8 crypto_int8
+#define uint8 crypto_uint8
+#define int16 crypto_int16
+#define uint16 crypto_uint16
+#define int32 crypto_int32
+#define uint32 crypto_uint32
+#define int64 crypto_int64
+#define uint64 crypto_uint64
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/int32_minmax.inc */
+#define int32_MINMAX(a,b) \
+do { \
+ int64_t ab = (int64_t)b ^ (int64_t)a; \
+ int64_t c = (int64_t)b - (int64_t)a; \
+ c ^= ab & (c ^ b); \
+ c >>= 31; \
+ c &= ab; \
+ a ^= c; \
+ b ^= c; \
+} while(0)
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/sort.c */
+
+
+static void crypto_sort_int32(void *array,long long n)
+{
+ long long top,p,q,r,i,j;
+ int32 *x = array;
+
+ if (n < 2) return;
+ top = 1;
+ while (top < n - top) top += top;
+
+ for (p = top;p >= 1;p >>= 1) {
+ i = 0;
+ while (i + 2 * p <= n) {
+ for (j = i;j < i + p;++j)
+ int32_MINMAX(x[j],x[j+p]);
+ i += 2 * p;
+ }
+ for (j = i;j < n - p;++j)
+ int32_MINMAX(x[j],x[j+p]);
+
+ i = 0;
+ j = 0;
+ for (q = top;q > p;q >>= 1) {
+ if (j != i) for (;;) {
+ if (j == n - q) goto done;
+ int32 a = x[j + p];
+ for (r = q;r > p;r >>= 1)
+ int32_MINMAX(a,x[j + r]);
+ x[j + p] = a;
+ ++j;
+ if (j == i + p) {
+ i += 2 * p;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ while (i + p <= n - q) {
+ for (j = i;j < i + p;++j) {
+ int32 a = x[j + p];
+ for (r = q;r > p;r >>= 1)
+ int32_MINMAX(a,x[j+r]);
+ x[j + p] = a;
+ }
+ i += 2 * p;
+ }
+ /* now i + p > n - q */
+ j = i;
+ while (j < n - q) {
+ int32 a = x[j + p];
+ for (r = q;r > p;r >>= 1)
+ int32_MINMAX(a,x[j+r]);
+ x[j + p] = a;
+ ++j;
+ }
+
+ done: ;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/uint32/useint32/sort.c */
+
+/* can save time by vectorizing xor loops */
+/* can save time by integrating xor loops with int32_sort */
+
+static void crypto_sort_uint32(void *array,long long n)
+{
+ crypto_uint32 *x = array;
+ long long j;
+ for (j = 0;j < n;++j) x[j] ^= 0x80000000;
+ crypto_sort_int32(array,n);
+ for (j = 0;j < n;++j) x[j] ^= 0x80000000;
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/uint32.c */
+
+/*
+CPU division instruction typically takes time depending on x.
+This software is designed to take time independent of x.
+Time still varies depending on m; user must ensure that m is constant.
+Time also varies on CPUs where multiplication is variable-time.
+There could be more CPU issues.
+There could also be compiler issues.
+*/
+
+static void uint32_divmod_uint14(uint32 *q,uint16 *r,uint32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+ uint32 v = 0x80000000;
+ uint32 qpart;
+ uint32 mask;
+
+ v /= m;
+
+ /* caller guarantees m > 0 */
+ /* caller guarantees m < 16384 */
+ /* vm <= 2^31 <= vm+m-1 */
+ /* xvm <= 2^31 x <= xvm+x(m-1) */
+
+ *q = 0;
+
+ qpart = (x*(uint64)v)>>31;
+ /* 2^31 qpart <= xv <= 2^31 qpart + 2^31-1 */
+ /* 2^31 qpart m <= xvm <= 2^31 qpart m + (2^31-1)m */
+ /* 2^31 qpart m <= 2^31 x <= 2^31 qpart m + (2^31-1)m + x(m-1) */
+ /* 0 <= 2^31 newx <= (2^31-1)m + x(m-1) */
+ /* 0 <= newx <= (1-1/2^31)m + x(m-1)/2^31 */
+ /* 0 <= newx <= (1-1/2^31)(2^14-1) + (2^32-1)((2^14-1)-1)/2^31 */
+
+ x -= qpart*m; *q += qpart;
+ /* x <= 49146 */
+
+ qpart = (x*(uint64)v)>>31;
+ /* 0 <= newx <= (1-1/2^31)m + x(m-1)/2^31 */
+ /* 0 <= newx <= m + 49146(2^14-1)/2^31 */
+ /* 0 <= newx <= m + 0.4 */
+ /* 0 <= newx <= m */
+
+ x -= qpart*m; *q += qpart;
+ /* x <= m */
+
+ x -= m; *q += 1;
+ mask = -(x>>31);
+ x += mask&(uint32)m; *q += mask;
+ /* x < m */
+
+ *r = x;
+}
+
+
+static uint16 uint32_mod_uint14(uint32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+ uint32 q;
+ uint16 r;
+ uint32_divmod_uint14(&q,&r,x,m);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/int32.c */
+
+static void int32_divmod_uint14(int32 *q,uint16 *r,int32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+ uint32 uq,uq2;
+ uint16 ur,ur2;
+ uint32 mask;
+
+ uint32_divmod_uint14(&uq,&ur,0x80000000+(uint32)x,m);
+ uint32_divmod_uint14(&uq2,&ur2,0x80000000,m);
+ ur -= ur2; uq -= uq2;
+ mask = -(uint32)(ur>>15);
+ ur += mask&m; uq += mask;
+ *r = ur; *q = uq;
+}
+
+
+static uint16 int32_mod_uint14(int32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+ int32 q;
+ uint16 r;
+ int32_divmod_uint14(&q,&r,x,m);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/paramsmenu.h */
+/* pick one of these three: */
+#define SIZE761
+#undef SIZE653
+#undef SIZE857
+
+/* pick one of these two: */
+#define SNTRUP /* Streamlined NTRU Prime */
+#undef LPR /* NTRU LPRime */
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/params.h */
+#ifndef params_H
+#define params_H
+
+/* menu of parameter choices: */
+
+
+/* what the menu means: */
+
+#if defined(SIZE761)
+#define p 761
+#define q 4591
+#define Rounded_bytes 1007
+#ifndef LPR
+#define Rq_bytes 1158
+#define w 286
+#else
+#define w 250
+#define tau0 2156
+#define tau1 114
+#define tau2 2007
+#define tau3 287
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(SIZE653)
+#define p 653
+#define q 4621
+#define Rounded_bytes 865
+#ifndef LPR
+#define Rq_bytes 994
+#define w 288
+#else
+#define w 252
+#define tau0 2175
+#define tau1 113
+#define tau2 2031
+#define tau3 290
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(SIZE857)
+#define p 857
+#define q 5167
+#define Rounded_bytes 1152
+#ifndef LPR
+#define Rq_bytes 1322
+#define w 322
+#else
+#define w 281
+#define tau0 2433
+#define tau1 101
+#define tau2 2265
+#define tau3 324
+#endif
+
+#else
+#error "no parameter set defined"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LPR
+#define I 256
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.h */
+#ifndef Decode_H
+#define Decode_H
+
+
+/* Decode(R,s,M,len) */
+/* assumes 0 < M[i] < 16384 */
+/* produces 0 <= R[i] < M[i] */
+
+#endif
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.c */
+
+static void Decode(uint16 *out,const unsigned char *S,const uint16 *M,long long len)
+{
+ if (len == 1) {
+ if (M[0] == 1)
+ *out = 0;
+ else if (M[0] <= 256)
+ *out = uint32_mod_uint14(S[0],M[0]);
+ else
+ *out = uint32_mod_uint14(S[0]+(((uint16)S[1])<<8),M[0]);
+ }
+ if (len > 1) {
+ uint16 R2[(len+1)/2];
+ uint16 M2[(len+1)/2];
+ uint16 bottomr[len/2];
+ uint32 bottomt[len/2];
+ long long i;
+ for (i = 0;i < len-1;i += 2) {
+ uint32 m = M[i]*(uint32) M[i+1];
+ if (m > 256*16383) {
+ bottomt[i/2] = 256*256;
+ bottomr[i/2] = S[0]+256*S[1];
+ S += 2;
+ M2[i/2] = (((m+255)>>8)+255)>>8;
+ } else if (m >= 16384) {
+ bottomt[i/2] = 256;
+ bottomr[i/2] = S[0];
+ S += 1;
+ M2[i/2] = (m+255)>>8;
+ } else {
+ bottomt[i/2] = 1;
+ bottomr[i/2] = 0;
+ M2[i/2] = m;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i < len)
+ M2[i/2] = M[i];
+ Decode(R2,S,M2,(len+1)/2);
+ for (i = 0;i < len-1;i += 2) {
+ uint32 r = bottomr[i/2];
+ uint32 r1;
+ uint16 r0;
+ r += bottomt[i/2]*R2[i/2];
+ uint32_divmod_uint14(&r1,&r0,r,M[i]);
+ r1 = uint32_mod_uint14(r1,M[i+1]); /* only needed for invalid inputs */
+ *out++ = r0;
+ *out++ = r1;
+ }
+ if (i < len)
+ *out++ = R2[i/2];
+ }
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.h */
+#ifndef Encode_H
+#define Encode_H
+
+
+/* Encode(s,R,M,len) */
+/* assumes 0 <= R[i] < M[i] < 16384 */
+
+#endif
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.c */
+
+/* 0 <= R[i] < M[i] < 16384 */
+static void Encode(unsigned char *out,const uint16 *R,const uint16 *M,long long len)
+{
+ if (len == 1) {
+ uint16 r = R[0];
+ uint16 m = M[0];
+ while (m > 1) {
+ *out++ = r;
+ r >>= 8;
+ m = (m+255)>>8;
+ }
+ }
+ if (len > 1) {
+ uint16 R2[(len+1)/2];
+ uint16 M2[(len+1)/2];
+ long long i;
+ for (i = 0;i < len-1;i += 2) {
+ uint32 m0 = M[i];
+ uint32 r = R[i]+R[i+1]*m0;
+ uint32 m = M[i+1]*m0;
+ while (m >= 16384) {
+ *out++ = r;
+ r >>= 8;
+ m = (m+255)>>8;
+ }
+ R2[i/2] = r;
+ M2[i/2] = m;
+ }
+ if (i < len) {
+ R2[i/2] = R[i];
+ M2[i/2] = M[i];
+ }
+ Encode(out,R2,M2,(len+1)/2);
+ }
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/kem.c */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+#endif
+
+
+/* ----- masks */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* return -1 if x!=0; else return 0 */
+static int int16_nonzero_mask(int16 x)
+{
+ uint16 u = x; /* 0, else 1...65535 */
+ uint32 v = u; /* 0, else 1...65535 */
+ v = -v; /* 0, else 2^32-65535...2^32-1 */
+ v >>= 31; /* 0, else 1 */
+ return -v; /* 0, else -1 */
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* return -1 if x<0; otherwise return 0 */
+static int int16_negative_mask(int16 x)
+{
+ uint16 u = x;
+ u >>= 15;
+ return -(int) u;
+ /* alternative with gcc -fwrapv: */
+ /* x>>15 compiles to CPU's arithmetic right shift */
+}
+
+/* ----- arithmetic mod 3 */
+
+typedef int8 small;
+
+/* F3 is always represented as -1,0,1 */
+/* so ZZ_fromF3 is a no-op */
+
+/* x must not be close to top int16 */
+static small F3_freeze(int16 x)
+{
+ return int32_mod_uint14(x+1,3)-1;
+}
+
+/* ----- arithmetic mod q */
+
+#define q12 ((q-1)/2)
+typedef int16 Fq;
+/* always represented as -q12...q12 */
+/* so ZZ_fromFq is a no-op */
+
+/* x must not be close to top int32 */
+static Fq Fq_freeze(int32 x)
+{
+ return int32_mod_uint14(x+q12,q)-q12;
+}
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+static Fq Fq_recip(Fq a1)
+{
+ int i = 1;
+ Fq ai = a1;
+
+ while (i < q-2) {
+ ai = Fq_freeze(a1*(int32)ai);
+ i += 1;
+ }
+ return ai;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Top and Right */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+#define tau 16
+
+static int8 Top(Fq C)
+{
+ return (tau1*(int32)(C+tau0)+16384)>>15;
+}
+
+static Fq Right(int8 T)
+{
+ return Fq_freeze(tau3*(int32)T-tau2);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ----- small polynomials */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* 0 if Weightw_is(r), else -1 */
+static int Weightw_mask(small *r)
+{
+ int weight = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) weight += r[i]&1;
+ return int16_nonzero_mask(weight-w);
+}
+
+/* R3_fromR(R_fromRq(r)) */
+static void R3_fromRq(small *out,const Fq *r)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = F3_freeze(r[i]);
+}
+
+/* h = f*g in the ring R3 */
+static void R3_mult(small *h,const small *f,const small *g)
+{
+ small fg[p+p-1];
+ small result;
+ int i,j;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) {
+ result = 0;
+ for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) result = F3_freeze(result+f[j]*g[i-j]);
+ fg[i] = result;
+ }
+ for (i = p;i < p+p-1;++i) {
+ result = 0;
+ for (j = i-p+1;j < p;++j) result = F3_freeze(result+f[j]*g[i-j]);
+ fg[i] = result;
+ }
+
+ for (i = p+p-2;i >= p;--i) {
+ fg[i-p] = F3_freeze(fg[i-p]+fg[i]);
+ fg[i-p+1] = F3_freeze(fg[i-p+1]+fg[i]);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = fg[i];
+}
+
+/* returns 0 if recip succeeded; else -1 */
+static int R3_recip(small *out,const small *in)
+{
+ small f[p+1],g[p+1],v[p+1],r[p+1];
+ int i,loop,delta;
+ int sign,swap,t;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) v[i] = 0;
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = 0;
+ r[0] = 1;
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) f[i] = 0;
+ f[0] = 1; f[p-1] = f[p] = -1;
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[p-1-i] = in[i];
+ g[p] = 0;
+
+ delta = 1;
+
+ for (loop = 0;loop < 2*p-1;++loop) {
+ for (i = p;i > 0;--i) v[i] = v[i-1];
+ v[0] = 0;
+
+ sign = -g[0]*f[0];
+ swap = int16_negative_mask(-delta) & int16_nonzero_mask(g[0]);
+ delta ^= swap&(delta^-delta);
+ delta += 1;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) {
+ t = swap&(f[i]^g[i]); f[i] ^= t; g[i] ^= t;
+ t = swap&(v[i]^r[i]); v[i] ^= t; r[i] ^= t;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) g[i] = F3_freeze(g[i]+sign*f[i]);
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = F3_freeze(r[i]+sign*v[i]);
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[i] = g[i+1];
+ g[p] = 0;
+ }
+
+ sign = f[0];
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = sign*v[p-1-i];
+
+ return int16_nonzero_mask(delta);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- polynomials mod q */
+
+/* h = f*g in the ring Rq */
+static void Rq_mult_small(Fq *h,const Fq *f,const small *g)
+{
+ Fq fg[p+p-1];
+ Fq result;
+ int i,j;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) {
+ result = 0;
+ for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) result = Fq_freeze(result+f[j]*(int32)g[i-j]);
+ fg[i] = result;
+ }
+ for (i = p;i < p+p-1;++i) {
+ result = 0;
+ for (j = i-p+1;j < p;++j) result = Fq_freeze(result+f[j]*(int32)g[i-j]);
+ fg[i] = result;
+ }
+
+ for (i = p+p-2;i >= p;--i) {
+ fg[i-p] = Fq_freeze(fg[i-p]+fg[i]);
+ fg[i-p+1] = Fq_freeze(fg[i-p+1]+fg[i]);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = fg[i];
+}
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* h = 3f in Rq */
+static void Rq_mult3(Fq *h,const Fq *f)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = Fq_freeze(3*f[i]);
+}
+
+/* out = 1/(3*in) in Rq */
+/* returns 0 if recip succeeded; else -1 */
+static int Rq_recip3(Fq *out,const small *in)
+{
+ Fq f[p+1],g[p+1],v[p+1],r[p+1];
+ int i,loop,delta;
+ int swap,t;
+ int32 f0,g0;
+ Fq scale;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) v[i] = 0;
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = 0;
+ r[0] = Fq_recip(3);
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) f[i] = 0;
+ f[0] = 1; f[p-1] = f[p] = -1;
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[p-1-i] = in[i];
+ g[p] = 0;
+
+ delta = 1;
+
+ for (loop = 0;loop < 2*p-1;++loop) {
+ for (i = p;i > 0;--i) v[i] = v[i-1];
+ v[0] = 0;
+
+ swap = int16_negative_mask(-delta) & int16_nonzero_mask(g[0]);
+ delta ^= swap&(delta^-delta);
+ delta += 1;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) {
+ t = swap&(f[i]^g[i]); f[i] ^= t; g[i] ^= t;
+ t = swap&(v[i]^r[i]); v[i] ^= t; r[i] ^= t;
+ }
+
+ f0 = f[0];
+ g0 = g[0];
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) g[i] = Fq_freeze(f0*g[i]-g0*f[i]);
+ for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = Fq_freeze(f0*r[i]-g0*v[i]);
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[i] = g[i+1];
+ g[p] = 0;
+ }
+
+ scale = Fq_recip(f[0]);
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = Fq_freeze(scale*(int32)v[p-1-i]);
+
+ return int16_nonzero_mask(delta);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- rounded polynomials mod q */
+
+static void Round(Fq *out,const Fq *a)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = a[i]-F3_freeze(a[i]);
+}
+
+/* ----- sorting to generate short polynomial */
+
+static void Short_fromlist(small *out,const uint32 *in)
+{
+ uint32 L[p];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < w;++i) L[i] = in[i]&(uint32)-2;
+ for (i = w;i < p;++i) L[i] = (in[i]&(uint32)-3)|1;
+ crypto_sort_uint32(L,p);
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = (L[i]&3)-1;
+}
+
+/* ----- underlying hash function */
+
+#define Hash_bytes 32
+
+/* e.g., b = 0 means out = Hash0(in) */
+static void Hash_prefix(unsigned char *out,int b,const unsigned char *in,int inlen)
+{
+ unsigned char x[inlen+1];
+ unsigned char h[64];
+ int i;
+
+ x[0] = b;
+ for (i = 0;i < inlen;++i) x[i+1] = in[i];
+ crypto_hash_sha512(h,x,inlen+1);
+ for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) out[i] = h[i];
+}
+
+/* ----- higher-level randomness */
+
+static uint32 urandom32(void)
+{
+ unsigned char c[4];
+ uint32 out[4];
+
+ randombytes(c,4);
+ out[0] = (uint32)c[0];
+ out[1] = ((uint32)c[1])<<8;
+ out[2] = ((uint32)c[2])<<16;
+ out[3] = ((uint32)c[3])<<24;
+ return out[0]+out[1]+out[2]+out[3];
+}
+
+static void Short_random(small *out)
+{
+ uint32 L[p];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) L[i] = urandom32();
+ Short_fromlist(out,L);
+}
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+static void Small_random(small *out)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = (((urandom32()&0x3fffffff)*3)>>30)-1;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime Core */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* h,(f,ginv) = KeyGen() */
+static void KeyGen(Fq *h,small *f,small *ginv)
+{
+ small g[p];
+ Fq finv[p];
+
+ for (;;) {
+ Small_random(g);
+ if (R3_recip(ginv,g) == 0) break;
+ }
+ Short_random(f);
+ Rq_recip3(finv,f); /* always works */
+ Rq_mult_small(h,finv,g);
+}
+
+/* c = Encrypt(r,h) */
+static void Encrypt(Fq *c,const small *r,const Fq *h)
+{
+ Fq hr[p];
+
+ Rq_mult_small(hr,h,r);
+ Round(c,hr);
+}
+
+/* r = Decrypt(c,(f,ginv)) */
+static void Decrypt(small *r,const Fq *c,const small *f,const small *ginv)
+{
+ Fq cf[p];
+ Fq cf3[p];
+ small e[p];
+ small ev[p];
+ int mask;
+ int i;
+
+ Rq_mult_small(cf,c,f);
+ Rq_mult3(cf3,cf);
+ R3_fromRq(e,cf3);
+ R3_mult(ev,e,ginv);
+
+ mask = Weightw_mask(ev); /* 0 if weight w, else -1 */
+ for (i = 0;i < w;++i) r[i] = ((ev[i]^1)&~mask)^1;
+ for (i = w;i < p;++i) r[i] = ev[i]&~mask;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- NTRU LPRime Core */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+/* (G,A),a = KeyGen(G); leaves G unchanged */
+static void KeyGen(Fq *A,small *a,const Fq *G)
+{
+ Fq aG[p];
+
+ Short_random(a);
+ Rq_mult_small(aG,G,a);
+ Round(A,aG);
+}
+
+/* B,T = Encrypt(r,(G,A),b) */
+static void Encrypt(Fq *B,int8 *T,const int8 *r,const Fq *G,const Fq *A,const small *b)
+{
+ Fq bG[p];
+ Fq bA[p];
+ int i;
+
+ Rq_mult_small(bG,G,b);
+ Round(B,bG);
+ Rq_mult_small(bA,A,b);
+ for (i = 0;i < I;++i) T[i] = Top(Fq_freeze(bA[i]+r[i]*q12));
+}
+
+/* r = Decrypt((B,T),a) */
+static void Decrypt(int8 *r,const Fq *B,const int8 *T,const small *a)
+{
+ Fq aB[p];
+ int i;
+
+ Rq_mult_small(aB,B,a);
+ for (i = 0;i < I;++i)
+ r[i] = -int16_negative_mask(Fq_freeze(Right(T[i])-aB[i]+4*w+1));
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- encoding I-bit inputs */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Inputs_bytes (I/8)
+typedef int8 Inputs[I]; /* passed by reference */
+
+static void Inputs_encode(unsigned char *s,const Inputs r)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) s[i] = 0;
+ for (i = 0;i < I;++i) s[i>>3] |= r[i]<<(i&7);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Expand */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+static const unsigned char aes_nonce[16] = {0};
+
+static void Expand(uint32 *L,const unsigned char *k)
+{
+ int i;
+ crypto_stream_aes256ctr((unsigned char *) L,4*p,aes_nonce,k);
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) {
+ uint32 L0 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i];
+ uint32 L1 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i+1];
+ uint32 L2 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i+2];
+ uint32 L3 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i+3];
+ L[i] = L0+(L1<<8)+(L2<<16)+(L3<<24);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Seeds */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Seeds_bytes 32
+
+static void Seeds_random(unsigned char *s)
+{
+ randombytes(s,Seeds_bytes);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Generator, HashShort */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+/* G = Generator(k) */
+static void Generator(Fq *G,const unsigned char *k)
+{
+ uint32 L[p];
+ int i;
+
+ Expand(L,k);
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) G[i] = uint32_mod_uint14(L[i],q)-q12;
+}
+
+/* out = HashShort(r) */
+static void HashShort(small *out,const Inputs r)
+{
+ unsigned char s[Inputs_bytes];
+ unsigned char h[Hash_bytes];
+ uint32 L[p];
+
+ Inputs_encode(s,r);
+ Hash_prefix(h,5,s,sizeof s);
+ Expand(L,h);
+ Short_fromlist(out,L);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- NTRU LPRime Expand */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+/* (S,A),a = XKeyGen() */
+static void XKeyGen(unsigned char *S,Fq *A,small *a)
+{
+ Fq G[p];
+
+ Seeds_random(S);
+ Generator(G,S);
+ KeyGen(A,a,G);
+}
+
+/* B,T = XEncrypt(r,(S,A)) */
+static void XEncrypt(Fq *B,int8 *T,const int8 *r,const unsigned char *S,const Fq *A)
+{
+ Fq G[p];
+ small b[p];
+
+ Generator(G,S);
+ HashShort(b,r);
+ Encrypt(B,T,r,G,A,b);
+}
+
+#define XDecrypt Decrypt
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- encoding small polynomials (including short polynomials) */
+
+#define Small_bytes ((p+3)/4)
+
+/* these are the only functions that rely on p mod 4 = 1 */
+
+static void Small_encode(unsigned char *s,const small *f)
+{
+ small x;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p/4;++i) {
+ x = *f++ + 1;
+ x += (*f++ + 1)<<2;
+ x += (*f++ + 1)<<4;
+ x += (*f++ + 1)<<6;
+ *s++ = x;
+ }
+ x = *f++ + 1;
+ *s++ = x;
+}
+
+static void Small_decode(small *f,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+ unsigned char x;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p/4;++i) {
+ x = *s++;
+ *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1; x >>= 2;
+ *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1; x >>= 2;
+ *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1; x >>= 2;
+ *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1;
+ }
+ x = *s++;
+ *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1;
+}
+
+/* ----- encoding general polynomials */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+static void Rq_encode(unsigned char *s,const Fq *r)
+{
+ uint16 R[p],M[p];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) R[i] = r[i]+q12;
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = q;
+ Encode(s,R,M,p);
+}
+
+static void Rq_decode(Fq *r,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+ uint16 R[p],M[p];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = q;
+ Decode(R,s,M,p);
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) r[i] = ((Fq)R[i])-q12;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- encoding rounded polynomials */
+
+static void Rounded_encode(unsigned char *s,const Fq *r)
+{
+ uint16 R[p],M[p];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) R[i] = ((r[i]+q12)*10923)>>15;
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = (q+2)/3;
+ Encode(s,R,M,p);
+}
+
+static void Rounded_decode(Fq *r,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+ uint16 R[p],M[p];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = (q+2)/3;
+ Decode(R,s,M,p);
+ for (i = 0;i < p;++i) r[i] = R[i]*3-q12;
+}
+
+/* ----- encoding top polynomials */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Top_bytes (I/2)
+
+static void Top_encode(unsigned char *s,const int8 *T)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0;i < Top_bytes;++i)
+ s[i] = T[2*i]+(T[2*i+1]<<4);
+}
+
+static void Top_decode(int8 *T,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0;i < Top_bytes;++i) {
+ T[2*i] = s[i]&15;
+ T[2*i+1] = s[i]>>4;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime Core plus encoding */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+typedef small Inputs[p]; /* passed by reference */
+#define Inputs_random Short_random
+#define Inputs_encode Small_encode
+#define Inputs_bytes Small_bytes
+
+#define Ciphertexts_bytes Rounded_bytes
+#define SecretKeys_bytes (2*Small_bytes)
+#define PublicKeys_bytes Rq_bytes
+
+/* pk,sk = ZKeyGen() */
+static void ZKeyGen(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ Fq h[p];
+ small f[p],v[p];
+
+ KeyGen(h,f,v);
+ Rq_encode(pk,h);
+ Small_encode(sk,f); sk += Small_bytes;
+ Small_encode(sk,v);
+}
+
+/* C = ZEncrypt(r,pk) */
+static void ZEncrypt(unsigned char *C,const Inputs r,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+ Fq h[p];
+ Fq c[p];
+ Rq_decode(h,pk);
+ Encrypt(c,r,h);
+ Rounded_encode(C,c);
+}
+
+/* r = ZDecrypt(C,sk) */
+static void ZDecrypt(Inputs r,const unsigned char *C,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ small f[p],v[p];
+ Fq c[p];
+
+ Small_decode(f,sk); sk += Small_bytes;
+ Small_decode(v,sk);
+ Rounded_decode(c,C);
+ Decrypt(r,c,f,v);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- NTRU LPRime Expand plus encoding */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Ciphertexts_bytes (Rounded_bytes+Top_bytes)
+#define SecretKeys_bytes Small_bytes
+#define PublicKeys_bytes (Seeds_bytes+Rounded_bytes)
+
+static void Inputs_random(Inputs r)
+{
+ unsigned char s[Inputs_bytes];
+ int i;
+
+ randombytes(s,sizeof s);
+ for (i = 0;i < I;++i) r[i] = 1&(s[i>>3]>>(i&7));
+}
+
+/* pk,sk = ZKeyGen() */
+static void ZKeyGen(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ Fq A[p];
+ small a[p];
+
+ XKeyGen(pk,A,a); pk += Seeds_bytes;
+ Rounded_encode(pk,A);
+ Small_encode(sk,a);
+}
+
+/* c = ZEncrypt(r,pk) */
+static void ZEncrypt(unsigned char *c,const Inputs r,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+ Fq A[p];
+ Fq B[p];
+ int8 T[I];
+
+ Rounded_decode(A,pk+Seeds_bytes);
+ XEncrypt(B,T,r,pk,A);
+ Rounded_encode(c,B); c += Rounded_bytes;
+ Top_encode(c,T);
+}
+
+/* r = ZDecrypt(C,sk) */
+static void ZDecrypt(Inputs r,const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ small a[p];
+ Fq B[p];
+ int8 T[I];
+
+ Small_decode(a,sk);
+ Rounded_decode(B,c);
+ Top_decode(T,c+Rounded_bytes);
+ XDecrypt(r,B,T,a);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- confirmation hash */
+
+#define Confirm_bytes 32
+
+/* h = HashConfirm(r,pk,cache); cache is Hash4(pk) */
+static void HashConfirm(unsigned char *h,const unsigned char *r,const unsigned char *pk,const unsigned char *cache)
+{
+#ifndef LPR
+ unsigned char x[Hash_bytes*2];
+ int i;
+
+ Hash_prefix(x,3,r,Inputs_bytes);
+ for (i = 0;i < Hash_bytes;++i) x[Hash_bytes+i] = cache[i];
+#else
+ unsigned char x[Inputs_bytes+Hash_bytes];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) x[i] = r[i];
+ for (i = 0;i < Hash_bytes;++i) x[Inputs_bytes+i] = cache[i];
+#endif
+ Hash_prefix(h,2,x,sizeof x);
+}
+
+/* ----- session-key hash */
+
+/* k = HashSession(b,y,z) */
+static void HashSession(unsigned char *k,int b,const unsigned char *y,const unsigned char *z)
+{
+#ifndef LPR
+ unsigned char x[Hash_bytes+Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes];
+ int i;
+
+ Hash_prefix(x,3,y,Inputs_bytes);
+ for (i = 0;i < Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes;++i) x[Hash_bytes+i] = z[i];
+#else
+ unsigned char x[Inputs_bytes+Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) x[i] = y[i];
+ for (i = 0;i < Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes;++i) x[Inputs_bytes+i] = z[i];
+#endif
+ Hash_prefix(k,b,x,sizeof x);
+}
+
+/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime and NTRU LPRime */
+
+/* pk,sk = KEM_KeyGen() */
+static void KEM_KeyGen(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ ZKeyGen(pk,sk); sk += SecretKeys_bytes;
+ for (i = 0;i < PublicKeys_bytes;++i) *sk++ = pk[i];
+ randombytes(sk,Inputs_bytes); sk += Inputs_bytes;
+ Hash_prefix(sk,4,pk,PublicKeys_bytes);
+}
+
+/* c,r_enc = Hide(r,pk,cache); cache is Hash4(pk) */
+static void Hide(unsigned char *c,unsigned char *r_enc,const Inputs r,const unsigned char *pk,const unsigned char *cache)
+{
+ Inputs_encode(r_enc,r);
+ ZEncrypt(c,r,pk); c += Ciphertexts_bytes;
+ HashConfirm(c,r_enc,pk,cache);
+}
+
+/* c,k = Encap(pk) */
+static void Encap(unsigned char *c,unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+ Inputs r;
+ unsigned char r_enc[Inputs_bytes];
+ unsigned char cache[Hash_bytes];
+
+ Hash_prefix(cache,4,pk,PublicKeys_bytes);
+ Inputs_random(r);
+ Hide(c,r_enc,r,pk,cache);
+ HashSession(k,1,r_enc,c);
+}
+
+/* 0 if matching ciphertext+confirm, else -1 */
+static int Ciphertexts_diff_mask(const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *c2)
+{
+ uint16 differentbits = 0;
+ int len = Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes;
+
+ while (len-- > 0) differentbits |= (*c++)^(*c2++);
+ return (1&((differentbits-1)>>8))-1;
+}
+
+/* k = Decap(c,sk) */
+static void Decap(unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + SecretKeys_bytes;
+ const unsigned char *rho = pk + PublicKeys_bytes;
+ const unsigned char *cache = rho + Inputs_bytes;
+ Inputs r;
+ unsigned char r_enc[Inputs_bytes];
+ unsigned char cnew[Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes];
+ int mask;
+ int i;
+
+ ZDecrypt(r,c,sk);
+ Hide(cnew,r_enc,r,pk,cache);
+ mask = Ciphertexts_diff_mask(c,cnew);
+ for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) r_enc[i] ^= mask&(r_enc[i]^rho[i]);
+ HashSession(k,1+mask,r_enc,c);
+}
+
+/* ----- crypto_kem API */
+
+
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ KEM_KeyGen(pk,sk);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc(unsigned char *c,unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+ Encap(c,k,pk);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec(unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+ Decap(k,c,sk);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* USE_SNTRUP761X25519 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sntrup761.sh b/crypto/openssh/sntrup761.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5cd5f92c31d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sntrup761.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: sntrup761.sh,v 1.5 2021/01/08 02:33:13 dtucker Exp $
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+#
+AUTHOR="supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/implementors"
+FILES="
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/int32_minmax.inc
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/sort.c
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/uint32/useint32/sort.c
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/uint32.c
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/int32.c
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/paramsmenu.h
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/params.h
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.h
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.c
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.h
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.c
+ supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/kem.c
+"
+###
+
+set -e
+cd $1
+echo -n '/* $'
+echo 'OpenBSD: $ */'
+echo
+echo '/*'
+echo ' * Public Domain, Authors:'
+sed -e '/Alphabetical order:/d' -e 's/^/ * - /' < $AUTHOR
+echo ' */'
+echo
+echo '#include <string.h>'
+echo '#include "crypto_api.h"'
+echo
+# Map the types used in this code to the ones in crypto_api.h. We use #define
+# instead of typedef since some systems have existing intXX types and do not
+# permit multiple typedefs even if they do not conflict.
+for t in int8 uint8 int16 uint16 int32 uint32 int64 uint64; do
+ echo "#define $t crypto_${t}"
+done
+echo
+for i in $FILES; do
+ echo "/* from $i */"
+ # Changes to all files:
+ # - remove all includes, we inline everything required.
+ # - make functions not required elsewhere static.
+ # - rename the functions we do use.
+ # - remove unneccesary defines and externs.
+ sed -e "/#include/d" \
+ -e "s/crypto_kem_/crypto_kem_sntrup761_/g" \
+ -e "s/^void /static void /g" \
+ -e "s/^int16 /static int16 /g" \
+ -e "s/^uint16 /static uint16 /g" \
+ -e "/^extern /d" \
+ -e '/CRYPTO_NAMESPACE/d' \
+ -e "/^#define int32 crypto_int32/d" \
+ $i | \
+ case "$i" in
+ # Use int64_t for intermediate values in int32_MINMAX to prevent signed
+ # 32-bit integer overflow when called by crypto_sort_uint32.
+ */int32_minmax.inc)
+ sed -e "s/int32 ab = b ^ a/int64_t ab = (int64_t)b ^ (int64_t)a/" \
+ -e "s/int32 c = b - a/int64_t c = (int64_t)b - (int64_t)a/"
+ ;;
+ */int32/portable4/sort.c)
+ sed -e "s/void crypto_sort/void crypto_sort_int32/g"
+ ;;
+ */uint32/useint32/sort.c)
+ sed -e "s/void crypto_sort/void crypto_sort_uint32/g"
+ ;;
+ # Remove unused function to prevent warning.
+ */crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/int32.c)
+ sed -e '/ int32_div_uint14/,/^}$/d'
+ ;;
+ # Remove unused function to prevent warning.
+ */crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/uint32.c)
+ sed -e '/ uint32_div_uint14/,/^}$/d'
+ ;;
+ # Default: pass through.
+ *)
+ cat
+ ;;
+ esac
+ echo
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/srclimit.c b/crypto/openssh/srclimit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5014ed79f296
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/srclimit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Darren Tucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "addr.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "srclimit.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+static int max_children, max_persource, ipv4_masklen, ipv6_masklen;
+
+/* Per connection state, used to enforce unauthenticated connection limit. */
+static struct child_info {
+ int id;
+ struct xaddr addr;
+} *child;
+
+void
+srclimit_init(int max, int persource, int ipv4len, int ipv6len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ max_children = max;
+ ipv4_masklen = ipv4len;
+ ipv6_masklen = ipv6len;
+ max_persource = persource;
+ if (max_persource == INT_MAX) /* no limit */
+ return;
+ debug("%s: max connections %d, per source %d, masks %d,%d", __func__,
+ max, persource, ipv4len, ipv6len);
+ if (max <= 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid number of sockets: %d", __func__, max);
+ child = xcalloc(max_children, sizeof(*child));
+ for (i = 0; i < max_children; i++)
+ child[i].id = -1;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 if connection allowed, 0 if not allowed. */
+int
+srclimit_check_allow(int sock, int id)
+{
+ struct xaddr xa, xb, xmask;
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr;
+ int i, bits, first_unused, count = 0;
+ char xas[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+ if (max_persource == INT_MAX) /* no limit */
+ return 1;
+
+ debug("%s: sock %d id %d limit %d", __func__, sock, id, max_persource);
+ if (getpeername(sock, sa, &addrlen) != 0)
+ return 1; /* not remote socket? */
+ if (addr_sa_to_xaddr(sa, addrlen, &xa) != 0)
+ return 1; /* unknown address family? */
+
+ /* Mask address off address to desired size. */
+ bits = xa.af == AF_INET ? ipv4_masklen : ipv6_masklen;
+ if (addr_netmask(xa.af, bits, &xmask) != 0 ||
+ addr_and(&xb, &xa, &xmask) != 0) {
+ debug3("%s: invalid mask %d bits", __func__, bits);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ first_unused = max_children;
+ /* Count matching entries and find first unused one. */
+ for (i = 0; i < max_children; i++) {
+ if (child[i].id == -1) {
+ if (i < first_unused)
+ first_unused = i;
+ } else if (addr_cmp(&child[i].addr, &xb) == 0) {
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (addr_ntop(&xa, xas, sizeof(xas)) != 0) {
+ debug3("%s: addr ntop failed", __func__);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ debug3("%s: new unauthenticated connection from %s/%d, at %d of %d",
+ __func__, xas, bits, count, max_persource);
+
+ if (first_unused == max_children) { /* no free slot found */
+ debug3("%s: no free slot", __func__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (first_unused < 0 || first_unused >= max_children)
+ fatal("%s: internal error: first_unused out of range",
+ __func__);
+
+ if (count >= max_persource)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Connection allowed, store masked address. */
+ child[first_unused].id = id;
+ memcpy(&child[first_unused].addr, &xb, sizeof(xb));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void
+srclimit_done(int id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (max_persource == INT_MAX) /* no limit */
+ return;
+
+ debug("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
+ /* Clear corresponding state entry. */
+ for (i = 0; i < max_children; i++) {
+ if (child[i].id == id) {
+ child[i].id = -1;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c b/crypto/openssh/srclimit.h
similarity index 67%
copy from crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
copy to crypto/openssh/srclimit.h
index 7f6d779bedb3..6e04f32b3ff7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/srclimit.h
@@ -1,45 +1,18 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Darren Tucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-static int fail = 0;
-
-void
-test(const char *a)
-{
- char *b;
-
- b = strdup(a);
- if (b == 0) {
- fail = 1;
- return;
- }
- if (strcmp(a, b) != 0)
- fail = 1;
- free(b);
-}
-
-int
-main(void)
-{
- test("");
- test("a");
- test("\0");
- test("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz");
- return fail;
-}
+void srclimit_init(int, int, int, int);
+int srclimit_check_allow(int, int);
+void srclimit_done(int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1
index d5da9279c5f9..2786df514178 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,211 +1,262 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.66 2017/08/29 13:05:58 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.81 2020/07/14 23:57:01 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 29 2017 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 14 2020 $
.Dt SSH-ADD 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-add
-.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
+.Nd adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-add
-.Op Fl cDdkLlqXx
+.Op Fl cDdKkLlqvXx
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl S Ar provider
.Op Fl t Ar life
.Op Ar
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl s Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl e Ar pkcs11
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl T
+.Ar pubkey ...
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
When run without arguments, it adds the files
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .
After loading a private key,
.Nm
will try to load corresponding certificate information from the
filename obtained by appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to the name of the private key file.
Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
.Pp
If any file requires a passphrase,
.Nm
asks for the passphrase from the user.
The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
.Nm
retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
.Pp
The authentication agent must be running and the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable must contain the name of its socket for
.Nm
to work.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl c
Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
being used for authentication.
Confirmation is performed by
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
rather than text entered into the requester.
.It Fl D
Deletes all identities from the agent.
.It Fl d
Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
If
.Nm
has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
their corresponding certificates will be removed.
Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
If no public key is found at a given path,
.Nm
will append
.Pa .pub
and retry.
+If the argument list consists of
+.Dq -
+then
+.Nm
+will read public keys to be removed from standard input.
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl e Ar pkcs11
Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
+.It Fl K
+Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
.It Fl k
When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private
keys only and skip certificates.
.It Fl L
Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
by the agent.
.It Fl l
Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
.It Fl q
Be quiet after a successful operation.
+.It Fl S Ar provider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
+internal USB HID support.
.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
+.It Fl T Ar pubkey ...
+Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified
+.Ar pubkey
+files are usable by performing sign and verify operations on each.
.It Fl t Ar life
Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
specified in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in debugging problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
.It Fl X
Unlock the agent.
.It Fl x
Lock the agent with a password.
.El
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS"
+.It Ev "DISPLAY", "SSH_ASKPASS" and "SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE"
If
.Nm
needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
terminal if it was run from a terminal.
If
.Nm
does not have a terminal associated with it but
.Ev DISPLAY
and
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
are set, it will execute the program specified by
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
(by default
.Dq ssh-askpass )
and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
This is particularly useful when calling
.Nm
from a
.Pa .xsession
or related script.
-(Note that on some machines it
-may be necessary to redirect the input from
-.Pa /dev/null
-to make this work.)
+.Pp
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
+allows further control over the use of an askpass program.
+If this variable is set to
+.Dq never
+then
+.Nm
+will never attempt to use one.
+If it is set to
+.Dq prefer ,
+then
+.Nm
+will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY when requesting
+passwords.
+Finally, if the variable is set to
+.Dq force ,
+then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase input regardless
+of whether
+.Ev DISPLAY
+is set.
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
.El
.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-Contains the Ed25519 authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the RSA authentication identity of the user.
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
.El
.Pp
Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.
Note that
.Nm
ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
.Sh EXIT STATUS
Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails,
and 2 if
.Nm
is unable to contact the authentication agent.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
index 627c02983685..92192fcfa23c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,699 +1,864 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.136 2018/09/19 02:03:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.160 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation,
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
/* Default files to add */
static char *default_files[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA,
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK,
#endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519,
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS,
NULL
};
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
static int lifetime = 0;
/* User has to confirm key use */
static int confirm = 0;
/* Maximum number of signatures (XMSS) */
static u_int maxsign = 0;
static u_int minleft = 0;
/* we keep a cache of one passphrase */
static char *pass = NULL;
static void
clear_pass(void)
{
if (pass) {
- explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
- free(pass);
+ freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
pass = NULL;
}
}
+static int
+delete_one(int agent_fd, const struct sshkey *key, const char *comment,
+ const char *path, int qflag)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, key)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+ path, ssh_err(r));
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (!qflag) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s %s (%s)\n", path,
+ sshkey_type(key), comment);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+delete_stdin(int agent_fd, int qflag)
+{
+ char *line = NULL, *cp;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int lnum = 0, r, ret = -1;
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, stdin) != -1) {
+ lnum++;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
+ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+ continue;
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_new");
+ if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "(stdin):%d: invalid key", lnum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (delete_one(agent_fd, key, cp, "(stdin)", qflag) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(line);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int
delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag)
{
struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL;
char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
int r, ret = -1;
+ if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0)
+ return delete_stdin(agent_fd, qflag);
+
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
- if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) {
- if (!qflag) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n",
- filename, comment);
- }
+ if (delete_one(agent_fd, public, comment, filename, qflag) == 0)
ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
- filename, ssh_err(r));
if (key_only)
goto out;
/* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
free(comment);
comment = NULL;
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
- error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
- certpath, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Failed to load certificate \"%s\"", certpath);
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public))
fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
- if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) {
- if (!qflag) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n",
- certpath, comment);
- }
+ if (delete_one(agent_fd, cert, comment, certpath, qflag) == 0)
ret = 0;
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
- certpath, ssh_err(r));
out:
sshkey_free(cert);
sshkey_free(public);
free(certpath);
free(comment);
return ret;
}
/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
static int
delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
{
int ret = -1;
/*
* Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked
* to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2
* keys.
*/
if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0)
ret = 0;
/* ignore error-code for ssh1 */
ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1);
if (ret != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
else if (!qflag)
fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
return ret;
}
static int
-add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag)
+add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag,
+ const char *skprovider)
{
struct sshkey *private, *cert;
char *comment = NULL;
char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
int r, fd, ret = -1;
size_t i;
u_int32_t left;
struct sshbuf *keyblob;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
fd = STDIN_FILENO;
filename = "(stdin)";
- } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
perror(filename);
return -1;
}
/*
* Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
* will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
*/
if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
}
- if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, keyblob)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &keyblob)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
/* At first, try empty passphrase */
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private,
&comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto fail_load;
}
/* try last */
if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private,
&comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto fail_load;
}
}
if (private == NULL) {
/* clear passphrase since it did not work */
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ",
filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
for (;;) {
pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
goto fail_load;
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
&private, &comment)) == 0)
break;
else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
fail_load:
clear_pass();
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return -1;
}
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
"Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename,
confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
}
}
if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0')
comment = xstrdup(filename);
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
/* For XMSS */
if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(private, filename)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not add filename to private key: %s (%s)\n",
filename, comment);
goto out;
}
if (maxsign && minleft &&
(r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (!sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], private))
continue;
left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
if (left < minleft) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Only %d signatures left.\n", left);
break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Skipping update: ");
if (left == minleft) {
fprintf(stderr,
- "required signatures left (%d).\n", left);
+ "required signatures left (%d).\n", left);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
- "more signatures left (%d) than"
+ "more signatures left (%d) than"
" required (%d).\n", left, minleft);
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
goto out;
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
}
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(private)) {
+ if (skprovider == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load FIDO key %s "
+ "without provider\n", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((private->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "FIDO verify-required key %s is not "
+ "currently supported by ssh-agent\n", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Don't send provider constraint for other keys */
+ skprovider = NULL;
+ }
+
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
- lifetime, confirm, maxsign)) == 0) {
+ lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) == 0) {
ret = 0;
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n",
filename, comment);
if (lifetime != 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
}
if (confirm != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
"each use of the key\n");
}
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */
if (key_only)
goto out;
/* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
- error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
- certpath, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Failed to load certificate \"%s\"", certpath);
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) {
error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
/* Graft with private bits */
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified");
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy");
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
sshkey_free(cert);
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
- lifetime, confirm, maxsign)) != 0) {
- error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath,
- private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r));
+ lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath,
+ private->cert->key_id);
goto out;
}
/* success */
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
private->cert->key_id);
if (lifetime != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n",
lifetime);
}
if (confirm != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use "
"of the key\n");
}
}
out:
free(certpath);
free(comment);
sshkey_free(private);
return ret;
}
static int
update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag)
{
char *pin = NULL;
int r, ret = -1;
if (add) {
if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
lifetime, confirm)) == 0) {
ret = 0;
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
add ? "added" : "removed", id);
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n",
add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r));
ret = -1;
}
free(pin);
return ret;
}
+static int
+test_key(int agent_fd, const char *filename)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ size_t slen = 0;
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ char data[1024];
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &key, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't read public key %s", filename);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ arc4random_buf(data, sizeof(data));
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(agent_fd, key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, 0)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Agent signature failed for %s", filename);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Signature verification failed for %s", filename);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ done:
+ free(sig);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int
list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp)
{
char *fp;
int r;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
u_int32_t left;
size_t i;
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n",
ssh_err(r));
else
printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (do_fp) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i],
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]),
fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i],
sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i]));
free(fp);
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n",
ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
fprintf(stdout, " %s", idlist->comments[i]);
left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
if (left > 0)
fprintf(stdout,
" [signatures left %d]", left);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
return 0;
}
static int
lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
{
char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
int r, passok = 1, ret = -1;
strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (lock) {
strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
passok = 0;
}
- explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2));
- free(p2);
+ freezero(p2, strlen(p2));
}
if (passok) {
if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
ret = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n",
lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r));
}
}
- explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1));
- free(p1);
+ freezero(p1, strlen(p1));
return (ret);
}
static int
-do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag)
+load_resident_keys(int agent_fd, const char *skprovider, int qflag)
+{
+ struct sshkey **keys;
+ size_t nkeys, i;
+ int r, ok = 0;
+ char *fp;
+
+ pass = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, NULL, pass,
+ &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys");
+ return r;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i],
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, keys[i], "",
+ lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to add key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ ok = r;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ok == 0)
+ ok = 1;
+ if (!qflag) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Resident identity added: %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp);
+ if (lifetime != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+ }
+ if (confirm != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
+ "each use of the key\n");
+ }
+ }
+ free(fp);
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ }
+ free(keys);
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ return ok == 1 ? 0 : ok;
+}
+
+static int
+do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag,
+ const char *skprovider)
{
if (deleting) {
if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
- if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
+ if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag, skprovider) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void
usage(void)
{
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname);
- fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -E hash Specify hash algorithm used for fingerprints.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -m minleft Maxsign is only changed if less than minleft are left (for XMSS)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -M maxsign Maximum number of signatures allowed (for XMSS)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -q Be quiet after a successful operation.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+" [-M maxsign] [-m minleft]\n"
+#endif
+" [file ...]\n"
+" ssh-add -s pkcs11\n"
+" ssh-add -e pkcs11\n"
+" ssh-add -T pubkey ...\n"
+ );
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int agent_fd;
- char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
- int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
- int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0;
+ char *pkcs11provider = NULL, *skprovider = NULL;
+ int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0, do_download = 0;
+ int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0, Tflag = 0;
+ SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+ LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-#endif
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
/* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your "
"authentication agent.\n");
exit(2);
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
exit(2);
}
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:M:m:qs:t:")) != -1) {
+ skprovider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vkKlLcdDTxXE:e:M:m:qs:S:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
+ case 'v':
+ if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ break;
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'k':
key_only = 1;
break;
+ case 'K':
+ do_download = 1;
+ break;
case 'l':
case 'L':
if (lflag != 0)
fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag);
lflag = ch;
break;
case 'x':
case 'X':
if (xflag != 0)
fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag);
xflag = ch;
break;
case 'c':
confirm = 1;
break;
case 'm':
minleft = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
if (minleft == 0) {
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'M':
maxsign = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
if (maxsign == 0) {
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'd':
deleting = 1;
break;
case 'D':
Dflag = 1;
break;
case 's':
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
+ case 'S':
+ skprovider = optarg;
+ break;
case 'e':
deleting = 1;
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
case 't':
- if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1 ||
+ lifetime < 0 || (u_long)lifetime > UINT32_MAX) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'q':
qflag = 1;
break;
+ case 'T':
+ Tflag = 1;
+ break;
default:
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
}
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1)
fatal("Invalid combination of actions");
else if (xflag) {
if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (lflag) {
if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (Dflag) {
if (delete_all(agent_fd, qflag) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ if (skprovider == NULL)
+ skprovider = "internal";
+#endif
+
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
+ if (Tflag) {
+ if (argc <= 0)
+ fatal("no keys to test");
+ for (r = i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+ r |= test_key(agent_fd, argv[i]);
+ ret = r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider,
qflag) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
+ if (do_download) {
+ if (skprovider == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
+ if (load_resident_keys(agent_fd, skprovider, qflag) != 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
if (argc == 0) {
char buf[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pw;
struct stat st;
int count = 0;
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
(u_int)getuid());
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
default_files[i]);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(buf, &st) == -1)
continue;
if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf,
- qflag) == -1)
+ qflag, skprovider) == -1)
ret = 1;
else
count++;
}
if (count == 0)
ret = 1;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only,
- argv[i], qflag) == -1)
+ argv[i], qflag, skprovider) == -1)
ret = 1;
}
}
- clear_pass();
-
done:
+ clear_pass();
ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
index 8f1b7e8a00b1..0320a2b0ff58 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,234 +1,236 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.64 2016/11/30 06:54:26 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.72 2020/06/22 05:52:05 djm Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 22 2020 $
.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-agent
-.Nd authentication agent
+.Nd OpenSSH authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Op Fl \&Ddx
.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
-.Op Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
+.Op Fl P Ar allowed_providers
.Op Fl t Ar life
-.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl P Ar allowed_providers
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Ar command Op Ar arg ...
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Fl k
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
-is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
-(RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519).
-.Nm
-is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and
-all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent
-program.
+is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication.
Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
machines using
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Pp
-The agent initially does not have any private keys.
-Keys are added using
-.Xr ssh 1
-(see
-.Cm AddKeysToAgent
-in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for details)
-or
-.Xr ssh-add 1 .
-Multiple identities may be stored in
-.Nm
-concurrently and
-.Xr ssh 1
-will automatically use them if present.
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-is also used to remove keys from
-.Nm
-and to query the keys that are held in one.
-.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl a Ar bind_address
Bind the agent to the
.Ux Ns -domain
socket
.Ar bind_address .
The default is
.Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
.It Fl c
Generate C-shell commands on
.Dv stdout .
This is the default if
.Ev SHELL
looks like it's a csh style of shell.
.It Fl D
Foreground mode.
When this option is specified
.Nm
will not fork.
.It Fl d
Debug mode.
When this option is specified
.Nm
will not fork and will write debug information to standard error.
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl k
Kill the current agent (given by the
.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
environment variable).
-.It Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
-Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared libraries
-that may be added using the
+.It Fl P Ar allowed_providers
+Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 provider and FIDO
+authenticator middleware shared libraries that may be used with the
+.Fl S
+or
.Fl s
-option to
+options to
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
-The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
-.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
-PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
+Libraries that do not match the pattern list will be refused.
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for a description of pattern-list syntax.
+The default list is
+.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
.It Fl s
Generate Bourne shell commands on
.Dv stdout .
This is the default if
.Ev SHELL
does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
.It Fl t Ar life
Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
A lifetime specified for an identity with
.Xr ssh-add 1
overrides this value.
Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
+.It Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+If a command (and optional arguments) is given,
+this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
+The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+line terminates.
.It Fl x
Exit after the last client has disconnected.
.El
.Pp
-If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
-When the command dies, so does the agent.
-.Pp
-The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
-terminal.
-Authentication data need not be stored on any other
-machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network.
-However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH
-remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the
-identities anywhere in the network in a secure way.
-.Pp
-There are two main ways to get an agent set up:
-The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment
-variables are exported, eg
+There are two main ways to get an agent set up.
+The first is at the start of an X session,
+where all other windows or programs are started as children of the
+.Nm
+program.
+The agent starts a command under which its environment
+variables are exported, for example
.Cm ssh-agent xterm & .
-The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either
-.Xr sh 1
-or
-.Xr csh 1
-syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg
-.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s`
-for Bourne-type shells such as
-.Xr sh 1
-or
-.Xr ksh 1
-and
-.Cm eval `ssh-agent -c`
-for
-.Xr csh 1
-and derivatives.
+When the command terminates, so does the agent.
.Pp
-Later
+The second method is used for a login session.
+When
+.Nm
+is started,
+it prints the shell commands required to set its environment variables,
+which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for example
+.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` .
+.Pp
+In both cases,
.Xr ssh 1
-looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
+looks at these environment variables
+and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
.Pp
-The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
-Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed
-by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester.
-This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
+The agent initially does not have any private keys.
+Keys are added using
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+or by
+.Xr ssh 1
+when
+.Cm AddKeysToAgent
+is set in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Multiple identities may be stored in
+.Nm
+concurrently and
+.Xr ssh 1
+will automatically use them if present.
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+is also used to remove keys from
+.Nm
+and to query the keys that are held in one.
.Pp
-A
+Connections to
+.Nm
+may be forwarded from further remote hosts using the
+.Fl A
+option to
+.Xr ssh 1
+(but see the caveats documented therein),
+avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines.
+Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network:
+the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections
+and the result is returned to the requester,
+allowing the user access to their identities anywhere in the network
+in a secure fashion.
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_AGENT_PID"
+.It Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+When
+.Nm
+starts, it stores the name of the agent's process ID (PID) in this variable.
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+When
+.Nm
+starts, it creates a
.Ux Ns -domain
-socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the
-.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-environment
-variable.
-The socket is made accessible only to the current user.
-This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same
-user.
-.Pp
-The
-.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
-environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
-.Pp
-The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
-line terminates.
+socket and stores its pathname in this variable.
+It is accessible only to the current user,
+but is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user.
+.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
index 7a35ca48cb6f..15949d2cc9ec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,1367 +1,1670 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.231 2018/05/11 03:38:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.278 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The authentication agent program.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
# include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-#endif
+#include "sk-api.h"
-#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
-# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
+#ifndef DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
+# define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
#endif
/* Maximum accepted message length */
#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024)
+/* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
+#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096)
typedef enum {
- AUTH_UNUSED,
- AUTH_SOCKET,
- AUTH_CONNECTION
+ AUTH_UNUSED = 0,
+ AUTH_SOCKET = 1,
+ AUTH_CONNECTION = 2,
} sock_type;
-typedef struct {
+typedef struct socket_entry {
int fd;
sock_type type;
struct sshbuf *input;
struct sshbuf *output;
struct sshbuf *request;
} SocketEntry;
u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
typedef struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
struct sshkey *key;
char *comment;
char *provider;
time_t death;
u_int confirm;
+ char *sk_provider;
} Identity;
struct idtable {
int nentries;
TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
};
/* private key table */
struct idtable *idtab;
int max_fd = 0;
/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
-/* PKCS#11 path whitelist */
-static char *pkcs11_whitelist;
+/* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
+static char *allowed_providers;
/* locking */
#define LOCK_SIZE 32
#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16
#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1
int locked = 0;
u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
extern char *__progname;
/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
-static long lifetime = 0;
+static int lifetime = 0;
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+/* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
+static int restrict_websafe = 1;
+
/*
* Client connection count; incremented in new_socket() and decremented in
* close_socket(). When it reaches 0, ssh-agent will exit. Since it is
* normally initialized to 1, it will never reach 0. However, if the -x
* option is specified, it is initialized to 0 in main(); in that case,
* ssh-agent will exit as soon as it has had at least one client but no
* longer has any.
*/
static int xcount = 1;
static void
close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
{
int last = 0;
if (e->type == AUTH_CONNECTION) {
debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount - 1);
if (--xcount == 0)
last = 1;
}
close(e->fd);
- e->fd = -1;
- e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sshbuf_free(e->input);
sshbuf_free(e->output);
sshbuf_free(e->request);
+ memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
+ e->fd = -1;
+ e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
if (last)
cleanup_exit(0);
}
static void
idtab_init(void)
{
idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab));
TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist);
idtab->nentries = 0;
}
static void
free_identity(Identity *id)
{
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->provider);
free(id->comment);
+ free(id->sk_provider);
free(id);
}
/* return matching private key for given public key */
static Identity *
lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
{
Identity *id;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
return (id);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
static int
-confirm_key(Identity *id)
+confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra)
{
char *p;
int ret = -1;
p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (p != NULL &&
- ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
- id->comment, p))
+ ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s",
+ id->comment, p,
+ extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra))
ret = 0;
free(p);
return (ret);
}
static void
send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
}
/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
static void
process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
+ debug2_f("entering");
+
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
- if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO))
- != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) {
- error("%s: put key/comment: %s", __func__,
- ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "compose key/comment");
continue;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static char *
agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
{
if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
return "rsa-sha2-256";
else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
return "rsa-sha2-512";
+ } else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+ if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
+ return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+ else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
+ return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com";
}
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth
+ * request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded
+ * key against the one that is being used for signing.
+ * Note: does not modify msg buffer.
+ * Optionally extract the username and session ID from the request.
+ */
+static int
+parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key,
+ char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL;
+ char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
+ int r;
+ u_char t, sig_follows;
+ struct sshkey *mkey = NULL;
+
+ if (userp != NULL)
+ *userp = NULL;
+ if (sess_idp != NULL)
+ *sess_idp = NULL;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
+
+ /* SSH userauth request */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+ (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */
+ goto out;
+ if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST ||
+ sig_follows != 1 ||
+ strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 ||
+ !sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) ||
+ sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ debug3_f("well formed userauth");
+ if (userp != NULL) {
+ *userp = user;
+ user = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sess_idp != NULL) {
+ *sess_idp = sess_id;
+ sess_id = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ sshbuf_free(sess_id);
+ free(user);
+ free(service);
+ free(method);
+ free(pkalg);
+ sshkey_free(mkey);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request.
+ * Note: does not modify buffer.
+ */
+static int
+parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */
+ goto out;
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
+ * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
+ * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
+ * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
+ * for the web.
+ */
+static int
+check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data)
+{
+ if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
+ debug_f("signed data matches public key userauth request");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) {
+ debug_f("signed data matches SSHSIG signature request");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX check CA signature operation */
+
+ error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* ssh2 only */
static void
process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
{
- const u_char *data;
u_char *signature = NULL;
- size_t dlen, slen = 0;
+ size_t slen = 0;
u_int compat = 0, flags;
int r, ok = -1;
- struct sshbuf *msg;
+ char *fp = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct identity *id;
+ struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
- if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ debug_f("entering");
+
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
- error("%s: couldn't parse request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto send;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
- verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+ verbose_f("%s key not found", sshkey_type(key));
goto send;
}
- if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) {
- verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__);
+ if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, NULL) != 0) {
+ verbose_f("user refused key");
goto send;
}
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
+ if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 &&
+ !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) {
+ /* error already logged */
+ goto send;
+ }
+ if ((id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+ notifier = notify_start(0,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+ }
+ }
+ /* XXX support PIN required FIDO keys */
if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
- data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), compat)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
+ id->sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
goto send;
}
/* Success */
ok = 0;
send:
- sshkey_free(key);
+ notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");
+
if (ok == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose failure");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+ sshbuf_free(data);
sshbuf_free(msg);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(fp);
free(signature);
}
/* shared */
static void
process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
int r, success = 0;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
Identity *id;
+ debug2_f("entering");
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
- error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse key");
goto done;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
- debug("%s: key not found", __func__);
+ debug_f("key not found");
goto done;
}
/* We have this key, free it. */
if (idtab->nentries < 1)
- fatal("%s: internal error: nentries %d",
- __func__, idtab->nentries);
+ fatal_f("internal error: nentries %d", idtab->nentries);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
- sshkey_free(key);
success = 1;
done:
+ sshkey_free(key);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
+ debug2_f("entering");
/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
}
/* Mark that there are no identities. */
idtab->nentries = 0;
/* Send success. */
send_status(e, 1);
}
/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
static time_t
reaper(void)
{
time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
Identity *id, *nxt;
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
if (id->death == 0)
continue;
if (now >= id->death) {
debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
} else
deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
MINIMUM(deadline, id->death);
}
if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
return 0;
else
return (deadline - now);
}
-static void
-process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+static int
+parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp)
{
- Identity *id;
- int success = 0, confirm = 0;
- u_int seconds, maxsign;
- char *comment = NULL;
- time_t death = 0;
- struct sshkey *k = NULL;
- u_char ctype;
- int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *ext_name = NULL;
+ int r;
- if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
- k == NULL ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
- error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto err;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse constraint extension");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug_f("constraint ext %s", ext_name);
+ if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ if (sk_providerp == NULL) {
+ error_f("%s not valid here", ext_name);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*sk_providerp != NULL) {
+ error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, sk_providerp, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse %s", ext_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ error_f("unsupported constraint \"%s\"", ext_name);
+ r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
}
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(ext_name);
+ return r;
+}
- while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto err;
+static int
+parse_key_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey *k, time_t *deathp,
+ u_int *secondsp, int *confirmp, char **sk_providerp)
+{
+ u_char ctype;
+ int r;
+ u_int seconds, maxsign = 0;
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(m)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ctype)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse constraint type");
+ goto out;
}
switch (ctype) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) {
- error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto err;
+ if (*deathp != 0) {
+ error_f("lifetime already set");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &seconds)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse lifetime constraint");
+ goto out;
}
- death = monotime() + seconds;
+ *deathp = monotime() + seconds;
+ *secondsp = seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
- confirm = 1;
+ if (*confirmp != 0) {
+ error_f("confirm already set");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *confirmp = 1;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &maxsign)) != 0) {
- error("%s: bad maxsign constraint: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto err;
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ error_f("maxsign not valid here");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (maxsign != 0) {
+ error_f("maxsign already set");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxsign)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse maxsign constraint");
+ goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) {
- error("%s: cannot enable maxsign: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto err;
+ error_fr(r, "enable maxsign");
+ goto out;
}
break;
+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
+ if ((r = parse_key_constraint_extension(m,
+ sk_providerp)) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ break;
default:
- error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype);
- err:
- sshbuf_reset(e->request);
- free(comment);
- sshkey_free(k);
- goto send;
+ error_f("Unknown constraint %d", ctype);
+ r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto out;
}
}
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
- success = 1;
+static void
+process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ Identity *id;
+ int success = 0, confirm = 0;
+ char *fp, *comment = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL;
+ char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ time_t death = 0;
+ u_int seconds = 0;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ debug2_f("entering");
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
+ k == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, k, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
+ &sk_provider) != 0) {
+ error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+ sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_provider != NULL) {
+ if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
+ error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an "
+ "authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
+ debug_f("internal provider");
+ } else {
+ if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+ verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
+ "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ free(sk_provider);
+ sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+ if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider,
+ allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
+ error("Refusing add key: "
+ "provider %s not allowed", sk_provider);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "shield private");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
/* Increment the number of identities. */
idtab->nentries++;
} else {
/* key state might have been updated */
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->comment);
+ free(id->sk_provider);
}
+ /* success */
id->key = k;
id->comment = comment;
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
-send:
+ id->sk_provider = sk_provider;
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ debug_f("add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) "
+ "(provider: %s)", sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment, seconds,
+ confirm, sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider);
+ free(fp);
+ /* transferred */
+ k = NULL;
+ comment = NULL;
+ sk_provider = NULL;
+ success = 1;
+ out:
+ free(sk_provider);
+ free(comment);
+ sshkey_free(k);
send_status(e, success);
}
/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
static void
process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
{
int r, success = 0, delay;
char *passwd;
u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
static u_int fail_count = 0;
size_t pwlen;
+ debug2_f("entering");
/*
* This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
* but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
* do is abort.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (pwlen == 0) {
debug("empty password not supported");
} else if (locked && !lock) {
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
debug("agent unlocked");
locked = 0;
fail_count = 0;
explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
success = 1;
} else {
/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
if (fail_count < 100)
fail_count++;
delay = 100000 * fail_count;
debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
(double)delay/1000000);
usleep(delay);
}
explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
} else if (!locked && lock) {
debug("agent locked");
locked = 1;
arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
success = 1;
}
- explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen);
- free(passwd);
+ freezero(passwd, pwlen);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
static void
process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ char **comments = NULL;
int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
- u_int seconds;
+ u_int seconds = 0;
time_t death = 0;
- u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
+ debug2_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto send;
}
-
- while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto send;
- }
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto send;
- }
- death = monotime() + seconds;
- break;
- case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
- confirm = 1;
- break;
- default:
- error("%s: Unknown constraint type %d", __func__, type);
- goto send;
- }
+ if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, NULL, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
+ NULL) != 0) {
+ error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+ goto send;
}
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
- if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
- "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
+ "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
goto send;
}
- debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+ debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
- count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
+ count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
+ keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
- id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
+ if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
+ id->comment = comments[i];
+ comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
+ } else {
+ id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+ }
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
idtab->nentries++;
success = 1;
- } else {
- sshkey_free(k);
}
- keys[i] = NULL;
+ /* XXX update constraints for existing keys */
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(comments[i]);
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
+ free(comments);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, success = 0;
Identity *id, *nxt;
+ debug2_f("entering");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
goto send;
}
free(pin);
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
- debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+ debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
/* Skip file--based keys */
if (id->provider == NULL)
continue;
if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
}
}
if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
success = 1;
else
- error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__);
+ error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed");
send:
free(provider);
send_status(e, success);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-/* dispatch incoming messages */
-
+/*
+ * dispatch incoming message.
+ * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
+ */
static int
process_message(u_int socknum)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int r;
SocketEntry *e;
- if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
- fatal("%s: socket number %u >= allocated %u",
- __func__, socknum, sockets_alloc);
- }
+ if (socknum >= sockets_alloc)
+ fatal_f("sock %u >= allocated %u", socknum, sockets_alloc);
e = &sockets[socknum];
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) {
- debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
- __func__, socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
+ debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
+ socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
return -1;
}
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */
/* move the current input to e->request */
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE ||
r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) {
- debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
return -1;
}
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
}
- debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type);
+ debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", socknum, e->fd, type);
/* check whether agent is locked */
if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
/* send empty lists */
no_identities(e);
break;
default:
/* send a fail message for all other request types */
send_status(e, 0);
}
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */
break;
/* ssh2 */
case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
process_sign_request2(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
process_request_identities(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
process_add_identity(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
process_remove_identity(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
process_add_smartcard_key(e);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
default:
/* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
error("Unknown message %d", type);
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
send_status(e, 0);
break;
}
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
static void
new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
{
u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
+ debug_f("type = %s", type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" :
+ (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN"));
if (type == AUTH_CONNECTION) {
debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount + 1);
++xcount;
}
set_nonblock(fd);
if (fd > max_fd)
max_fd = fd;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
sockets[i].fd = fd;
- if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
sockets[i].type = type;
return;
}
old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
- sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
+ sockets = xrecallocarray(sockets, old_alloc, new_alloc,
+ sizeof(sockets[0]));
for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
- if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
}
static int
handle_socket_read(u_int socknum)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
socklen_t slen;
uid_t euid;
gid_t egid;
int fd;
slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
- if (fd < 0) {
+ if (fd == -1) {
error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) < 0) {
+ if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return -1;
}
if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
(u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
close(fd);
return -1;
}
new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_conn_read(u_int socknum)
{
- char buf[1024];
+ char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN];
ssize_t len;
int r;
if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) {
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
return 0;
- error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
- __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd,
- strerror(errno));
+ error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
+ socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
}
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- process_message(socknum);
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ else if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ }
return 0;
}
static int
handle_conn_write(u_int socknum)
{
ssize_t len;
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0)
return 0; /* shouldn't happen */
if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd,
sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output),
sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) {
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
return 0;
- error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
- __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd,
- strerror(errno));
+ error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
+ socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
}
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
return 0;
}
static void
after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds)
{
size_t i;
u_int socknum, activefds = npfd;
for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) {
if (pfd[i].revents == 0)
continue;
/* Find sockets entry */
for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) {
if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET &&
sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION)
continue;
if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd)
break;
}
if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
- error("%s: no socket for fd %d", __func__, pfd[i].fd);
+ error_f("no socket for fd %d", pfd[i].fd);
continue;
}
/* Process events */
switch (sockets[socknum].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0)
break;
if (npfd > maxfds) {
debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); "
"skipping accept", activefds, maxfds);
break;
}
if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0)
activefds++;
break;
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 &&
handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) {
goto close_sock;
}
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 &&
handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) {
close_sock:
if (activefds == 0)
fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock");
close_socket(&sockets[socknum]);
activefds--;
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
static int
prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds)
{
struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp;
size_t i, j, npfd = 0;
time_t deadline;
+ int r;
/* Count active sockets */
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
npfd++;
break;
case AUTH_UNUSED:
break;
default:
fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
break;
}
}
if (npfd != *npfdp &&
(pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("recallocarray failed");
*pfdp = pfd;
*npfdp = npfd;
for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
if (npfd > maxfds) {
debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); "
"skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds);
break;
}
pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
pfd[j].revents = 0;
pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
j++;
break;
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
pfd[j].revents = 0;
- /* XXX backoff when input buffer full */
- pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
+ /*
+ * Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size
+ * input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply..
+ */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input,
+ AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output,
+ AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0)
+ pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0)
pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT;
j++;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
deadline = reaper();
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
if (deadline == 0) {
*timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */
} else {
if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000)
*timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000;
else
*timeoutp = deadline * 1000;
}
return (1);
}
static void
cleanup_socket(void)
{
if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
return;
- debug("%s: cleanup", __func__);
+ debug_f("cleanup");
if (socket_name[0])
unlink(socket_name);
if (socket_dir[0])
rmdir(socket_dir);
}
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
cleanup_socket();
_exit(i);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
cleanup_handler(int sig)
{
cleanup_socket();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
_exit(2);
}
static void
check_parent_exists(void)
{
/*
* If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
* so testing for that should be safe.
*/
if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
cleanup_socket();
_exit(2);
}
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Ddx] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
- " [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+ " [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n"
+ " ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-P allowed_providers]\n"
+ " [-t life] command [arg ...]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
- int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
+ int sock, ch, result, saved_errno;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
struct rlimit rlim;
#endif
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
pid_t pid;
char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
size_t len;
mode_t prev_mask;
int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */
struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
size_t npfd = 0;
u_int maxfds;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
/* drop */
setegid(getgid());
setgid(getgid());
setuid(geteuid());
platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */
+#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1)
fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
seed_rng();
- while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:x")) != -1) {
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:x")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
usage();
c_flag++;
break;
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
+ case 'O':
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
+ restrict_websafe = 0;
+ else
+ fatal("Unknown -O option");
+ break;
case 'P':
- if (pkcs11_whitelist != NULL)
+ if (allowed_providers != NULL)
fatal("-P option already specified");
- pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ allowed_providers = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
s_flag++;
break;
case 'd':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
d_flag++;
break;
case 'D':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
D_flag++;
break;
case 'a':
agentsocket = optarg;
break;
case 't':
if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
usage();
}
break;
case 'x':
xcount = 0;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
usage();
- if (pkcs11_whitelist == NULL)
- pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST);
+ if (allowed_providers == NULL)
+ allowed_providers = xstrdup(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS);
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
const char *errstr = NULL;
pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
if (pidstr == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
exit(1);
}
pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr) {
fprintf(stderr,
"%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
exit(1);
}
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
perror("kill");
exit(1);
}
format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
/*
* Minimum file descriptors:
* stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) +
* a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc.
*/
#define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4)
if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS)
- fatal("%s: file descriptior rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)",
+ fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)",
__progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS);
maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS;
parent_pid = getpid();
if (agentsocket == NULL) {
/* Create private directory for agent socket */
mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
exit(1);
}
snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
(long)parent_pid);
} else {
/* Try to use specified agent socket */
socket_dir[0] = '\0';
strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
}
/*
* Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
* the parent.
*/
prev_mask = umask(0177);
sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
/* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
cleanup_exit(1);
}
umask(prev_mask);
/*
* Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
* the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
*/
if (D_flag || d_flag) {
log_init(__progname,
d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
fflush(stdout);
goto skip;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
perror("fork");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
close(sock);
snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
if (ac == 0) {
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
perror("setenv");
exit(1);
}
execvp(av[0], av);
perror(av[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* child */
log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
if (setsid() == -1) {
error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
(void)chdir("/");
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
- /* XXX might close listen socket */
- (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
- (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
- (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
- if (fd > 2)
- close(fd);
- }
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 1) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) {
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) {
error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
#endif
skip:
cleanup_pid = getpid();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(0);
#endif
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
if (ac > 0)
parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_agent();
while (1) {
prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds);
result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout);
saved_errno = errno;
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
check_parent_exists();
(void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
- if (result < 0) {
+ if (result == -1) {
if (saved_errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
} else if (result > 0)
after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
index a23c383dc805..fddc29cc9173 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
@@ -1,209 +1,207 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.37 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.39 2020/02/26 13:40:09 jsg Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#define INTBLOB_LEN 20
#define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN)
int
ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
goto out;
if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
slen = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
BN_bn2bin(sig_r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
BN_bn2bin(sig_s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (sigp != NULL) {
if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
int
ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* parse signature */
if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
(sig_r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(sig_s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_r) == NULL) ||
(BN_bin2bn(sigblob + INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_s) == NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
/* sha1 the data */
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
goto out;
switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
break;
case 0:
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
out:
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
BN_clear_free(sig_r);
BN_clear_free(sig_s);
sshbuf_free(b);
free(ktype);
- if (sigblob != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
- free(sigblob);
- }
+ if (sigblob != NULL)
+ freezero(sigblob, len);
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c6927ecb27c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.8 2020/06/22 23:44:27 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h> /* needed for DEBUG_SK only */
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+/*
+ * Check FIDO/W3C webauthn signatures clientData field against the expected
+ * format and prepare a hash of it for use in signature verification.
+ *
+ * webauthn signatures do not sign the hash of the message directly, but
+ * instead sign a JSON-like "clientData" wrapper structure that contains the
+ * message hash along with a other information.
+ *
+ * Fortunately this structure has a fixed format so it is possible to verify
+ * that the hash of the signed message is present within the clientData
+ * structure without needing to implement any JSON parsing.
+ */
+static int
+webauthn_check_prepare_hash(const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *origin, const struct sshbuf *wrapper,
+ uint8_t flags, const struct sshbuf *extensions,
+ u_char *msghash, size_t msghashlen)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *chall = NULL, *m = NULL;
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (chall = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Ensure origin contains no quote character and that the flags are
+ * consistent with what we received
+ */
+ if (strchr(origin, '\"') != NULL ||
+ (flags & 0x40) != 0 /* AD */ ||
+ ((flags & 0x80) == 0 /* ED */) != (sshbuf_len(extensions) == 0)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare the preamble to clientData that we expect, poking the
+ * challenge and origin into their canonical positions in the
+ * structure. The crossOrigin flag and any additional extension
+ * fields present are ignored.
+ */
+#define WEBAUTHN_0 "{\"type\":\"webauthn.get\",\"challenge\":\""
+#define WEBAUTHN_1 "\",\"origin\":\""
+#define WEBAUTHN_2 "\""
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_0, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_0) - 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_dtourlb64(chall, m, 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_1, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_1) - 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(m, origin, strlen(origin))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_2, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_2) - 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: received origin: %s\n", __func__, origin);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: received clientData:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(wrapper, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: expected clientData premable:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(m, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* Check that the supplied clientData has the preamble we expect */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(wrapper, 0, sshbuf_ptr(m), sshbuf_len(m))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Prepare hash of clientData */
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, wrapper,
+ msghash, msghashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(chall);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+ u_char sig_flags;
+ u_char msghash[32], apphash[32], sighash[32];
+ u_int sig_counter;
+ int is_webauthn = 0, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *original_signed = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *webauthn_wrapper = NULL, *webauthn_exts = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL, *webauthn_origin = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (detailsp != NULL)
+ *detailsp = NULL;
+ if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA_SK ||
+ signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != NID_X9_62_prime256v1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* fetch signature */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(ktype, "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") == 0)
+ is_webauthn = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(ktype, "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_webauthn) {
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &webauthn_origin, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_wrapper) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_exts) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* parse signature */
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: data: (len %zu)\n", __func__, datalen);
+ /* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_r)));
+ free(tmp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_s)));
+ free(tmp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+ __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
+ if (is_webauthn) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn origin: %s\n", __func__,
+ webauthn_origin);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn_wrapper:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(webauthn_wrapper, stderr);
+ }
+#endif
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+
+ /* Reconstruct data that was supposedly signed */
+ if ((original_signed = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_webauthn) {
+ if ((ret = webauthn_check_prepare_hash(data, datalen,
+ webauthn_origin, webauthn_wrapper, sig_flags, webauthn_exts,
+ msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen,
+ msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Application value is hashed before signature */
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
+ strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed,
+ apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u8(original_signed, sig_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(original_signed, sig_counter)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_putb(original_signed, webauthn_exts)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Signature is over H(original_signed) */
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, original_signed,
+ sighash, sizeof(sighash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
+ details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(original_signed, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed hash:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(sighash, sizeof(sighash), stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Verify it */
+ switch (ECDSA_do_verify(sighash, sizeof(sighash), sig, key->ecdsa)) {
+ case 1:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ if (detailsp != NULL) {
+ *detailsp = details;
+ details = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&sig_flags, sizeof(sig_flags));
+ explicit_bzero(&sig_counter, sizeof(sig_counter));
+ explicit_bzero(msghash, sizeof(msghash));
+ explicit_bzero(sighash, sizeof(msghash));
+ explicit_bzero(apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ sshbuf_free(webauthn_wrapper);
+ sshbuf_free(webauthn_exts);
+ free(webauthn_origin);
+ sshbuf_free(original_signed);
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+ BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+ free(ktype);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c
index 2f553175267e..599c7199db19 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -1,202 +1,200 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.14 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.16 2019/01/21 09:54:11 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/* ARGSUSED */
int
ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
int hash_alg;
u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t len, dlen;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
(dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
goto out;
if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_r)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_s)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (sigp != NULL) {
if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(bb);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
int hash_alg;
u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t dlen;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
(dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
/* parse signature */
- if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
- (sig_r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (sig_s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig_r) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig_s) != 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
goto out;
switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
break;
case 0:
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
out:
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(b);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
BN_clear_free(sig_r);
BN_clear_free(sig_s);
free(ktype);
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519-sk.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4393ca669e17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519-sk.c,v 1.6 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+ const u_char *sigblob;
+ const u_char *sm;
+ u_char *m = NULL;
+ u_char apphash[32];
+ u_char msghash[32];
+ u_char sig_flags;
+ u_int sig_counter;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int ret;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+
+ if (detailsp != NULL)
+ *detailsp = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519_SK ||
+ key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+ signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: data:\n", __func__);
+ /* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigblob:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(sigblob, len, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+ __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
+#endif
+ if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
+ strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen,
+ msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
+ details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
+ if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_put(encoded, sigblob, len) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(encoded, apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, sig_flags) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sig_counter) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(encoded, msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(encoded, stderr);
+#endif
+ sm = sshbuf_ptr(encoded);
+ smlen = sshbuf_len(encoded);
+ mlen = smlen;
+ if ((m = malloc(smlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
+ key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
+ debug2_f("crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", ret);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0 || mlen != smlen - len) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* XXX compare 'm' and 'sm + len' ? */
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (detailsp != NULL) {
+ *detailsp = details;
+ details = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ if (m != NULL)
+ freezero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ sshbuf_free(encoded);
+ free(ktype);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c
index 5163e029728b..23419f3c884a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-ed25519.c
@@ -1,167 +1,160 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.7 2016/04/21 06:08:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.9 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh.h"
int
ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t slen = 0, len;
unsigned long long smlen;
int r, ret;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (key == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen,
key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */
goto out;
}
/* encode signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (sigp != NULL) {
if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
- if (sig != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
- free(sig);
- }
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ freezero(sig, slen);
return r;
}
int
ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
const u_char *sigblob;
u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL;
size_t len;
unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
int r, ret;
if (key == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
smlen = len + datalen;
mlen = smlen;
if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen);
if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d",
- __func__, ret);
+ debug2_f("crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", ret);
}
if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) {
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
/* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
- if (sm != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(sm, smlen);
- free(sm);
- }
- if (m != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
- free(m);
- }
+ if (sm != NULL)
+ freezero(sm, smlen);
+ if (m != NULL)
+ freezero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
sshbuf_free(b);
free(ktype);
return r;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
index 887399b6b00a..e19009770f5d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
@@ -1,140 +1,140 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _SSH_GSS_H
#define _SSH_GSS_H
#ifdef GSSAPI
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
#include <gssapi.h>
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
# ifndef HEIMDAL
# ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
# include <gssapi_generic.h>
# elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
# endif
/* Old MIT Kerberos doesn't seem to define GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */
# if !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
# define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
# endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
# endif /* !HEIMDAL */
#endif /* KRB5 */
/* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66
#define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
typedef struct {
char *filename;
char *envvar;
char *envval;
void *data;
} ssh_gssapi_ccache;
typedef struct {
gss_buffer_desc displayname;
gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
gss_cred_id_t creds;
struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
} ssh_gssapi_client;
typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
char *enc_name;
char *name;
gss_OID_desc oid;
int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
} ssh_gssapi_mech;
typedef struct {
OM_uint32 major; /* both */
OM_uint32 minor; /* both */
gss_ctx_id_t context; /* both */
gss_name_t name; /* both */
gss_OID oid; /* client */
gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
gss_name_t client; /* server */
gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
} Gssctxt;
extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID);
void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *);
ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *);
void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
struct sshbuf;
int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *);
char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *);
void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
- const char *, const char *);
+ const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
/* In the server */
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
index bfa2eb5f3e37..f83f515f6008 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,904 +1,1243 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.150 2018/09/12 06:18:59 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.216 2021/08/11 08:54:17 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 12 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion
+.Nd OpenSSH authentication key utility
.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Bk -words
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Op Fl q
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl b Ar bits
-.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa
-.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
.Op Fl C Ar comment
.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar format
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
+.Op Fl w Ar provider
+.Op Fl Z Ar cipher
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl p
-.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
-.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar format
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
+.Op Fl Z Ar cipher
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl i
-.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl e
-.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl y
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl c
-.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl C Ar comment
.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl l
.Op Fl v
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl B
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl D Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl F Ar hostname
+.Op Fl lv
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
-.Op Fl l
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl H
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl K
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
+.Op Fl w Ar provider
+.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl R Ar hostname
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl r Ar hostname
-.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Op Fl g
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl G Ar output_file
-.Op Fl v
-.Op Fl b Ar bits
-.Op Fl M Ar memory
-.Op Fl S Ar start_point
+.Fl M Cm generate
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Ar output_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl T Ar output_file
-.Fl f Ar input_file
-.Op Fl v
-.Op Fl a Ar rounds
-.Op Fl J Ar num_lines
-.Op Fl j Ar start_line
-.Op Fl K Ar checkpt
-.Op Fl W Ar generator
+.Fl M Cm screen
+.Op Fl f Ar input_file
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Ar output_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl s Ar ca_key
.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
-.Op Fl h
-.Op Fl U
+.Fl s Ar ca_key
+.Op Fl hU
.Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider
.Op Fl n Ar principals
.Op Fl O Ar option
.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl L
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl A
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
.Op Fl f Ar prefix_path
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl k
.Fl f Ar krl_file
.Op Fl u
.Op Fl s Ar ca_public
.Op Fl z Ar version_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Q
+.Op Fl l
.Fl f Ar krl_file
.Ar
-.Ek
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm find-principals
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Fl s Ar signature_file
+.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Fl n Ar namespace
+.Fl s Ar signature_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm sign
+.Fl f Ar key_file
+.Fl n Ar namespace
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm verify
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
+.Fl I Ar signer_identity
+.Fl n Ar namespace
+.Fl s Ar signature_file
+.Op Fl r Ar revocation_file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Nm
can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
.Pp
The type of key to be generated is specified with the
.Fl t
option.
If invoked without any arguments,
.Nm
will generate an RSA key.
.Pp
.Nm
is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group
exchange (DH-GEX).
See the
.Sx MODULI GENERATION
section for details.
.Pp
Finally,
.Nm
can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
given keys have been revoked by one.
See the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section for details.
.Pp
Normally each user wishing to use SSH
with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
as seen in
.Pa /etc/rc .
.Pp
Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
to store the private key.
The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
.Dq .pub
appended.
The program also asks for a passphrase.
The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
arbitrary length.
A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
characters you want.
Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are
not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters,
numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters.
The passphrase can be changed later by using the
.Fl p
option.
.Pp
There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated
and the corresponding public key copied to other machines.
.Pp
-For keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format,
-there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for
-convenience to the user to help identify the key.
-The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful.
+.Nm
+will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
+This format is preferred as it offers better protection for
+keys at rest as well as allowing storage of key comments within
+the private key file itself.
+The key comment may be useful to help identify the key.
The comment is initialized to
.Dq user@host
when the key is created, but can be changed using the
.Fl c
option.
.Pp
-After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys
+It is still possible for
+.Nm
+to write the previously-used PEM format private keys using the
+.Fl m
+flag.
+This may be used when generating new keys, and existing new-format
+keys may be converted using this option in conjunction with the
+.Fl p
+(change passphrase) flag.
+.Pp
+After a key is generated,
+.Nm
+will ask where the keys
should be placed to be activated.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl A
For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
for which host keys
do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
If
.Fl f
has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
default path for the resulting host key files.
This is used by
.Pa /etc/rc
to generate new host keys.
.It Fl a Ar rounds
-When saving a private key this option specifies the number of KDF
-(key derivation function) rounds used.
+When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of KDF
+(key derivation function, currently
+.Xr bcrypt_pbkdf 3 )
+rounds used.
Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased
resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
-.Pp
-When screening DH-GEX candidates (using the
-.Fl T
-command).
-This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
+The default is 16 rounds.
.It Fl B
Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
.It Fl b Ar bits
Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
-For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
-Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient.
+For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
+Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient.
DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
For ECDSA keys, the
.Fl b
flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic
curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.
Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys
will fail.
-Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the
+ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length and the
.Fl b
flag will be ignored.
.It Fl C Ar comment
Provides a new comment.
.It Fl c
Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
.It Fl D Ar pkcs11
-Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details).
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl e
This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
-print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the
+print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by the
.Fl m
option.
The default export format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including
several commercial SSH implementations.
-.It Fl F Ar hostname
+.It Fl F Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
Search for the specified
.Ar hostname
+(with optional port number)
in a
.Pa known_hosts
file, listing any occurrences found.
This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
used in conjunction with the
.Fl H
option to print found keys in a hashed format.
.It Fl f Ar filename
Specifies the filename of the key file.
-.It Fl G Ar output_file
-Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX.
-These primes must be screened for
-safety (using the
-.Fl T
-option) before use.
.It Fl g
Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the
.Fl r
command.
.It Fl H
Hash a
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations
within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with
a .old suffix.
These hashes may be used normally by
.Nm ssh
and
.Nm sshd ,
but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
be disclosed.
This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe
to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names.
.It Fl h
When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
certificate.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl I Ar certificate_identity
Specify the key identity when signing a public key.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl i
This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
in the format specified by the
.Fl m
option and print an OpenSSH compatible private
(or public) key to stdout.
This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
commercial SSH implementations.
The default import format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
-.It Fl J Ar num_lines
-Exit after screening the specified number of lines
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-.It Fl j Ar start_line
-Start screening at the specified line number
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-.It Fl K Ar checkpt
-Write the last line processed to the file
-.Ar checkpt
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
-processed if the job is restarted.
+.It Fl K
+Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
+Public and private key files will be written to the current directory for
+each downloaded key.
+If multiple FIDO authenticators are attached, keys will be downloaded from
+the first touched authenticator.
.It Fl k
Generate a KRL file.
In this mode,
.Nm
will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
.Fl f
flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line.
Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
using the format described in the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section.
.It Fl L
Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
.It Fl l
Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
For RSA and DSA keys
.Nm
tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
If combined with
.Fl v ,
a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the
fingerprint.
-.It Fl M Ar memory
-Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
-candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl M Cm generate
+Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) parameters for
+eventual use by the
+.Sq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-*
+key exchange methods.
+The numbers generated by this operation must be further screened before
+use.
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for more information.
+.It Fl M Cm screen
+Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
+This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they are
+safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group generators.
+The results of this operation may be added to the
+.Pa /etc/moduli
+file.
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for more information.
.It Fl m Ar key_format
-Specify a key format for the
+Specify a key format for key generation, the
.Fl i
-(import) or
+(import),
.Fl e
-(export) conversion options.
+(export) conversion options, and the
+.Fl p
+change passphrase operation.
+The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH private key and PEM
+private key formats.
The supported key formats are:
.Dq RFC4716
(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
.Dq PKCS8
-(PEM PKCS8 public key)
+(PKCS8 public or private key)
or
.Dq PEM
(PEM public key).
-The default conversion format is
+By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
+format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
Setting a format of
.Dq PEM
when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the
key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
Provides the new passphrase.
.It Fl n Ar principals
Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in
a certificate when signing a key.
Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl O Ar option
-Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
-This option may be specified multiple times.
-See also the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for further details.
-.Pp
-At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
-The options that are valid for user certificates are:
-.Pp
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Ic clear
-Clear all enabled permissions.
-This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
-be added individually.
-.Pp
-.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
-.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
-Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
-The specified
-.Ar name
-should include a domain suffix, e.g.\&
-.Dq name@example.com .
-If
-.Ar contents
-is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option
-encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no
-contents (usually indicating a flag).
-Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them,
-whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
-.Pp
-.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
-Forces the execution of
-.Ar command
-instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
-the certificate is used for authentication.
-.Pp
-.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
-Disable
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding (permitted by default).
+Specify a key/value option.
+These are specific to the operation that
+.Nm
+has been requested to perform.
.Pp
-.It Ic no-port-forwarding
-Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section may be specified here.
.Pp
-.It Ic no-pty
-Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the options
+listed in the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section may be specified.
.Pp
-.It Ic no-user-rc
-Disable execution of
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-by
+When generating a key that will be hosted on a FIDO authenticator,
+this flag may be used to specify key-specific options.
+Those supported at present are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm application
+Override the default FIDO application/origin string of
+.Dq ssh: .
+This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific resident keys.
+The specified application string must begin with
+.Dq ssh: .
+.It Cm challenge Ns = Ns Ar path
+Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the
+FIDO token during key generation.
+The challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band
+protocol for key enrollment
+(a random challenge is used by default).
+.It Cm device
+Explicitly specify a
+.Xr fido 4
+device to use, rather than letting the token middleware select one.
+.It Cm no-touch-required
+Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch
+events (user presence) when making signatures.
+Note that
.Xr sshd 8
-(permitted by default).
-.Pp
-.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
-Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
-Allows
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding.
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
-Allows port forwarding.
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-pty
-Allows PTY allocation.
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-user-rc
-Allows execution of
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-by
-.Xr sshd 8 .
+will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via
+an authorized_keys option.
+.It Cm resident
+Indicate that the key should be stored on the FIDO authenticator itself.
+Resident keys may be supported on FIDO2 tokens and typically require that
+a PIN be set on the token prior to generation.
+Resident keys may be loaded off the token using
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+.It Cm user
+A username to be associated with a resident key,
+overriding the empty default username.
+Specifying a username may be useful when generating multiple resident keys
+for the same application name.
+.It Cm verify-required
+Indicate that this private key should require user verification for
+each signature.
+Not all FIDO tokens support this option.
+Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method,
+but other methods may be supported in the future.
+.It Cm write-attestation Ns = Ns Ar path
+May be used at key generation time to record the attestation data
+returned from FIDO tokens during key generation.
+Please note that this information is potentially sensitive.
+By default, this information is discarded.
+.El
.Pp
-.It Ic permit-X11-forwarding
-Allows X11 forwarding.
+When performing signature-related options using the
+.Fl Y
+flag, the following options are accepted:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm print-pubkey
+Print the full public key to standard output after signature verification.
+.It Cm verify-time Ns = Ns Ar timestamp
+Specifies a time to use when validating signatures instead of the current
+time.
+The time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time
+in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
+.El
.Pp
-.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
-Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
The
-.Ar address_list
-is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
-format.
-.El
+.Fl O
+option may be specified multiple times.
.It Fl P Ar passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
.It Fl p
Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
creating a new private key.
The program will prompt for the file
containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
new passphrase.
.It Fl Q
Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
+If the
+.Fl l
+option is also specified then the contents of the KRL will be printed.
.It Fl q
Silence
.Nm ssh-keygen .
-.It Fl R Ar hostname
-Removes all keys belonging to
+.It Fl R Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
+Removes all keys belonging to the specified
.Ar hostname
+(with optional port number)
from a
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the
.Fl H
option above).
.It Fl r Ar hostname
Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named
.Ar hostname
for the specified public key file.
-.It Fl S Ar start
-Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.It Fl s Ar ca_key
Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.Pp
When generating a KRL,
.Fl s
specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly
by key ID or serial number.
See the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section for details.
-.It Fl T Ar output_file
-Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the
-.Fl G
-option) for safety.
-.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa
+.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
Specifies the type of key to create.
The possible values are
.Dq dsa ,
.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sk ,
.Dq ed25519 ,
+.Dq ed25519-sk ,
or
.Dq rsa .
+.Pp
+This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
+signing certificates using an RSA CA key.
+The available RSA signature variants are
+.Dq ssh-rsa
+(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
+.Dq rsa-sha2-256 ,
+and
+.Dq rsa-sha2-512
+(the default).
.It Fl U
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
this option indicates that a CA key resides in a
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
See the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for more information.
.It Fl u
Update a KRL.
When specified with
.Fl k ,
keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than
a new KRL being created.
.It Fl V Ar validity_interval
Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
.Pp
The start time may be specified as the string
.Dq always
to indicate the certificate has no specified start time,
a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format,
a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
an interval in the format described in the
TIME FORMATS section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Pp
The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time,
a relative time starting with a plus character or the string
.Dq forever
-to indicate that the certificate has no expirty date.
+to indicate that the certificate has no expiry date.
.Pp
For example:
.Dq +52w1d
(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
.Dq -4w:+4w
(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
.Dq -1d:20110101
-(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
+(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011),
.Dq -1m:forever
(valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful for debugging moduli generation.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
-.It Fl W Ar generator
-Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl w Ar provider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the internal USB HID support.
+.It Fl Y Cm find-principals
+Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a signature,
+provided using the
+.Fl s
+flag in an authorized signers file provided using the
+.Fl f
+flag.
+The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
+.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
+section below.
+If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on
+standard output.
+.It Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
+Checks that a signature generated using
+.Nm
+.Fl Y Cm sign
+has a valid structure.
+This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer.
+When testing a signature,
+.Nm
+accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
+.Fl n .
+A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
+.Fl s
+flag.
+Successful testing of the signature is signalled by
+.Nm
+returning a zero exit status.
+.It Fl Y Cm sign
+Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key.
+When signing,
+.Nm
+accepts zero or more files to sign on the command-line - if no files
+are specified then
+.Nm
+will sign data presented on standard input.
+Signatures are written to the path of the input file with
+.Dq .sig
+appended, or to standard output if the message to be signed was read from
+standard input.
+.Pp
+The key used for signing is specified using the
+.Fl f
+option and may refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
+half available via
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+An additional signature namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across
+different domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be provided
+via the
+.Fl n
+flag.
+Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and may include:
+.Dq file
+for file signing,
+.Dq email
+for email signing.
+For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
+NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
+.It Fl Y Cm verify
+Request to verify a signature generated using
+.Nm
+.Fl Y Cm sign
+as described above.
+When verifying a signature,
+.Nm
+accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
+.Fl n .
+A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
+.Fl s
+flag, along with the identity of the signer using
+.Fl I
+and a list of allowed signers via the
+.Fl f
+flag.
+The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
+.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
+section below.
+A file containing revoked keys can be passed using the
+.Fl r
+flag.
+The revocation file may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
+Successful verification by an authorized signer is signalled by
+.Nm
+returning a zero exit status.
.It Fl y
This option will read a private
OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+.It Fl Z Ar cipher
+Specifies the cipher to use for encryption when writing an OpenSSH-format
+private key file.
+The list of available ciphers may be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+The default is
+.Dq aes256-ctr .
.It Fl z Ar serial_number
Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
this certificate from others from the same CA.
+If the
+.Ar serial_number
+is prefixed with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the serial number will be incremented for each certificate
+signed on a single command-line.
The default serial number is zero.
.Pp
When generating a KRL, the
.Fl z
flag is used to specify a KRL version number.
.El
.Sh MODULI GENERATION
.Nm
may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange
(DH-GEX) protocol.
Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate
primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process.
These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive
process).
.Pp
Generation of primes is performed using the
-.Fl G
+.Fl M Cm generate
option.
The desired length of the primes may be specified by the
-.Fl b
+.Fl O Cm bits
option.
For example:
.Pp
-.Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
.Pp
By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the
desired length range.
This may be overridden using the
-.Fl S
+.Fl O Cm start
option, which specifies a different start point (in hex).
.Pp
Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
suitability.
This may be performed using the
-.Fl T
+.Fl M Cm screen
option.
In this mode
.Nm
will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the
.Fl f
option).
For example:
.Pp
-.Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
.Pp
By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
This may be overridden using the
-.Fl a
+.Fl O Cm prime-tests
option.
The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the
prime under consideration.
If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the
-.Fl W
+.Fl O Cm generator
option.
Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
.Pp
Screened DH groups may be installed in
.Pa /etc/moduli .
-It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
-that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
+It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths.
+.Pp
+A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via the
+.Fl O
+flag:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic lines Ns = Ns Ar number
+Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH
+candidate screening.
+.It Ic start-line Ns = Ns Ar line-number
+Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate
+screening.
+.It Ic checkpoint Ns = Ns Ar filename
+Write the last line processed to the specified file while performing DH
+candidate screening.
+This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
+processed if the job is restarted.
+.It Ic memory Ns = Ns Ar mbytes
+Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
+candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Ic start Ns = Ns Ar hex-value
+Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Ic generator Ns = Ns Ar value
+Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.El
.Sh CERTIFICATES
.Nm
supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
user or host authentication.
Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that
are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to
the X.509 certificates used in
.Xr ssl 8 .
.Pp
.Nm
supports two types of certificates: user and host.
User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
authenticate server hosts to users.
To generate a user certificate:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
.Pp
The resultant certificate will be placed in
.Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub .
A host certificate requires the
.Fl h
option:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
.Pp
The host certificate will be output to
.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub .
.Pp
It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
providing the token library using
.Fl D
and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument
to
.Fl s :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
.Pp
Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
This is indicated by the
.Fl U
flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half.
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
.Pp
In all cases,
.Ar key_id
is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate
is used for authentication.
.Pp
Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host)
names.
By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts.
To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub"
.Pp
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
be specified through certificate options.
A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
force the use of a specific command.
-For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the
-.Fl O
-option above.
+.Pp
+The options that are valid for user certificates are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Ic clear
+Clear all enabled permissions.
+This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
+be added individually.
+.Pp
+.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
+.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
+Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
+The specified
+.Ar name
+should include a domain suffix, e.g.\&
+.Dq name@example.com .
+If
+.Ar contents
+is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option
+encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no
+contents (usually indicating a flag).
+Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them,
+whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
+.Pp
+.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
+Forces the execution of
+.Ar command
+instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
+the certificate is used for authentication.
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
+Disable
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-port-forwarding
+Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-pty
+Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-user-rc
+Disable execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8
+(permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
+Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
+Allows
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
+Allows port forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-pty
+Allows PTY allocation.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-user-rc
+Allows execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-X11-forwarding
+Allows X11 forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-touch-required
+Do not require signatures made using this key include demonstration
+of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the authenticator).
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.Pp
+.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
+Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
+The
+.Ar address_list
+is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
+format.
+.Pp
+.It Ic verify-required
+Require signatures made using this key indicate that the user was first
+verified.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method,
+but other methods may be supported in the future.
+.El
+.Pp
+At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
.Pp
Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.
The
.Fl V
option allows specification of certificate start and end times.
A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
considered valid.
-By default, certificates are valid from
+By default, certificates are valid from the
.Ux
Epoch to the distant future.
.Pp
For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
public key must be trusted by
.Xr sshd 8
or
.Xr ssh 1 .
Please refer to those manual pages for details.
.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS
.Nm
is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being
revoked by serial number.
.Pp
KRLs may be generated using the
.Fl k
flag.
This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new
KRL.
The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
listed one per line.
Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and
certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or
not available).
.Pp
Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original
certificate on hand.
A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number
Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
in decimal, hex or octal.
If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
The CA key must have been specified on the
.Nm
command line using the
.Fl s
option.
.It Cm id : Ar key_id
Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
The CA key must have been specified on the
.Nm
command line using the
.Fl s
option.
.It Cm key : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key.
If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
.It Cm sha256 : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL.
KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions
prior to 7.9.
.It Cm hash : Ar fingerprint
Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
.Xr sshd 8
authentication log message or the
.Nm
.Fl l
flag.
Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are
not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
.El
.Pp
KRLs may be updated using the
.Fl u
flag in addition to
.Fl k .
When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into
the KRL, adding to those already there.
.Pp
It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
(or keys).
The
.Fl Q
flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line.
If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
then
.Nm
will exit with a non-zero exit status.
A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked.
+.Sh ALLOWED SIGNERS
+When verifying signatures,
+.Nm
+uses a simple list of identities and keys to determine whether a signature
+comes from an authorized source.
+This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
+AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Each line of the file contains the following space-separated fields:
+principals, options, keytype, base64-encoded key.
+Empty lines and lines starting with a
+.Ql #
+are ignored as comments.
+.Pp
+The principals field is a pattern-list (see PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 )
+consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
+that are accepted for signing.
+When verifying, the identity presented via the
+.Fl I
+option must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be
+considered acceptable for verification.
+.Pp
+The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications.
+No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords
+are case-insensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm cert-authority
+Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority (CA) and
+that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for verification.
+.It Cm namespaces Ns = Ns "namespace-list"
+Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this key.
+If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded in the
+signature object and presented on the verification command-line must
+match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable.
+.It Cm valid-after Ns = Ns "timestamp"
+Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified timestamp,
+which may be a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
+.It Cm valid-before Ns = Ns "timestamp"
+Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the specified timestamp.
+.El
+.Pp
+When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
+name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file and
+the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
+.Pp
+An example allowed signers file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
+# A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
+*@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
+# A key that is accepted only for file signing.
+user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
+.Ed
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
-authentication identity of the user.
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
It is possible to
specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES.
This file is not automatically accessed by
.Nm
but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
.Xr ssh 1
will read this file when a login attempt is made.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
-Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
-public key for authentication.
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication.
The contents of this file should be added to
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%R RFC 4716
.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
.%D 2006
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
index 46b3af5a89ed..18e9f1d180c6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,2945 +1,3776 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.322 2018/09/14 04:17:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.435 2021/08/11 08:54:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "krl.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "authfd.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */
+#include "cipher.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
#else
# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
#endif
-/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */
-#define DEFAULT_BITS 2048
-#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
-#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256
-u_int32_t bits = 0;
-
/*
- * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be
- * set on the command line.
- */
-int change_passphrase = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set
- * on the command line.
+ * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be
+ * overridden on the command line.
+ *
+ * These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at
+ * least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57:
+ * Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1.
+ * For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for
+ * which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only
+ * SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits.
*/
-int change_comment = 0;
-
-int quiet = 0;
-
-int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
-
-/* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */
-int hash_hosts = 0;
-/* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */
-int find_host = 0;
-/* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */
-int delete_host = 0;
+#define DEFAULT_BITS 3072
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256
-/* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */
-int show_cert = 0;
+static int quiet = 0;
/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
-int print_fingerprint = 0;
-int print_bubblebabble = 0;
+static int print_fingerprint = 0;
+static int print_bubblebabble = 0;
/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */
-int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
-char identity_file[1024];
-int have_identity = 0;
+static char identity_file[PATH_MAX];
+static int have_identity = 0;
/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
-char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
+static char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
-char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
-
-/* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */
-char *identity_comment = NULL;
-
-/* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */
-char *ca_key_path = NULL;
-
-/* Prefer to use agent keys for CA signing */
-int prefer_agent = 0;
-
-/* Certificate serial number */
-unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
+static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
/* Key type when certifying */
-u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
+static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
/* "key ID" of signed key */
-char *cert_key_id = NULL;
+static char *cert_key_id = NULL;
/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */
-char *cert_principals = NULL;
+static char *cert_principals = NULL;
/* Validity period for certificates */
-u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
-u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
+static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
+static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
/* Certificate options */
-#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
-#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
-#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
-#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
-#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
+#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
+#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
+#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
+#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5)
#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
-u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
-char *certflags_command = NULL;
-char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
+static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
+static char *certflags_command = NULL;
+static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */
-struct cert_userext {
+struct cert_ext {
char *key;
char *val;
int crit;
};
-struct cert_userext *cert_userext;
-size_t ncert_userext;
+static struct cert_ext *cert_ext;
+static size_t ncert_ext;
/* Conversion to/from various formats */
-int convert_to = 0;
-int convert_from = 0;
enum {
FMT_RFC4716,
FMT_PKCS8,
FMT_PEM
} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
-int print_public = 0;
-int print_generic = 0;
-char *key_type_name = NULL;
+static char *key_type_name = NULL;
/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
-char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
+static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
+
+/* FIDO/U2F provider to use */
+static char *sk_provider = NULL;
-/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */
-int use_new_format = 1;
+/* Format for writing private keys */
+static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
-char *new_format_cipher = NULL;
+static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
-/*
- * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
- * number of primality trials when screening moduli.
- */
-int rounds = 0;
+/* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */
+static int rounds = 0;
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
-char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* moduli.c */
int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
unsigned long);
#endif
static void
type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
{
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- u_int maxbits, nid;
-#endif
-
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
if (*bitsp == 0) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- if (type == KEY_DSA)
+ int nid;
+
+ switch(type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
- else if (type == KEY_ECDSA) {
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
if (name != NULL &&
(nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0)
*bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
if (*bitsp == 0)
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
- } else
-#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ?
- OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
- if (*bitsp > maxbits)
- fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if (*bitsp != 1024)
fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits");
break;
case KEY_RSA:
if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits",
SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits",
+ OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS);
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
"256, 384 or 521 bits");
+#else
+ fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
+ "256 or 384 bits");
+#endif
}
#endif
}
+/*
+ * Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish
+ * to overwrite it.
+ * Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to
+ * overwrite, or zero otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+confirm_overwrite(const char *filename)
+{
+ char yesno[3];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(filename, &st) != 0)
+ return 1;
+ printf("%s already exists.\n", filename);
+ printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
static void
ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
{
char buf[1024];
char *name = NULL;
if (key_type_name == NULL)
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
else {
switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK;
+ break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK;
+ break;
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS;
break;
default:
fatal("bad key type");
}
}
snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file),
"%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
exit(1);
buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
have_identity = 1;
}
static struct sshkey *
-load_identity(char *filename)
+load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp)
{
char *pass;
struct sshkey *prv;
int r;
- if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, NULL)) == 0)
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0)
return prv;
if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename);
if (identity_passphrase)
pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else
pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, NULL);
- explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
- free(pass);
+ r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp);
+ freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
if (r != 0)
- fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename);
return prv;
}
#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static void
do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k)
{
- size_t len;
- u_char *blob;
- char comment[61];
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ char comment[61], *b64;
int r;
- if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "put key");
+ if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64_string failed");
+
/* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
"%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k),
pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ sshkey_free(k);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
- fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment);
- dump_base64(stdout, blob, len);
+ fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64);
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
- sshkey_free(k);
- free(blob);
+ free(b64);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa))
fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
case KEY_DSA:
if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#endif
default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
+ fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
}
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa))
fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed");
break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#endif
default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
+ fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
}
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *k;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0)
- k = load_identity(identity_file);
+ k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL);
switch (convert_format) {
case FMT_RFC4716:
do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k);
break;
case FMT_PKCS8:
do_convert_to_pkcs8(k);
break;
case FMT_PEM:
do_convert_to_pem(k);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
+ fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format);
}
exit(0);
}
/*
* This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length
* instead of 16.
*/
static void
buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value)
{
u_int bytes, bignum_bits;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes)
- fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu",
- __func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b));
+ fatal_f("input buffer too small: need %d have %zu",
+ bytes, sshbuf_len(b));
if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("BN_bin2bn failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
}
static struct sshkey *
-do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
+do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b)
{
- struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *type, *cipher;
u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345";
int r, rlen, ktype;
u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4;
size_t slen;
u_long e;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
- if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
+
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse magic");
if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic,
SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
- sshbuf_free(b);
return NULL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
free(cipher);
- sshbuf_free(b);
free(type);
return NULL;
}
free(cipher);
if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
ktype = KEY_DSA;
} else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
ktype = KEY_RSA;
} else {
- sshbuf_free(b);
free(type);
return NULL;
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
free(type);
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("BN_new");
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key);
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g))
- fatal("%s: DSA_set0_pqg failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("DSA_set0_pqg failed");
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key))
- fatal("%s: DSA_set0_key failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("DSA_set0_key failed");
dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
case KEY_RSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
(e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
(e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse RSA");
e = e1;
debug("e %lx", e);
if (e < 30) {
e <<= 8;
e += e2;
debug("e %lx", e);
e <<= 8;
e += e3;
debug("e %lx", e);
}
if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("BN_new");
if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) {
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
- sshbuf_free(b);
sshkey_free(key);
return NULL;
}
if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("BN_new");
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p);
if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d))
- fatal("%s: RSA_set0_key failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("RSA_set0_key failed");
rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q))
- fatal("%s: RSA_set0_factors failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("RSA_set0_factors failed");
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
- fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters");
BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
break;
}
rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
if (rlen != 0)
- error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: "
- "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
- sshbuf_free(b);
+ error_f("remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
/* try the key */
- if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0 ||
- sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0) {
+ if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
+ sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
free(sig);
return NULL;
}
free(sig);
return key;
}
static int
get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
{
int c;
size_t pos = 0;
line[0] = '\0';
while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
if (pos >= len - 1)
fatal("input line too long.");
switch (c) {
case '\r':
c = fgetc(fp);
if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF)
fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno));
return pos;
case '\n':
return pos;
}
line[pos++] = c;
line[pos] = '\0';
}
/* We reached EOF */
return -1;
}
static void
do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
int r, blen, escaped = 0;
u_int len;
char line[1024];
- u_char blob[8096];
+ struct sshbuf *buf;
char encoded[8096];
FILE *fp;
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
encoded[0] = '\0';
while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\')
escaped++;
if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
*private = 1;
if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
break;
}
/* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
continue;
}
if (escaped) {
escaped--;
/* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
continue;
}
strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
}
len = strlen(encoded);
if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
(encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
(encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
(encoded[len-3] == '='))
encoded[len-3] = '\0';
- blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob));
- if (blen < 0)
- fatal("uudecode failed.");
- if (*private)
- *k = do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen);
- else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0)
- fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "base64 decode");
+ if (*private) {
+ if ((*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("private key conversion failed");
+ } else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
fclose(fp);
}
static void
do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
FILE *fp;
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
- fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__,
+ fatal_f("%s is not a recognised public key format",
identity_file);
}
fclose(fp);
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
(*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
(*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
(*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
(*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa);
break;
#endif
default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
+ fatal_f("unsupported pubkey type %d",
EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
return;
}
static void
do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
FILE *fp;
RSA *rsa;
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
(*k)->rsa = rsa;
fclose(fp);
return;
}
- fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__);
+ fatal_f("unrecognised raw private key format");
}
static void
do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int r, private = 0, ok = 0;
struct stat st;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
switch (convert_format) {
case FMT_RFC4716:
do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private);
break;
case FMT_PKCS8:
do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private);
break;
case FMT_PEM:
do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
+ fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format);
}
if (!private) {
if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0)
ok = 1;
if (ok)
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
} else {
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA:
ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__,
- sshkey_type(k));
+ fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
}
}
if (!ok)
fatal("key write failed");
sshkey_free(k);
exit(0);
}
#endif
static void
do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *prv;
struct stat st;
int r;
+ char *comment = NULL;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- prv = load_identity(identity_file);
+ prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment);
if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0)
- error("sshkey_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
- sshkey_free(prv);
+ fatal_fr(r, "write key");
+ if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0')
+ fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(prv)) {
+ debug("sk_application: \"%s\", sk_flags 0x%02x",
+ prv->sk_application, prv->sk_flags);
+ }
+ sshkey_free(prv);
+ free(comment);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_download(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
int i, nkeys;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
- char *fp, *ra;
+ char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
- pkcs11_init(0);
- nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
+ pkcs11_init(1);
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments);
if (nkeys <= 0)
fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]),
fp, sshkey_type(keys[i]));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
} else {
(void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
- fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n",
+ *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]);
}
+ free(comments[i]);
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
}
+ free(comments);
free(keys);
pkcs11_terminate();
exit(0);
#else
fatal("no pkcs11 support");
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
}
static struct sshkey *
try_read_key(char **cpp)
{
struct sshkey *ret;
int r;
if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0)
return ret;
/* Not a key */
sshkey_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
static void
fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
{
char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
static void
fingerprint_private(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
char *comment = NULL;
- struct sshkey *public = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
int r;
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
- if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
- debug("load public \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &pubkey, &comment)) != 0)
+ debug_r(r, "load public \"%s\"", path);
+ if (pubkey == NULL || comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') {
+ free(comment);
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL,
- &public, &comment)) != 0) {
- debug("load private \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
- fatal("%s is not a key file.", path);
- }
+ &privkey, &comment)) != 0)
+ debug_r(r, "load private \"%s\"", path);
}
+ if (pubkey == NULL && privkey == NULL)
+ fatal("%s is not a key file.", path);
- fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
- sshkey_free(public);
+ fingerprint_one_key(pubkey == NULL ? privkey : pubkey, comment);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ sshkey_free(privkey);
free(comment);
}
static void
do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f;
struct sshkey *public = NULL;
char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
int i, invalid = 1;
const char *path;
u_long lnum = 0;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
path = identity_file;
if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) {
f = stdin;
path = "(stdin)";
} else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lnum++;
cp = line;
cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
/* Trim leading space and comments */
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
continue;
/*
* Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys
* or known_hosts.
*/
/*
* Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if
* "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're
* not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin).
*/
if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 &&
strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) {
free(line);
fclose(f);
fingerprint_private(path);
exit(0);
}
/*
* If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to
* accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options.
* Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff.
*/
if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
if (i == 0 || ep == NULL ||
(*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
int quoted = 0;
comment = cp;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
*cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
else if (*cp == '"')
quoted = !quoted;
}
if (!*cp)
continue;
*cp++ = '\0';
}
}
/* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */
if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum);
continue;
}
/* Find trailing comment, if any */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#')
comment = cp;
fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
sshkey_free(public);
invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */
}
fclose(f);
free(line);
if (invalid)
fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct {
char *key_type;
char *key_type_display;
char *path;
} key_types[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
{ "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE },
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
{ "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE },
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
+ u_int32_t bits = 0;
int first = 0;
struct stat st;
struct sshkey *private, *public;
char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file;
int i, type, fd, r;
- FILE *f;
for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
public = private = NULL;
prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL;
xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
/* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */
if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) {
if (st.st_size != 0)
goto next;
} else if (errno != ENOENT) {
error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
/*
* Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with
* key generation.
*/
xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
if (first == 0) {
first = 1;
printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
}
printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
fflush(stdout);
type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
+ error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
- close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to generate/reserve a name */
+ (void)close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to reserve a name */
bits = 0;
type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits);
if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
- error("sshkey_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "sshkey_generate failed");
goto failnext;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private");
snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
hostname);
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
- comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- prv_tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+ rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", prv_tmp);
goto failnext;
}
if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
pub_tmp, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
(void)fchmod(fd, 0644);
- f = fdopen(fd, "w");
- if (f == NULL) {
- error("fdopen %s failed: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- goto failnext;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) {
- error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
- fclose(f);
- goto failnext;
- }
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- if (ferror(f) != 0) {
- error("write key failed: %s", strerror(errno));
- fclose(f);
- goto failnext;
- }
- if (fclose(f) != 0) {
- error("key close failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ (void)close(fd);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, pub_tmp, comment)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s",
+ identity_file);
goto failnext;
}
/* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */
if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) {
error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
pub_file, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) {
error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
key_types[i].path, strerror(errno));
failnext:
first = 0;
goto next;
}
next:
sshkey_free(private);
sshkey_free(public);
free(prv_tmp);
free(pub_tmp);
free(prv_file);
free(pub_file);
}
if (first != 0)
printf("\n");
}
struct known_hosts_ctx {
const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */
FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */
int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */
int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */
int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */
+ int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */
+ int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */
+ int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */
};
static int
known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;
switch (l->status) {
case HKF_STATUS_OK:
case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED:
/*
* Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
* characters or a CA/revocation marker.
*/
if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
- if (has_wild && !find_host) {
+ if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) {
logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
"with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
l->linenum, l->hosts);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list,
* hash and store separately.
*/
ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
lowercase(cp);
if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("hash_host failed");
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
ctx->has_unhashed = 1;
}
free(ohosts);
return 0;
case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
return -1;
}
static int
known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
- char *fp;
+ char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
- if (delete_host) {
+ if (ctx->delete_host) {
if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
} else {
/*
* Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke
* marker, delete it by *not* writing the
* line to ctx->out.
*/
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet)
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
ctx->host, l->linenum);
}
return 0;
- } else if (find_host) {
+ } else if (ctx->find_host) {
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet) {
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
ctx->host,
l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
(l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
}
- if (hash_hosts)
+ if (ctx->hash_hosts)
known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
else if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
- mprintf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
- sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key,
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host,
+ sshkey_type(l->key), fp,
+ l->comment[0] ? " " : "",
+ l->comment);
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ printf("%s\n", ra);
+ free(ra);
free(fp);
} else
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
- } else if (delete_host) {
+ } else if (ctx->delete_host) {
/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
}
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
}
return 0;
}
static void
-do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
+do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host,
+ int delete_host, int hash_hosts)
{
char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0;
struct known_hosts_ctx ctx;
u_int foreach_options;
+ struct stat sb;
if (!have_identity) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
sizeof(identity_file))
fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
free(cp);
have_identity = 1;
}
+ if (stat(identity_file, &sb) != 0)
+ fatal("Cannot stat %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.out = stdout;
ctx.host = name;
+ ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts;
+ ctx.find_host = find_host;
+ ctx.delete_host = delete_host;
/*
* Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
* A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
*/
if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
fatal("known_hosts path too long");
umask(077);
if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
unlink(tmp);
fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
}
+ fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644);
inplace = 1;
}
/* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */
foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0;
foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0;
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ?
known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL,
- foreach_options)) != 0) {
+ foreach_options, 0)) != 0) {
if (inplace)
unlink(tmp);
- fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach");
}
if (inplace)
fclose(ctx.out);
if (ctx.invalid) {
error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file);
if (inplace) {
error("Not replacing existing known_hosts "
"file because of errors");
unlink(tmp);
}
exit(1);
} else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) {
logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file);
if (inplace)
unlink(tmp);
} else if (inplace) {
/* Backup existing file */
if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
strerror(errno));
/* Move new one into place */
if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
strerror(errno));
unlink(tmp);
unlink(old);
exit(1);
}
printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file);
printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
if (ctx.has_unhashed) {
logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old);
logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy "
"of hostnames");
}
}
exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key);
}
/*
* Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure
* for the current user.
*/
static void
do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
{
char *comment;
char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
struct stat st;
struct sshkey *private;
int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
/* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment);
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
if (identity_passphrase)
old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else
old_passphrase =
read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
&private, &comment);
- explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
- free(old_passphrase);
+ freezero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
if (r != 0)
goto badkey;
} else if (r != 0) {
badkey:
- fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Failed to load key %s", identity_file);
}
if (comment)
mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
if (identity_new_passphrase) {
passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
passphrase2 = NULL;
} else {
passphrase1 =
read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
"passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
/* Verify that they are the same. */
if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
free(passphrase1);
free(passphrase2);
printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Destroy the other copy. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase2);
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
}
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
- comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
- identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(1);
}
/* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
+ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */
free(comment);
printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
exit(0);
}
/*
* Print the SSHFP RR.
*/
static int
-do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname)
+do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname,
+ int print_generic)
{
struct sshkey *public;
char *comment = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (fname == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no filename", __func__);
- if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) {
+ fatal_f("no filename");
+ if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0)
- fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.",
- fname, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\"", fname);
export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
sshkey_free(public);
free(comment);
return 1;
}
/*
* Change the comment of a private key file.
*/
static void
-do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
+do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
{
char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
struct sshkey *private;
struct sshkey *public;
struct stat st;
- FILE *f;
- int r, fd;
+ int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "",
&private, &comment)) == 0)
passphrase = xstrdup("");
else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
- identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file);
else {
if (identity_passphrase)
passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else if (identity_new_passphrase)
passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
else
passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
/* Try to load using the passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase,
&private, &comment)) != 0) {
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
- fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
- identity_file, ssh_err(r));
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"",
+ identity_file);
}
}
if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
- !use_new_format) {
+ private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
"the new format (-o).");
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
exit(1);
}
if (comment)
- printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+ printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment);
else
- printf("Key now has no comment\n");
+ printf("No existing comment\n");
if (identity_comment) {
strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
} else {
- printf("Enter new comment: ");
+ printf("New comment: ");
fflush(stdout);
if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
exit(1);
}
new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
}
+ if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) {
+ printf("No change to comment\n");
+ free(passphrase);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ free(comment);
+ exit(0);
+ }
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
- new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
+ new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+ rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(1);
}
- explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- free(passphrase);
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private");
sshkey_free(private);
strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
- fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
- if (fd == -1)
- fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file);
- f = fdopen(fd, "w");
- if (f == NULL)
- fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
- fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, new_comment)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file);
sshkey_free(public);
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
- fclose(f);
-
free(comment);
- printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n");
+ if (strlen(new_comment) > 0)
+ printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment);
+ else
+ printf("Comment removed\n");
+
exit(0);
}
static void
-add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name)
+cert_ext_add(const char *key, const char *value, int iscrit)
{
- int r;
-
- debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ cert_ext = xreallocarray(cert_ext, ncert_ext + 1, sizeof(*cert_ext));
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].key = xstrdup(key);
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].val = value == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(value);
+ cert_ext[ncert_ext].crit = iscrit;
+ ncert_ext++;
}
-static void
-add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value)
+/* qsort(3) comparison function for certificate extensions */
+static int
+cert_ext_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b)
{
- struct sshbuf *b;
+ const struct cert_ext *a = (const struct cert_ext *)_a;
+ const struct cert_ext *b = (const struct cert_ext *)_b;
int r;
- debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value);
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
- sshbuf_free(b);
+ if (a->crit != b->crit)
+ return (a->crit < b->crit) ? -1 : 1;
+ if ((r = strcmp(a->key, b->key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((a->val == NULL) != (b->val == NULL))
+ return (a->val == NULL) ? -1 : 1;
+ if (a->val != NULL && (r = strcmp(a->val, b->val)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
}
#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
static void
prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which)
{
+ struct sshbuf *b;
size_t i;
+ int r;
+ const struct cert_ext *ext;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
sshbuf_reset(c);
- if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
- certflags_command != NULL)
- add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command);
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
- (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
- add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc");
- if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
- certflags_src_addr != NULL)
- add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr);
- for (i = 0; i < ncert_userext; i++) {
- if ((cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) ||
- (!cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL)))
+ for (i = 0; i < ncert_ext; i++) {
+ ext = &cert_ext[i];
+ if ((ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) ||
+ (!ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL)))
continue;
- if (cert_userext[i].val == NULL)
- add_flag_option(c, cert_userext[i].key);
- else {
- add_string_option(c, cert_userext[i].key,
- cert_userext[i].val);
+ if (ext->val == NULL) {
+ /* flag option */
+ debug3_f("%s", ext->key);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "prepare flag");
+ } else {
+ /* key/value option */
+ debug3_f("%s=%s", ext->key, ext->val);
+ sshbuf_reset(b);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ext->val)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "prepare k/v");
}
}
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+}
+
+static void
+finalise_cert_exts(void)
+{
+ /* critical options */
+ if (certflags_command != NULL)
+ cert_ext_add("force-command", certflags_command, 1);
+ if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+ cert_ext_add("source-address", certflags_src_addr, 1);
+ /* extensions */
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-X11-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-agent-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-port-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-pty", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("permit-user-rc", NULL, 0);
+ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0)
+ cert_ext_add("no-touch-required", NULL, 0);
+ /* order lexically by key */
+ if (ncert_ext > 0)
+ qsort(cert_ext, ncert_ext, sizeof(*cert_ext), cert_ext_cmp);
}
static struct sshkey *
load_pkcs11_key(char *path)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL;
int r, i, nkeys;
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s",
- path, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path);
- nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys);
- debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys);
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase,
+ &keys, NULL);
+ debug3_f("%d keys", nkeys);
if (nkeys <= 0)
fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) {
private = keys[i];
continue;
}
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
}
free(keys);
sshkey_free(public);
return private;
#else
fatal("no pkcs11 support");
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
}
/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */
static int
-agent_signer(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
- const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx)
+ const char *alg, const char *provider, const char *pin,
+ u_int compat, void *ctx)
{
int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx;
return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
}
static void
-do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
+do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
+ unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc,
+ int argc, char **argv)
{
- int r, i, fd, found, agent_fd = -1;
+ int r, i, found, agent_fd = -1;
u_int n;
struct sshkey *ca, *public;
- char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL;
- FILE *f;
+ char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment;
+ char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL, *pin = NULL;
struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids;
size_t j;
+ struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(1);
#endif
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
/* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */
if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL)
fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path);
} else if (prefer_agent) {
/*
* Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making
* sure the public key specified is actually present in the
* agent.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s",
- tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
- fatal("Cannot use public key for CA signature: %s",
- ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot use public key for CA signature");
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0)
- fatal("Retrieve agent key list: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Retrieve agent key list");
found = 0;
for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp);
ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids);
ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
} else {
/* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */
- ca = load_identity(tmp);
+ ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL);
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+ (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for CA key: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("couldn't read PIN");
+ }
}
free(tmp);
- if (key_type_name != NULL &&
- sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
- fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
- sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ if (key_type_name != NULL) {
+ if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
+ fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ }
+ } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ /* Default to a good signature algorithm */
+ key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
}
+ ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ finalise_cert_exts();
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
/* Split list of principals */
n = 0;
if (cert_principals != NULL) {
otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
plist = NULL;
for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
fatal("Empty principal name");
}
free(otmp);
}
if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
fatal("Too many certificate principals specified");
-
+
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s",
- __func__, tmp, ssh_err(r));
- if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA &&
- public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519 &&
- public->type != KEY_XMSS)
- fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
- __func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public));
+ fatal_r(r, "load pubkey \"%s\"", tmp);
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(public))
+ fatal_f("key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
+ tmp, sshkey_type(public));
/* Prepare certificate to sign */
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0)
- fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s",
- tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp);
public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
public->cert->nprincipals = n;
public->cert->principals = plist;
public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL);
prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca,
&public->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private (ca key)");
if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) {
if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca,
- key_type_name, agent_signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
- fatal("Couldn't certify key %s via agent: %s",
- tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ key_type_name, sk_provider, NULL, agent_signer,
+ &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify %s via agent", tmp);
} else {
- if ((sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name)) != 0)
- fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s",
- tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+ (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ notifier = notify_start(0,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp);
+ }
+ r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name,
+ sk_provider, pin);
+ notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify key %s", tmp);
}
if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0)
*cp = '\0';
xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp);
free(tmp);
- if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
- fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out,
- strerror(errno));
- if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
- fatal("Could not write certified key to %s: %s",
- out, ssh_err(r));
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- fclose(f);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, out, comment)) != 0) {
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s",
+ identity_file);
+ }
if (!quiet) {
sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert,
valid, sizeof(valid));
logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
"valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public),
out, public->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)public->cert->serial,
cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
valid);
}
sshkey_free(public);
free(out);
+ if (cert_serial_autoinc)
+ cert_serial++;
}
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ free(ca_fp);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
exit(0);
}
static u_int64_t
parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
{
int64_t mul, secs;
mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1;
if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1)
fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s);
if (mul == -1 && secs > now)
fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
}
static void
parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
{
char *from, *to;
time_t now = time(NULL);
int64_t secs;
/* +timespec relative to now */
if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) {
if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1)
fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec);
cert_valid_to = now + secs;
/*
* Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts
* with poorly-synchronised clocks.
*/
cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60;
return;
}
/*
* from:to, where
* from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always"
* to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever"
*/
from = xstrdup(timespec);
to = strchr(from, ':');
if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0')
fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec);
*to++ = '\0';
if (*from == '-' || *from == '+')
cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
cert_valid_from = 0;
else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
if (*to == '-' || *to == '+')
cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from)
fatal("Empty certificate validity interval");
free(from);
}
static void
add_cert_option(char *opt)
{
char *val, *cp;
int iscrit = 0;
if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
certflags_flags = 0;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
val = opt + 14;
if (*val == '\0')
fatal("Empty force-command option");
if (certflags_command != NULL)
fatal("force-command already specified");
certflags_command = xstrdup(val);
} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
val = opt + 15;
if (*val == '\0')
fatal("Empty source-address option");
if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
fatal("source-address already specified");
if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
fatal("Invalid source-address list");
certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 ||
- (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) {
+ (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) {
val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1);
if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL)
*cp++ = '\0';
- cert_userext = xreallocarray(cert_userext, ncert_userext + 1,
- sizeof(*cert_userext));
- cert_userext[ncert_userext].key = val;
- cert_userext[ncert_userext].val = cp == NULL ?
- NULL : xstrdup(cp);
- cert_userext[ncert_userext].crit = iscrit;
- ncert_userext++;
+ cert_ext_add(val, cp, iscrit);
+ free(val);
} else
fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
}
static void
show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical)
{
- char *name, *arg;
+ char *name, *arg, *hex;
struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL;
int r;
if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(option);
option = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse option");
printf(" %s", name);
if (!in_critical &&
(strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0))
+ strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) {
printf("\n");
- else if (in_critical &&
+ } else if (in_critical &&
(strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse critical");
printf(" %s\n", arg);
free(arg);
- } else {
- printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n",
- sshbuf_len(option));
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(option) > 0) {
+ hex = sshbuf_dtob16(option);
+ printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION: %s (len %zu)\n",
+ hex, sshbuf_len(option));
sshbuf_reset(option);
- }
+ free(hex);
+ } else
+ printf(" UNKNOWN FLAG OPTION\n");
free(name);
if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0)
fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
}
sshbuf_free(option);
sshbuf_free(options);
}
static void
print_cert(struct sshkey *key)
{
char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp;
u_int i;
key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid));
printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
sshkey_cert_type(key));
printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp);
- printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n",
- sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
+ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n",
+ sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+ key->cert->signature_type);
printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial);
printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid);
printf(" Principals: ");
if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++)
printf("\n %s",
key->cert->principals[i]);
printf("\n");
}
printf(" Critical Options: ");
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
printf("\n");
show_options(key->cert->critical, 1);
}
printf(" Extensions: ");
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
printf("\n");
show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0);
}
}
static void
do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0;
FILE *f;
char *cp, *line = NULL;
const char *path;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long lnum = 0;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
- if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) < 0)
+ if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
path = identity_file;
if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
f = stdin;
path = "(stdin)";
is_stdin = 1;
} else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lnum++;
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
/* Trim leading space and comments */
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
continue;
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new");
if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
- error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path,
- lnum, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum);
continue;
}
ok = 1;
if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1)
printf("%s:\n", path);
else
printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum);
print_cert(key);
}
free(line);
sshkey_free(key);
fclose(f);
exit(ok ? 0 : 1);
}
static void
load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
{
struct sshbuf *krlbuf;
- int r, fd;
+ int r;
- if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
- if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0)
- fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r));
- close(fd);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to load KRL %s", path);
/* XXX check sigs */
if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
*krlp == NULL)
- fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Invalid KRL file %s", path);
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
}
static void
hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp,
const char *file, u_long lnum)
{
char *tmp;
size_t tlen;
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0)
fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum);
cp += 7;
/*
* OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '='
* characters; put them back for decode.
*/
tlen = strlen(cp);
tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1);
strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1);
while ((tlen % 4) != 0) {
tmp[tlen++] = '=';
tmp[tlen] = '\0';
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0)
- fatal("%s:%lu: decode hash failed: %s", file, lnum, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: decode hash failed", file, lnum);
free(tmp);
*lenp = sshbuf_len(b);
*blobp = xmalloc(*lenp);
memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp);
sshbuf_free(b);
}
static void
update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_long lnum = 0;
char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
u_char *blob = NULL;
size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0;
unsigned long long serial, serial2;
int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r;
FILE *krl_spec;
path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
krl_spec = stdin;
free(path);
path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
} else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (!quiet)
printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) {
lnum++;
was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0;
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
/* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
cp[i] = '\0';
break;
}
if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
/* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
if (r == -1)
r = i;
} else
r = -1;
}
if (r != -1)
cp[r] = '\0';
if (*cp == '\0')
continue;
if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
fatal("revoking certificates by serial number "
"requires specification of a CA key");
}
cp += 7;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
errno = 0;
serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
path, lnum, cp);
if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
path, lnum);
serial2 = serial;
if (*ep == '-') {
cp = ep + 1;
errno = 0;
serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
path, lnum, cp);
if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
path, lnum);
if (serial2 <= serial)
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
"%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
(unsigned long long)serial,
(unsigned long long)serial2);
}
if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: revoke serial failed",
- __func__);
+ fatal_f("revoke serial failed");
}
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
fatal("revoking certificates by key ID "
"requires specification of a CA key");
}
cp += 3;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
- fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("revoke key ID failed");
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) {
cp += 5;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum);
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
} else {
if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
cp += 4;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_explicit_key = 1;
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
cp += 5;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_sha1 = 1;
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) {
cp += 7;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_sha256 = 1;
/*
* Just try to process the line as a key.
* Parsing will fail if it isn't.
*/
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new");
if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0)
- fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s",
- path, lnum, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
if (was_explicit_key)
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
else if (was_sha1) {
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
file, lnum);
}
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen);
} else if (was_sha256) {
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
file, lnum);
}
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
} else
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
if (r != 0)
- fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
freezero(blob, blen);
blob = NULL;
blen = 0;
sshkey_free(key);
}
}
if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
fclose(krl_spec);
free(line);
free(path);
}
static void
-do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv)
+do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path,
+ unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment,
+ int argc, char **argv)
{
struct ssh_krl *krl;
struct stat sb;
struct sshkey *ca = NULL;
- int fd, i, r, wild_ca = 0;
+ int i, r, wild_ca = 0;
char *tmp;
struct sshbuf *kbuf;
if (*identity_file == '\0')
fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
identity_file, strerror(errno));
if (updating)
fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0)
wild_ca = 1;
else {
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s",
- tmp, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
free(tmp);
}
}
if (updating)
load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
fatal("couldn't create KRL");
- if (cert_serial != 0)
- ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial);
- if (identity_comment != NULL)
- ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment);
+ if (krl_version != 0)
+ ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version);
+ if (krl_comment != NULL)
+ ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl);
if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
- if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
- fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kbuf), sshbuf_len(kbuf)) !=
- sshbuf_len(kbuf))
+ if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0)
fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
sshbuf_free(kbuf);
ssh_krl_free(krl);
sshkey_free(ca);
}
static void
-do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
+do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int print_krl, int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, r, ret = 0;
char *comment;
struct ssh_krl *krl;
struct sshkey *k;
if (*identity_file == '\0')
fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+ if (print_krl)
+ krl_dump(krl, stdout);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0)
- fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s",
- argv[i], ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]);
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
*comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
if (r != 0)
ret = 1;
sshkey_free(k);
free(comment);
}
ssh_krl_free(krl);
exit(ret);
}
+static struct sshkey *
+load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey)
+{
+ size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath);
+ char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath);
+ const char *suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL };
+ struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the corresponding
+ * private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line
+ * and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
+ slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
+ if (plen <= slen ||
+ strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0)
+ continue;
+ privpath[plen - slen] = '\0';
+ debug_f("%s looks like a public key, using private key "
+ "path %s instead", keypath, privpath);
+ }
+ if ((privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ error("Couldn't load identity %s", keypath);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) {
+ error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s",
+ keypath, privpath);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) {
+ /*
+ * Graft the certificate onto the private key to make
+ * it capable of signing.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = privkey;
+ privkey = NULL;
+ done:
+ sshkey_free(privkey);
+ free(privpath);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
+ const char *sig_namespace, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno;
+ char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+ char *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ if (fd == STDIN_FILENO)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename);
+ }
+ if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey)) {
+ if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key: ",
+ sshkey_type(signkey));
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt,
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("couldn't read PIN");
+ }
+ if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(signkey), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, sk_provider, pin,
+ fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Signing %s failed", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("buffer error");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) {
+ fputs(asig, stdout);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ } else {
+ xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename);
+ if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) {
+ if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC,
+ 0666)) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("Cannot open %s: %s",
+ wfile, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig,
+ strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("Cannot write to %s: %s",
+ wfile, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n",
+ wfile);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(wfile);
+ free(prompt);
+ free(asig);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ if (wfd != -1)
+ close(wfd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1;
+ int agent_fd = -1;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL;
+ sshsig_signer *signer = NULL;
+
+ /* Check file arguments. */
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (i > 0 || argc > 1)
+ fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input");
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't load public key %s", keypath);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
+ debug_r(r, "Couldn't get agent socket");
+ else {
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0)
+ signer = agent_signer;
+ else
+ debug_r(r, "Couldn't find key in agent");
+ }
+
+ if (signer == NULL) {
+ /* Not using agent - try to load private key */
+ if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL)
+ goto done;
+ signkey = privkey;
+ } else {
+ /* Will use key in agent */
+ signkey = pubkey;
+ }
+
+ if (argc == 0) {
+ if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO,
+ sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0)
+ fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+ else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+ error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s",
+ argv[i], strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace,
+ signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ goto done;
+ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ fd = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ sshkey_free(privkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, uint64_t *verify_timep,
+ int *print_pubkey)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ time_t now;
+
+ *verify_timep = 0;
+ *print_pubkey = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
+ if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,
+ verify_timep) != 0 || *verify_timep == 0) {
+ error("Invalid \"verify-time\" option");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ } else if (print_pubkey &&
+ strcasecmp(opts[i], "print-pubkey") == 0) {
+ *print_pubkey = 1;
+ } else {
+ error("Invalid option \"%s\"", opts[i]);
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ }
+ if (*verify_timep == 0) {
+ if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) {
+ error("Time is before epoch");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ *verify_timep = (uint64_t)now;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace,
+ const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys,
+ char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ int print_pubkey = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
+ char *fp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
+ uint64_t verify_time = 0;
+
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &verify_time, &print_pubkey) != 0)
+ goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+ memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace,
+ &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0)
+ goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp);
+ if (sig_details != NULL) {
+ debug2_f("signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x",
+ sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
+ }
+ free(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+
+ if (revoked_keys != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) {
+ debug3_fr(r, "sshkey_check_revoked");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (allowed_keys != NULL && (r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys,
+ sign_key, principal, sig_namespace, verify_time)) != 0) {
+ debug3_fr(r, "sshsig_check_allowed_keys");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (!quiet) {
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ if (principal == NULL) {
+ printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n",
+ sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+
+ } else {
+ printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n",
+ sig_namespace, principal,
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+ }
+ } else {
+ printf("Could not verify signature.\n");
+ }
+ }
+ /* Print the signature key if requested */
+ if (ret == 0 && print_pubkey && sign_key != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(sign_key, stdout)) == 0)
+ fputc('\n', stdout);
+ else {
+ error_r(r, "Could not print public key.\n");
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+ free(fp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys,
+ char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
+ char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp;
+ uint64_t verify_time = 0;
+
+ if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &verify_time, NULL) != 0)
+ goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_get_pubkey");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key,
+ verify_time, &principals)) != 0) {
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+ error_fr(r, "sshsig_find_principal");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (ret == 0 ) {
+ /* Emit matching principals one per line */
+ tmp = principals;
+ while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0')
+ puts(cp);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n");
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ free(principals);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ u_int32_t memory = 0;
+ BIGNUM *start = NULL;
+ int moduli_bits = 0;
+ FILE *out;
+ size_t i;
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ /* Parse options */
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) {
+ memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1,
+ UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s",
+ errstr, opts[i]+7);
+ }
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) {
+ /* XXX - also compare length against bits */
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0)
+ fatal("Invalid start point.");
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) {
+ moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1,
+ INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+12, errstr);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+ "generation", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+ if (moduli_bits == 0)
+ moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ fatal("Moduli generation is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ char *checkpoint = NULL;
+ u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0;
+ unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
+ int prime_tests = 0;
+ FILE *out, *in = stdin;
+ size_t i;
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ /* Parse options */
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) {
+ lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+ start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
+ checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+ generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+ opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL) {
+ fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+10, errstr);
+ }
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) {
+ prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1,
+ INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+12, errstr);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+ "screening", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
+ if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
+ "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+ if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests,
+ generator_wanted, checkpoint,
+ start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus screening failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+static char *
+private_key_passphrase(void)
+{
+ char *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+
+ /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ else {
+passphrase_again:
+ passphrase1 =
+ read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
+ "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
+ * retry.
+ */
+ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
+ goto passphrase_again;
+ }
+ /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ }
+ return passphrase1;
+}
+
+static const char *
+skip_ssh_url_preamble(const char *s)
+{
+ if (strncmp(s, "ssh://", 6) == 0)
+ return s + 6;
+ else if (strncmp(s, "ssh:", 4) == 0)
+ return s + 4;
+ return s;
+}
+
+static int
+do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device)
+{
+ struct sshkey **keys;
+ size_t nkeys, i;
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ char *fp, *pin = NULL, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath;
+ const char *ext;
+
+ if (skprovider == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
+
+ pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your authenticator "
+ "to authorize key download.\n");
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin,
+ &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+ logit("No keys to download");
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (keys[i]->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK &&
+ keys[i]->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) {
+ error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->type);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i],
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ debug_f("key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", i,
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp, keys[i]->sk_application,
+ keys[i]->sk_flags);
+ ext = skip_ssh_url_preamble(keys[i]->sk_application);
+ xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s",
+ keys[i]->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk",
+ *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext);
+
+ /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+ if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) {
+ free(path);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the key with the application string as the comment */
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ pass = private_key_passphrase();
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(keys[i], path, pass,
+ keys[i]->sk_application, private_key_format,
+ openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", path);
+ free(path);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]),
+ *ext != '\0' ? " " : "",
+ *ext != '\0' ? keys[i]->sk_application : "",
+ path);
+ }
+
+ /* Save public key too */
+ xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path);
+ free(path);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(keys[i], pubpath,
+ keys[i]->sk_application)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving public key \"%s\" failed", pubpath);
+ free(pubpath);
+ break;
+ }
+ free(pubpath);
+ }
+
+ if (i >= nkeys)
+ ret = 0; /* success */
+ if (pass != NULL)
+ freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path)
+{
+ mode_t omask;
+ int r;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ return; /* nothing to do */
+ if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0)
+ fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data");
+ omask = umask(077);
+ r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest);
+ umask(omask);
+ if (r != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to write attestation data \"%s\"", path);
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in "
+ "%s\n", path);
+}
+
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa]\n"
- " [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+ "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
+ " [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]\n"
+ " [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n"
+ " [-w provider] [-Z cipher]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n"
+ " [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ " ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
+#endif
" ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n"
" ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
fprintf(stderr,
" ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr,
- " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
" ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]\n"
" ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n"
- " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n"
#endif
- " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-U]\n"
- " [-D pkcs11_provider] [-n principals] [-O option]\n"
- " [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n"
+ " [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n"
+ " [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -A\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]\n"
" ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n"
" file ...\n"
- " ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n");
+ " ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file [file ...]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n"
+ " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file]\n");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Main program for key management.
*/
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+ char comment[1024], *passphrase;
char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
struct sshkey *private, *public;
struct passwd *pw;
- struct stat st;
- int r, opt, type, fd;
+ int r, opt, type;
+ int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0;
+ int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0;
int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
- FILE *f;
+ int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0;
+ int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0;
+ int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0;
+ unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
+ char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL;
+ char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL;
+ char *sk_attestation_path = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL;
+ size_t i, nopts = 0;
+ u_int32_t bits = 0;
+ uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
const char *errstr;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- /* Moduli generation/screening */
- char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL;
- u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0;
- int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
- unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
- BIGNUM *start = NULL;
-#endif
+ int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ char *sign_op = NULL;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-#endif
- log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
-
seed_rng();
+ log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
msetlocale();
/* we need this for the home * directory. */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw)
fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
- if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
+ pw = pwcopy(pw);
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
- /* Remaining characters: Ydw */
- while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQUXceghiklopquvxy"
- "C:D:E:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:"
- "a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) {
+ sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+
+ /* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy"
+ "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:"
+ "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'A':
gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
break;
case 'b':
- bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 10, 32768, &errstr);
+ bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX,
+ &errstr);
if (errstr)
fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
optarg, errstr);
break;
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'F':
find_host = 1;
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'H':
hash_hosts = 1;
break;
case 'I':
cert_key_id = optarg;
break;
case 'R':
delete_host = 1;
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'L':
show_cert = 1;
break;
case 'l':
print_fingerprint = 1;
break;
case 'B':
print_bubblebabble = 1;
break;
case 'm':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
break;
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
+ private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
break;
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PEM;
- use_new_format = 0;
+ private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
break;
}
fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
case 'n':
cert_principals = optarg;
break;
case 'o':
/* no-op; new format is already the default */
break;
case 'p':
change_passphrase = 1;
break;
case 'c':
change_comment = 1;
break;
case 'f':
if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg,
sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file))
fatal("Identity filename too long");
have_identity = 1;
break;
case 'g':
print_generic = 1;
break;
+ case 'K':
+ download_sk = 1;
+ break;
case 'P':
identity_passphrase = optarg;
break;
case 'N':
identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
break;
case 'Q':
check_krl = 1;
break;
case 'O':
- add_cert_option(optarg);
+ opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1,
+ sizeof(*opts));
+ opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'Z':
- new_format_cipher = optarg;
+ openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
+ if (cipher_by_name(openssh_format_cipher) == NULL)
+ fatal("Invalid OpenSSH-format cipher '%s'",
+ openssh_format_cipher);
break;
case 'C':
identity_comment = optarg;
break;
case 'q':
quiet = 1;
break;
case 'e':
- case 'x':
/* export key */
convert_to = 1;
break;
case 'h':
cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
certflags_flags = 0;
break;
case 'k':
gen_krl = 1;
break;
case 'i':
case 'X':
/* import key */
convert_from = 1;
break;
case 'y':
print_public = 1;
break;
case 's':
ca_key_path = optarg;
break;
case 't':
key_type_name = optarg;
break;
case 'D':
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
case 'U':
prefer_agent = 1;
break;
case 'u':
update_krl = 1;
break;
case 'v':
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
else {
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
}
break;
case 'r':
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'a':
rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
optarg, errstr);
break;
case 'V':
parse_cert_times(optarg);
break;
+ case 'Y':
+ sign_op = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ sk_provider = optarg;
+ break;
case 'z':
errno = 0;
+ if (*optarg == '+') {
+ cert_serial_autoinc = 1;
+ optarg++;
+ }
cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
(errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- /* Moduli generation/screening */
- case 'G':
- do_gen_candidates = 1;
- if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
- sizeof(out_file))
- fatal("Output filename too long");
- break;
- case 'J':
- lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
- break;
- case 'j':
- start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
- break;
- case 'K':
- if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX)
- fatal("Checkpoint filename too long");
- checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
case 'M':
- memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX,
- &errstr);
- if (errstr)
- fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0)
+ do_gen_candidates = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0)
+ do_screen_candidates = 1;
+ else
+ fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg);
break;
- case 'S':
- /* XXX - also compare length against bits */
- if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0)
- fatal("Invalid start point.");
- break;
- case 'T':
- do_screen_candidates = 1;
- if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
- sizeof(out_file))
- fatal("Output filename too long");
- break;
- case 'W':
- generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1,
- UINT_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL)
- fatal("Desired generator invalid: %s (%s)",
- optarg, errstr);
- break;
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ if (sk_provider == NULL)
+ sk_provider = "internal";
+#endif
+
/* reinit */
log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
argv += optind;
argc -= optind;
+ if (sign_op != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) {
+ if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+ "missing signature file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+ "missing allowed keys file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file,
+ opts, nopts);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) {
+ if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+ *cert_principals == '\0') {
+ error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+ "missing namespace");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+ "missing key");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals,
+ argc, argv);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) {
+ if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
+ "missing signature file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, opts, nopts);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) {
+ if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+ *cert_principals == '\0') {
+ error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+ "missing namespace");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+ "missing signature file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+ "missing allowed keys file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (cert_key_id == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+ "missing principal ID");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+ cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname,
+ opts, nopts);
+ }
+ error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op);
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
error("Too few arguments.");
usage();
}
- } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) {
+ } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl &&
+ !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) {
error("Too many arguments.");
usage();
}
if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
error("Can only have one of -p and -c.");
usage();
}
if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.");
usage();
}
if (gen_krl) {
- do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv);
+ do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path,
+ cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv);
return (0);
}
if (check_krl) {
- do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv);
+ do_check_krl(pw, print_fingerprint, argc, argv);
return (0);
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (cert_key_id == NULL)
fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
- do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv);
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++)
+ add_cert_option(opts[i]);
+ do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent,
+ cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv);
}
if (show_cert)
do_show_cert(pw);
- if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host)
- do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname);
+ if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) {
+ do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host,
+ delete_host, hash_hosts);
+ }
if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
do_download(pw);
+ if (download_sk) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+ sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+ "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device);
+ }
if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
do_fingerprint(pw);
if (change_passphrase)
do_change_passphrase(pw);
if (change_comment)
- do_change_comment(pw);
+ do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (convert_to)
do_convert_to(pw);
if (convert_from)
do_convert_from(pw);
-#endif
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ if (convert_to || convert_from)
+ fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (print_public)
do_print_public(pw);
if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
unsigned int n = 0;
if (have_identity) {
- n = do_print_resource_record(pw,
- identity_file, rr_hostname);
+ n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file,
+ rr_hostname, print_generic);
if (n == 0)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
exit(0);
} else {
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
- _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+ _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+ print_generic);
if (n == 0)
fatal("no keys found.");
exit(0);
}
}
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) {
+ if (argc <= 0)
+ fatal("No output file specified");
+ else if (argc > 1)
+ fatal("Too many output files specified");
+ }
if (do_gen_candidates) {
- FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
-
- if (out == NULL) {
- error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
- out_file, strerror(errno));
- return (1);
- }
- if (bits == 0)
- bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
- if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0)
- fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
-
- return (0);
+ do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+ return 0;
}
-
if (do_screen_candidates) {
- FILE *in;
- FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a");
-
- if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
- if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
- fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
- "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- } else
- in = stdin;
-
- if (out == NULL) {
- fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
- out_file, strerror(errno));
- }
- if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds,
- generator_wanted, checkpoint,
- start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
- fatal("modulus screening failed");
- return (0);
+ do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
return (0);
}
if (key_type_name == NULL)
key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
if (!quiet)
printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n",
key_type_name);
- if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_generate failed");
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+ sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "verify-required") == 0) {
+ sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) {
+ sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+ sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) {
+ sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10,
+ &challenge)) != 0) {
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to load FIDO "
+ "enrollment challenge \"%s\"",
+ opts[i] + 10);
+ }
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+ "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) {
+ sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+ "application=", 12) == 0) {
+ sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12);
+ if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) {
+ fatal("FIDO application string must "
+ "begin with \"ssh:\"");
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+ "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your authenticator "
+ "to authorize key generation.\n");
+ }
+ if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((sk_flags &
+ (SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY))) {
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for "
+ "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ } else {
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0 ; ; i++) {
+ fflush(stdout);
+ r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device,
+ sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application,
+ sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge,
+ &private, attest);
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ fatal_r(r, "Key enrollment failed");
+ else if (passphrase != NULL) {
+ error("PIN incorrect");
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
+ if (i >= 3)
+ fatal("Too many incorrect PINs");
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for "
+ "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your "
+ "authenticator (again) to authorize "
+ "key generation.\n");
+ }
+ }
+ if (passphrase != NULL) {
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshkey_generate failed");
+ break;
+ }
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private");
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
/* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
- snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s",
- pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) {
- if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) {
- if (errno != ENOENT) {
- error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir,
- strerror(errno));
- } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) {
- error("Could not create directory '%s': %s",
- dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
- } else if (!quiet)
- printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir);
- }
- }
+ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(identity_file, !quiet);
+
/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
- char yesno[3];
- printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
- printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
- fflush(stdout);
- if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
- exit(1);
- if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
- if (identity_passphrase)
- passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
- else if (identity_new_passphrase)
- passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
- else {
-passphrase_again:
- passphrase1 =
- read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
- "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
- /*
- * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
- * retry.
- */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase1);
- free(passphrase2);
- printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
- goto passphrase_again;
- }
- /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase2);
- }
+ if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file))
+ exit(1);
+ /* Determine the passphrase for the private key */
+ passphrase = private_key_passphrase();
if (identity_comment) {
strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
} else {
/* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
}
/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
- if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
- comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
+ comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
exit(1);
}
- /* Clear the passphrase. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
-
- /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n",
+ identity_file);
+ }
strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
- if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
- fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
- identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
- fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
- error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- if (ferror(f) || fclose(f) != 0)
- fatal("write public failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file);
if (!quiet) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
- printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n",
identity_file);
printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
+ if (sk_attestation_path != NULL)
+ save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path);
+
+ sshbuf_free(attest);
sshkey_free(public);
+
exit(0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
index f3d7a4078f53..f9df75d42f1a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1
@@ -1,158 +1,158 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.44 2018/03/05 07:03:18 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.45 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
.\"
.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keyscan
-.Nd gather SSH public keys
+.Nd gather SSH public keys from servers
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-keyscan
.Op Fl 46cDHv
.Op Fl f Ar file
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl T Ar timeout
.Op Fl t Ar type
.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a number of
hosts.
It was designed to aid in building and verifying
.Pa ssh_known_hosts
files,
the format of which is documented in
.Xr sshd 8 .
.Nm
provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl
scripts.
.Pp
.Nm
uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in
parallel, so it is very efficient.
The keys from a domain of 1,000
hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
hosts are down or do not run
.Xr sshd 8 .
For scanning, one does not need
login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
scanning process involve any encryption.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Force
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Force
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.It Fl c
Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
.It Fl D
Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records.
The default is to print keys in a format usable as a
.Xr ssh 1
.Pa known_hosts
file.
.It Fl f Ar file
Read hosts or
.Dq addrlist namelist
pairs from
.Ar file ,
one per line.
If
.Sq -
is supplied instead of a filename,
.Nm
will read from the standard input.
Input is expected in the format:
.Bd -literal
1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
.Ed
.It Fl H
Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.
Hashed names may be used normally by
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8 ,
but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
be disclosed.
.It Fl p Ar port
Connect to
.Ar port
on the remote host.
.It Fl T Ar timeout
Set the timeout for connection attempts.
If
.Ar timeout
seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
last time anything was read from that host, the connection is
closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
The default is 5 seconds.
.It Fl t Ar type
Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
The possible values are
.Dq dsa ,
.Dq ecdsa ,
.Dq ed25519 ,
or
.Dq rsa .
Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
The default is to fetch
.Dq rsa ,
.Dq ecdsa ,
and
.Dq ed25519
keys.
.It Fl v
Verbose mode:
print debugging messages about progress.
.El
.Pp
If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using
.Nm
without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to
.Em man in the middle
attacks.
On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
.Nm
can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
.Sh FILES
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
.Sh EXAMPLES
Print the RSA host key for machine
.Ar hostname :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname
.Pp
Find all hosts from the file
.Pa ssh_hosts
which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e
sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%D 2006
.%R RFC 4255
.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
.An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu
wrote the initial version, and
.An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net
added support for protocol version 2.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
index 38b1c548be3e..7abbcbff5d00 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -1,807 +1,824 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.120 2018/06/06 18:29:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.139 2021/01/27 09:26:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
* Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
* permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
* OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#endif
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "dns.h"
/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
#define KT_DSA (1)
#define KT_RSA (1<<1)
#define KT_ECDSA (1<<2)
#define KT_ED25519 (1<<3)
#define KT_XMSS (1<<4)
+#define KT_ECDSA_SK (1<<5)
+#define KT_ED25519_SK (1<<6)
#define KT_MIN KT_DSA
-#define KT_MAX KT_XMSS
+#define KT_MAX KT_ED25519_SK
int get_cert = 0;
-int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519;
+int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519|KT_ECDSA_SK|KT_ED25519_SK;
int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */
int print_sshfp = 0; /* Print SSHFP records instead of known_hosts */
+int found_one = 0; /* Successfully found a key */
+
#define MAXMAXFD 256
/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
int timeout = 5;
int maxfd;
#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
extern char *__progname;
fd_set *read_wait;
size_t read_wait_nfdset;
int ncon;
-struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */
-
/*
* Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state
* associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
*/
typedef struct Connection {
u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */
#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */
#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */
#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */
int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */
int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */
int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */
int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_* */
sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */
char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */
char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */
char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */
char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */
struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */
struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */
TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */
} con;
TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */
con *fdcon;
static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key);
static int
fdlim_get(int hard)
{
#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
struct rlimit rlfd;
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
else
return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
#else
return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
#endif
}
static int
fdlim_set(int lim)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
struct rlimit rlfd;
#endif
if (lim <= 0)
return (-1);
#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
setdtablesize(lim);
#endif
return (0);
}
/*
* This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
* separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
* one in the GNU libc.
*/
static char *
xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
{
char *s, *e;
if (!**str)
return (NULL);
s = *str;
e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
if (*e != '\0')
*e++ = '\0';
*str = e;
return (s);
}
/*
* Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a
* null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
*/
static char *
strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
{
char *tok;
do {
tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
} while (tok && *tok == '\0');
return (tok);
}
static int
key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
con *c;
if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL)
keyprint(c, hostkey);
/* always abort key exchange */
return -1;
}
static int
ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
{
switch (remote_major) {
case 1:
if (remote_minor == 99)
return 1;
break;
case 2:
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static void
keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
int r;
switch (c->c_keytype) {
case KT_DSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss";
break;
case KT_RSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
- "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa";
+ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+ "rsa-sha2-512,"
+ "rsa-sha2-256,"
+ "ssh-rsa";
break;
case KT_ED25519:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519";
break;
case KT_XMSS:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-xmss@openssh.com";
break;
case KT_ECDSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
break;
+ case KT_ECDSA_SK:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com";
+ break;
+ case KT_ED25519_SK:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com";
+ break;
default:
fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype);
break;
}
if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) {
free(c->c_ssh);
fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
exit(1);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
- c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
- c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif
- c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper);
/*
* do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until
* the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done.
*/
ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done);
}
static void
keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
char *hostport;
const char *known_host, *hashed;
+ found_one = 1;
+
if (print_sshfp) {
export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0);
return;
}
hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
lowercase(hostport);
if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("host_hash failed");
known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport;
if (!get_cert)
fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host);
sshkey_write(key, stdout);
fputs("\n", stdout);
free(hostport);
}
static void
keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key)
{
char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
char *host, *ohosts;
if (key == NULL)
return;
if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) {
keyprint_one(hosts, key);
return;
}
ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts);
while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL)
keyprint_one(host, key);
free(ohosts);
}
static int
tcpconnect(char *host)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, s = -1;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (s < 0) {
+ if (s == -1) {
error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(s) == -1)
- fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s);
- if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 &&
+ fatal_f("set_nonblock(%d)", s);
+ if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 &&
errno != EINPROGRESS)
error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
else
break;
close(s);
s = -1;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return s;
}
static int
conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype)
{
char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
int s;
namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
do {
name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
if (!name) {
free(namebase);
return (-1);
}
} while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
if (s >= maxfd)
fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
if (fdcon[s].c_status)
fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
- debug3("%s: oname %s kt %d", __func__, oname, keytype);
+ debug3_f("oname %s kt %d", oname, keytype);
fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
fdcon[s].c_name = name;
fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv);
fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
FD_SET(s, read_wait);
ncon++;
return (s);
}
static void
confree(int s)
{
if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
free(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
free(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
free(fdcon[s].c_data);
fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) {
ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
free(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL;
} else
close(s);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
FD_CLR(s, read_wait);
ncon--;
}
static void
contouch(int s)
{
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv);
fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
}
static int
conrecycle(int s)
{
con *c = &fdcon[s];
int ret;
ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
confree(s);
return (ret);
}
static void
congreet(int s)
{
int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
char buf[256], *cp;
char remote_version[sizeof buf];
size_t bufsiz;
con *c = &fdcon[s];
/* send client banner */
n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
error("snprintf: buffer too small");
confree(s);
return;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
}
for (;;) {
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
cp = buf;
while (bufsiz-- &&
(n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
if (*cp == '\r')
*cp = '\n';
cp++;
}
if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
}
if (n == 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EPIPE:
error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
break;
case ECONNREFUSED:
break;
default:
error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
break;
}
conrecycle(s);
return;
}
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
confree(s);
return;
}
*cp = '\0';
if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL)
fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed");
ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1);
ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */
+ c->c_ssh->compat = 0;
if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
- c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
- else
- c->c_ssh->compat = 0;
+ compat_banner(c->c_ssh, remote_version);
if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
confree(s);
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "%c %s:%d %s\n", print_sshfp ? ';' : '#',
c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf));
keygrab_ssh2(c);
confree(s);
}
static void
conread(int s)
{
con *c = &fdcon[s];
size_t n;
if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
congreet(s);
return;
}
n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
if (n == 0) {
error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
}
c->c_off += n;
if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
switch (c->c_status) {
case CS_SIZE:
c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
c->c_off = 0;
c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
break;
default:
fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
break;
}
contouch(s);
}
static void
conloop(void)
{
struct timeval seltime, now;
fd_set *r, *e;
con *c;
int i;
monotime_tv(&now);
c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
- if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec ||
- (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) {
- seltime = c->c_tv;
- seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec;
- seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec;
- if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) {
- seltime.tv_usec += 1000000;
- seltime.tv_sec--;
- }
- } else
+ if (c && timercmp(&c->c_tv, &now, >))
+ timersub(&c->c_tv, &now, &seltime);
+ else
timerclear(&seltime);
r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
;
for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) {
error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name);
confree(i);
} else if (FD_ISSET(i, r))
conread(i);
}
free(r);
free(e);
c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
- while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
- (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) {
+ while (c && timercmp(&c->c_tv, &now, <)) {
int s = c->c_fd;
c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link);
conrecycle(s);
}
}
static void
do_host(char *host)
{
char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
int j;
if (name == NULL)
return;
for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) {
if (get_keytypes & j) {
while (ncon >= MAXCON)
conloop();
conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
}
}
}
void
-fatal(const char *fmt,...)
+sshfatal(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+ LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
- do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+ sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
- exit(255);
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
"\t\t [host | addrlist namelist]\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
int opt, fopt_count = 0, j;
char *tname, *cp, *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
FILE *fp;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
if (argc <= 1)
usage();
while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'H':
hash_hosts = 1;
break;
case 'c':
get_cert = 1;
break;
case 'D':
print_sshfp = 1;
break;
case 'p':
ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
if (ssh_port <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'T':
timeout = convtime(optarg);
if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg);
usage();
}
break;
case 'v':
if (!debug_flag) {
debug_flag = 1;
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
}
else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
else
fatal("Too high debugging level.");
break;
case 'f':
if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
optarg = NULL;
argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
break;
case 't':
get_keytypes = 0;
tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
while (tname) {
int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
break;
case KEY_XMSS:
get_keytypes |= KT_XMSS;
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519_SK;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA_SK;
+ break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
default:
fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname);
}
tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
}
break;
case '4':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
}
if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
usage();
log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
if (maxfd < 0)
fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
if (MAXCON <= 0)
fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
fdlim_set(maxfd);
fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
if (argv[j] == NULL)
fp = stdin;
else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
- strerror(errno));
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
/* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */
if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL)
cp = line + strlen(line) - 1;
while (cp >= line) {
if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' ||
*cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
*cp-- = '\0';
else
break;
}
/* Skip empty lines */
if (*line == '\0')
continue;
do_host(line);
}
if (ferror(fp))
- fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
- strerror(errno));
+ fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno));
fclose(fp);
}
free(line);
while (optind < argc)
do_host(argv[optind++]);
while (ncon > 0)
conloop();
- return (0);
+ return found_one ? 0 : 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
index 19b0dbc533c8..73b62397c10b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -1,93 +1,93 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.15 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.16 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keysign
-.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is used by
.Xr ssh 1
to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
required during host-based authentication.
.Pp
.Nm
is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
global client configuration file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
by setting
.Cm EnableSSHKeysign
to
.Dq yes .
.Pp
.Nm
is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
.Xr ssh 1 .
See
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8
for more information about host-based authentication.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Controls whether
.Nm
is enabled.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
generate the digital signature.
They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
accessible to others.
Since they are readable only by root,
.Nm
must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
information corresponding with the private keys above.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
.Ox 3.2 .
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
index 744ecb4f90f3..d6ac98c6c8c7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -1,303 +1,294 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.55 2018/07/27 05:34:42 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.67 2021/07/05 01:16:46 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
-struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */
-
extern char *__progname;
static int
valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
u_char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_char type, *pkblob;
char *p;
size_t blen, len;
char *pkalg, *luser;
int r, pktype, fail;
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = NULL;
fail = 0;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_from failed");
/* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
if (len != 20 && len != 32)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
/* server user */
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse user");
/* service */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse service");
if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* method */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* pubkey */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC)
fail++;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
- error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "decode key");
fail++;
} else if (key->type != pktype)
fail++;
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p);
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse hostname");
+ debug2_f("check expect chost %s got %s", host, p);
if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
fail++;
else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
fail++;
else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* local user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse luser");
if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0)
fail++;
free(luser);
/* end of message */
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
- debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail);
+ debug3_f("fail %d", fail);
if (fail)
sshkey_free(key);
else if (ret != NULL)
*ret = key;
return (fail ? -1 : 0);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
Options options;
#define NUM_KEYTYPES 5
struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL;
struct passwd *pw;
int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
u_char *signature, *data, rver;
char *host, *fp;
size_t slen, dlen;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- u_int32_t rnd[256];
-#endif
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
/* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2)
exit(1);
/* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
i = 0;
/* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("getpwuid failed");
pw = pwcopy(pw);
permanently_set_uid(pw);
seed_rng();
#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN
log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
#endif
/* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */
initialize_options(&options);
- (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "", &options, 0);
- fill_default_options(&options);
+ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "",
+ &options, 0, NULL);
+ (void)fill_default_options(&options);
if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
if (key_fd[i] != -1)
found = 1;
}
if (found == 0)
fatal("could not open any host key");
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-#endif
-
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
keys[i] = NULL;
if (key_fd[i] == -1)
continue;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL, &key, NULL);
close(key_fd[i]);
if (r != 0)
- debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_r(r, "parse key %d", i);
else if (key != NULL) {
keys[i] = key;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found)
fatal("no hostkey found");
if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0)
- fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+ fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __progname);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
if (rver != version)
- fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version);
+ fatal("%s: bad version: received %d, expected %d",
+ __progname, rver, version);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO)
- fatal("bad fd");
+ fatal("%s: bad fd = %d", __progname, fd);
if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
- fatal("cannot get local name for fd");
+ fatal("%s: cannot get local name for fd", __progname);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
- fatal("not a valid request");
+ fatal("%s: not a valid request", __progname);
free(host);
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
if (keys[i] != NULL &&
sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname);
- fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s",
+ fatal("%s: no matching hostkey found for key %s %s", __progname,
sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : "");
}
- if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, NULL, 0))
- != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: sshkey_sign failed", __progname);
free(data);
/* send reply */
sshbuf_reset(b);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1)
- fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
+ fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __progname);
return (0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
index d1241ce67f32..e724736944f4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
@@ -1,269 +1,391 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.10 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.17 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
-int fd = -1;
-pid_t pid = -1;
+static int fd = -1;
+static pid_t pid = -1;
static void
send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4];
size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
int r;
POKE_U32(buf, mlen);
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m),
sshbuf_len(m)) != sshbuf_len(m))
error("write to helper failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(m, mlen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
}
static int
recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int l, len;
u_char c, buf[1024];
int r;
if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) {
error("read from helper failed: %u", len);
return (0); /* XXX */
}
len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("response too long: %u", len);
/* read len bytes into m */
sshbuf_reset(m);
while (len > 0) {
l = len;
if (l > sizeof(buf))
l = sizeof(buf);
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) {
error("response from helper failed.");
return (0); /* XXX */
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, buf, l)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
len -= l;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &c)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
return c;
}
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
return (0);
}
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
}
static int
-pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
- int padding)
+rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- struct sshkey key; /* XXX */
- u_char *blob, *signature = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *msg = NULL;
+ u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
size_t blen, slen = 0;
int r, ret = -1;
- struct sshbuf *msg;
if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return (-1);
- key.type = KEY_RSA;
- key.rsa = rsa;
- if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- return -1;
+ goto fail;
+ key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ key->rsa = rsa;
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "encode key");
+ goto fail;
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- free(blob);
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (slen <= (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
memcpy(to, signature, slen);
ret = slen;
}
free(signature);
}
+ fail:
+ free(blob);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+static ECDSA_SIG *
+ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+ const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *msg = NULL;
+ ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ size_t blen, slen = 0;
+ int r, nid;
+
+ nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
+ if (nid < 0) {
+ error_f("couldn't get curve nid");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ key->ecdsa = ec;
+ key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
+ key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ EC_KEY_up_ref(ec);
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "encode key");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, dgst, dgst_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+ send_msg(msg);
+ sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+ if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ cp = signature;
+ ret = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, slen);
+ free(signature);
+ }
+
+ fail:
+ free(blob);
+ sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return (ret);
}
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa;
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+static EC_KEY_METHOD *helper_ecdsa;
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+/* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
+static void
+wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k->type == KEY_RSA)
+ RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa);
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA)
+ EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa);
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ else
+ fatal_f("unknown key type");
+}
-/* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
static int
-wrap_key(RSA *rsa)
+pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void)
{
- static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa;
+ if (helper_rsa != NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
+ unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
+ if (helper_ecdsa != NULL)
+ return (0);
+ helper_ecdsa = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
+ if (helper_ecdsa == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("RSA_meth_dup failed");
if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") ||
- !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt))
- fatal("%s: failed to prepare method", __func__);
- RSA_set_method(rsa, helper_rsa);
+ !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, rsa_encrypt))
+ fatal_f("failed to prepare method");
+
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_start_helper(void)
{
int pair[2];
+ char *helper, *verbosity = NULL;
+
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1)
+ verbosity = "-vvv";
+
+ if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods() == -1) {
+ error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed");
+ return (-1);
+ }
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
} else if (pid == 0) {
if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
(dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
close(pair[0]);
close(pair[1]);
- execlp(_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER,
- (char *)NULL);
- fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER,
- strerror(errno));
+ helper = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER");
+ if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0)
+ helper = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER;
+ debug_f("starting %s %s", helper,
+ verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity);
+ execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
+ fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", helper, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
close(pair[1]);
fd = pair[0];
return (0);
}
int
-pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp)
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+ char ***labelsp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
- int r;
+ int r, type;
u_char *blob;
+ char *label;
size_t blen;
u_int nkeys, i;
struct sshbuf *msg;
if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
return (-1);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
- if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+ type = recv_msg(msg);
+ if (type == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse nkeys");
*keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+ if (labelsp)
+ *labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_skip_string(msg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &label, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: bad key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- wrap_key(k->rsa);
+ fatal_fr(r, "decode key");
+ wrap_key(k);
(*keysp)[i] = k;
+ if (labelsp)
+ (*labelsp)[i] = label;
+ else
+ free(label);
free(blob);
}
+ } else if (type == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0)
+ nkeys = -1;
} else {
nkeys = -1;
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
return (nkeys);
}
int
pkcs11_del_provider(char *name)
{
int r, ret = -1;
struct sshbuf *msg;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
ret = 0;
sshbuf_free(msg);
return (ret);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
index 3728c4e4e7e4..6a592b1f36e3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
@@ -1,43 +1,66 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.4 2013/07/16 00:07:52 schwarze Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.6 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
.\"
.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2013 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SSH-PKCS11-HELPER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-pkcs11-helper
-.Nd ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
+.Op Fl v
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is used by
.Xr ssh-agent 1
to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token.
.Pp
.Nm
is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+.Pp
+A single option is supported:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in debugging problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+will automatically pass the
+.Fl v
+flag to
+.Nm
+when it has itself been placed in debug mode.
+.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
.Ox 4.7 .
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
index 6301033c513a..5ca8d03fbd1e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
@@ -1,402 +1,446 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.14 2018/01/08 15:18:46 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.25 2021/08/11 05:20:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <errno.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
struct pkcs11_keyinfo {
struct sshkey *key;
- char *providername;
+ char *providername, *label;
TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist;
#define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/
/* input and output queue */
struct sshbuf *iqueue;
struct sshbuf *oqueue;
static void
-add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name)
+add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name, char *label)
{
struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki));
ki->providername = xstrdup(name);
ki->key = k;
+ ki->label = xstrdup(label);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
}
static void
del_keys_by_name(char *name)
{
struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt;
for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next);
if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
free(ki->providername);
+ free(ki->label);
sshkey_free(ki->key);
free(ki);
}
}
}
/* lookup matching 'private' key */
static struct sshkey *
lookup_key(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) {
- debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername);
+ debug("check %s %s %s", sshkey_type(ki->key),
+ ki->providername, ki->label);
if (sshkey_equal(k, ki->key))
return (ki->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
static void
send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
}
static void
process_add(void)
{
char *name, *pin;
- struct sshkey **keys;
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
int r, i, nkeys;
u_char *blob;
size_t blen;
struct sshbuf *msg;
+ char **labels = NULL;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) {
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+ if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys, &labels)) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nkeys)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
- debug("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_fr(r, "encode key");
continue;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, labels[i])) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose key");
free(blob);
- add_key(keys[i], name);
+ add_key(keys[i], name, labels[i]);
+ free(labels[i]);
}
- free(keys);
- } else {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, -nkeys)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+ free(labels);
+ free(keys); /* keys themselves are transferred to pkcs11_keylist */
free(pin);
free(name);
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process_del(void)
{
char *name, *pin;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
del_keys_by_name(name);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0 ?
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
free(pin);
free(name);
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process_sign(void)
{
u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0;
int r, ok = -1;
struct sshkey *key, *found;
struct sshbuf *msg;
/* XXX support SHA2 signature flags */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0)
- error("%s: sshkey_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "decode key");
else {
if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int ret;
- slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- signature = xmalloc(slen);
- if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature,
- found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) {
- slen = ret;
- ok = 0;
- }
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+ signature = xmalloc(slen);
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature,
+ found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (ret != -1) {
+ slen = ret;
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ } else if (key->type == KEY_ECDSA) {
+ u_int xslen = ECDSA_size(key->ecdsa);
+
+ signature = xmalloc(xslen);
+ /* "The parameter type is ignored." */
+ ret = ECDSA_sign(-1, data, dlen, signature,
+ &xslen, found->ecdsa);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ ok = 0;
+ else
+ error_f("ECDSA_sign returned %d", ret);
+ slen = xslen;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ } else
+ error_f("don't know how to sign with key "
+ "type %d", (int)key->type);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
sshkey_free(key);
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if (ok == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose response");
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose failure response");
}
free(data);
free(blob);
free(signature);
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process(void)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_int buf_len;
u_int consumed;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int r;
buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (buf_len < 5)
return; /* Incomplete message. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue);
msg_len = get_u32(cp);
if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
error("bad message len %d", msg_len);
cleanup_exit(11);
}
if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
return;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse type/len");
buf_len -= 4;
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
debug("process_add");
process_add();
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
debug("process_del");
process_del();
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
debug("process_sign");
process_sign();
break;
default:
error("Unknown message %d", type);
break;
}
/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) {
error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (msg_len < consumed) {
error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (msg_len > consumed) {
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
}
}
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
/* XXX */
_exit(i);
}
+
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- fd_set *rset, *wset;
- int r, in, out, max, log_stderr = 0;
- ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
+ int r, ch, in, out, log_stderr = 0;
+ ssize_t len;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
char buf[4*4096];
-
extern char *__progname;
+ struct pollfd pfd[2];
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ seed_rng();
TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist);
- pkcs11_init(0);
- seed_rng();
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'v':
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+ pkcs11_init(0);
in = STDIN_FILENO;
out = STDOUT_FILENO;
- max = 0;
- if (in > max)
- max = in;
- if (out > max)
- max = out;
-
if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- rset = xmalloc(set_size);
- wset = xmalloc(set_size);
-
- for (;;) {
- memset(rset, 0, set_size);
- memset(wset, 0, set_size);
+ while (1) {
+ memset(pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
+ pfd[0].fd = in;
+ pfd[1].fd = out;
/*
* Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
* the worst-case length packet it can generate,
* otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
- FD_SET(in, rset);
+ pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
- olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue);
- if (olen > 0)
- FD_SET(out, wset);
+ if (sshbuf_len(oqueue) > 0)
+ pfd[1].events = POLLOUT;
- if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
- if (errno == EINTR)
+ if ((r = poll(pfd, 2, -1 /* INFTIM */)) <= 0) {
+ if (r == 0 || errno == EINTR)
continue;
- error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(2);
+ fatal("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* copy stdin to iqueue */
- if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
+ if ((pfd[0].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0) {
len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
if (len == 0) {
debug("read eof");
cleanup_exit(0);
} else if (len < 0) {
error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
- } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
}
/* send oqueue to stdout */
- if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
- len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen);
+ if ((pfd[1].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0) {
+ len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue),
+ sshbuf_len(oqueue));
if (len < 0) {
error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
- } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
}
/*
* Process requests from client if we can fit the results
* into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
* and let the output queue drain.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
process();
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
}
}
+
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ _exit(i);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "PKCS#11 code is not enabled\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern char *__progname;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time");
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c
index 775de964210f..37a6b1b5bcae 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -1,732 +1,1886 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.26 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.54 2021/08/11 05:20:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "digest.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
CK_TOKEN_INFO token;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
int logged_in;
};
struct pkcs11_provider {
char *name;
void *handle;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list;
CK_INFO info;
CK_ULONG nslots;
CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo;
int valid;
int refcount;
TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers;
struct pkcs11_key {
struct pkcs11_provider *provider;
CK_ULONG slotidx;
- int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa);
- RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
char *keyid;
int keyid_len;
};
int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+static void
+ossl_error(const char *msg)
+{
+ unsigned long e;
+
+ error_f("%s", msg);
+ while ((e = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
+ error_f("libcrypto error: %s", ERR_error_string(e, NULL));
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
pkcs11_interactive = interactive;
TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers);
return (0);
}
/*
- * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable.
+ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
* however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
- * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
+ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
* this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
*/
static void
pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_ULONG i;
- debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d",
- p, p->refcount, p->valid);
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d",
+ p->name, p->refcount, p->valid);
if (!p->valid)
return;
for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
(rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
}
if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
p->valid = 0;
p->function_list = NULL;
dlclose(p->handle);
}
/*
* remove a reference to the provider.
* called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered.
*/
static void
pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
{
- debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount);
if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
if (p->valid)
- error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p);
+ error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name);
+ free(p->name);
free(p->slotlist);
free(p->slotinfo);
free(p);
}
}
/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
}
}
/* lookup provider by name */
static struct pkcs11_provider *
pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
- debug("check %p %s", p, p->name);
+ debug("check provider \"%s\"", p->name);
if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name))
return (p);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* unregister provider by name */
int
pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
return (0);
}
return (-1);
}
-/* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */
-static int
-pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
+static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
+static int rsa_idx = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
+static int ec_key_idx = 0;
+#endif
+
+/* release a wrapped object */
+static void
+pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
+ long argl, void *argp)
{
- struct pkcs11_key *k11;
- int rv = -1;
+ struct pkcs11_key *k11 = ptr;
- if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) {
- if (k11->orig_finish)
- rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa);
- if (k11->provider)
- pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
- RSA_meth_free(k11->rsa_method);
- free(k11->keyid);
- free(k11);
- }
- return (rv);
+ debug_f("parent %p ptr %p idx %d", parent, ptr, idx);
+ if (k11 == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (k11->provider)
+ pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+ free(k11->keyid);
+ free(k11);
}
/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */
static int
pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_ULONG nfound = 0;
CK_RV rv;
int ret = -1;
f = p->function_list;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
return (-1);
}
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
nfound != 1) {
debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu",
nfound, nattr, rv);
} else
ret = 0;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
return (ret);
}
-/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
static int
-pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
- int padding)
+pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
+ CK_USER_TYPE type)
+{
+ char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024];
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ if (provider == NULL || si == NULL || !provider->valid) {
+ error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
+ error("need pin entry%s",
+ (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ?
+ " on reader keypad" : "");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+ verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
+ else {
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
+ si->token.label);
+ if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
+ debug_f("no pin specified");
+ return (-1); /* bail out */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
+ (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+ switch (rv) {
+ case CKR_OK:
+ case CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN:
+ /* success */
+ break;
+ case CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE:
+ error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN length out of range");
+ return -1;
+ case CKR_PIN_INCORRECT:
+ error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN incorrect");
+ return -1;
+ case CKR_PIN_LOCKED:
+ error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN locked");
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ error("PKCS#11 login failed: error %lu", rv);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ si->logged_in = 1;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
+{
+ if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
+ error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
+ &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
+}
+
+
+static int
+pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, int *val)
{
- struct pkcs11_key *k11;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
- CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
- CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE;
- CK_MECHANISM mech = {
- CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = {
- {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) },
- {CKA_ID, NULL, 0},
- {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) }
- };
- char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024];
- int rval = -1;
+ CK_BBOOL flag = 0;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attr;
+ CK_RV rv;
- key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
- key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val;
+ *val = 0;
+
+ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
+ error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ f = k11->provider->function_list;
+ si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) {
- error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa);
+ attr.type = type;
+ attr.pValue = &flag;
+ attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(flag);
+
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(si->session, obj, &attr, 1);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
+ *val = flag != 0;
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\" slot %lu object %lu: attrib %lu = %d",
+ k11->provider->name, k11->slotidx, obj, type, *val);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class;
+ CK_BBOOL true_val;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[3];
+ int always_auth = 0;
+ int did_login = 0;
+
if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
- error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa);
+ error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
+
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+
if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
- if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
- error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags &
- CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ?
- " on reader keypad" : "");
- return (-1);
- }
- if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
- verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
- else {
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
- "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label);
- pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
- if (pin == NULL)
- return (-1); /* bail out */
- }
- rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin,
- (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
- if (pin != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin));
- free(pin);
- }
- if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
- error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
+ if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
+ error("login failed");
return (-1);
}
- si->logged_in = 1;
+ did_login = 1;
}
+
+ memset(&key_filter, 0, sizeof(key_filter));
+ private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ key_filter[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+ key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
+ key_filter[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(private_key_class);
+
+ key_filter[1].type = CKA_ID;
key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len;
+
+ true_val = CK_TRUE;
+ key_filter[2].type = CKA_SIGN;
+ key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val;
+ key_filter[2].ulValueLen = sizeof(true_val);
+
/* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */
if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 &&
pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) {
error("cannot find private key");
- } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ memset(&mech, 0, sizeof(mech));
+ mech.mechanism = mech_type;
+ mech.pParameter = NULL_PTR;
+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+ if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv);
- } else {
- /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
- tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
- rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen);
- if (rv == CKR_OK)
- rval = tlen;
- else
- error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(k11, obj, CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE,
+ &always_auth); /* ignore errors here */
+ if (always_auth && !did_login) {
+ debug_f("always-auth key");
+ if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) < 0) {
+ error("login failed for always-auth key");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_key *k11;
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int rval = -1;
+
+ if ((k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx)) == NULL) {
+ error("RSA_get_ex_data failed");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_RSA_PKCS) == -1) {
+ error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
+ return (-1);
}
+
+ f = k11->provider->function_list;
+ si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
+
+ /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen);
+ if (rv == CKR_OK)
+ rval = tlen;
+ else
+ error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
+
return (rval);
}
static int
pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
int padding)
{
return (-1);
}
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
+{
+ if (rsa_method != NULL)
+ return (0);
+ rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method());
+ if (rsa_method == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+ rsa_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-rsa",
+ NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
+ if (rsa_idx == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_method, "pkcs11") ||
+ !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) ||
+ !RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt)) {
+ error_f("setup pkcs11 method failed");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
static int
pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
- const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method();
+
+ if (pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
+ return (-1);
k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
k11->provider = provider;
provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */
k11->slotidx = slotidx;
/* identify key object on smartcard */
k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
if (k11->keyid_len > 0) {
k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
}
- k11->rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(def);
- if (k11->rsa_method == NULL)
- fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__);
- k11->orig_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(def);
- if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(k11->rsa_method, "pkcs11") ||
- !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(k11->rsa_method,
- pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) ||
- !RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(k11->rsa_method,
- pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt) ||
- !RSA_meth_set_finish(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_finish))
- fatal("%s: setup pkcs11 method failed", __func__);
- RSA_set_method(rsa, k11->rsa_method);
- RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11);
+
+ RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
+static ECDSA_SIG *
+ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+ const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_key *k11;
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_ULONG siglen = 0, bnlen;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+ u_char *sig;
+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+
+ if ((k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx)) == NULL) {
+ ossl_error("EC_KEY_get_key_method_data failed for ec");
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_ECDSA) == -1) {
+ error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ f = k11->provider->function_list;
+ si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+
+ siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
+ sig = xmalloc(siglen);
+
+ /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, sig, &siglen);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (siglen < 64 || siglen > 132 || siglen % 2) {
+ ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ bnlen = siglen/2;
+ if ((ret = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("ECDSA_SIG_new failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = BN_bin2bn(sig, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (s = BN_bin2bn(sig+bnlen, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s)) {
+ error_f("ECDSA_SIG_set0 failed");
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ r = s = NULL; /* now owned by ret */
+ /* success */
+ done:
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
+ free(sig);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
+{
+ int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
+ unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
+
+ if (ec_key_method != NULL)
+ return (0);
+ ec_key_idx = EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-ecdsa",
+ NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
+ if (ec_key_idx == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ ec_key_method = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
+ if (ec_key_method == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_key_method, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_key_method, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_key *k11;
+
+ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
+ k11->provider = provider;
+ provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by ECDSA key */
+ k11->slotidx = slotidx;
+ /* identify key object on smartcard */
+ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
+ k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
+ memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+
+ EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
+ EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
+
return (0);
}
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
/* remove trailing spaces */
static void
rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
if (!len)
return;
for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ')
buf[i] = '\0';
else
break;
}
/*
* open a pkcs11 session and login if required.
* if pin == NULL we delay login until key use
*/
static int
-pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin)
+pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
+ CK_ULONG user)
{
- CK_RV rv;
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_RV rv;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
- int login_required;
+ int login_required, ret;
f = p->function_list;
- login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
- if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) {
+ si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+
+ login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
+
+ /* fail early before opening session */
+ if (login_required && !pkcs11_interactive &&
+ (pin == NULL || strlen(pin) == 0)) {
error("pin required");
- return (-1);
+ return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
}
if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
- CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session))
- != CKR_OK) {
+ CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
- if (login_required && pin) {
- rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
- (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin));
+ if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
+ rv = f->C_Login(session, user, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin));
if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
+ ret = (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED) ?
+ -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED :
+ -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL;
if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
- return (-1);
+ return (ret);
}
- p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1;
+ si->logged_in = 1;
}
- p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session;
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx,
- * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
- * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
- */
-static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], struct sshkey ***, int *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE))));
-
-static int
-pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys)
-{
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
- CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = {
- { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) }
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = {
- { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) }
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = {
- { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 }
- };
- CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = {
- { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 },
- { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 }
- };
- pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class;
- cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class;
-
- if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs,
- keysp, nkeys) < 0 ||
- pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs,
- keysp, nkeys) < 0)
- return (-1);
+ si->session = session;
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++)
if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i]))
return (1);
return (0);
}
-static int
-have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa)
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
- const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
-
- RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
- return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL;
-}
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3];
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *attrp = NULL;
+ int i;
+ int nid;
-static int
-pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3],
- struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys)
-{
- struct sshkey *key;
- RSA *rsa;
- X509 *x509;
- EVP_PKEY *evp;
- int i;
- const u_char *cp;
- CK_RV rv;
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
- CK_ULONG nfound;
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+ key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
+ key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
- f = p->function_list;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
- /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
- return (-1);
+ f = p->function_list;
+
+ /* figure out size of the attributes */
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (NULL);
}
- while (1) {
- /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- attribs[i].pValue = NULL;
- attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0;
- }
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK
- || nfound == 0)
- break;
- /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */
- if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3))
- != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
- * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
- * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
- */
- if (attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
- attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
- continue;
- }
- /* allocate buffers for attributes */
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- if (attribs[i].ulValueLen > 0) {
- attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc(
- attribs[i].ulValueLen);
- }
- }
- /*
- * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key,
- * or ID, subject and value for certificates.
- */
- rsa = NULL;
- if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3))
- != CKR_OK) {
- error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) {
- if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
- error("RSA_new failed");
- } else {
- BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
-
- rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
- attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
- rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
- attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
- if (rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL) {
- if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa,
- rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL))
- fatal("%s: set key", __func__);
- rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
- }
- BN_free(rsa_n);
- BN_free(rsa_e);
- }
- } else {
- cp = attribs[2].pValue;
- if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) {
- error("X509_new failed");
- } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen)
- == NULL) {
- error("d2i_X509 failed");
- } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL ||
- EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
- EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
- debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa");
- } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(
- EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) {
- error("RSAPublicKey_dup");
- }
- X509_free(x509);
- }
- if (rsa && have_rsa_key(rsa) &&
- pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
- if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
- fatal("sshkey_new failed");
- key->rsa = rsa;
- key->type = KEY_RSA;
- key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
- if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
- sshkey_free(key);
- } else {
- /* expand key array and add key */
- *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
- *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
- (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
- *nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
- debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
- }
- } else if (rsa) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
- free(attribs[i].pValue);
+ /*
+ * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
+ * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ */
+ if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+ key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ error("invalid attribute length");
+ return (NULL);
}
- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
- error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
- return (0);
-}
-/* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */
-int
-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp)
+ /* allocate buffers for attributes */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+
+ /* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ ec = EC_KEY_new();
+ if (ec == NULL) {
+ error("EC_KEY_new failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
+ group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
+ if (group == NULL) {
+ ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) == 0) {
+ ossl_error("EC_KEY_set_group failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
+ error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
+ octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
+ if (octet == NULL) {
+ ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ attrp = octet->data;
+ if (o2i_ECPublicKey(&ec, &attrp, octet->length) == NULL) {
+ ossl_error("o2i_ECPublicKey failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
+ if (nid < 0) {
+ error("couldn't get curve nid");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec))
+ goto fail;
+
+ key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("sshkey_new failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ key->ecdsa = ec;
+ key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
+ key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */
+
+fail:
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+ if (ec)
+ EC_KEY_free(ec);
+ if (group)
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
+ if (octet)
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet);
+
+ return (key);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+{
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3];
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+ key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
+ key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+
+ session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ f = p->function_list;
+
+ /* figure out size of the attributes */
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
+ * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ */
+ if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+ key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ error("invalid attribute length");
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ /* allocate buffers for attributes */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+
+ /* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ error("RSA_new failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
+ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
+ if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
+ error("BN_bin2bn failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL))
+ fatal_f("set key");
+ rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+
+ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
+ goto fail;
+
+ key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("sshkey_new failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ key->rsa = rsa;
+ key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */
+
+fail:
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+
+ return (key);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
+{
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[3];
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *x509_name = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *evp;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+#endif
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int i;
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ int nid;
+#endif
+ const u_char *cp;
+ char *subject = NULL;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ *labelp = NULL;
+
+ memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
+ cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+ cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
+ cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
+
+ session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ f = p->function_list;
+
+ /* figure out size of the attributes */
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
+ * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ */
+ if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+ cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ error("invalid attribute length");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate buffers for attributes */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+
+ /* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Decode DER-encoded cert subject */
+ cp = cert_attr[1].pValue;
+ if ((x509_name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &cp,
+ cert_attr[1].ulValueLen)) == NULL ||
+ (subject = X509_NAME_oneline(x509_name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+ subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
+ X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
+
+ cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
+ if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
+ error("d2i_x509 failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) {
+ error("X509_get_pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
+ error("invalid x509; no rsa key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) {
+ error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa))
+ goto out;
+
+ key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("sshkey_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key->rsa = rsa;
+ key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) {
+ error("invalid x509; no ec key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ec = EC_KEY_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp))) == NULL) {
+ error("EC_KEY_dup failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
+ if (nid < 0) {
+ error("couldn't get curve nid");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec))
+ goto out;
+
+ key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("sshkey_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ key->ecdsa = ec;
+ key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
+ key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ } else {
+ error("unknown certificate key type");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ out:
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ EC_KEY_free(ec);
+#endif
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ free(subject);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ *labelp = subject;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+static int
+have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
+ return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, const char *context,
+ struct sshkey *key)
+{
+ char *fp;
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ return;
+ }
+ debug2("%s: provider %s slot %lu: %s %s", context, p->name,
+ (u_long)slotidx, sshkey_type(key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lookup certificates for token in slot identified by slotidx,
+ * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
+ * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1];
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
+ CK_ULONG n = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+ char *label;
+
+ memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+
+ key_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
+ key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+ key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+ key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+
+ session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ f = p->function_list;
+
+ rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE ck_cert_type;
+
+ rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (n == 0)
+ break;
+
+ memset(&ck_cert_type, 0, sizeof(ck_cert_type));
+ memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ key_attr[0].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+ key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_cert_type;
+ key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_cert_type);
+
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 1);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ key = NULL;
+ label = NULL;
+ switch (ck_cert_type) {
+ case CKC_X_509:
+ if (pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj,
+ &key, &label) != 0) {
+ error("failed to fetch key");
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("skipping unsupported certificate type %lu",
+ ck_cert_type);
+ continue;
+ }
+ note_key(p, slotidx, __func__, key);
+ if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
+ debug2_f("key already included");;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ } else {
+ /* expand key array and add key */
+ *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
+ *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+ (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
+ if (labelsp != NULL) {
+ *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
+ *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
+ (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
+ }
+ *nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
+ debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+fail:
+ rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx,
+ * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
+ * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[2];
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
+ CK_ULONG n = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+
+ key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+ key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+ key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+
+ session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ f = p->function_list;
+
+ rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ CK_KEY_TYPE ck_key_type;
+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[256];
+
+ rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (n == 0)
+ break;
+
+ memset(&ck_key_type, 0, sizeof(ck_key_type));
+ memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ key_attr[0].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
+ key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_key_type;
+ key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_key_type);
+ key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
+ key_attr[1].pValue = &label;
+ key_attr[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(label) - 1;
+
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 2);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ label[key_attr[1].ulValueLen] = '\0';
+
+ switch (ck_key_type) {
+ case CKK_RSA:
+ key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+ break;
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ case CKK_ECDSA:
+ key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+ break;
+#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ default:
+ /* XXX print key type? */
+ key = NULL;
+ error("skipping unsupported key type");
+ }
+
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("failed to fetch key");
+ continue;
+ }
+ note_key(p, slotidx, __func__, key);
+ if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
+ debug2_f("key already included");;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ } else {
+ /* expand key array and add key */
+ *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
+ *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+ (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
+ if (labelsp != NULL) {
+ *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
+ *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
+ (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
+ }
+ *nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
+ debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+fail:
+ rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
+#define FILL_ATTR(attr, idx, typ, val, len) \
+ { (attr[idx]).type=(typ); (attr[idx]).pValue=(val); (attr[idx]).ulValueLen=len; idx++; }
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ char *plabel = label ? label : "";
+ int npub = 0, npriv = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16];
+ CK_MECHANISM mech = {
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
+ };
+ CK_BYTE pubExponent[] = {
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 /* RSA_F4 in bytes */
+ };
+ pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class;
+ cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class;
+
+ *err = 0;
+
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
+ sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &bits, sizeof(bits));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubExponent,
+ sizeof(pubExponent));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val,
+ sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+ f = p->function_list;
+ si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+ session = si->session;
+
+ if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
+ &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error_f("key generation failed: error 0x%lx", rv);
+ *err = rv;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_decode_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char **dest, size_t *rlen)
+{
+ size_t i, len;
+ char ptr[3];
+
+ if (dest)
+ *dest = NULL;
+ if (rlen)
+ *rlen = 0;
+
+ if ((len = strlen(hex)) % 2)
+ return -1;
+ len /= 2;
+
+ *dest = xmalloc(len);
+
+ ptr[2] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ ptr[0] = hex[2 * i];
+ ptr[1] = hex[(2 * i) + 1];
+ if (!isxdigit(ptr[0]) || !isxdigit(ptr[1]))
+ return -1;
+ (*dest)[i] = (unsigned char)strtoul(ptr, NULL, 16);
+ }
+
+ if (rlen)
+ *rlen = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct ec_curve_info {
+ const char *name;
+ const char *oid;
+ const char *oid_encoded;
+ size_t size;
+} ec_curve_infos[] = {
+ {"prime256v1", "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7", "06082A8648CE3D030107", 256},
+ {"secp384r1", "1.3.132.0.34", "06052B81040022", 384},
+ {"secp521r1", "1.3.132.0.35", "06052B81040023", 521},
+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, 0},
+};
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ char *plabel = label ? label : "";
+ int i;
+ size_t ecparams_size;
+ unsigned char *ecparams = NULL;
+ int npub = 0, npriv = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech = {
+ CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
+ };
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16];
+
+ *err = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; ec_curve_infos[i].name; i++) {
+ if (ec_curve_infos[i].size == bits)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ec_curve_infos[i].name) {
+ error_f("invalid key size %lu", bits);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (pkcs11_decode_hex(ec_curve_infos[i].oid_encoded, &ecparams,
+ &ecparams_size) == -1) {
+ error_f("invalid oid");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
+ sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecparams, ecparams_size);
+ FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val,
+ sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+ FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+ f = p->function_list;
+ si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+ session = si->session;
+
+ if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
+ &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
+ error_f("key generation failed: error 0x%lx", rv);
+ *err = rv;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
+
+/*
+ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
+ * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
+ struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
{
int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
void *handle = NULL;
CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **);
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
CK_ULONG i;
- *keyp = NULL;
+ if (providerp == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ *providerp = NULL;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (labelsp != NULL)
+ *labelsp = NULL;
+
if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
- debug("%s: provider already registered: %s",
- __func__, provider_id);
+ debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
goto fail;
}
- /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */
+ /* open shared pkcs11-library */
if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
goto fail;
}
p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
p->handle = handle;
/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
p->function_list = f;
if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
need_finalize = 1;
if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
" libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
provider_id,
p->info.manufacturerID,
p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
p->info.libraryDescription,
p->info.libraryVersion.major,
p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
if (p->nslots == 0) {
- debug("%s: provider %s returned no slots", __func__,
- provider_id);
+ debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id);
+ ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
goto fail;
}
p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
!= CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
p->valid = 1;
nkeys = 0;
for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
!= CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
- "failed: %lu", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, rv);
+ "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv);
continue;
}
if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
- debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in "
- "provider %s slot %lu", __func__,
- provider_id, (unsigned long)i);
+ debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
+ "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i);
continue;
}
rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> "
"model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx",
provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
token->serialNumber, token->flags);
- /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */
- if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0)
- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys);
- }
- if (nkeys > 0) {
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
- p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */
- return (nkeys);
+ /*
+ * open session, login with pin and retrieve public
+ * keys (if keyp is provided)
+ */
+ if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
+ keyp == NULL)
+ continue;
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+ if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
+ pkcs11_interactive) {
+ /*
+ * Some tokens require login before they will
+ * expose keys.
+ */
+ if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
+ CKU_USER) < 0) {
+ error("login failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+ }
}
- debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__, provider_id);
- /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */
+
+ /* now owned by caller */
+ *providerp = p;
+
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */
+
+ return (nkeys);
fail:
if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
if (p) {
+ free(p->name);
free(p->slotlist);
free(p->slotinfo);
free(p);
}
if (handle)
dlclose(handle);
- return (-1);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ ret = -1;
+ return (ret);
}
-#else
+/*
+ * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
+ * fails if provider already exists
+ */
+int
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+ char ***labelsp)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ int nkeys;
+
+ nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
+ &p, CKU_USER);
+
+ /* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
+ if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+ pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+ }
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+ debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id);
+
+ return (nkeys);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
+struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_gakp(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned int slotidx, char *label,
+ unsigned int type, unsigned int bits, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ int ret = -1, reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ *err = 0;
+
+ if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL)
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\" available", provider_id);
+ else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL,
+ &p, CKU_SO)) < 0) {
+ debug_f("could not register provider %s", provider_id);
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ reset_provider = 1;
+
+ f = p->function_list;
+ si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+ session = si->session;
+
+ if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
+ CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
+ debug_f("could not supply SO pin: %lu", rv);
+ reset_pin = 0;
+ } else
+ reset_pin = 1;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((k = pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
+ bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
+ debug_f("failed to generate RSA key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if ((k = pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
+ bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
+ debug_f("failed to generate ECDSA key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ *err = SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC;
+ debug_f("unknown type %d", type);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (reset_pin)
+ f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
+ CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+
+ if (reset_provider)
+ pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
+
+ return (k);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned long slotidx,
+ unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+ struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ int reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
+ CK_ULONG nattrs;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[16];
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ *err = 0;
+
+ if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
+ debug_f("using provider \"%s\"", provider_id);
+ } else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p,
+ CKU_SO) < 0) {
+ debug_f("could not register provider %s",
+ provider_id);
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ reset_provider = 1;
+
+ f = p->function_list;
+ si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+ session = si->session;
+
+ if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
+ CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
+ debug_f("could not supply SO pin: %lu", rv);
+ reset_pin = 0;
+ } else
+ reset_pin = 1;
+
+ /* private key */
+ nattrs = 0;
+ key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+ FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
+ FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+ if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
+ obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
+ debug_f("could not destroy private key 0x%hhx",
+ keyid);
+ *err = rv;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* public key */
+ nattrs = 0;
+ key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
+ FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+ if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
+ obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+
+ /* get key type */
+ nattrs = 0;
+ FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
+ sizeof(key_type));
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, nattrs);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ debug_f("could not get key type of public key 0x%hhx",
+ keyid);
+ *err = rv;
+ key_type = -1;
+ }
+ if (key_type == CKK_RSA)
+ k = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+ else if (key_type == CKK_ECDSA)
+ k = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+
+ if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
+ debug_f("could not destroy public key 0x%hhx", keyid);
+ *err = rv;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (reset_pin)
+ f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
+ CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+
+ if (reset_provider)
+ pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
+
+ return (k);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
+#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
- return (0);
+ error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+ char ***labelsp)
+{
+ error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
+ return (-1);
}
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
- return;
+ error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
}
-
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.h
index 0ced74f29ce7..81f1d7c5d392 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.h
@@ -1,24 +1,40 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.4 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.6 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+
+/* Errors for pkcs11_add_provider() */
+#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC 1
+#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL 2
+#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS 3
+#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED 4
+#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED 5
+
int pkcs11_init(int);
void pkcs11_terminate(void);
-int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***);
+int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
int pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
+#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
+struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
+ unsigned int, unsigned char, u_int32_t *);
+struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *, char *, unsigned long, unsigned char,
+ u_int32_t *);
+#endif
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-client.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-client.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e932590094a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-client.c,v 1.9 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+static int
+start_helper(int *fdp, pid_t *pidp, void (**osigchldp)(int))
+{
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+ int oerrno, pair[2];
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *helper, *verbosity = NULL;
+
+ *fdp = -1;
+ *pidp = 0;
+ *osigchldp = SIG_DFL;
+
+ helper = getenv("SSH_SK_HELPER");
+ if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0)
+ helper = _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER;
+ if (access(helper, X_OK) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_f("helper \"%s\" unusable: %s", helper, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ verbosity = "-vvv";
+#endif
+
+ /* Start helper */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
+ error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(pair[0]);
+ close(pair[1]);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+ (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+ error_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ close(pair[0]);
+ close(pair[1]);
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ debug_f("starting %s %s", helper,
+ verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity);
+ execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
+ error_f("execlp: %s", strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ close(pair[1]);
+
+ /* success */
+ debug3_f("started pid=%ld", (long)pid);
+ *fdp = pair[0];
+ *pidp = pid;
+ *osigchldp = osigchld;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+reap_helper(pid_t pid)
+{
+ int status, oerrno;
+
+ debug3_f("pid=%ld", (long)pid);
+
+ errno = 0;
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ errno = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ error_f("helper exited abnormally");
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ error_f("helper exited with non-zero exit status");
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+client_converse(struct sshbuf *msg, struct sshbuf **respp, u_int type)
+{
+ int oerrno, fd, r2, ll, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_int rtype, rerr;
+ pid_t pid;
+ u_char version;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+ struct sshbuf *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ *respp = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = start_helper(&fd, &pid, &osigchld)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Request preamble: type, log_on_stderr, log_level */
+ ll = log_level_get();
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, log_is_on_stderr() != 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, ll < 0 ? 0 : ll)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(req, msg)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_msg_send(fd, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, req)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "send");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_msg_recv(fd, resp)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "receive");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(resp, &version)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse version");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) {
+ error_f("unsupported version: got %u, expected %u",
+ version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rtype)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse message type");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (rtype == SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rerr)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug_f("helper returned error -%u", rerr);
+ /* OpenSSH error values are negative; encoded as -err on wire */
+ if (rerr == 0 || rerr >= INT_MAX)
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ else
+ r = -(int)rerr;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (rtype != type) {
+ error_f("helper returned incorrect message type %u, "
+ "expecting %u", rtype, type);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ if ((r2 = reap_helper(pid)) != 0) {
+ if (r == 0) {
+ r = r2;
+ oerrno = errno;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r == 0) {
+ *respp = resp;
+ resp = NULL;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+ int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *fp = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SK
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+#endif
+
+ if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "encode key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(req, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, compat)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(resp, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse signature");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+ error_f("trailing data in response");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ if (r != 0) {
+ freezero(*sigp, *lenp);
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+ int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (attest != NULL)
+ sshbuf_reset(attest);
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SK
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+#endif
+
+ if (type < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((abuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, (u_int)type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, userid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, challenge_buf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+ error_f("trailing data in response");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "encode");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (attest != NULL && (r = sshbuf_putb(attest, abuf)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "encode attestation information");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp)
+{
+ int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, **keys = NULL, **tmp;
+ size_t i, nkeys = 0;
+
+ *keysp = NULL;
+ *nkeysp = 0;
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+ /* key, comment */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(resp, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse signature");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "decode key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((tmp = recallocarray(keys, nkeys, nkeys + 1,
+ sizeof(*keys))) == NULL) {
+ error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug_f("keys[%zu]: %s %s", nkeys, sshkey_type(key),
+ key->sk_application);
+ keys = tmp;
+ keys[nkeys++] = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *keysp = keys;
+ *nkeysp = nkeys;
+ keys = NULL;
+ nkeys = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-helper.8
similarity index 61%
copy from crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
copy to crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-helper.8
index 3728c4e4e7e4..3c53da1ec796 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-helper.8
@@ -1,43 +1,66 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.4 2013/07/16 00:07:52 schwarze Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.8,v 1.3 2019/12/21 20:22:34 naddy Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
.\"
.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2013 $
-.Dt SSH-PKCS11-HELPER 8
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2019 $
+.Dt SSH-SK-HELPER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-pkcs11-helper
-.Nd ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
+.Nm ssh-sk-helper
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for FIDO authenticator support
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
+.Op Fl v
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is used by
.Xr ssh-agent 1
-to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token.
+to access keys provided by a FIDO authenticator.
.Pp
.Nm
is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+.Pp
+A single option is supported:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in debugging problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+will automatically pass the
+.Fl v
+flag to
+.Nm
+when it has itself been placed in debug mode.
+.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
-.Ox 4.7 .
+.Ox 6.7 .
.Sh AUTHORS
-.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
+.An Damien Miller Aq Mt djm@openbsd.org
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-helper.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..21a08919d340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.c,v 1.11 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is a tiny program used to isolate the address space used for
+ * security key middleware signing operations from ssh-agent. It is similar
+ * to ssh-pkcs11-helper.c but considerably simpler as the operations for
+ * security keys are stateless.
+ *
+ * Please crank SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION in sshkey.h for any incompatible
+ * protocol changes.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static struct sshbuf *reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ va_list ap;
+ struct sshbuf *resp;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ debug("%s: %s", __progname, msg);
+ free(msg);
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ fatal_f("invalid error code %d", r);
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+ if (sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put_u32(resp, (u_int)-r) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __progname);
+ return resp;
+}
+
+/* If the specified string is zero length, then free it and replace with NULL */
+static void
+null_empty(char **s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL || *s == NULL || **s != '\0')
+ return;
+
+ free(*s);
+ *s = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_sign(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *resp, *kbuf;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ uint32_t compat;
+ const u_char *message;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ size_t msglen, siglen = 0;
+ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(req, &kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(req, &message, &msglen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &compat)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+ if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: Unable to parse private key", __progname);
+ if (!sshkey_is_sk(key)) {
+ fatal("%s: Unsupported key type %s",
+ __progname, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+ }
+
+ debug_f("ready to sign with key %s, provider %s: "
+ "msg len %zu, compat 0x%lx", sshkey_type(key),
+ provider, msglen, (u_long)compat);
+
+ null_empty(&pin);
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_sign(provider, key, &sig, &siglen,
+ message, msglen, compat, pin)) != 0) {
+ resp = reply_error(r, "Signing failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, siglen)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: compose", __progname);
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ free(provider);
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ freezero(sig, siglen);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ return resp;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_enroll(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int type;
+ char *provider, *application, *pin, *device, *userid;
+ uint8_t flags;
+ struct sshbuf *challenge, *attest, *kbuf, *resp;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+
+ if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &application, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &userid, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(req, &challenge)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+ if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+ if (type > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: bad type %u", __progname, type);
+ if (sshbuf_len(challenge) == 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(challenge);
+ challenge = NULL;
+ }
+ null_empty(&device);
+ null_empty(&userid);
+ null_empty(&pin);
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_enroll((int)type, provider, device, application, userid,
+ flags, pin, challenge, &key, attest)) != 0) {
+ resp = reply_error(r, "Enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: encode key", __progname);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, attest)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: compose", __progname);
+
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(attest);
+ sshbuf_free(challenge);
+ free(provider);
+ free(application);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+ return resp;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_load_resident(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+ int r;
+ char *provider, *pin, *device;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf, *resp;
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+ size_t nkeys = 0, i;
+
+ if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+ if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+ null_empty(&device);
+ null_empty(&pin);
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(provider, device, pin,
+ &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
+ resp = reply_error(r, " sshsk_load_resident failed: %s",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: compose", __progname);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ debug_f("key %zu %s %s", i, sshkey_type(keys[i]),
+ keys[i]->sk_application);
+ sshbuf_reset(kbuf);
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(keys[i], kbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: encode key", __progname);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(resp, "")) != 0) /* comment */
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: compose key", __progname);
+ }
+
+ out:
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ free(provider);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ return resp;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+ LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *req, *resp;
+ int in, out, ch, r, vflag = 0;
+ u_int rtype, ll = 0;
+ uint8_t version, log_stderr = 0;
+
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'v':
+ vflag = 1;
+ if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, vflag);
+
+ /*
+ * Rearrange our file descriptors a little; we don't trust the
+ * providers not to fiddle with stdin/out.
+ */
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: dup: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+ close(STDIN_FILENO);
+ close(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ sanitise_stdfd(); /* resets to /dev/null */
+
+ if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(in, req) < 0)
+ fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+ close(in);
+ debug_f("received message len %zu", sshbuf_len(req));
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &version)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: parse version", __progname);
+ if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) {
+ fatal("unsupported version: received %d, expected %d",
+ version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &rtype)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &log_stderr)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &ll)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+
+ if (!vflag && log_level_name((LogLevel)ll) != NULL)
+ log_init(__progname, (LogLevel)ll, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ switch (rtype) {
+ case SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN:
+ resp = process_sign(req);
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL:
+ resp = process_enroll(req);
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT:
+ resp = process_load_resident(req);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unsupported request type %u", __progname, rtype);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ debug_f("reply len %zu", sshbuf_len(resp));
+
+ if (ssh_msg_send(out, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, resp) == -1)
+ fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ close(out);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+#else /* ENABLE_SK */
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssh-sk-helper: disabled at compile time\n");
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d254e77f9397
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,826 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.35 2021/02/26 00:16:58 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+struct sshsk_provider {
+ char *path;
+ void *dlhandle;
+
+ /* Return the version of the middleware API */
+ uint32_t (*sk_api_version)(void);
+
+ /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+ int (*sk_enroll)(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
+ size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+ /* Sign a challenge */
+ int (*sk_sign)(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+ /* Enumerate resident keys */
+ int (*sk_load_resident_keys)(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+};
+
+/* Built-in version */
+int ssh_sk_enroll(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
+ size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+int ssh_sk_sign(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+int ssh_sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+static void
+sshsk_free(struct sshsk_provider *p)
+{
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return;
+ free(p->path);
+ if (p->dlhandle != NULL)
+ dlclose(p->dlhandle);
+ free(p);
+}
+
+static struct sshsk_provider *
+sshsk_open(const char *path)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *ret = NULL;
+ uint32_t version;
+
+ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+ error("No FIDO SecurityKeyProvider specified");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+ error_f("calloc failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((ret->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("strdup failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Skip the rest if we're using the linked in middleware */
+ if (strcasecmp(ret->path, "internal") == 0) {
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ ret->sk_enroll = ssh_sk_enroll;
+ ret->sk_sign = ssh_sk_sign;
+ ret->sk_load_resident_keys = ssh_sk_load_resident_keys;
+#else
+ error("internal security key support not enabled");
+#endif
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_api_version = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
+ "sk_api_version")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_api_version) failed: %s",
+ path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ version = ret->sk_api_version();
+ debug_f("provider %s implements version 0x%08lx", ret->path,
+ (u_long)version);
+ if ((version & SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK) != SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" implements unsupported "
+ "version 0x%08lx (supported: 0x%08lx)",
+ path, (u_long)version, (u_long)SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_enroll = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_enroll")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider %s dlsym(sk_enroll) failed: %s",
+ path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_sign = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_sign")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_sign) failed: %s",
+ path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_load_resident_keys = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
+ "sk_load_resident_keys")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_load_resident_keys) "
+ "failed: %s", path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ return ret;
+fail:
+ sshsk_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_enroll_response(struct sk_enroll_response *r)
+{
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return;
+ freezero(r->key_handle, r->key_handle_len);
+ freezero(r->public_key, r->public_key_len);
+ freezero(r->signature, r->signature_len);
+ freezero(r->attestation_cert, r->attestation_cert_len);
+ freezero(r->authdata, r->authdata_len);
+ freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_sign_response(struct sk_sign_response *r)
+{
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return;
+ freezero(r->sig_r, r->sig_r_len);
+ freezero(r->sig_s, r->sig_s_len);
+ freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* Assemble key from response */
+static int
+sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *q = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA_SK)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->ecdsa_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
+ (q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL ||
+ (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("allocation failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b,
+ resp->public_key, resp->public_key_len)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_string");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) {
+ error("Authenticator returned invalid ECDSA key");
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
+ /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
+ error_f("allocation failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ EC_POINT_free(q);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+sshsk_ed25519_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (resp->public_key_len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+ error_f("invalid size: %zu", resp->public_key_len);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519_SK)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("malloc failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(key->ed25519_pk, resp->public_key, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsk_key_from_response(int alg, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ /* Check response validity */
+ if (resp->public_key == NULL || resp->key_handle == NULL) {
+ error_f("sk_enroll response invalid");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch (alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error_f("unsupported algorithm %d", alg);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->sk_flags = flags;
+ if ((key->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (key->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("allocation failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key->sk_application = strdup(application)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("strdup application failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(key->sk_key_handle, resp->key_handle,
+ resp->key_handle_len)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "put key handle");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+skerr_to_ssherr(int skerr)
+{
+ switch (skerr) {
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED:
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
+ return SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL:
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_options(struct sk_option **opts)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (opts == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; opts[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ free(opts[i]->name);
+ free(opts[i]->value);
+ free(opts[i]);
+ }
+ free(opts);
+}
+
+static int
+sshsk_add_option(struct sk_option ***optsp, size_t *noptsp,
+ const char *name, const char *value, uint8_t required)
+{
+ struct sk_option **opts = *optsp;
+ size_t nopts = *noptsp;
+
+ if ((opts = recallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 2, /* extra for NULL */
+ sizeof(*opts))) == NULL) {
+ error_f("array alloc failed");
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ *optsp = opts;
+ *noptsp = nopts + 1;
+ if ((opts[nopts] = calloc(1, sizeof(**opts))) == NULL) {
+ error_f("alloc failed");
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if ((opts[nopts]->name = strdup(name)) == NULL ||
+ (opts[nopts]->value = strdup(value)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("alloc failed");
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ opts[nopts]->required = required;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+make_options(const char *device, const char *user_id,
+ struct sk_option ***optsp)
+{
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+ size_t nopts = 0;
+ int r, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (device != NULL &&
+ (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "device", device, 0)) != 0) {
+ ret = r;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (user_id != NULL &&
+ (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "user", user_id, 0)) != 0) {
+ ret = r;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *optsp = opts;
+ opts = NULL;
+ nopts = 0;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int
+fill_attestation_blob(const struct sk_enroll_response *resp,
+ struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (attest == NULL)
+ return 0; /* nothing to do */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest, "ssh-sk-attest-v01")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->authdata, resp->authdata_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
+ return r;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ u_char randchall[32];
+ const u_char *challenge;
+ size_t challenge_len;
+ struct sk_enroll_response *resp = NULL;
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int alg;
+
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\", device \"%s\", application \"%s\", "
+ "userid \"%s\", flags 0x%02x, challenge len %zu%s",
+ provider_path, device, application, userid, flags,
+ challenge_buf == NULL ? 0 : sshbuf_len(challenge_buf),
+ (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (attest)
+ sshbuf_reset(attest);
+
+ if ((r = make_options(device, userid, &opts)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error_f("unsupported key type");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (provider_path == NULL) {
+ error_f("missing provider");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (application == NULL || *application == '\0') {
+ error_f("missing application");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (challenge_buf == NULL) {
+ debug_f("using random challenge");
+ arc4random_buf(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
+ challenge = randchall;
+ challenge_len = sizeof(randchall);
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(challenge_buf) == 0) {
+ error("Missing enrollment challenge");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ challenge = sshbuf_ptr(challenge_buf);
+ challenge_len = sshbuf_len(challenge_buf);
+ debug3_f("using explicit challenge len=%zd", challenge_len);
+ }
+ if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* XXX validate flags? */
+ /* enroll key */
+ if ((r = skp->sk_enroll(alg, challenge, challenge_len, application,
+ flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\" failure %d", provider_path, r);
+ r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(alg, application, flags,
+ resp, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Optionally fill in the attestation information */
+ if ((r = fill_attestation_blob(resp, attest)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ sshsk_free(skp);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshsk_free_enroll_response(resp);
+ explicit_bzero(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
+ return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+sshsk_ecdsa_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* Check response validity */
+ if (resp->sig_r == NULL || resp->sig_s == NULL) {
+ error_f("sk_sign response invalid");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((inner_sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Prepare and append inner signature object */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
+ resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
+ resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose inner");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sig, inner_sig)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: inner:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(inner_sig, stderr);
+#endif
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+sshsk_ed25519_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* Check response validity */
+ if (resp->sig_r == NULL) {
+ error_f("sk_sign response invalid");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sig,
+ resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose");
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
+#endif
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int type, alg;
+ struct sk_sign_response *resp = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\", key %s, flags 0x%02x%s",
+ provider_path, sshkey_type(key), key->sk_flags,
+ (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
+
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ type = sshkey_type_plain(key->type);
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if (provider_path == NULL ||
+ key->sk_key_handle == NULL ||
+ key->sk_application == NULL || *key->sk_application == '\0') {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sk_flags = 0x%02x, sk_application = \"%s\"\n",
+ __func__, key->sk_flags, key->sk_application);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sk_key_handle:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(key->sk_key_handle, stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((r = skp->sk_sign(alg, data, datalen, key->sk_application,
+ sshbuf_ptr(key->sk_key_handle), sshbuf_len(key->sk_key_handle),
+ key->sk_flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
+ debug_f("sk_sign failed with code %d", r);
+ r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Assemble signature */
+ if ((sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sig, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "compose outer");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+ __func__, resp->flags, resp->counter);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: data to sign:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigbuf:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(sig, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ if ((*sigp = malloc(sshbuf_len(sig))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig));
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = sshbuf_len(sig);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ sshsk_free(skp);
+ sshsk_free_sign_response(resp);
+ sshbuf_free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(struct sk_resident_key **rks, size_t nrks)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (nrks == 0 || rks == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+ free(rks[i]->application);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.signature, rks[i]->key.signature_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.attestation_cert,
+ rks[i]->key.attestation_cert_len);
+ freezero(rks[i], sizeof(**rks));
+ }
+ free(rks);
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
+ size_t i, nrks = 0, nkeys = 0;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, **keys = NULL, **tmp;
+ uint8_t flags;
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+
+ debug_f("provider \"%s\"%s", provider_path,
+ (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? ", have-pin": "");
+
+ if (keysp == NULL || nkeysp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *keysp = NULL;
+ *nkeysp = 0;
+
+ if ((r = make_options(device, NULL, &opts)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = skp->sk_load_resident_keys(pin, opts, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", provider_path, r);
+ r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+ debug3_f("rk %zu: slot = %zu, alg = %d, application = \"%s\"",
+ i, rks[i]->slot, rks[i]->alg, rks[i]->application);
+ /* XXX need better filter here */
+ if (strncmp(rks[i]->application, "ssh:", 4) != 0)
+ continue;
+ switch (rks[i]->alg) {
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ break;
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+ flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+ if ((rks[i]->flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+ flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+ if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(rks[i]->alg,
+ rks[i]->application, flags, &rks[i]->key, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((tmp = recallocarray(keys, nkeys, nkeys + 1,
+ sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) {
+ error_f("recallocarray failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ keys = tmp;
+ keys[nkeys++] = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ /* XXX synthesise comment */
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keysp = keys;
+ *nkeysp = nkeys;
+ keys = NULL;
+ nkeys = 0;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ sshsk_free(skp);
+ sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(rks, nrks);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ if (nkeys != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0f566bbc3859
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-sk.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.h,v 1.10 2020/01/10 23:43:26 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_SK_H
+#define _SSH_SK_H 1
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sk_option;
+
+/* Version of protocol expected from ssh-sk-helper */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION 5
+
+/* ssh-sk-helper messages */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR 0 /* Only valid H->C */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN 1
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL 2
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT 3
+
+/*
+ * Enroll (generate) a new security-key hosted private key of given type
+ * via the specified provider middleware.
+ * If challenge_buf is NULL then a random 256 bit challenge will be used.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ *
+ * If successful and the attest_data buffer is not NULL then attestation
+ * information is placed there.
+ */
+int sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest);
+
+/*
+ * Calculate an ECDSA_SK or ED25519_SK signature using the specified key
+ * and provider middleware.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin);
+
+/*
+ * Enumerates and loads all SSH-compatible resident keys from a security
+ * key.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp);
+
+#endif /* _SSH_SK_H */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-xmss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-xmss.c
index 4c734fd7d5e2..7bd3a96a3bf5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-xmss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-xmss.c
@@ -1,192 +1,185 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-xmss.c,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $*/
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-xmss.c,v 1.4 2020/10/19 22:49:23 dtucker Exp $*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Stefan-Lukas Gazdag.
* Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "xmss_fast.h"
int
ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t slen = 0, len = 0, required_siglen;
unsigned long long smlen;
int r, ret;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (key == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS ||
key->xmss_sk == NULL ||
sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0)
return r;
if (datalen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
smlen = slen = datalen + required_siglen;
if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(key, error)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(key, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = xmss_sign(key->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(key), sig, &smlen,
data, datalen, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */
goto out;
}
/* encode signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-xmss@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (sigp != NULL) {
if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
- if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_update_state(key, error)) != 0) {
+ if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_update_state(key, 1)) != 0) {
/* discard signature since we cannot update the state */
if (r == 0 && sigp != NULL && *sigp != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(*sigp, len);
free(*sigp);
}
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
r = ret;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
- if (sig != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
- free(sig);
- }
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ freezero(sig, slen);
return r;
}
int
ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
const u_char *sigblob;
u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL;
size_t len, required_siglen;
unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
int r, ret;
if (key == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS ||
key->xmss_pk == NULL ||
sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0)
return r;
if (datalen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strcmp("ssh-xmss@openssh.com", ktype) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
}
if (len != required_siglen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
smlen = len + datalen;
mlen = smlen;
if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen);
if ((ret = xmss_sign_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: crypto_sign_xmss_open failed: %d",
- __func__, ret);
+ debug2_f("xmss_sign_open failed: %d", ret);
}
if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) {
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
/* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
- if (sm != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(sm, smlen);
- free(sm);
- }
- if (m != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
- free(m);
- }
+ if (sm != NULL)
+ freezero(sm, smlen);
+ if (m != NULL)
+ freezero(m, smlen);
sshbuf_free(b);
free(ktype);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
index bffaadbbae12..645962bc9d9c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
@@ -1,1711 +1,1771 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.399 2018/09/20 06:58:48 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.425 2021/07/28 05:57:42 jmc Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 28 2021 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+.Nd OpenSSH remote login client
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh
.Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
.Op Fl B Ar bind_interface
.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
.Op Fl E Ar log_file
.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
.Op Fl F Ar configfile
.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl L Ar address
.Op Fl l Ar login_name
.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl Q Ar query_option
.Op Fl R Ar address
.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
.Ar destination
.Op Ar command
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands on a remote machine.
It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
.Pp
.Nm
connects and logs into the specified
.Ar destination ,
which may be specified as either
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc hostname
.Sm on
or a URI of the form
.Sm off
.No ssh:// Oo user @ Oc hostname Op : port .
.Sm on
The user must prove
-his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
+their identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
(see below).
.Pp
If a
.Ar command
is specified,
it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.Pp
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.Pp
.It Fl A
-Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent such as
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the agent's
.Ux Ns -domain
socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+A safer alternative may be to use a jump host
+(see
+.Fl J ) .
.Pp
.It Fl a
Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
.Pp
.It Fl B Ar bind_interface
Bind to the address of
.Ar bind_interface
before attempting to connect to the destination host.
This is only useful on systems with more than one address.
.Pp
.It Fl b Ar bind_address
Use
.Ar bind_address
on the local machine as the source address
of the connection.
Only useful on systems with more than one address.
.Pp
.It Fl C
Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
data for forwarded X11, TCP and
.Ux Ns -domain
connections).
The compression algorithm is the same used by
.Xr gzip 1 .
Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
configuration files; see the
.Cm Compression
option.
.Pp
.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
.Ar cipher_spec
is a comma-separated list of ciphers
listed in order of preference.
See the
.Cm Ciphers
keyword in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl D Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies a local
.Dq dynamic
application-level port forwarding.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to
.Ar port
on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
.Ar bind_address .
Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
remote machine.
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
.Nm
will act as a SOCKS server.
Only root can forward privileged ports.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Dq localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
.It Fl E Ar log_file
Append debug logs to
.Ar log_file
instead of standard error.
.Pp
.It Fl e Ar escape_char
Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
.Ql ~ ) .
The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
The escape character followed by a dot
.Pq Ql \&.
closes the connection;
followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
and followed by itself sends the escape character once.
Setting the character to
.Dq none
disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
.Pp
.It Fl F Ar configfile
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
If a configuration file is given on the command line,
the system-wide configuration file
.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
will be ignored.
The default for the per-user configuration file is
.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
+If set to
+.Dq none ,
+no configuration files will be read.
.Pp
.It Fl f
Requests
.Nm
to go to background just before command execution.
This is useful if
.Nm
is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
wants it in the background.
This implies
.Fl n .
The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
something like
.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
.Pp
If the
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
configuration option is set to
.Dq yes ,
then a client started with
.Fl f
will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
before placing itself in the background.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
.Pp
.It Fl G
Causes
.Nm
to print its configuration after evaluating
.Cm Host
and
.Cm Match
blocks and exit.
.Pp
.It Fl g
Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
on the master process.
.Pp
.It Fl I Ar pkcs11
Specify the PKCS#11 shared library
.Nm
-should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's
-private RSA key.
+should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
+authentication.
.Pp
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
public key authentication is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Identity files may also be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
It is possible to have multiple
.Fl i
options (and multiple identities specified in
configuration files).
If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the
.Cm CertificateFile
directive,
.Nm
will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained
by appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to identity filenames.
.Pp
.It Fl J Ar destination
Connect to the target host by first making a
.Nm
connection to the jump host described by
.Ar destination
and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there.
Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
This is a shortcut to specify a
.Cm ProxyJump
configuration directive.
+Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line generally
+apply to the destination host and not any specified jump hosts.
+Use
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config
+to specify configuration for jump hosts.
.Pp
.It Fl K
Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
credentials to the server.
.Pp
.It Fl k
Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
.Pp
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : remote_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Ar local_socket : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Ar local_socket : remote_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local
(client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket,
on the remote side.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
.Ar port
on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
.Ar bind_address ,
or to a Unix socket.
Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
made to either
.Ar host
port
.Ar hostport ,
or the Unix socket
.Ar remote_socket ,
from the remote machine.
.Pp
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
.Pp
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Dq localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
.It Fl l Ar login_name
Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
.Pp
.It Fl M
Places the
.Nm
client into
.Dq master
mode for connection sharing.
Multiple
.Fl M
options places
.Nm
into
.Dq master
mode but with confirmation required using
.Xr ssh-askpass 1
before each operation that changes the multiplexing state
(e.g. opening a new session).
Refer to the description of
.Cm ControlMaster
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for details.
.Pp
.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms,
specified in order of preference.
See the
.Cm MACs
keyword for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl N
Do not execute a remote command.
This is useful for just forwarding ports.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm SessionType
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
.Pp
.It Fl n
Redirects stdin from
.Pa /dev/null
(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
This must be used when
.Nm
is run in the background.
A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
For example,
.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
The
.Nm
program will be put in the background.
(This does not work if
.Nm
needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
.Fl f
option.)
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm StdinNull
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
.Pp
.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
Control an active connection multiplexing master process.
When the
.Fl O
option is specified, the
.Ar ctl_cmd
argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
Valid commands are:
.Dq check
(check that the master process is running),
.Dq forward
(request forwardings without command execution),
.Dq cancel
(cancel forwardings),
.Dq exit
(request the master to exit), and
.Dq stop
(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests).
.Pp
.It Fl o Ar option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
command-line flag.
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddKeysToAgent
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
-.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It ClearAllForwardings
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It DynamicForward
.It EscapeChar
.It ExitOnForwardFailure
.It FingerprintHash
+.It ForkAfterAuthentication
.It ForwardAgent
.It ForwardX11
.It ForwardX11Timeout
.It ForwardX11Trusted
.It GatewayPorts
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
+.It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
.It HostbasedAuthentication
-.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
-.It HostName
+.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
+.It KnownHostsCommand
.It LocalCommand
.It LocalForward
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It Match
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PermitLocalCommand
+.It PermitRemoteOpen
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
.It ProxyUseFdpass
-.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+.It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It RemoteCommand
.It RemoteForward
.It RequestTTY
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It SessionType
.It SetEnv
+.It StdinNull
.It StreamLocalBindMask
.It StreamLocalBindUnlink
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It Tunnel
.It TunnelDevice
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.It VersionAddendum
.It VisualHostKey
.It XAuthLocation
.El
.Pp
.It Fl p Ar port
Port to connect to on the remote host.
This can be specified on a
per-host basis in the configuration file.
.Pp
.It Fl Q Ar query_option
-Queries
-.Nm
-for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2.
-The available features are:
+Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the following features:
.Ar cipher
(supported symmetric ciphers),
.Ar cipher-auth
(supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption),
.Ar help
(supported query terms for use with the
.Fl Q
flag),
.Ar mac
(supported message integrity codes),
.Ar kex
(key exchange algorithms),
.Ar key
(key types),
.Ar key-cert
(certificate key types),
.Ar key-plain
(non-certificate key types),
+.Ar key-sig
+(all key types and signature algorithms),
.Ar protocol-version
(supported SSH protocol versions), and
.Ar sig
(supported signature algorithms).
+Alternatively, any keyword from
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+or
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the corresponding
+query_option.
.Pp
.It Fl q
Quiet mode.
Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
.Pp
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : local_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Ar remote_socket : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Ar remote_socket : local_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote
(server) host are to be forwarded to the local side.
.Pp
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
.Ar port
or to a Unix socket on the remote side.
Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by
.Ar host
port
.Ar hostport ,
or
.Ar local_socket ,
or, if no explicit destination was specified,
.Nm
will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations
requested by the remote SOCKS client.
.Pp
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
.Pp
By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback
interface only.
This may be overridden by specifying a
.Ar bind_address .
An empty
.Ar bind_address ,
or the address
.Ql * ,
indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
Specifying a remote
.Ar bind_address
will only succeed if the server's
.Cm GatewayPorts
option is enabled (see
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
.Pp
If the
.Ar port
argument is
.Ql 0 ,
the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
to the client at run time.
When used together with
.Ic -O forward
the allocated port will be printed to the standard output.
.Pp
.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
or the string
.Dq none
to disable connection sharing.
Refer to the description of
.Cm ControlPath
and
.Cm ControlMaster
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for details.
.Pp
.It Fl s
May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH
as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\&
.Xr sftp 1 ) .
The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm SessionType
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
.Pp
.It Fl T
Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
.Pp
.It Fl t
Force pseudo-terminal allocation.
This can be used to execute arbitrary
screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
e.g. when implementing menu services.
Multiple
.Fl t
options force tty allocation, even if
.Nm
has no local tty.
.Pp
.It Fl V
Display the version number and exit.
.Pp
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.Pp
.It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to
.Ar host
on
.Ar port
over the secure channel.
Implies
.Fl N ,
.Fl T ,
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
and
.Cm ClearAllForwardings ,
though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using
.Fl o
command line options.
.Pp
.It Fl w Xo
.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
.Xc
Requests
tunnel
device forwarding with the specified
.Xr tun 4
devices between the client
.Pq Ar local_tun
and the server
.Pq Ar remote_tun .
.Pp
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
.Dq any ,
which uses the next available tunnel device.
If
.Ar remote_tun
is not specified, it defaults to
.Dq any .
See also the
.Cm Tunnel
and
.Cm TunnelDevice
directives in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
If the
.Cm Tunnel
directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is
.Dq point-to-point .
If a different
.Cm Tunnel
forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
.Fl w .
.Pp
.It Fl X
Enables X11 forwarding.
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the user's X authorization database)
can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
.Pp
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
restrictions by default.
Please refer to the
.Nm
.Fl Y
option and the
.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
directive in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl x
Disables X11 forwarding.
.Pp
.It Fl Y
Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
controls.
.Pp
.It Fl y
Send log information using the
.Xr syslog 3
system module.
By default this information is sent to stderr.
.El
.Pp
.Nm
may additionally obtain configuration data from
a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Sh AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
.Pp
The methods available for authentication are:
GSSAPI-based authentication,
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
-challenge-response authentication,
+keyboard-interactive authentication,
and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
though
.Cm PreferredAuthentications
can be used to change the default order.
.Pp
Host-based authentication works as follows:
If the machine the user logs in from is listed in
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
or
.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-on the remote machine, and the user names are
+on the remote machine, the user is non-root and the user names are
the same on both sides, or if the files
.Pa ~/.rhosts
or
.Pa ~/.shosts
exist in the user's home directory on the
remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
considered for login.
Additionally, the server
.Em must
be able to verify the client's
host key (see the description of
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
below)
for login to be permitted.
This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
[Note to the administrator:
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
disabled if security is desired.]
.Pp
Public key authentication works as follows:
The scheme is based on public-key cryptography,
using cryptosystems
where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
The idea is that each user creates a public/private
key pair for authentication purposes.
The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
.Nm
implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
The HISTORY section of
.Xr ssl 8
contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
.Pp
The file
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
When the user logs in, the
.Nm
program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
authentication.
The client proves that it has access to the private key
and the server checks that the corresponding public key
is authorized to accept the account.
.Pp
The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
different method.
These may be viewed by increasing the
.Cm LogLevel
to
.Cm DEBUG
or higher (e.g. by using the
.Fl v
flag).
.Pp
-The user creates his/her key pair by running
+The user creates their key pair by running
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
This stores the private key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
(DSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
(Ed25519),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
(RSA)
and stores the public key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
(DSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
(Ed25519),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
(RSA)
in the user's home directory.
The user should then copy the public key
to
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
+in their home directory on the remote machine.
The
.Pa authorized_keys
file corresponds to the conventional
.Pa ~/.rhosts
file, and has one key
per line, though the lines can be very long.
After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
.Pp
A variation on public key authentication
is available in the form of certificate authentication:
instead of a set of public/private keys,
signed certificates are used.
This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority
can be used in place of many public/private keys.
See the CERTIFICATES section of
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
for more information.
.Pp
The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
may be with an authentication agent.
See
.Xr ssh-agent 1
and (optionally) the
.Cm AddKeysToAgent
directive in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
-Challenge-response authentication works as follows:
+Keyboard-interactive authentication works as follows:
The server sends an arbitrary
.Qq challenge
-text, and prompts for a response.
-Examples of challenge-response authentication include
+text and prompts for a response, possibly multiple times.
+Examples of keyboard-interactive authentication include
.Bx
Authentication (see
.Xr login.conf 5 )
and PAM (some
.Pf non- Ox
systems).
.Pp
Finally, if other authentication methods fail,
.Nm
prompts the user for a password.
The password is sent to the remote
host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
.Pp
.Nm
automatically maintains and checks a database containing
identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.
Host keys are stored in
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the user's home directory.
Additionally, the file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
is automatically checked for known hosts.
Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
If a host's identification ever changes,
.Nm
warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent
server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
The
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
option can be used to control logins to machines whose
host key is not known or has changed.
.Pp
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or,
if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives
the user a normal shell as an interactive session.
All communication with
the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
.Pp
If an interactive session is requested
.Nm
by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive
sessions when the client has one.
The flags
.Fl T
and
.Fl t
can be used to override this behaviour.
.Pp
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the
user may use the escape characters noted below.
.Pp
If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated,
the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
On most systems, setting the escape character to
.Dq none
will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
.Pp
The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested,
.Nm
supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character.
.Pp
A single tilde character can be sent as
.Ic ~~
or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
special.
The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
.Cm EscapeChar
configuration directive or on the command line by the
.Fl e
option.
.Pp
The supported escapes (assuming the default
.Ql ~ )
are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm ~.
Disconnect.
.It Cm ~^Z
Background
.Nm .
.It Cm ~#
List forwarded connections.
.It Cm ~&
Background
.Nm
at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
.It Cm ~?
Display a list of escape characters.
.It Cm ~B
Send a BREAK to the remote system
(only useful if the peer supports it).
.It Cm ~C
Open command line.
Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
.Fl L ,
.Fl R
and
.Fl D
options (see above).
It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings
with
.Sm off
.Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for local,
.Sm off
.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for remote and
.Sm off
.Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for dynamic port-forwardings.
.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
allows the user to execute a local command if the
.Ic PermitLocalCommand
option is enabled in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Basic help is available, using the
.Fl h
option.
.It Cm ~R
Request rekeying of the connection
(only useful if the peer supports it).
.It Cm ~V
Decrease the verbosity
.Pq Ic LogLevel
when errors are being written to stderr.
.It Cm ~v
Increase the verbosity
.Pq Ic LogLevel
when errors are being written to stderr.
.El
.Sh TCP FORWARDING
-Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can
-be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
+Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel
+can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a
mail server; another is going through firewalls.
.Pp
-In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between
-an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly
-support encrypted communications.
+In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC client,
+even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
+support encrypted communication.
This works as follows:
the user connects to the remote host using
.Nm ,
-specifying a port to be used to forward connections
-to the remote server.
-After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted
-on the client machine,
-connecting to the same local port,
+specifying the ports to be used to forward the connection.
+After that it is possible to start the program locally,
and
.Nm
-will encrypt and forward the connection.
+will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote server.
.Pp
-The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
-.Dq 127.0.0.1
-(localhost)
-to remote server
-.Dq server.example.com :
-.Bd -literal -offset 4n
-$ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
-$ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
-.Ed
-.Pp
-This tunnels a connection to IRC server
+The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client
+to an IRC server at
.Dq server.example.com ,
joining channel
.Dq #users ,
nickname
.Dq pinky ,
-using port 1234.
-It doesn't matter which port is used,
-as long as it's greater than 1023
-(remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports)
-and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use.
-The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server,
-since that's the standard port for IRC services.
+using the standard IRC port, 6667:
+.Bd -literal -offset 4n
+$ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+$ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
+.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl f
option backgrounds
.Nm
and the remote command
.Dq sleep 10
is specified to allow an amount of time
(10 seconds, in the example)
-to start the service which is to be tunnelled.
+to start the program which is going to use the tunnel.
If no connections are made within the time specified,
.Nm
will exit.
.Sh X11 FORWARDING
If the
.Cm ForwardX11
variable is set to
.Dq yes
(or see the description of the
.Fl X ,
.Fl x ,
and
.Fl Y
options above)
and the user is using X11 (the
.Ev DISPLAY
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
from the local machine.
The user should not manually set
.Ev DISPLAY .
Forwarding of X11 connections can be
configured on the command line or in configuration files.
.Pp
The
.Ev DISPLAY
value set by
.Nm
will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero.
This is normal, and happens because
.Nm
creates a
.Dq proxy
X server on the server machine for forwarding the
connections over the encrypted channel.
.Pp
.Nm
will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
the connection is opened.
The real authentication cookie is never
sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
.Pp
If the
.Cm ForwardAgent
variable is set to
.Dq yes
(or see the description of the
.Fl A
and
.Fl a
options above) and
the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS
When connecting to a server for the first time,
a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
(unless the option
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
has been disabled).
Fingerprints can be determined using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
.Pp
If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
and the key can be accepted or rejected.
If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
.Fl E
option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match.
.Pp
Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
just by looking at fingerprint strings,
there is also support to compare host keys visually,
using
.Em random art .
By setting the
.Cm VisualHostKey
option to
.Dq yes ,
a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter
if the session itself is interactive or not.
By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily
find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern
is displayed.
Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
.Pp
To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
all known hosts, the following command line can be used:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
.Pp
If the fingerprint is unknown,
an alternative method of verification is available:
SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.
An additional resource record (RR),
SSHFP,
is added to a zonefile
and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint
with that of the key presented.
.Pp
In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
.Dq host.example.com .
The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
host.example.com:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
.Ed
.Pp
The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
.Pp
.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
.Pp
Finally the client connects:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
[...]
Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
.Ed
.Pp
See the
.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
option in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
.Nm
contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling
using the
.Xr tun 4
network pseudo-device,
allowing two networks to be joined securely.
The
.Xr sshd_config 5
configuration option
.Cm PermitTunnel
controls whether the server supports this,
and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).
.Pp
The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24
with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection
from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2,
provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network,
at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
.Pp
On the client:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
.Ed
.Pp
On the server:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
.Ed
.Pp
Client access may be more finely tuned via the
.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
file (see below) and the
.Cm PermitRootLogin
server option.
The following entry would permit connections on
.Xr tun 4
device 1 from user
.Dq jane
and on tun device 2 from user
.Dq john ,
if
.Cm PermitRootLogin
is set to
.Dq forced-commands-only :
.Bd -literal -offset 2n
tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
.Ed
.Pp
Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
it may be more suited to temporary setups,
such as for wireless VPNs.
More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as
.Xr ipsecctl 8
and
.Xr isakmpd 8 .
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Nm
will normally set the following environment variables:
.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
.It Ev DISPLAY
The
.Ev DISPLAY
variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
It is automatically set by
.Nm
to point to a value of the form
.Dq hostname:n ,
where
.Dq hostname
indicates the host where the shell runs, and
.Sq n
is an integer \*(Ge 1.
.Nm
uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
channel.
The user should normally not set
.Ev DISPLAY
explicitly, as that
will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
manually copy any required authorization cookies).
.It Ev HOME
Set to the path of the user's home directory.
.It Ev LOGNAME
Synonym for
.Ev USER ;
set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
.It Ev MAIL
Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
.It Ev PATH
Set to the default
.Ev PATH ,
as specified when compiling
.Nm .
.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
If
.Nm
needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
terminal if it was run from a terminal.
If
.Nm
does not have a terminal associated with it but
.Ev DISPLAY
and
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
are set, it will execute the program specified by
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
This is particularly useful when calling
.Nm
from a
.Pa .xsession
or related script.
(Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null
to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
+Allows further control over the use of an askpass program.
+If this variable is set to
+.Dq never
+then
+.Nm
+will never attempt to use one.
+If it is set to
+.Dq prefer ,
+then
+.Nm
+will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY when requesting
+passwords.
+Finally, if the variable is set to
+.Dq force ,
+then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase input regardless
+of whether
+.Ev DISPLAY
+is set.
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION
Identifies the client and server ends of the connection.
The variable contains
four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number,
server IP address, and server port number.
.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
is executed.
It can be used to extract the original arguments.
.It Ev SSH_TTY
This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
with the current shell or command.
If the current session has no tty,
this variable is not set.
.It Ev SSH_TUNNEL
Optionally set by
.Xr sshd 8
to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was
requested by the client.
.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
Optionally set by
.Xr sshd 8 ,
this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication
methods successfully used when the session was established, including any
public keys that were used.
.It Ev TZ
This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
on to new connections).
.It Ev USER
Set to the name of the user logging in.
.El
.Pp
Additionally,
.Nm
reads
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
and adds lines of the format
.Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
change their environment.
For more information, see the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Xr sshd 8
reads it as root.
Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended
permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa .rhosts ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.
There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described in the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page.
This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
.Sx ENVIRONMENT ,
above.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the private key for authentication.
These files
contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
accessible by others (read/write/execute).
.Nm
will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.
It is possible to specify a passphrase when
generating the key which will be used to encrypt the
sensitive part of this file using AES-128.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication.
These files are not
sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
See
.Xr sshd 8
for further details of the format of this file.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Commands in this file are executed by
.Nm
when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
started.
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see above).
It should only be writable by root.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa hosts.equiv ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys
and are used for host-based authentication.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys.
This file should be prepared by the
system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
organization.
It should be world-readable.
See
.Xr sshd 8
for further details of the format of this file.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
Commands in this file are executed by
.Nm
when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Nm
exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
if an error occurred.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr tun 4 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh STANDARDS
.Rs
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4250
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4251
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4252
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4253
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4254
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Schlyter
.%A W. Griffin
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4255
.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A F. Cusack
.%A M. Forssen
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4256
.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Galbraith
.%A P. Remaker
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4335
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A M. Bellare
.%A T. Kohno
.%A C. Namprempre
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4344
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A B. Harris
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4345
.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A M. Friedl
.%A N. Provos
.%A W. Simpson
.%D March 2006
.%R RFC 4419
.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Galbraith
.%A R. Thayer
.%D November 2006
.%R RFC 4716
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A D. Stebila
.%A J. Green
.%D December 2009
.%R RFC 5656
.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A A. Perrig
.%A D. Song
.%D 1999
.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
index 98217813eac1..a5f04f5d0b19 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -1,2158 +1,2383 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.494 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.566 2021/08/08 08:49:09 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
* The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
* of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
- * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Modified to work with SSLeay by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* in Canada (German citizen).
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
-#include "digest.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#endif
extern char *__progname;
/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
static char **saved_av;
#endif
/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */
int debug_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */
int tty_flag = 0;
-/* don't exec a shell */
-int no_shell_flag = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
- * on the command line.
- */
-int stdin_null_flag = 0;
-
/*
* Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
- * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
+ * a new mux-client launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
*/
int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
-/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */
-int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
-
-/*
- * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
- * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
- * background.
- */
-int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground mux-client */
+int ostdin_null_flag, osession_type, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
/*
* General data structure for command line options and options configurable
* in configuration files. See readconf.h.
*/
Options options;
/* optional user configfile */
char *config = NULL;
/*
* Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
- * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
* configuration file.
*/
char *host;
-/* Various strings used to to percent_expand() arguments */
-static char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
-static char uidstr[32], *host_arg, *conn_hash_hex;
+/*
+ * A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is
+ * not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead.
+ */
+char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
/* socket address the host resolves to */
struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
/* Private host keys. */
Sensitive sensitive_data;
/* command to be executed */
struct sshbuf *command;
-/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
-int subsystem_flag = 0;
-
/* # of replies received for global requests */
-static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0;
+static int forward_confirms_pending = -1;
/* mux.c */
extern int muxserver_sock;
extern u_int muxclient_command;
/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n"
" [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n"
" [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n"
" [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
" [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n"
" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]\n"
);
exit(255);
}
-static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, struct passwd *);
-static void load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *);
+static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+static void load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *);
static void main_sigchld_handler(int);
/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */
static void
tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
{
u_int i;
char *cp;
for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid());
free(paths[i]);
paths[i] = cp;
}
}
+/*
+ * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
+ * in the client that support percent expansion.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+default_client_percent_expand(const char *str,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+ return percent_expand(str,
+ DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+ (char *)NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
+ * AND perform environment variable substitution.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+default_client_percent_dollar_expand(const char *str,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ ret = percent_dollar_expand(str,
+ DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+ (char *)NULL);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ fatal("invalid environment variable expansion");
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
* optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
* Returns NULL on failure.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
{
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
- int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ int gaierr;
+ LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
if (port <= 0)
port = default_ssh_port();
+ if (cname != NULL)
+ *cname = '\0';
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if (cname != NULL)
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
__progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return NULL;
}
if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
- error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
- __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
+ error_f("host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+ name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
if (clen > 0)
*cname = '\0';
}
}
return res;
}
/* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */
static int
is_addr_fast(const char *name)
{
return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL ||
strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name));
}
/* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */
static int
is_addr(const char *name)
{
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
if (is_addr_fast(name))
return 1;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port());
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0)
return 0;
if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) {
freeaddrinfo(res);
return 0;
}
freeaddrinfo(res);
return 1;
}
/*
* Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address.
* Returns a canonical address string.
* Returns NULL on failure.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen)
{
char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
int gaierr;
if (port <= 0)
port = default_ssh_port();
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s",
- __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ debug2_f("could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s",
+ name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return NULL;
}
if (res == NULL) {
- debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses",
- __func__, name);
+ debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", name);
return NULL;
}
if (res->ai_next != NULL) {
- debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses",
- __func__, name);
+ debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", name);
goto fail;
}
if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen,
addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
- debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s",
- __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ debug_f("Could not format address for name %.100s: %s",
+ name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
goto fail;
}
if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) {
- error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
- __func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen);
+ error_f("host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+ name, addr, (u_long)clen);
if (clen > 0)
*caddr = '\0';
fail:
freeaddrinfo(res);
return NULL;
}
return res;
}
/*
* Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
* and perform the replacement if it is.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static int
check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname)
{
int i;
struct allowed_cname *rule;
if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 ||
strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
return 0;
if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
return 0;
/*
* Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
* a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so.
*/
if (!direct &&
options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
return 0;
- debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
+ debug3_f("check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 ||
match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1)
continue;
verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
"\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
free(*namep);
*namep = xstrdup(cname);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
* canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
* if no name was found after canonicalization.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
{
int i, direct, ndots;
char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST];
struct addrinfo *addrs;
/*
* Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of
* whether hostname canonicalisation was requested
*/
if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port,
newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) {
- debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp);
+ debug2_f("hostname %.100s is address", *hostp);
if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) {
- debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
- __func__, *hostp, newname);
+ debug2_f("canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+ *hostp, newname);
free(*hostp);
*hostp = xstrdup(newname);
}
return addrs;
}
/*
* If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might
* be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further
* attempts at canonicalisation.
*/
if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) {
- debug("%s: hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address",
- __func__, *hostp);
+ debug_f("hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address", *hostp);
return NULL;
}
if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
return NULL;
/*
* Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
* a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
*/
direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
options.jump_host == NULL;
if (!direct &&
options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
return NULL;
/* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */
if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') {
- debug3("%s: name is fully qualified", __func__);
+ debug3_f("name is fully qualified");
fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL)
goto found;
free(fullhost);
goto notfound;
}
/* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
ndots = 0;
for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (*cp == '.')
ndots++;
}
if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) {
- debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
- __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
+ debug3_f("not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
+ *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
return NULL;
}
/* Attempt each supplied suffix */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
- *newname = '\0';
+ if (strcasecmp(options.canonical_domains[i], "none") == 0)
+ break;
xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
options.canonical_domains[i]);
- debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__,
- *hostp, fullhost);
+ debug3_f("attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) {
free(fullhost);
continue;
}
found:
/* Remove trailing '.' */
fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
/* Follow CNAME if requested */
if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) {
debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
*hostp, fullhost);
}
free(*hostp);
*hostp = fullhost;
return addrs;
}
notfound:
if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
- debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp);
+ debug2_f("host %s not found in any suffix", *hostp);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
* fatal()ing for others.
*/
static void
check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
{
switch (r) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
- fatal("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
/* Ignore missing files */
if (errno == ENOENT)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
- error("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
break;
}
}
/*
* Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config
* file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
*/
static void
-process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int post_canon)
+process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass,
+ int *want_final_pass)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX];
int r;
if (config != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
!read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options,
- SSHCONF_USERCONF | (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0)))
+ SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0),
+ want_final_pass))
fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
"%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
} else {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
&options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
- (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0));
+ (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
/* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw,
host, host_name, &options,
- post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0);
+ final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass);
}
}
/* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */
static void
set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
{
struct addrinfo *addr;
for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) {
switch (addr->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin_port = htons(port);
break;
case AF_INET6:
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin6_port = htons(port);
break;
}
}
}
+static void
+ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+ if (cinfo == NULL)
+ return;
+ free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex);
+ free(cinfo->shorthost);
+ free(cinfo->uidstr);
+ free(cinfo->keyalias);
+ free(cinfo->thishost);
+ free(cinfo->host_arg);
+ free(cinfo->portstr);
+ free(cinfo->remhost);
+ free(cinfo->remuser);
+ free(cinfo->homedir);
+ free(cinfo->locuser);
+ free(cinfo);
+}
+
/*
* Main program for the ssh client.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
- int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0;
- char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *logfile;
- char cname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
+ char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile, *host_arg;
+ char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
extern int optind, optreset;
extern char *optarg;
struct Forward fwd;
struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
- u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t n, len;
+ u_int j;
+ struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo = NULL;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
+ /*
+ * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
+ * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
+ */
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
/* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av));
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_av[i] = NULL;
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_av;
#endif
- /*
- * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
- * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
- */
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ seed_rng();
/* Get user data. */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw) {
logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
exit(255);
}
/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
pw = pwcopy(pw);
/*
* Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
* with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but
* writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
* don't set the modes explicitly.
*/
umask(022);
msetlocale();
/*
* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
* set.
*/
initialize_options(&options);
/*
* Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures
*/
if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't allocate session state");
channel_init_channels(ssh);
- active_state = ssh; /* XXX legacy API compat */
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
host = NULL;
use_syslog = 0;
logfile = NULL;
argv0 = av[0];
again:
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
"AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '1':
fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
/* Ignored */
break;
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'n':
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ options.stdin_null = 1;
break;
case 'f':
- fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ options.fork_after_authentication = 1;
+ options.stdin_null = 1;
break;
case 'x':
options.forward_x11 = 0;
break;
case 'X':
options.forward_x11 = 1;
break;
case 'y':
use_syslog = 1;
break;
case 'E':
logfile = optarg;
break;
case 'G':
config_test = 1;
break;
case 'Y':
options.forward_x11 = 1;
options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
break;
case 'g':
options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1;
break;
case 'O':
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing "
"command with -W");
else if (muxclient_command != 0)
fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY;
else
fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
break;
case 'P': /* deprecated */
break;
case 'Q':
cp = NULL;
- if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0)
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0)
cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0);
else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0)
cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1);
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0)
cp = mac_alg_list('\n');
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0)
+ cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0)
cp = xstrdup("2");
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) {
+ cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0));
+ len = strlen(cp);
+ for (n = 0; n < len; n++)
+ if (cp[n] == ',')
+ cp[n] = '\n';
+ } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
cp = xstrdup(
- "cipher\ncipher-auth\nkex\nkey\n"
- "key-cert\nkey-plain\nmac\n"
+ "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
+ "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
"protocol-version\nsig");
}
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
printf("%s\n", cp);
free(cp);
exit(0);
break;
case 'a':
options.forward_agent = 0;
break;
case 'A':
options.forward_agent = 1;
break;
case 'k':
options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
break;
case 'K':
options.gss_authentication = 1;
options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
break;
case 'i':
p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
- if (stat(p, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
"not accessible: %s.\n", p,
strerror(errno));
else
add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1);
free(p);
break;
case 'I':
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
free(options.pkcs11_provider);
options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg);
#else
fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n");
#endif
break;
case 'J':
- if (options.jump_host != NULL)
- fatal("Only a single -J option permitted");
+ if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
+ fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted "
+ "(use commas to separate multiple "
+ "jump hops)");
+ }
if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand");
if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1)
fatal("Invalid -J argument");
options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
break;
case 't':
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE;
else
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES;
break;
case 'v':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else {
if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
debug_flag++;
options.log_level++;
}
}
break;
case 'V':
if (options.version_addendum &&
*options.version_addendum != '\0')
fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE,
options.version_addendum,
OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING);
else
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE,
OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING);
if (opt == 'V')
exit(0);
break;
case 'w':
if (options.tun_open == -1)
options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'W':
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
fatal("stdio forward already specified");
if (muxclient_command != 0)
fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O");
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host;
options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port;
free(fwd.connect_host);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
- no_shell_flag = 1;
+ options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'e':
if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
(u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
(u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'c':
- if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' ?
+ if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ?
optarg + 1 : optarg)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
free(options.ciphers);
options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'm':
if (mac_valid(optarg)) {
free(options.macs);
options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'M':
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
else
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
break;
case 'p':
if (options.port == -1) {
options.port = a2port(optarg);
if (options.port <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
}
break;
case 'l':
if (options.user == NULL)
options.user = optarg;
break;
case 'L':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'R':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) ||
parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) {
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad remote forwarding specification "
"'%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'D':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
"'%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'C':
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
options.compression = 1;
+#else
+ error("Compression not supported, disabling.");
+#endif
break;
case 'N':
- no_shell_flag = 1;
+ if (options.session_type != -1 &&
+ options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+ fatal("Cannot specify -N with -s/SessionType");
+ options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
break;
case 'T':
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
break;
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_config_line(&options, pw,
host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line,
"command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0)
exit(255);
free(line);
break;
case 's':
- subsystem_flag = 1;
+ if (options.session_type != -1 &&
+ options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM)
+ fatal("Cannot specify -s with -N/SessionType");
+ options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM;
break;
case 'S':
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'b':
options.bind_address = optarg;
break;
case 'B':
options.bind_interface = optarg;
break;
case 'F':
config = optarg;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0)
opt_terminated = 1;
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && !host) {
int tport;
char *tuser;
switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) {
case -1:
usage();
break;
case 0:
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = tuser;
tuser = NULL;
}
free(tuser);
if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
options.port = tport;
break;
default:
p = xstrdup(*av);
cp = strrchr(p, '@');
if (cp != NULL) {
if (cp == p)
usage();
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = p;
p = NULL;
}
*cp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cp);
free(p);
} else
host = p;
break;
}
if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) {
optind = optreset = 1;
goto again;
}
ac--, av++;
}
/* Check that we got a host name. */
if (!host)
usage();
host_arg = xstrdup(host);
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-#endif
-
/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
/*
* Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
* is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
* packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
*/
if (!ac) {
/* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
- if (subsystem_flag) {
+ if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM) {
fprintf(stderr,
"You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
usage();
}
} else {
/* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s",
i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
}
/*
* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
* goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
*/
if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL)
fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E");
if (logfile != NULL)
log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
log_init(argv0,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility,
!use_syslog);
if (debug_flag)
/* version_addendum is always NULL at this point */
logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING);
/* Parse the configuration files */
- process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0);
+ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass);
+ if (want_final_pass)
+ debug("configuration requests final Match pass");
/* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
/* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
if (options.hostname != NULL) {
/* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
"h", host, (char *)NULL);
free(host);
host = cp;
free(options.hostname);
options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
}
/* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */
if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0)
lowercase(host);
/*
* Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the
* hostname is an address.
*/
if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr)
addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
/*
* If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
* other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
* or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
* as a result of CNAME following.
*
* Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
* usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
*
* Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
* has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
* CanonicalizeHostname=always
*/
direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
options.jump_host == NULL;
if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (direct ||
options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port,
direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) {
/* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */
if (direct)
cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */
} else
check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname);
}
/*
* If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration
* files as new stanzas may match.
*/
- if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0) {
- debug("Re-reading configuration after hostname "
- "canonicalisation");
+ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) {
+ debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, "
+ "will re-parse configuration");
+ want_final_pass = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (want_final_pass) {
+ debug("re-parsing configuration");
free(options.hostname);
options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
- process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1);
+ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1, NULL);
/*
* Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation
* enabled and the port number may have changed since, so
* reset it in address list
*/
if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0)
set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port);
}
/* Fill configuration defaults. */
- fill_default_options(&options);
+ if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+
+ if (options.user == NULL)
+ options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
/*
* If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
*/
if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
char port_s[8];
- const char *sshbin = argv0;
+ const char *jumpuser = options.jump_user, *sshbin = argv0;
+ int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
+
+ if (port <= 0)
+ port = default_ssh_port();
+ if (jumpport <= 0)
+ jumpport = default_ssh_port();
+ if (jumpuser == NULL)
+ jumpuser = options.user;
+ if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport &&
+ strcmp(options.user, jumpuser) == 0)
+ fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
/*
* Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
* "ssh" if it appears unavailable.
*/
if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0)
sshbin = "ssh";
/* Consistency check */
if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump");
/* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */
options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
"%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
sshbin,
/* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
/* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */
options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ",
options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s,
/* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */
options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ",
options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra,
/* Optional "-F" argumment if -F specified */
config == NULL ? "" : " -F ",
config == NULL ? "" : config,
/* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */
debug_flag ? " -" : "",
debug_flag, "vvv",
/* Mandatory hostname */
options.jump_host);
debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s",
options.proxy_command);
}
if (options.port == 0)
options.port = default_ssh_port();
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
/* Tidy and check options */
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL)
lowercase(options.host_key_alias);
if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
options.proxy_use_fdpass)
fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
- if (options.control_persist &&
- options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
- debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist; "
- "disabling");
- options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+ if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) {
+ debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+ "ControlPersist; disabling");
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 ||
+ options.remote_command != NULL ||
+ options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) {
+ debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+ "remote command execution; disabling");
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+ /* no point logging anything; user won't see it */
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ }
}
if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL)
fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command.");
/* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 &&
- options.remote_command == NULL && !no_shell_flag)
+ if (options.fork_after_authentication && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 &&
+ options.remote_command == NULL &&
+ options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
"to execute.");
/* reinit */
log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog);
+ for (j = 0; j < options.num_log_verbose; j++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(options.log_verbose[j], "none") == 0)
+ break;
+ log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[j]);
+ }
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES ||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE)
tty_flag = 1;
/* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL)
tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO;
/* Force no tty */
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO ||
(muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY))
tty_flag = 0;
/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
- if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
+ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || options.stdin_null) &&
options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
if (tty_flag)
logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
"stdin is not a terminal.");
tty_flag = 0;
}
- seed_rng();
-
- if (options.user == NULL)
- options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
-
/* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */
+ cinfo = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cinfo));
if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
- strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
- shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
- snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port);
- snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+ cinfo->thishost = xstrdup(thishost);
+ thishost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
+ cinfo->shorthost = xstrdup(thishost);
+ xasprintf(&cinfo->portstr, "%d", options.port);
+ xasprintf(&cinfo->uidstr, "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+ cinfo->keyalias = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias ?
+ options.host_key_alias : host_arg);
+ cinfo->conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(cinfo->thishost, host,
+ cinfo->portstr, options.user);
+ cinfo->host_arg = xstrdup(host_arg);
+ cinfo->remhost = xstrdup(host);
+ cinfo->remuser = xstrdup(options.user);
+ cinfo->homedir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+ cinfo->locuser = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
/* Find canonic host name. */
if (strchr(host, '.') == 0) {
struct addrinfo hints;
struct addrinfo *ai = NULL;
int errgai;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family;
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai);
if (errgai == 0) {
if (ai->ai_canonname != NULL)
host = xstrdup(ai->ai_canonname);
freeaddrinfo(ai);
}
}
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 ||
- ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__);
- ssh_digest_free(md);
- conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
-
/*
* Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later,
* after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local
* tunnel interface name allocated.
*/
if (options.remote_command != NULL) {
debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
cp = options.remote_command;
- options.remote_command = percent_expand(cp,
- "C", conn_hash_hex,
- "L", shorthost,
- "d", pw->pw_dir,
- "h", host,
- "i", uidstr,
- "l", thishost,
- "n", host_arg,
- "p", portstr,
- "r", options.user,
- "u", pw->pw_name,
- (char *)NULL);
+ options.remote_command = default_client_percent_expand(cp,
+ cinfo);
debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command,
strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid());
free(options.control_path);
- options.control_path = percent_expand(cp,
- "C", conn_hash_hex,
- "L", shorthost,
- "h", host,
- "i", uidstr,
- "l", thishost,
- "n", host_arg,
- "p", portstr,
- "r", options.user,
- "u", pw->pw_name,
- "i", uidstr,
- (char *)NULL);
+ options.control_path = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
+ cinfo);
free(cp);
}
+ if (options.identity_agent != NULL) {
+ p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, getuid());
+ cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo);
+ free(p);
+ free(options.identity_agent);
+ options.identity_agent = cp;
+ }
+
+ if (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
+ p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path,
+ getuid());
+ cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo);
+ free(p);
+ free(options.forward_agent_sock_path);
+ options.forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
+ if (stat(options.forward_agent_sock_path, &st) != 0) {
+ error("Cannot forward agent socket path \"%s\": %s",
+ options.forward_agent_sock_path, strerror(errno));
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 0 &&
+ strcasecmp(options.system_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) {
+ if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 1)
+ fatal("Invalid GlobalKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" "
+ "appears with other entries");
+ free(options.system_hostfiles[0]);
+ options.system_hostfiles[0] = NULL;
+ options.num_system_hostfiles = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 0 &&
+ strcasecmp(options.user_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) {
+ if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 1)
+ fatal("Invalid UserKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" "
+ "appears with other entries");
+ free(options.user_hostfiles[0]);
+ options.user_hostfiles[0] = NULL;
+ options.num_user_hostfiles = 0;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < options.num_user_hostfiles; j++) {
+ if (options.user_hostfiles[j] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfiles[j], getuid());
+ p = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ if (strcmp(options.user_hostfiles[j], p) != 0)
+ debug3("expanded UserKnownHostsFile '%s' -> "
+ "'%s'", options.user_hostfiles[j], p);
+ free(options.user_hostfiles[j]);
+ free(cp);
+ options.user_hostfiles[j] = p;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ if (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
+ cp = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path;
+ p = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path =
+ default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+ debug3("expanded LocalForward listen path "
+ "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+ if (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
+ cp = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path;
+ p = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path =
+ default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+ debug3("expanded LocalForward connect path "
+ "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ if (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
+ cp = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path;
+ p = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path =
+ default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+ debug3("expanded RemoteForward listen path "
+ "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+ if (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
+ cp = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path;
+ p = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path =
+ default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+ debug3("expanded RemoteForward connect path "
+ "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+ }
+
if (config_test) {
dump_client_config(&options, host);
exit(0);
}
+ /* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+ strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+ if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) {
+ debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; "
+ "disabling", options.sk_provider);
+ free(options.sk_provider);
+ options.sk_provider = NULL;
+ } else {
+ debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s",
+ options.sk_provider, cp);
+ free(options.sk_provider);
+ options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp);
+ }
+ }
+
if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
int sock;
if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) {
ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock);
- packet_set_mux();
+ ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh);
goto skip_connect;
}
}
/*
* If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
* have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
*/
if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
}
- timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+ if (options.connection_timeout >= INT_MAX/1000)
+ timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+ else
+ timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
- options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
+ if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ options.connection_attempts,
&timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
- exit(255);
+ exit(255);
if (addrs != NULL)
freeaddrinfo(addrs);
- packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
+ ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval,
options.server_alive_count_max);
- ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-
if (timeout_ms > 0)
debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
/*
* If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth
* enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign
* helper to sign challenges.
*/
sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
if (options.hostbased_authentication) {
sensitive_data.nkeys = 10;
sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
sizeof(struct sshkey));
/* XXX check errors? */
#define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
- fatal("%s pubkey out of array bounds", __func__); \
+ fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
p, "pubkey"); \
} while (0)
#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
- fatal("%s cert out of array bounds", __func__); \
+ fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
} while (0)
if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9);
}
}
- /* Create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */
- if (config == NULL) {
- r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
- strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) {
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf);
-#endif
- if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
- error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.",
- buf);
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
-#endif
- }
- }
/* load options.identity_files */
- load_public_identity_files(pw);
+ load_public_identity_files(cinfo);
/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */
if (options.identity_agent &&
strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {
unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
} else {
- p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent,
- getuid());
- cp = percent_expand(p,
- "d", pw->pw_dir,
- "h", host,
- "i", uidstr,
- "l", thishost,
- "r", options.user,
- "u", pw->pw_name,
- (char *)NULL);
- free(p);
- /*
- * If identity_agent represents an environment variable
- * then recheck that it is valid (since processing with
- * percent_expand() may have changed it) and substitute
- * its value.
- */
- if (cp[0] == '$') {
+ cp = options.identity_agent;
+ /* legacy (limited) format */
+ if (cp[0] == '$' && cp[1] != '{') {
if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent "
"environment variable name %s", cp);
}
if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL)
unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
else
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1);
} else {
/* identity_agent specifies a path directly */
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1);
}
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (options.forward_agent && options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
+ cp = options.forward_agent_sock_path;
+ if (cp[0] == '$') {
+ if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
+ fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp);
+ }
+ if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL)
+ forward_agent_sock_path = xstrdup(p);
+ else
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
free(cp);
+ } else {
+ forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
}
}
/* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles,
options.num_system_hostfiles);
tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
/* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */
- ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
- options.port, pw, timeout_ms);
-
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
- } else {
- verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
- }
+ ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
+ options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo);
/* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
/* Destroys contents safely */
debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
}
}
free(sensitive_data.keys);
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
free(options.identity_files[i]);
options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
free(options.certificate_files[i]);
options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ (void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
+#endif
+
skip_connect:
- exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, pw);
- packet_close();
+ exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
+ ssh_conn_info_free(cinfo);
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
/* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */
ssh_kill_proxy_command();
return exit_status;
}
static void
control_persist_detach(void)
{
pid_t pid;
- int devnull, keep_stderr;
- debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__);
+ debug_f("backgrounding master process");
/*
* master (current process) into the background, and make the
* foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
*/
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
- fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
case 0:
/* Child: master process continues mainloop */
break;
default:
- /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */
- debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
- stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag;
+ /* Parent: set up mux client to connect to backgrounded master */
+ debug2_f("background process is %ld", (long)pid);
+ options.stdin_null = ostdin_null_flag;
options.request_tty = orequest_tty;
tty_flag = otty_flag;
+ options.session_type = osession_type;
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
muxclient(options.control_path);
/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
}
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- } else {
- keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag;
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
- dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
- (!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1))
- error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- }
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
daemon(1, 1);
setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
}
/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
static void
fork_postauth(void)
{
if (need_controlpersist_detach)
control_persist_detach();
debug("forking to background");
- fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
- if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+ options.fork_after_authentication = 0;
+ if (daemon(1, 1) == -1)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+}
+
+static void
+forwarding_success(void)
+{
+ if (forward_confirms_pending == -1)
+ return;
+ if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) {
+ debug_f("all expected forwarding replies received");
+ if (options.fork_after_authentication)
+ fork_postauth();
+ } else {
+ debug2_f("%d expected forwarding replies remaining",
+ forward_confirms_pending);
+ }
}
/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
static void
ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
+ u_int port;
+ int r;
/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path :
rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "",
(rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
- rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
- logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
- rfwd->allocated_port,
- rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
- channel_update_permission(ssh,
- rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+ if (port > 65535) {
+ error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote "
+ "forward to %s:%d", port,
+ rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+ /* Ensure failure processing runs below */
+ type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE;
+ channel_update_permission(ssh,
+ rfwd->handle, -1);
+ } else {
+ rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
+ logit("Allocated port %u for remote "
+ "forward to %s:%d",
+ rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host,
+ rfwd->connect_port);
+ channel_update_permission(ssh,
+ rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port);
+ }
} else {
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
}
}
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) {
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
} else {
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
}
}
- if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) {
- debug("All remote forwarding requests processed");
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
- fork_postauth();
- }
+ forwarding_success();
}
static void
client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
debug("stdio forwarding: done");
cleanup_exit(0);
}
static void
ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
if (!success)
fatal("stdio forwarding failed");
}
+static void
+ssh_tun_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+ if (!success) {
+ error("Tunnel forwarding failed");
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ debug_f("tunnel forward established, id=%d", id);
+ forwarding_success();
+}
+
static void
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int in, out;
if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL)
return;
- debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, options.stdio_forward_host,
+ debug3_f("%s:%d", options.stdio_forward_host,
options.stdio_forward_port);
- if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 ||
- (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0)
- fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
+ if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
+ (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
+ fatal_f("dup() in/out failed");
if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
- options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
+ options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
+ CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed");
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
}
+static void
+ssh_init_forward_permissions(struct ssh *ssh, const char *what, char **opens,
+ u_int num_opens)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int port;
+ char *addr, *arg, *oarg, ch;
+ int where = FORWARD_LOCAL;
+
+ channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
+ if (num_opens == 0)
+ return; /* permit any */
+
+ /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
+ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
+ return;
+ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
+ channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
+ oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
+ ch = '\0';
+ addr = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
+ if (addr == NULL || ch == '/')
+ fatal_f("missing host in %s", what);
+ addr = cleanhostname(addr);
+ if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
+ fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what);
+ /* Send it to channels layer */
+ channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
+ where, addr, port);
+ free(oarg);
+ }
+}
+
static void
ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname)
{
int success = 0;
int i;
+ ssh_init_forward_permissions(ssh, "permitremoteopen",
+ options.permitted_remote_opens,
+ options.num_permitted_remote_opens);
+
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ forward_confirms_pending = 0; /* track pending requests */
/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
"address %.200s:%d",
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh,
&options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts);
}
if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
if (i > 0 && success == 0)
error("Could not request local forwarding.");
/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
"local address %.200s:%d",
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
- options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
+ if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh,
- &options.remote_forwards[i]);
- if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) {
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
- fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
- else
- logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
- "forwarding.");
- } else {
+ &options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) {
client_register_global_confirm(
ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
&options.remote_forwards[i]);
- }
+ forward_confirms_pending++;
+ } else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+ else
+ logit("Warning: Could not request remote forwarding.");
}
/* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh,
options.tun_open, options.tun_local,
- options.tun_remote)) == NULL) {
- if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
- fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
- else
- error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
- }
+ options.tun_remote, ssh_tun_confirm, NULL)) != NULL)
+ forward_confirms_pending++;
+ else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+ else
+ error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+ }
+ if (forward_confirms_pending > 0) {
+ debug_f("expecting replies for %d forwards",
+ forward_confirms_pending);
}
}
static void
check_agent_present(void)
{
int r;
if (options.forward_agent) {
/* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) {
options.forward_agent = 0;
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
- debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
- ssh_err(r));
+ debug_r(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket");
}
}
}
static void
ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
extern char **environ;
- const char *display;
- int interactive = tty_flag;
+ const char *display, *term;
+ int r, interactive = tty_flag;
char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
if (!success)
return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display,
options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto,
data, 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
interactive = 1;
}
check_agent_present();
if (options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
}
/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
- packet_set_interactive(interactive,
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
- client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"),
+ if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv,
+ options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0')
+ term = getenv("TERM");
+ client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag,
+ options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM, term,
NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
}
/* open new channel for a session */
static int
ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ if (options.stdin_null) {
in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
} else {
in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
}
out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
- if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
+ if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
- /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
- if (!isatty(in))
- set_nonblock(in);
- if (!isatty(out))
- set_nonblock(out);
- if (!isatty(err))
- set_nonblock(err);
-
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (tty_flag) {
window >>= 1;
packetmax >>= 1;
}
c = channel_new(ssh,
"session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
- "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+ "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);
+ debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
- if (!no_shell_flag)
+ if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
return c->self;
}
static int
-ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw)
+ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
{
- int devnull, id = -1;
+ int r, id = -1;
char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
/* XXX should be pre-session */
if (!options.control_persist)
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname);
if (options.local_command != NULL) {
debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
cp = options.local_command;
options.local_command = percent_expand(cp,
- "C", conn_hash_hex,
- "L", shorthost,
- "d", pw->pw_dir,
- "h", host,
- "i", uidstr,
- "l", thishost,
- "n", host_arg,
- "p", portstr,
- "r", options.user,
- "u", pw->pw_name,
+ DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
"T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname,
(char *)NULL);
debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
free(cp);
}
/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
- if (!packet_get_mux())
+ if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh))
muxserver_listen(ssh);
/*
* If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen
* socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground
- * client attach as a control slave.
+ * client attach as a control client.
* NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
- * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until
+ * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the client until
* after the connection is fully established (in particular,
* async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
*/
if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
- ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag;
- ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag;
+ ostdin_null_flag = options.stdin_null;
+ osession_type = options.session_type;
orequest_tty = options.request_tty;
otty_flag = tty_flag;
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
- no_shell_flag = 1;
+ options.stdin_null = 1;
+ options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
tty_flag = 0;
- if (!fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ if (!options.fork_after_authentication &&
+ (osession_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE ||
+ options.stdio_forward_host != NULL))
need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
- fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
+ options.fork_after_authentication = 1;
}
/*
* ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the
* stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier.
*/
if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1)
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
- if (!no_shell_flag)
+ if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
id = ssh_session2_open(ssh);
else {
- packet_set_interactive(
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh,
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
}
/* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
- (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
+ (ssh->compat & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
- packet_put_char(0);
- packet_send();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+ "no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
}
/* Execute a local command */
if (options.local_command != NULL &&
options.permit_local_command)
ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
/*
* stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here
* so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd.
* NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed,
* as it may want to write to stdout.
*/
- if (!need_controlpersist_detach) {
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1)
- error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
- _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
- fatal("%s: dup2() stdout failed", __func__);
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
- }
+ if (!need_controlpersist_detach && stdfd_devnull(0, 1, 0) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
/*
* If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
* forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
*/
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
+ if (options.fork_after_authentication) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
"confirmation received");
} else
fork_postauth();
}
return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ?
options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
}
/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
static void
-load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw)
+load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
{
char *filename, *cp;
struct sshkey *public;
int i;
u_int n_ids, n_certs;
char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- struct sshkey **keys;
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+ char **comments = NULL;
int nkeys;
#endif /* PKCS11 */
n_ids = n_certs = 0;
memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0,
sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files));
memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates));
memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0,
sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
(pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
(nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
- &keys)) > 0) {
+ &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(comments[i]);
continue;
}
identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
- identity_files[n_ids] =
- xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */
+ identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
n_ids++;
}
free(keys);
+ free(comments);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
free(options.identity_files[i]);
options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
- filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir,
- "u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host,
- "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.identity_files[i]);
identity_files[n_ids] = filename;
identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
continue;
/*
* If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try
* to add the default certificate variant too.
*/
if (options.num_certificate_files != 0)
continue;
xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
public ? public->type : -1);
if (public == NULL) {
free(cp);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
- debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
- __func__, cp, sshkey_type(public));
+ debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+ cp, sshkey_type(public));
sshkey_free(public);
free(cp);
continue;
}
/* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */
identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename);
identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
n_ids++;
}
if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
- fatal("%s: too many certificates", __func__);
+ fatal_f("too many certificates");
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i],
getuid());
- filename = percent_expand(cp,
- "d", pw->pw_dir,
- "h", host,
- "i", uidstr,
- "l", thishost,
- "r", options.user,
- "u", pw->pw_name,
- (char *)NULL);
+ filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
filename, "certificate");
debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.certificate_files[i]);
options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
if (public == NULL) {
free(filename);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
- debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
- __func__, filename, sshkey_type(public));
+ debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+ filename, sshkey_type(public));
sshkey_free(public);
free(filename);
continue;
}
certificate_files[n_certs] = filename;
certificates[n_certs] = public;
certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] =
options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
++n_certs;
}
options.num_identity_files = n_ids;
memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided,
identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
options.num_certificate_files = n_certs;
memcpy(options.certificate_files,
certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files));
memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates));
memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided,
certificate_file_userprovided,
sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
}
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
- (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+ (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
;
errno = save_errno;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
index 5abfd7a688fe..8110c060287f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
@@ -1,95 +1,104 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.88 2018/06/06 18:29:18 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.90 2020/07/14 23:57:01 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES
/* Default port number. */
#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22
/*
* Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified
* in configuration files or on the command line.
*/
#define SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES 100
/*
* Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
* in configuration files or on the command line.
*/
#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100
/*
* Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatibility
* that prevents communication.
*
* Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility
* that does not prevent interoperation.
*/
#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1
#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5
/* We support only SSH2 */
#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2
#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0
/*
* Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the
* default port if present.
*/
#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh"
/*
* Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
* authentication agent.
*/
#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID"
/*
* Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
* authentication socket.
*/
#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
/*
* Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass
*/
#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS"
+/*
+ * Environment variable to control whether or not askpass is used.
+ */
+#define SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE"
+
/*
* Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this
* many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work.
*/
#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128
/*
* Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the
* protocol.)
*/
#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32
/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2
/*
* unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes;
* sshd will change its privileges to this user and its
* primary group.
*/
#ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd"
#endif
/* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
#define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128
+
+/* Limits for banner exchange */
+#define SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN 8192
+#define SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES 1024
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
index f2e37c96aa26..32ddae89b33b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
@@ -1,174 +1,174 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.18 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.19 2020/11/19 23:05:05 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
- * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt
+ * RFC4251:
*
* Transport layer protocol:
*
* 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,
* etc)
* 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
* 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
* different authentication methods)
*
* User authentication protocol:
*
* 50-59 User authentication generic
* 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused
* for different authentication methods)
*
* Connection protocol:
*
* 80-89 Connection protocol generic
* 90-127 Channel related messages
*
* Reserved for client protocols:
*
* 128-191 Reserved
*
* Local extensions:
*
* 192-255 Local extensions
*/
/* special marker for no message */
#define SSH_MSG_NONE 0
/* ranges */
#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN 1
#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX 49
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN 50
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX 79
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN 60
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX
#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN 80
#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX 127
#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN 128
#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX 191
#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN 192
#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX 255
#define SSH2_MSG_MIN 1
#define SSH2_MSG_MAX 255
/* transport layer: generic */
#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1
#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2
#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3
#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4
#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5
#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6
#define SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO 7
/* transport layer: alg negotiation */
#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20
#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21
/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */
#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30
#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31
/* dh-group-exchange */
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34
/* ecdh */
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 30
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 31
/* user authentication: generic */
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53
/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61
/* connection protocol: generic */
#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80
#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81
#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82
/* channel related messages */
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99
#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100
/* disconnect reason code */
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14
#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15
/* misc */
#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1
#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2
#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3
#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4
#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1
/* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */
#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c
index c84b4e713bf4..d3c6617616bd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c
@@ -1,540 +1,570 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.8 2017/04/30 23:13:25 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.27 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
#include <string.h>
int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *);
-int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, char **);
-int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, char **);
+int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *);
int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
-int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
- u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+ u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
/*
* stubs for the server side implementation of kex.
* disable privsep so our stubs will never be called.
*/
int use_privsep = 0;
int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *,
- u_char *, u_int, char *, u_int);
-DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ const u_char *, u_int, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int);
-/* Define these two variables here so that they are part of the library */
-u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+#endif
int
mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *alg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
return (-1);
}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
return (NULL);
}
+#endif
/* API */
int
ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
{
- char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
struct ssh *ssh;
char **proposal;
static int called;
int r;
if (!called) {
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ seed_rng();
called = 1;
}
if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (is_server)
ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
/* Initialize key exchange */
proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal;
- if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0) {
ssh_free(ssh);
return r;
}
ssh->kex->server = is_server;
if (is_server) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key;
ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key;
ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign;
} else {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key;
}
*sshp = ssh;
return 0;
}
void
ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
- ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+ if (ssh == NULL)
+ return;
+
/*
* we've only created the public keys variants in case we
* are a acting as a server.
*/
while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server)
sshkey_free(k->key);
free(k);
}
while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next);
free(k);
}
- if (ssh->kex)
- kex_free(ssh->kex);
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
free(ssh);
}
void
ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data)
{
ssh->app_data = app_data;
}
void *
ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->app_data;
}
/* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */
int
ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL;
int r;
if (ssh->kex->server) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
return r;
if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL ||
(k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) {
free(k);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
k_prv->key = key;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next);
/* add the public key, too */
k->key = pubkey;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
r = 0;
} else {
if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
k->key = key;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
r = 0;
}
return r;
}
int
ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *))
{
if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len);
}
int
ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
{
int r;
u_int32_t seqnr;
u_char type;
/*
* Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not
* enough data.
*/
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
- if (ssh->kex->client_version_string == NULL ||
- ssh->kex->server_version_string == NULL)
+ if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0 ||
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh);
/*
* If we enough data and a dispatch function then
* call the function and get the next packet.
* Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it
* can decide how to go on.
*
* We will only call the dispatch function for:
* 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
* 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
* different authentication methods)
*/
for (;;) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
*typep = type;
return 0;
}
}
}
const u_char *
ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp);
}
int
ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
const u_char *
ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len)
{
struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh);
*len = sshbuf_len(output);
return sshbuf_ptr(output);
}
int
ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len);
}
int
ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len));
}
int
ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len));
}
/* Read other side's version identification. */
int
-_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp)
+_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
{
- struct sshbuf *input;
- const char *s;
- char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
+ struct sshbuf *input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh);
const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n";
- int r, remote_major, remote_minor;
- size_t i, n, j, len;
+ const u_char *s = sshbuf_ptr(input);
+ u_char c;
+ char *cp = NULL, *remote_version = NULL;
+ int r = 0, remote_major, remote_minor, expect_nl;
+ size_t n, j;
- *bannerp = NULL;
- input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh);
- len = sshbuf_len(input);
- s = (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(input);
for (j = n = 0;;) {
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (j >= len)
- return (0);
- buf[i] = s[j++];
- if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = '\n';
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
- continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
+ sshbuf_reset(banner);
+ expect_nl = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (j >= sshbuf_len(input))
+ return 0; /* insufficient data in input buf */
+ c = s[j++];
+ if (c == '\r') {
+ expect_nl = 1;
+ continue;
}
- if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ if (c == '\n')
break;
- }
+ if (expect_nl)
+ goto bad;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(banner, c)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (sshbuf_len(banner) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN)
+ goto bad;
}
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
- if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+ if (sshbuf_len(banner) >= 4 &&
+ memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(banner), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
- debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
- if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > 65536) {
+ debug_f("%.*s", (int)sshbuf_len(banner),
+ sshbuf_ptr(banner));
+ /* Accept lines before banner only on client */
+ if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
+ bad:
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh),
- mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0)
+ mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0)
return r;
+ /* XXX remote version must be the same size as banner for sscanf */
+ if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL ||
+ (remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(banner))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
- if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
- &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (sscanf(cp, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
- ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) {
remote_major = 2;
remote_minor = 0;
}
if (remote_major != 2)
- return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH;
- chop(buf);
- debug("Remote version string %.100s", buf);
- if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- return 0;
+ r = SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH;
+
+ debug("Remote version string %.100s", cp);
+ out:
+ free(cp);
+ free(remote_version);
+ return r;
}
/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
int
-_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp)
+_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
{
- char buf[256];
+ char *cp;
int r;
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), buf, strlen(buf))) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Remove trailing \r\n */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(banner, 2)) != 0)
return r;
- chop(buf);
- debug("Local version string %.100s", buf);
- if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL)
+ if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ debug("Local version string %.100s", cp);
+ free(cp);
return 0;
}
int
_ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
/*
* if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string
* it will return NULL and we end up calling it again.
*/
r = 0;
if (kex->server) {
- if (kex->server_version_string == NULL)
- r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string);
+ if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
+ r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
if (r == 0 &&
- kex->server_version_string != NULL &&
- kex->client_version_string == NULL)
- r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string);
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
+ r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
} else {
- if (kex->server_version_string == NULL)
- r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string);
+ if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
+ r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
if (r == 0 &&
- kex->server_version_string != NULL &&
- kex->client_version_string == NULL)
- r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string);
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
+ r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
}
if (r != 0)
return r;
/* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */
- if (kex->server_version_string != NULL &&
- kex->client_version_string != NULL) {
+ if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
+ sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) != 0) {
if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
struct sshkey *
_ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
- debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("need %d", type);
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
- debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
+ debug3_f("check %s", sshkey_type(k->key));
if (k->key->type == type &&
(type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
return (k->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
struct sshkey *
_ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
- debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
+ debug3_f("need %d", type);
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) {
- debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
+ debug3_f("check %s", sshkey_type(k->key));
if (k->key->type == type &&
(type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
return (k->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
int
_ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
- debug3("%s: need %s", __func__, sshkey_type(hostkey));
+ debug3_f("need %s", sshkey_type(hostkey));
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
- debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
+ debug3_f("check %s", sshkey_type(k->key));
if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key))
return (0); /* ok */
}
return (-1); /* failed */
}
/* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */
int
_ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL;
char **proposal;
size_t maxlen;
int ktype, r;
/* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0)
return r;
orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
*replace = '\0';
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
continue;
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
if (k->key->type == ktype ||
(sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type ==
sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) {
if (*replace != '\0')
strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen);
strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen);
break;
}
}
}
if (*replace != '\0') {
- debug2("%s: orig/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, orig);
- debug2("%s: replace/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, replace);
+ debug2_f("orig/%d %s", ssh->kex->server, orig);
+ debug2_f("replace/%d %s", ssh->kex->server, replace);
free(orig);
proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace;
replace = NULL; /* owned by proposal */
r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal);
}
out:
free(oavail);
free(replace);
kex_prop_free(proposal);
return r;
}
int
-_ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey,
- u_char **signature, size_t *slen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
- const char *alg, u_int compat)
+_ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
+ struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
{
- return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, alg, compat);
+ return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen,
+ alg, NULL, NULL, ssh->compat);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
index e7d969abed25..d2a1db35d42e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@@ -1,49 +1,49 @@
-# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.33 2017/05/07 23:12:57 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.35 2020/07/17 03:43:42 dtucker Exp $
# $FreeBSD$
# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See
# ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for
# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files
# or on the command line.
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive
# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
# ssh_config(5) man page.
# Host *
# ForwardAgent no
# ForwardX11 no
# PasswordAuthentication yes
# HostbasedAuthentication no
# GSSAPIAuthentication no
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
# BatchMode no
# CheckHostIP no
# AddressFamily any
# ConnectTimeout 0
# StrictHostKeyChecking ask
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
# Port 22
-# Protocol 2
# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com
# EscapeChar ~
# Tunnel no
# TunnelDevice any:any
# PermitLocalCommand no
# VisualHostKey no
# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
# RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+# UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
# VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
-# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20200214
+# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20210907
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
index e8b52f309b50..3ca36e231c0d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
@@ -1,1823 +1,2184 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.286 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.362 2021/08/12 23:59:25 djm Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 3 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 12 2021 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh_config
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
+.Nd OpenSSH client configuration file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Xr ssh 1
obtains configuration data from the following sources in
the following order:
.Pp
.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
.It
command-line options
.It
user's configuration file
.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
.It
system-wide configuration file
.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
.El
.Pp
For each parameter, the first obtained value
will be used.
The configuration files contain sections separated by
.Cm Host
specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
match one of the patterns given in the specification.
The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line
(see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option for exceptions).
.Pp
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
file, and general defaults at the end.
.Pp
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
.Pq \&"
in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
optional whitespace and exactly one
.Ql = ;
the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
when specifying configuration options using the
.Nm ssh ,
.Nm scp ,
and
.Nm sftp
.Fl o
option.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm Host
Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
.Cm Host
or
.Cm Match
keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
given after the keyword.
If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
A single
.Ql *
as a pattern can be used to provide global
defaults for all hosts.
The host is usually the
.Ar hostname
argument given on the command line
(see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
keyword for exceptions).
.Pp
A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
If a negated entry is matched, then the
.Cm Host
entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line
match.
Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard
matches.
.Pp
See
.Sx PATTERNS
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm Match
Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
.Cm Host
or
.Cm Match
keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
.Cm Match
keyword are satisfied.
Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria
or the single token
.Cm all
which always matches.
The available criteria keywords are:
.Cm canonical ,
+.Cm final ,
.Cm exec ,
.Cm host ,
.Cm originalhost ,
.Cm user ,
and
.Cm localuser .
The
.Cm all
criteria must appear alone or immediately after
-.Cm canonical .
+.Cm canonical
+or
+.Cm final .
Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily.
All criteria but
-.Cm all
+.Cm all ,
+.Cm canonical ,
and
-.Cm canonical
+.Cm final
require an argument.
Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
.Pp
The
.Cm canonical
keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed
after hostname canonicalization (see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
-option.)
+option).
This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host
names only.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm final
+keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled), and matches only during this final pass.
+If
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled, then
+.Cm canonical
+and
+.Cm final
+match during the same pass.
+.Pp
The
.Cm exec
keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true.
Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted.
Arguments to
.Cm exec
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated
lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
.Sx PATTERNS
section.
The criteria for the
.Cm host
keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution
by the
.Cm Hostname
or
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
options.
The
.Cm originalhost
keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line.
The
.Cm user
keyword matches against the target username on the remote host.
The
.Cm localuser
keyword matches against the name of the local user running
.Xr ssh 1
(this keyword may be useful in system-wide
.Nm
files).
.It Cm AddKeysToAgent
Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm yes
and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to
the agent with the default lifetime, as if by
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm ask ,
.Xr ssh 1
will require confirmation using the
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
program before adding a key (see
.Xr ssh-add 1
for details).
If this option is set to
.Cm confirm ,
each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the
.Fl c
option was specified to
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm no ,
no keys are added to the agent.
+Alternately, this option may be specified as a time interval
+using the format described in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+to specify the key's lifetime in
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+after which it will automatically be removed.
The argument must be
-.Cm yes ,
-.Cm confirm ,
-.Cm ask ,
-or
.Cm no
-(the default).
+(the default),
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm confirm
+(optionally followed by a time interval),
+.Cm ask
+or a time interval.
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
Valid arguments are
.Cm any
(the default),
.Cm inet
(use IPv4 only), or
.Cm inet6
(use IPv6 only).
.It Cm BatchMode
If set to
.Cm yes ,
-passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests
+will be disabled.
This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
-is present to supply the password.
+is present to interact with
+.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm BindAddress
Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
the connection.
Only useful on systems with more than one address.
.It Cm BindInterface
Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the
source address of the connection.
.It Cm CanonicalDomains
When
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to
search for the specified destination host.
.It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails.
The default,
.Cm yes ,
will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
search rules.
A value of
.Cm no
will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to fail instantly if
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains
specified by
.Cm CanonicalDomains .
.It Cm CanonicalizeHostname
Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
The default,
.Cm no ,
is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all
hostname lookups.
If set to
.Cm yes
then, for connections that do not use a
.Cm ProxyCommand
or
.Cm ProxyJump ,
.Xr ssh 1
will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line
using the
.Cm CanonicalDomains
suffixes and
.Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
rules.
If
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is set to
.Cm always ,
then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too.
.Pp
If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed
again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching
.Cm Host
and
.Cm Match
stanzas.
+A value of
+.Cm none
+disables the use of a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+host.
.It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots
Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before
canonicalization is disabled.
The default, 1,
allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
.It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when
canonicalizing hostnames.
The rules consist of one or more arguments of
.Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list ,
where
.Ar source_domain_list
is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization,
and
.Ar target_domain_list
is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to.
.Pp
For example,
.Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com
will allow hostnames matching
.Qq *.a.example.com
to be canonicalized to names in the
.Qq *.b.example.com
or
.Qq *.c.example.com
domains.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
.Ed
.Pp
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
.Xr ssh 1
will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
specified.
.It Cm CertificateFile
Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
to use this certificate either
from an
.Cm IdentityFile
directive or
.Fl i
flag to
.Xr ssh 1 ,
via
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
or via a
-.Cm PKCS11Provider .
+.Cm PKCS11Provider
+or
+.Cm SecurityKeyProvider .
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm CertificateFile
-may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
-or the tokens described in the
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
.Pp
It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence.
Multiple
.Cm CertificateFile
directives will add to the list of certificates used for
authentication.
-.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
-The argument to this keyword must be
-.Cm yes
-(the default)
-or
-.Cm no .
.It Cm CheckHostIP
If set to
.Cm yes ,
.Xr ssh 1
will additionally check the host IP address in the
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing
and will add addresses of destination hosts to
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the process, regardless of the setting of
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking .
If the option is set to
-.Cm no ,
+.Cm no
+(the default),
the check will not be executed.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
cleared.
This option is primarily useful when used from the
.Xr ssh 1
command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by
.Xr scp 1
and
.Xr sftp 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm Compression
Specifies whether to use compression.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
The argument must be an integer.
This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
The default is 1.
.It Cm ConnectTimeout
Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
-This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable,
-not when it refuses the connection.
+This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing
+the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange.
.It Cm ControlMaster
Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
When set to
.Cm yes ,
.Xr ssh 1
will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
.Cm ControlPath
argument.
Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
.Cm ControlPath
with
.Cm ControlMaster
set to
.Cm no
(the default).
These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection
rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally
if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
.Pp
Setting this to
.Cm ask
will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
If the
.Cm ControlPath
cannot be opened,
.Xr ssh 1
will continue without connecting to a master instance.
.Pp
X11 and
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master
connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
.Pp
Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
exist.
These options are:
.Cm auto
and
.Cm autoask .
The latter requires confirmation like the
.Cm ask
option.
.It Cm ControlPath
Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
in the
.Cm ControlMaster
section above or the string
.Cm none
to disable connection sharing.
Arguments to
.Cm ControlPath
-may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
-or the tokens described in the
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
It is recommended that any
.Cm ControlPath
used for opportunistic connection sharing include
at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory
that is not writable by other users.
This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
.It Cm ControlPersist
When used in conjunction with
.Cm ControlMaster ,
specifies that the master connection should remain open
in the background (waiting for future client connections)
after the initial client connection has been closed.
If set to
-.Cm no ,
+.Cm no
+(the default),
then the master connection will not be placed into the background,
and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
If set to
.Cm yes
or 0,
then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely
(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
.Qq ssh -O exit ) .
If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate
after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
specified time.
.It Cm DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
remote machine.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
.Sm on
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Cm localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
.Xr ssh 1
will act as a SOCKS server.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
Setting this option to
.Cm yes
in the global client configuration file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
enables the use of the helper program
.Xr ssh-keysign 8
during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
See
.Xr ssh-keysign 8
for more information.
.It Cm EscapeChar
Sets the escape character (default:
.Ql ~ ) .
The escape character can also
be set on the command line.
The argument should be a single character,
.Ql ^
followed by a letter, or
.Cm none
to disable the escape
character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
data).
.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh 1
should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\&
if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port).
Note that
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
for example, cause
.Xr ssh 1
to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Cm md5
and
.Cm sha256
(the default).
+.It Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+Requests
+.Nm ssh
+to go to background just before command execution.
+This is useful if
+.Nm ssh
+is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
+wants it in the background.
+This implies the
+.Cm StdinNull
+configuration option being set to
+.Dq yes .
+The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
+something like
+.Ic ssh -f host xterm ,
+which is the same as
+.Ic ssh host xterm
+if the
+.Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+configuration option is set to
+.Dq yes .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+configuration option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+then a client started with the
+.Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+configuration option being set to
+.Dq yes
+will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
+before placing itself in the background.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+(same as the
+.Fl f
+option) or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
.It Cm ForwardAgent
Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
will be forwarded to the remote machine.
-The argument must be
-.Cm yes
-or
+The argument may be
+.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
-(the default).
+(the default),
+an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable
+(beginning with
+.Sq $ )
+in which to find the path.
.Pp
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
.It Cm ForwardX11
Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
over the secure channel and
.Ev DISPLAY
set.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.Pp
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the user's X11 authorization database)
can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
if the
.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
option is also enabled.
.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout
Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding
using the format described in the
.Sx TIME FORMATS
section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
X11 connections received by
.Xr ssh 1
after this time will be refused.
Setting
.Cm ForwardX11Timeout
to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life
of the connection.
The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has
elapsed.
.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to
.Cm yes ,
remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no
(the default),
remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
clients.
Furthermore, the
.Xr xauth 1
token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
.Pp
See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports.
By default,
.Xr ssh 1
binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that ssh
should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the global
host key database, separated by whitespace.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 .
.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Xr ssh 1
should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
These hashed names may be used normally by
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8 ,
-but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
-be disclosed.
+but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the
+file's contents are disclosed.
The default is
.Cm no .
Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
will not be converted automatically,
but may be manually hashed using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
-authentication.
-The argument must be
-.Cm yes
-or
-.Cm no
-(the default).
-.It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes
-Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication
-as a comma-separated list of patterns.
-Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
+authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
+to the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
-character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+at the head of the default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl Q
option of
.Xr ssh 1
-may be used to list supported key types.
+may be used to list supported signature algorithms.
+This was formerly named HostbasedKeyTypes.
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-Specifies the host key algorithms
+Specifies the host key signature algorithms
that the client wants to use in order of preference.
-Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
-character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+at the head of the default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
to prefer their algorithms.
.Pp
-The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
.It Cm HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
real host name when looking up or saving the host key
in the host key database files and when validating host certificates.
This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
or for multiple servers running on a single host.
-.It Cm HostName
+.It Cm Hostname
Specifies the real host name to log into.
This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
Arguments to
-.Cm HostName
+.Cm Hostname
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
-.Cm HostName
+.Cm Hostname
specifications).
The default is the name given on the command line.
.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
Specifies that
.Xr ssh 1
-should only use the authentication identity and certificate files explicitly
-configured in the
+should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files
+(either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the
.Nm
files
or passed on the
.Xr ssh 1
-command-line,
+command-line),
even if
.Xr ssh-agent 1
or a
.Cm PKCS11Provider
+or
+.Cm SecurityKeyProvider
offers more identities.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
offers many different identities.
.It Cm IdentityAgent
Specifies the
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the authentication agent.
.Pp
This option overrides the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent.
Setting the socket name to
.Cm none
disables the use of an authentication agent.
If the string
.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
Otherwise if the specified value begins with a
.Sq $
character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
the location of the socket.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm IdentityAgent
-may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
-or the tokens described in the
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
section.
.It Cm IdentityFile
-Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication
-identity is read.
+Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA,
+Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
will be used for authentication unless
.Cm IdentitiesOnly
is set.
If no certificates have been explicitly specified by
.Cm CertificateFile ,
.Xr ssh 1
will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by
appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to the path of a specified
.Cm IdentityFile .
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm IdentityFile
may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
or the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
It is possible to have
multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
identities will be tried in sequence.
Multiple
.Cm IdentityFile
directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour
differs from that of other configuration directives).
.Pp
.Cm IdentityFile
may be used in conjunction with
.Cm IdentitiesOnly
to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication.
.Cm IdentityFile
may also be used in conjunction with
.Cm CertificateFile
in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
the identity.
.It Cm IgnoreUnknown
Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
encountered in configuration parsing.
This may be used to suppress errors if
.Nm
contains options that are unrecognised by
.Xr ssh 1 .
It is recommended that
.Cm IgnoreUnknown
be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
to unknown options that appear before it.
.It Cm Include
Include the specified configuration file(s).
Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
.Xr glob 7
wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like
.Sq ~
references to user home directories.
+Wildcards will be expanded and processed in lexical order.
Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
.Pa ~/.ssh
if included in a user configuration file or
.Pa /etc/ssh
if included from the system configuration file.
.Cm Include
directive may appear inside a
.Cm Match
or
.Cm Host
block
to perform conditional inclusion.
.It Cm IPQoS
Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
Accepted values are
.Cm af11 ,
.Cm af12 ,
.Cm af13 ,
.Cm af21 ,
.Cm af22 ,
.Cm af23 ,
.Cm af31 ,
.Cm af32 ,
.Cm af33 ,
.Cm af41 ,
.Cm af42 ,
.Cm af43 ,
.Cm cs0 ,
.Cm cs1 ,
.Cm cs2 ,
.Cm cs3 ,
.Cm cs4 ,
.Cm cs5 ,
.Cm cs6 ,
.Cm cs7 ,
.Cm ef ,
+.Cm le ,
.Cm lowdelay ,
.Cm throughput ,
.Cm reliability ,
a numeric value, or
.Cm none
to use the operating system default.
This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
The default is
.Cm af21
(Low-Latency Data)
for interactive sessions and
.Cm cs1
(Lower Effort)
for non-interactive sessions.
.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+is a deprecated alias for this.
.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
The default is to use the server specified list.
The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
For an OpenSSH server,
it may be zero or more of:
.Cm bsdauth
and
.Cm pam .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q kex .
+.It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+Specifies a command to use to obtain a list of host keys, in addition to
+those listed in
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+and
+.Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile .
+This command is executed after the files have been read.
+It may write host key lines to standard output in identical format to the
+usual files (described in the
+.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+section in
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+Arguments to
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+The command may be invoked multiple times per connection: once when preparing
+the preference list of host key algorithms to use, again to obtain the
+host key for the requested host name and, if
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is enabled, one more time to obtain the host key matching the server's
+address.
+If the command exits abnormally or returns a non-zero exit status then the
+connection is terminated.
.It Cm LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
Arguments to
.Cm LocalCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
session of the
.Xr ssh 1
that spawned it.
It should not be used for interactive commands.
.Pp
This directive is ignored unless
.Cm PermitLocalCommand
has been enabled.
.It Cm LocalForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
-The first argument must be
+The first argument specifies the listener and may be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
-and the second argument must be
-.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
+or a Unix domain socket path.
+The second argument is the destination and may be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
+or a Unix domain socket path if the remote host supports it.
+.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
given on the command line.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Cm localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+.It Cm LogVerbose
+Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel.
+An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function
+and line number to force detailed logging for.
+For example, an override pattern of:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:*
+.Ed
+.Pp
+would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of
+.Pa kex.c ,
+everything in the
+.Fn kex_exchange_identification
+function, and all code in the
+.Pa packet.c
+file.
+This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
in order of preference.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
These are considered safer and their use recommended.
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
The default is 3.
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether to use password authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm PermitLocalCommand
Allow local command execution via the
.Ic LocalCommand
option or using the
.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
escape sequence in
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
+.It Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+Specifies the destinations to which remote TCP port forwarding is permitted when
+.Cm RemoteForward
+is used as a SOCKS proxy.
+The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_addr : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Cm any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
+An argument of
+.Cm none
+can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
+The wildcard
+.Sq *
+can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively.
+Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied
+names.
.It Cm PKCS11Provider
-Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use.
-The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library
+Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or
+.Cm none
+to indicate that no provider should be used (the default).
+The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library
.Xr ssh 1
-should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's
-private RSA key.
+should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
+authentication.
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
The default is 22.
.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods.
This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
.Cm keyboard-interactive )
over another method (e.g.\&
.Cm password ) .
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
keyboard-interactive,password
.Ed
.It Cm ProxyCommand
Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
The command
string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
using the user's shell
.Ql exec
directive to avoid a lingering shell process.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm ProxyCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
The command can be basically anything,
and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
It should eventually connect an
.Xr sshd 8
server running on some machine, or execute
.Ic sshd -i
somewhere.
Host key management will be done using the
-HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by
-the user).
+.Cm Hostname
+of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user).
Setting the command to
.Cm none
disables this option entirely.
Note that
.Cm CheckHostIP
is not available for connects with a proxy command.
.Pp
This directive is useful in conjunction with
.Xr nc 1
and its proxy support.
For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
192.0.2.0:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
.Ed
.It Cm ProxyJump
Specifies one or more jump proxies as either
.Xo
.Sm off
.Op Ar user No @
.Ar host
.Op : Ns Ar port
.Sm on
or an ssh URI
.Xc .
Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited
sequentially.
Setting this option will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to connect to the target host by first making a
.Xr ssh 1
connection to the specified
.Cm ProxyJump
host and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
+Setting the host to
+.Cm none
+disables this option entirely.
.Pp
Note that this option will compete with the
.Cm ProxyCommand
option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
other from taking effect.
+.Pp
+Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied
+via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied
+to jump hosts.
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config
+should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts.
.It Cm ProxyUseFdpass
Specifies that
.Cm ProxyCommand
will pass a connected file descriptor back to
.Xr ssh 1
instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
The default is
.Cm no .
-.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
-as a comma-separated list of patterns.
-Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
+authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
instead of replacing it.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
-character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
-The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
-session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
+session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum amount of
time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
.Sq K ,
.Sq M ,
or
.Sq G
to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
The default is between
.Sq 1G
and
.Sq 4G ,
depending on the cipher.
The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
-units documented in the
-.Sx TIME FORMATS
-section of
+units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
The default value for
.Cm RekeyLimit
is
.Cm default none ,
which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
.It Cm RemoteCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
Arguments to
.Cm RemoteCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.It Cm RemoteForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
the secure channel.
The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port
from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote
client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine.
-The first argument must be
+The first argument is the listening specification and may be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
+or, if the remote host supports it, a Unix domain socket path.
If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be
-.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport ,
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
+or a Unix domain socket path,
otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding
will be established as a SOCKS proxy.
+When acting as a SOCKS proxy the destination of the connection can be
+restricted by
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen .
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
forwardings can be given on the command line.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine.
+Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
.Pp
If the
.Ar port
argument is 0,
the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
to the client at run time.
.Pp
If the
.Ar bind_address
is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
If the
.Ar bind_address
is
.Ql *
or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
interfaces.
Specifying a remote
.Ar bind_address
will only succeed if the server's
.Cm GatewayPorts
option is enabled (see
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
.It Cm RequestTTY
Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.
The argument may be one of:
.Cm no
(never request a TTY),
.Cm yes
(always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY),
.Cm force
(always request a TTY) or
.Cm auto
(request a TTY when opening a login session).
This option mirrors the
.Fl t
and
.Fl T
flags for
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm RevokedHostKeys
Specifies revoked host public keys.
Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable,
then host authentication will be refused for all hosts.
Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.Pp
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq $
+character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
+the path to the library.
.It Cm SendEnv
Specifies what variables from the local
.Xr environ 7
should be sent to the server.
The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
accept these environment variables.
Note that the
.Ev TERM
environment variable is always sent whenever a
pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
Refer to
.Cm AcceptEnv
in
.Xr sshd_config 5
for how to configure the server.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
across multiple
.Cm SendEnv
directives.
.Pp
See
.Sx PATTERNS
for more information on patterns.
.Pp
It is possible to clear previously set
.Cm SendEnv
variable names by prefixing patterns with
.Pa - .
The default is not to send any environment variables.
.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without
.Xr ssh 1
receiving any messages back from the server.
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
(below).
The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
and therefore will not be spoofable.
The TCP keepalive option enabled by
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
is spoofable.
The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
-server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
.Pp
The default value is 3.
If, for example,
.Cm ServerAliveInterval
(see below) is set to 15 and
.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the server,
.Xr ssh 1
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the server.
The default
is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
+.It Cm SessionType
+May be used to either request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system,
+or to prevent the execution of a remote command at all.
+The latter is useful for just forwarding ports.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm none
+(same as the
+.Fl N
+option),
+.Cm subsystem
+(same as the
+.Fl s
+option) or
+.Cm default
+(shell or command execution).
.It Cm SetEnv
Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to
be sent to the server.
Similarly to
.Cm SendEnv ,
-the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable.
+with the exception of the
+.Ev TERM
+variable, the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable.
+.It Cm StdinNull
+Redirects stdin from
+.Pa /dev/null
+(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
+Either this or the equivalent
+.Fl n
+option must be used when
+.Nm ssh
+is run in the background.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+(same as the
+.Fl n
+option) or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask
.Pq umask
used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
readable and writable only by the owner.
Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
is not enabled,
.Nm ssh
will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
If this flag is set to
.Cm yes ,
.Xr ssh 1
will never automatically add host keys to the
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
though it can be annoying when the
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
frequently made.
This option forces the user to manually
add all new hosts.
.Pp
If this flag is set to
.Dq accept-new
-then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user
-known hosts files, but will not permit connections to hosts with
+then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user's
+.Pa known_hosts
+file, but will not permit connections to hosts with
changed host keys.
If this flag is set to
.Dq no
or
.Dq off ,
ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files
and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed,
subject to some restrictions.
If this flag is set to
.Cm ask
(the default),
new host keys
will be added to the user known host files only after the user
has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
The host keys of
known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is USER.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
other side.
If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
of the machines will be properly noticed.
However, this means that
connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
find it annoying.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm yes
(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice
if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
.Pp
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
.Cm no .
See also
.Cm ServerAliveInterval
for protocol-level keepalives.
.It Cm Tunnel
Request
.Xr tun 4
device forwarding between the client and the server.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm point-to-point
(layer 3),
.Cm ethernet
(layer 2),
or
.Cm no
(the default).
Specifying
.Cm yes
requests the default tunnel mode, which is
.Cm point-to-point .
.It Cm TunnelDevice
Specifies the
.Xr tun 4
devices to open on the client
.Pq Ar local_tun
and the server
.Pq Ar remote_tun .
.Pp
The argument must be
.Sm off
.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
.Sm on
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
.Cm any ,
which uses the next available tunnel device.
If
.Ar remote_tun
is not specified, it defaults to
.Cm any .
The default is
.Cm any:any .
.It Cm UpdateHostKeys
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh 1
should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent
after authentication has completed and add them to
.Cm UserKnownHostsFile .
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
-(the default) or
+or
.Cm ask .
-Enabling this option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server
+This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server
and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement
public keys before old ones are removed.
+.Pp
Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the
-host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user.
+host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user, the host was
+authenticated via
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+(i.e. not
+.Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile )
+and the host was authenticated using a plain key and not a certificate.
+.Pp
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+setting and has not enabled
+.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS ,
+otherwise
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+will be set to
+.Cm no .
+.Pp
If
.Cm UpdateHostKeys
is set to
.Cm ask ,
then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file.
Confirmation is currently incompatible with
.Cm ControlPersist ,
and will be disabled if it is enabled.
.Pp
Presently, only
.Xr sshd 8
from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
.Qq hostkeys@openssh.com
protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys.
.It Cm User
Specifies the user to log in as.
This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
This saves the trouble of
having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the user
host key database, separated by whitespace.
+Each filename may use tilde notation to refer to the user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 .
.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
records.
If this option is set to
.Cm yes ,
the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint
from DNS.
Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to
.Cm ask .
If this option is set to
.Cm ask ,
information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still
need to confirm new host keys according to the
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
option.
The default is
.Cm yes
if compiled with LDNS and
.Cm no
otherwise.
.Pp
See also
.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
in
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm VersionAddendum
Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify
OS- or site-specific modifications.
The default is
-.Dq FreeBSD-20200214 .
+.Dq FreeBSD-20210907 .
The value
.Cm none
may be used to disable this.
.It Cm VisualHostKey
If this flag is set to
.Cm yes ,
an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and
for unknown host keys.
If this flag is set to
.Cm no
(the default),
no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
.It Cm XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the
.Xr xauth 1
program.
The default is
.Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth .
.El
.Sh PATTERNS
A
.Em pattern
consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
.Sq *
(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
or
.Sq ?\&
(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
.Qq .co.uk
set of domains,
the following pattern could be used:
.Pp
.Dl Host *.co.uk
.Pp
The following pattern
would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
.Pp
.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
.Pp
A
.Em pattern-list
is a comma-separated list of patterns.
Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
by preceding them with an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
For example,
to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization
except from the
.Qq dialup
pool,
the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
.Pp
Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself.
For example, attempting to match
.Qq host3
against the following pattern-list will fail:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&"
.Pp
The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match,
such as a wildcard:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&"
.Sh TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
which are expanded at runtime:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
.It %%
A literal
.Sq % .
.It \&%C
Hash of %l%h%p%r.
.It %d
Local user's home directory.
+.It %f
+The fingerprint of the server's host key.
+.It %H
+The
+.Pa known_hosts
+hostname or address that is being searched for.
.It %h
The remote hostname.
+.It \%%I
+A string describing the reason for a
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand
+execution: either
+.Cm ADDRESS
+when looking up a host by address (only when
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is enabled),
+.Cm HOSTNAME
+when searching by hostname, or
+.Cm ORDER
+when preparing the host key algorithm preference list to use for the
+destination host.
.It %i
The local user ID.
+.It %K
+The base64 encoded host key.
+.It %k
+The host key alias if specified, otherwise the original remote hostname given
+on the command line.
.It %L
The local hostname.
.It %l
The local hostname, including the domain name.
.It %n
The original remote hostname, as given on the command line.
.It %p
The remote port.
.It %r
The remote username.
.It \&%T
The local
.Xr tun 4
or
.Xr tap 4
network interface assigned if
tunnel forwarding was requested, or
.Qq NONE
otherwise.
+.It %t
+The type of the server host key, e.g.
+.Cm ssh-ed25519 .
.It %u
The local username.
.El
.Pp
-.Cm Match exec
-accepts the tokens %%, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
+.Cm CertificateFile ,
+.Cm ControlPath ,
+.Cm IdentityAgent ,
+.Cm IdentityFile ,
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand ,
+.Cm LocalForward ,
+.Cm Match exec ,
+.Cm RemoteCommand ,
+.Cm RemoteForward ,
+and
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+accept the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %k, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
.Pp
-.Cm CertificateFile
-accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u.
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand
+additionally accepts the tokens %f, %H, %I, %K and %t.
.Pp
-.Cm ControlPath
-accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
-.Pp
-.Cm HostName
+.Cm Hostname
accepts the tokens %% and %h.
.Pp
-.Cm IdentityAgent
-and
-.Cm IdentityFile
-accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u.
-.Pp
.Cm LocalCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T, and %u.
+accepts all tokens.
.Pp
.Cm ProxyCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %h, %p, and %r.
-.Pp
-.Cm RemoteCommand
-accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
+accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r.
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+Arguments to some keywords can be expanded at runtime from environment
+variables on the client by enclosing them in
+.Ic ${} ,
+for example
+.Ic ${HOME}/.ssh
+would refer to the user's .ssh directory.
+If a specified environment variable does not exist then an error will be
+returned and the setting for that keyword will be ignored.
+.Pp
+The keywords
+.Cm CertificateFile ,
+.Cm ControlPath ,
+.Cm IdentityAgent ,
+.Cm IdentityFile ,
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand ,
+and
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+support environment variables.
+The keywords
+.Cm LocalForward
+and
+.Cm RemoteForward
+support environment variables only for Unix domain socket paths.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The format of this file is described above.
This file is used by the SSH client.
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
-read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file.
This file provides defaults for those
values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
for those users who do not have a configuration file.
This file must be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl ,
.An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
index 71accdf4fb59..2c2060567460 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h
@@ -1,862 +1,925 @@
/*
* This file was machine-@generated. Do not edit manually.
* Run crypto/openssh/freebsd-namespace.sh to regenerate.
*/
#define Blowfish_decipher Fssh_Blowfish_decipher
#define Blowfish_encipher Fssh_Blowfish_encipher
#define Blowfish_expand0state Fssh_Blowfish_expand0state
#define Blowfish_expandstate Fssh_Blowfish_expandstate
#define Blowfish_initstate Fssh_Blowfish_initstate
#define Blowfish_stream2word Fssh_Blowfish_stream2word
+#define Decode Fssh_Decode
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv Fssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv Fssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv
+#define Encode Fssh_Encode
+#define Hide Fssh_Hide
+#define Rq_mult_small Fssh_Rq_mult_small
+#define Short_random Fssh_Short_random
#define _ssh__compat_glob Fssh__ssh__compat_glob
#define _ssh__compat_globfree Fssh__ssh__compat_globfree
-#define _ssh_compat_realpath Fssh__ssh_compat_realpath
#define _ssh_exchange_banner Fssh__ssh_exchange_banner
#define _ssh_host_key_sign Fssh__ssh_host_key_sign
#define _ssh_host_private_key Fssh__ssh_host_private_key
#define _ssh_host_public_key Fssh__ssh_host_public_key
#define _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs Fssh__ssh_order_hostkeyalgs
#define _ssh_read_banner Fssh__ssh_read_banner
#define _ssh_send_banner Fssh__ssh_send_banner
#define _ssh_verify_host_key Fssh__ssh_verify_host_key
#define a2port Fssh_a2port
#define a2tun Fssh_a2tun
#define add_host_to_hostfile Fssh_add_host_to_hostfile
#define add_p1p1 Fssh_add_p1p1
#define addargs Fssh_addargs
+#define addr_and Fssh_addr_and
+#define addr_cmp Fssh_addr_cmp
+#define addr_host_is_all0s Fssh_addr_host_is_all0s
+#define addr_hostmask Fssh_addr_hostmask
+#define addr_invert Fssh_addr_invert
+#define addr_is_all0s Fssh_addr_is_all0s
#define addr_match_cidr_list Fssh_addr_match_cidr_list
#define addr_match_list Fssh_addr_match_list
#define addr_netmask Fssh_addr_netmask
#define addr_netmatch Fssh_addr_netmatch
+#define addr_ntop Fssh_addr_ntop
+#define addr_pton Fssh_addr_pton
#define addr_pton_cidr Fssh_addr_pton_cidr
+#define addr_sa_pton Fssh_addr_sa_pton
+#define addr_sa_to_xaddr Fssh_addr_sa_to_xaddr
+#define addr_unicast_masklen Fssh_addr_unicast_masklen
+#define addr_xaddr_to_sa Fssh_addr_xaddr_to_sa
#define argv_assemble Fssh_argv_assemble
+#define argv_consume Fssh_argv_consume
+#define argv_free Fssh_argv_free
+#define argv_next Fssh_argv_next
#define argv_split Fssh_argv_split
#define ask_permission Fssh_ask_permission
+#define asmprintf Fssh_asmprintf
#define atoi_err Fssh_atoi_err
#define atomicio Fssh_atomicio
#define atomicio6 Fssh_atomicio6
#define atomiciov Fssh_atomiciov
#define atomiciov6 Fssh_atomiciov6
#define bandwidth_limit Fssh_bandwidth_limit
#define bandwidth_limit_init Fssh_bandwidth_limit_init
#define barrett_reduce Fssh_barrett_reduce
#define baud_to_speed Fssh_baud_to_speed
#define bcrypt_hash Fssh_bcrypt_hash
#define bcrypt_pbkdf Fssh_bcrypt_pbkdf
#define bitmap_clear_bit Fssh_bitmap_clear_bit
#define bitmap_free Fssh_bitmap_free
#define bitmap_from_string Fssh_bitmap_from_string
#define bitmap_nbits Fssh_bitmap_nbits
#define bitmap_nbytes Fssh_bitmap_nbytes
#define bitmap_new Fssh_bitmap_new
#define bitmap_set_bit Fssh_bitmap_set_bit
#define bitmap_test_bit Fssh_bitmap_test_bit
#define bitmap_to_string Fssh_bitmap_to_string
#define bitmap_zero Fssh_bitmap_zero
#define blf_cbc_decrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_decrypt
#define blf_cbc_encrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_encrypt
#define blf_dec Fssh_blf_dec
#define blf_ecb_decrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_decrypt
#define blf_ecb_encrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_encrypt
#define blf_enc Fssh_blf_enc
#define blf_key Fssh_blf_key
#define blob_section Fssh_blob_section
#define cert_free Fssh_cert_free
#define chacha_encrypt_bytes Fssh_chacha_encrypt_bytes
#define chacha_ivsetup Fssh_chacha_ivsetup
#define chacha_keysetup Fssh_chacha_keysetup
-#define chachapoly_crypt Fssh_chachapoly_crypt
-#define chachapoly_get_length Fssh_chachapoly_get_length
-#define chachapoly_init Fssh_chachapoly_init
#define chan_ibuf_empty Fssh_chan_ibuf_empty
#define chan_is_dead Fssh_chan_is_dead
#define chan_mark_dead Fssh_chan_mark_dead
#define chan_obuf_empty Fssh_chan_obuf_empty
#define chan_rcvd_eow Fssh_chan_rcvd_eow
#define chan_rcvd_ieof Fssh_chan_rcvd_ieof
#define chan_rcvd_oclose Fssh_chan_rcvd_oclose
#define chan_read_failed Fssh_chan_read_failed
#define chan_send_eof2 Fssh_chan_send_eof2
#define chan_shutdown_extended_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_extended_read
#define chan_shutdown_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_read
#define chan_shutdown_write Fssh_chan_shutdown_write
#define chan_write_failed Fssh_chan_write_failed
#define channel_add_permission Fssh_channel_add_permission
#define channel_after_select Fssh_channel_after_select
#define channel_by_id Fssh_channel_by_id
#define channel_by_remote_id Fssh_channel_by_remote_id
#define channel_cancel_cleanup Fssh_channel_cancel_cleanup
#define channel_cancel_lport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_lport_listener
#define channel_cancel_rport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener
#define channel_clear_permission Fssh_channel_clear_permission
#define channel_close_all Fssh_channel_close_all
#define channel_close_fd Fssh_channel_close_fd
#define channel_connect_by_listen_address Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_address
#define channel_connect_by_listen_path Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_path
#define channel_connect_stdio_fwd Fssh_channel_connect_stdio_fwd
#define channel_connect_to_path Fssh_channel_connect_to_path
#define channel_connect_to_port Fssh_channel_connect_to_port
#define channel_decode_socks4 Fssh_channel_decode_socks4
#define channel_decode_socks5 Fssh_channel_decode_socks5
#define channel_disable_admin Fssh_channel_disable_admin
#define channel_find_open Fssh_channel_find_open
#define channel_format_extended_usage Fssh_channel_format_extended_usage
#define channel_free Fssh_channel_free
#define channel_free_all Fssh_channel_free_all
#define channel_fwd_bind_addr Fssh_channel_fwd_bind_addr
#define channel_handler Fssh_channel_handler
#define channel_init_channels Fssh_channel_init_channels
#define channel_input_data Fssh_channel_input_data
#define channel_input_extended_data Fssh_channel_input_extended_data
#define channel_input_ieof Fssh_channel_input_ieof
#define channel_input_oclose Fssh_channel_input_oclose
#define channel_input_open_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_open_confirmation
#define channel_input_open_failure Fssh_channel_input_open_failure
#define channel_input_status_confirm Fssh_channel_input_status_confirm
#define channel_input_window_adjust Fssh_channel_input_window_adjust
#define channel_lookup Fssh_channel_lookup
#define channel_new Fssh_channel_new
#define channel_not_very_much_buffered_data Fssh_channel_not_very_much_buffered_data
#define channel_open_message Fssh_channel_open_message
#define channel_output_poll Fssh_channel_output_poll
#define channel_parse_id Fssh_channel_parse_id
#define channel_permit_all Fssh_channel_permit_all
#define channel_post_auth_listener Fssh_channel_post_auth_listener
#define channel_post_connecting Fssh_channel_post_connecting
#define channel_post_mux_client Fssh_channel_post_mux_client
#define channel_post_mux_listener Fssh_channel_post_mux_listener
#define channel_post_open Fssh_channel_post_open
#define channel_post_port_listener Fssh_channel_post_port_listener
#define channel_post_x11_listener Fssh_channel_post_x11_listener
#define channel_pre_connecting Fssh_channel_pre_connecting
#define channel_pre_dynamic Fssh_channel_pre_dynamic
#define channel_pre_listener Fssh_channel_pre_listener
#define channel_pre_mux_client Fssh_channel_pre_mux_client
#define channel_pre_open Fssh_channel_pre_open
#define channel_pre_x11_open Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open
#define channel_prepare_select Fssh_channel_prepare_select
#define channel_proxy_downstream Fssh_channel_proxy_downstream
#define channel_proxy_upstream Fssh_channel_proxy_upstream
#define channel_register_cleanup Fssh_channel_register_cleanup
#define channel_register_fds Fssh_channel_register_fds
#define channel_register_filter Fssh_channel_register_filter
#define channel_register_open_confirm Fssh_channel_register_open_confirm
#define channel_register_status_confirm Fssh_channel_register_status_confirm
#define channel_request_remote_forwarding Fssh_channel_request_remote_forwarding
#define channel_request_rforward_cancel Fssh_channel_request_rforward_cancel
#define channel_request_start Fssh_channel_request_start
#define channel_send_open Fssh_channel_send_open
#define channel_send_window_changes Fssh_channel_send_window_changes
#define channel_set_af Fssh_channel_set_af
#define channel_set_fds Fssh_channel_set_fds
#define channel_set_x11_refuse_time Fssh_channel_set_x11_refuse_time
#define channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal
#define channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip
#define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener
#define channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener
#define channel_still_open Fssh_channel_still_open
#define channel_stop_listening Fssh_channel_stop_listening
#define channel_update_permission Fssh_channel_update_permission
#define check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type Fssh_check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type
#define check_key_in_hostkeys Fssh_check_key_in_hostkeys
#define child_set_env Fssh_child_set_env
#define choose_dh Fssh_choose_dh
#define choose_t Fssh_choose_t
#define chop Fssh_chop
#define cipher_alg_list Fssh_cipher_alg_list
#define cipher_authlen Fssh_cipher_authlen
#define cipher_blocksize Fssh_cipher_blocksize
#define cipher_by_name Fssh_cipher_by_name
#define cipher_crypt Fssh_cipher_crypt
#define cipher_ctx_is_plaintext Fssh_cipher_ctx_is_plaintext
#define cipher_free Fssh_cipher_free
#define cipher_get_keyiv Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv
#define cipher_get_keyiv_len Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len
#define cipher_get_length Fssh_cipher_get_length
#define cipher_init Fssh_cipher_init
#define cipher_is_cbc Fssh_cipher_is_cbc
#define cipher_ivlen Fssh_cipher_ivlen
#define cipher_keylen Fssh_cipher_keylen
#define cipher_seclen Fssh_cipher_seclen
#define cipher_set_keyiv Fssh_cipher_set_keyiv
#define cipher_warning_message Fssh_cipher_warning_message
#define ciphers_valid Fssh_ciphers_valid
#define cleanhostname Fssh_cleanhostname
#define cleanup_exit Fssh_cleanup_exit
#define colon Fssh_colon
#define compare Fssh_compare
#define compare_gps Fssh_compare_gps
+#define compat_banner Fssh_compat_banner
#define compat_cipher_proposal Fssh_compat_cipher_proposal
-#define compat_datafellows Fssh_compat_datafellows
#define compat_kex_proposal Fssh_compat_kex_proposal
#define compat_pkalg_proposal Fssh_compat_pkalg_proposal
+#define compression_alg_list Fssh_compression_alg_list
#define connect_next Fssh_connect_next
#define connect_to_helper Fssh_connect_to_helper
#define convtime Fssh_convtime
#define crypto_hash_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hash_sha512
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair
#define crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 Fssh_crypto_scalarmult_curve25519
#define crypto_sign_ed25519 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_open Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_open
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes
#define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime
#define crypto_verify_32 Fssh_crypto_verify_32
#define daemonized Fssh_daemonized
#define dangerous_locale Fssh_dangerous_locale
#define dbl_p1p1 Fssh_dbl_p1p1
-#define debug Fssh_debug
-#define debug2 Fssh_debug2
-#define debug3 Fssh_debug3
#define default_key_sign Fssh_default_key_sign
#define dh_estimate Fssh_dh_estimate
#define dh_gen_key Fssh_dh_gen_key
#define dh_new_group Fssh_dh_new_group
#define dh_new_group1 Fssh_dh_new_group1
#define dh_new_group14 Fssh_dh_new_group14
#define dh_new_group16 Fssh_dh_new_group16
#define dh_new_group18 Fssh_dh_new_group18
#define dh_new_group_asc Fssh_dh_new_group_asc
#define dh_new_group_fallback Fssh_dh_new_group_fallback
#define dh_pub_is_valid Fssh_dh_pub_is_valid
+#define dh_set_moduli_file Fssh_dh_set_moduli_file
#define dispatch_protocol_error Fssh_dispatch_protocol_error
#define dispatch_protocol_ignore Fssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore
-#define dns_read_key Fssh_dns_read_key
#define do_log Fssh_do_log
-#define do_log2 Fssh_do_log2
-#define dump_base64 Fssh_dump_base64
+#define dollar_expand Fssh_dollar_expand
+#define ecdsa_do_sign Fssh_ecdsa_do_sign
#define encode_constraints Fssh_encode_constraints
-#define error Fssh_error
#define exited_cleanly Fssh_exited_cleanly
#define export_dns_rr Fssh_export_dns_rr
-#define fatal Fssh_fatal
#define filter_list Fssh_filter_list
#define fingerprint_b64 Fssh_fingerprint_b64
#define fingerprint_hex Fssh_fingerprint_hex
#define fmprintf Fssh_fmprintf
#define fmt_scaled Fssh_fmt_scaled
+#define fmt_timeframe Fssh_fmt_timeframe
#define format_absolute_time Fssh_format_absolute_time
#define forward_equals Fssh_forward_equals
#define free_hostkeys Fssh_free_hostkeys
#define freeargs Fssh_freeargs
#define freerrset Fssh_freerrset
#define freezero Fssh_freezero
#define fwd_ident Fssh_fwd_ident
#define gen_candidates Fssh_gen_candidates
#define get_hram Fssh_get_hram
#define get_local_ipaddr Fssh_get_local_ipaddr
#define get_local_name Fssh_get_local_name
#define get_local_port Fssh_get_local_port
#define get_peer_ipaddr Fssh_get_peer_ipaddr
#define get_peer_port Fssh_get_peer_port
#define get_rdomain Fssh_get_rdomain
+#define get_sock_af Fssh_get_sock_af
#define get_sock_port Fssh_get_sock_port
#define get_socket_address Fssh_get_socket_address
#define get_u16 Fssh_get_u16
#define get_u32 Fssh_get_u32
#define get_u32_le Fssh_get_u32_le
#define get_u64 Fssh_get_u64
#define getrrsetbyname Fssh_getrrsetbyname
#define glob0 Fssh_glob0
#define glob2 Fssh_glob2
#define globexp1 Fssh_globexp1
#define globextend Fssh_globextend
#define host_delete Fssh_host_delete
#define host_hash Fssh_host_hash
+#define hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir Fssh_hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir
#define hostfile_read_key Fssh_hostfile_read_key
#define hostfile_replace_entries Fssh_hostfile_replace_entries
#define hostkeys_foreach Fssh_hostkeys_foreach
+#define hostkeys_foreach_file Fssh_hostkeys_foreach_file
#define hpdelim Fssh_hpdelim
+#define hpdelim2 Fssh_hpdelim2
#define init_hostkeys Fssh_init_hostkeys
-#define input_kex_c25519_init Fssh_input_kex_c25519_init
-#define input_kex_c25519_reply Fssh_input_kex_c25519_reply
-#define input_kex_dh Fssh_input_kex_dh
#define input_kex_dh_gex_group Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_group
#define input_kex_dh_gex_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_init
#define input_kex_dh_gex_reply Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_reply
#define input_kex_dh_gex_request Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_request
-#define input_kex_dh_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_init
-#define input_kex_ecdh_init Fssh_input_kex_ecdh_init
-#define input_kex_ecdh_reply Fssh_input_kex_ecdh_reply
+#define input_kex_gen_init Fssh_input_kex_gen_init
+#define input_kex_gen_reply Fssh_input_kex_gen_reply
#define iptos2str Fssh_iptos2str
#define ipv64_normalise_mapped Fssh_ipv64_normalise_mapped
#define is_key_revoked Fssh_is_key_revoked
#define kex_alg_by_name Fssh_kex_alg_by_name
#define kex_alg_list Fssh_kex_alg_list
#define kex_assemble_names Fssh_kex_assemble_names
#define kex_buf2prop Fssh_kex_buf2prop
-#define kex_c25519_hash Fssh_kex_c25519_hash
+#define kex_c25519_dec Fssh_kex_c25519_dec
+#define kex_c25519_enc Fssh_kex_c25519_enc
+#define kex_c25519_keypair Fssh_kex_c25519_keypair
#define kex_derive_keys Fssh_kex_derive_keys
-#define kex_derive_keys_bn Fssh_kex_derive_keys_bn
-#define kex_dh_hash Fssh_kex_dh_hash
-#define kex_ecdh_hash Fssh_kex_ecdh_hash
+#define kex_dh_compute_key Fssh_kex_dh_compute_key
+#define kex_dh_dec Fssh_kex_dh_dec
+#define kex_dh_enc Fssh_kex_dh_enc
+#define kex_dh_keygen Fssh_kex_dh_keygen
+#define kex_dh_keypair Fssh_kex_dh_keypair
+#define kex_ecdh_dec Fssh_kex_ecdh_dec
+#define kex_ecdh_dec_key_group Fssh_kex_ecdh_dec_key_group
+#define kex_ecdh_enc Fssh_kex_ecdh_enc
+#define kex_ecdh_keypair Fssh_kex_ecdh_keypair
+#define kex_exchange_identification Fssh_kex_exchange_identification
#define kex_free Fssh_kex_free
#define kex_free_newkeys Fssh_kex_free_newkeys
+#define kex_gen_client Fssh_kex_gen_client
+#define kex_gen_hash Fssh_kex_gen_hash
+#define kex_gen_server Fssh_kex_gen_server
#define kex_input_ext_info Fssh_kex_input_ext_info
#define kex_input_kexinit Fssh_kex_input_kexinit
#define kex_input_newkeys Fssh_kex_input_newkeys
+#define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec
+#define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc
+#define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair
+#define kex_load_hostkey Fssh_kex_load_hostkey
#define kex_names_cat Fssh_kex_names_cat
#define kex_names_valid Fssh_kex_names_valid
#define kex_new Fssh_kex_new
#define kex_prop2buf Fssh_kex_prop2buf
#define kex_prop_free Fssh_kex_prop_free
#define kex_protocol_error Fssh_kex_protocol_error
+#define kex_ready Fssh_kex_ready
#define kex_send_kexinit Fssh_kex_send_kexinit
#define kex_send_newkeys Fssh_kex_send_newkeys
#define kex_setup Fssh_kex_setup
#define kex_start_rekex Fssh_kex_start_rekex
-#define kexc25519_client Fssh_kexc25519_client
+#define kex_verify_host_key Fssh_kex_verify_host_key
#define kexc25519_keygen Fssh_kexc25519_keygen
-#define kexc25519_server Fssh_kexc25519_server
#define kexc25519_shared_key Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key
-#define kexdh_client Fssh_kexdh_client
-#define kexdh_server Fssh_kexdh_server
-#define kexecdh_client Fssh_kexecdh_client
-#define kexecdh_server Fssh_kexecdh_server
+#define kexc25519_shared_key_ext Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key_ext
#define kexgex_client Fssh_kexgex_client
#define kexgex_hash Fssh_kexgex_hash
#define kexgex_server Fssh_kexgex_server
+#define krl_dump Fssh_krl_dump
#define load_hostkeys Fssh_load_hostkeys
+#define load_hostkeys_file Fssh_load_hostkeys_file
#define log_change_level Fssh_log_change_level
#define log_facility_name Fssh_log_facility_name
#define log_facility_number Fssh_log_facility_number
#define log_init Fssh_log_init
#define log_is_on_stderr Fssh_log_is_on_stderr
#define log_level_get Fssh_log_level_get
#define log_level_name Fssh_log_level_name
#define log_level_number Fssh_log_level_number
#define log_redirect_stderr_to Fssh_log_redirect_stderr_to
-#define logdie Fssh_logdie
-#define logit Fssh_logit
+#define log_verbose_add Fssh_log_verbose_add
+#define log_verbose_reset Fssh_log_verbose_reset
+#define lookup_env_in_list Fssh_lookup_env_in_list
#define lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type Fssh_lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type
+#define lookup_marker_in_hostkeys Fssh_lookup_marker_in_hostkeys
#define lowercase Fssh_lowercase
#define mac_alg_list Fssh_mac_alg_list
#define mac_check Fssh_mac_check
#define mac_clear Fssh_mac_clear
#define mac_compute Fssh_mac_compute
#define mac_init Fssh_mac_init
#define mac_setup Fssh_mac_setup
#define mac_valid Fssh_mac_valid
-#define match Fssh_match
-#define match_filter_blacklist Fssh_match_filter_blacklist
-#define match_filter_whitelist Fssh_match_filter_whitelist
+#define match_filter_allowlist Fssh_match_filter_allowlist
+#define match_filter_denylist Fssh_match_filter_denylist
#define match_host_and_ip Fssh_match_host_and_ip
#define match_hostname Fssh_match_hostname
#define match_list Fssh_match_list
#define match_pattern Fssh_match_pattern
#define match_pattern_list Fssh_match_pattern_list
#define match_user Fssh_match_user
+#define match_usergroup_pattern_list Fssh_match_usergroup_pattern_list
#define mktemp_proto Fssh_mktemp_proto
#define mm_choose_dh Fssh_mm_choose_dh
#define mm_receive_fd Fssh_mm_receive_fd
#define mm_send_fd Fssh_mm_send_fd
#define mm_sshkey_sign Fssh_mm_sshkey_sign
#define monotime Fssh_monotime
#define monotime_double Fssh_monotime_double
#define monotime_ts Fssh_monotime_ts
#define monotime_tv Fssh_monotime_tv
#define mprintf Fssh_mprintf
#define ms_subtract_diff Fssh_ms_subtract_diff
#define ms_to_timeval Fssh_ms_to_timeval
#define msetlocale Fssh_msetlocale
-#define mysignal Fssh_mysignal
#define newkeys_from_blob Fssh_newkeys_from_blob
#define newkeys_to_blob Fssh_newkeys_to_blob
#define nh_aux Fssh_nh_aux
#define nh_final Fssh_nh_final
+#define note_key Fssh_note_key
+#define notify_complete Fssh_notify_complete
+#define notify_start Fssh_notify_start
#define open_preamble Fssh_open_preamble
-#define packet_close Fssh_packet_close
-#define packet_disconnect Fssh_packet_disconnect
-#define packet_get_char Fssh_packet_get_char
-#define packet_get_int Fssh_packet_get_int
-#define packet_process_incoming Fssh_packet_process_incoming
-#define packet_read_expect Fssh_packet_read_expect
-#define packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr
-#define packet_read_seqnr Fssh_packet_read_seqnr
-#define packet_send_debug Fssh_packet_send_debug
-#define packet_set_connection Fssh_packet_set_connection
-#define packet_write_poll Fssh_packet_write_poll
-#define packet_write_wait Fssh_packet_write_wait
+#define opt_array_append Fssh_opt_array_append
+#define opt_array_append2 Fssh_opt_array_append2
+#define opt_dequote Fssh_opt_dequote
+#define opt_flag Fssh_opt_flag
+#define opt_match Fssh_opt_match
+#define ossl_error Fssh_ossl_error
#define parse_absolute_time Fssh_parse_absolute_time
#define parse_ipqos Fssh_parse_ipqos
#define parse_prime Fssh_parse_prime
#define parse_uri Fssh_parse_uri
#define parse_user_host_path Fssh_parse_user_host_path
#define parse_user_host_port Fssh_parse_user_host_port
+#define path_absolute Fssh_path_absolute
#define pem_passphrase_cb Fssh_pem_passphrase_cb
+#define percent_dollar_expand Fssh_percent_dollar_expand
#define percent_expand Fssh_percent_expand
#define permission_set_add Fssh_permission_set_add
#define permitopen_port Fssh_permitopen_port
#define pkcs11_add_provider Fssh_pkcs11_add_provider
#define pkcs11_del_provider Fssh_pkcs11_del_provider
-#define pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter
+#define pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap Fssh_pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap
+#define pkcs11_fetch_certs Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_certs
+#define pkcs11_fetch_keys Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_keys
#define pkcs11_find Fssh_pkcs11_find
+#define pkcs11_get_key Fssh_pkcs11_get_key
#define pkcs11_init Fssh_pkcs11_init
+#define pkcs11_k11_free Fssh_pkcs11_k11_free
+#define pkcs11_login_slot Fssh_pkcs11_login_slot
#define pkcs11_provider_finalize Fssh_pkcs11_provider_finalize
-#define pkcs11_rsa_finish Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_finish
+#define pkcs11_provider_unref Fssh_pkcs11_provider_unref
#define pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt
#define pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt
+#define pkcs11_rsa_wrap Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_wrap
#define pkcs11_terminate Fssh_pkcs11_terminate
#define plain_key_blob Fssh_plain_key_blob
#define platform_disable_tracing Fssh_platform_disable_tracing
#define platform_pledge_agent Fssh_platform_pledge_agent
#define platform_pledge_mux Fssh_platform_pledge_mux
#define platform_pledge_sftp_server Fssh_platform_pledge_sftp_server
#define platform_sys_dir_uid Fssh_platform_sys_dir_uid
#define pledge Fssh_pledge
#define poly1305_auth Fssh_poly1305_auth
#define poly64 Fssh_poly64
#define poly_hash Fssh_poly_hash
#define port_open_helper Fssh_port_open_helper
#define prime_test Fssh_prime_test
-#define proto_spec Fssh_proto_spec
+#define private2_uudecode Fssh_private2_uudecode
#define put_host_port Fssh_put_host_port
#define put_u16 Fssh_put_u16
#define put_u32 Fssh_put_u32
#define put_u32_le Fssh_put_u32_le
#define put_u64 Fssh_put_u64
#define pwcopy Fssh_pwcopy
#define qfileout Fssh_qfileout
#define read_mux Fssh_read_mux
#define read_passphrase Fssh_read_passphrase
#define recallocarray Fssh_recallocarray
#define record_hostkey Fssh_record_hostkey
#define reduce_add_sub Fssh_reduce_add_sub
#define refresh_progress_meter Fssh_refresh_progress_meter
#define replacearg Fssh_replacearg
#define revoke_blob Fssh_revoke_blob
#define revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE
#define revoked_certs_for_ca_key Fssh_revoked_certs_for_ca_key
#define revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE
#define rijndaelEncrypt Fssh_rijndaelEncrypt
#define rijndaelKeySetupEnc Fssh_rijndaelKeySetupEnc
+#define rtrim Fssh_rtrim
#define safe_path Fssh_safe_path
#define safe_path_fd Fssh_safe_path_fd
#define sanitise_stdfd Fssh_sanitise_stdfd
#define scan_scaled Fssh_scan_scaled
#define seed_rng Fssh_seed_rng
+#define send_error Fssh_send_error
#define set_log_handler Fssh_set_log_handler
#define set_nodelay Fssh_set_nodelay
#define set_nonblock Fssh_set_nonblock
#define set_rdomain Fssh_set_rdomain
#define set_reuseaddr Fssh_set_reuseaddr
+#define set_sock_tos Fssh_set_sock_tos
+#define sftp_realpath Fssh_sftp_realpath
#define shadow_pw Fssh_shadow_pw
#define sieve_large Fssh_sieve_large
+#define sig_alarm Fssh_sig_alarm
#define sig_winch Fssh_sig_winch
-#define sigdie Fssh_sigdie
+#define skip_space Fssh_skip_space
#define snmprintf Fssh_snmprintf
#define sock_set_v6only Fssh_sock_set_v6only
#define speed_to_baud Fssh_speed_to_baud
-#define ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms Fssh_ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
#define ssh_add_hostkey Fssh_ssh_add_hostkey
#define ssh_add_identity_constrained Fssh_ssh_add_identity_constrained
+#define ssh_agent_has_key Fssh_ssh_agent_has_key
#define ssh_agent_sign Fssh_ssh_agent_sign
#define ssh_alloc_session_state Fssh_ssh_alloc_session_state
#define ssh_clear_newkeys Fssh_ssh_clear_newkeys
#define ssh_close_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_close_authentication_socket
#define ssh_compatible_openssl Fssh_ssh_compatible_openssl
-#define ssh_crc32 Fssh_ssh_crc32
#define ssh_digest_alg_by_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_by_name
#define ssh_digest_alg_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_name
#define ssh_digest_blocksize Fssh_ssh_digest_blocksize
#define ssh_digest_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_buffer
#define ssh_digest_bytes Fssh_ssh_digest_bytes
#define ssh_digest_copy_state Fssh_ssh_digest_copy_state
#define ssh_digest_final Fssh_ssh_digest_final
#define ssh_digest_free Fssh_ssh_digest_free
#define ssh_digest_memory Fssh_ssh_digest_memory
#define ssh_digest_start Fssh_ssh_digest_start
#define ssh_digest_update Fssh_ssh_digest_update
#define ssh_digest_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_update_buffer
#define ssh_dispatch_init Fssh_ssh_dispatch_init
#define ssh_dispatch_range Fssh_ssh_dispatch_range
#define ssh_dispatch_run Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run
#define ssh_dispatch_run_fatal Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run_fatal
#define ssh_dispatch_set Fssh_ssh_dispatch_set
#define ssh_dss_sign Fssh_ssh_dss_sign
#define ssh_dss_verify Fssh_ssh_dss_verify
#define ssh_ecdsa_sign Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sign
#define ssh_ecdsa_verify Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_verify
#define ssh_ed25519_sign Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sign
#define ssh_ed25519_verify Fssh_ssh_ed25519_verify
#define ssh_err Fssh_ssh_err
#define ssh_fetch_identitylist Fssh_ssh_fetch_identitylist
#define ssh_free Fssh_ssh_free
#define ssh_free_identitylist Fssh_ssh_free_identitylist
#define ssh_gai_strerror Fssh_ssh_gai_strerror
#define ssh_get_app_data Fssh_ssh_get_app_data
#define ssh_get_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket
+#define ssh_get_authentication_socket_path Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket_path
#define ssh_get_progname Fssh_ssh_get_progname
#define ssh_hmac_bytes Fssh_ssh_hmac_bytes
#define ssh_hmac_final Fssh_ssh_hmac_final
#define ssh_hmac_free Fssh_ssh_hmac_free
#define ssh_hmac_init Fssh_ssh_hmac_init
#define ssh_hmac_start Fssh_ssh_hmac_start
#define ssh_hmac_update Fssh_ssh_hmac_update
#define ssh_hmac_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_hmac_update_buffer
#define ssh_init Fssh_ssh_init
#define ssh_input_append Fssh_ssh_input_append
#define ssh_input_space Fssh_ssh_input_space
#define ssh_krl_check_key Fssh_ssh_krl_check_key
#define ssh_krl_file_contains_key Fssh_ssh_krl_file_contains_key
#define ssh_krl_free Fssh_ssh_krl_free
#define ssh_krl_from_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_from_blob
#define ssh_krl_init Fssh_ssh_krl_init
#define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id
#define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial
#define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range
#define ssh_krl_revoke_key Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key
#define ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit
#define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1
#define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256
#define ssh_krl_set_comment Fssh_ssh_krl_set_comment
#define ssh_krl_set_version Fssh_ssh_krl_set_version
#define ssh_krl_to_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_to_blob
+#define ssh_libcrypto_init Fssh_ssh_libcrypto_init
#define ssh_local_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_local_ipaddr
#define ssh_local_port Fssh_ssh_local_port
#define ssh_lock_agent Fssh_ssh_lock_agent
-#define ssh_malloc_init Fssh_ssh_malloc_init
#define ssh_msg_recv Fssh_ssh_msg_recv
#define ssh_msg_send Fssh_ssh_msg_send
#define ssh_output_consume Fssh_ssh_output_consume
#define ssh_output_ptr Fssh_ssh_output_ptr
#define ssh_output_space Fssh_ssh_output_space
+#define ssh_packet_check_rekey Fssh_ssh_packet_check_rekey
#define ssh_packet_clear_keys Fssh_ssh_packet_clear_keys
#define ssh_packet_close Fssh_ssh_packet_close
#define ssh_packet_close_internal Fssh_ssh_packet_close_internal
#define ssh_packet_connection_af Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_af
#define ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket
#define ssh_packet_disconnect Fssh_ssh_packet_disconnect
#define ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress Fssh_ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress
-#define ssh_packet_get_bignum2 Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bignum2
#define ssh_packet_get_bytes Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bytes
-#define ssh_packet_get_char Fssh_ssh_packet_get_char
#define ssh_packet_get_connection_in Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_in
#define ssh_packet_get_connection_out Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_out
-#define ssh_packet_get_cstring Fssh_ssh_packet_get_cstring
-#define ssh_packet_get_ecpoint Fssh_ssh_packet_get_ecpoint
#define ssh_packet_get_input Fssh_ssh_packet_get_input
-#define ssh_packet_get_int Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int
-#define ssh_packet_get_int64 Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int64
#define ssh_packet_get_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_get_maxsize
#define ssh_packet_get_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_get_mux
#define ssh_packet_get_output Fssh_ssh_packet_get_output
#define ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags
#define ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout
#define ssh_packet_get_state Fssh_ssh_packet_get_state
-#define ssh_packet_get_string Fssh_ssh_packet_get_string
-#define ssh_packet_get_string_ptr Fssh_ssh_packet_get_string_ptr
#define ssh_packet_have_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_have_data_to_write
#define ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts
#define ssh_packet_is_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_is_interactive
#define ssh_packet_is_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_is_rekeying
#define ssh_packet_log_type Fssh_ssh_packet_log_type
#define ssh_packet_need_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_need_rekeying
#define ssh_packet_next Fssh_ssh_packet_next
#define ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write
#define ssh_packet_payload Fssh_ssh_packet_payload
#define ssh_packet_process_incoming Fssh_ssh_packet_process_incoming
#define ssh_packet_put Fssh_ssh_packet_put
-#define ssh_packet_put_bignum2 Fssh_ssh_packet_put_bignum2
-#define ssh_packet_put_char Fssh_ssh_packet_put_char
-#define ssh_packet_put_cstring Fssh_ssh_packet_put_cstring
-#define ssh_packet_put_ecpoint Fssh_ssh_packet_put_ecpoint
-#define ssh_packet_put_int Fssh_ssh_packet_put_int
-#define ssh_packet_put_int64 Fssh_ssh_packet_put_int64
-#define ssh_packet_put_raw Fssh_ssh_packet_put_raw
-#define ssh_packet_put_string Fssh_ssh_packet_put_string
#define ssh_packet_rdomain_in Fssh_ssh_packet_rdomain_in
#define ssh_packet_read Fssh_ssh_packet_read
#define ssh_packet_read_expect Fssh_ssh_packet_read_expect
#define ssh_packet_read_poll2 Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll2
#define ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr
#define ssh_packet_read_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_seqnr
#define ssh_packet_remaining Fssh_ssh_packet_remaining
-#define ssh_packet_send Fssh_ssh_packet_send
#define ssh_packet_send2 Fssh_ssh_packet_send2
#define ssh_packet_send2_wrapped Fssh_ssh_packet_send2_wrapped
#define ssh_packet_send_debug Fssh_ssh_packet_send_debug
#define ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts
#define ssh_packet_set_authenticated Fssh_ssh_packet_set_authenticated
#define ssh_packet_set_connection Fssh_ssh_packet_set_connection
#define ssh_packet_set_input_hook Fssh_ssh_packet_set_input_hook
#define ssh_packet_set_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_set_interactive
#define ssh_packet_set_log_preamble Fssh_ssh_packet_set_log_preamble
#define ssh_packet_set_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_set_maxsize
#define ssh_packet_set_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_set_mux
#define ssh_packet_set_nonblocking Fssh_ssh_packet_set_nonblocking
#define ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags
#define ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits Fssh_ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits
#define ssh_packet_set_server Fssh_ssh_packet_set_server
#define ssh_packet_set_state Fssh_ssh_packet_set_state
#define ssh_packet_set_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_set_timeout
#define ssh_packet_set_tos Fssh_ssh_packet_set_tos
-#define ssh_packet_start Fssh_ssh_packet_start
#define ssh_packet_start_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_start_discard
#define ssh_packet_stop_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_stop_discard
#define ssh_packet_write_poll Fssh_ssh_packet_write_poll
#define ssh_packet_write_wait Fssh_ssh_packet_write_wait
#define ssh_remote_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_remote_ipaddr
#define ssh_remote_port Fssh_ssh_remote_port
#define ssh_remove_all_identities Fssh_ssh_remove_all_identities
#define ssh_remove_identity Fssh_ssh_remove_identity
#define ssh_request_reply Fssh_ssh_request_reply
#define ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters Fssh_ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters
#define ssh_rsa_sign Fssh_ssh_rsa_sign
#define ssh_rsa_verify Fssh_ssh_rsa_verify
#define ssh_set_app_data Fssh_ssh_set_app_data
#define ssh_set_newkeys Fssh_ssh_set_newkeys
#define ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback Fssh_ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback
+#define ssh_signal Fssh_ssh_signal
#define ssh_tty_make_modes Fssh_ssh_tty_make_modes
#define ssh_tty_parse_modes Fssh_ssh_tty_parse_modes
#define ssh_update_card Fssh_ssh_update_card
#define sshbuf_alloc Fssh_sshbuf_alloc
#define sshbuf_allocate Fssh_sshbuf_allocate
#define sshbuf_avail Fssh_sshbuf_avail
#define sshbuf_b64tod Fssh_sshbuf_b64tod
#define sshbuf_check_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_check_reserve
+#define sshbuf_cmp Fssh_sshbuf_cmp
#define sshbuf_consume Fssh_sshbuf_consume
#define sshbuf_consume_end Fssh_sshbuf_consume_end
#define sshbuf_dtob16 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob16
#define sshbuf_dtob64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64
+#define sshbuf_dtob64_string Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64_string
+#define sshbuf_dtourlb64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtourlb64
#define sshbuf_dump Fssh_sshbuf_dump
#define sshbuf_dump_data Fssh_sshbuf_dump_data
#define sshbuf_dup_string Fssh_sshbuf_dup_string
+#define sshbuf_find Fssh_sshbuf_find
#define sshbuf_free Fssh_sshbuf_free
#define sshbuf_from Fssh_sshbuf_from
#define sshbuf_fromb Fssh_sshbuf_fromb
#define sshbuf_froms Fssh_sshbuf_froms
#define sshbuf_get Fssh_sshbuf_get
-#define sshbuf_get_bignum1 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum1
#define sshbuf_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2
#define sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct
#define sshbuf_get_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_get_cstring
#define sshbuf_get_ec Fssh_sshbuf_get_ec
#define sshbuf_get_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_get_eckey
#define sshbuf_get_string Fssh_sshbuf_get_string
#define sshbuf_get_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_string_direct
#define sshbuf_get_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_get_stringb
#define sshbuf_get_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u16
#define sshbuf_get_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u32
#define sshbuf_get_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u64
#define sshbuf_get_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u8
#define sshbuf_len Fssh_sshbuf_len
+#define sshbuf_load_fd Fssh_sshbuf_load_fd
+#define sshbuf_load_file Fssh_sshbuf_load_file
#define sshbuf_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_max_size
#define sshbuf_mutable_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_mutable_ptr
#define sshbuf_new Fssh_sshbuf_new
#define sshbuf_parent Fssh_sshbuf_parent
#define sshbuf_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_peek_string_direct
+#define sshbuf_peek_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u16
+#define sshbuf_peek_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u32
+#define sshbuf_peek_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u64
+#define sshbuf_peek_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u8
+#define sshbuf_poke Fssh_sshbuf_poke
+#define sshbuf_poke_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u16
+#define sshbuf_poke_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u32
+#define sshbuf_poke_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u64
+#define sshbuf_poke_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u8
#define sshbuf_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_ptr
#define sshbuf_put Fssh_sshbuf_put
-#define sshbuf_put_bignum1 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum1
#define sshbuf_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2
#define sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes
#define sshbuf_put_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_put_cstring
#define sshbuf_put_ec Fssh_sshbuf_put_ec
#define sshbuf_put_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_put_eckey
#define sshbuf_put_string Fssh_sshbuf_put_string
#define sshbuf_put_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_put_stringb
#define sshbuf_put_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u16
#define sshbuf_put_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u32
#define sshbuf_put_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u64
#define sshbuf_put_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u8
#define sshbuf_putb Fssh_sshbuf_putb
#define sshbuf_putf Fssh_sshbuf_putf
#define sshbuf_putfv Fssh_sshbuf_putfv
#define sshbuf_refcount Fssh_sshbuf_refcount
#define sshbuf_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_reserve
#define sshbuf_reset Fssh_sshbuf_reset
#define sshbuf_set_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_set_max_size
#define sshbuf_set_parent Fssh_sshbuf_set_parent
+#define sshbuf_write_file Fssh_sshbuf_write_file
+#define sshfatal Fssh_sshfatal
+#define sshkey_advance_past_options Fssh_sshkey_advance_past_options
#define sshkey_alg_list Fssh_sshkey_alg_list
#define sshkey_cert_check_authority Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority
+#define sshkey_cert_check_authority_now Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority_now
+#define sshkey_cert_check_host Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_host
#define sshkey_cert_copy Fssh_sshkey_cert_copy
#define sshkey_cert_type Fssh_sshkey_cert_type
#define sshkey_certify Fssh_sshkey_certify
#define sshkey_certify_custom Fssh_sshkey_certify_custom
#define sshkey_check_cert_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_check_cert_sigtype
#define sshkey_check_revoked Fssh_sshkey_check_revoked
#define sshkey_check_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_check_sigtype
#define sshkey_curve_name_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_curve_name_to_nid
#define sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits
#define sshkey_curve_nid_to_name Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_name
#define sshkey_drop_cert Fssh_sshkey_drop_cert
#define sshkey_dump_ec_key Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_key
#define sshkey_dump_ec_point Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_point
#define sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg Fssh_sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg
#define sshkey_ec_validate_private Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_private
#define sshkey_ec_validate_public Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_public
#define sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid
#define sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid
#define sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name
#define sshkey_enable_maxsign Fssh_sshkey_enable_maxsign
#define sshkey_equal Fssh_sshkey_equal
#define sshkey_equal_public Fssh_sshkey_equal_public
#define sshkey_fingerprint Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint
#define sshkey_fingerprint_raw Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint_raw
#define sshkey_format_cert_validity Fssh_sshkey_format_cert_validity
#define sshkey_format_text Fssh_sshkey_format_text
#define sshkey_free Fssh_sshkey_free
#define sshkey_from_blob Fssh_sshkey_from_blob
#define sshkey_from_blob_internal Fssh_sshkey_from_blob_internal
#define sshkey_from_private Fssh_sshkey_from_private
#define sshkey_fromb Fssh_sshkey_fromb
#define sshkey_froms Fssh_sshkey_froms
#define sshkey_generate Fssh_sshkey_generate
+#define sshkey_get_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_get_sigtype
#define sshkey_in_file Fssh_sshkey_in_file
#define sshkey_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_is_cert
+#define sshkey_is_shielded Fssh_sshkey_is_shielded
+#define sshkey_is_sk Fssh_sshkey_is_sk
#define sshkey_load_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_cert
-#define sshkey_load_file Fssh_sshkey_load_file
#define sshkey_load_private Fssh_sshkey_load_private
#define sshkey_load_private_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_private_cert
#define sshkey_load_private_type Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type
#define sshkey_load_private_type_fd Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type_fd
#define sshkey_load_public Fssh_sshkey_load_public
#define sshkey_names_valid2 Fssh_sshkey_names_valid2
#define sshkey_new Fssh_sshkey_new
#define sshkey_parse_private2 Fssh_sshkey_parse_private2
#define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob
#define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type
-#define sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob
+#define sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type
#define sshkey_perm_ok Fssh_sshkey_perm_ok
#define sshkey_plain_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_plain_to_blob
#define sshkey_private_deserialize Fssh_sshkey_private_deserialize
#define sshkey_private_serialize Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize
#define sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign
#define sshkey_private_serialize_opt Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize_opt
#define sshkey_private_to_blob2 Fssh_sshkey_private_to_blob2
#define sshkey_private_to_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_private_to_fileblob
#define sshkey_putb Fssh_sshkey_putb
#define sshkey_putb_plain Fssh_sshkey_putb_plain
#define sshkey_puts Fssh_sshkey_puts
#define sshkey_puts_opts Fssh_sshkey_puts_opts
#define sshkey_read Fssh_sshkey_read
#define sshkey_save_private Fssh_sshkey_save_private
+#define sshkey_save_public Fssh_sshkey_save_public
#define sshkey_set_filename Fssh_sshkey_set_filename
+#define sshkey_shield_private Fssh_sshkey_shield_private
+#define sshkey_sig_details_free Fssh_sshkey_sig_details_free
#define sshkey_sigalg_by_name Fssh_sshkey_sigalg_by_name
#define sshkey_sign Fssh_sshkey_sign
#define sshkey_signatures_left Fssh_sshkey_signatures_left
#define sshkey_size Fssh_sshkey_size
#define sshkey_ssh_name Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name
#define sshkey_ssh_name_plain Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name_plain
#define sshkey_to_base64 Fssh_sshkey_to_base64
#define sshkey_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_to_blob
#define sshkey_to_certified Fssh_sshkey_to_certified
#define sshkey_try_load_public Fssh_sshkey_try_load_public
#define sshkey_type Fssh_sshkey_type
#define sshkey_type_from_name Fssh_sshkey_type_from_name
#define sshkey_type_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_type_is_cert
#define sshkey_type_plain Fssh_sshkey_type_plain
+#define sshkey_unshield_private Fssh_sshkey_unshield_private
#define sshkey_verify Fssh_sshkey_verify
#define sshkey_write Fssh_sshkey_write
+#define sshlog Fssh_sshlog
+#define sshlogdie Fssh_sshlogdie
+#define sshlogdirect Fssh_sshlogdirect
+#define sshlogv Fssh_sshlogv
#define sshpkt_add_padding Fssh_sshpkt_add_padding
#define sshpkt_disconnect Fssh_sshpkt_disconnect
#define sshpkt_fatal Fssh_sshpkt_fatal
#define sshpkt_fmt_connection_id Fssh_sshpkt_fmt_connection_id
#define sshpkt_get Fssh_sshpkt_get
#define sshpkt_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_get_bignum2
#define sshpkt_get_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_get_cstring
#define sshpkt_get_ec Fssh_sshpkt_get_ec
#define sshpkt_get_end Fssh_sshpkt_get_end
#define sshpkt_get_string Fssh_sshpkt_get_string
#define sshpkt_get_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_get_string_direct
#define sshpkt_get_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u32
#define sshpkt_get_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u64
#define sshpkt_get_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u8
+#define sshpkt_getb_froms Fssh_sshpkt_getb_froms
#define sshpkt_msg_ignore Fssh_sshpkt_msg_ignore
#define sshpkt_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_peek_string_direct
#define sshpkt_ptr Fssh_sshpkt_ptr
#define sshpkt_put Fssh_sshpkt_put
#define sshpkt_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_put_bignum2
#define sshpkt_put_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_put_cstring
#define sshpkt_put_ec Fssh_sshpkt_put_ec
#define sshpkt_put_string Fssh_sshpkt_put_string
#define sshpkt_put_stringb Fssh_sshpkt_put_stringb
#define sshpkt_put_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u32
#define sshpkt_put_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u64
#define sshpkt_put_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u8
#define sshpkt_putb Fssh_sshpkt_putb
#define sshpkt_send Fssh_sshpkt_send
#define sshpkt_start Fssh_sshpkt_start
+#define sshpkt_vfatal Fssh_sshpkt_vfatal
+#define sshsigdie Fssh_sshsigdie
#define start_progress_meter Fssh_start_progress_meter
+#define stdfd_devnull Fssh_stdfd_devnull
#define stop_progress_meter Fssh_stop_progress_meter
#define stravis Fssh_stravis
#define strdelim Fssh_strdelim
#define strdelim_internal Fssh_strdelim_internal
#define strdelimw Fssh_strdelimw
#define strnvis Fssh_strnvis
#define strvis Fssh_strvis
#define strvisx Fssh_strvisx
+#define subprocess Fssh_subprocess
#define sys_tun_open Fssh_sys_tun_open
+#define tilde_expand Fssh_tilde_expand
#define tilde_expand_filename Fssh_tilde_expand_filename
+#define timeout_connect Fssh_timeout_connect
#define to_blob Fssh_to_blob
#define to_blob_buf Fssh_to_blob_buf
#define tohex Fssh_tohex
#define tun_open Fssh_tun_open
#define umac128_delete Fssh_umac128_delete
#define umac128_final Fssh_umac128_final
#define umac128_new Fssh_umac128_new
#define umac128_update Fssh_umac128_update
#define umac_delete Fssh_umac_delete
#define umac_final Fssh_umac_final
#define umac_new Fssh_umac_new
#define umac_update Fssh_umac_update
#define unix_listener Fssh_unix_listener
#define unset_nonblock Fssh_unset_nonblock
-#define update_progress_meter Fssh_update_progress_meter
#define urldecode Fssh_urldecode
-#define uudecode Fssh_uudecode
-#define uuencode Fssh_uuencode
#define valid_domain Fssh_valid_domain
#define valid_env_name Fssh_valid_env_name
#define vasnmprintf Fssh_vasnmprintf
-#define verbose Fssh_verbose
+#define vdollar_percent_expand Fssh_vdollar_percent_expand
#define verify_host_key_dns Fssh_verify_host_key_dns
#define vfmprintf Fssh_vfmprintf
#define vis Fssh_vis
+#define waitfd Fssh_waitfd
+#define waitrfd Fssh_waitrfd
#define write_host_entry Fssh_write_host_entry
#define x11_connect_display Fssh_x11_connect_display
#define x11_create_display_inet Fssh_x11_create_display_inet
#define x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing Fssh_x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing
#define xasprintf Fssh_xasprintf
#define xcalloc Fssh_xcalloc
#define xcrypt Fssh_xcrypt
+#define xextendf Fssh_xextendf
#define xmalloc Fssh_xmalloc
#define xreallocarray Fssh_xreallocarray
#define xrecallocarray Fssh_xrecallocarray
#define xstrdup Fssh_xstrdup
+#define xvasprintf Fssh_xvasprintf
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
index 50648258f48d..9803fb5ed904 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
@@ -1,464 +1,633 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.7 2017/06/01 04:51:58 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.11 2020/06/05 03:25:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
int
sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0)
return r;
if (v != NULL && len != 0)
memcpy(v, p, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U64(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U32(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U16(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = (u_int8_t)*p;
return 0;
}
+static int
+check_offset(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wr, size_t offset, size_t len)
+{
+ if (sshbuf_ptr(buf) == NULL) /* calls sshbuf_check_sanity() */
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (offset >= SIZE_MAX - len)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(buf)) {
+ return wr ?
+ SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE : SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+check_roffset(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len,
+ const u_char **p)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ *p = NULL;
+ if ((r = check_offset(buf, 0, offset, len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf) + offset;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = 0;
+ if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = PEEK_U64(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = 0;
+ if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = PEEK_U32(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = 0;
+ if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = PEEK_U16(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char *valp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = 0;
+ if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = *p;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
const u_char *val;
size_t len;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL) {
if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if (len != 0)
memcpy(*valp, val, len);
(*valp)[len] = '\0';
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len;
const u_char *p;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = p;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp)
{
u_int32_t len;
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
len = PEEK_U32(p);
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE"));
return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE;
}
if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = p + 4;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len;
const u_char *p, *z;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
return r;
/* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */
if (len > 0 &&
(z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT"));
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
return -1;
if (valp != NULL) {
if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if (len != 0)
memcpy(*valp, p, len);
(*valp)[len] = '\0';
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = (size_t)len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v)
{
u_int32_t len;
u_char *p;
int r;
/*
* Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is
* a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly
* into 'v'.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0)
return r;
if (len != 0)
memcpy(p, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
+ if (v == NULL)
+ return 0;
return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
}
int
sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
va_list ap2;
int r, len;
u_char *p;
VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (len == 0) {
r = 0;
goto out; /* Nothing to do */
}
va_end(ap2);
VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0)
goto out;
if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
/* Consume terminating \0 */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
va_end(ap2);
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U64(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U16(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0)
return r;
p[0] = val;
return 0;
}
+static int
+check_woffset(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len, u_char **p)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ *p = NULL;
+ if ((r = check_offset(buf, 1, offset, len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
+ *p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) + offset;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val)
+{
+ u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U64(p, val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val)
+{
+ u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U32(p, val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val)
+{
+ u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ POKE_U16(p, val);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val)
+{
+ u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ *p = val;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len)
+{
+ u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, len, &p)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ memcpy(p, v, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *d;
int r;
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(d, len);
if (len != 0)
memcpy(d + 4, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v));
}
int
sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
+ if (v == NULL)
+ return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
+
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
}
int
sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp)
{
const u_char *p;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *ret;
int r;
if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*bufp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
return r;
if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */
(r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(ret);
return r;
}
*bufp = ret;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *d;
const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v;
int r, prepend;
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
}
/* Skip leading zero bytes */
for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++)
;
/*
* If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
* avoid interpretation as a negative number.
*/
prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(d, len + prepend);
if (prepend)
d[4] = 0;
if (len != 0)
memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
const u_char *d;
size_t len, olen;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0)
return r;
len = olen;
/* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */
if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0))
return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE;
/* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */
if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 ||
(len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0))
return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
/* Trim leading zeros */
while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) {
d++;
len--;
}
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = d;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
index d0d791b50a34..2e61d3bcd809 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
@@ -1,224 +1,180 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.5 2016/01/12 23:42:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.8 2019/11/15 06:00:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
int
-sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v)
+sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp)
{
+ BIGNUM *v;
const u_char *d;
size_t len;
int r;
+ if (valp != NULL)
+ *valp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(buf, &d, &len)) != 0)
return r;
- if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v)
-{
- const u_char *d = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
- u_int16_t len_bits;
- size_t len_bytes;
-
- /* Length in bits */
- if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2)
- return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- len_bits = PEEK_U16(d);
- len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) >> 3;
- if (len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
- return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
- if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2 + len_bytes)
- return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d + 2, len_bytes, v) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if (sshbuf_consume(buf, 2 + len_bytes) != 0) {
- SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
- SSHBUF_ABORT();
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (valp != NULL) {
+ if ((v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL) {
+ BN_clear_free(v);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ *valp = v;
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
static int
get_ec(const u_char *d, size_t len, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
/* Refuse overlong bignums */
if (len == 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT)
return SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE;
/* Only handle uncompressed points */
if (*d != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (v != NULL && EC_POINT_oct2point(g, v, d, len, NULL) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX assumption */
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
const u_char *d;
size_t len;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if ((r = get_ec(d, len, v, g)) != 0)
return r;
/* Skip string */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v)
{
EC_POINT *pt = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
int r;
const u_char *d;
size_t len;
if (pt == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) {
EC_POINT_free(pt);
return r;
}
if ((r = get_ec(d, len, pt, EC_KEY_get0_group(v))) != 0) {
EC_POINT_free(pt);
return r;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(v, pt) != 1) {
EC_POINT_free(pt);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX assumption */
}
EC_POINT_free(pt);
/* Skip string */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
int
sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v)
{
u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1];
int len = BN_num_bytes(v), prepend = 0, r;
if (len < 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*d = '\0';
if (BN_bn2bin(v, d + 1) != len)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
/* If MSB is set, prepend a \0 */
if (len > 0 && (d[1] & 0x80) != 0)
prepend = 1;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d + 1 - prepend, len + prepend)) < 0) {
explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
return r;
}
explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
return 0;
}
-int
-sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v)
-{
- int r, len_bits = BN_num_bits(v);
- size_t len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) / 8;
- u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM], *dp;
-
- if (len_bits < 0 || len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if (BN_bn2bin(v, d) != (int)len_bytes)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
- if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len_bytes + 2, &dp)) < 0) {
- explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
- return r;
- }
- POKE_U16(dp, len_bits);
- if (len_bytes != 0)
- memcpy(dp + 2, d, len_bytes);
- explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
- return 0;
-}
-
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT];
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
size_t len;
int ret;
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, bn_ctx)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) {
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ NULL, 0, NULL)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) {
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- d, len, bn_ctx) != len) {
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ d, len, NULL) != len) {
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
ret = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d, len);
explicit_bzero(d, len);
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_ec(buf, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(v),
EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-io.c b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-io.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..13ef40e7d272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-io.c,v 1.2 2020/01/25 23:28:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/* Load a file from a fd into a buffer */
+int
+sshbuf_load_fd(int fd, struct sshbuf **blobp)
+{
+ u_char buf[4096];
+ size_t len;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+ struct sshbuf *blob;
+
+ *blobp = NULL;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ st.st_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE)
+ break;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshbuf_len(blob) > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *blobp = blob;
+ blob = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_load_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf **bufp)
+{
+ int r, fd, oerrno;
+
+ *bufp = NULL;
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, bufp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ if (r != 0)
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ int fd, oerrno;
+
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+ sshbuf_len(buf)) != sshbuf_len(buf) || close(fd) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ unlink(path);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c
index 15dcfbc79196..80714d1f3839 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c
@@ -1,161 +1,271 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.6 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.17 2021/08/11 05:21:32 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "ssherr.h"
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "sshbuf.h"
void
sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f)
{
size_t i, j;
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i);
for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
if (j < len)
fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]);
else
fprintf(f, " ");
}
fprintf(f, " ");
for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
if (j < len) {
if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j]))
fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]);
else
fprintf(f, ".");
}
}
fprintf(f, "\n");
}
}
void
-sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f)
+sshbuf_dump(const struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f)
{
- fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf));
+ fprintf(f, "buffer len = %zu\n", sshbuf_len(buf));
sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f);
}
char *
sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf);
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
char *ret;
const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
if (len == 0)
return strdup("");
if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf];
}
ret[j] = '\0';
return ret;
}
+int
+sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap)
+{
+ size_t i, slen = 0;
+ char *s = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (d == NULL || b64 == NULL || sshbuf_len(d) >= SIZE_MAX / 2)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (sshbuf_len(d) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ slen = ((sshbuf_len(d) + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1;
+ if ((s = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (b64_ntop(sshbuf_ptr(d), sshbuf_len(d), s, slen) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (wrap) {
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, s[i])) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((i - 1) % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(b64, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ r = 0;
+ fail:
+ freezero(s, slen);
+ return r;
+}
+
char *
-sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf)
+sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap)
{
- size_t len = sshbuf_len(buf), plen;
- const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+ struct sshbuf *tmp;
char *ret;
- int r;
- if (len == 0)
- return strdup("");
- plen = ((len + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1;
- if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(plen)) == NULL)
+ if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
- if ((r = b64_ntop(p, len, ret, plen)) == -1) {
- explicit_bzero(ret, plen);
- free(ret);
+ if (sshbuf_dtob64(buf, tmp, wrap) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
+ ret = sshbuf_dup_string(tmp);
+ sshbuf_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64)
{
size_t plen = strlen(b64);
int nlen, r;
u_char *p;
if (plen == 0)
return 0;
if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) {
- explicit_bzero(p, plen);
- free(p);
+ freezero(p, plen);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) {
- explicit_bzero(p, plen);
- free(p);
+ freezero(p, plen);
return r;
}
- explicit_bzero(p, plen);
- free(p);
+ freezero(p, plen);
return 0;
}
+int
+sshbuf_dtourlb64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_char *p;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ size_t i, l;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ /* Encode using regular base64; we'll transform it once done */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(d, b, wrap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* remove padding from end of encoded string*/
+ for (;;) {
+ l = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if (l <= 1 || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_ptr(b)[l - 1] != '=')
+ break;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(b, 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Replace characters with rfc4648 equivalents */
+ l = sshbuf_len(b);
+ if ((p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ if (p[i] == '+')
+ p[i] = '-';
+ else if (p[i] == '/')
+ p[i] = '_';
+ }
+ r = sshbuf_putb(b64, b);
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
char *
sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
const u_char *p = NULL, *s = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
size_t l = sshbuf_len(buf);
char *r;
if (s == NULL || l > SIZE_MAX)
return NULL;
/* accept a nul only as the last character in the buffer */
if (l > 0 && (p = memchr(s, '\0', l)) != NULL) {
if (p != s + l - 1)
return NULL;
l--; /* the nul is put back below */
}
if ((r = malloc(l + 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (l > 0)
memcpy(r, s, l);
r[l] = '\0';
return r;
}
+int
+sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
+ const void *s, size_t len)
+{
+ if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(b) + offset, s, len) != 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
+ const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp)
+{
+ void *p;
+
+ if (offsetp != NULL)
+ *offsetp = 0;
+ if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if (start_offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (start_offset > sshbuf_len(b) || start_offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
+ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ if ((p = memmem(sshbuf_ptr(b) + start_offset,
+ sshbuf_len(b) - start_offset, s, len)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (offsetp != NULL)
+ *offsetp = (const u_char *)p - sshbuf_ptr(b);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.c b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.c
index 20ddf9eb6272..368ba7980b75 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.c
@@ -1,399 +1,401 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.12 2018/07/09 21:56:06 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.15 2020/02/26 13:40:09 jsg Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
static inline int
sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
SSHBUF_TELL("sanity");
if (__predict_false(buf == NULL ||
(!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) ||
buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX ||
buf->cd == NULL ||
buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
buf->alloc > buf->max_size ||
buf->size > buf->alloc ||
buf->off > buf->size)) {
/* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
- signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
raise(SIGSEGV);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static void
sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force)
{
SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force));
SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack");
if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return;
if (force ||
(buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) {
memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off);
buf->size -= buf->off;
buf->off = 0;
SSHBUF_TELL("packed");
}
}
struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_new(void)
{
struct sshbuf *ret;
if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
ret->readonly = 0;
ret->refcount = 1;
ret->parent = NULL;
if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len)
{
struct sshbuf *ret;
if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
(ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len;
ret->readonly = 1;
ret->refcount = 1;
ret->parent = NULL;
ret->cd = blob;
ret->d = NULL;
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0)
return r;
child->parent = parent;
child->parent->refcount++;
return 0;
}
struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
struct sshbuf *ret;
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return NULL;
if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
void
sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (buf == NULL)
return;
/*
* The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest
* course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may
* have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would
* be bad.
*/
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return;
- /*
- * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference
- * count and possibly free it.
- */
- sshbuf_free(buf->parent);
- buf->parent = NULL;
+
/*
* If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just
* yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our
* refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free.
*/
buf->refcount--;
if (buf->refcount > 0)
return;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference
+ * count and possibly free it.
+ */
+ sshbuf_free(buf->parent);
+ buf->parent = NULL;
+
if (!buf->readonly) {
explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc);
free(buf->d);
}
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(*buf));
- free(buf);
+ freezero(buf, sizeof(*buf));
}
void
sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
u_char *d;
if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) {
/* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */
buf->off = buf->size;
return;
}
(void) sshbuf_check_sanity(buf);
buf->off = buf->size = 0;
if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) {
if ((d = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT,
1)) != NULL) {
buf->cd = buf->d = d;
buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
}
}
explicit_bzero(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT);
}
size_t
sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->max_size;
}
size_t
sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->alloc;
}
const struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->parent;
}
u_int
sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->refcount;
}
int
sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size)
{
size_t rlen;
u_char *dp;
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (max_size == buf->max_size)
return 0;
if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
/* pack and realloc if necessary */
sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size);
if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) {
if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)
rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
else
rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
if (rlen > max_size)
rlen = max_size;
SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen));
if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
buf->alloc = rlen;
}
SSHBUF_TELL("new-max");
if (max_size < buf->alloc)
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
buf->max_size = max_size;
return 0;
}
size_t
sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return 0;
return buf->size - buf->off;
}
size_t
sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return 0;
return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off);
}
const u_char *
sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return NULL;
return buf->cd + buf->off;
}
u_char *
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return NULL;
return buf->d + buf->off;
}
int
sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
SSHBUF_TELL("check");
/* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
size_t rlen, need;
u_char *dp;
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
* then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
*/
sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
SSHBUF_TELL("allocate");
if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc)
return 0; /* already have it. */
/*
* Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
* allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
*/
need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
if (rlen > buf->max_size)
rlen = buf->alloc + need;
SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
buf->alloc = rlen;
buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
/* shouldn't fail */
return r;
}
SSHBUF_TELL("done");
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
{
u_char *dp;
int r;
if (dpp != NULL)
*dpp = NULL;
SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
dp = buf->d + buf->size;
buf->size += len;
if (dpp != NULL)
*dpp = dp;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
buf->off += len;
/* deal with empty buffer */
if (buf->off == buf->size)
buf->off = buf->size = 0;
SSHBUF_TELL("done");
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
buf->size -= len;
SSHBUF_TELL("done");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.h b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.h
index a43598cac4de..2ad0e61be120 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshbuf.h
@@ -1,348 +1,411 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.11 2018/07/09 21:56:06 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.23 2020/06/22 05:54:10 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _SSHBUF_H
#define _SSHBUF_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */
#define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */
#define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */
#define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
/*
* NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque
* one day.
*/
struct sshbuf {
u_char *d; /* Data */
const u_char *cd; /* Const data */
size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */
size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */
size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */
size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */
int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */
int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */
u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */
struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */
};
/*
* Create a new sshbuf buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing
* buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the
* resultant buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in
* an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process).
* The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant
* buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp);
/*
* Clear and free buf
*/
void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved.
*/
void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Return the maximum size of buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Set the maximum size of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size);
/*
* Returns the length of data in buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size.
*/
size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf
*/
const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or
* NULL if the buffer is read-only.
*/
u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
* Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
* with unsigned overflows correctly.
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
* Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
* required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Reserve len bytes in buf.
* Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
- * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ * optional dpp parameter or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
/*
* Consume len bytes from the start of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Consume len bytes from the end of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/* Extract or deposit some bytes */
int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
/* Append using a printf(3) format */
int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap);
/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp);
int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val);
+/* Functions to peek at the contents of a buffer without modifying it. */
+int sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+ u_int64_t *valp);
+int sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+ u_int32_t *valp);
+int sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+ u_int16_t *valp);
+int sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+ u_char *valp);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to poke values into an existing buffer (e.g. a length header
+ * to a packet). The destination bytes must already exist in the buffer.
+ */
+int sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val);
+int sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val);
+int sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val);
+int sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val);
+int sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len);
+
/*
* Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data)
* The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents.
* Caller must free *valp.
*/
int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v);
int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v);
int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
/*
* "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to
* avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the
* next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free.
*/
int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp);
/* Skip past a string */
#define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)
/* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */
int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp);
-/* XXX peek_u8 / peek_u32 */
/*
* Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic
* curve points.
*/
int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v);
-int sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v);
+int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp);
int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
-int sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v);
int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */
-void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f);
+void sshbuf_dump(const struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f);
/* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */
void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f);
/* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */
char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf);
/* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */
-char *sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf);
+char *sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap);
+int sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap);
+/* RFC4648 "base64url" encoding variant */
+int sshbuf_dtourlb64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap);
/* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */
int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64);
+/*
+ * Tests whether the buffer contains the specified byte sequence at the
+ * specified offset. Returns 0 on successful match, or a ssherr.h code
+ * otherwise. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
+ * present but the buffer contents did not match those supplied. Zero-
+ * length comparisons are not allowed.
+ *
+ * If sufficient data is present to make a comparison, then it is
+ * performed with timing independent of the value of the data. If
+ * insufficient data is present then the comparison is not attempted at
+ * all.
+ */
+int sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
+ const void *s, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Searches the buffer for the specified string. Returns 0 on success
+ * and updates *offsetp with the offset of the first match, relative to
+ * the start of the buffer. Otherwise sshbuf_find will return a ssherr.h
+ * error code. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
+ * present in the buffer for a match to be possible but none was found.
+ * Searches for zero-length data are not allowed.
+ */
+int
+sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
+ const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp);
+
/*
* Duplicate the contents of a buffer to a string (caller to free).
* Returns NULL on buffer error, or if the buffer contains a premature
* nul character.
*/
char *sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf);
+/*
+ * Fill a buffer from a file descriptor or filename. Both allocate the
+ * buffer for the caller.
+ */
+int sshbuf_load_fd(int, struct sshbuf **)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+int sshbuf_load_file(const char *, struct sshbuf **)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+
+/*
+ * Write a buffer to a path, creating/truncating as needed (mode 0644,
+ * subject to umask). The buffer contents are not modified.
+ */
+int sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+
/* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */
#define PEEK_U64(p) \
(((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \
(u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7]))
#define PEEK_U32(p) \
(((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \
((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \
((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \
(u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]))
#define PEEK_U16(p) \
(((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \
(u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]))
#define POKE_U64(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int64_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
#define POKE_U32(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int32_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
#define POKE_U16(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int16_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
/* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */
#ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL
/*
* Return the allocation size of buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Increment the reference count of buf.
*/
int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent);
/*
* Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent.
*/
const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Return the reference count of buf
*/
u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf);
# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */
# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */
# define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */
/* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */
/* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */
# ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT
# define SSHBUF_ABORT()
# endif
# ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG
# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \
printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \
__FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \
buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \
printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \
printf x; \
printf("\n"); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
# else
# define SSHBUF_TELL(what)
# define SSHBUF_DBG(x)
# endif
#endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */
#endif /* _SSHBUF_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index b50029de71b8..8f7541942ac1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,1584 +1,1710 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.305 2018/09/20 03:30:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.355 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
* login (authentication) dialog.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
# include <ifaddrs.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfd.h"
+#include "kex.h"
-char *client_version_string = NULL;
-char *server_version_string = NULL;
struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL;
static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
/* import */
+extern int debug_flag;
extern Options options;
extern char *__progname;
static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *);
static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *);
/* Expand a proxy command */
static char *
expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
- const char *host, int port)
+ const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port)
{
char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ const char *keyalias = options.host_key_alias ?
+ options.host_key_alias : host_arg;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
- ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport,
- "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ ret = percent_expand(tmp,
+ "h", host,
+ "k", keyalias,
+ "n", host_arg,
+ "p", strport,
+ "r", options.user,
+ (char *)NULL);
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a
* a connected fd back to us.
*/
static int
-ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
- const char *proxy_command)
+ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host,
+ const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
{
char *command_string;
int sp[2], sock;
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0)
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) == -1)
fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with "
"proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
- host, port);
+ host, host_arg, port);
debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string);
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
close(sp[1]);
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
if (sp[0] != 0) {
- if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0)
+ if (dup2(sp[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
}
if (sp[0] != 1) {
- if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0)
+ if (dup2(sp[0], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
}
if (sp[0] >= 2)
close(sp[0]);
/*
- * Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
- * printed on the user's terminal.
+ * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
+ * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
*/
+ if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
+ options.control_persist && stdfd_devnull(0, 0, 1) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/*
* Execute the proxy command.
* Note that we gave up any extra privileges above.
*/
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
- if (pid < 0)
+ if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sp[0]);
free(command_string);
if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1)
fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection");
close(sp[1]);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
*/
static int
-ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
- const char *proxy_command)
+ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
+ u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
{
char *command_string;
int pin[2], pout[2];
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
- if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
+ if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1)
fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
- host, port);
+ host, host_arg, port);
debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
close(pin[1]);
if (pin[0] != 0) {
- if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+ if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
close(pin[0]);
}
close(pout[0]);
- if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+ if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
/* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
close(pout[1]);
- /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
- printed on the user's terminal. */
+ /*
+ * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
+ * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
+ */
+ if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
+ options.control_persist && stdfd_devnull(0, 0, 1) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
- /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
- extra privileges above. */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ /*
+ * Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
+ * extra privileges above.
+ */
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
- if (pid < 0)
+ if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
/* Close child side of the descriptors. */
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
/* Free the command name. */
free(command_string);
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
void
ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
{
/*
* Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
* case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
*/
if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
}
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
/*
* Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an
* address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface.
* Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
static int
check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs,
struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
struct sockaddr_in *sa;
struct in6_addr *v6addr;
const struct ifaddrs *ifa;
int allow_local;
/*
* Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them
* if nothing else matches.
*/
for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) {
for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL ||
(ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 ||
ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af ||
strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0)
continue;
switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr;
if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr ==
htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
- error("%s: v4 addr doesn't fit",
- __func__);
+ error_f("v4 addr doesn't fit");
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp);
return 0;
case AF_INET6:
sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr;
v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr;
if (!allow_local &&
(IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr)))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) {
- error("%s: v6 addr doesn't fit",
- __func__);
+ error_f("v6 addr doesn't fit");
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp);
return 0;
}
}
}
return -1;
}
#endif
/*
* Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection.
*/
static int
ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai)
{
int sock, r;
struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr;
socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0;
struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL;
#endif
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
- if (sock < 0) {
+ if (sock == -1) {
error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ /* Use interactive QOS (if specified) until authentication completed */
+ if (options.ip_qos_interactive != INT_MAX)
+ set_sock_tos(sock, options.ip_qos_interactive);
+
/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL)
return sock;
if (options.bind_address != NULL) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL,
&hints, &res)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
if (res == NULL) {
error("getaddrinfo: no addrs");
goto fail;
}
- if (res->ai_addrlen > sizeof(bindaddr)) {
- error("%s: addr doesn't fit", __func__);
- goto fail;
- }
memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen;
} else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) {
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) {
error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface,
- strerror(errno));
+ strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr);
if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family,
ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) {
logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses",
- options.bind_interface);
+ options.bind_interface);
goto fail;
}
#else
error("BindInterface not supported on this platform.");
#endif
}
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
- error("%s: getnameinfo failed: %s", __func__,
- ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+ error_f("getnameinfo failed: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) {
error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
- debug("%s: bound to %s", __func__, ntop);
+ debug_f("bound to %s", ntop);
/* success */
goto out;
fail:
close(sock);
sock = -1;
out:
if (res != NULL)
freeaddrinfo(res);
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if (ifaddrs != NULL)
freeifaddrs(ifaddrs);
#endif
return sock;
}
-/*
- * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates
- * *timeoutp with time remaining.
- * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
- */
-static int
-waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp)
-{
- struct pollfd pfd;
- struct timeval t_start;
- int oerrno, r;
-
- monotime_tv(&t_start);
- pfd.fd = fd;
- pfd.events = POLLIN;
- for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) {
- r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp);
- oerrno = errno;
- ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
- errno = oerrno;
- if (r > 0)
- return 0;
- else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN)
- return -1;
- else if (r == 0)
- break;
- }
- /* timeout */
- errno = ETIMEDOUT;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int
-timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
- socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
-{
- int optval = 0;
- socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval);
-
- /* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */
- if (*timeoutp <= 0)
- return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
-
- set_nonblock(sockfd);
- if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) {
- /* Succeeded already? */
- unset_nonblock(sockfd);
- return 0;
- } else if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
- return -1;
-
- if (waitrfd(sockfd, timeoutp) == -1)
- return -1;
-
- /* Completed or failed */
- if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) {
- debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (optval != 0) {
- errno = optval;
- return -1;
- }
- unset_nonblock(sockfd);
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
* The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
* If port is 0, the default port will be used.
* Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
* second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
* and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
* the daemon.
*/
static int
ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
- struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
- int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
+ struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int connection_attempts,
+ int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
{
- int on = 1;
+ int on = 1, saved_timeout_ms = *timeout_ms;
int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo *ai;
- debug2("%s", __func__);
+ debug3_f("entering");
memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop));
memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport));
for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
if (attempt > 0) {
/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
sleep(1);
debug("Trying again...");
}
/*
* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
* sequence until the connection succeeds.
*/
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) {
errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
continue;
}
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
- error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
+ error_f("getnameinfo failed");
errno = oerrno;
continue;
}
debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
host, ntop, strport);
/* Create a socket for connecting. */
sock = ssh_create_socket(ai);
if (sock < 0) {
/* Any error is already output */
errno = 0;
continue;
}
+ *timeout_ms = saved_timeout_ms;
if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
timeout_ms) >= 0) {
/* Successful connection. */
memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
break;
} else {
oerrno = errno;
debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
sock = -1;
errno = oerrno;
}
}
if (sock != -1)
break; /* Successful connection. */
}
/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
if (sock == -1) {
error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
debug("Connection established.");
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (want_keepalive &&
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
- sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
- return 0;
+ return 0;
}
int
-ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs,
- struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
+ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
+ struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port,
int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
{
+ int in, out;
+
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port,
- family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive);
+ connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive);
} else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
- if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh,
- STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO)) == NULL)
+ if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
+ (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) {
+ if (in >= 0)
+ close(in);
+ error_f("dup() in/out failed");
+ return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
+ }
+ if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, in, out)) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
} else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
- return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, port,
+ return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
options.proxy_command);
}
- return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, port, options.proxy_command);
-}
-
-static void
-send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
-{
- /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
- xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\n",
- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
- *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
- options.version_addendum);
- if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
- strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
- fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- chop(client_version_string);
- debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
-}
-
-/*
- * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
- * identification string.
- */
-void
-ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
-{
- char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
- int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
- int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
- int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
- u_int i, n;
- size_t len;
- int rc;
-
- send_client_banner(connection_out, 0);
-
- /* Read other side's version identification. */
- for (n = 0;;) {
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (timeout_ms > 0) {
- rc = waitrfd(connection_in, &timeout_ms);
- if (rc == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
- fatal("Connection timed out during "
- "banner exchange");
- } else if (rc == -1) {
- fatal("%s: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-
- len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
- if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
- "Connection closed by remote host");
- else if (len != 1)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
- "read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = '\n';
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
- continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
- break;
- }
- if (++n > 65536)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
- "No banner received");
- }
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
- if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
- break;
- debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
- }
- server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
-
- /*
- * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
- * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
- */
- if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
- &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
- fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
- debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
- remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
-
- active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
- mismatch = 0;
-
- switch (remote_major) {
- case 2:
- break;
- case 1:
- if (remote_minor != 99)
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- default:
- mismatch = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (mismatch)
- fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major);
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
- logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
- "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
- chop(server_version_string);
+ return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
+ options.proxy_command);
}
/* defaults to 'no' */
static int
-confirm(const char *prompt)
+confirm(const char *prompt, const char *fingerprint)
{
const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
- char *p;
+ const char *again_fp = "Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: ";
+ char *p, *cp;
int ret = -1;
if (options.batch_mode)
return 0;
- for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) {
- p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
+ for (msg = prompt;;msg = fingerprint ? again_fp : again) {
+ cp = p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
if (p == NULL)
return 0;
- p[strcspn(p, "\n")] = '\0';
+ p += strspn(p, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
+ p[strcspn(p, " \t\n")] = '\0'; /* remove trailing whitespace */
if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0)
ret = 0;
- else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
+ else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0 || (fingerprint != NULL &&
+ strcmp(p, fingerprint) == 0))
ret = 1;
- free(p);
+ free(cp);
if (ret != -1)
return ret;
}
}
-static int
-check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *key)
-{
- const char *reason;
- int r;
-
- if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) {
- error("%s", reason);
- return 0;
- }
- if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) {
- error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
- "critical options(s)", host);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
- options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
- logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
- (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
- "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
static int
sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
{
switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
case AF_INET6:
return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
* host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
*/
void
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
{
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
socklen_t addrlen;
switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
case -1:
addrlen = 0;
break;
case AF_INET:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
break;
case AF_INET6:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
break;
default:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
break;
}
/*
* We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
* using a proxy command
*/
if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
- fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("getnameinfo failed");
*hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
} else {
*hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
"command>");
}
}
/*
* Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
* differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh
* tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
* sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
*/
if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
*hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
} else {
*hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
}
}
}
+/* returns non-zero if path appears in hostfiles, or 0 if not. */
+static int
+path_in_hostfiles(const char *path, char **hostfiles, u_int num_hostfiles)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_hostfiles; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(path, hostfiles[i]) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct find_by_key_ctx {
+ const char *host, *ip;
+ const struct sshkey *key;
+ char **names;
+ u_int nnames;
+};
+
+/* Try to replace home directory prefix (per $HOME) with a ~/ sequence */
+static char *
+try_tilde_unexpand(const char *path)
+{
+ char *home, *ret = NULL;
+ size_t l;
+
+ if (*path != '/')
+ return xstrdup(path);
+ if ((home = getenv("HOME")) == NULL || (l = strlen(home)) == 0)
+ return xstrdup(path);
+ if (strncmp(path, home, l) != 0)
+ return xstrdup(path);
+ /*
+ * ensure we have matched on a path boundary: either the $HOME that
+ * we just compared ends with a '/' or the next character of the path
+ * must be a '/'.
+ */
+ if (home[l - 1] != '/' && path[l] != '/')
+ return xstrdup(path);
+ if (path[l] == '/')
+ l++;
+ xasprintf(&ret, "~/%s", path + l);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+hostkeys_find_by_key_cb(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+ struct find_by_key_ctx *ctx = (struct find_by_key_ctx *)_ctx;
+ char *path;
+
+ /* we are looking for keys with names that *do not* match */
+ if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* not interested in marker lines */
+ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE)
+ return 0;
+ /* we are only interested in exact key matches */
+ if (l->key == NULL || !sshkey_equal(ctx->key, l->key))
+ return 0;
+ path = try_tilde_unexpand(l->path);
+ debug_f("found matching key in %s:%lu", path, l->linenum);
+ ctx->names = xrecallocarray(ctx->names,
+ ctx->nnames, ctx->nnames + 1, sizeof(*ctx->names));
+ xasprintf(&ctx->names[ctx->nnames], "%s:%lu: %s", path, l->linenum,
+ strncmp(l->hosts, HASH_MAGIC, strlen(HASH_MAGIC)) == 0 ?
+ "[hashed name]" : l->hosts);
+ ctx->nnames++;
+ free(path);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(const char *file, const char *which,
+ struct find_by_key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ debug3_f("trying %s hostfile \"%s\"", which, file);
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(file, hostkeys_find_by_key_cb, ctx,
+ ctx->host, ctx->ip, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist", file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", file);
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find 'key' in known hosts file(s) that do not match host/ip.
+ * Used to display also-known-as information for previously-unseen hostkeys.
+ */
+static void
+hostkeys_find_by_key(const char *host, const char *ip, const struct sshkey *key,
+ char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
+ char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles,
+ char ***names, u_int *nnames)
+{
+ struct find_by_key_ctx ctx = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ u_int i;
+
+ *names = NULL;
+ *nnames = 0;
+
+ if (key == NULL || sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ return;
+
+ ctx.host = host;
+ ctx.ip = ip;
+ ctx.key = key;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+ if (hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(user_hostfiles[i],
+ "user", &ctx) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) {
+ if (hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(system_hostfiles[i],
+ "system", &ctx) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *names = ctx.names;
+ *nnames = ctx.nnames;
+ ctx.names = NULL;
+ ctx.nnames = 0;
+ return;
+ fail:
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx.nnames; i++)
+ free(ctx.names[i]);
+ free(ctx.names);
+}
+
+#define MAX_OTHER_NAMES 8 /* Maximum number of names to list */
+static char *
+other_hostkeys_message(const char *host, const char *ip,
+ const struct sshkey *key,
+ char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
+ char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL, **othernames = NULL;
+ u_int i, n, num_othernames = 0;
+
+ hostkeys_find_by_key(host, ip, key,
+ user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
+ system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles,
+ &othernames, &num_othernames);
+ if (num_othernames == 0)
+ return xstrdup("This key is not known by any other names");
+
+ xasprintf(&ret, "This host key is known by the following other "
+ "names/addresses:");
+
+ n = num_othernames;
+ if (n > MAX_OTHER_NAMES)
+ n = MAX_OTHER_NAMES;
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ xextendf(&ret, "\n", " %s", othernames[i]);
+ }
+ if (n < num_othernames) {
+ xextendf(&ret, "\n", " (%d additional names omitted)",
+ num_othernames - n);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_othernames; i++)
+ free(othernames[i]);
+ free(othernames);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
+ const char *invocation, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo,
+ const struct sshkey *host_key, const char *hostfile_hostname)
+{
+ int r, i, ac = 0;
+ char *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL, *tmp;
+ char *command = NULL, *tag = NULL, **av = NULL;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ pid_t pid;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+ xasprintf(&tag, "KnownHostsCommand-%s", invocation);
+
+ if (host_key != NULL) {
+ if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(host_key, &keytext)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
+ }
+ /*
+ * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+ * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+ */
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+ if (argv_split(command_template, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
+ error("%s \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", tag,
+ command_template);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ac == 0) {
+ error("%s \"%s\" yielded no arguments", tag,
+ command_template);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+ tmp = percent_dollar_expand(av[i],
+ DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+ "H", hostfile_hostname,
+ "I", invocation,
+ "t", host_key == NULL ? "NONE" : sshkey_ssh_name(host_key),
+ "f", key_fp == NULL ? "NONE" : key_fp,
+ "K", keytext == NULL ? "NONE" : keytext,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
+ free(av[i]);
+ av[i] = tmp;
+ }
+ /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+ command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
+
+ if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
+
+ if (exited_cleanly(pid, tag, command, 0) != 0)
+ fatal("KnownHostsCommand failed");
+
+ out:
+ if (f != NULL)
+ fclose(f);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ free(av[i]);
+ free(av);
+ free(tag);
+ free(command);
+ free(key_fp);
+ free(keytext);
+}
+
/*
* check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
* is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
*/
#define RDRW 0
#define RDONLY 1
#define ROQUIET 2
static int
-check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly,
+check_host_key(char *hostname, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo,
+ struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly, int clobber_port,
char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
- char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
+ char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles,
+ const char *hostfile_command)
{
- HostStatus host_status;
- HostStatus ip_status;
+ HostStatus host_status = -1, ip_status = -1;
struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL;
char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
char msg[1024];
- const char *type;
- const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
- int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
+ const char *type, *fail_reason;
+ const struct hostkey_entry *host_found = NULL, *ip_found = NULL;
+ int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
u_int i;
/*
* Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
* problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
* machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
* them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
* essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
* this is probably not a real problem.
*/
if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
"loopback/localhost.");
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
return 0;
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
* In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
*/
- get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip);
+ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr,
+ clobber_port ? 0 : port, &host, &ip);
/*
* Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
* command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
options.check_host_ip = 0;
host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]);
+ load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i], 0);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]);
+ load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i], 0);
+ if (hostfile_command != NULL && !clobber_port) {
+ load_hostkeys_command(host_hostkeys, hostfile_command,
+ "HOSTNAME", cinfo, host_key, host);
+ }
ip_hostkeys = NULL;
if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]);
+ load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i], 0);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]);
+ load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i], 0);
+ if (hostfile_command != NULL && !clobber_port) {
+ load_hostkeys_command(ip_hostkeys, hostfile_command,
+ "ADDRESS", cinfo, host_key, ip);
+ }
}
retry:
/* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key);
type = sshkey_type(host_key);
/*
* Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
* hosts or in the systemwide list.
*/
host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
&host_found);
+ /*
+ * If there are no hostfiles, or if the hostkey was found via
+ * KnownHostsCommand, then don't try to touch the disk.
+ */
+ if (!readonly && (num_user_hostfiles == 0 ||
+ (host_found != NULL && host_found->note != 0)))
+ readonly = RDONLY;
+
/*
* Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
* localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
* address to begin with.
*/
if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
&ip_found);
if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
- (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
+ (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
(ip_found != NULL &&
!sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
host_ip_differ = 1;
} else
ip_status = host_status;
switch (host_status) {
case HOST_OK:
/* The host is known and the key matches. */
debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
- if (want_cert &&
- !check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ?
- hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key))
- goto fail;
+ if (want_cert) {
+ if (sshkey_cert_check_host(host_key,
+ options.host_key_alias == NULL ?
+ hostname : options.host_key_alias, 0,
+ options.ca_sign_algorithms, &fail_reason) != 0) {
+ error("%s", fail_reason);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Do not attempt hostkey update if a certificate was
+ * successfully matched.
+ */
+ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0) {
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ debug3_f("certificate host key in use; "
+ "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
+ }
+ }
+ /* Turn off UpdateHostkeys if key was in system known_hosts */
+ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 &&
+ (path_in_hostfiles(host_found->file,
+ system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) ||
+ (ip_status == HOST_OK && ip_found != NULL &&
+ path_in_hostfiles(ip_found->file,
+ system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles)))) {
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ debug3_f("host key found in GlobalKnownHostsFile; "
+ "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
+ }
+ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && host_found->note) {
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ debug3_f("host key found via KnownHostsCommand; "
+ "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
+ }
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
if (readonly || want_cert)
logit("%s host key for IP address "
"'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
type, ip);
else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
"address '%.128s' to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", type, ip,
user_hostfiles[0]);
else
logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
"key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
"of known hosts.", type, ip);
} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
hostkey_trusted = 1;
break;
case HOST_NEW:
if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
- port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
+ port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT && !clobber_port) {
debug("checking without port identifier");
- if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
- ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
- system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
+ if (check_host_key(hostname, cinfo, hostaddr, 0,
+ host_key, ROQUIET, 1,
+ user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
+ system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles,
+ hostfile_command) == 0) {
debug("found matching key w/out port");
break;
}
}
if (readonly || want_cert)
goto fail;
/* The host is new. */
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) {
/*
* User has requested strict host key checking. We
* will not add the host key automatically. The only
* alternative left is to abort.
*/
error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
"have requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
- char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
+ char *msg1 = NULL, *msg2 = NULL;
+
+ xasprintf(&msg1, "The authenticity of host "
+ "'%.200s (%s)' can't be established", host, ip);
+
+ if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) {
+ xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "but keys of different "
+ "type are already known for this host.");
+ } else
+ xextendf(&msg1, "", ".");
- if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
- snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
- "\nbut keys of different type are already"
- " known for this host.");
- else
- snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
- /* The default */
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
- msg2[0] = '\0';
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s key fingerprint is %s.",
+ type, fp);
+ if (options.visual_host_key)
+ xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s", ra);
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- if (matching_host_key_dns)
- snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
- "Matching host key fingerprint"
- " found in DNS.\n");
- else
- snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
- "No matching host key fingerprint"
- " found in DNS.\n");
+ xextendf(&msg1, "\n",
+ "%s host key fingerprint found in DNS.",
+ matching_host_key_dns ?
+ "Matching" : "No matching");
}
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
- "established%s\n"
- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
+ /* msg2 informs for other names matching this key */
+ if ((msg2 = other_hostkeys_message(host, ip, host_key,
+ user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
+ system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles)) != NULL)
+ xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s", msg2);
+
+ xextendf(&msg1, "\n",
"Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
- "(yes/no)? ",
- host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
- options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
- options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
- msg2);
+ "(yes/no/[fingerprint])? ");
+
+ confirmed = confirm(msg1, fp);
free(ra);
free(fp);
- if (!confirm(msg))
+ free(msg1);
+ free(msg2);
+ if (!confirmed)
goto fail;
hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
}
/*
* If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically
* to the local known_hosts file.
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
hostp = hostline;
if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
} else {
/* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
hostline, host_key,
options.hash_known_hosts);
}
} else {
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
hostp = host;
}
if (!r)
logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]);
else
logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
"list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
break;
case HOST_REVOKED:
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host);
error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to");
error("impersonate this host.");
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
}
goto continue_unsafe;
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (want_cert) {
/*
* This is only a debug() since it is valid to have
* CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match
* all hosts that one might visit.
*/
debug("Host certificate authority does not "
"match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
host_found->file, host_found->line);
goto fail;
}
if (readonly == ROQUIET)
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
char *key_msg;
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
key_msg = "is unknown";
else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
key_msg = "is unchanged";
else
key_msg = "has a different value";
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
user_hostfiles[0]);
error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
sshkey_type(host_found->key),
host_found->file, host_found->line);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
- error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
- "requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ error("Host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+ "requested strict checking.", host);
goto fail;
}
continue_unsafe:
/*
* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
* the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
* forwarding.
*/
if (options.password_authentication) {
error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.password_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
" to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
- options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
- cancelled_forwarding = 1;
- }
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
- error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
- " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
- options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_agent) {
error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_agent = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_x11) {
error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_x11 = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.num_local_forwards =
options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
+ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0) {
+ error("UpdateHostkeys is disabled because the host "
+ "key is not trusted.");
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ }
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
"check failure");
/*
* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
* This could be done by converting the host key to an
* identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
- * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to
+ * by that sentence, and ask the user if they wish to
* accept the authentication.
*/
break;
case HOST_FOUND:
fatal("internal error");
break;
}
if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
"differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
"\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
len = strlen(msg);
snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
"\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
}
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
"to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
- if (!confirm(msg))
+ if (!confirm(msg, NULL))
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
logit("%s", msg);
error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
goto fail;
} else {
logit("%s", msg);
}
}
if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) {
- debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: "
- "disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__);
+ debug_f("hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: "
+ "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
}
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return 0;
fail:
if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
/*
* No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
* search normally.
*/
debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key");
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "decode key");
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
- fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Couldn't drop certificate");
host_key = raw_key;
goto retry;
}
sshkey_free(raw_key);
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return -1;
}
/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
int
-verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
{
u_int i;
int r = -1, flags = 0;
char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "fingerprint host key");
r = -1;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "fingerprint CA key");
r = -1;
goto out;
}
sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert,
valid, sizeof(valid));
debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu "
"ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp,
(unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial,
host_key->cert->key_id,
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp,
valid);
for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s",
host_key->cert->principals[i]);
}
} else {
debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp);
}
if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) {
- debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key",
- __func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
+ debug2_f("server host key %s %s matches cached key",
+ sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
r = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */
if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) {
r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break; /* not revoked */
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s",
sshkey_type(host_key), fp,
options.revoked_host_keys);
r = -1;
goto out;
default:
- error("Error checking host key %s %s in "
- "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key),
- fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Error checking host key %s %s in "
+ "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(host_key),
+ fp, options.revoked_host_keys);
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
/*
* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
* them and try the plain key.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshkey_is_cert(plain))
sshkey_drop_cert(plain);
if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
matching_host_key_dns = 1;
} else {
warn_changed_key(plain);
error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
"with the new host key to get rid "
"of this message.");
}
}
}
}
- r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
- options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
- options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
+ r = check_host_key(host, cinfo, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+ RDRW, 0, options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
+ options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles,
+ options.known_hosts_command);
out:
sshkey_free(plain);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
* server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
* to the server must already have been established before this is called.
* If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
* This function does not require super-user privileges.
*/
void
-ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
- struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
+ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
+ struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
{
char *host;
char *server_user, *local_user;
+ int r;
local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
host = xstrdup(orighost);
lowercase(host);
/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
- ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);
+ if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms,
+ options.version_addendum)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
/* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
- packet_set_nonblocking();
+ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
/* key exchange */
/* authenticate user */
debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user);
- ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port);
- ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
+ ssh_kex2(ssh, host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ ssh_userauth2(ssh, local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
free(local_user);
-}
-
-void
-ssh_put_password(char *password)
-{
- int size;
- char *padded;
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) {
- packet_put_cstring(password);
- return;
- }
- size = ROUNDUP(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
- padded = xcalloc(1, size);
- strlcpy(padded, password, size);
- packet_put_string(padded, size);
- explicit_bzero(padded, size);
- free(padded);
+ free(host);
}
/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
static int
show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key)
{
int type[] = {
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_XMSS,
-1
};
int i, ret = 0;
char *fp, *ra;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
if (type[i] == key->type)
continue;
- if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i],
+ -1, &found))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
"in %s:%lu\n"
"%s key fingerprint %s.",
sshkey_type(found->key),
found->host, found->file, found->line,
sshkey_type(found->key), fp);
if (options.visual_host_key)
logit("%s", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
static void
warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key)
{
char *fp;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (fp == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
error("Please contact your system administrator.");
free(fp);
}
/*
* Execute a local command
*/
int
ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
{
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
int status;
void (*osighand)(int);
if (!options.permit_local_command ||
args == NULL || !*args)
return (1);
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
- osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osighand = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
shell, args, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
- signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
return (1);
return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
void
-maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, const struct sshkey *private,
- char *comment, char *passphrase)
+maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *authfile, struct sshkey *private,
+ const char *comment, const char *passphrase)
{
int auth_sock = -1, r;
+ const char *skprovider = NULL;
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0)
return;
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key");
return;
}
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
!ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
debug3("user denied adding this key");
close(auth_sock);
return;
}
-
- if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment, 0,
- (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0)) == 0)
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(private))
+ skprovider = options.sk_provider;
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private,
+ comment == NULL ? authfile : comment,
+ options.add_keys_to_agent_lifespan,
+ (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0, skprovider)) == 0)
debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
else
debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
close(auth_sock);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
index 890d857330cd..f518a9a1302f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
@@ -1,59 +1,94 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.35 2018/07/19 10:28:47 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.46 2020/12/22 00:15:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
struct Sensitive {
struct sshkey **keys;
int nkeys;
};
+struct ssh_conn_info {
+ char *conn_hash_hex;
+ char *shorthost;
+ char *uidstr;
+ char *keyalias;
+ char *thishost;
+ char *host_arg;
+ char *portstr;
+ char *remhost;
+ char *remuser;
+ char *homedir;
+ char *locuser;
+};
+
struct addrinfo;
struct ssh;
+struct hostkeys;
+struct ssh_conn_info;
-int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, struct addrinfo *,
- struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int, int *, int);
-void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
+/* default argument for client percent expansions */
+#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(conn_info) \
+ "C", conn_info->conn_hash_hex, \
+ "L", conn_info->shorthost, \
+ "i", conn_info->uidstr, \
+ "k", conn_info->keyalias, \
+ "l", conn_info->thishost, \
+ "n", conn_info->host_arg, \
+ "p", conn_info->portstr, \
+ "d", conn_info->homedir, \
+ "h", conn_info->remhost, \
+ "r", conn_info->remuser, \
+ "u", conn_info->locuser
-void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
- struct passwd *, int);
+int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
+ struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short,
+ int, int *, int);
+void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
-void ssh_exchange_identification(int);
+void ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *,
+ struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *);
-int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *);
+int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *);
void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
char **, char **);
-void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
-void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short);
+void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *);
-void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
-void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
+void ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *, const char *,
+ char *, Sensitive *);
-void ssh_put_password(char *);
int ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
-void maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *, const struct sshkey *, char *, char *);
+void maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *, struct sshkey *,
+ const char *, const char *);
+
+void load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *, const char *,
+ const char *, const struct ssh_conn_info *,
+ const struct sshkey *, const char *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index 1675f393561e..fea50fab61d3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,2159 +1,2337 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.288 2018/10/11 03:48:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.351 2021/07/23 05:24:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
#include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "utf8.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
/* import */
extern char *client_version_string;
extern char *server_version_string;
extern Options options;
/*
* SSH2 key exchange
*/
-u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-u_int session_id2_len = 0;
-
-char *xxx_host;
-struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
+static char *xxx_host;
+static struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
+static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
static int
verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
- if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
+ if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+ xxx_conn_info) == -1)
fatal("Host key verification failed.");
return 0;
}
+/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
+static char *
+first_alg(const char *algs)
+{
+ char *ret, *cp;
+
+ ret = xstrdup(algs);
+ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
static char *
-order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
{
- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
+ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
size_t maxlen;
- struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
int ktype;
u_int i;
/* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i], 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) {
+ load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname,
+ options.system_hostfiles[i], 0);
+ }
+ if (options.known_hosts_command != NULL) {
+ load_hostkeys_command(hostkeys, options.known_hosts_command,
+ "ORDER", cinfo, NULL, host);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
+ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
+ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
+ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
+ * plain keys if necessary.
+ */
+ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)),
+ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(best), NULL)) {
+ debug3_f("have matching best-preference key type %s, "
+ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", best);
+ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ goto out;
+ }
- oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
+ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
+ */
+ oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
first = xmalloc(maxlen);
last = xmalloc(maxlen);
*first = *last = '\0';
#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
do { \
if (*to != '\0') \
strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
} while (0)
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
- fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
+ fatal_f("unknown alg %s", alg);
+ /*
+ * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then
+ * prefer all certificate algorithms.
+ */
+ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) &&
+ lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) {
+ ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */
if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
- sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
+ sshkey_type_plain(ktype),
+ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(alg), NULL)) {
ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
- else
- ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, put it last */
+ ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
}
#undef ALG_APPEND
xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
(*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last);
if (*first != '\0')
- debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
-
+ debug3_f("prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", first);
+ else
+ debug3_f("no algorithms matched; accept original");
+ out:
+ free(best);
free(first);
free(last);
free(hostname);
free(oavail);
free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
return ret;
}
void
-ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s, *all_key;
- struct kex *kex;
- int r;
+ int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user has not specified HostkeyAlgorithms, or has only
+ * appended or removed algorithms from that list then prefer algorithms
+ * that are in the list that are supported by known_hosts keys.
+ */
+ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms == NULL ||
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '-' ||
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '+')
+ use_known_hosts_order = 1;
+
+ /* Expand or fill in HostkeyAlgorithms */
+ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
+ kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
+ free(all_key);
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
+ compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
+ compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = options.compression ?
- "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none" : "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
+ (char *)compression_alg_list(options.compression);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
- all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
- KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
- fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
- free(all_key);
+ if (use_known_hosts_order) {
+ /* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
+ order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
} else {
- /* Enforce default */
- options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
+ /* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(
- order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
+ ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
- if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
- fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
- kex = active_state->kex;
+ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
- ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
+ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
- if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
-
- session_id2 = kex->session_id;
- session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+ compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
+ if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
#endif
}
/*
* Authenticate user
*/
typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt;
typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod;
typedef struct identity Identity;
typedef struct idlist Idlist;
struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */
struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */
char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
int tried;
int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
int userprovided;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
struct cauthctxt {
const char *server_user;
const char *local_user;
const char *host;
const char *service;
struct cauthmethod *method;
sig_atomic_t success;
char *authlist;
- int attempt;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* gssapi */
+ gss_OID_set gss_supported_mechs;
+ u_int mech_tried;
+#endif
/* pubkey */
struct idlist keys;
int agent_fd;
/* hostbased */
Sensitive *sensitive;
char *oktypes, *ktypes;
const char *active_ktype;
/* kbd-interactive */
int info_req_seen;
+ int attempt_kbdint;
+ /* password */
+ int attempt_passwd;
/* generic */
void *methoddata;
};
struct cauthmethod {
char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
- int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
- void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ int (*userauth)(struct ssh *ssh);
+ void (*cleanup)(struct ssh *ssh);
int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */
int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */
};
-int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-
-int userauth_none(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
-int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
+static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+static int userauth_none(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
-int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
-int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *);
+static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
#endif
-void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+void userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
-static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *, Identity *);
+static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *);
+static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *);
static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
-static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *);
static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *);
static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *);
static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
static char *authmethods_get(void);
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
#ifdef GSSAPI
{"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
- NULL,
+ userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
&options.gss_authentication,
NULL},
#endif
{"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
NULL,
&options.hostbased_authentication,
NULL},
{"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
NULL,
&options.pubkey_authentication,
NULL},
{"keyboard-interactive",
userauth_kbdint,
NULL,
&options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"password",
userauth_passwd,
NULL,
&options.password_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"none",
userauth_none,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL},
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
};
void
-ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
- Sensitive *sensitive)
+ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+ const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state;
Authctxt authctxt;
int r;
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
- options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
/* setup authentication context */
memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
- pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
authctxt.server_user = server_user;
authctxt.local_user = local_user;
authctxt.host = host;
authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */
authctxt.success = 0;
authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
authctxt.authlist = NULL;
authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL;
authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
+ authctxt.attempt_kbdint = 0;
+ authctxt.attempt_passwd = 0;
+#if GSSAPI
+ authctxt.gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
+ authctxt.mech_tried = 0;
+#endif
authctxt.agent_fd = -1;
- if (authctxt.method == NULL)
- fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
+ pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
+ if (authctxt.method == NULL) {
+ fatal_f("internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
+ }
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */
+ pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
- pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
if (!authctxt.success)
fatal("Authentication failed.");
- debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ authctxt.method->name);
+ } else {
+ verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy) using \"%s\".", host,
+ authctxt.method->name);
+ }
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
int r;
if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
char *reply;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
free(reply);
} else {
debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
/* initial userauth request */
- userauth_none(authctxt);
+ userauth_none(ssh);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
}
void
-userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
+userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
- authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
+ authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
if (authlist == NULL) {
authlist = authctxt->authlist;
} else {
free(authctxt->authlist);
authctxt->authlist = authlist;
}
for (;;) {
Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
if (method == NULL)
fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).",
authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist);
authctxt->method = method;
/* reset the per method handler */
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
/* and try new method */
- if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) {
+ if (method->userauth(ssh) != 0) {
debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
break;
} else {
debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
method->enabled = NULL;
}
}
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
- fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
- "type %d", type);
+ fatal_f("bad message during authentication: type %d", type);
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
- char *msg, *lang;
- u_int len;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- msg = packet_get_string(&len);
- lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug3_f("entering");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+ r = 0;
+ out:
free(msg);
- free(lang);
- return 0;
+ return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context");
+ fatal_f("no authentication context");
free(authctxt->authlist);
authctxt->authlist = NULL;
if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
- authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt);
+ authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
return 0;
}
-int
+#if 0
+static int
input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__);
+ fatal_f("no authentication context");
fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.",
authctxt->method->name);
return 0;
}
+#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *authlist = NULL;
u_char partial;
- int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ if (sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial) != 0 ||
+ sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
goto out;
if (partial != 0) {
- verbose("Authenticated with partial success.");
+ verbose("Authenticated using \"%s\" with partial success.",
+ authctxt->method->name);
/* reset state */
pubkey_reset(authctxt);
}
debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
- userauth(authctxt, authlist);
+ userauth(ssh, authlist);
authlist = NULL;
out:
free(authlist);
return 0;
}
/*
* Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint
* and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free.
*/
static char *
format_identity(Identity *id)
{
char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+ const char *note = "";
if (id->key != NULL) {
- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
}
+ if (id->key) {
+ if ((id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
+ note = " token";
+ else if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
+ note = " authenticator";
+ }
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s",
id->filename,
id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "",
fp ? fp : "",
- id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "",
- (id->key && (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) ? " token" : "",
+ id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", note,
id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : "");
free(fp);
return ret;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
Identity *id = NULL;
int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0;
size_t blen;
char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto done;
if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- debug("%s: server sent unknown pkalg %s", __func__, pkalg);
+ debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
- debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s: %s", pkalg, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_r(r, "no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
"for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
/*
* search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
* moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
* duplicate keys
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found || id == NULL) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
- error("%s: server replied with unknown key: %s %s", __func__,
+ error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s",
sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
goto done;
}
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident);
- sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, authctxt, id);
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
r = 0;
done:
sshkey_free(key);
free(ident);
free(fp);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
/* try another method if we did not send a packet */
if (r == 0 && sent == 0)
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ userauth(ssh, NULL);
return r;
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
-int
-userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static int
+userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
- static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
- static u_int mech = 0;
OM_uint32 min;
int r, ok = 0;
+ gss_OID mech = NULL;
/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
* once. */
- if (gss_supported == NULL)
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+ if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL)
+ gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
- /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
+ !ok) {
+ mech = &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->
+ elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+ if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+ mech, authctxt->host)) {
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
} else {
- mech++;
+ authctxt->mech_tried++;
}
}
- if (!ok)
+ if (!ok || mech == NULL)
return 0;
authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh,
- (gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (mech->length) + 2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh,
- gss_supported->elements[mech].length)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put(ssh,
- gss_supported->elements[mech].elements,
- gss_supported->elements[mech].length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, mech->length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, mech->elements, mech->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
- mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */
+ authctxt->mech_tried++; /* Move along to next candidate */
return 1;
}
+static void
+userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt = (Gssctxt *)authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
+ authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+
+ free(authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
+ authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
+}
+
static OM_uint32
process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
int r;
status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
if (send_tok.length > 0) {
u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ?
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK :
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send %u packet", type);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
}
if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send completion");
} else {
struct sshbuf *b;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user,
- authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic",
+ ssh->kex->session_id);
if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value,
mic.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send MIC");
}
sshbuf_free(b);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
}
}
return status;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
size_t oidlen;
u_char *oidv = NULL;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
/* Setup our OID */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0)
goto done;
if (oidlen <= 2 ||
oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ userauth(ssh, NULL);
goto ok;
}
if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto done;
if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
/* Start again with next method on list */
debug("Trying to start again");
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ userauth(ssh, NULL);
goto ok;
}
ok:
r = 0;
done:
free(oidv);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
u_char *p = NULL;
size_t len;
OM_uint32 status;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok);
/* Start again with the next method in the list */
if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
- userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+ userauth(ssh, NULL);
/* ok */
}
r = 0;
out:
free(p);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 ms;
u_char *p = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
free(p);
return r;
}
/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
(void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
&recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
free(p);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
/* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *msg = NULL;
char *lang = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* maj */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* min */
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
out:
free(msg);
free(lang);
return r;
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
-int
-userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static int
+userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int r;
/* initial userauth request */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
return 1;
}
-int
-userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static int
+userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- static int attempt = 0;
- char prompt[256];
- char *password;
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+ char *password, *prompt = NULL;
const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
authctxt->host;
int r;
- if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+ if (authctxt->attempt_passwd++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
return 0;
- if (attempt != 1)
+ if (authctxt->attempt_passwd != 1)
error("Permission denied, please try again.");
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
- authctxt->server_user, host);
+ xasprintf(&prompt, "%s@%s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
- if (password)
+ free(prompt);
+ if (password != NULL)
freezero(password, strlen(password));
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
&input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
return 1;
}
/*
* parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
-int
+static int
input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
char prompt[256];
const char *host;
int r;
debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
"no authentication context");
host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strlen(info) > 0)
logit("%s", info);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* additional info */
goto out;
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0)
goto out;
freezero(password, strlen(password));
password = NULL;
while (password == NULL) {
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
if (password == NULL) {
/* bail out */
r = 0;
goto out;
}
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
freezero(password, strlen(password));
logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
password = NULL;
}
freezero(retype, strlen(retype));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
&input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
r = 0;
out:
if (password)
freezero(password, strlen(password));
free(info);
free(lang);
return r;
}
/*
* Select an algorithm for publickey signatures.
* Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found.
*
* Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and
* only attempt with the key's base signature type.
*/
static char *
key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key)
{
char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL;
+ const char *server_sig_algs;
/*
* The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm
* for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for
* newer (SHA2) algorithms.
*/
if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL ||
(key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
- (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) {
+ (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) {
/* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */
return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
- options.pubkey_key_types, NULL);
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos, NULL);
}
+ /*
+ * Workaround OpenSSH 7.4 bug: this version supports RSA/SHA-2 but
+ * fails to advertise it via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO.
+ */
+ server_sig_algs = ssh->kex->server_sig_algs;
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))
+ server_sig_algs = "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512";
+
/*
* For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type:
- * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes of the right type
+ * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms of the right type
* that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from
* the server.
*/
- oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
+ oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
continue;
- tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL);
+ tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp),
+ server_sig_algs, NULL);
if (tmp != NULL)
alg = xstrdup(cp);
free(tmp);
if (alg != NULL)
break;
}
free(oallowed);
return alg;
}
static int
identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg)
{
- struct sshkey *prv;
- int r;
+ struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL;
+ int retried = 0, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+ char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
+
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
/* The agent supports this key. */
if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) {
return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
}
/*
* We have already loaded the private key or the private key is
* stored in external hardware.
*/
if (id->key != NULL &&
(id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) {
- if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
- alg, compat)) != 0)
- return r;
- /*
- * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms,
- * so check what we get back.
- */
- if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0)
- return r;
- return 0;
+ sign_key = id->key;
+ } else {
+ /* Load the private key from the file. */
+ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) {
+ error_f("private key %s contents do not match public",
+ id->filename);
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sign_key = prv;
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key)) {
+ if ((sign_key->sk_flags &
+ SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+ retry_pin:
+ xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key %s: ",
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), id->filename);
+ pin = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ }
+ if ((sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ /* XXX should batch mode just skip these? */
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+ notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+ alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
+ if (pin == NULL && !retried && sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) &&
+ r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ notify_complete(notifier, NULL);
+ notifier = NULL;
+ retried = 1;
+ goto retry_pin;
+ }
+ goto out;
}
- /* Load the private key from the file. */
- if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
- if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) {
- error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public",
- __func__, id->filename);
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ /*
+ * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms,
+ * so check what we get back.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "sshkey_check_sigtype");
+ goto out;
}
- r = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(prompt);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ notify_complete(notifier, r == 0 ? "User presence confirmed" : NULL);
sshkey_free(prv);
return r;
}
static int
id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id)
{
const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL };
size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename);
size_t i, slen;
if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
if (len > slen && plen == len - slen &&
strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 &&
memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
-sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL;
u_char *signature = NULL;
size_t slen = 0, skip = 0;
int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0;
char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *loc = "";
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
return 0;
- debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+ debug3_f("%s %s", sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
/*
* If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key
* and use it to complete the signature.
* If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate
* key itself in case it has a private half already loaded.
* This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform
* the signature.
*/
if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) &&
id->key->type != private_id->key->type) {
sign_id = private_id;
break;
}
}
/*
* Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow
* filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that
* didn't load public keys. This supports the case
* of keeping just a private key file and public
* certificate on disk.
*/
if (sign_id == NULL &&
!id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
(id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
if (private_id->key == NULL &&
id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) {
sign_id = private_id;
break;
}
}
}
if (sign_id != NULL) {
- debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for "
- "certificate", __func__, id->filename,
- id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
+ debug2_f("using private key \"%s\"%s for "
+ "certificate", sign_id->filename,
+ sign_id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
} else {
- debug("%s: no separate private key for certificate "
- "\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename);
+ debug_f("no separate private key for certificate "
+ "\"%s\"", id->filename);
}
}
/*
* If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing
* then default to the one we started with.
*/
if (sign_id == NULL)
sign_id = id;
/* assemble and sign data */
for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) {
free(alg);
slen = 0;
signature = NULL;
if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh,
id->key)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: no mutual signature supported", __func__);
+ error_f("no mutual signature supported");
goto out;
}
- debug3("%s: signing using %s", __func__, alg);
+ debug3_f("signing using %s %s", alg, fp);
sshbuf_free(b);
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
- session_id2_len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putb");
} else {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
- session_id2_len)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b,
+ ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_stringb");
}
skip = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) {
- fatal("%s: assemble signed data: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble signed data");
}
/* generate signature */
r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows, alg);
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), ssh->compat, alg);
if (r == 0)
break;
else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
goto out; /* soft failure */
else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED &&
!fallback_sigtype) {
if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1)
loc = "agent ";
else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
loc = "token ";
logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type",
loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
continue;
}
- error("%s: signing failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "signing failed for %s \"%s\"%s",
+ sshkey_type(sign_id->key), sign_id->filename,
+ id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
goto out;
}
if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */
- fatal("%s: no signature", __func__);
+ fatal_f("no signature");
/* append signature */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: append signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "append signature");
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* skip session id and packet type */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: consume: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "consume");
/* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: enqueue request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "enqueue request");
/* success */
sent = 1;
out:
free(fp);
free(alg);
sshbuf_free(b);
freezero(signature, slen);
return sent;
}
static int
-send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
u_char *blob = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
size_t bloblen;
u_int have_sig = 0;
int sent = 0, r;
if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) {
- debug("%s: no mutual signature algorithm", __func__);
+ debug_f("no mutual signature algorithm");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
- debug3("%s: cannot handle key", __func__);
+ debug3_f("cannot handle key");
goto out;
}
/* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
sent = 1;
out:
free(alg);
free(blob);
return sent;
}
static struct sshkey *
load_identity_file(Identity *id)
{
struct sshkey *private = NULL;
char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment;
- int r, perm_ok = 0, quit = 0, i;
+ int r, quit = 0, i;
struct stat st;
- if (stat(id->filename, &st) < 0) {
- (id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s",
- id->filename, strerror(errno));
+ if (stat(id->filename, &st) == -1) {
+ do_log2(id->userprovided ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
+ "no such identity: %s: %s", id->filename, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
"Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename);
for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
if (i == 0)
passphrase = "";
else {
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (*passphrase == '\0') {
debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
free(passphrase);
break;
}
}
switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename,
- passphrase, &private, &comment, &perm_ok))) {
+ passphrase, &private, &comment))) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
if (options.batch_mode) {
quit = 1;
break;
}
if (i != 0)
debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
break;
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ENOENT) {
- debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s",
- id->filename, ssh_err(r));
+ debug2_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", id->filename);
quit = 1;
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
- error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", id->filename);
quit = 1;
break;
}
+ if (private != NULL && sshkey_is_sk(private) &&
+ options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+ debug("key \"%s\" is an authenticator-hosted key, "
+ "but no provider specified", id->filename);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ private = NULL;
+ quit = 1;
+ }
if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
!(id->key && id->isprivate))
maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
passphrase);
if (i > 0)
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
free(comment);
if (private != NULL || quit)
break;
}
return private;
}
static int
key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key)
{
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
- options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
return 1;
/* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512",
- options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
return 1;
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256",
- options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
return 1;
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
- options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
return 1;
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
- options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
return 1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* try keys in the following order:
- * 1. certificates listed in the config file
- * 2. other input certificates
+ * 1. certificates listed in the config file
+ * 2. other input certificates
* 3. agent keys that are found in the config file
* 4. other agent keys
* 5. keys that are only listed in the config file
*/
static void
pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
struct idlist agent, files, *preferred;
struct sshkey *key;
int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found;
size_t j;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
char *ident;
TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */
TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */
preferred = &authctxt->keys;
TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */
/* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
key = options.identity_keys[i];
- if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
+ if (key && key->cert &&
+ key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+ debug_f("ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
+ "certificate", options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
+ }
+ if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+ debug_f("ignoring authenticator-hosted key %s as no "
+ "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
+ options.identity_files[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->agent_fd = -1;
id->key = key;
id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
}
/* list of certificates specified by user */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
key = options.certificates[i];
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL ||
- key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
+ key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+ debug_f("ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
+ "certificate", options.identity_files[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+ debug_f("ignoring authenticator-hosted key "
+ "certificate %s as no "
+ "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
+ options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
+ }
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->agent_fd = -1;
id->key = key;
id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]);
id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
}
/* list of keys supported by the agent */
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
- debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_fr(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket");
} else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
- debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ debug_fr(r, "ssh_fetch_identitylist");
close(agent_fd);
} else {
for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
/*
* agent keys from the config file are
* preferred
*/
if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
/* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */
id->key = idlist->keys[j];
id->filename = idlist->comments[j];
idlist->keys[j] = NULL;
idlist->comments[j] = NULL;
id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
/* append remaining agent keys */
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- }
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &agent, next);
authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd;
}
/* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) {
if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
continue;
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) {
if (id2->key == NULL ||
- (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
+ (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
found = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
if (!found && options.identities_only) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
freezero(id, sizeof(*id));
}
}
/* append remaining keys from the config file */
- for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
- }
- /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &files, next);
+ /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) {
debug("Skipping %s key %s - "
- "not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
+ "corresponding algo not in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms",
sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next);
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
continue;
}
}
/* List the keys we plan on using */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident);
free(ident);
}
- debug2("%s: done", __func__);
+ debug2_f("done");
}
static void
-pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Identity *id;
- if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1)
+ if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) {
ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd);
+ authctxt->agent_fd = -1;
+ }
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
free(id);
}
}
static void
pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Identity *id;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next)
id->tried = 0;
}
static int
-try_identity(Identity *id)
+try_identity(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
{
if (!id->key)
return (0);
if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
- (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+ (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server",
sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename);
return (0);
}
return 1;
}
-int
-userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static int
+userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Identity *id;
int sent = 0;
char *ident;
while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
if (id->tried++)
return (0);
/* move key to the end of the queue */
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
/*
* send a test message if we have the public key. for
* encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
* private key instead
*/
if (id->key != NULL) {
- if (try_identity(id)) {
+ if (try_identity(ssh, id)) {
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Offering public key: %s", ident);
free(ident);
- sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, authctxt, id);
+ sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, id);
}
} else {
debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
id->key = load_identity_file(id);
if (id->key != NULL) {
- if (try_identity(id)) {
+ if (try_identity(ssh, id)) {
id->isprivate = 1;
- sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh,
- authctxt, id);
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
}
sshkey_free(id->key);
id->key = NULL;
id->isprivate = 0;
}
}
if (sent)
return (sent);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
*/
-int
-userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static int
+userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
- static int attempt = 0;
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int r;
- if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+ if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
return 0;
/* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
- if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
+ if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
return 0;
}
debug2("userauth_kbdint");
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* lang */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
return 1;
}
/*
* parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
*/
-int
+static int
input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
- char *response = NULL;
+ char *display_prompt = NULL, *response = NULL;
u_char echo = 0;
u_int num_prompts, i;
int r;
- debug2("input_userauth_info_req");
+ debug2_f("entering");
if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context");
+ fatal_f("no authentication context");
authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strlen(name) > 0)
logit("%s", name);
if (strlen(inst) > 0)
logit("%s", inst);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0)
goto out;
/*
* Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
* We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
* further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
* be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0)
goto out;
- debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
+ debug2_f("num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0)
goto out;
- response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
+ if (asmprintf(&display_prompt, INT_MAX, NULL, "(%s@%s) %s",
+ authctxt->server_user, options.host_key_alias ?
+ options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host, prompt) == -1)
+ fatal_f("asmprintf failed");
+ response = read_passphrase(display_prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0)
goto out;
freezero(response, strlen(response));
free(prompt);
- response = prompt = NULL;
+ free(display_prompt);
+ display_prompt = response = prompt = NULL;
}
/* done with parsing incoming message. */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshpkt_send(ssh);
out:
if (response)
freezero(response, strlen(response));
free(prompt);
+ free(display_prompt);
free(name);
free(inst);
free(lang);
return r;
}
static int
-ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ssh_keysign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct stat st;
pid_t pid;
- int i, r, to[2], from[2], status, sock = packet_get_connection_in();
+ int r, to[2], from[2], status;
+ int sock = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
u_char rversion = 0, version = 2;
void (*osigchld)(int);
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
- if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) {
- error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) == -1) {
+ error_f("not installed: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (fflush(stdout) != 0) {
- error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (pipe(to) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(to) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (pipe(from) < 0) {
- error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(from) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
- error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+ error_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (pid == 0) {
- /* keep the socket on exec */
- fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0);
close(from[0]);
- if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
- fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
close(to[1]);
- if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
- fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
close(from[1]);
close(to[0]);
- /* Close everything but stdio and the socket */
- for (i = STDERR_FILENO + 1; i < sock; i++)
- close(i);
+
+ if (dup2(sock, STDERR_FILENO + 1) == -1)
+ fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
+ fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); /* keep the socket on exec */
closefrom(sock + 1);
- debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s",
- __func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN);
+
+ debug3_f("[child] pid=%ld, exec %s",
+ (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN);
execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL);
- fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
+ fatal_f("exec(%s): %s", _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
strerror(errno));
}
close(from[1]);
close(to[0]);
+ sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/* send # of sock, data to be signed */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)
- fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__);
+ fatal_f("couldn't send request");
sshbuf_reset(b);
r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b);
close(from[0]);
close(to[1]);
if (r < 0) {
- error("%s: no reply", __func__);
+ error_f("no reply");
goto fail;
}
errno = 0;
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
- error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s",
- __func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno));
+ error_f("waitpid %ld: %s", (long)pid, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
- error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__);
+ error_f("exited abnormally");
goto fail;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
- error("%s: exited with status %d",
- __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ error_f("exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "buffer error");
goto fail;
}
if (rversion != version) {
- error("%s: bad version", __func__);
+ error_f("bad version");
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "buffer error");
fail:
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
sshbuf_free(b);
return -1;
}
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
sshbuf_free(b);
return 0;
}
-int
-userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+static int
+userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
struct sshkey *private = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL;
char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL;
size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0;
int i, r, success = 0;
if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) {
- authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types);
+ authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_accepted_algos);
authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes;
}
/*
- * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes,
+ * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
* trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn.
*/
for (;;) {
if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL)
authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ",");
if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL ||
*authctxt->active_ktype == '\0')
break;
- debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__,
- authctxt->active_ktype);
+ debug3_f("trying key type %s", authctxt->active_ktype);
/* check for a useful key */
private = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
continue;
if (match_pattern_list(
sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
continue;
/* we take and free the key */
private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
break;
}
/* Found one */
if (private != NULL)
break;
/* No more keys of this type; advance */
authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
}
if (private == NULL) {
free(authctxt->oktypes);
authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL;
authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
goto out;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
goto out;
}
- debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s",
- __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
+ debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
/* figure out a name for the client host */
- if ((lname = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in())) == NULL) {
- error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__);
+ lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ if (lname == NULL) {
+ error_f("cannot get local ipaddr/name");
goto out;
}
/* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */
xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname);
- debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost);
+ debug2_f("chost %s", chost);
/* construct data */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) {
- error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->active_ktype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) {
- error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "buffer error");
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
- r = ssh_keysign(private, &sig, &siglen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
- if (r != 0) {
+ if ((r = ssh_keysign(ssh, private, &sig, &siglen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b))) != 0) {
error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed",
sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->active_ktype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error_fr(r, "packet error");
goto out;
}
success = 1;
out:
if (sig != NULL)
freezero(sig, siglen);
free(keyblob);
free(lname);
free(fp);
free(chost);
sshkey_free(private);
sshbuf_free(b);
return success;
}
/* find auth method */
/*
* given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
* in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
*/
static int
authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
{
if (method == NULL)
return 0;
/* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
return 0;
/* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static Authmethod *
authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
{
Authmethod *method = NULL;
if (name != NULL)
for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
return method;
debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
return NULL;
}
/* XXX internal state */
static Authmethod *current = NULL;
static char *supported = NULL;
static char *preferred = NULL;
/*
* Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
* next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list,
* use a built-in default list.
*/
static Authmethod *
authmethod_get(char *authlist)
{
char *name = NULL;
u_int next;
/* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */
if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
free(supported);
supported = xstrdup(authlist);
preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
current = NULL;
} else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
return current;
for (;;) {
if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
current = NULL;
return NULL;
}
preferred += next;
debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
free(name);
return current;
}
free(name);
}
}
static char *
authmethods_get(void)
{
Authmethod *method = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b;
char *list;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s",
sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
}
if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
return list;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
index 72bf498e9f32..be9a57cf2ff7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
@@ -1,1003 +1,1032 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.304 2018/07/22 12:16:59 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.316 2021/07/30 14:28:13 jmc Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 22 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 30 2021 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sshd
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon
+.Nd OpenSSH daemon
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sshd
.Bk -words
.Op Fl 46DdeiqTt
.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
.Op Fl E Ar log_file
.Op Fl f Ar config_file
.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl u Ar len
.Ek
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
.Xr ssh 1 .
-Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh,
-and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
+It provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
over an insecure network.
.Pp
.Nm
listens for connections from clients.
It is normally started at boot from
.Pa /etc/rc.d/sshd .
It forks a new
daemon for each incoming connection.
The forked daemons handle
key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
and data exchange.
.Pp
.Nm
can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
(by default
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
command-line options override values specified in the
configuration file.
.Nm
rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
.Dv SIGHUP ,
by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.It Fl C Ar connection_spec
Specify the connection parameters to use for the
.Fl T
extended test mode.
If provided, any
.Cm Match
directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the
configuration is written to standard output.
The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be
supplied in any order, either with multiple
.Fl C
options or as a comma-separated list.
The keywords are
-.Dq addr,
+.Dq addr ,
.Dq user ,
.Dq host ,
.Dq laddr ,
.Dq lport ,
and
.Dq rdomain
and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name,
local address, local port number and routing domain respectively.
.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify
.Nm
during key exchange.
The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the
.Fl h
option or the
.Cm HostKey
configuration directive.
.It Fl D
When this option is specified,
.Nm
will not detach and does not become a daemon.
This allows easy monitoring of
.Nm sshd .
.It Fl d
Debug mode.
The server sends verbose debug output to standard error,
and does not put itself in the background.
-The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
+The server also will not
+.Xr fork 2
+and will only process one connection.
This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
Multiple
.Fl d
options increase the debugging level.
Maximum is 3.
.It Fl E Ar log_file
Append debug logs to
.Ar log_file
instead of the system log.
.It Fl e
Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
.It Fl f Ar config_file
Specifies the name of the configuration file.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
.Nm
refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
120 seconds).
If the client fails to authenticate the user within
this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
A value of zero indicates no limit.
.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
Specifies a file from which a host key is read.
This option must be given if
.Nm
is not run as root (as the normal
host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
and
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
It is possible to have multiple host key files for
the different host key algorithms.
.It Fl i
Specifies that
.Nm
is being run from
.Xr inetd 8 .
.It Fl o Ar option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
command-line flag.
For full details of the options, and their values, see
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It Fl p Ar port
Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
(default 22).
Multiple port options are permitted.
Ports specified in the configuration file with the
.Cm Port
option are ignored when a command-line port is specified.
Ports specified using the
.Cm ListenAddress
option override command-line ports.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode.
Nothing is sent to the system log.
Normally the beginning,
authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
.It Fl T
Extended test mode.
Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
to stdout and then exit.
Optionally,
.Cm Match
rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
.Fl C
options.
.It Fl t
Test mode.
Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
This is useful for updating
.Nm
reliably as configuration options may change.
.It Fl u Ar len
This option is used to specify the size of the field
in the
.Li utmp
structure that holds the remote host name.
If the resolved host name is longer than
.Ar len ,
the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
This allows hosts with very long host names that
overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
Specifying
.Fl u0
indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
should be put into the
.Pa utmp
file.
.Fl u0
may also be used to prevent
.Nm
from making DNS requests unless the authentication
mechanism or configuration requires it.
Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
and using a
.Cm from="pattern-list"
option in a key file.
Configuration options that require DNS include using a
USER@HOST pattern in
.Cm AllowUsers
or
.Cm DenyUsers .
.El
.Sh AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only.
Each host has a host-specific key,
used to identify the host.
Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
host key.
The client compares the
host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
-Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
This key agreement results in a shared session key.
-The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
-128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.
+The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher.
The client selects the encryption algorithm
to use from those offered by the server.
Additionally, session integrity is provided
-through a cryptographic message authentication code
-(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128,
-hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
+through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC).
.Pp
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
The client tries to authenticate itself using
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication,
or password authentication.
.Pp
Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is
locked, listed in
.Cm DenyUsers
or its group is listed in
.Cm DenyGroups
\&. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms
have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
.Ql \&*LK\&*
on Solaris and UnixWare,
.Ql \&*
on HP-UX, containing
.Ql Nologin
on Tru64,
a leading
.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
on FreeBSD and a leading
.Ql \&!
on most Linuxes).
If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
should be set to something other than these values (eg
.Ql NP
or
.Ql \&*NP\&*
).
.Pp
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
preparing the session is entered.
At this time the client may request
things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
connection over the secure channel.
.Pp
After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
The sides then enter session mode.
In this mode, either side may send
data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
.Pp
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
the client, and both sides exit.
.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
When a user successfully logs in,
.Nm
does the following:
.Bl -enum -offset indent
.It
If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
prints last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd
(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
see the
.Sx FILES
section).
.It
If the login is on a tty, records login time.
.It
Checks
.Pa /etc/nologin and
.Pa /var/run/nologin ;
if one exists, it prints the contents and quits
(unless root).
.It
Changes to run with normal user privileges.
.It
Sets up basic environment.
.It
Reads the file
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
See the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It
Changes to user's home directory.
.It
If
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
exists and the
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm PermitUserRC
option is set, runs it; else if
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
exists, runs
it; otherwise runs
.Xr xauth 1 .
The
.Dq rc
files are given the X11
authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
See
.Sx SSHRC ,
below.
.It
Runs user's shell or command.
All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the
system password database.
.El
.Sh SSHRC
If the file
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
exists,
.Xr sh 1
runs it after reading the
environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
instead.
If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
its standard input (and
.Ev DISPLAY
in its environment).
The script must call
.Xr xauth 1
because
.Nm
will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
.Pp
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
.Pp
This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
something similar to:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
# X11UseLocalhost=yes
echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
else
# X11UseLocalhost=no
echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
fi | xauth -q -
fi
.Ed
.Pp
If this file does not exist,
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
is run, and if that
does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
specifies the files containing public keys for
public key authentication;
if this option is not specified, the default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 .
Each line of the file contains one
key (empty lines and lines starting with a
.Ql #
are ignored as
comments).
Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
The options field is optional.
-The keytype is
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
-.Dq ssh-ed25519 ,
-.Dq ssh-dss
-or
-.Dq ssh-rsa ;
-the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+The supported key types are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
+.It
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+.It
+ssh-ed25519
+.It
+ssh-dss
+.It
+ssh-rsa
+.El
+.Pp
+The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
user to identify the key).
.Pp
Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long
(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
-8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA
-keys up to 16 kilobits.
+8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits.
You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
.Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
+.Pa id_ecdsa_sk.pub ,
.Pa id_ed25519.pub ,
+.Pa id_ed25519_sk.pub ,
or the
.Pa id_rsa.pub
file and edit it.
.Pp
.Nm
enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
.Pp
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications.
No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note
that option keywords are case-insensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm agent-forwarding
Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm cert-authority
Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is
trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication.
.Pp
Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options.
If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most
restrictive union of the two is applied.
.It Cm command="command"
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
authentication.
The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
otherwise it is run without a tty.
If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
one must not request a pty or should specify
.Cm no-pty .
A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
.Pp
This option might be useful
to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the
.Cm restrict
key option.
.Pp
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
environment variable.
Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
Also note that this command may be superseded by a
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm ForceCommand
directive.
.Pp
If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate
used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the
two commands are identical.
.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
logging in using this key.
Environment variables set this way
override other default environment values.
Multiple options of this type are permitted.
Environment processing is disabled by default and is
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
.It Cm expiry-time="timespec"
Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.
The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time
in the system time-zone.
.It Cm from="pattern-list"
Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
comma-separated list of patterns.
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.Pp
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
addresses, a
.Cm from
stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
.Pp
The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
just the key).
.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
authentication.
.It Cm no-port-forwarding
Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
.Cm command
option.
.It Cm no-pty
Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
.It Cm no-user-rc
Disables execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
.It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port"
Limit remote port forwarding with the
.Xr ssh 1
.Fl R
option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Multiple
.Cm permitlisten
options may be applied separated by commas.
Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
A port specification of
.Cm *
matches any port.
Note that the setting of
.Cm GatewayPorts
may further restrict listen addresses.
Note that
.Xr ssh 1
will send a hostname of
.Dq localhost
if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and
that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses
.Dq 127.0.0.1
and
.Dq ::1 .
.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
Limit local port forwarding with the
.Xr ssh 1
.Fl L
option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Multiple
.Cm permitopen
options may be applied separated by commas.
-No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames,
-they must be literal domains or addresses.
+No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the
+specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses.
A port specification of
.Cm *
matches any port.
.It Cm port-forwarding
Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm principals="principals"
On a
.Cm cert-authority
line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a
comma-separated list.
At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's
list of principals for the certificate to be accepted.
This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
signers using the
.Cm cert-authority
option.
.It Cm pty
Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
+.It Cm no-touch-required
+Do not require demonstration of user presence
+for signatures made using this key.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.It Cm verify-required
+Require that signatures made using this key attest that they verified
+the user, e.g. via a PIN.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
.It Cm restrict
Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding,
as well as disabling PTY allocation
and execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files
they will be included in this set.
.It Cm tunnel="n"
Force a
.Xr tun 4
device on the server.
Without this option, the next available device will be used if
the client requests a tunnel.
.It Cm user-rc
Enables execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm X11-forwarding
Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.El
.Pp
An example authorized_keys file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-# Comments allowed at start of line
-ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
-from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
-AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
-command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa
-AAAAC3...51R== example.net
-permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa
-AAAAB5...21S==
-permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa
-AAAAB5...21S==
-tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
-jane@example.net
-restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
-user@example.net
-restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
-user@example.net
+# Comments are allowed at start of line. Blank lines are allowed.
+# Plain key, no restrictions
+ssh-rsa ...
+# Forced command, disable PTY and all forwarding
+restrict,command="dump /home" ssh-rsa ...
+# Restriction of ssh -L forwarding destinations
+permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa ...
+# Restriction of ssh -R forwarding listeners
+permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitlisten="[::1]:22000" ssh-rsa ...
+# Configuration for tunnel forwarding
+tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa ...
+# Override of restriction to allow PTY allocation
+restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa ...
+# Allow FIDO key without requiring touch
+no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ...
+# Require user-verification (e.g. PIN or biometric) for FIDO key
+verify-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ...
+# Trust CA key, allow touch-less FIDO if requested in certificate
+cert-authority,no-touch-required,principals="user_a" ssh-rsa ...
.Ed
.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
The global file should
be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host,
its key is added to the per-user file.
.Pp
-Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
+Each line in these files contains the following fields: marker (optional),
hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
The fields are separated by spaces.
.Pp
The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
.Dq @cert-authority ,
to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key,
or
.Dq @revoked ,
to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever
be accepted.
Only one marker should be used on a key line.
.Pp
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
.Pf ( Ql *
and
.Ql \&?
act as
wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name.
When
.Nm sshd
is authenticating a client, such as when using
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
this will be the canonical client host name.
When
.Xr ssh 1
is authenticating a server, this will be the host name
given by the user, the value of the
.Xr ssh 1
.Cm HostkeyAlias
if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the
.Xr ssh 1
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option was used.
.Pp
A pattern may also be preceded by
.Ql \&!
to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
pattern on the line.
A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
.Ql \&[
and
.Ql \&]
brackets then followed by
.Ql \&:
and a non-standard port number.
.Pp
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
Hashed hostnames start with a
.Ql |
character.
Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
.Pp
The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they
can be obtained, for example, from
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub .
The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
.Pp
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are ignored as comments.
.Pp
When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or,
if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key
of the certification authority that signed the certificate.
For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the
.Dq @cert-authority
marker described above.
.Pp
The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
stolen.
Revoked keys are specified by including the
.Dq @revoked
marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will
produce a warning from
.Xr ssh 1
when they are encountered.
.Pp
It is permissible (but not
recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
names.
This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
from different domains are put in the file.
It is possible
that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
.Pp
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
Rather, generate them by a script,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
or by taking, for example,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
and adding the host names at the front.
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
also offers some basic automated editing for
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host
names to their hashed representations.
.Pp
An example ssh_known_hosts file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# Comments allowed at start of line
closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
# A hashed hostname
|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
AAAA1234.....=
# A revoked key
@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
@cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
.Ed
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd ,
if
.Cm PrintLastLog
and
.Cm PrintMotd ,
respectively,
are enabled.
It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
.Cm Banner .
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see
.Xr ssh 1
for more information).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Nm
reads it as root.
Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended
permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa .rhosts ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.
There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described above.
The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
.Pp
If this file, the
.Pa ~/.ssh
directory, or the user's home directory are writable
by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
users.
In this case,
.Nm
will not allow it to be used unless the
.Cm StrictModes
option has been set to
.Dq no .
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
.Ql # ) ,
and assignment lines of the form name=value.
The file should be writable
only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
Environment processing is disabled by default and is
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
can, but need not be, world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Contains initialization routines to be run before
the user's home directory becomes accessible.
This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
readable by anyone else.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
Further details are described in
.Xr hosts_access 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see
.Xr ssh 1 ) .
It should only be writable by root.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
key exchange method.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will
be used.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/motd
See
.Xr motd 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/nologin
If this file exists,
.Nm
refuses to let anyone except root log in.
The contents of the file
are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
refused.
The file should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa hosts.equiv ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys.
These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
accessible to others.
Note that
.Nm
does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
These files contain the public parts of the host keys.
These files should be world-readable but writable only by
root.
Their contents should match the respective private parts.
These files are not
really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
These files are created using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys.
This file should be prepared by the
system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
organization.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
.Nm sshd .
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
Similar to
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
it can be used to specify
machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /var/empty
.Xr chroot 2
directory used by
.Nm
during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
and not group or world-writable.
.Pp
.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the
.Nm
listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
.Xr login.conf 5 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr inetd 8 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
index 532e5dc04fc2..25a3769b4823 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -1,2425 +1,2528 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.516 2018/09/21 12:23:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.578 2021/07/19 02:21:50 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
* and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
* information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
* connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
* authentication agent connections.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation:
* Privilege Separation:
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
#include <sys/security.h>
#include <prot.h>
#endif
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
#include <resolv.h>
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#elif defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
#include <gssapi.h>
#endif
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "srclimit.h"
+#include "dh.h"
#include "blacklist_client.h"
#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
int allow_severity;
int deny_severity;
#endif /* LIBWRAP */
/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
extern char *__progname;
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
* log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
* the first connection.
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
/*
* Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys.
* If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective
* configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the
* "-C" flag.
*/
-int test_flag = 0;
+static int test_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-int inetd_flag = 0;
+static int inetd_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
-int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
-int log_stderr = 0;
+static int log_stderr = 0;
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
-char **saved_argv;
-int saved_argc;
+static char **saved_argv;
+static int saved_argc;
/* re-exec */
-int rexeced_flag = 0;
-int rexec_flag = 1;
-int rexec_argc = 0;
-char **rexec_argv;
+static int rexeced_flag = 0;
+static int rexec_flag = 1;
+static int rexec_argc = 0;
+static char **rexec_argv;
/*
* The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
* signal handler.
*/
#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
-int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
-int num_listen_socks = 0;
-
-/*
- * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
- * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
- */
-char *client_version_string = NULL;
-char *server_version_string = NULL;
+static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
+static int num_listen_socks = 0;
/* Daemon's agent connection */
int auth_sock = -1;
-int have_agent = 0;
+static int have_agent = 0;
/*
* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
* structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
* that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
* problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
* have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
* not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
*/
struct {
struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
int have_ssh2_key;
} sensitive_data;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
-/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
-u_char session_id[16];
-
-/* same for ssh2 */
-u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-u_int session_id2_len = 0;
-
/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
-/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
-int *startup_pipes = NULL;
-int startup_pipe; /* in child */
+/*
+ * startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd
+ * process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things:
+ *
+ * 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated
+ * connections.
+ * 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes
+ * may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process
+ * after it restarts.
+ * 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state
+ * from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP.
+ *
+ * Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks
+ * and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their
+ * sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing
+ * the sock (or by exiting).
+ */
+static int *startup_pipes = NULL;
+static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */
+static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
int use_privsep = -1;
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
static int privsep_chroot = 1;
-/* global authentication context */
+/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+struct ssh *the_active_state;
/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;
+/* Included files from the configuration file */
+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+
/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
+static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+
+static char *listener_proctitle;
/*
* Close all listening sockets
*/
static void
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
int i;
if (startup_pipes)
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
close(startup_pipes[i]);
}
/*
* Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
* the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
* the server key).
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
- int save_errno = errno;
-
received_sighup = 1;
- errno = save_errno;
}
/*
* Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
* Restarts the server.
*/
static void
sighup_restart(void)
{
logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
platform_pre_restart();
close_listen_socks();
close_startup_pipes();
- alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
/*
* Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
received_sigterm = sig;
}
/*
* SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
* reap any zombies left by exited children.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
- (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+ (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
;
errno = save_errno;
}
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
/*
* Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
* keys command helpers.
*/
if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
kill(0, SIGTERM);
}
- BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
+ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(the_active_state, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "ssh");
/* Log error and exit. */
- sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state));
-}
-
-static void
-sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
-{
- u_int i;
- int remote_major, remote_minor;
- char *s;
- char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
- char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
-
- xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
- *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
- options.version_addendum);
-
- /* Send our protocol version identification. */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
- strlen(server_version_string))
- != strlen(server_version_string)) {
- logit("Could not write ident string to %s port %d",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- /* Read other sides version identification. */
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
- logit("Did not receive identification string "
- "from %s port %d",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = 0;
- /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
- if (i == 12 &&
- strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
- break;
- continue;
- }
- if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- buf[i] = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
- client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
-
- /*
- * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
- * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
- */
- if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
- &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
- s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
- logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' "
- "from %s port %d", client_version_string,
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
- close(sock_in);
- close(sock_out);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
- remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
-
- ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
-
- if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
- logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- client_version_string);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
- logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- client_version_string);
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
- if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
- logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
- "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
- }
-
- chop(server_version_string);
- debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
-
- if (remote_major != 2 &&
- !(remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) {
- s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
- close(sock_in);
- close(sock_out);
- logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s port %d: "
- "%.200s vs. %.200s",
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- server_version_string, client_version_string);
- cleanup_exit(255);
+ if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid <= 0)
+ cleanup_exit(255); /* don't log in privsep child */
+ else {
+ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),
+ ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
}
}
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
}
if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
void
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
struct sshkey *tmp;
u_int i;
int r;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
- fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s",
- sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]),
- ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
+ sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
}
static void
reseed_prngs(void)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_poll();
#endif
arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */
if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
gid_t gidset[1];
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
#endif
reseed_prngs();
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
/* Demote the child */
if (privsep_chroot) {
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* Drop our privileges */
debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
(u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
- if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
+ if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
}
}
static int
-privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int status, r;
pid_t pid;
struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
- pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex;
+ pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
if (have_agent) {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
if (r != 0) {
- error("Could not get agent socket: %s",
- ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Could not get agent socket");
have_agent = 0;
}
}
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
- monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
+ monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
- fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
}
privsep_is_preauth = 0;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
- fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
- __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ fatal_f("preauth child exited with status %d",
+ WEXITSTATUS(status));
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
- fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
- __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
+ fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d",
+ WTERMSIG(status));
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
return 1;
} else {
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
privsep_preauth_child();
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
return 0;
}
}
static void
-privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
#else
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
#endif
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
use_privsep = 0;
goto skip;
}
/* New socket pair */
monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
- monitor_clear_keystate(pmonitor);
- monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+ monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
reseed_prngs();
/* Drop privileges */
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
skip:
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+ monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/*
* Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
* this information is not part of the key state.
*/
- packet_set_authenticated();
+ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
}
static void
append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
{
int r;
if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
- debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
- __func__, s);
+ debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key;
char *ret;
u_int i;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b,
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
append_hostkey_type(b,
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
- debug("%s: %s", __func__, ret);
+ debug_f("%s", ret);
return ret;
}
static struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
struct sshkey *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
break;
default:
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL && !need_private)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
break;
}
- if (key != NULL && key->type == type &&
- (key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
+ continue;
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
+ continue;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
return need_private ?
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
+ }
}
return NULL;
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
}
int
get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key,
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
return (i);
} else {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
return (i);
if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
return (i);
}
}
return (-1);
}
/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
static void
notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct sshkey *key;
u_int i, nkeys;
int r;
char *fp;
/* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
return;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
sshkey_is_cert(key))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
- debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i,
- sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
+ debug3_f("key %d: %s %s", i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (nkeys == 0) {
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00@openssh.com");
- packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */
+ /*
+ * Start building the request when we find the
+ * first usable key.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__);
}
+ /* Append the key to the request */
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s",
- __func__, i, ssh_err(r));
- packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+ fatal_fr(r, "couldn't put hostkey %d", i);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__);
nkeys++;
}
- debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
+ debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0)
- fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
- packet_send();
+ fatal_f("no hostkeys");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
/*
* returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
* dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
* of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
* all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
*/
static int
-drop_connection(int startups)
+should_drop_connection(int startups)
{
int p, r;
if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
return 0;
if (startups >= options.max_startups)
return 1;
if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
return 1;
p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
r = arc4random_uniform(100);
- debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
+ debug_f("p %d, r %d", p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
}
+/*
+ * Check whether connection should be accepted by MaxStartups.
+ * Returns 0 if the connection is accepted. If the connection is refused,
+ * returns 1 and attempts to send notification to client.
+ * Logs when the MaxStartups condition is entered or exited, and periodically
+ * while in that state.
+ */
+static int
+drop_connection(int sock, int startups, int notify_pipe)
+{
+ char *laddr, *raddr;
+ const char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n";
+ static time_t last_drop, first_drop;
+ static u_int ndropped;
+ LogLevel drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+ time_t now;
+
+ now = monotime();
+ if (!should_drop_connection(startups) &&
+ srclimit_check_allow(sock, notify_pipe) == 1) {
+ if (last_drop != 0 &&
+ startups < options.max_startups_begin - 1) {
+ /* XXX maybe need better hysteresis here */
+ logit("exited MaxStartups throttling after %s, "
+ "%u connections dropped",
+ fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped);
+ last_drop = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#define SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL (5 * 60)
+ if (last_drop == 0) {
+ error("beginning MaxStartups throttling");
+ drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ first_drop = now;
+ ndropped = 0;
+ } else if (last_drop + SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL < now) {
+ /* Periodic logs */
+ error("in MaxStartups throttling for %s, "
+ "%u connections dropped",
+ fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped + 1);
+ drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ }
+ last_drop = now;
+ ndropped++;
+
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
+ raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
+ do_log2(drop_level, "drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d on [%s]:%d "
+ "past MaxStartups", startups, raddr, get_peer_port(sock),
+ laddr, get_local_port(sock));
+ free(laddr);
+ free(raddr);
+ /* best-effort notification to client */
+ (void)write(sock, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static void
usage(void)
{
if (options.version_addendum && *options.version_addendum != '\0')
fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n",
SSH_RELEASE,
options.version_addendum, OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING);
else
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING);
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
);
exit(1);
}
static void
send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
- struct sshbuf *m;
+ struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
+ struct include_item *item = NULL;
int r;
- debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
+ debug3_f("entering fd = %d config len %zu", fd,
sshbuf_len(conf));
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ /* pack includes into a string */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose includes");
+ }
+
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
- * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
+ * string included_files[] {
+ * string selector
+ * string filename
+ * string contents
+ * }
+ * string rng_seed (if required)
*/
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose config");
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
#endif
-
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
+ error_f("ssh_msg_send failed");
sshbuf_free(m);
+ sshbuf_free(inc);
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ debug3_f("done");
}
static void
recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
- struct sshbuf *m;
+ struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
u_char *cp, ver;
size_t len;
int r;
+ struct include_item *item;
- debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
+ debug3_f("entering fd = %d", fd);
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
- fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("ssh_msg_recv failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
if (ver != 0)
- fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_f("rexec version mismatch");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse config");
+
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
#endif
+ if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse includes");
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
+ }
+
free(cp);
sshbuf_free(m);
- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ debug3_f("done");
}
/* Accept a connection from inetd */
static void
server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
{
- int fd;
-
- startup_pipe = -1;
if (rexeced_flag) {
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- if (!debug_flag) {
- startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- }
} else {
*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
}
/*
* We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
* as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
* ttyfd happens to be one of those.
*/
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
- dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
- dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
- if (!log_stderr)
- dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
- if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO))
- close(fd);
- }
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !log_stderr) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
}
/*
* Listen for TCP connections
*/
static void
listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
{
int ret, listen_sock;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
"Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
continue;
}
/* Create socket for listening. */
listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
- if (listen_sock < 0) {
+ if (listen_sock == -1) {
/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/* Socket options */
set_reuseaddr(listen_sock);
if (la->rdomain != NULL &&
set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);
debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
- if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
num_listen_socks++;
/* Start listening on the port. */
- if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
+ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1)
fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.",
ntop, strport,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain);
}
}
static void
server_listen(void)
{
u_int i;
+ /* Initialise per-source limit tracking. */
+ srclimit_init(options.max_startups, options.per_source_max_startups,
+ options.per_source_masklen_ipv4, options.per_source_masklen_ipv6);
+
for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) {
listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]);
freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs);
free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain);
memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0,
sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i]));
}
free(options.listen_addrs);
options.listen_addrs = NULL;
options.num_listen_addrs = 0;
if (!num_listen_socks)
fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
}
/*
* The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
* from this function are in a forked subprocess.
*/
static void
server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
{
fd_set *fdset;
int i, j, ret, maxfd;
- int startups = 0;
+ int ostartups = -1, startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0;
int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+ char c = 0;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
pid_t pid;
u_char rnd[256];
+ sigset_t nsigset, osigset;
/* setup fd set for accept */
fdset = NULL;
maxfd = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
maxfd = listen_socks[i];
- /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
+ /* pipes connected to unauthenticated child sshd processes */
startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+ startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+ /*
+ * Prepare signal mask that we use to block signals that might set
+ * received_sigterm or received_sighup, so that we are guaranteed
+ * to immediately wake up the pselect if a signal is received after
+ * the flag is checked.
+ */
+ sigemptyset(&nsigset);
+ sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGHUP);
+ sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGCHLD);
+ sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGTERM);
+ sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGQUIT);
+
/*
* Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
* the daemon is killed with a signal.
*/
for (;;) {
- if (received_sighup)
- sighup_restart();
+ sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nsigset, &osigset);
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ (int) received_sigterm);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ unlink(options.pid_file);
+ exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
+ }
+ if (ostartups != startups) {
+ setproctitle("%s [listener] %d of %d-%d startups",
+ listener_proctitle, startups,
+ options.max_startups_begin, options.max_startups);
+ ostartups = startups;
+ }
+ if (received_sighup) {
+ if (!lameduck) {
+ debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children");
+ close_listen_socks();
+ lameduck = 1;
+ }
+ if (listening <= 0) {
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL);
+ sighup_restart();
+ }
+ }
free(fdset);
fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
sizeof(fd_mask));
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
- /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
- ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
- error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- (int) received_sigterm);
- close_listen_socks();
- if (options.pid_file != NULL)
- unlink(options.pid_file);
- exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
- }
- if (ret < 0)
+ /* Wait until a connection arrives or a child exits. */
+ ret = pselect(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL, &osigset);
+ if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR)
+ error("pselect: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL);
+ if (ret == -1)
continue;
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
- FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
- /*
- * the read end of the pipe is ready
- * if the child has closed the pipe
- * after successful authentication
- * or if the child has died
- */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) {
+ if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 ||
+ !FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset))
+ continue;
+ switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) {
+ case -1:
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+ continue;
+ if (errno != EPIPE) {
+ error_f("startup pipe %d (fd=%d): "
+ "read %s", i, startup_pipes[i],
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 0:
+ /* child exited or completed auth */
close(startup_pipes[i]);
+ srclimit_done(startup_pipes[i]);
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
startups--;
+ if (startup_flags[i])
+ listening--;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* child has finished preliminaries */
+ if (startup_flags[i]) {
+ listening--;
+ startup_flags[i] = 0;
+ }
+ break;
}
+ }
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
continue;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
- if (*newsock < 0) {
+ if (*newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN)
error("accept: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
usleep(100 * 1000);
continue;
}
- if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
- close(*newsock);
- continue;
- }
- if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
- char *laddr = get_local_ipaddr(*newsock);
- char *raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(*newsock);
-
- verbose("drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d "
- "on [%s]:%d past MaxStartups", startups,
- raddr, get_peer_port(*newsock),
- laddr, get_local_port(*newsock));
- free(laddr);
- free(raddr);
- close(*newsock);
+ if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1 ||
+ pipe(startup_p) == -1)
continue;
- }
- if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+ if (drop_connection(*newsock, startups, startup_p[0])) {
close(*newsock);
+ close(startup_p[0]);
+ close(startup_p[1]);
continue;
}
if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
error("reexec socketpair: %s",
strerror(errno));
close(*newsock);
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
maxfd = startup_p[0];
startups++;
+ startup_flags[j] = 1;
break;
}
/*
* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
* we are in debugging mode.
*/
if (debug_flag) {
/*
* In debugging mode. Close the listening
* socket, and start processing the
* connection without forking.
*/
debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
startup_pipe = -1;
pid = getpid();
if (rexec_flag) {
send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
}
- break;
+ return;
}
/*
* Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
* the child process the connection. The
* parent continues listening.
*/
platform_pre_fork();
+ listening++;
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
/*
* Child. Close the listening and
* max_startup sockets. Start using
* the accepted socket. Reinitialize
* logging (since our pid has changed).
- * We break out of the loop to handle
+ * We return from this function to handle
* the connection.
*/
platform_post_fork_child();
startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
close_startup_pipes();
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level,
options.log_facility,
log_stderr);
if (rexec_flag)
close(config_s[0]);
- break;
+ else {
+ /*
+ * Signal parent that the preliminaries
+ * for this child are complete. For the
+ * re-exec case, this happens after the
+ * child has received the rexec state
+ * from the server.
+ */
+ (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe,
+ "\0", 1);
+ }
+ return;
}
/* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
- if (pid < 0)
+ if (pid == -1)
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
close(startup_p[1]);
if (rexec_flag) {
+ close(config_s[1]);
send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
- close(config_s[1]);
}
close(*newsock);
/*
* Ensure that our random state differs
* from that of the child
*/
arc4random_stir();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
-
- /* child process check (or debug mode) */
- if (num_listen_socks < 0)
- break;
}
}
/*
* If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
* return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
* source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
* (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
* if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
* source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
* rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
* exit here if we detect any IP options.
*/
static void
check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
{
#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
struct sockaddr_storage from;
u_char opts[200];
socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
- &fromlen) < 0)
+ &fromlen) == -1)
return;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
return;
/* XXX IPv6 options? */
if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
text[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
" %2.2x", opts[i]);
fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
}
return;
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
}
/* Set the routing domain for this process */
static void
set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
/* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */
return sys_set_process_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
const char *errstr;
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
rtable, strerror(errno));
- debug("%s: set routing domain %d (was %d)", __func__, rtable, ortable);
+ debug_f("set routing domain %d (was %d)", rtable, ortable);
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform");
#endif
}
static void
accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg,
- const struct sshkey *key)
+ struct sshkey *key)
{
static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
u_char *hash;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *buf;
int r;
if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__);
+ fatal_f("ssh_digest_start");
if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */
/* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg),
sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
+ fatal_f("ssh_digest_update");
len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
hash = xmalloc(len);
if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final", __func__);
+ fatal_f("ssh_digest_final");
options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash);
freezero(hash, len);
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
return;
}
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s could not allocate buffer", __func__);
+ fatal_f("could not allocate buffer");
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_private_serialize: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "decode key");
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
+ fatal_f("ssh_digest_update");
sshbuf_reset(buf);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
+static char *
+prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ xextendf(&ret, " ", "%s", av[i]);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
u_int i, j;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshkey *pubkey;
int keytype;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
- ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
-
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;
saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_argv;
#endif
if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
+ seed_rng();
+
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
"C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'f':
config_file_name = optarg;
break;
case 'c':
servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0,
&options, optarg);
break;
case 'd':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
options.log_level++;
break;
case 'D':
no_daemon_flag = 1;
break;
case 'E':
logfile = optarg;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'e':
log_stderr = 1;
break;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
rexec_flag = 0;
break;
case 'R':
rexeced_flag = 1;
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'b':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'p':
options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
exit(1);
}
options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'g':
if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'k':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'h':
servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0,
- &options, optarg);
+ &options, optarg, 1);
break;
case 't':
test_flag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
test_flag = 2;
break;
case 'C':
- connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
+ connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
optarg) == -1)
exit(1);
break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
- "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
exit(1);
free(line);
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
rexec_flag = 0;
- if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/')))
+ if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0]))
fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
if (rexeced_flag)
closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
else
closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-#endif
-
/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
if (logfile != NULL)
log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
* key (unless started from inetd)
*/
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
- log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
+ log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
* root's environment
*/
if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
(void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
/*
* If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection
* test params.
*/
if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL)
fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
- "test mode (-T)");
+ "test mode (-T)");
/* Fetch our configuration */
if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if (rexeced_flag)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if (rexeced_flag) {
+ setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]");
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg);
- else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ /*
+ * Signal parent that this child is at a point where
+ * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending.
+ */
+ (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
+ }
+ } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- cfg, NULL);
+ cfg, &includes, NULL);
- seed_rng();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+#endif
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
- /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
- options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
-
/* Check that options are sensible */
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
"AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
/*
* Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
* Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
* daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
* and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i],
1) == 0)
break;
}
if (i >= options.num_auth_methods)
fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
"enabled authentication methods");
}
/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
if (optind < ac) {
fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
exit(1);
}
- debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
-#else
- "without OpenSSL"
-#endif
- );
+ debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication)
fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
} else {
privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
}
endpwent();
/* load host keys */
sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
if (options.host_key_agent) {
if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
options.host_key_agent, 1);
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
have_agent = 1;
else
- error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s",
- options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Could not connect to agent \"%s\"",
+ options.host_key_agent);
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+
if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "",
&key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
- error("Error loading host key \"%s\": %s",
- options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
+ do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ key->sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+ }
+ if (r == 0 && key != NULL &&
+ (r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) {
+ do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to shield host key \"%s\"",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ key = NULL;
+ }
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i],
&pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
- error("Error loading host key \"%s\": %s",
- options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
- if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
+ do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ if (pubkey != NULL && key != NULL) {
+ if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, key)) {
+ error("Public key for %s does not match "
+ "private key", options.host_key_files[i]);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ pubkey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
- fatal("Could not demote key: \"%s\": %s",
- options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ }
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) {
debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
keytype = pubkey->type;
} else if (key != NULL) {
keytype = key->type;
accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key);
} else {
- error("Could not load host key: %s",
+ do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
switch (keytype) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
if (have_agent || key != NULL)
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
break;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
free(fp);
}
accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
* indices to the public keys that they relate to.
*/
sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) {
if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i],
&key, NULL)) != 0) {
- error("Could not load host certificate \"%s\": %s",
- options.host_cert_files[i], ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Could not load host certificate \"%s\"",
+ options.host_cert_files[i]);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
sshkey_free(key);
continue;
}
/* Find matching private key */
for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(key,
- sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) {
+ sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[j])) {
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
break;
}
}
if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) {
error("No matching private key for certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
sshkey_free(key);
continue;
}
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type,
sshkey_type(key));
}
if (privsep_chroot) {
struct stat st;
if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
(st.st_uid != getuid () ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
#else
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
#endif
fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
"world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
}
if (test_flag > 1) {
/*
* If no connection info was provided by -C then use
* use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match.
*/
if (connection_info == NULL)
- connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
- parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
+ connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
+ connection_info->test = 1;
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
dump_config(&options);
}
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
/*
* Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
* prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
* portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
* to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
* module which might be used).
*/
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
if (rexec_flag) {
if (rexec_argc < 0)
fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc);
rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) {
debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
}
rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
}
+ listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av);
/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
(void) umask(new_umask);
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
log_stderr = 1;
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+ log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
/*
* If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already
* daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling
* terminal, and fork. The original process exits.
*/
already_daemon = daemonized();
if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) {
- if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
+ if (daemon(0, 0) == -1)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
disconnect_controlling_tty();
}
/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Avoid killing the process in high-pressure swapping environments. */
if (!inetd_flag && madvise(NULL, 0, MADV_PROTECT) != 0)
debug("madvise(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
- /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- unmounted if desired. */
+ /*
+ * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ * unmounted if desired.
+ */
if (chdir("/") == -1)
error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* ignore SIGPIPE */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
if (inetd_flag) {
server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
} else {
platform_pre_listen();
server_listen();
- signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
/*
* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
* is setup and the listen sockets are bound
*/
if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
if (f == NULL) {
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
} else {
fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);
}
}
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
&newsock, config_s);
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
* want the child to be able to affect the parent.
*/
#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
/*
* If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
* controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
* controlling tty" errors.
*/
- if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
+ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
if (rexec_flag) {
- int fd;
-
debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (startup_pipe == -1)
close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
}
dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
close(config_s[1]);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* avoid reset to SIG_DFL */
execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
/* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Clean up fds */
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
- dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
- dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
- if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(fd);
- }
+ if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
+ error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
}
/* Executed child processes don't need these. */
fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- /*
- * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
- * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
- * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
- */
- alarm(0);
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+ /* We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
/*
* Initialize the resolver. This may not happen automatically
* before privsep chroot().
*/
if ((_res.options & RES_INIT) == 0) {
debug("res_init()");
res_init();
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
/*
* Force GSS-API to parse its configuration and load any
* mechanism plugins.
*/
{
gss_OID_set mechs;
OM_uint32 minor_status;
gss_indicate_mechs(&minor_status, &mechs);
gss_release_oid_set(&minor_status, &mechs);
}
#endif
#endif
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
- packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
- packet_set_server();
- ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Unable to create connection");
+ the_active_state = ssh;
+ ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
check_ip_options(ssh);
/* Prepare the channels layer */
channel_init_channels(ssh);
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
- if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
- setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (options.routing_domain != NULL)
set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain);
/*
* The rest of the code depends on the fact that
* ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
* the socket goes away.
*/
remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
/* Also caches remote hostname for sandboxed child. */
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
#endif
#ifdef LIBWRAP
allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
struct request_info req;
request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
fromhost(&req);
if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
refuse(&req);
/* NOTREACHED */
fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
}
}
#endif /* LIBWRAP */
rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
/* Log the connection. */
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s",
remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh),
rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"",
rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain,
rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
free(laddr);
/*
* We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
* cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
* indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
- signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
if (!debug_flag)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
- sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out);
- packet_set_nonblocking();
+ if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1,
+ options.version_addendum)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
+
+ ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
/* allocate authentication context */
authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
the_authctxt = authctxt;
/* Set default key authentication options */
if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
fatal("allocation failed");
/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
auth_debug_reset();
BLACKLIST_INIT();
if (use_privsep) {
- if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
+ if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
goto authenticated;
} else if (have_agent) {
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
- error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ error_r(r, "Unable to get agent socket");
have_agent = 0;
}
}
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
- do_ssh2_kex();
- do_authentication2(authctxt);
+ do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
+ do_authentication2(ssh);
/*
* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
* the current keystate and exits
*/
if (use_privsep) {
- mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
- packet_clear_keys();
+ mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
exit(0);
}
authenticated:
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
*/
alarm(0);
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
authctxt->authenticated = 1;
if (startup_pipe != -1) {
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = -1;
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+ audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_authentication) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
restore_uid();
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);
do_pam_session(ssh);
}
#endif
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
* file descriptor passing.
*/
if (use_privsep) {
- privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+ privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
}
- packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
+ ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval,
options.client_alive_count_max);
/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
notify_hostkeys(ssh);
/* Start session. */
do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
- packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
+ ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
finish_pam();
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
#endif
- packet_close();
+ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
if (use_privsep)
mm_terminate();
exit(0);
}
int
-sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey,
- u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
- const char *alg, u_int flag)
+sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
+ struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
{
int r;
- if (privkey) {
- if (PRIVSEP(sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
- alg, datafellows)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
- } else if (use_privsep) {
- if (mm_sshkey_sign(pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
- alg, datafellows) < 0)
- fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__);
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ if (privkey) {
+ if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
+ fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
+ } else {
+ if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
+ fatal_f("pubkey sign failed");
+ }
} else {
- if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slenp,
- data, dlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (privkey) {
+ if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
+ alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0)
+ fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
+ } else {
+ if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey,
+ signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg,
+ ssh->compat)) != 0) {
+ fatal_fr(r, "agent sign failed");
+ }
+ }
}
return 0;
}
/* SSH2 key exchange */
static void
-do_ssh2_kex(void)
+do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
int r;
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
options.kex_algorithms);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
options.ciphers);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
+ ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- list_hostkey_types());
+ ssh, list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
- if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
- fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
- kex = active_state->kex;
+ if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
+ kex = ssh->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
- ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
-
- session_id2 = kex->session_id;
- session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+ ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- packet_put_cstring("markus");
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send test");
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-
- if (the_authctxt) {
- do_cleanup(ssh, the_authctxt);
+ if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
+ do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
- errno != ESRCH)
- error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
- pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ errno != ESRCH) {
+ error_f("kill(%d): %s", pmonitor->m_pid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
}
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+ if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
index 4f636bc5c13b..7555b01be832 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@@ -1,121 +1,121 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.103 2018/04/09 20:41:22 tj Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.104 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $
# $FreeBSD$
# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
# sshd_config(5) for more information.
# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin
# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the
# default value.
# Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and
# FreeBSD has a few additional options.
#Port 22
#AddressFamily any
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
#ListenAddress ::
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
# Ciphers and keying
#RekeyLimit default none
# Logging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
#LoginGraceTime 2m
#PermitRootLogin no
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
#HostbasedAuthentication no
# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
# HostbasedAuthentication
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes
# Change to yes to enable built-in password authentication.
#PasswordAuthentication no
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Change to no to disable PAM authentication
-#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+#KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes
# Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
#KerberosGetAFSToken no
# GSSAPI options
#GSSAPIAuthentication no
#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
# Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+# be allowed through the KbdInteractiveAuthentication and
# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
-# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+# PAM authentication via KbdInteractiveAuthentication may bypass
# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
-# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+# and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
#UsePAM yes
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
#GatewayPorts no
#X11Forwarding yes
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
#PermitTTY yes
#PrintMotd yes
#PrintLastLog yes
#TCPKeepAlive yes
#PermitUserEnvironment no
#Compression delayed
#ClientAliveInterval 0
#ClientAliveCountMax 3
#UseDNS yes
#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
#MaxStartups 10:30:100
#PermitTunnel no
#ChrootDirectory none
#UseBlacklist no
-#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20200214
+#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20210907
# no default banner path
#Banner none
# override default of no subsystems
Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
#Match User anoncvs
# X11Forwarding no
# AllowTcpForwarding no
# PermitTTY no
# ForceCommand cvs server
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
index 366669cec5ad..f568dac96540 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@@ -1,1852 +1,2003 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.282 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.334 2021/08/12 23:59:25 djm Exp $
.\" $FreeBSD$
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 28 2020 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 12 2021 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sshd_config
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
+.Nd OpenSSH daemon configuration file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Xr sshd 8
reads configuration data from
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
(or the file specified with
.Fl f
on the command line).
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used.
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
.Pq \&"
in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm AcceptEnv
Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into
the session's
.Xr environ 7 .
See
.Cm SendEnv
and
.Cm SetEnv
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for how to configure the client.
The
.Ev TERM
environment variable is always accepted whenever the client
requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
.Ql *
and
.Ql \&? .
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
across multiple
.Cm AcceptEnv
directives.
Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
user environments.
For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
The default is not to accept any environment variables.
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family should be used by
.Xr sshd 8 .
Valid arguments are
.Cm any
(the default),
.Cm inet
(use IPv4 only), or
.Cm inet6
(use IPv6 only).
.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding is permitted.
The default is
.Cm yes .
Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security
unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
their own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
+The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
.Cm AllowGroups .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding
Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted.
The available options are
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm all
to allow StreamLocal forwarding,
.Cm no
to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding,
.Cm local
to allow local (from the perspective of
.Xr ssh 1 )
forwarding only or
.Cm remote
to allow remote forwarding only.
Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless
users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
The available options are
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm all
to allow TCP forwarding,
.Cm no
to prevent all TCP forwarding,
.Cm local
to allow local (from the perspective of
.Xr ssh 1 )
forwarding only or
.Cm remote
to allow remote forwarding only.
Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
match one of the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Cm AllowUsers .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
for a user to be granted access.
This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated
authentication method names, or by the single string
.Cm any
to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication
method.
If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
.Pp
For example,
.Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or
keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
.Pp
For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a
colon followed by the device identifier
.Cm bsdauth
or
.Cm pam .
depending on the server configuration.
For example,
.Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth
would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the
.Cm bsdauth
device.
.Pp
If the publickey method is listed more than once,
.Xr sshd 8
verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for
subsequent authentications.
For example,
.Qq publickey,publickey
requires successful authentication using two different public keys.
.Pp
Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
in the configuration.
.Pp
The available authentication methods are:
.Qq gssapi-with-mic ,
.Qq hostbased ,
.Qq keyboard-interactive ,
.Qq none
(used for access to password-less accounts when
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
is enabled),
.Qq password
and
.Qq publickey .
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
specified by an absolute path.
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
.Pp
The program should produce on standard output zero or
more lines of authorized_keys output (see
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS
in
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
-If a key supplied by
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-does not successfully authenticate
-and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
+is tried after the usual
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-files.
+files and will not be executed if a matching key is found there.
By default, no
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run.
It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
than running authorized keys commands.
If
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is specified but
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
is not, then
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to start.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication.
-The format is described in the
-.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
-section of
+The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of
.Xr sshd 8 .
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
directory.
Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
Alternately this option may be set to
.Cm none
to skip checking for user keys in files.
The default is
.Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
certificate principals as per
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile .
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
specified by an absolute path.
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
.Pp
The program should produce on standard output zero or
more lines of
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
output.
If either
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
or
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication
must contain a principal that is listed.
By default, no
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is run.
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is run.
It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
than running authorized principals commands.
If
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is specified but
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
is not, then
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to start.
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
certificate authentication.
When using certificates signed by a key listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it
to be accepted for authentication.
Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
in
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
Empty lines and comments starting with
.Ql #
are ignored.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory.
The default is
.Cm none ,
i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username
of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be
accepted.
.Pp
Note that
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ,
though the
.Cm principals=
key option offers a similar facility (see
.Xr sshd 8
for details).
.It Cm Banner
The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
authentication is allowed.
If the argument is
.Cm none
then no banner is displayed.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
.Ed
.Pp
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
public key or host-based authentication.
-.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-.Xr login.conf 5 )
-The default is
-.Cm yes .
.It Cm ChrootDirectory
Specifies the pathname of a directory to
.Xr chroot 2
to after authentication.
At session startup
.Xr sshd 8
checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories
which are not writable by any other user or group.
After the chroot,
.Xr sshd 8
changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
Arguments to
.Cm ChrootDirectory
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The
.Cm ChrootDirectory
must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
user's session.
For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
.Xr sh 1 ,
and basic
.Pa /dev
nodes such as
.Xr null 4 ,
.Xr zero 4 ,
.Xr stdin 4 ,
.Xr stdout 4 ,
.Xr stderr 4 ,
and
.Xr tty 4
devices.
For file transfer sessions using SFTP
no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process
sftp-server is used,
though sessions which use logging may require
.Pa /dev/log
inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see
.Xr sftp-server 8
for details).
.Pp
For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
those outside the jail).
Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
.Xr sshd 8
cannot detect.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm none ,
indicating not to
.Xr chroot 2 .
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
3des-cbc
.It
aes128-cbc
.It
aes192-cbc
.It
aes256-cbc
.It
aes128-ctr
.It
aes192-ctr
.It
aes256-ctr
.It
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
.It
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.It
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without
.Xr sshd 8
receiving any messages back from the client.
If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive .
The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
and therefore will not be spoofable.
The TCP keepalive option enabled by
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
is spoofable.
The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
-server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
.Pp
The default value is 3.
If
.Cm ClientAliveInterval
is set to 15, and
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+Setting a zero
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+disables connection termination.
.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the client,
.Xr sshd 8
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the client.
The default
is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
.It Cm Compression
Specifies whether compression is enabled after
the user has authenticated successfully.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm delayed
(a legacy synonym for
.Cm yes )
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm DenyGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
+The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
.Cm AllowGroups .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm DenyUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Cm AllowUsers .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm DisableForwarding
Disables all forwarding features, including X11,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
TCP and StreamLocal.
This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may
simplify restricted configurations.
.It Cm ExposeAuthInfo
Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and
public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user.
The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the
.Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
environment variable.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Cm md5
and
.Cm sha256 .
The default is
.Cm sha256 .
.It Cm ForceCommand
Forces the execution of the command specified by
.Cm ForceCommand ,
ignoring any command supplied by the client and
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
if present.
The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
It is most useful inside a
.Cm Match
block.
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
environment variable.
Specifying a command of
.Cm internal-sftp
will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support
files when used with
.Cm ChrootDirectory .
The default is
.Cm none .
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
forwarded for the client.
By default,
.Xr sshd 8
binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that sshd
should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
allowing other hosts to connect.
The argument may be
.Cm no
to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
.Cm yes
to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
.Cm clientspecified
to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
a client authenticates against.
If set to
.Cm yes
then the client must authenticate against the host
service on the current hostname.
If set to
.Cm no
then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
machine's default store.
This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
The default is
.Cm yes .
-.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
-Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
-as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
-character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
+the head of the default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
-The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+This was formerly named HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes.
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
(host-based authentication).
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
name lookup when matching the name in the
.Pa ~/.shosts ,
.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
and
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
files during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
A setting of
.Cm yes
means that
.Xr sshd 8
uses the name supplied by the client rather than
attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HostCertificate
Specifies a file containing a public host certificate.
The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified
by
.Cm HostKey .
The default behaviour of
.Xr sshd 8
is not to load any certificates.
.It Cm HostKey
Specifies a file containing a private host key
used by SSH.
The defaults are
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
and
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
.Pp
Note that
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible
and that the
.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
option restricts which of the keys are actually used by
.Xr sshd 8 .
.Pp
It is possible to have multiple host key files.
It is also possible to specify public host key files instead.
In this case operations on the private key will be delegated
to an
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
.It Cm HostKeyAgent
Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
with an agent that has access to the private host keys.
If the string
.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-Specifies the host key algorithms
+Specifies the host key signature algorithms
that the server offers.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
-The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-Specifies that
+Specifies whether to ignore per-user
.Pa .rhosts
and
.Pa .shosts
-files will not be used in
+files during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
-.Pp
+The system-wide
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
and
.Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv
-are still used.
-The default is
-.Cm yes .
+are still used regardless of this setting.
+.Pp
+Accepted values are
+.Cm yes
+(the default) to ignore all per-user files,
+.Cm shosts-only
+to allow the use of
+.Pa .shosts
+but to ignore
+.Pa .rhosts
+or
+.Cm no
+to allow both
+.Pa .shosts
+and
+.Pa rhosts .
.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should ignore the user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
and use only the system-wide known hosts file
.Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
The default is
-.Cm no .
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Include
+Include the specified configuration file(s).
+Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+wildcards that will be expanded and processed in lexical order.
+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+.Pa /etc/ssh .
+An
+.Cm Include
+directive may appear inside a
+.Cm Match
+block
+to perform conditional inclusion.
.It Cm IPQoS
Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
Accepted values are
.Cm af11 ,
.Cm af12 ,
.Cm af13 ,
.Cm af21 ,
.Cm af22 ,
.Cm af23 ,
.Cm af31 ,
.Cm af32 ,
.Cm af33 ,
.Cm af41 ,
.Cm af42 ,
.Cm af43 ,
.Cm cs0 ,
.Cm cs1 ,
.Cm cs2 ,
.Cm cs3 ,
.Cm cs4 ,
.Cm cs5 ,
.Cm cs6 ,
.Cm cs7 ,
.Cm ef ,
+.Cm le ,
.Cm lowdelay ,
.Cm throughput ,
.Cm reliability ,
a numeric value, or
.Cm none
to use the operating system default.
This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
The default is
.Cm af21
(Low-Latency Data)
for interactive sessions and
.Cm cs1
(Lower Effort)
for non-interactive sessions.
.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
+All authentication styles from
+.Xr login.conf 5
+are supported.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
-The default is to use whatever value
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-is set to
-(by default
-.Cm yes ) .
+is a deprecated alias for this.
.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
To use this option, the server needs a
Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
such as
.Pa /etc/passwd .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
file on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
The supported algorithms are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
curve25519-sha256
.It
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
.It
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.It
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
.It
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
.It
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+.It
+sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q kex .
+.Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
.It Cm ListenAddress
Specifies the local addresses
.Xr sshd 8
should listen on.
The following forms may be used:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar hostname | address
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar hostname : port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar IPv4_address : port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.El
.Pp
The optional
.Cm rdomain
qualifier requests
.Xr sshd 8
listen in an explicit routing domain.
If
.Ar port
is not specified,
sshd will listen on the address and all
.Cm Port
options specified.
The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default
routing domain.
Multiple
.Cm ListenAddress
options are permitted.
For more information on routing domains, see
.Xr rdomain 4 .
.It Cm LoginGraceTime
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
successfully logged in.
If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
The default is 120 seconds.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+.It Cm LogVerbose
+Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel.
+An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function
+and line number to force detailed logging for.
+For example, an override pattern of:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:*
+.Ed
+.Pp
+would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of
+.Pa kex.c ,
+everything in the
+.Fn kex_exchange_identification
+function, and all code in the
+.Pa packet.c
+file.
+This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
These are considered safer and their use recommended.
The supported MACs are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
hmac-md5
.It
hmac-md5-96
.It
hmac-sha1
.It
hmac-sha1-96
.It
hmac-sha2-256
.It
hmac-sha2-512
.It
umac-64@openssh.com
.It
umac-128@openssh.com
.It
hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
.It
umac-64-etm@openssh.com
.It
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm Match
Introduces a conditional block.
If all of the criteria on the
.Cm Match
line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
set in the global section of the config file, until either another
.Cm Match
line or the end of the file.
If a keyword appears in multiple
.Cm Match
blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is
applied.
.Pp
The arguments to
.Cm Match
are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token
.Cm All
which matches all criteria.
The available criteria are
.Cm User ,
.Cm Group ,
.Cm Host ,
.Cm LocalAddress ,
.Cm LocalPort ,
.Cm RDomain ,
and
.Cm Address
(with
.Cm RDomain
representing the
.Xr rdomain 4
-on which the connection was received.)
+on which the connection was received).
.Pp
The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated
lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
.Sx PATTERNS
section of
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
The patterns in an
.Cm Address
criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format,
such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32.
Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address -
it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
or one with bits set in this host portion of the address.
For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively.
.Pp
Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
.Cm Match
keyword.
Available keywords are
.Cm AcceptEnv ,
.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
.Cm AllowGroups ,
.Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding ,
.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
.Cm AllowUsers ,
.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
.Cm Banner ,
.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax ,
.Cm ClientAliveInterval ,
.Cm DenyGroups ,
.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm DisableForwarding ,
.Cm ForceCommand ,
.Cm GatewayPorts ,
.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
-.Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes ,
+.Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms ,
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
+.Cm IgnoreRhosts ,
+.Cm Include ,
.Cm IPQoS ,
.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
.Cm LogLevel ,
.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
.Cm MaxSessions ,
.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
.Cm PermitListen ,
.Cm PermitOpen ,
.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
.Cm PermitTTY ,
.Cm PermitTunnel ,
.Cm PermitUserRC ,
-.Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ,
+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ,
.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
.Cm RekeyLimit ,
.Cm RevokedKeys ,
.Cm RDomain ,
.Cm SetEnv ,
.Cm StreamLocalBindMask ,
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
.Cm X11Forwarding
and
-.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost .
.It Cm MaxAuthTries
Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
connection.
Once the number of failures reaches half this value,
additional failures are logged.
The default is 6.
.It Cm MaxSessions
Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp)
sessions permitted per network connection.
Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection
multiplexing.
Setting
.Cm MaxSessions
to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0
will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
forwarding.
The default is 10.
.It Cm MaxStartups
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
SSH daemon.
Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
.Cm LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection.
The default is 10:30:100.
.Pp
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
the three colon separated values
start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60").
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%)
if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections.
The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60).
+.It Cm ModuliFile
+Specifies the
+.Xr moduli 5
+file that contains the Diffie-Hellman groups used for the
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
+and
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
+key exchange methods.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/moduli .
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
See also
.Cm UsePAM .
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PermitListen
Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen.
The listen specification must be one of the following forms:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm PermitListen
.Sm off
.Ar port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitListen
.Sm off
.Ar host : port
.Sm on
.El
.Pp
Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
An argument of
.Cm any
can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests.
An argument of
.Cm none
can be used to prohibit all listen requests.
The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
The wildcard
.Sq *
can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports.
By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted.
Note that the
.Cm GatewayPorts
option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on.
Note also that
.Xr ssh 1
will request a listen host of
.Dq localhost
-if no listen host was specifically requested, and this this name is
+if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is
treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of
.Dq 127.0.0.1
and
.Dq ::1 .
.It Cm PermitOpen
Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar host : port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar IPv4_addr : port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
.Sm on
.El
.Pp
Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
An argument of
.Cm any
can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
An argument of
.Cm none
can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
The wildcard
.Sq *
-can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports, respectively.
+can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively.
+Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied
+names.
By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
.It Cm PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm prohibit-password ,
.Cm forced-commands-only ,
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm no .
Note that if
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
and
.Cm UsePAM
are both
.Cm yes ,
this setting may be overridden by the PAM policy.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm prohibit-password
(or its deprecated alias,
.Cm without-password ) ,
password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm forced-commands-only ,
root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
but only if the
.Ar command
option has been specified
(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
normally not allowed).
All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no ,
root is not allowed to log in.
.It Cm PermitTTY
Specifies whether
.Xr pty 4
allocation is permitted.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PermitTunnel
Specifies whether
.Xr tun 4
device forwarding is allowed.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm point-to-point
(layer 3),
.Cm ethernet
(layer 2), or
.Cm no .
Specifying
.Cm yes
permits both
.Cm point-to-point
and
.Cm ethernet .
The default is
.Cm no .
.Pp
Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
.Xr tun 4
device must allow access to the user.
.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
Specifies whether
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment
and
.Cm environment=
options in
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
are processed by
.Xr sshd 8 .
Valid options are
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept
(for example
.Qq LANG,LC_* ) .
The default is
.Cm no .
Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
.It Cm PermitUserRC
Specifies whether any
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
file is executed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
+.It Cm PerSourceMaxStartups
+Specifies the number of unauthenticated connections allowed from a
+given source address, or
+.Dq none
+if there is no limit.
+This limit is applied in addition to
+.Cm MaxStartups ,
+whichever is lower.
+The default is
+.Cm none .
+.It Cm PerSourceNetBlockSize
+Specifies the number of bits of source address that are grouped together
+for the purposes of applying PerSourceMaxStartups limits.
+Values for IPv4 and optionally IPv6 may be specified, separated by a colon.
+The default is
+.Cm 32:128 ,
+which means each address is considered individually.
.It Cm PidFile
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
SSH daemon, or
.Cm none
to not write one.
The default is
.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number that
.Xr sshd 8
listens on.
The default is 22.
Multiple options of this type are permitted.
See also
.Cm ListenAddress .
.It Cm PrintLastLog
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
in interactively.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PrintMotd
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should print
.Pa /etc/motd
when a user logs in interactively.
(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
.Pa /etc/profile ,
or equivalent.)
The default is
.Cm yes .
-.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
-as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
+authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
-If the specified value begins with a
+If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
-character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
-The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthOptions
+Sets one or more public key authentication options.
+The supported keywords are:
+.Cm none
+(the default; indicating no additional options are enabled),
+.Cm touch-required
+and
+.Cm verify-required .
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm touch-required
+option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm
+(i.e.\&
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+or
+.Cm ed25519-sk )
+to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user
+explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator).
+By default,
+.Xr sshd 8
+requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option.
+The
+.Cm touch-required
+flag disables this override.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm verify-required
+option requires a FIDO key signature attest that the user was verified,
+e.g. via a PIN.
+.Pp
+Neither the
+.Cm touch-required
+or
+.Cm verify-required
+options have any effect for other, non-FIDO, public key types.
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
-session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
+session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum amount of
time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
.Sq K ,
.Sq M ,
or
.Sq G
to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
The default is between
.Sq 1G
and
.Sq 4G ,
depending on the cipher.
The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
units documented in the
.Sx TIME FORMATS
section.
The default value for
.Cm RekeyLimit
is
.Cm default none ,
which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
.It Cm RevokedKeys
Specifies revoked public keys file, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
be refused for all users.
Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm RDomain
Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication
has completed.
-The user session, as well and any forwarded or listening IP sockets,
+The user session, as well as any forwarded or listening IP sockets,
will be bound to this
.Xr rdomain 4 .
If the routing domain is set to
.Cm \&%D ,
then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
+.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
.It Cm SetEnv
Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
by
.Xr sshd 8
as
.Dq NAME=VALUE .
The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace
characters).
Environment variables set by
.Cm SetEnv
override the default environment and any variables specified by the user
via
.Cm AcceptEnv
or
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment .
.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask
.Pq umask
used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
readable and writable only by the owner.
Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
is not enabled,
.Nm sshd
will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm StrictModes
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should check file modes and ownership of the
user's files and home directory before accepting login.
This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
directory or files world-writable.
The default is
.Cm yes .
Note that this does not apply to
.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
.It Cm Subsystem
Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
to execute upon subsystem request.
.Pp
The command
.Cm sftp-server
implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem.
.Pp
Alternately the name
.Cm internal-sftp
implements an in-process SFTP server.
This may simplify configurations using
.Cm ChrootDirectory
to force a different filesystem root on clients.
.Pp
By default no subsystems are defined.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
other side.
If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
of the machines will be properly noticed.
However, this means that
connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
find it annoying.
On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent,
sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
.Qq ghost
users and consuming server resources.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm yes
(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice
if the network goes down or the client host crashes.
This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
.Pp
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
.Cm no .
.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with
.Ql #
are allowed.
If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key
listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
listed in the certificate's principals list.
Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
for authentication using
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys .
For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm UseBlacklist
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
attempts to send authentication success and failure messages
to the
.Xr blacklistd 8
daemon.
The default is
.Cm no .
For forward compatibility with an upcoming
.Xr blacklistd
rename, the
.Cm UseBlocklist
alias can be used instead.
.It Cm UseDNS
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should look up the remote host name, and to check that
the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
very same IP address.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no ,
then only addresses and not host names may be used in
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
.Cm from
and
.Nm
.Cm Match
.Cm Host
directives.
The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm UsePAM
Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
If set to
.Cm yes
this will enable PAM authentication using
-.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
and
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
authentication types.
.Pp
-Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
+Because PAM keyboard-interactive authentication usually serves an equivalent
role to password authentication, you should disable either
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
or
-.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
+.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication .
.Pp
If
.Cm UsePAM
is enabled, you will not be able to run
.Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
sent by the server upon connection.
The default is
-.Qq FreeBSD-20200214 .
+.Qq FreeBSD-20210907 .
The value
.Cm none
may be used to disable this.
.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for
.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
X11 forwarding.
This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
The default is 10.
.It Cm X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.Pp
When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
the server and to client displays if the
.Xr sshd 8
proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
.Cm X11UseLocalhost ) ,
though this is not the default.
Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
verification and substitution occur on the client side.
The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
forwarding (see the warnings for
.Cm ForwardX11
in
.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
.Cm no
setting.
.Pp
Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
the wildcard address.
By default,
sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
hostname part of the
.Ev DISPLAY
environment variable to
.Cm localhost .
This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display.
However, some older X11 clients may not function with this
configuration.
.Cm X11UseLocalhost
may be set to
.Cm no
to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard
address.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the
.Xr xauth 1
program, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
The default is
.Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth .
.El
.Sh TIME FORMATS
.Xr sshd 8
command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
.Sm off
.Ar time Op Ar qualifier ,
.Sm on
where
.Ar time
is a positive integer value and
.Ar qualifier
is one of the following:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
.It Aq Cm none
seconds
.It Cm s | Cm S
seconds
.It Cm m | Cm M
minutes
.It Cm h | Cm H
hours
.It Cm d | Cm D
days
.It Cm w | Cm W
weeks
.El
.Pp
Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
the total time value.
.Pp
Time format examples:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
.It 600
600 seconds (10 minutes)
.It 10m
10 minutes
.It 1h30m
1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
.El
.Sh TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
which are expanded at runtime:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
.It %%
A literal
.Sq % .
.It \&%D
The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received.
.It %F
The fingerprint of the CA key.
.It %f
The fingerprint of the key or certificate.
.It %h
The home directory of the user.
.It %i
The key ID in the certificate.
.It %K
The base64-encoded CA key.
.It %k
The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication.
.It %s
The serial number of the certificate.
.It \&%T
The type of the CA key.
.It %t
The key or certificate type.
.It \&%U
The numeric user ID of the target user.
.It %u
The username.
.El
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm ChrootDirectory
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm RoutingDomain
accepts the token %D.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
.Xr sshd 8 .
This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos ,
.An Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
.An Niels Provos
and
.An Markus Friedl
contributed support for privilege separation.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssherr.c b/crypto/openssh/ssherr.c
index 8ad3d5750190..bd954aadd729 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssherr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssherr.c
@@ -1,147 +1,151 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.8 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.10 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ssherr.h"
const char *
ssh_err(int n)
{
switch (n) {
case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS:
return "success";
case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return "unexpected internal error";
case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
return "memory allocation failed";
case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE:
return "incomplete message";
case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT:
return "invalid format";
case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE:
return "bignum is negative";
case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE:
return "string is too large";
case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE:
return "bignum is too large";
case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE:
return "elliptic curve point is too large";
case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE:
return "insufficient buffer space";
case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
return "invalid argument";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH:
return "key bits do not match";
case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID:
return "invalid elliptic curve";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH:
return "key type does not match";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
return "unknown or unsupported key type";
case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH:
return "elliptic curve does not match";
case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT:
return "plain key provided where certificate required";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB:
return "key lacks certificate data";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE:
return "unknown/unsupported certificate type";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY:
return "invalid certificate signing key";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE:
return "invalid elliptic curve value";
case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID:
return "incorrect signature";
case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR:
return "error in libcrypto"; /* XXX fetch and return */
case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA:
return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding";
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
return strerror(errno);
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID:
return "invalid certificate";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION:
return "communication with agent failed";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE:
return "agent refused operation";
case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE:
return "DH GEX group out of range";
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
return "disconnected";
case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID:
return "message authentication code incorrect";
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching cipher found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching MAC found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching compression method found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching key exchange method found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching host key type found";
case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH:
return "protocol version mismatch";
case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
return "could not read protocol version";
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED:
return "could not load host key";
case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY:
return "rekeying not supported by peer";
case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT:
return "passphrase is too short (minimum five characters)";
case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED:
return "file changed while reading";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER:
return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS:
return "bad permissions";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH:
return "certificate does not match key";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
return "key not found";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
return "agent not present";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES:
return "agent contains no identities";
case SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY:
return "internal error: buffer is read-only";
case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC:
return "KRL file has invalid magic number";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
return "Key is revoked";
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
return "Connection closed";
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
return "Connection timed out";
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT:
return "Connection corrupted";
case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR:
return "Protocol error";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
return "Invalid key length";
case SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE:
return "number is too large";
case SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED:
return "signature algorithm not supported";
+ case SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
+ return "requested feature not supported";
+ case SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
+ return "device not found";
default:
return "unknown error";
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssherr.h b/crypto/openssh/ssherr.h
index 348da5a20865..085e752744d8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssherr.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssherr.h
@@ -1,87 +1,89 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.6 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.8 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _SSHERR_H
#define _SSHERR_H
/* XXX are these too granular? not granular enough? I can't decide - djm */
/* Error codes */
#define SSH_ERR_SUCCESS 0
#define SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR -1
#define SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL -2
#define SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE -3
#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT -4
#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE -5
#define SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE -6
#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE -7
#define SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE -8
#define SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE -9
#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -10
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH -11
#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID -12
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH -13
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN -14 /* XXX UNSUPPORTED? */
#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH -15
#define SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT -16
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB -17
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE -18
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY -19
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE -20
#define SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID -21
#define SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR -22
#define SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA -23
#define SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR -24
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID -25
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION -26
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE -27
#define SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE -28
#define SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED -29
#define SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID -30
#define SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH -31
#define SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH -32
#define SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH -33
#define SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH -34
#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH -35
#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED -36
#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH -37
#define SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION -38
#define SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY -39
#define SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT -40
#define SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED -41
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -42
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE -43
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS -44
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH -45
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND -46
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT -47
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES -48
#define SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY -49
#define SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC -50
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED -51
#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED -52
#define SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT -53
#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT -54
#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR -55
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH -56
#define SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE -57
#define SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED -58
+#define SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -59
+#define SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -60
/* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */
const char *ssh_err(int n);
#endif /* _SSHERR_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.c b/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.c
index aaae7028928c..f5235ef2fbd8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.c
@@ -1,1055 +1,1113 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.3 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.11 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H
# include <sys/file.h>
#endif
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "log.h"
#include "xmss_fast.h"
/* opaque internal XMSS state */
#define XMSS_MAGIC "xmss-state-v1"
#define XMSS_CIPHERNAME "aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
struct ssh_xmss_state {
xmss_params params;
u_int32_t n, w, h, k;
bds_state bds;
u_char *stack;
u_int32_t stackoffset;
u_char *stacklevels;
u_char *auth;
u_char *keep;
u_char *th_nodes;
u_char *retain;
treehash_inst *treehash;
u_int32_t idx; /* state read from file */
u_int32_t maxidx; /* restricted # of signatures */
int have_state; /* .state file exists */
int lockfd; /* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */
- int allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */
+ u_char allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */
char *enc_ciphername;/* encrypt state with cipher */
u_char *enc_keyiv; /* encrypt state with key */
u_int32_t enc_keyiv_len; /* length of enc_keyiv */
};
int sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *, const char *);
void sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *, const char *,
- int *, sshkey_printfn *);
+ int *, int);
int sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
struct sshbuf **);
int sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
struct sshbuf **);
int sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
-#define PRINT(s...) do { if (pr) pr(s); } while (0)
+#define PRINT(...) do { if (printerror) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, \
+ 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
int
sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *key, const char *name)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state;
if (key->xmss_state != NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
state = calloc(sizeof(struct ssh_xmss_state), 1);
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME) == 0) {
state->n = 32;
state->w = 16;
state->h = 10;
} else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME) == 0) {
state->n = 32;
state->w = 16;
state->h = 16;
} else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME) == 0) {
state->n = 32;
state->w = 16;
state->h = 20;
} else {
free(state);
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if ((key->xmss_name = strdup(name)) == NULL) {
free(state);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
state->k = 2; /* XXX hardcoded */
state->lockfd = -1;
if (xmss_set_params(&state->params, state->n, state->h, state->w,
state->k) != 0) {
free(state);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
key->xmss_state = state;
return 0;
}
void
sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key);
if (state) {
if (state->enc_keyiv) {
explicit_bzero(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len);
free(state->enc_keyiv);
}
free(state->enc_ciphername);
free(state);
}
key->xmss_state = NULL;
}
#define SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC "k=2"
#define num_stack(x) ((x->h+1)*(x->n))
#define num_stacklevels(x) (x->h+1)
#define num_auth(x) ((x->h)*(x->n))
#define num_keep(x) ((x->h >> 1)*(x->n))
#define num_th_nodes(x) ((x->h - x->k)*(x->n))
#define num_retain(x) (((1ULL << x->k) - x->k - 1) * (x->n))
#define num_treehash(x) ((x->h) - (x->k))
int
sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
u_int32_t i;
state->stackoffset = 0;
if ((state->stack = calloc(num_stack(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->stacklevels = calloc(num_stacklevels(state), 1))== NULL ||
(state->auth = calloc(num_auth(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->keep = calloc(num_keep(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->th_nodes = calloc(num_th_nodes(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->retain = calloc(num_retain(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state),
sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL) {
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < state->h - state->k; i++)
state->treehash[i].node = &state->th_nodes[state->n*i];
xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset,
state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash,
state->retain, 0);
return 0;
}
void
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return;
free(state->stack);
free(state->stacklevels);
free(state->auth);
free(state->keep);
free(state->th_nodes);
free(state->retain);
free(state->treehash);
state->stack = NULL;
state->stacklevels = NULL;
state->auth = NULL;
state->keep = NULL;
state->th_nodes = NULL;
state->retain = NULL;
state->treehash = NULL;
}
void *
sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return NULL;
return &state->params;
}
void *
sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return NULL;
return &state->bds;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *key, size_t *lenp)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (lenp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
*lenp = 4 + state->n +
state->params.wots_par.keysize +
state->h * state->n;
return 0;
}
size_t
sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return 0;
return state->n * 2;
}
size_t
sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return 0;
return state->n * 4 + 4;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, const char *ciphername)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((state->enc_ciphername = strdup(ciphername)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
state->enc_keyiv_len = keylen + ivlen;
if ((state->enc_keyiv = calloc(state->enc_keyiv_len, 1)) == NULL) {
free(state->enc_ciphername);
state->enc_ciphername = NULL;
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
arc4random_buf(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len);
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
int r;
if (state == NULL || state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, state->enc_ciphername)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->enc_keyiv,
state->enc_keyiv_len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
size_t len;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &state->enc_ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->enc_keyiv, &len)) != 0)
return r;
state->enc_keyiv_len = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_char have_info = 1;
u_int32_t idx;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (opts != SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)
return 0;
idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_info)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_char have_info;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* optional */
if (sshbuf_len(b) == 0)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_info)) != 0)
return r;
if (have_info != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *k, u_int bits)
{
int r;
const char *name;
if (bits == 10) {
name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME;
} else if (bits == 16) {
name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME;
} else if (bits == 20) {
name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME;
} else {
name = XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME;
}
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(k, XMSS_CIPHERNAME)) != 0)
return r;
if ((k->xmss_pk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) == NULL ||
(k->xmss_sk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_sklen(k))) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
xmss_keypair(k->xmss_pk, k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k),
sshkey_xmss_params(k));
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename,
- int *have_file, sshkey_printfn *pr)
+ int *have_file, int printerror)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, r, fd = -1;
u_int32_t len;
unsigned char buf[4], *data = NULL;
*have_file = 0;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
*have_file = 1;
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
- PRINT("%s: corrupt state file: %s", __func__, filename);
+ PRINT("corrupt state file: %s", filename);
goto done;
}
len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if ((data = calloc(len, 1)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if (atomicio(read, fd, data, len) != len) {
- PRINT("%s: cannot read blob: %s", __func__, filename);
+ PRINT("cannot read blob: %s", filename);
goto done;
}
if ((enc = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(k);
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(k, enc, &b)) != 0) {
ret = r;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) {
ret = r;
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
}
done:
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
free(data);
sshbuf_free(enc);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
int
-sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr)
+sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *k, int printerror)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_int32_t idx = 0;
char *filename = NULL;
char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *lockfile = NULL;
int lockfd = -1, have_state = 0, have_ostate, tries = 0;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, r;
if (state == NULL)
goto done;
/*
* If maxidx is set, then we are allowed a limited number
* of signatures, but don't need to access the disk.
* Otherwise we need to deal with the on-disk state.
*/
if (state->maxidx) {
/* xmss_sk always contains the current state */
idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
if (idx < state->maxidx) {
state->allow_update = 1;
return 0;
}
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL)
goto done;
- if (asprintf(&lockfile, "%s.lock", filename) < 0 ||
- asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) < 0 ||
- asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) < 0) {
+ if (asprintf(&lockfile, "%s.lock", filename) == -1 ||
+ asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 ||
+ asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
- if ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_CREAT|O_RDONLY, 0600)) < 0) {
+ if ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_CREAT|O_RDONLY, 0600)) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: cannot open/create: %s", __func__, lockfile);
+ PRINT("cannot open/create: %s", lockfile);
goto done;
}
- while (flock(lockfd, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) < 0) {
+ while (flock(lockfd, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) == -1) {
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: cannot lock: %s", __func__, lockfile);
+ PRINT("cannot lock: %s", lockfile);
goto done;
}
if (++tries > 10) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: giving up on: %s", __func__, lockfile);
+ PRINT("giving up on: %s", lockfile);
goto done;
}
usleep(1000*100*tries);
}
/* XXX no longer const */
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k,
- statefile, &have_state, pr)) != 0) {
+ statefile, &have_state, printerror)) != 0) {
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k,
- ostatefile, &have_ostate, pr)) == 0) {
+ ostatefile, &have_ostate, printerror)) == 0) {
state->allow_update = 1;
r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, 1);
state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
state->allow_update = 0;
}
}
if (!have_state && !have_ostate) {
/* check that bds state is initialized */
if (state->bds.auth == NULL)
goto done;
- PRINT("%s: start from scratch idx 0: %u", __func__, state->idx);
+ PRINT("start from scratch idx 0: %u", state->idx);
} else if (r != 0) {
ret = r;
goto done;
}
if (state->idx + 1 < state->idx) {
- PRINT("%s: state wrap: %u", __func__, state->idx);
+ PRINT("state wrap: %u", state->idx);
goto done;
}
state->have_state = have_state;
state->lockfd = lockfd;
state->allow_update = 1;
lockfd = -1;
ret = 0;
done:
if (lockfd != -1)
close(lockfd);
free(lockfile);
free(statefile);
free(ostatefile);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t reserve)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t required_siglen;
unsigned long long smlen;
u_char data;
int ret, r;
if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (reserve == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state->idx + reserve <= state->idx)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(k, &required_siglen)) != 0)
return r;
if ((sig = malloc(required_siglen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
while (reserve-- > 0) {
state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
smlen = required_siglen;
if ((ret = xmss_sign(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k),
sig, &smlen, &data, 0, sshkey_xmss_params(k))) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
}
}
free(sig);
return r;
}
int
-sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr)
+sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, int printerror)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL;
u_int32_t idx = 0;
unsigned char buf[4];
char *filename = NULL;
char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *nstatefile = NULL;
int fd = -1;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update)
return ret;
if (state->maxidx) {
/* no update since the number of signatures is limited */
ret = 0;
goto done;
}
idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
if (idx == state->idx) {
/* no signature happened, no need to update */
ret = 0;
goto done;
} else if (idx != state->idx + 1) {
- PRINT("%s: more than one signature happened: idx %u state %u",
- __func__, idx, state->idx);
+ PRINT("more than one signature happened: idx %u state %u",
+ idx, state->idx);
goto done;
}
state->idx = idx;
if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL)
goto done;
- if (asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) < 0 ||
- asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) < 0 ||
- asprintf(&nstatefile, "%s.nstate", filename) < 0) {
+ if (asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 ||
+ asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1 ||
+ asprintf(&nstatefile, "%s.nstate", filename) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
unlink(nstatefile);
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0) {
- PRINT("%s: SERLIALIZE FAILED: %d", __func__, ret);
+ PRINT("SERLIALIZE FAILED: %d", ret);
goto done;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(k, b, &enc)) != 0) {
- PRINT("%s: ENCRYPT FAILED: %d", __func__, ret);
+ PRINT("ENCRYPT FAILED: %d", ret);
goto done;
}
- if ((fd = open(nstatefile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) {
+ if ((fd = open(nstatefile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0600)) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: open new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
+ PRINT("open new state file: %s", nstatefile);
goto done;
}
POKE_U32(buf, sshbuf_len(enc));
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: write new state file hdr: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
+ PRINT("write new state file hdr: %s", nstatefile);
close(fd);
goto done;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(enc), sshbuf_len(enc)) !=
sshbuf_len(enc)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: write new state file data: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
+ PRINT("write new state file data: %s", nstatefile);
close(fd);
goto done;
}
- if (fsync(fd) < 0) {
+ if (fsync(fd) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: sync new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
+ PRINT("sync new state file: %s", nstatefile);
close(fd);
goto done;
}
- if (close(fd) < 0) {
+ if (close(fd) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: close new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
+ PRINT("close new state file: %s", nstatefile);
goto done;
}
if (state->have_state) {
unlink(ostatefile);
if (link(statefile, ostatefile)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: backup state %s to %s", __func__, statefile,
- ostatefile);
+ PRINT("backup state %s to %s", statefile, ostatefile);
goto done;
}
}
- if (rename(nstatefile, statefile) < 0) {
+ if (rename(nstatefile, statefile) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- PRINT("%s: rename %s to %s", __func__, nstatefile, statefile);
+ PRINT("rename %s to %s", nstatefile, statefile);
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (state->lockfd != -1) {
close(state->lockfd);
state->lockfd = -1;
}
if (nstatefile)
unlink(nstatefile);
free(statefile);
free(ostatefile);
free(nstatefile);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(enc);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
treehash_inst *th;
u_int32_t i, node;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state->stack == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
state->stackoffset = state->bds.stackoffset; /* copy back */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stack, num_stack(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->stackoffset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stacklevels, num_stacklevels(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->auth, num_auth(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->keep, num_keep(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->th_nodes, num_th_nodes(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->retain, num_retain(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, num_treehash(state))) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) {
th = &state->treehash[i];
node = th->node - state->th_nodes;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->h)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->next_idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->stackusage)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, th->completed)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, node)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
int r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ u_char have_stack, have_filename, have_enc;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, opts)) != 0)
return r;
switch (opts) {
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE:
r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b);
break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL:
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
- break;
+ return r;
r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b);
break;
+ case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD:
+ /* all of stack/filename/enc are optional */
+ have_stack = state->stack != NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_stack)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_stack) {
+ state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); /* update */
+ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ have_filename = k->xmss_filename != NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_filename)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_filename &&
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, k->xmss_filename)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ have_enc = state->enc_keyiv != NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_enc)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_enc &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, state->allow_update)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT:
r = 0;
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
}
return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
treehash_inst *th;
u_int32_t i, lh, node;
size_t ls, lsl, la, lk, ln, lr;
char *magic;
- int r;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (k->xmss_sk == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state),
sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &magic, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stack, &ls)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->stackoffset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stacklevels, &lsl)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->auth, &la)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->keep, &lk)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->th_nodes, &ln)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->retain, &lr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &lh)) != 0)
- return r;
- if (strcmp(magic, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC) != 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ if (strcmp(magic, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* XXX check stackoffset */
if (ls != num_stack(state) ||
lsl != num_stacklevels(state) ||
la != num_auth(state) ||
lk != num_keep(state) ||
ln != num_th_nodes(state) ||
lr != num_retain(state) ||
- lh != num_treehash(state))
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ lh != num_treehash(state)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) {
th = &state->treehash[i];
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->h)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->next_idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->stackusage)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &th->completed)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &node)) != 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
if (node < num_th_nodes(state))
th->node = &state->th_nodes[node];
}
POKE_U32(k->xmss_sk, state->idx);
xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset,
state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash,
state->retain, 0);
- return 0;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(magic);
+ return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
+ struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts;
- u_char have_state;
+ u_char have_state, have_stack, have_filename, have_enc;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_state)) != 0)
return r;
opts = have_state;
switch (opts) {
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT:
r = 0;
break;
+ case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_stack)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_stack &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_filename)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_filename &&
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &k->xmss_filename, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_enc)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_enc &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &state->allow_update)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE:
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL:
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
return r;
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
break;
}
return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
struct sshbuf **retp)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
struct sshbuf *encrypted = NULL, *encoded = NULL, *padded = NULL;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
u_char *cp, *key, *iv = NULL;
size_t i, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen, encrypted_len, aadlen;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (retp != NULL)
*retp = NULL;
if (state == NULL ||
state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
key = state->enc_keyiv;
if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(padded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */
memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen);
POKE_U32(iv, state->idx);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, state->idx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* padded state will be encrypted */
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(padded, b)) != 0)
goto out;
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(padded) % blocksize) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(padded, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
goto out;
}
encrypted_len = sshbuf_len(padded);
/* header including the length of state is used as AAD */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, encrypted_len)) != 0)
goto out;
aadlen = sshbuf_len(encoded);
/* concat header and state */
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(encoded, padded)) != 0)
goto out;
/* reserve space for encryption of encoded data plus auth tag */
/* encrypt at offset addlen */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted,
encrypted_len + aadlen + authlen, &cp)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
iv, ivlen, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encoded),
encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
if (retp != NULL) {
*retp = encrypted;
encrypted = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(padded);
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(encrypted);
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
free(iv);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *encoded,
struct sshbuf **retp)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
u_char *key, *iv = NULL, *dp;
size_t keylen, ivlen, authlen, aadlen;
u_int blocksize, encrypted_len, index;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (retp != NULL)
*retp = NULL;
if (state == NULL ||
state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
key = state->enc_keyiv;
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(encoded)) == NULL ||
(decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* check magic */
if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC) ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(encoded), XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* parse public portion */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &index)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* check size of encrypted key blob */
if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
- if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) {
+ if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < authlen ||
+ sshbuf_len(encoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
aadlen = sshbuf_len(copy) - sshbuf_len(encoded);
/* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */
memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen);
POKE_U32(iv, index);
/* decrypt private state of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, aadlen + encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
iv, ivlen, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(copy),
encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* there should be no trailing data */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(encoded) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* remove AAD */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decrypted, aadlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* XXX encrypted includes unchecked padding */
/* success */
r = 0;
if (retp != NULL) {
*retp = decrypted;
decrypted = NULL;
}
out:
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshbuf_free(decrypted);
free(iv);
return r;
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_int32_t idx;
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS && state &&
state->maxidx) {
idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx;
if (idx < state->maxidx)
return state->maxidx - idx;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (maxsign == 0)
return 0;
if (state->idx + maxsign < state->idx)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
state->maxidx = state->idx + maxsign;
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.h b/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.h
index b9f8ead1047f..32a12be620b1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey-xmss.h
@@ -1,56 +1,56 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.h,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.h,v 1.3 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef SSHKEY_XMSS_H
#define SSHKEY_XMSS_H
-#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10"
-#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16"
-#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20"
-#define XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME
+#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10"
+#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16"
+#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20"
+#define XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME
size_t sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *);
size_t sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *, const char *);
void sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *, u_int);
int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
- enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+ enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *, size_t *);
void *sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *);
void *sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *);
-int sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *, sshkey_printfn *);
+int sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *, int);
int sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
int sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
-int sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *, sshkey_printfn *);
+int sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *, int);
u_int32_t sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *);
#endif /* SSHKEY_XMSS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c
index 6555c5ef8de0..0dbc0d873b4f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c
@@ -1,4165 +1,4829 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.72 2018/10/11 00:52:46 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.119 2021/07/23 03:37:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#endif
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <resolv.h>
+#include <time.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
-#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "xmss_fast.h"
+#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/* openssh private key file format */
#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1)
#define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1)
#define KDFNAME "bcrypt"
#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
#define SALT_LEN 16
#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-ctr"
#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16
/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
#define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"
-int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(const struct sshkey *key,
+/*
+ * Constants relating to "shielding" support; protection of keys expected
+ * to remain in memory for long durations
+ */
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN (16 * 1024)
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER "aes256-ctr" /* XXX want AES-EME* */
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH SSH_DIGEST_SHA512
+
+int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key,
struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
-static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep);
/* Supported key types */
struct keytype {
const char *name;
const char *shortname;
const char *sigalg;
int type;
int nid;
int cert;
int sigonly;
};
static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
{ "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", NULL, KEY_ED25519, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
+ { "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK", NULL,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK-CERT", NULL,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
{ "ssh-xmss@openssh.com", "XMSS", NULL, KEY_XMSS, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "XMSS-CERT", NULL,
KEY_XMSS_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ "ssh-rsa", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "ssh-dss", "DSA", NULL, KEY_DSA, 0, 0, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 },
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ { "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK", NULL,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 },
+ { "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK", NULL,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 1 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
{ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
{ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT",
"rsa-sha2-256", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 },
{ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT",
"rsa-sha2-512", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 },
{ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 },
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ { "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK-CERT", NULL,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
};
const char *
sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == k->type)
return kt->shortname;
}
return "unknown";
}
static const char *
sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid))
return kt->name;
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}
int
sshkey_type_is_cert(int type)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == type)
return kt->cert;
}
return 0;
}
const char *
sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
}
const char *
sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type),
k->ecdsa_nid);
}
int
sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
/* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */
if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) ||
(!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0))
return kt->type;
}
return KEY_UNSPEC;
}
+static int
+key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)
+ if (!key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type))
continue;
if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0)
return kt->nid;
}
return -1;
}
char *
sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
{
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL)
continue;
if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
continue;
if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
continue;
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(kt->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
const struct keytype *kt;
int type;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
type = sshkey_type_from_name(p);
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
if (allow_wildcard) {
/*
* Try matching key types against the string.
* If any has a positive or negative match then
* the component is accepted.
*/
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (match_pattern_list(kt->name,
p, 0) != 0)
break;
}
if (kt->type != -1)
continue;
}
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
free(s);
return 1;
}
u_int
sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *dsa_p;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (k->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
return BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (k->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, NULL, NULL);
return BN_num_bits(dsa_p);
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return 256; /* XXX */
}
return 0;
}
static int
sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
int
sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return 0;
return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type);
}
+int
+sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
int
sshkey_type_plain(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return KEY_RSA;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return KEY_DSA;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
return KEY_ECDSA;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ return KEY_ECDSA_SK;
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return KEY_ED25519;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ return KEY_ED25519_SK;
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return KEY_XMSS;
default:
return type;
}
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
int
sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
{
if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
return NID_secp384r1;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
return NID_secp521r1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
else
return -1;
}
u_int
sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
return 256;
case NID_secp384r1:
return 384;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case NID_secp521r1:
return 521;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return 0;
}
}
int
sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
{
switch (bits) {
case 256:
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
case 384:
return NID_secp384r1;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case 521:
return NID_secp521r1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return -1;
}
}
const char *
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
return "nistp256";
case NID_secp384r1:
return "nistp384";
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case NID_secp521r1:
return "nistp521";
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return NULL;
}
}
int
sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid)
{
int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
if (kbits <= 0)
return -1;
/* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
if (kbits <= 256)
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
else if (kbits <= 384)
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
else
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static void
cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
u_int i;
if (cert == NULL)
return;
sshbuf_free(cert->certblob);
sshbuf_free(cert->critical);
sshbuf_free(cert->extensions);
free(cert->key_id);
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
free(cert->principals[i]);
free(cert->principals);
sshkey_free(cert->signature_key);
free(cert->signature_type);
freezero(cert, sizeof(*cert));
}
static struct sshkey_cert *
cert_new(void)
{
struct sshkey_cert *cert;
if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
cert_free(cert);
return NULL;
}
cert->key_id = NULL;
cert->principals = NULL;
cert->signature_key = NULL;
cert->signature_type = NULL;
return cert;
}
struct sshkey *
sshkey_new(int type)
{
struct sshkey *k;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RSA *rsa;
DSA *dsa;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
return NULL;
k->type = type;
k->ecdsa = NULL;
k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
k->dsa = NULL;
k->rsa = NULL;
k->cert = NULL;
k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
k->xmss_sk = NULL;
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
k->rsa = rsa;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
k->dsa = dsa;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
/* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
/* no need to prealloc */
break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
free(k);
return NULL;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) {
sshkey_free(k);
return NULL;
}
}
return k;
}
void
sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
RSA_free(k->rsa);
k->rsa = NULL;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
DSA_free(k->dsa);
k->dsa = NULL;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ free(k->sk_application);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa);
k->ecdsa = NULL;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ free(k->sk_application);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
freezero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
freezero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
freezero(k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k));
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
freezero(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(k));
k->xmss_sk = NULL;
sshkey_xmss_free_state(k);
free(k->xmss_name);
k->xmss_name = NULL;
free(k->xmss_filename);
k->xmss_filename = NULL;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
break;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k))
cert_free(k->cert);
+ freezero(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len);
+ freezero(k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len);
freezero(k, sizeof(*k));
}
static int
cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b)
{
if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 0;
if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob))
return 0;
if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob),
sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between
* certificates and plain keys too.
*/
int
sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
{
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
const BIGNUM *rsa_e_a, *rsa_n_a;
const BIGNUM *rsa_e_b, *rsa_n_b;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p_a, *dsa_q_a, *dsa_g_a, *dsa_pub_key_a;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p_b, *dsa_q_b, *dsa_g_b, *dsa_pub_key_b;
-# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
-# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type))
return 0;
switch (a->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &rsa_n_a, &rsa_e_a, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &rsa_n_b, &rsa_e_b, NULL);
return BN_cmp(rsa_e_a, rsa_e_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(rsa_n_a, rsa_n_b) == 0;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &dsa_p_a, &dsa_q_a, &dsa_g_a);
DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &dsa_p_b, &dsa_q_b, &dsa_g_b);
DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_a, NULL);
DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_b, NULL);
return BN_cmp(dsa_p_a, dsa_p_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_q_a, dsa_q_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_g_a, dsa_g_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_pub_key_a, dsa_pub_key_b) == 0;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL ||
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL ||
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL)
return 0;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return 0;
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0 ||
EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) {
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0)
return 0;
- }
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return 1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL &&
memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return a->xmss_pk != NULL && b->xmss_pk != NULL &&
sshkey_xmss_pklen(a) == sshkey_xmss_pklen(b) &&
memcmp(a->xmss_pk, b->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(a)) == 0;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
int
sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
{
if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
return 0;
if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) {
if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert))
return 0;
}
return sshkey_equal_public(a, b);
}
static int
to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
const char *typename;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (key == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key->cert == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
}
type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
/* Use the existing blob */
/* XXX modified flag? */
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
if (key->dsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if (key->ecdsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0)
return ret;
+ if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ key->sk_application)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
break;
# endif
case KEY_RSA:
if (key->rsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(b,
key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
return ret;
+ if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ key->sk_application)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
if (key->xmss_name == NULL || key->xmss_pk == NULL ||
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(b,
key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(key, b, opts)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
struct sshbuf *tmp;
int r;
if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0, opts);
if (r == 0)
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshkey_puts_opts(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
static int
to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (blobp != NULL)
*blobp = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (blobp != NULL) {
if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
{
return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
{
return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
u_char **retp, size_t *lenp)
{
u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL;
size_t blob_len = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (retp != NULL)
*retp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT))
!= 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len,
ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (retp != NULL) {
*retp = ret;
ret = NULL;
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg);
r = 0;
out:
free(ret);
- if (blob != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len);
- free(blob);
- }
+ if (blob != NULL)
+ freezero(blob, blob_len);
return r;
}
static char *
fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char *ret;
size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1;
size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1;
- int r;
if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
return NULL;
strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen);
strlcat(ret, ":", rlen);
if (dgst_raw_len == 0)
return ret;
- if ((r = b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len,
- ret + plen, rlen - plen)) == -1) {
+ if (b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen) == -1) {
freezero(ret, rlen);
return NULL;
}
/* Trim padding characters from end */
ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0';
return ret;
}
static char *
fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char *retval, hex[5];
size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2;
if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
return NULL;
strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen);
strlcat(retval, ":", rlen);
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x",
i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]);
strlcat(retval, hex, rlen);
}
return retval;
}
static char *
fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
char *retval;
rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL)
return NULL;
retval[j++] = 'x';
for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
seed) % 6;
idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
(seed / 6)) % 6;
retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
retval[j++] = '-';
retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
seed = ((seed * 5) +
((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
}
} else {
idx0 = seed % 6;
idx1 = 16;
idx2 = seed / 6;
retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
}
}
retval[j++] = 'x';
retval[j++] = '\0';
return retval;
}
/*
* Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
* profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
* This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
* scientific publications like this original paper:
*
* "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
* Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
* Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
* sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
*
* The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
*
* If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
* If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
*
* The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
* leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
* Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
* makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
* Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
* walked in either direction.
*/
/*
* Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point
* can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
* Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
* fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
*/
#define FLDBASE 8
#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1)
#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
static char *
fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
const struct sshkey *k)
{
/*
* Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
* intersects with itself. Matter of taste.
*/
char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X];
u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
size_t i, tlen, hlen;
u_int b;
int x, y, r;
size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* initialize field */
memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
/* process raw key */
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
int input;
/* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
input = dgst_raw[i];
for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
/* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
/* assure we are still in bounds */
x = MAXIMUM(x, 0);
y = MAXIMUM(y, 0);
x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
/* augment the field */
if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
field[x][y]++;
input = input >> 2;
}
}
/* mark starting point and end point*/
field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
field[x][y] = len;
/* assemble title */
r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]",
sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k));
/* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */
if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title))
r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k));
tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title);
/* assemble hash ID. */
r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg);
hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash);
/* output upper border */
p = retval;
*p++ = '+';
for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++)
*p++ = '-';
memcpy(p, title, tlen);
p += tlen;
for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = '+';
*p++ = '\n';
/* output content */
for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
*p++ = '|';
for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
*p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)];
*p++ = '|';
*p++ = '\n';
}
/* output lower border */
*p++ = '+';
for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++)
*p++ = '-';
memcpy(p, hash, hlen);
p += hlen;
for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = '+';
return retval;
}
char *
sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep)
{
char *retval = NULL;
u_char *dgst_raw;
size_t dgst_raw_len;
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0)
return NULL;
switch (dgst_rep) {
case SSH_FP_DEFAULT:
if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) {
retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
} else {
retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
}
break;
case SSH_FP_HEX:
retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_BASE64:
retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
break;
default:
- explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
- free(dgst_raw);
+ freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
return NULL;
}
- explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
- free(dgst_raw);
+ freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
return retval;
}
static int
peek_type_nid(const char *s, size_t l, int *nid)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL || strlen(kt->name) != l)
continue;
if (memcmp(s, kt->name, l) == 0) {
*nid = -1;
- if (kt->type == KEY_ECDSA || kt->type == KEY_ECDSA_CERT)
+ if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type))
*nid = kt->nid;
return kt->type;
}
}
return KEY_UNSPEC;
}
/* XXX this can now be made const char * */
int
sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
char *cp, *blobcopy;
size_t space;
int r, type, curve_nid = -1;
struct sshbuf *blob;
if (ret == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
switch (ret->type) {
case KEY_UNSPEC:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
break; /* ok */
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
/* Decode type */
cp = *cpp;
space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
if (space == strlen(cp))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((type = peek_type_nid(cp, space, &curve_nid)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* skip whitespace */
for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp == '\0')
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* find end of keyblob and decode */
space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
if ((blobcopy = strndup(cp, space)) == NULL) {
sshbuf_free(blob);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, blobcopy)) != 0) {
free(blobcopy);
sshbuf_free(blob);
return r;
}
free(blobcopy);
if ((r = sshkey_fromb(blob, &k)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(blob);
return r;
}
sshbuf_free(blob);
/* skip whitespace and leave cp at start of comment */
for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* ensure type of blob matches type at start of line */
if (k->type != type) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
- if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
+ if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(type) && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
}
/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
ret->type = type;
if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
}
if (ret->cert != NULL)
cert_free(ret->cert);
ret->cert = k->cert;
k->cert = NULL;
}
switch (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type)) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
RSA_free(ret->rsa);
ret->rsa = k->rsa;
k->rsa = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
DSA_free(ret->dsa);
ret->dsa = k->dsa;
k->dsa = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
#endif
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
k->ecdsa = NULL;
k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
+ ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
+ ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
+ ret->sk_application = k->sk_application;
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
+ k->sk_application = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
+ fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", ret->sk_application);
#endif
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
/* XXX */
#endif
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+ ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
+ ret->sk_application = k->sk_application;
+ k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ k->sk_application = NULL;
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
free(ret->xmss_pk);
ret->xmss_pk = k->xmss_pk;
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_state);
ret->xmss_state = k->xmss_state;
k->xmss_state = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_name);
ret->xmss_name = k->xmss_name;
k->xmss_name = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_filename);
ret->xmss_filename = k->xmss_filename;
k->xmss_filename = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
/* XXX */
#endif
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
sshkey_free(k);
/* success */
*cpp = cp;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *uu = NULL;
if (b64p != NULL)
*b64p = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) {
+ if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 0)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Success */
if (b64p != NULL) {
*b64p = uu;
uu = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(uu);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *uu = NULL;
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
free(uu);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
if (feof(f))
errno = EPIPE;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
const char *
sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (k->cert->type) {
case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER:
return "user";
case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST:
return "host";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
{
RSA *private = NULL;
BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (rsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*rsap = NULL;
if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
*rsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
RSA_free(private);
BN_free(f4);
return ret;
}
static int
dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap)
{
DSA *private;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (dsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (bits != 1024)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
*dsap = NULL;
if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL,
NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
*dsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
DSA_free(private);
return ret;
}
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
{
EC_GROUP *eg;
int nids[] = {
NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
NID_secp384r1,
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
NID_secp521r1,
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
-1
};
int nid;
u_int i;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
/*
* The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two
* ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID
* or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the
* "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure
* it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that
* are supported.
*/
if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0)
return nid;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return -1;
for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
- if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) {
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL)
return -1;
- }
- if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0)
+ if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, NULL) == 0)
break;
EC_GROUP_free(eg);
}
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
if (nids[i] != -1) {
/* Use the group with the NID attached */
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) {
EC_GROUP_free(eg);
return -1;
}
}
return nids[i];
}
static int
ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
{
EC_KEY *private;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*ecdsap = NULL;
if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
*ecdsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
EC_KEY_free(private);
return ret;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*keyp = NULL;
if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
switch (type) {
case KEY_ED25519:
if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL ||
(k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
}
crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk);
ret = 0;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
ret = sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(k, bits);
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa);
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid,
&k->ecdsa);
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa);
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (ret == 0) {
k->type = type;
*keyp = k;
} else
sshkey_free(k);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key)
{
u_int i;
const struct sshkey_cert *from;
struct sshkey_cert *to;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (to_key == NULL || (from = from_key->cert) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((to = cert_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0)
goto out;
to->serial = from->serial;
to->type = from->type;
if (from->key_id == NULL)
to->key_id = NULL;
else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
to->valid_before = from->valid_before;
if (from->signature_key == NULL)
to->signature_key = NULL;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key,
&to->signature_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (from->signature_type != NULL &&
(to->signature_type = strdup(from->signature_type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (from->nprincipals > 0) {
if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals,
sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) {
to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]);
if (to->principals[i] == NULL) {
to->nprincipals = i;
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
}
}
to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals;
/* success */
cert_free(to_key->cert);
to_key->cert = to;
to = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
cert_free(to);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
{
struct sshkey *n = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
BIGNUM *rsa_n_dup = NULL, *rsa_e_dup = NULL;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
BIGNUM *dsa_p_dup = NULL, *dsa_q_dup = NULL, *dsa_g_dup = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
*pkp = NULL;
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
-
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((dsa_p_dup = BN_dup(dsa_p)) == NULL ||
(dsa_q_dup = BN_dup(dsa_q)) == NULL ||
(dsa_g_dup = BN_dup(dsa_g)) == NULL ||
(dsa_pub_key_dup = BN_dup(dsa_pub_key)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, dsa_p_dup, dsa_q_dup, dsa_g_dup)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p_dup = dsa_q_dup = dsa_g_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, dsa_pub_key_dup, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
if (n->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ if (k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT)
+ break;
+ /* Append security-key application string */
+ if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((rsa_n_dup = BN_dup(rsa_n)) == NULL ||
(rsa_e_dup = BN_dup(rsa_e)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, rsa_n_dup, rsa_e_dup, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n_dup = rsa_e_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) {
if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
}
+ if (k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK &&
+ k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT)
+ break;
+ /* Append security-key application string */
+ if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(n, k->xmss_name)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->xmss_pk != NULL) {
+ u_int32_t left;
size_t pklen = sshkey_xmss_pklen(k);
if (pklen == 0 || sshkey_xmss_pklen(n) != pklen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((n->xmss_pk = malloc(pklen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(n->xmss_pk, k->xmss_pk, pklen);
+ /* simulate number of signatures left on pubkey */
+ left = sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
+ if (left)
+ sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(n, left);
}
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k) && (r = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
*pkp = n;
n = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
sshkey_free(n);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BN_clear_free(rsa_n_dup);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key_dup);
#endif
return r;
}
+int
+sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ return k != NULL && k->shielded_private != NULL;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
+ u_char *prekey = NULL, *enc = NULL, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ size_t i, enclen = 0;
+ struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+#endif
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
+ ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare a random pre-key, and from it an ephemeral key */
+ if ((prekey = malloc(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ arc4random_buf(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
+ prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN,
+ keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
+ stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+ keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */
+ if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_is_shielded(k) && (r = sshkey_unshield_private(k)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, prvbuf,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* pad to cipher blocksize */
+ i = 0;
+ while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf) % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(prvbuf, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* encrypt */
+ enclen = sshbuf_len(prvbuf);
+ if ((enc = malloc(enclen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, enc,
+ sshbuf_ptr(prvbuf), sshbuf_len(prvbuf), 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(enc, enclen, stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Make a scrubbed, public-only copy of our private key argument */
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &kswap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Swap the private key out (it will be destroyed below) */
+ tmp = *kswap;
+ *kswap = *k;
+ *k = tmp;
+
+ /* Insert the shielded key into our argument */
+ k->shielded_private = enc;
+ k->shielded_len = enclen;
+ k->shield_prekey = prekey;
+ k->shield_prekey_len = SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN;
+ enc = prekey = NULL; /* transferred */
+ enclen = 0;
+
+ /* preserve key fields that are required for correct operation */
+ k->sk_flags = kswap->sk_flags;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ /* XXX behaviour on error - invalidate original private key? */
+ cipher_free(cctx);
+ explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
+ explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ freezero(enc, enclen);
+ freezero(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
+ sshkey_free(kswap);
+ sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
+ u_char pad, *cp, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ size_t i;
+ struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+#endif
+ if (!sshkey_is_shielded(k))
+ return 0; /* nothing to do */
+
+ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
+ ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* check size of shielded key blob */
+ if (k->shielded_len < cipher_blocksize(cipher) ||
+ (k->shielded_len % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate the ephemeral key from the prekey */
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
+ k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len,
+ keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+ keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
+ stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Decrypt and parse the shielded private key using the ephemeral key */
+ if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(prvbuf, k->shielded_len, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* decrypt */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, cp,
+ k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
+#endif
+ /* Parse private key */
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(prvbuf, &kswap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Check deterministic padding */
+ i = 0;
+ while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(prvbuf, &pad)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Swap the parsed key back into place */
+ tmp = *kswap;
+ *kswap = *k;
+ *k = tmp;
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+
+ out:
+ cipher_free(cctx);
+ explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
+ explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ sshkey_free(kswap);
+ sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
+ return r;
+}
+
static int
cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
{
struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL;
struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0)
return ret;
/* Parse body of certificate up to signature */
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) {
/* XXX debug print error for ret */
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */
signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER &&
key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE;
goto out;
}
/* Parse principals section */
while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) {
char *principal = NULL;
char **oprincipals = NULL;
if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal,
NULL)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
oprincipals = key->cert->principals;
key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals,
key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1,
sizeof(*key->cert->principals));
if (key->cert->principals == NULL) {
free(principal);
key->cert->principals = oprincipals;
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal;
}
/*
* Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections
* for later use.
*/
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 ||
(exts != NULL &&
(ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0))
goto out;
/*
* Validate critical options and extensions sections format.
*/
while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical);
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions);
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Parse CA key and check signature */
if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
+ if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
+ &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Success */
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(ca);
sshbuf_free(crit);
sshbuf_free(exts);
sshbuf_free(principals);
free(sig);
return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
{
const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
return 0;
}
#endif
static int
sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
int allow_cert)
{
int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
size_t len;
u_char *pk = NULL;
struct sshbuf *copy;
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL, *dsa_pub_key = NULL;
# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
EC_POINT *q = NULL;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_RSA:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, rsa_e) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, rsa_n) != 0) {
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_p) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_q) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_g) != 0 ||
- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key) != 0) {
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_p) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_q) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_g) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_pub_key) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
#endif
break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype);
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid))
== NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
q) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
/* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q);
#endif
+ if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK || type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) {
+ /* Parse additional security-key application string */
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application,
+ NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application);
+#endif
+ }
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
+ if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK || type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) {
+ /* Parse additional security-key application string */
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application,
+ NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application);
+#endif
+ }
key->ed25519_pk = pk;
pk = NULL;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_XMSS:
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_init(key, xmss_name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len == 0 || len != sshkey_xmss_pklen(key)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
key->xmss_pk = pk;
pk = NULL;
if (type != KEY_XMSS_CERT &&
(ret = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
case KEY_UNSPEC:
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/* Parse certificate potion */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0)
goto out;
if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
}
out:
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshkey_free(key);
free(xmss_name);
free(ktype);
free(curve);
free(pk);
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key);
# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
EC_POINT_free(q);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
}
int
sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0)
return r;
r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
-static int
-get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
+int
+sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
{
int r;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
if (sigtypep != NULL)
*sigtypep = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (sigtypep != NULL) {
*sigtypep = sigtype;
sigtype = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(sigtype);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/*
*
* Checks whether a certificate's signature type is allowed.
* Returns 0 (success) if the certificate signature type appears in the
* "allowed" pattern-list, or the key is not a certificate to begin with.
* Otherwise returns a ssherr.h code.
*/
int
sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const char *allowed)
{
if (key == NULL || allowed == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(key->type))
return 0;
if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (match_pattern_list(key->cert->signature_type, allowed, 0) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the expected signature algorithm for a given public key algorithm.
*/
const char *
sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (strcmp(kt->name, name) != 0)
continue;
if (kt->sigalg != NULL)
return kt->sigalg;
if (!kt->cert)
return kt->name;
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(
sshkey_type_plain(kt->type), kt->nid);
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Verifies that the signature algorithm appearing inside the signature blob
* matches that which was requested.
*/
int
sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
const char *requested_alg)
{
const char *expected_alg;
char *sigtype = NULL;
int r;
if (requested_alg == NULL)
return 0;
if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
return r;
r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
free(sigtype);
return r ? 0 : SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
}
int
-sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
+sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
{
+ int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+ int r2, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+ return r;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
- return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ r = ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
- return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ r = ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
- return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg);
+ r = ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg);
+ break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ r = ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+ datalen, compat, sk_pin);
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
- return ssh_xmss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ r = ssh_xmss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
+ break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
}
+ if (was_shielded && (r2 = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0)
+ return r2;
+ return r;
}
/*
* ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error.
* If "alg" specified, then the signature must use that algorithm.
*/
int
sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
- const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
{
+ if (detailsp != NULL)
+ *detailsp = NULL;
if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ return ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+ compat, detailsp);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, alg);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+ compat, detailsp);
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return ssh_xmss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
}
/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */
int
sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k)
{
int newtype;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
newtype = KEY_RSA_CERT;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
newtype = KEY_DSA_CERT;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ newtype = KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT;
+ break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ newtype = KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT;
+ break;
case KEY_ED25519:
newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
newtype = KEY_XMSS_CERT;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
k->type = newtype;
return 0;
}
/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */
int
sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k)
{
if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
cert_free(k->cert);
k->cert = NULL;
k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type);
return 0;
}
/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */
int
sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *principals = NULL;
u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32];
size_t i, ca_len, sig_len;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *cert = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL ||
k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(k))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
/*
* If no alg specified as argument but a signature_type was set,
* then prefer that. If both were specified, then they must match.
*/
if (alg == NULL)
alg = k->cert->signature_type;
else if (k->cert->signature_type != NULL &&
strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ /*
+ * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
+ * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
+ */
+ if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
+ alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+
if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */
sshbuf_reset(cert);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0)
goto out;
/* -v01 certs put nonce first */
arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0)
goto out;
/* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
+ if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
+ k->sk_application)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_n)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert,
k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
+ if (k->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
+ k->sk_application)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if (k->xmss_name == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->xmss_name)) ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert,
k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals,
k->cert->principals[i])) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Sign the whole mess */
if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert),
- sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_len(cert), alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
- if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
goto out;
if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (k->cert->signature_type == NULL) {
k->cert->signature_type = sigtype;
sigtype = NULL;
}
/* Append signature and we are done */
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0)
sshbuf_reset(cert);
free(sig_blob);
free(ca_blob);
free(sigtype);
sshbuf_free(principals);
return ret;
}
static int
-default_key_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+default_key_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
- const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx)
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ u_int compat, void *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
+ return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
+ sk_provider, sk_pin, compat);
}
int
-sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg)
+sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin)
{
- return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, default_key_sign, NULL);
+ return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, sk_provider, sk_pin,
+ default_key_sign, NULL);
}
int
sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k,
- int want_host, int require_principal,
- const char *name, const char **reason)
+ int want_host, int require_principal, int wildcard_pattern,
+ uint64_t verify_time, const char *name, const char **reason)
{
u_int i, principal_matches;
- time_t now = time(NULL);
-
- if (reason != NULL)
- *reason = NULL;
+ if (reason == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+ *reason = "Key is not a certificate";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
if (want_host) {
if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
} else {
if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
- if (now < 0) {
- /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */
- *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
- }
- if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) {
+ if (verify_time < k->cert->valid_after) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
- if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) {
+ if (verify_time >= k->cert->valid_before) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: expired";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) {
if (require_principal) {
*reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
} else if (name != NULL) {
principal_matches = 0;
for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
- if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
+ if (wildcard_pattern) {
+ if (match_pattern(k->cert->principals[i],
+ name)) {
+ principal_matches = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
principal_matches = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!principal_matches) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed "
"principal";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
return 0;
}
-size_t
-sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l)
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(const struct sshkey *k,
+ int want_host, int require_principal, int wildcard_pattern,
+ const char *name, const char **reason)
{
- char from[32], to[32], ret[64];
- time_t tt;
- struct tm *tm;
-
- *from = *to = '\0';
- if (cert->valid_after == 0 &&
- cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
- return strlcpy(s, "forever", l);
+ time_t now;
- if (cert->valid_after != 0) {
- /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
- tt = cert->valid_after > INT_MAX ?
- INT_MAX : cert->valid_after;
- tm = localtime(&tt);
- strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
- }
- if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) {
- /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
- tt = cert->valid_before > INT_MAX ?
- INT_MAX : cert->valid_before;
- tm = localtime(&tt);
- strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
+ if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) {
+ /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */
+ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
+ return sshkey_cert_check_authority(k, want_host, require_principal,
+ wildcard_pattern, (uint64_t)now, name, reason);
+}
- if (cert->valid_after == 0)
- snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
- else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_host(const struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
+ int wildcard_principals, const char *ca_sign_algorithms,
+ const char **reason)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 1, 0, wildcard_principals,
+ host, reason)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) {
+ *reason = "Certificate contains unsupported critical options";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ if (ca_sign_algorithms != NULL &&
+ (r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
+ *reason = "Certificate signed with disallowed algorithm";
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l)
+{
+ char from[32], to[32], ret[128];
+
+ *from = *to = '\0';
+ if (cert->valid_after == 0 &&
+ cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+ return strlcpy(s, "forever", l);
+
+ if (cert->valid_after != 0)
+ format_absolute_time(cert->valid_after, from, sizeof(from));
+ if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+ format_absolute_time(cert->valid_before, to, sizeof(to));
+
+ if (cert->valid_after == 0)
+ snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
+ else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from);
else
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to);
return strlcpy(s, ret, l);
}
int
-sshkey_private_serialize_opt(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_iqmp, *rsa_p, *rsa_q;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key, *dsa_priv_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
goto out;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d);
RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, &dsa_priv_key);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &dsa_priv_key);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
+ ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
+ ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
if (key->xmss_name == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk,
sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0 ||
key->xmss_name == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk,
sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
- /* success */
+ /*
+ * success (but we still need to append the output to buf after
+ * possibly re-shielding the private key)
+ */
r = 0;
out:
+ if (was_shielded)
+ r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = sshbuf_putb(buf, b);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+
return r;
}
int
-sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(key, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
{
char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL;
+ char *expect_sk_application = NULL;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0;
int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL;
+ u_char *expect_ed25519_pk = NULL;
u_char *xmss_pk = NULL, *xmss_sk = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *exponent = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_iqmp = NULL, *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (kp != NULL)
*kp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
- switch (type) {
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- case KEY_DSA:
- if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+ /*
+ * Certificate key private keys begin with the certificate
+ * itself. Make sure this matches the type of the enclosing
+ * private key.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (k->type != type) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* For ECDSA keys, the group must match too */
+ if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
- if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Several fields are redundant between certificate and
+ * private key body, we require these to match.
+ */
+ expect_sk_application = k->sk_application;
+ expect_ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
+ k->sk_application = NULL;
+ k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_pub_key)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
+ }
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_q)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
- if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) {
+ if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
- break;
+ dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, dsa_priv_key)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
- if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
- if (k->ecdsa == NULL || (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if (k->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)))
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &exponent)) != 0)
goto out;
if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
- break;
-# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- case KEY_RSA:
- if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
- if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_n)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_q)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) {
+ k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
+ if (k->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
- if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
- if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_n)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_e)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_q)) != 0)
+ rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_d)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, rsa_d)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
- if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
- ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL;
+ ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0)
goto out;
- if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
+ if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
- k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
- k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
- ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL;
- break;
-#ifdef WITH_XMSS
- case KEY_XMSS:
- if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, xmss_name)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) ||
- sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto out;
- }
- k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk;
- k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk;
- xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL;
- /* optional internal state */
- if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
goto out;
+ k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
+ ed25519_pk = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+ case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
- if (strcmp(xmss_name, k->xmss_name)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (type == KEY_XMSS &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, xmss_name)) != 0)
goto out;
- }
if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) ||
sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk;
k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk;
xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL;
/* optional internal state */
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* enable blinding */
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
break;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ if ((expect_sk_application != NULL && (k->sk_application == NULL ||
+ strcmp(expect_sk_application, k->sk_application) != 0)) ||
+ (expect_ed25519_pk != NULL && (k->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+ memcmp(expect_ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) != 0))) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* success */
r = 0;
if (kp != NULL) {
*kp = k;
k = NULL;
}
out:
free(tname);
free(curve);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BN_clear_free(exponent);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key);
BN_clear_free(dsa_priv_key);
BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
BN_clear_free(rsa_d);
BN_clear_free(rsa_p);
BN_clear_free(rsa_q);
BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
sshkey_free(k);
freezero(ed25519_pk, pklen);
freezero(ed25519_sk, sklen);
free(xmss_name);
freezero(xmss_pk, pklen);
freezero(xmss_sk, sklen);
+ free(expect_sk_application);
+ free(expect_ed25519_pk);
return r;
}
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
int
sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
{
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
- BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp;
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
/*
* NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public
* point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point()
* implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever
* reachable with public points not unmarshalled using
* EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check.
*/
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
-
/*
* We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
* refuses to load GF2m points.
*/
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_prime_field)
goto out;
/* Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public))
goto out;
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1 ||
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL) != 1 ||
EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
- x, y, bnctx) != 1) {
+ x, y, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 ||
BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
goto out;
/* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) {
+ if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1)
goto out;
/* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
+ BN_clear_free(order);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
EC_POINT_free(nq);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
{
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
- BIGNUM *order, *tmp;
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
-
- if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
+ if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) {
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
goto out;
/* private < order - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ BN_clear_free(order);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
void
sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
{
- BIGNUM *x, *y;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
if (point == NULL) {
fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
return;
}
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_new failed\n", __func__);
- return;
- }
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_get failed\n", __func__);
- return;
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_new failed\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
}
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__);
- return;
+ goto out;
}
- if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y,
- bnctx) != 1) {
+ if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point,
+ x, y, NULL) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n",
__func__);
- return;
+ goto out;
}
fputs("x=", stderr);
BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
fputs("\ny=", stderr);
BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
fputs("\n", stderr);
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
}
void
sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
{
const BIGNUM *exponent;
sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
fputs("exponent=", stderr);
if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
else
BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
fputs("\n", stderr);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
static int
-sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
+sshkey_private_to_blob2(struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername,
int rounds)
{
u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL;
u_char salt[SALT_LEN];
char *b64 = NULL;
size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
u_int check;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
if (rounds <= 0)
rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
ciphername = "none";
kdfname = "none";
} else if (ciphername == NULL)
ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN);
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
} else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
/* Unsupported KDF type */
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */
(r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */
/* Random check bytes */
check = arc4random();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0)
goto out;
/* append private key and comment*/
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(prv, encrypted,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 ||
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
goto out;
/* padding */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* length in destination buffer */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0)
goto out;
/* encrypt */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
- /* uuencode */
- if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
-
sshbuf_reset(blob);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0)
- goto out;
- for (i = 0; i < strlen(b64); i++) {
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, b64[i])) != 0)
- goto out;
- /* insert line breaks */
- if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0)
- goto out;
- }
- if (i % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0)
- goto out;
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0)
+
+ /* assemble uuencoded key */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded, blob, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(kdf);
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(encrypted);
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
- if (key != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
- free(key);
- }
- if (pubkeyblob != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen);
- free(pubkeyblob);
- }
- if (b64 != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64));
- free(b64);
- }
+ if (key != NULL)
+ freezero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+ if (pubkeyblob != NULL)
+ freezero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen);
+ if (b64 != NULL)
+ freezero(b64, strlen(b64));
return r;
}
static int
-sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
- struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+private2_uudecode(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **decodedp)
{
- char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL;
- const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
const u_char *cp;
- int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t encoded_len;
- size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
+ int r;
+ u_char last;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
- struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
- struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
- struct sshkey *k = NULL;
- u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last;
- u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
- if (keyp != NULL)
- *keyp = NULL;
- if (commentp != NULL)
- *commentp = NULL;
+ if (blob == NULL || decodedp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ *decodedp = NULL;
if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
- (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
- (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* check preamble */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob);
encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob);
if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) ||
memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
/* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */
while (encoded_len > 0) {
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0)
goto out;
}
last = *cp;
encoded_len--;
cp++;
if (last == '\n') {
if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN &&
memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) {
/* \0 terminate */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
}
}
}
if (encoded_len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* decode base64 */
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0)
goto out;
/* check magic */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
+ /* success */
+ *decodedp = decoded;
+ decoded = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(encoded);
+ sshbuf_free(decoded);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+private2_decrypt(struct sshbuf *decoded, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshbuf **decryptedp, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
+{
+ char *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL;
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+ u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp;
+ u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
+
+ if (decoded == NULL || decryptedp == NULL || pubkeyp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ *decryptedp = NULL;
+ *pubkeyp = NULL;
+
+ if ((decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* parse public portion of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (nkeys != 1) {
+ /* XXX only one key supported at present */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
- if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) &&
- strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
- /* passphrase required */
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
- goto out;
- }
if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
- if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
+ if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") == 0 && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
- if (nkeys != 1) {
- /* XXX only one key supported */
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) &&
+ strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
+ /* passphrase required */
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
/* check size of encrypted key blob */
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* setup key */
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen,
key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
- if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) {
+ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < authlen ||
+ sshbuf_len(decoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* decrypt private portion of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
/* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* there should be no trailing data */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* check check bytes */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0)
goto out;
if (check1 != check2) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
+ /* success */
+ *decryptedp = decrypted;
+ decrypted = NULL;
+ *pubkeyp = pubkey;
+ pubkey = NULL;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ cipher_free(ciphercontext);
+ free(ciphername);
+ free(kdfname);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ if (salt != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(salt, slen);
+ free(salt);
+ }
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+ free(key);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(kdf);
+ sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+ return r;
+}
- /* Load the private key and comment */
- if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
- goto out;
+/* Check deterministic padding after private key */
+static int
+private2_check_padding(struct sshbuf *decrypted)
+{
+ u_char pad;
+ size_t i;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- /* Check deterministic padding */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&pad, sizeof(pad));
+ explicit_bzero(&i, sizeof(i));
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
- /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (commentp != NULL)
+ *commentp = NULL;
+
+ /* Undo base64 encoding and decrypt the private section */
+ if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0 ||
+ (r = private2_decrypt(decoded, passphrase,
+ &decrypted, &pubkey)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+ sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Load the private key and comment */
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check deterministic padding after private section */
+ if ((r = private2_check_padding(decrypted)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check that the public key in the envelope matches the private key */
+ if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, k)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* success */
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = k;
k = NULL;
}
if (commentp != NULL) {
*commentp = comment;
comment = NULL;
}
out:
- pad = 0;
- cipher_free(ciphercontext);
- free(ciphername);
- free(kdfname);
free(comment);
- if (salt != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(salt, slen);
- free(salt);
- }
- if (key != NULL) {
- explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
- free(key);
- }
- sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(decoded);
- sshbuf_free(kdf);
sshbuf_free(decrypted);
sshkey_free(k);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
return r;
}
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+ u_int nkeys = 0;
+
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* parse public key from unencrypted envelope */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* cipher */
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF alg */
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF hint */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (nkeys != 1) {
+ /* XXX only one key supported at present */
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse the public key */
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+ sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = pubkey;
+ pubkey = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(decoded);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ return r;
+}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
+/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
static int
-sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
- const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
+sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
+ int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
{
+ int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
int success, r;
int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
char *bptr;
BIO *bio = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *blob;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
- if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
+ if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
+ }
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
+ }
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA:
- success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
- cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+ success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
+ }
break;
default:
success = 0;
break;
}
if (success == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
+ if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
+ passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
+ if (was_shielded)
+ r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = sshbuf_putb(buf, blob);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
BIO_free(bio);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */
int
sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
- int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
- if (force_new_format) {
- return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
- comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
- }
- return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob,
- passphrase, comment);
+ break; /* see below */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
- comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
+ comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
-}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ switch (format) {
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+ comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
+ case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
+ return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
+ format, passphrase, comment);
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
{
int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
case ERR_LIB_PEM:
switch (pem_reason) {
case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
case ERR_LIB_EVP:
switch (pem_reason) {
case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
#endif
case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
#endif
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
default:
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
static void
clear_libcrypto_errors(void)
{
while (ERR_get_error() != 0)
;
}
/*
* Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
* passphrase is required/incorrect.
*/
static int
convert_libcrypto_error(void)
{
/*
* Some password errors are reported at the beginning
* of the error queue.
*/
if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) ==
SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error());
}
static int
pem_passphrase_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
{
char *p = (char *)u;
size_t len;
if (p == NULL || (len = strlen(p)) == 0)
return -1;
if (size < 0 || len > (size_t)size)
return -1;
memcpy(buf, p, len);
return (int)len;
}
static int
sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) !=
(int)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
clear_libcrypto_errors();
if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, pem_passphrase_cb,
(char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
- /*
- * libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting
- * to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase.
- * Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a
- * passphrase was supplied.
- */
+ /*
+ * libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting
+ * to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase.
+ * Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a
+ * passphrase was supplied.
+ */
if (passphrase != NULL && *passphrase != '\0')
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
else
r = convert_libcrypto_error();
goto out;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
prv->type = KEY_RSA;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
#endif
if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
prv->type = KEY_DSA;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa);
if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 ||
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL ||
sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
# ifdef DEBUG_PK
if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL)
sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
# endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
} else {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = prv;
prv = NULL;
}
out:
BIO_free(bio);
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
sshkey_free(prv);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
switch (type) {
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_RSA:
- return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
- passphrase, keyp);
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
-#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
-#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+ /* No fallback for new-format-only keys */
return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
keyp, commentp);
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ default:
r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
commentp);
- /* Do not fallback to PEM parser if only passphrase is wrong. */
- if (r == 0 || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ /* Only fallback to PEM parser if a format error occurred. */
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT)
return r;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
passphrase, keyp);
#else
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- default:
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
}
int
sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
passphrase, keyp, commentp);
}
+void
+sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *details)
+{
+ freezero(details, sizeof(*details));
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (pubkeyp != NULL)
+ *pubkeyp = NULL;
+ /* only new-format private keys bundle a public key inside */
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(blob, type, pubkeyp)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
/*
* serialize the key with the current state and forward the state
* maxsign times.
*/
int
-sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
- u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr)
+sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+ u_int32_t maxsign, int printerror)
{
int r, rupdate;
if (maxsign == 0 ||
sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
- if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, pr)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, printerror)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, maxsign)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
- if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, pr)) != 0) {
+ if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, printerror)) != 0) {
if (r == 0)
r = rupdate;
}
return r;
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS)
return sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign);
}
int
sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
{
if (k == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return 0;
if (filename == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((k->xmss_filename = strdup(filename)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
#else
int
-sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
- u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr)
+sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+ u_int32_t maxsign, int printerror)
{
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
int
sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
{
if (k == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h
index f6a007fdff35..6edc6c5a5dbd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h
@@ -1,277 +1,334 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.30 2018/09/14 04:17:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.50 2021/07/23 03:37:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef SSHKEY_H
#define SSHKEY_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#define SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
# define BIGNUM void
# define RSA void
# define DSA void
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
+#define SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION "without OpenSSL"
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 1024
#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20)
struct sshbuf;
/* Key types */
enum sshkey_types {
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_RSA_CERT,
KEY_DSA_CERT,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
KEY_ED25519_CERT,
KEY_XMSS,
KEY_XMSS_CERT,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
KEY_UNSPEC
};
/* Default fingerprint hash */
#define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256
/* Fingerprint representation formats */
enum sshkey_fp_rep {
SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0,
SSH_FP_HEX,
SSH_FP_BASE64,
SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART
};
/* Private key serialisation formats, used on the wire */
enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT = 0,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1, /* only state is serialized */
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2, /* include keys for saving to disk */
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD = 3, /* everything, for encrypting in ram */
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254, /* minimal information */
+};
+
+/* Private key disk formats */
+enum sshkey_private_format {
+ SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
+ SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
+ SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
};
/* key is stored in external hardware */
#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256
/* XXX opaquify? */
struct sshkey_cert {
struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
u_int64_t serial;
char *key_id;
u_int nprincipals;
char **principals;
u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
struct sshbuf *critical;
struct sshbuf *extensions;
struct sshkey *signature_key;
char *signature_type;
};
/* XXX opaquify? */
struct sshkey {
int type;
int flags;
+ /* KEY_RSA */
RSA *rsa;
+ /* KEY_DSA */
DSA *dsa;
+ /* KEY_ECDSA and KEY_ECDSA_SK */
int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */
EC_KEY *ecdsa;
+ /* KEY_ED25519 and KEY_ED25519_SK */
u_char *ed25519_sk;
u_char *ed25519_pk;
+ /* KEY_XMSS */
char *xmss_name;
char *xmss_filename; /* for state file updates */
void *xmss_state; /* depends on xmss_name, opaque */
u_char *xmss_sk;
u_char *xmss_pk;
+ /* KEY_ECDSA_SK and KEY_ED25519_SK */
+ char *sk_application;
+ uint8_t sk_flags;
+ struct sshbuf *sk_key_handle;
+ struct sshbuf *sk_reserved;
+ /* Certificates */
struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+ /* Private key shielding */
+ u_char *shielded_private;
+ size_t shielded_len;
+ u_char *shield_prekey;
+ size_t shield_prekey_len;
};
#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
+/* Additional fields contained in signature */
+struct sshkey_sig_details {
+ uint32_t sk_counter; /* U2F signature counter */
+ uint8_t sk_flags; /* U2F signature flags; see ssh-sk.h */
+};
+
struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int);
void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *,
const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *);
char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *,
int, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **);
u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp);
int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
+
+int sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
+
int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
int sshkey_type_plain(int);
int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
-int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int,
+int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, int,
+ uint64_t, const char *, const char **);
+int sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(const struct sshkey *, int, int, int,
const char *, const char **);
+int sshkey_cert_check_host(const struct sshkey *, const char *,
+ int , const char *, const char **);
size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *,
char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3)));
int sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *, const char *);
-int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *);
+int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+ const char *, const char *, const char *);
/* Variant allowing use of a custom signature function (e.g. for ssh-agent) */
-typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, void *);
+typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+ u_int, void *);
int sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *,
- sshkey_certify_signer *, void *);
+ const char *, const char *, sshkey_certify_signer *, void *);
int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int);
u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **);
int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
-int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+int sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int);
int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
int sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
+int sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
/* for debug */
void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
/* private key parsing and serialisation */
-int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf);
-int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
+int sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf);
+int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp);
/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
- int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds);
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
+ int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
/* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
/* stateful keys (e.g. XMSS) */
-#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS
-typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...);
-#else
-typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-#endif
int sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *, const char *);
int sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *);
-int sshkey_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t, sshkey_printfn *);
-int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr);
+int sshkey_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t, int);
+int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *key,
+ struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t maxsign, int);
+
+void sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *ident);
int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *alg);
int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp);
int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp);
int ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
#endif
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
# undef RSA
# undef DSA
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#endif
#endif /* SSHKEY_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
index 1b2ee5f858f1..82dd848191b1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
@@ -1,170 +1,173 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.33 2018/07/09 21:26:02 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.35 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot
* easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are
* several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of
* login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands
* on a tty.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
/*
* Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the
* information is not available. This must be called before record_login.
* The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
*/
time_t
get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
char *buf, size_t bufsize)
{
struct logininfo li;
login_get_lastlog(&li, uid);
strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize);
return (time_t)li.tv_sec;
}
/*
* Generate and store last login message. This must be done before
* login_login() is called and lastlog is updated.
*/
static void
store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
{
#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
- char *time_string, hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX+1] = "";
+# ifndef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+ char hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX+1] = "";
time_t last_login_time;
+# endif
+ char *time_string;
int r;
if (!options.print_lastlog)
return;
# ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid);
if (time_string != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg,
time_string, strlen(time_string))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(time_string);
}
# else
last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname,
sizeof(hostname));
if (last_login_time != 0) {
time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0';
if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0)
r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s\r\n",
time_string);
else
r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s from %s\r\n",
time_string, hostname);
if (r != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
# endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */
#endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
}
/*
* Records that the user has logged in. I wish these parts of operating
* systems were more standardized.
*/
void
record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
{
struct logininfo *li;
/* save previous login details before writing new */
store_lastlog_message(user, uid);
li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
login_login(li);
login_free_entry(li);
}
#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
void
record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
{
struct logininfo *li;
li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
login_utmp_only(li);
login_free_entry(li);
}
#endif
/* Records that the user has logged out. */
void
record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user)
{
struct logininfo *li;
li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty);
login_logout(li);
login_free_entry(li);
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
index 4da84d05f7cd..cae0b977a585 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
@@ -1,229 +1,232 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.31 2016/11/29 03:54:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.34 2019/07/04 16:20:10 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include <unistd.h>
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
# include <pty.h>
#endif
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
#ifdef __APPLE__
# include <AvailabilityMacros.h>
# if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5)
# define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
# endif
#endif
/*
* Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or
* nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file
* descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are
* returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters).
*/
int
pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
{
/* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */
char *name;
int i;
i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (i < 0) {
+ if (i == -1) {
error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
name = ttyname(*ttyfd);
if (!name)
fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails.");
strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */
return 1;
}
/* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */
void
pty_release(const char *tty)
{
#if !defined(__APPLE_PRIVPTY__) && !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
- if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
+ if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) == -1)
error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
- if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0)
+ if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) == -1)
error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
#endif /* !__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ && !HAVE_OPENPTY */
}
/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
void
pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
{
int fd;
/* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */
#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0) {
(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
close(fd);
}
#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
- if (setsid() < 0)
+ if (setsid() == -1)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/*
* Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling
* tty.
*/
fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0) {
error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
close(fd);
}
/* Make it our controlling tty. */
#ifdef TIOCSCTTY
debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY.");
if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0)
error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */
#ifdef NEED_SETPGRP
if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0)
error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
#endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */
fd = open(tty, O_RDWR);
- if (fd < 0)
+ if (fd == -1)
error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
else
close(fd);
/* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */
fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY);
- if (fd < 0)
+ if (fd == -1)
error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
else
close(fd);
}
/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */
void
pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel)
{
struct winsize w;
/* may truncate u_int -> u_short */
w.ws_row = row;
w.ws_col = col;
w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
w.ws_ypixel = ypixel;
(void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w);
}
void
pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
{
struct group *grp;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
struct stat st;
/* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */
grp = getgrnam("tty");
+ if (grp == NULL)
+ debug("%s: no tty group", __func__);
gid = (grp != NULL) ? grp->gr_gid : pw->pw_gid;
mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0620 : 0600;
/*
* Change owner and mode of the tty as required.
* Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/
* tty is owned by root.
*/
- if (stat(tty, &st))
+ if (stat(tty, &st) == -1)
fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty,
strerror(errno));
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
#endif
if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
- if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
+ if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) == -1) {
if (errno == EROFS &&
(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
strerror(errno));
else
fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
strerror(errno));
}
}
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) {
- if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) {
+ if (chmod(tty, mode) == -1) {
if (errno == EROFS &&
(st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
else
fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
}
}
}
/* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
void
disconnect_controlling_tty(void)
{
#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
int fd;
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) {
(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
close(fd);
}
#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshsig.c b/crypto/openssh/sshsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d0d401a326ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1098 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshsig.c,v 1.21 2021/07/23 04:00:59 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#define SIG_VERSION 0x01
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE) - 1)
+#define BEGIN_SIGNATURE "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n"
+#define END_SIGNATURE "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----"
+#define RSA_SIGN_ALG "rsa-sha2-512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
+#define RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
+#define HASHALG_DEFAULT "sha512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
+#define HASHALG_ALLOWED "sha256,sha512"
+
+int
+sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *out = NULL;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, BEGIN_SIGNATURE,
+ sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(blob, buf, 1)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "base64 encode signature");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, END_SIGNATURE,
+ sizeof(END_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '\n')) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *out = buf;
+ buf = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t eoffset = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *sbuf = NULL;
+ char *b64 = NULL;
+
+ if ((sbuf = sshbuf_fromb(sig)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(sbuf, 0,
+ BEGIN_SIGNATURE, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
+ error("Couldn't parse signature: missing header");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sbuf, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "consume");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_find(sbuf, 0, "\n" END_SIGNATURE,
+ sizeof("\n" END_SIGNATURE)-1, &eoffset)) != 0) {
+ error("Couldn't parse signature: missing footer");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(sbuf, sshbuf_len(sbuf)-eoffset)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "consume");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((b64 = sshbuf_dup_string(sbuf)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_new() failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, b64)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "decode base64");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ *out = buf;
+ r = 0;
+ buf = NULL; /* transferred */
+done:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ sshbuf_free(sbuf);
+ free(b64);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_wrap_sign(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, const struct sshbuf *h_message,
+ const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+ sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t slen = 0;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *tosign = NULL;
+ const char *sign_alg = NULL;
+
+ if ((tosign = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(tosign, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(tosign, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, hashalg)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(tosign, h_message)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "assemble message to sign");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* If using RSA keys then default to a good signature algorithm */
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)
+ sign_alg = RSA_SIGN_ALG;
+
+ if (signer != NULL) {
+ if ((r = signer(key, &sig, &slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
+ sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't sign message (signer)");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
+ sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't sign message");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(blob, SIG_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_puts(key, blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, hashalg)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, sig, slen)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "assemble signature object");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ *out = blob;
+ blob = NULL;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+done:
+ free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ sshbuf_free(tosign);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Check preamble and version. */
+static int
+sshsig_parse_preamble(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ uint32_t sversion;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(buf, 0, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_consume(buf, (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE)-1))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &sversion)) != 0) {
+ error("Couldn't verify signature: invalid format");
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (sversion > SIG_VERSION) {
+ error("Signature version %lu is larger than supported "
+ "version %u", (unsigned long)sversion, SIG_VERSION);
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_check_hashalg(const char *hashalg)
+{
+ if (hashalg == NULL ||
+ match_pattern_list(hashalg, HASHALG_ALLOWED, 0) == 1)
+ return 0;
+ error_f("unsupported hash algorithm \"%.100s\"", hashalg);
+ return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_peek_hashalg(struct sshbuf *signature, char **hashalgp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ char *hashalg = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (hashalgp != NULL)
+ *hashalgp = NULL;
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_fromb(signature)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(buf)) != 0)
+ goto done;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse signature object");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *hashalgp = hashalg;
+ hashalg = NULL;
+ done:
+ free(hashalg);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_wrap_verify(struct sshbuf *signature, const char *hashalg,
+ const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *expect_namespace,
+ struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL, *toverify = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ const u_char *sig;
+ char *got_namespace = NULL, *sigtype = NULL, *sig_hashalg = NULL;
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ debug_f("verify message length %zu", sshbuf_len(h_message));
+ if (sig_details != NULL)
+ *sig_details = NULL;
+ if (sign_keyp != NULL)
+ *sign_keyp = NULL;
+
+ if ((toverify = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(toverify, MAGIC_PREAMBLE,
+ MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, expect_namespace)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(toverify, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, hashalg)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(toverify, h_message)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "assemble message to verify");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
+ goto done;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &got_namespace, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(signature, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &sig_hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(signature, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse signature object");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(signature) != 0) {
+ error("Signature contains trailing data");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(expect_namespace, got_namespace) != 0) {
+ error("Couldn't verify signature: namespace does not match");
+ debug_f("expected namespace \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
+ expect_namespace, got_namespace);
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(hashalg, sig_hashalg) != 0) {
+ error("Couldn't verify signature: hash algorithm mismatch");
+ debug_f("expected algorithm \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
+ hashalg, sig_hashalg);
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Ensure that RSA keys use an acceptable signature algorithm */
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Couldn't verify signature: unable to get "
+ "signature type");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (match_pattern_list(sigtype, RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED, 0) != 1) {
+ error("Couldn't verify signature: unsupported RSA "
+ "signature algorithm %s", sigtype);
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(toverify),
+ sshbuf_len(toverify), NULL, 0, sig_details)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "Signature verification failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (sign_keyp != NULL) {
+ *sign_keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+done:
+ free(got_namespace);
+ free(sigtype);
+ free(sig_hashalg);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ sshbuf_free(toverify);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+hash_buffer(const struct sshbuf *m, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
+{
+ char *hex, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ int alg, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+ *bp = NULL;
+ memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+ if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
+ error_f("can't look up hash algorithm %s", hashalg);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(alg, m, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_buffer");
+ return r;
+ }
+ if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
+ debug3_f("final hash: %s", hex);
+ freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
+ }
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *bp = b;
+ b = NULL; /* transferred */
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
+ struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (hashalg == NULL)
+ hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
+ if (out != NULL)
+ *out = NULL;
+ if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "hash buffer");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b,
+ sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature, const struct sshbuf *message,
+ const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *hashalg = NULL;
+
+ if (sig_details != NULL)
+ *sig_details = NULL;
+ if (sign_keyp != NULL)
+ *sign_keyp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug_f("signature made with hash \"%s\"", hashalg);
+ if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "hash buffer");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
+ sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(hashalg);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
+{
+ char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ ssize_t n, total = 0;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
+ int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+ *bp = NULL;
+ memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+ if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
+ error_f("can't look up hash algorithm %s", hashalg);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ if ((ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("ssh_digest_start failed");
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((n = read(fd, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+ continue;
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (n == 0) {
+ debug2_f("hashed %zu bytes", total);
+ break; /* EOF */
+ }
+ total += (size_t)n;
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_update(ctx, rbuf, (size_t)n)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_update");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_final");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
+ debug3_f("final hash: %s", hex);
+ freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
+ }
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *bp = b;
+ b = NULL; /* transferred */
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+ sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (hashalg == NULL)
+ hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
+ if (out != NULL)
+ *out = NULL;
+ if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "hash_file");
+ return r;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b,
+ sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
+ const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *hashalg = NULL;
+
+ if (sig_details != NULL)
+ *sig_details = NULL;
+ if (sign_keyp != NULL)
+ *sign_keyp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ debug_f("signature made with hash \"%s\"", hashalg);
+ if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "hash_file");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
+ sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(hashalg);
+ return r;
+}
+
+struct sshsigopt {
+ int ca;
+ char *namespaces;
+ uint64_t valid_after, valid_before;
+};
+
+struct sshsigopt *
+sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts, const char *path, u_long linenum,
+ const char **errstrp)
+{
+ struct sshsigopt *ret;
+ int r;
+ char *opt;
+ const char *errstr = NULL;
+
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (opts == NULL || *opts == '\0')
+ return ret; /* Empty options yields empty options :) */
+
+ while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
+ /* flag options */
+ if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
+ ret->ca = 1;
+ } else if (opt_match(&opts, "namespaces")) {
+ if (ret->namespaces != NULL) {
+ errstr = "multiple \"namespaces\" clauses";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ret->namespaces = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
+ if (ret->namespaces == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (opt_match(&opts, "valid-after")) {
+ if (ret->valid_after != 0) {
+ errstr = "multiple \"valid-after\" clauses";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &ret->valid_after) != 0 ||
+ ret->valid_after == 0) {
+ free(opt);
+ errstr = "invalid \"valid-after\" time";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ free(opt);
+ } else if (opt_match(&opts, "valid-before")) {
+ if (ret->valid_before != 0) {
+ errstr = "multiple \"valid-before\" clauses";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+ if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &ret->valid_before) != 0 ||
+ ret->valid_before == 0) {
+ free(opt);
+ errstr = "invalid \"valid-before\" time";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ free(opt);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
+ * (or break out if there are no more).
+ */
+ if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
+ break; /* End of options. */
+ /* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
+ if (*opts != ',') {
+ errstr = "unknown key option";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ opts++;
+ if (*opts == '\0') {
+ errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ /* final consistency check */
+ if (ret->valid_after != 0 && ret->valid_before != 0 &&
+ ret->valid_before <= ret->valid_after) {
+ errstr = "\"valid-before\" time is before \"valid-after\"";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ return ret;
+ fail:
+ if (errstrp != NULL)
+ *errstrp = errstr;
+ sshsigopt_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts)
+{
+ if (opts == NULL)
+ return;
+ free(opts->namespaces);
+ free(opts);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_principals_key_and_options(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+ const char *required_principal, char **principalsp, struct sshkey **keyp,
+ struct sshsigopt **sigoptsp)
+{
+ char *opts = NULL, *tmp, *cp, *principals = NULL;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+ struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (principalsp != NULL)
+ *principalsp = NULL;
+ if (sigoptsp != NULL)
+ *sigoptsp = NULL;
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ cp = line;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; /* blank or all-comment line */
+
+ /* format: identity[,identity...] [option[,option...]] key */
+ if ((tmp = strdelimw(&cp)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s:%lu: invalid line", path, linenum);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((principals = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("strdup failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Bail out early if we're looking for a particular principal and this
+ * line does not list it.
+ */
+ if (required_principal != NULL) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(required_principal,
+ principals, 0) != 1) {
+ /* principal didn't match */
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug_f("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%s\"",
+ path, linenum, required_principal);
+ }
+
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
+ /* no key? Check for options */
+ opts = cp;
+ if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
+ error("%s:%lu: invalid options", path, linenum);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ skip_space(&cp);
+ if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
+ error("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, linenum);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ debug3("%s:%lu: options %s", path, linenum, opts == NULL ? "" : opts);
+ if ((sigopts = sshsigopt_parse(opts, path, linenum, &reason)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s:%lu: bad options: %s", path, linenum, reason);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ if (principalsp != NULL) {
+ *principalsp = principals;
+ principals = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ if (sigoptsp != NULL) {
+ *sigoptsp = sigopts;
+ sigopts = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(principals);
+ sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+check_allowed_keys_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+ const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal,
+ const char *sig_namespace, uint64_t verify_time)
+{
+ struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
+ int r, success = 0;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+ struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+ char tvalid[64], tverify[64];
+
+ /* Parse the line */
+ if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
+ principal, NULL, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) {
+ /* error already logged */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) {
+ /* Exact match of key */
+ debug("%s:%lu: matched key", path, linenum);
+ } else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) &&
+ sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) {
+ /* Match of certificate's CA key */
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(sign_key, 0, 1, 0,
+ verify_time, principal, &reason)) != 0) {
+ error("%s:%lu: certificate not authorized: %s",
+ path, linenum, reason);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum);
+ } else {
+ /* Didn't match key */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether options preclude the use of this key */
+ if (sigopts->namespaces != NULL &&
+ match_pattern_list(sig_namespace, sigopts->namespaces, 0) != 1) {
+ error("%s:%lu: key is not permitted for use in signature "
+ "namespace \"%s\"", path, linenum, sig_namespace);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* check key time validity */
+ format_absolute_time((uint64_t)verify_time, tverify, sizeof(tverify));
+ if (sigopts->valid_after != 0 &&
+ (uint64_t)verify_time < sigopts->valid_after) {
+ format_absolute_time(sigopts->valid_after,
+ tvalid, sizeof(tvalid));
+ error("%s:%lu: key is not yet valid: "
+ "verify time %s < valid-after %s", path, linenum,
+ tverify, tvalid);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (sigopts->valid_before != 0 &&
+ (uint64_t)verify_time > sigopts->valid_before) {
+ format_absolute_time(sigopts->valid_before,
+ tvalid, sizeof(tvalid));
+ error("%s:%lu: key has expired: "
+ "verify time %s > valid-before %s", path, linenum,
+ tverify, tvalid);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ success = 1;
+
+ done:
+ sshkey_free(found_key);
+ sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
+ return success ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+ const char *principal, const char *sig_namespace, uint64_t verify_time)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char *line = NULL;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno;
+
+ /* Check key and principal against file */
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ linenum++;
+ r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line, sign_key,
+ principal, sig_namespace, verify_time);
+ free(line);
+ line = NULL;
+ linesize = 0;
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+ continue;
+ else if (r == 0) {
+ /* success */
+ fclose(f);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
+ fclose(f);
+ free(line);
+ return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
+}
+
+static int
+cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum,
+ char **principalsp, const struct sshkey *cert, uint64_t verify_time)
+{
+ char *cp, *oprincipals, *principals;
+ const char *reason;
+ struct sshbuf *nprincipals;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, success = 0;
+
+ oprincipals = principals = *principalsp;
+ *principalsp = NULL;
+
+ if ((nprincipals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while ((cp = strsep(&principals, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+ if (strcspn(cp, "!?*") != strlen(cp)) {
+ debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: "
+ "contains wildcards", path, linenum, cp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Check against principals list in certificate */
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(cert, 0, 1, 0,
+ verify_time, cp, &reason)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: %s",
+ path, linenum, cp, reason);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(nprincipals, "%s%s",
+ sshbuf_len(nprincipals) != 0 ? "," : "", cp)) != 0) {
+ error_f("buffer error");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(nprincipals) == 0) {
+ error("%s:%lu: no valid principals found", path, linenum);
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("buffer error");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ success = 1;
+ *principalsp = principals;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(nprincipals);
+ free(oprincipals);
+ return success ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+static int
+get_matching_principals_from_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+ const struct sshkey *sign_key, uint64_t verify_time, char **principalsp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
+ char *principals = NULL;
+ int r, found = 0;
+ struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+
+ if (principalsp != NULL)
+ *principalsp = NULL;
+
+ /* Parse the line */
+ if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
+ NULL, &principals, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) {
+ /* error already logged */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) {
+ /* Exact match of key */
+ debug("%s:%lu: matched key", path, linenum);
+ /* success */
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) &&
+ sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) {
+ /* Remove principals listed in file but not allowed by cert */
+ if ((r = cert_filter_principals(path, linenum,
+ &principals, sign_key, verify_time)) != 0) {
+ /* error already displayed */
+ debug_r(r, "%s:%lu: cert_filter_principals",
+ path, linenum);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum);
+ /* success */
+ found = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Key didn't match */
+ goto done;
+ }
+ done:
+ if (found && principalsp != NULL) {
+ *principalsp = principals;
+ principals = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ free(principals);
+ sshkey_free(found_key);
+ sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
+ return found ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+ uint64_t verify_time, char **principals)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char *line = NULL;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ linenum++;
+ r = get_matching_principals_from_line(path, linenum, line,
+ sign_key, verify_time, principals);
+ free(line);
+ line = NULL;
+ linesize = 0;
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+ continue;
+ else if (r == 0) {
+ /* success */
+ fclose(f);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ free(line);
+ /* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
+ if (ferror(f) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ fclose(f);
+ error("Unable to read allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey)
+{
+ struct sshkey *pk = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+
+ if (pubkey == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &pk)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ *pubkey = pk;
+ pk = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshsig.h b/crypto/openssh/sshsig.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b725c7d7acd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshsig.h
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshsig.h,v 1.10 2021/07/23 03:37:52 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSHSIG_H
+#define SSHSIG_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshsigopt;
+struct sshkey_sig_details;
+
+typedef int sshsig_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+ u_int, void *);
+
+/* Buffer-oriented API */
+
+/*
+ * Creates a detached SSH signature for a given buffer.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ * out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, const struct sshbuf *message,
+ const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+ sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that a detached signature is valid and optionally returns key
+ * used to sign via argument.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature,
+ const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
+ struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
+
+/* File/FD-oriented API */
+
+/*
+ * Creates a detached SSH signature for a given file.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ * out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+ const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+ int fd, const char *sig_namespace,
+ struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that a detached signature over a file is valid and optionally
+ * returns key used to sign via argument.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
+ const char *sig_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
+
+/* Utility functions */
+
+/*
+ * Return a base64 encoded "ASCII armoured" version of a raw signature.
+ */
+int sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out);
+
+/*
+ * Decode a base64 encoded armoured signature to a raw signature.
+ */
+int sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out);
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether a particular key/principal/namespace is permitted by
+ * an allowed_keys file. Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+ const char *principal, const char *ns, uint64_t verify_time);
+
+/* Parse zero or more allowed_keys signature options */
+struct sshsigopt *sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts,
+ const char *path, u_long linenum, const char **errstrp);
+
+/* Free signature options */
+void sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts);
+
+/* Get public key from signature */
+int sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey);
+
+/* Find principal in allowed_keys file, given a sshkey. Returns
+ * 0 on success.
+ */
+int sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+ uint64_t verify_time, char **principal);
+
+#endif /* SSHSIG_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
index f0c2a5d37d37..1d20ce8005bf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
@@ -1,456 +1,450 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.34 2018/07/09 21:20:26 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.36 2021/01/27 09:26:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way.
* Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times
* into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the
* suitable code.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#define TTY_OP_END 0
/*
* uint32 (u_int) follows speed.
*/
#define TTY_OP_ISPEED 128
#define TTY_OP_OSPEED 129
/*
* Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the
* constants for speed_t are not themselves portable.
*/
static int
speed_to_baud(speed_t speed)
{
switch (speed) {
case B0:
return 0;
case B50:
return 50;
case B75:
return 75;
case B110:
return 110;
case B134:
return 134;
case B150:
return 150;
case B200:
return 200;
case B300:
return 300;
case B600:
return 600;
case B1200:
return 1200;
case B1800:
return 1800;
case B2400:
return 2400;
case B4800:
return 4800;
case B9600:
return 9600;
#ifdef B19200
case B19200:
return 19200;
#else /* B19200 */
#ifdef EXTA
case EXTA:
return 19200;
#endif /* EXTA */
#endif /* B19200 */
#ifdef B38400
case B38400:
return 38400;
#else /* B38400 */
#ifdef EXTB
case EXTB:
return 38400;
#endif /* EXTB */
#endif /* B38400 */
#ifdef B7200
case B7200:
return 7200;
#endif /* B7200 */
#ifdef B14400
case B14400:
return 14400;
#endif /* B14400 */
#ifdef B28800
case B28800:
return 28800;
#endif /* B28800 */
#ifdef B57600
case B57600:
return 57600;
#endif /* B57600 */
#ifdef B76800
case B76800:
return 76800;
#endif /* B76800 */
#ifdef B115200
case B115200:
return 115200;
#endif /* B115200 */
#ifdef B230400
case B230400:
return 230400;
#endif /* B230400 */
default:
return 9600;
}
}
/*
* Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t.
*/
static speed_t
baud_to_speed(int baud)
{
switch (baud) {
case 0:
return B0;
case 50:
return B50;
case 75:
return B75;
case 110:
return B110;
case 134:
return B134;
case 150:
return B150;
case 200:
return B200;
case 300:
return B300;
case 600:
return B600;
case 1200:
return B1200;
case 1800:
return B1800;
case 2400:
return B2400;
case 4800:
return B4800;
case 9600:
return B9600;
#ifdef B19200
case 19200:
return B19200;
#else /* B19200 */
#ifdef EXTA
case 19200:
return EXTA;
#endif /* EXTA */
#endif /* B19200 */
#ifdef B38400
case 38400:
return B38400;
#else /* B38400 */
#ifdef EXTB
case 38400:
return EXTB;
#endif /* EXTB */
#endif /* B38400 */
#ifdef B7200
case 7200:
return B7200;
#endif /* B7200 */
#ifdef B14400
case 14400:
return B14400;
#endif /* B14400 */
#ifdef B28800
case 28800:
return B28800;
#endif /* B28800 */
#ifdef B57600
case 57600:
return B57600;
#endif /* B57600 */
#ifdef B76800
case 76800:
return B76800;
#endif /* B76800 */
#ifdef B115200
case 115200:
return B115200;
#endif /* B115200 */
#ifdef B230400
case 230400:
return B230400;
#endif /* B230400 */
default:
return B9600;
}
}
/*
* Encode a special character into SSH line format.
*/
static u_int
special_char_encode(cc_t c)
{
#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE)
return 255;
#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
return c;
}
/*
* Decode a special character from SSH line format.
*/
static cc_t
special_char_decode(u_int c)
{
#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
if (c == 255)
return _POSIX_VDISABLE;
#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
return c;
}
/*
* Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd
* or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet
* being constructed.
*/
void
ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd, struct termios *tiop)
{
struct termios tio;
struct sshbuf *buf;
int r, ibaud, obaud;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
if (tiop == NULL) {
if (fd == -1) {
- debug("%s: no fd or tio", __func__);
+ debug_f("no fd or tio");
goto end;
}
if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
goto end;
}
} else
tio = *tiop;
/* Store input and output baud rates. */
obaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio));
ibaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_OSPEED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, obaud)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_ISPEED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ibaud)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose");
/* Store values of mode flags. */
#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, \
special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]))) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", #NAME);
#define SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 42 /* for SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE */
#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
- if (OP == SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE)) { \
- debug3("%s: SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE", __func__); \
+ if (OP == SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE)) { \
+ debug3_f("SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE"); \
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0))) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", #NAME);
#include "ttymodes.h"
#undef TTYCHAR
#undef TTYMODE
end:
/* Mark end of mode data. */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_END)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "compose end");
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
/*
* Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable
* manner from a packet being read.
*/
void
ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd)
{
struct termios tio;
struct sshbuf *buf;
const u_char *data;
u_char opcode;
u_int baud, u;
int r, failure = 0;
size_t len;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
if (len == 0)
return;
if ((buf = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
+ error_f("sshbuf_from failed");
return;
}
/*
* Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these
* flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific
* modes, they will initially have reasonable values.
*/
if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
failure = -1;
}
while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &opcode)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse opcode");
switch (opcode) {
case TTY_OP_END:
goto set;
case TTY_OP_ISPEED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse ispeed");
if (failure != -1 &&
cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud);
break;
case TTY_OP_OSPEED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse ospeed");
if (failure != -1 &&
cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud);
break;
#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
case OP: \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, \
- ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #NAME); \
tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(u); \
break;
#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
case OP: \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, \
- ssh_err(r)); \
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #NAME); \
if (u) \
tio.FIELD |= NAME; \
else \
tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \
break;
#include "ttymodes.h"
#undef TTYCHAR
#undef TTYMODE
default:
debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)",
opcode, opcode);
/*
* SSH2:
* Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have a uint32
* argument.
* Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and cause parsing
* to stop.
*/
if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__,
- ssh_err(r));
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse arg");
break;
} else {
- logit("%s: unknown opcode %d", __func__,
- opcode);
+ logit_f("unknown opcode %d", opcode);
goto set;
}
}
}
set:
len = sshbuf_len(buf);
sshbuf_free(buf);
if (len > 0) {
- logit("%s: %zu bytes left", __func__, len);
+ logit_f("%zu bytes left", len);
return; /* Don't process bytes passed */
}
if (failure == -1)
return; /* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */
/* Set the new modes for the terminal. */
if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1)
logit("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
index 49f76d818a81..6ed3024d0180 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
@@ -1,236 +1,238 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.41 2018/07/18 11:34:04 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.42 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Code for uid-swapping.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/*
* Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases:
* 1. euid=0, ruid=0
* 2. euid=0, ruid!=0
* 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0
* Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has
* POSIX saved uids or not.
*/
#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that
is not part of the posix specification. */
#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
/* Saved effective uid. */
-static uid_t saved_euid = 0;
+static uid_t saved_euid = 0;
static gid_t saved_egid = 0;
#endif
/* Saved effective uid. */
static int privileged = 0;
static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
static uid_t user_groups_uid;
static gid_t *saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL;
static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1;
/*
* Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user
* id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested.
*/
void
temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
{
/* Save the current euid, and egroups. */
#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
saved_euid = geteuid();
saved_egid = getegid();
debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)",
(u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
(u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (saved_euid != 0) {
privileged = 0;
return;
}
#endif
#else
if (geteuid() != 0) {
privileged = 0;
return;
}
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
privileged = 1;
temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1;
saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
- if (saved_egroupslen < 0)
+ if (saved_egroupslen == -1)
fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (saved_egroupslen > 0) {
saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups,
saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
- if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
+ if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) == -1)
fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
} else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */
free(saved_egroups);
saved_egroups = NULL;
}
/* set and save the user's groups */
if (user_groupslen == -1 || user_groups_uid != pw->pw_uid) {
- if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
strerror(errno));
user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
- if (user_groupslen < 0)
+ if (user_groupslen == -1)
fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (user_groupslen > 0) {
user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups,
user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
- if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
+ if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) == -1)
fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
} else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */
free(user_groups);
user_groups = NULL;
}
user_groups_uid = pw->pw_uid;
}
/* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */
- if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
+ if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) == -1)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
/* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */
- if (setgid(getegid()) < 0)
+ if (setgid(getegid()) == -1)
debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno));
/* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */
- if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0)
+ if (setuid(geteuid()) == -1)
debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno));
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
- if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) == -1)
fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
strerror(errno));
if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
strerror(errno));
}
/*
* Restores to the original (privileged) uid.
*/
void
restore_uid(void)
{
/* it's a no-op unless privileged */
if (!privileged) {
debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)");
return;
}
if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective)
fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective");
#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
/* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */
- if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0)
+ if (seteuid(saved_euid) == -1)
fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno));
- if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0)
+ if (setegid(saved_egid) == -1)
fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno));
#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
/*
* We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
* Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
* as well.
*/
- setuid(getuid());
- setgid(getgid());
+ if (setuid(getuid()) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (setgid(getgid()) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setgid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
- if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
+ if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) == -1)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
}
/*
* Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be
* called while temporarily_use_uid is effective.
*/
void
permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
uid_t old_uid = getuid();
gid_t old_gid = getgid();
#endif
if (pw == NULL)
fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given");
if (temporarily_use_uid_effective)
fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective");
debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
(u_int)pw->pw_gid);
- if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
#ifdef __APPLE__
/*
* OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into
* memberd support for >16 supplemental groups.
*/
- if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s",
pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
#endif
- if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+ if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1)
fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
/* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */
if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 &&
(setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1))
fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__);
#endif
/* Verify GID drop was successful */
if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) {
fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)",
__func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(),
(u_int)pw->pw_gid);
}
#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
/* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid &&
(setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
#endif
/* Verify UID drop was successful */
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) {
fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
__func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(),
(u_int)pw->pw_uid);
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/umac.c b/crypto/openssh/umac.c
index ccae39f30940..e5ec19f082cb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/umac.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/umac.c
@@ -1,1282 +1,1282 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.17 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.21 2021/04/03 06:58:30 djm Exp $ */
/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
*
* Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18
*
* For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
* world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
* Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
* its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
* granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
* and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
* holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
* distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
*
* Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
*
* 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
*
* 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
* aligned
*
* 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
* a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
* does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
* zeroed.
*
* 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
* UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
* at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
* "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
* rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU
- * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+ * Public license at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
* includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is
* the third.
*
* 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes
* produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why.
*
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN
#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */
#endif
#if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \
UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16
# error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16
#endif
/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */
/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */
/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */
/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */
/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "umac.h"
#include "misc.h"
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- Primitive Data Types --- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */
typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */
typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */
typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */
typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */
typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */
/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */
/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */
/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1
#else
#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b)))
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p)
#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v)
#else
#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p)
#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v)
#endif
#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p))
#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v)
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */
#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
/* OpenSSL's AES */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
# include <openssl/aes.h>
#endif
typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1];
#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key)
#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key)
#else
#include "rijndael.h"
#define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6)
typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4]; /* AES internal */
#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out))
#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \
UMAC_KEY_LEN*8)
#endif
/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter
* mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes
* an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of
* 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct
* 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream.
*/
static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes)
{
UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0};
UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp;
int i;
/* Setup the initial value */
in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx;
in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1;
while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) {
aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN);
in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i;
nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN;
dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
}
if (nbytes) {
aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes);
}
explicit_bzero(in_buf, sizeof(in_buf));
explicit_bzero(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf));
}
/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom
* function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and
* xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce.
* This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces.
*/
typedef struct {
UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */
UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */
aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */
} pdf_ctx;
static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key)
{
UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN];
kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN);
aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key);
/* Initialize pdf and cache */
memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce));
aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
{
/* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes
* of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st
* element, then we may have the result in the cache already.
*/
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8)
#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0
#endif
union {
UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4];
UINT32 align;
} t;
#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0
int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK;
#endif
*(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1];
t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */
if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) ||
(((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) )
{
((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0];
((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0];
aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
}
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
*((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
*((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2];
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1];
#endif
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper
* and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website.
* The interface to this implementation has two
* versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed
* in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second
* allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the
- * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as
+ * multiple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as
* many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the
* hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output.
* Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
* must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
* the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
* optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface
* is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
* responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
*
* The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
* must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
*/
/* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They
* expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines
* produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call,
* allowing the parallel implementation of the streams.
*/
#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */
#define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */
#define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */
#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */
#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */
#define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */
typedef struct {
UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */
int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */
int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */
UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */
} nh_ctx;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and
* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp",
* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key
* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup.
*/
{
UINT64 h;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7;
h = *((UINT64 *)hp);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
*((UINT64 *)hp) = h;
}
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
* reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call.
*/
{
UINT64 h1,h2;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
k8,k9,k10,k11;
h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
}
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
* reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
*/
{
UINT64 h1,h2,h3;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15;
h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
}
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
* reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
*/
{
UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15,
k16,k17,k18,k19;
h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19);
h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4));
h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5));
h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6));
h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7));
k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19;
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes
* as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a
* multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset
* appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already.
*/
{
UINT8 *key;
key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed;
nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes)
/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */
/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */
{
UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw;
if (bpw == 4) {
UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
do {
*p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
p++;
} while (--iters);
} else if (bpw == 8) {
UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
UINT32 t;
do {
t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1);
p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
p[0] = t;
p += 2;
} while (--iters);
}
}
#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z))
#else
#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc)
/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */
{
hc->bytes_hashed = 0;
hc->next_data_empty = 0;
hc->state[0] = 0;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
hc->state[1] = 0;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
hc->state[2] = 0;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
hc->state[3] = 0;
#endif
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key)
/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */
{
kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
nh_reset(hc);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */
/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */
{
UINT32 i,j;
j = hc->next_data_empty;
if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
if (j) {
i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j;
memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i);
nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES);
nbytes -= i;
buf += i;
hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES;
}
if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1);
nh_transform(hc, buf, i);
nbytes -= i;
buf += i;
hc->bytes_hashed += i;
}
j = 0;
}
memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes);
hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes)
{
/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */
if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) {
*p = 0;
nbytes--;
p++;
}
while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
*(UWORD *)p = 0;
nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD);
p += sizeof(UWORD);
}
}
while (nbytes) {
*p = 0;
nbytes--;
p++;
}
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result)
/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration
* into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any
* bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the
* NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number
* of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result".
* If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated.
*/
{
int nh_len, nbits;
if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) {
nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) &
~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty,
nh_len - hc->next_data_empty);
nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty;
} else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) {
nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;
zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY);
nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
}
nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3);
((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits;
#endif
nh_reset(hc);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len,
UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result)
/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent.
* Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is
* well aligned
*/
{
UINT32 nbits;
/* Initialize the hash state */
nbits = (unpadded_len << 3);
((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits;
#endif
nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first
* hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer
* unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial-
* layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output.
*
* UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data
* buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the
* UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary.
* When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls
* uhash_final() which
* calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation
* the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine,
* uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and
* uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be
* used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary.
*
* The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and
* must be called once, before any other UHASH routine.
*/
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Primes and masks */
#define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */
#define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */
#define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
typedef struct uhash_ctx {
nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */
UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */
UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */
UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */
UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */
UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */
/* to uhash */
} uhash_ctx;
typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one
* word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64
* require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit
* the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to
* be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation
* patches any errant values.
*/
static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data)
{
UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32),
key_lo = (UINT32)key,
cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32),
cur_lo = (UINT32)cur,
x_lo,
x_hi;
UINT64 X,T,res;
X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo);
x_lo = (UINT32)X;
x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32);
res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo);
T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32);
res += T;
if (res < T)
res += 59;
res += data;
if (res < data)
res += 59;
return res;
}
/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this
* implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle
* the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to
* 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24
* bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB).
*/
static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
{
int i;
UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in;
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) {
hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1);
hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59));
} else {
hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]);
}
}
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
* produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
* product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
* multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
*/
static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data)
{
t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48);
t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32);
t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16);
t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data);
return t;
}
static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t)
{
/* Divisionless modular reduction */
UINT64 ret;
ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36);
if (ret >= p36)
ret -= p36;
/* return least significant 32 bits */
return (UINT32)(ret);
}
/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
* the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the
* NH output.
*/
static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res)
{
UINT64 t;
UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res;
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]);
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]);
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]);
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]);
#endif
}
/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
* the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the
* polyhash output.
*/
static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res)
{
int i;
UINT64 t;
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
/* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */
if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64)
ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64;
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i,
ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]);
}
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */
static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc)
{
nh_reset(&pc->hash);
pc->msg_len = 0;
pc->poly_accum[0] = 1;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
pc->poly_accum[1] = 1;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
pc->poly_accum[2] = 1;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
pc->poly_accum[3] = 1;
#endif
return 1;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context,
* initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner-
* product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native
* loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation.
*/
static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key)
{
int i;
UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)];
/* Zero the entire uhash context */
memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx));
/* Initialize the L1 hash */
nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key);
/* Setup L2 hash variables */
kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
/* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not
* used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a
* little-endian computer.
*/
memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8);
endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8);
/* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */
ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu;
ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */
}
/* Setup L3-1 hash variables */
kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++)
memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64),
4*sizeof(UINT64));
endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64),
sizeof(ahc->ip_keys));
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++)
ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */
/* Setup L3-2 hash variables */
/* Fill buffer with index 4 key */
kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32),
STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[])
{
/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */
uhash_ctx_t ctx;
u_char bytes_to_add;
aes_int_key prf_key;
ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1));
ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
*((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add;
}
aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
uhash_init(ctx, prf_key);
}
return (ctx);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx)
{
/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */
u_char bytes_to_sub;
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1);
ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub);
}
free(ctx);
}
return (1);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and
* hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output.
*/
{
UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining;
UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
ctx->msg_len += len;
} else {
bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN;
if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN)
bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN;
if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
/* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */
/* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */
/* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */
if (bytes_hashed) {
bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed);
nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining);
nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining;
poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
len -= bytes_remaining;
input += bytes_remaining;
}
/* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */
while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN,
L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN;
len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
input += L1_KEY_LEN;
poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
}
}
/* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */
if (len) {
nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
ctx->msg_len += len;
}
}
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res)
/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
{
UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) {
if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) {
nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
}
ip_long(ctx, res);
} else {
nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res);
}
uhash_reset(ctx);
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res)
/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */
/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */
{
UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
UINT32 nh_len;
int extra_zeroes_needed;
/* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip
* the polyhash.
*/
if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */
nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */
else
nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res);
} else {
/* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH
* output to poly_hash().
*/
do {
nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
msg += L1_KEY_LEN;
} while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN);
if (len) {
nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
}
ip_long(ahc, res);
}
uhash_reset(ahc);
return 1;
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where
* the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer,
* and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a
* time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and
* should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required.
*/
struct umac_ctx {
uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */
pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */
void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */
} umac_ctx;
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */
{
uhash_reset(&ctx->hash);
return (1);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
/* Deallocate the ctx structure */
{
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY)
ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr;
- explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
- free(ctx);
+ freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
}
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[])
/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
* generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary.
*/
{
struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx;
size_t bytes_to_add;
aes_int_key prf_key;
octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1));
ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
}
ctx->free_ptr = octx;
aes_key_setup(key, prf_key);
pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key);
uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key);
explicit_bzero(prf_key, sizeof(prf_key));
}
return (ctx);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8])
/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
{
uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag);
pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */
/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */
/* output buffer is full. */
{
uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len);
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
long len, u_char tag[],
u_char nonce[8])
/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */
{
uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag);
pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
return (1);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/umac.h b/crypto/openssh/umac.h
index 7fb770f8a52b..4651f0d5aaf0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/umac.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/umac.h
@@ -1,129 +1,129 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.3 2013/07/22 12:20:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.4 2019/06/07 14:18:48 dtucker Exp $ */
/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* umac.h -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
*
* Version 0.93a of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 14
*
* For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
* world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
* Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Ted Krovetz
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
* its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
* granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
* and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
* holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
* distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
*
* Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
*
* 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
*
* 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
* aligned
*
* 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
* a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
* does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
* zeroed.
*
* 4) Two free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
* UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
* at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
* "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
* rijndael-alg-fst.h.
- * Brian Gladman's version is distributed with GNU Public lisence
+ * Brian Gladman's version is distributed with GNU Public license
* and can be found at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
* includes a fast IA-32 assembly version.
*
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
#ifndef HEADER_UMAC_H
#define HEADER_UMAC_H
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]);
/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
* generate subkeys from key.
*/
#if 0
int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
/* Reset a umac_ctx to begin authenicating a new message */
#endif
int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len);
/* Incorporate len bytes pointed to by input into context ctx */
int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]);
/* Incorporate any pending data and the ctr value, and return tag.
* This function returns error code if ctr < 0.
*/
int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
/* Deallocate the context structure */
#if 0
int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
long len, u_char tag[],
u_char nonce[8]);
/* All-in-one implementation of the functions Reset, Update and Final */
#endif
/* uhash.h */
#if 0
typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
/* The uhash_ctx structure is defined by the implementation of the */
/* UHASH functions. */
uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[16]);
/* Dynamically allocate a uhash_ctx struct and generate subkeys using */
/* the kdf and kdf_key passed in. If kdf_key_len is 0 then RC6 is */
/* used to generate key with a fixed key. If kdf_key_len > 0 but kdf */
/* is NULL then the first 16 bytes pointed at by kdf_key is used as a */
/* key for an RC6 based KDF. */
int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
int uhash_set_params(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
void *params);
int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
u_char *input,
long len);
int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
- u_char ouput[]);
+ u_char output[]);
int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
u_char *input,
long len,
u_char output[]);
#endif
/* matching umac-128 API, we reuse umac_ctx, since it's opaque */
struct umac_ctx *umac128_new(const u_char key[]);
int umac128_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len);
int umac128_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]);
int umac128_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* HEADER_UMAC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/utf8.c b/crypto/openssh/utf8.c
index db7cb8f35eda..7f63b25aeefc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/utf8.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/utf8.c
@@ -1,340 +1,355 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.8 2018/08/21 13:56:27 schwarze Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.11 2020/05/01 06:28:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Utility functions for multibyte-character handling,
* in particular to sanitize untrusted strings for terminal output.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
# include <langinfo.h>
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_WCHAR_H
# include <wchar.h>
#endif
#include "utf8.h"
static int dangerous_locale(void);
static int grow_dst(char **, size_t *, size_t, char **, size_t);
-static int vasnmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, va_list);
/*
* For US-ASCII and UTF-8 encodings, we can safely recover from
* encoding errors and from non-printable characters. For any
* other encodings, err to the side of caution and abort parsing:
* For state-dependent encodings, recovery is impossible.
* For arbitrary encodings, replacement of non-printable
* characters would be non-trivial and too fragile.
* The comments indicate what nl_langinfo(CODESET)
* returns for US-ASCII on various operating systems.
*/
static int
dangerous_locale(void) {
char *loc;
loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
return strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 &&
strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 && /* OpenBSD */
strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && /* Linux */
strcmp(loc, "ISO8859-1") != 0 && /* AIX */
strcmp(loc, "646") != 0 && /* Solaris, NetBSD */
strcmp(loc, "") != 0; /* Solaris 6 */
}
static int
grow_dst(char **dst, size_t *sz, size_t maxsz, char **dp, size_t need)
{
char *tp;
size_t tsz;
if (*dp + need < *dst + *sz)
return 0;
tsz = *sz + 128;
if (tsz > maxsz)
tsz = maxsz;
if ((tp = recallocarray(*dst, *sz, tsz, 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
*dp = tp + (*dp - *dst);
*dst = tp;
*sz = tsz;
return 0;
}
/*
* The following two functions limit the number of bytes written,
* including the terminating '\0', to sz. Unless wp is NULL,
* they limit the number of display columns occupied to *wp.
* Whichever is reached first terminates the output string.
* To stay close to the standard interfaces, they return the number of
* non-NUL bytes that would have been written if both were unlimited.
* If wp is NULL, newline, carriage return, and tab are allowed;
* otherwise, the actual number of columns occupied by what was
* written is returned in *wp.
*/
-static int
+int
vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
char *src; /* Source string returned from vasprintf. */
char *sp; /* Pointer into src. */
char *dst; /* Destination string to be returned. */
char *dp; /* Pointer into dst. */
char *tp; /* Temporary pointer for dst. */
size_t sz; /* Number of bytes allocated for dst. */
wchar_t wc; /* Wide character at sp. */
int len; /* Number of bytes in the character at sp. */
int ret; /* Number of bytes needed to format src. */
int width; /* Display width of the character wc. */
int total_width, max_width, print;
src = NULL;
if ((ret = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap)) <= 0)
goto fail;
sz = strlen(src) + 1;
if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) {
free(src);
ret = -1;
goto fail;
}
if (maxsz > INT_MAX)
maxsz = INT_MAX;
sp = src;
dp = dst;
ret = 0;
print = 1;
total_width = 0;
max_width = wp == NULL ? INT_MAX : *wp;
while (*sp != '\0') {
if ((len = mbtowc(&wc, sp, MB_CUR_MAX)) == -1) {
(void)mbtowc(NULL, NULL, MB_CUR_MAX);
if (dangerous_locale()) {
ret = -1;
break;
}
len = 1;
width = -1;
} else if (wp == NULL &&
(wc == L'\n' || wc == L'\r' || wc == L'\t')) {
/*
* Don't use width uninitialized; the actual
* value doesn't matter because total_width
* is only returned for wp != NULL.
*/
width = 0;
} else if ((width = wcwidth(wc)) == -1 &&
dangerous_locale()) {
ret = -1;
break;
}
/* Valid, printable character. */
if (width >= 0) {
if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - len ||
total_width > max_width - width))
print = 0;
if (print) {
if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz,
&dp, len) == -1) {
ret = -1;
break;
}
total_width += width;
memcpy(dp, sp, len);
dp += len;
}
sp += len;
if (ret >= 0)
ret += len;
continue;
}
/* Escaping required. */
while (len > 0) {
if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - 4 ||
total_width > max_width - 4))
print = 0;
if (print) {
if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz,
&dp, 4) == -1) {
ret = -1;
break;
}
tp = vis(dp, *sp, VIS_OCTAL | VIS_ALL, 0);
width = tp - dp;
total_width += width;
dp = tp;
} else
width = 4;
len--;
sp++;
if (ret >= 0)
ret += width;
}
if (len > 0)
break;
}
free(src);
*dp = '\0';
*str = dst;
if (wp != NULL)
*wp = total_width;
/*
* If the string was truncated by the width limit but
* would have fit into the size limit, the only sane way
* to report the problem is using the return value, such
* that the usual idiom "if (ret < 0 || ret >= sz) error"
* works as expected.
*/
if (ret < (int)maxsz && !print)
ret = -1;
return ret;
fail:
if (wp != NULL)
*wp = 0;
if (ret == 0) {
*str = src;
return 0;
} else {
*str = NULL;
return -1;
}
}
int
snmprintf(char *str, size_t sz, int *wp, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
- char *cp;
+ char *cp = NULL;
int ret;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vasnmprintf(&cp, sz, wp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (cp != NULL) {
(void)strlcpy(str, cp, sz);
free(cp);
} else
*str = '\0';
return ret;
}
+int
+asmprintf(char **outp, size_t sz, int *wp, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int ret;
+
+ *outp = NULL;
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = vasnmprintf(outp, sz, wp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* To stay close to the standard interfaces, the following functions
* return the number of non-NUL bytes written.
*/
int
vfmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
- char *str;
+ char *str = NULL;
int ret;
- if ((ret = vasnmprintf(&str, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap)) < 0)
+ if ((ret = vasnmprintf(&str, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap)) < 0) {
+ free(str);
return -1;
+ }
if (fputs(str, stream) == EOF)
ret = -1;
free(str);
return ret;
}
int
fmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int ret;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vfmprintf(stream, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
int
mprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int ret;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vfmprintf(stdout, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
/*
* Set up libc for multibyte output in the user's chosen locale.
*
* XXX: we are known to have problems with Turkish (i/I confusion) so we
* deliberately fall back to the C locale for now. Longer term we should
* always prefer to select C.[encoding] if possible, but there's no
* standardisation in locales between systems, so we'll need to survey
* what's out there first.
*/
void
msetlocale(void)
{
const char *vars[] = { "LC_ALL", "LC_CTYPE", "LANG", NULL };
char *cp;
int i;
/*
* We can't yet cope with dotless/dotted I in Turkish locales,
* so fall back to the C locale for these.
*/
for (i = 0; vars[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((cp = getenv(vars[i])) == NULL)
continue;
if (strncasecmp(cp, "TR", 2) != 0)
break;
/*
* If we're in a UTF-8 locale then prefer to use
* the C.UTF-8 locale (or equivalent) if it exists.
*/
if ((strcasestr(cp, "UTF-8") != NULL ||
strcasestr(cp, "UTF8") != NULL) &&
(setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C.UTF-8") != NULL ||
setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "POSIX.UTF-8") != NULL))
return;
setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
return;
}
/* We can handle this locale */
setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/utf8.h b/crypto/openssh/utf8.h
index 88c5a34a3436..09941d47180a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/utf8.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/utf8.h
@@ -1,25 +1,28 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: utf8.h,v 1.1 2016/05/25 23:48:45 schwarze Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.h,v 1.4 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+int vasnmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, va_list);
int mprintf(const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
int fmprintf(FILE *, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int vfmprintf(FILE *, const char *, va_list);
int snmprintf(char *, size_t, int *, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
+int asmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
void msetlocale(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7fc867a11fd9..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.28 2015/04/24 01:36:24 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <resolv.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "uuencode.h"
-
-/*
- * Encode binary 'src' of length 'srclength', writing base64-encoded text
- * to 'target' of size 'targsize'. Will always nul-terminate 'target'.
- * Returns the number of bytes stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc.
- * 'targsize' too small).
- */
-int
-uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength,
- char *target, size_t targsize)
-{
- return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode base64-encoded 'src' into buffer 'target' of 'targsize' bytes.
- * Will skip leading and trailing whitespace. Returns the number of bytes
- * stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. targsize too small).
- */
-int
-uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
-{
- int len;
- char *encoded, *p;
-
- /* copy the 'readonly' source */
- encoded = xstrdup(src);
- /* skip whitespace and data */
- for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++)
- ;
- for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
- ;
- /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- *p = '\0';
- len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
- free(encoded);
- return len;
-}
-
-void
-dump_base64(FILE *fp, const u_char *data, u_int len)
-{
- char *buf;
- int i, n;
-
- if (len > 65536) {
- fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
- return;
- }
- buf = xreallocarray(NULL, 2, len);
- n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
- if (i % 70 == 69)
- fprintf(fp, "\n");
- }
- if (i % 70 != 69)
- fprintf(fp, "\n");
- free(buf);
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d9888126cdc..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.14 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-int uuencode(const u_char *, u_int, char *, size_t);
-int uudecode(const char *, u_char *, size_t);
-void dump_base64(FILE *, const u_char *, u_int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
index 9dbaf16e7192..bce1a257b927 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.83 2018/10/10 16:43:49 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.91 2021/08/20 03:22:55 djm Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD$ */
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.9"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.7"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
-#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20200214"
+#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20210907"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING "without OpenSSL"
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
index 5cc0310a4766..b48d33bbf68c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
@@ -1,118 +1,119 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.34 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.36 2019/11/12 22:32:48 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
* failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
-void
-ssh_malloc_init(void)
-{
#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
- extern char *malloc_options;
-
- malloc_options = "S";
+char *malloc_options = "S";
#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
-}
void *
xmalloc(size_t size)
{
void *ptr;
if (size == 0)
fatal("xmalloc: zero size");
ptr = malloc(size);
if (ptr == NULL)
fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size);
return ptr;
}
void *
xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *ptr;
if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0)
fatal("xcalloc: zero size");
if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size)
fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX");
ptr = calloc(nmemb, size);
if (ptr == NULL)
fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)",
size * nmemb);
return ptr;
}
void *
xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *new_ptr;
new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size);
if (new_ptr == NULL)
fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)",
nmemb, size);
return new_ptr;
}
void *
xrecallocarray(void *ptr, size_t onmemb, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *new_ptr;
new_ptr = recallocarray(ptr, onmemb, nmemb, size);
if (new_ptr == NULL)
fatal("xrecallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)",
nmemb, size);
return new_ptr;
}
char *
xstrdup(const char *str)
{
size_t len;
char *cp;
len = strlen(str) + 1;
cp = xmalloc(len);
strlcpy(cp, str, len);
return cp;
}
+int
+xvasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+ if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
+ fatal("xvasprintf: could not allocate memory");
+ return i;
+}
+
int
xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int i;
va_start(ap, fmt);
- i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+ i = xvasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
-
- if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
- fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory");
-
- return (i);
+ return i;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
index cf38ddfa48c5..a6b8d23bde8e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.17 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.20 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo
*
* Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
* failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
-void ssh_malloc_init(void);
void *xmalloc(size_t);
void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t);
void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
void *xrecallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t);
char *xstrdup(const char *);
int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...)
- __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
- __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+int xvasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmss_commons.c b/crypto/openssh/xmss_commons.c
index 59486aead708..8d6b80b6eb79 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmss_commons.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmss_commons.c
@@ -1,36 +1,36 @@
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_commons.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
xmss_commons.c 20160722
Andreas Hülsing
Joost Rijneveld
Public domain.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include "xmss_commons.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
void to_byte(unsigned char *out, unsigned long long in, uint32_t bytes)
{
int32_t i;
for (i = bytes-1; i >= 0; i--) {
out[i] = in & 0xff;
in = in >> 8;
}
}
#if 0
void hexdump(const unsigned char *a, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
printf("%02x", a[i]);
}
#endif
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmss_fast.c b/crypto/openssh/xmss_fast.c
index e37447f60d8c..421b39a37a9e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmss_fast.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmss_fast.c
@@ -1,1106 +1,1106 @@
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_fast.c,v 1.3 2018/03/22 07:06:11 markus Exp $ */
/*
xmss_fast.c version 20160722
Andreas Hülsing
Joost Rijneveld
Public domain.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include "xmss_fast.h"
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include "xmss_wots.h"
#include "xmss_hash.h"
#include "xmss_commons.h"
#include "xmss_hash_address.h"
// For testing
#include "stdio.h"
/**
* Used for pseudorandom keygeneration,
* generates the seed for the WOTS keypair at address addr
*
* takes n byte sk_seed and returns n byte seed using 32 byte address addr.
*/
static void get_seed(unsigned char *seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed, int n, uint32_t addr[8])
{
unsigned char bytes[32];
// Make sure that chain addr, hash addr, and key bit are 0!
setChainADRS(addr,0);
setHashADRS(addr,0);
setKeyAndMask(addr,0);
// Generate pseudorandom value
addr_to_byte(bytes, addr);
prf(seed, bytes, sk_seed, n);
}
/**
* Initialize xmss params struct
* parameter names are the same as in the draft
* parameter k is K as used in the BDS algorithm
*/
int xmss_set_params(xmss_params *params, int n, int h, int w, int k)
{
if (k >= h || k < 2 || (h - k) % 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "For BDS traversal, H - K must be even, with H > K >= 2!\n");
return 1;
}
params->h = h;
params->n = n;
params->k = k;
wots_params wots_par;
wots_set_params(&wots_par, n, w);
params->wots_par = wots_par;
return 0;
}
/**
* Initialize BDS state struct
* parameter names are the same as used in the description of the BDS traversal
*/
void xmss_set_bds_state(bds_state *state, unsigned char *stack, int stackoffset, unsigned char *stacklevels, unsigned char *auth, unsigned char *keep, treehash_inst *treehash, unsigned char *retain, int next_leaf)
{
state->stack = stack;
state->stackoffset = stackoffset;
state->stacklevels = stacklevels;
state->auth = auth;
state->keep = keep;
state->treehash = treehash;
state->retain = retain;
state->next_leaf = next_leaf;
}
/**
* Initialize xmssmt_params struct
* parameter names are the same as in the draft
*
* Especially h is the total tree height, i.e. the XMSS trees have height h/d
*/
int xmssmt_set_params(xmssmt_params *params, int n, int h, int d, int w, int k)
{
if (h % d) {
fprintf(stderr, "d must divide h without remainder!\n");
return 1;
}
params->h = h;
params->d = d;
params->n = n;
params->index_len = (h + 7) / 8;
xmss_params xmss_par;
if (xmss_set_params(&xmss_par, n, (h/d), w, k)) {
return 1;
}
params->xmss_par = xmss_par;
return 0;
}
/**
* Computes a leaf from a WOTS public key using an L-tree.
*/
static void l_tree(unsigned char *leaf, unsigned char *wots_pk, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
{
unsigned int l = params->wots_par.len;
unsigned int n = params->n;
uint32_t i = 0;
uint32_t height = 0;
uint32_t bound;
//ADRS.setTreeHeight(0);
setTreeHeight(addr, height);
while (l > 1) {
bound = l >> 1; //floor(l / 2);
for (i = 0; i < bound; i++) {
//ADRS.setTreeIndex(i);
setTreeIndex(addr, i);
//wots_pk[i] = RAND_HASH(pk[2i], pk[2i + 1], SEED, ADRS);
hash_h(wots_pk+i*n, wots_pk+i*2*n, pub_seed, addr, n);
}
//if ( l % 2 == 1 ) {
if (l & 1) {
//pk[floor(l / 2) + 1] = pk[l];
memcpy(wots_pk+(l>>1)*n, wots_pk+(l-1)*n, n);
//l = ceil(l / 2);
l=(l>>1)+1;
}
else {
//l = ceil(l / 2);
l=(l>>1);
}
//ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1);
height++;
setTreeHeight(addr, height);
}
//return pk[0];
memcpy(leaf, wots_pk, n);
}
/**
* Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair, then computes leaf using l_tree. As this happens position independent, we only require that addr encodes the right ltree-address.
*/
static void gen_leaf_wots(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t ltree_addr[8], uint32_t ots_addr[8])
{
unsigned char seed[params->n];
unsigned char pk[params->wots_par.keysize];
get_seed(seed, sk_seed, params->n, ots_addr);
wots_pkgen(pk, seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
l_tree(leaf, pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr);
}
static int treehash_minheight_on_stack(bds_state* state, const xmss_params *params, const treehash_inst *treehash) {
unsigned int r = params->h, i;
for (i = 0; i < treehash->stackusage; i++) {
if (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1] < r) {
r = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1];
}
}
return r;
}
/**
* Merkle's TreeHash algorithm. The address only needs to initialize the first 78 bits of addr. Everything else will be set by treehash.
* Currently only used for key generation.
*
*/
static void treehash_setup(unsigned char *node, int height, int index, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8])
{
unsigned int idx = index;
unsigned int n = params->n;
unsigned int h = params->h;
unsigned int k = params->k;
// use three different addresses because at this point we use all three formats in parallel
uint32_t ots_addr[8];
uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
uint32_t node_addr[8];
// only copy layer and tree address parts
memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
// type = ots
setType(ots_addr, 0);
memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
setType(ltree_addr, 1);
memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
setType(node_addr, 2);
uint32_t lastnode, i;
unsigned char stack[(height+1)*n];
unsigned int stacklevels[height+1];
unsigned int stackoffset=0;
unsigned int nodeh;
lastnode = idx+(1<<height);
for (i = 0; i < h-k; i++) {
state->treehash[i].h = i;
state->treehash[i].completed = 1;
state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0;
}
i = 0;
for (; idx < lastnode; idx++) {
setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
gen_leaf_wots(stack+stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
stacklevels[stackoffset] = 0;
stackoffset++;
if (h - k > 0 && i == 3) {
memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, stack+stackoffset*n, n);
}
while (stackoffset>1 && stacklevels[stackoffset-1] == stacklevels[stackoffset-2])
{
nodeh = stacklevels[stackoffset-1];
if (i >> nodeh == 1) {
memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n);
}
else {
if (nodeh < h - k && i >> nodeh == 3) {
memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n);
}
else if (nodeh >= h - k) {
memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((i >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n);
}
}
setTreeHeight(node_addr, stacklevels[stackoffset-1]);
setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (stacklevels[stackoffset-1]+1)));
hash_h(stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed,
node_addr, n);
stacklevels[stackoffset-2]++;
stackoffset--;
}
i++;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
node[i] = stack[i];
}
static void treehash_update(treehash_inst *treehash, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
int n = params->n;
uint32_t ots_addr[8];
uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
uint32_t node_addr[8];
// only copy layer and tree address parts
memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
// type = ots
setType(ots_addr, 0);
memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
setType(ltree_addr, 1);
memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
setType(node_addr, 2);
setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, treehash->next_idx);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, treehash->next_idx);
unsigned char nodebuffer[2 * n];
unsigned int nodeheight = 0;
gen_leaf_wots(nodebuffer, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
while (treehash->stackusage > 0 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == nodeheight) {
memcpy(nodebuffer + n, nodebuffer, n);
memcpy(nodebuffer, state->stack + (state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
setTreeHeight(node_addr, nodeheight);
setTreeIndex(node_addr, (treehash->next_idx >> (nodeheight+1)));
hash_h(nodebuffer, nodebuffer, pub_seed, node_addr, n);
nodeheight++;
treehash->stackusage--;
state->stackoffset--;
}
if (nodeheight == treehash->h) { // this also implies stackusage == 0
memcpy(treehash->node, nodebuffer, n);
treehash->completed = 1;
}
else {
memcpy(state->stack + state->stackoffset*n, nodebuffer, n);
treehash->stackusage++;
state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = nodeheight;
state->stackoffset++;
treehash->next_idx++;
}
}
/**
* Computes a root node given a leaf and an authapth
*/
static void validate_authpath(unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf, unsigned long leafidx, const unsigned char *authpath, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
{
unsigned int n = params->n;
uint32_t i, j;
unsigned char buffer[2*n];
// If leafidx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child and authpath has to go to the left.
// Otherwise, it is the other way around
if (leafidx & 1) {
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
buffer[n+j] = leaf[j];
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
buffer[j] = authpath[j];
}
else {
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
buffer[j] = leaf[j];
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
buffer[n+j] = authpath[j];
}
authpath += n;
for (i=0; i < params->h-1; i++) {
setTreeHeight(addr, i);
leafidx >>= 1;
setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx);
if (leafidx&1) {
hash_h(buffer+n, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n);
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
buffer[j] = authpath[j];
}
else {
hash_h(buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n);
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
buffer[j+n] = authpath[j];
}
authpath += n;
}
setTreeHeight(addr, (params->h-1));
leafidx >>= 1;
setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx);
hash_h(root, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n);
}
/**
* Performs one treehash update on the instance that needs it the most.
* Returns 1 if such an instance was not found
**/
static char bds_treehash_update(bds_state *state, unsigned int updates, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
uint32_t i, j;
unsigned int level, l_min, low;
unsigned int h = params->h;
unsigned int k = params->k;
unsigned int used = 0;
for (j = 0; j < updates; j++) {
l_min = h;
level = h - k;
for (i = 0; i < h - k; i++) {
if (state->treehash[i].completed) {
low = h;
}
else if (state->treehash[i].stackusage == 0) {
low = i;
}
else {
low = treehash_minheight_on_stack(state, params, &(state->treehash[i]));
}
if (low < l_min) {
level = i;
l_min = low;
}
}
if (level == h - k) {
break;
}
treehash_update(&(state->treehash[level]), state, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, addr);
used++;
}
return updates - used;
}
/**
* Updates the state (typically NEXT_i) by adding a leaf and updating the stack
* Returns 1 if all leaf nodes have already been processed
**/
static char bds_state_update(bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
uint32_t node_addr[8];
uint32_t ots_addr[8];
int n = params->n;
int h = params->h;
int k = params->k;
int nodeh;
int idx = state->next_leaf;
if (idx == 1 << h) {
return 1;
}
// only copy layer and tree address parts
memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
// type = ots
setType(ots_addr, 0);
memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
setType(ltree_addr, 1);
memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
setType(node_addr, 2);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx);
gen_leaf_wots(state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = 0;
state->stackoffset++;
if (h - k > 0 && idx == 3) {
memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, n);
}
while (state->stackoffset>1 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]) {
nodeh = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1];
if (idx >> nodeh == 1) {
memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
}
else {
if (nodeh < h - k && idx >> nodeh == 3) {
memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
}
else if (nodeh >= h - k) {
memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((idx >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
}
}
setTreeHeight(node_addr, state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]);
setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]+1)));
hash_h(state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed, node_addr, n);
state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]++;
state->stackoffset--;
}
state->next_leaf++;
return 0;
}
/**
* Returns the auth path for node leaf_idx and computes the auth path for the
* next leaf node, using the algorithm described by Buchmann, Dahmen and Szydlo
* in "Post Quantum Cryptography", Springer 2009.
*/
static void bds_round(bds_state *state, const unsigned long leaf_idx, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
{
unsigned int i;
unsigned int n = params->n;
unsigned int h = params->h;
unsigned int k = params->k;
unsigned int tau = h;
unsigned int startidx;
unsigned int offset, rowidx;
unsigned char buf[2 * n];
uint32_t ots_addr[8];
uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
uint32_t node_addr[8];
// only copy layer and tree address parts
memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
// type = ots
setType(ots_addr, 0);
memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
setType(ltree_addr, 1);
memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
setType(node_addr, 2);
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
if (! ((leaf_idx >> i) & 1)) {
tau = i;
break;
}
}
if (tau > 0) {
memcpy(buf, state->auth + (tau-1) * n, n);
// we need to do this before refreshing state->keep to prevent overwriting
memcpy(buf + n, state->keep + ((tau-1) >> 1) * n, n);
}
if (!((leaf_idx >> (tau + 1)) & 1) && (tau < h - 1)) {
memcpy(state->keep + (tau >> 1)*n, state->auth + tau*n, n);
}
if (tau == 0) {
setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, leaf_idx);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, leaf_idx);
gen_leaf_wots(state->auth, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
}
else {
setTreeHeight(node_addr, (tau-1));
setTreeIndex(node_addr, leaf_idx >> tau);
hash_h(state->auth + tau * n, buf, pub_seed, node_addr, n);
for (i = 0; i < tau; i++) {
if (i < h - k) {
memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->treehash[i].node, n);
}
else {
offset = (1 << (h - 1 - i)) + i - h;
rowidx = ((leaf_idx >> i) - 1) >> 1;
memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->retain + (offset + rowidx) * n, n);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < ((tau < h - k) ? tau : (h - k)); i++) {
startidx = leaf_idx + 1 + 3 * (1 << i);
if (startidx < 1U << h) {
state->treehash[i].h = i;
state->treehash[i].next_idx = startidx;
state->treehash[i].completed = 0;
state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0;
}
}
}
}
/*
* Generates a XMSS key pair for a given parameter set.
* Format sk: [(32bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
* Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid.
*/
int xmss_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, xmss_params *params)
{
unsigned int n = params->n;
// Set idx = 0
sk[0] = 0;
sk[1] = 0;
sk[2] = 0;
sk[3] = 0;
// Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte)
randombytes(sk+4, 3*n);
// Copy PUB_SEED to public key
memcpy(pk+n, sk+4+2*n, n);
uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
// Compute root
treehash_setup(pk, params->h, 0, state, sk+4, params, sk+4+2*n, addr);
// copy root to sk
memcpy(sk+4+3*n, pk, n);
return 0;
}
/**
* Signs a message.
* Returns
* 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND
* 2. an updated secret key!
*
*/
int xmss_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmss_params *params)
{
unsigned int h = params->h;
unsigned int n = params->n;
unsigned int k = params->k;
uint16_t i = 0;
// Extract SK
unsigned long idx = ((unsigned long)sk[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sk[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sk[2] << 8) | sk[3];
unsigned char sk_seed[n];
memcpy(sk_seed, sk+4, n);
unsigned char sk_prf[n];
memcpy(sk_prf, sk+4+n, n);
unsigned char pub_seed[n];
memcpy(pub_seed, sk+4+2*n, n);
// index as 32 bytes string
unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32];
to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32);
unsigned char hash_key[3*n];
// Update SK
sk[0] = ((idx + 1) >> 24) & 255;
sk[1] = ((idx + 1) >> 16) & 255;
sk[2] = ((idx + 1) >> 8) & 255;
sk[3] = (idx + 1) & 255;
// -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated.
// -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point!
// Init working params
unsigned char R[n];
unsigned char msg_h[n];
unsigned char ots_seed[n];
uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
// ---------------------------------
// Message Hashing
// ---------------------------------
// Message Hash:
// First compute pseudorandom value
prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n);
// Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
memcpy(hash_key, R, n);
memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+4+3*n, n);
to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
// Then use it for message digest
h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n);
// Start collecting signature
*sig_msg_len = 0;
// Copy index to signature
sig_msg[0] = (idx >> 24) & 255;
sig_msg[1] = (idx >> 16) & 255;
sig_msg[2] = (idx >> 8) & 255;
sig_msg[3] = idx & 255;
sig_msg += 4;
*sig_msg_len += 4;
// Copy R to signature
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
sig_msg[i] = R[i];
sig_msg += n;
*sig_msg_len += n;
// ----------------------------------
// Now we start to "really sign"
// ----------------------------------
// Prepare Address
setType(ots_addr, 0);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
// Compute seed for OTS key pair
get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr);
// Compute WOTS signature
wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize;
*sig_msg_len += params->wots_par.keysize;
// the auth path was already computed during the previous round
memcpy(sig_msg, state->auth, h*n);
if (idx < (1U << h) - 1) {
bds_round(state, idx, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr);
bds_treehash_update(state, (h - k) >> 1, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr);
}
/* TODO: save key/bds state here! */
sig_msg += params->h*n;
*sig_msg_len += params->h*n;
//Whipe secret elements?
//zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES);
memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen);
*sig_msg_len += msglen;
return 0;
}
/**
* Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key.
*/
int xmss_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmss_params *params)
{
unsigned int n = params->n;
unsigned long long i, m_len;
unsigned long idx=0;
unsigned char wots_pk[params->wots_par.keysize];
unsigned char pkhash[n];
unsigned char root[n];
unsigned char msg_h[n];
unsigned char hash_key[3*n];
unsigned char pub_seed[n];
memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n);
// Init addresses
uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
setType(ots_addr, 0);
setType(ltree_addr, 1);
setType(node_addr, 2);
// Extract index
idx = ((unsigned long)sig_msg[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[2] << 8) | sig_msg[3];
printf("verify:: idx = %lu\n", idx);
// Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg+4,n);
memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n);
to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
sig_msg += (n+4);
sig_msg_len -= (n+4);
// hash message
unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = params->wots_par.keysize+params->h*n;
m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len;
h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n);
//-----------------------
// Verify signature
//-----------------------
// Prepare Address
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
// Check WOTS signature
wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize;
sig_msg_len -= params->wots_par.keysize;
// Compute Ltree
setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx);
l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr);
// Compute root
validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx, sig_msg, params, pub_seed, node_addr);
sig_msg += params->h*n;
sig_msg_len -= params->h*n;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
if (root[i] != pk[i])
goto fail;
*msglen = sig_msg_len;
for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
msg[i] = sig_msg[i];
return 0;
fail:
*msglen = sig_msg_len;
for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
msg[i] = 0;
*msglen = -1;
return -1;
}
/*
* Generates a XMSSMT key pair for a given parameter set.
* Format sk: [(ceil(h/8) bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
* Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid.
*/
int xmssmt_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, xmssmt_params *params)
{
unsigned int n = params->n;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char ots_seed[params->n];
// Set idx = 0
for (i = 0; i < params->index_len; i++) {
sk[i] = 0;
}
// Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte)
randombytes(sk+params->index_len, 3*n);
// Copy PUB_SEED to public key
memcpy(pk+n, sk+params->index_len+2*n, n);
// Set address to point on the single tree on layer d-1
uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
setLayerADRS(addr, (params->d-1));
// Set up state and compute wots signatures for all but topmost tree root
for (i = 0; i < params->d - 1; i++) {
// Compute seed for OTS key pair
treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr);
setLayerADRS(addr, (i+1));
get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, addr);
wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, pk, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pk+n, addr);
}
treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr);
memcpy(sk+params->index_len+3*n, pk, n);
return 0;
}
/**
* Signs a message.
* Returns
* 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND
* 2. an updated secret key!
*
*/
int xmssmt_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmssmt_params *params)
{
unsigned int n = params->n;
unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h;
unsigned int h = params->h;
unsigned int k = params->xmss_par.k;
unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len;
uint64_t idx_tree;
uint32_t idx_leaf;
uint64_t i, j;
int needswap_upto = -1;
unsigned int updates;
unsigned char sk_seed[n];
unsigned char sk_prf[n];
unsigned char pub_seed[n];
// Init working params
unsigned char R[n];
unsigned char msg_h[n];
unsigned char hash_key[3*n];
unsigned char ots_seed[n];
uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32];
bds_state tmp;
// Extract SK
unsigned long long idx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
idx |= ((unsigned long long)sk[i]) << 8*(idx_len - 1 - i);
}
memcpy(sk_seed, sk+idx_len, n);
memcpy(sk_prf, sk+idx_len+n, n);
memcpy(pub_seed, sk+idx_len+2*n, n);
// Update SK
for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
sk[i] = ((idx + 1) >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255;
}
// -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated.
// -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point!
// ---------------------------------
// Message Hashing
// ---------------------------------
// Message Hash:
// First compute pseudorandom value
to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32);
prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n);
// Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
memcpy(hash_key, R, n);
memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+idx_len+3*n, n);
to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
// Then use it for message digest
h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n);
// Start collecting signature
*sig_msg_len = 0;
// Copy index to signature
for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
sig_msg[i] = (idx >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255;
}
sig_msg += idx_len;
*sig_msg_len += idx_len;
// Copy R to signature
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
sig_msg[i] = R[i];
sig_msg += n;
*sig_msg_len += n;
// ----------------------------------
// Now we start to "really sign"
// ----------------------------------
// Handle lowest layer separately as it is slightly different...
// Prepare Address
setType(ots_addr, 0);
idx_tree = idx >> tree_h;
idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1));
setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0);
setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf);
// Compute seed for OTS key pair
get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr);
// Compute WOTS signature
wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
*sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
memcpy(sig_msg, states[0].auth, tree_h*n);
sig_msg += tree_h*n;
*sig_msg_len += tree_h*n;
// prepare signature of remaining layers
for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) {
// put WOTS signature in place
memcpy(sig_msg, wots_sigs + (i-1)*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize);
sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
*sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
// put AUTH nodes in place
memcpy(sig_msg, states[i].auth, tree_h*n);
sig_msg += tree_h*n;
*sig_msg_len += tree_h*n;
}
updates = (tree_h - k) >> 1;
setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1));
// mandatory update for NEXT_0 (does not count towards h-k/2) if NEXT_0 exists
if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << h)) {
bds_state_update(&states[params->d], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
}
for (i = 0; i < params->d; i++) {
// check if we're not at the end of a tree
if (! (((idx + 1) & ((1ULL << ((i+1)*tree_h)) - 1)) == 0)) {
idx_leaf = (idx >> (tree_h * i)) & ((1 << tree_h)-1);
idx_tree = (idx >> (tree_h * (i+1)));
setLayerADRS(addr, i);
setTreeADRS(addr, idx_tree);
if (i == (unsigned int) (needswap_upto + 1)) {
bds_round(&states[i], idx_leaf, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
}
updates = bds_treehash_update(&states[i], updates, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1));
// if a NEXT-tree exists for this level;
if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << (h - tree_h * i))) {
if (i > 0 && updates > 0 && states[params->d + i].next_leaf < (1ULL << h)) {
bds_state_update(&states[params->d + i], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
updates--;
}
}
}
else if (idx < (1ULL << h) - 1) {
memcpy(&tmp, states+params->d + i, sizeof(bds_state));
memcpy(states+params->d + i, states + i, sizeof(bds_state));
memcpy(states + i, &tmp, sizeof(bds_state));
setLayerADRS(ots_addr, (i+1));
setTreeADRS(ots_addr, ((idx + 1) >> ((i+2) * tree_h)));
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, (((idx >> ((i+1) * tree_h)) + 1) & ((1 << tree_h)-1)));
get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, ots_addr);
wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, states[i].stack, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
states[params->d + i].stackoffset = 0;
states[params->d + i].next_leaf = 0;
updates--; // WOTS-signing counts as one update
needswap_upto = i;
for (j = 0; j < tree_h-k; j++) {
states[i].treehash[j].completed = 1;
}
}
}
//Whipe secret elements?
//zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES);
memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen);
*sig_msg_len += msglen;
return 0;
}
/**
* Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key.
*/
int xmssmt_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmssmt_params *params)
{
unsigned int n = params->n;
unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h;
unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len;
uint64_t idx_tree;
uint32_t idx_leaf;
unsigned long long i, m_len;
unsigned long long idx=0;
unsigned char wots_pk[params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize];
unsigned char pkhash[n];
unsigned char root[n];
unsigned char msg_h[n];
unsigned char hash_key[3*n];
unsigned char pub_seed[n];
memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n);
// Init addresses
uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
// Extract index
for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
idx |= ((unsigned long long)sig_msg[i]) << (8*(idx_len - 1 - i));
}
printf("verify:: idx = %llu\n", idx);
sig_msg += idx_len;
sig_msg_len -= idx_len;
// Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg,n);
memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n);
to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
sig_msg += n;
sig_msg_len -= n;
// hash message (recall, R is now on pole position at sig_msg
unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = (params->d * params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize) + (params->h * n);
m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len;
h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n);
//-----------------------
// Verify signature
//-----------------------
// Prepare Address
idx_tree = idx >> tree_h;
idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1));
setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0);
setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree);
setType(ots_addr, 0);
memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12);
setType(ltree_addr, 1);
memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12);
setType(node_addr, 2);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf);
// Check WOTS signature
wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
// Compute Ltree
setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf);
l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr);
// Compute root
validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr);
sig_msg += tree_h*n;
sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n;
for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) {
// Prepare Address
idx_leaf = (idx_tree & ((1 << tree_h)-1));
idx_tree = idx_tree >> tree_h;
setLayerADRS(ots_addr, i);
setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree);
setType(ots_addr, 0);
memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12);
setType(ltree_addr, 1);
memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12);
setType(node_addr, 2);
setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf);
// Check WOTS signature
wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, root, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
// Compute Ltree
setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf);
l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr);
// Compute root
validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr);
sig_msg += tree_h*n;
sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
if (root[i] != pk[i])
goto fail;
*msglen = sig_msg_len;
for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
msg[i] = sig_msg[i];
return 0;
fail:
*msglen = sig_msg_len;
for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
msg[i] = 0;
*msglen = -1;
return -1;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash.c b/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash.c
index b9eee7cff293..50a577943974 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash.c
@@ -1,140 +1,140 @@
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
hash.c version 20160722
Andreas Hülsing
Joost Rijneveld
Public domain.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include "xmss_hash_address.h"
#include "xmss_commons.h"
#include "xmss_hash.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *, const unsigned int, const unsigned char *,
unsigned int, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, unsigned int);
unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]){
#if IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN==1
int i = 0;
for(i=0;i<8;i++)
to_byte(bytes+i*4, addr[i],4);
return bytes;
#else
memcpy(bytes, addr, 32);
return bytes;
#endif
}
int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *out, const unsigned int type, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, unsigned int n){
unsigned long long i = 0;
unsigned char buf[inlen + n + keylen];
// Input is (toByte(X, 32) || KEY || M)
// set toByte
to_byte(buf, type, n);
for (i=0; i < keylen; i++) {
buf[i+n] = key[i];
}
for (i=0; i < inlen; i++) {
buf[keylen + n + i] = in[i];
}
if (n == 32) {
SHA256(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out);
return 0;
}
else {
if (n == 64) {
SHA512(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/**
* Implements PRF
*/
int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
return core_hash_SHA2(out, 3, key, keylen, in, 32, keylen);
}
/*
* Implemts H_msg
*/
int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n)
{
if (keylen != 3*n){
// H_msg takes 3n-bit keys, but n does not match the keylength of keylen
return -1;
}
return core_hash_SHA2(out, 2, key, keylen, in, inlen, n);
}
/**
* We assume the left half is in in[0]...in[n-1]
*/
int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n)
{
unsigned char buf[2*n];
unsigned char key[n];
unsigned char bitmask[2*n];
unsigned char byte_addr[32];
unsigned int i;
setKeyAndMask(addr, 0);
addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
// Use MSB order
setKeyAndMask(addr, 1);
addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
setKeyAndMask(addr, 2);
addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
prf(bitmask+n, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
for (i = 0; i < 2*n; i++) {
buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
}
return core_hash_SHA2(out, 1, key, n, buf, 2*n, n);
}
int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n)
{
unsigned char buf[n];
unsigned char key[n];
unsigned char bitmask[n];
unsigned char byte_addr[32];
unsigned int i;
setKeyAndMask(addr, 0);
addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
setKeyAndMask(addr, 1);
addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
}
return core_hash_SHA2(out, 0, key, n, buf, n, n);
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash_address.c b/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash_address.c
index c6c1347e9267..2702c4562bfc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash_address.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmss_hash_address.c
@@ -1,66 +1,66 @@
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash_address.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
hash_address.c version 20160722
Andreas Hülsing
Joost Rijneveld
Public domain.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include "xmss_hash_address.h" /* prototypes */
void setLayerADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t layer){
adrs[0] = layer;
}
void setTreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint64_t tree){
adrs[1] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
adrs[2] = (uint32_t) tree;
}
void setType(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t type){
adrs[3] = type;
int i;
for(i = 4; i < 8; i++){
adrs[i] = 0;
}
}
void setKeyAndMask(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t keyAndMask){
adrs[7] = keyAndMask;
}
// OTS
void setOTSADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ots){
adrs[4] = ots;
}
void setChainADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t chain){
adrs[5] = chain;
}
void setHashADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t hash){
adrs[6] = hash;
}
// L-tree
void setLtreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ltree){
adrs[4] = ltree;
}
// Hash Tree & L-tree
void setTreeHeight(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeHeight){
adrs[5] = treeHeight;
}
void setTreeIndex(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeIndex){
adrs[6] = treeIndex;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmss_wots.c b/crypto/openssh/xmss_wots.c
index ed904cd754dd..993e661f6707 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmss_wots.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmss_wots.c
@@ -1,192 +1,192 @@
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
wots.c version 20160722
Andreas Hülsing
Joost Rijneveld
Public domain.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmss_commons.h"
#include "xmss_hash.h"
#include "xmss_wots.h"
#include "xmss_hash_address.h"
/* libm-free version of log2() for wots */
static inline int
wots_log2(uint32_t v)
{
int b;
for (b = sizeof (v) * CHAR_BIT - 1; b >= 0; b--) {
if ((1U << b) & v) {
return b;
}
}
return 0;
}
void
wots_set_params(wots_params *params, int n, int w)
{
params->n = n;
params->w = w;
params->log_w = wots_log2(params->w);
params->len_1 = (CHAR_BIT * n) / params->log_w;
params->len_2 = (wots_log2(params->len_1 * (w - 1)) / params->log_w) + 1;
params->len = params->len_1 + params->len_2;
params->keysize = params->len * params->n;
}
/**
* Helper method for pseudorandom key generation
* Expands an n-byte array into a len*n byte array
* this is done using PRF
*/
static void expand_seed(unsigned char *outseeds, const unsigned char *inseed, const wots_params *params)
{
uint32_t i = 0;
unsigned char ctr[32];
for(i = 0; i < params->len; i++){
to_byte(ctr, i, 32);
prf((outseeds + (i*params->n)), ctr, inseed, params->n);
}
}
/**
* Computes the chaining function.
* out and in have to be n-byte arrays
*
* interprets in as start-th value of the chain
* addr has to contain the address of the chain
*/
static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int start, unsigned int steps, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
{
uint32_t i, j;
for (j = 0; j < params->n; j++)
out[j] = in[j];
for (i = start; i < (start+steps) && i < params->w; i++) {
setHashADRS(addr, i);
hash_f(out, out, pub_seed, addr, params->n);
}
}
/**
* base_w algorithm as described in draft.
*
*
*/
static void base_w(int *output, const int out_len, const unsigned char *input, const wots_params *params)
{
int in = 0;
int out = 0;
uint32_t total = 0;
int bits = 0;
int consumed = 0;
for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
if (bits == 0) {
total = input[in];
in++;
bits += 8;
}
bits -= params->log_w;
output[out] = (total >> bits) & (params->w - 1);
out++;
}
}
void wots_pkgen(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
{
uint32_t i;
expand_seed(pk, sk, params);
for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) {
setChainADRS(addr, i);
gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, pk+i*params->n, 0, params->w-1, params, pub_seed, addr);
}
}
int wots_sign(unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
{
//int basew[params->len];
int csum = 0;
uint32_t i = 0;
int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int));
if (basew == NULL)
return -1;
base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params);
for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) {
csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i];
}
csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8));
int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8;
unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes];
to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes);
int csum_basew[params->len_2];
base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params);
for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) {
basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i];
}
expand_seed(sig, sk, params);
for (i = 0; i < params->len; i++) {
setChainADRS(addr, i);
gen_chain(sig+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, 0, basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr);
}
free(basew);
return 0;
}
int wots_pkFromSig(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
{
int csum = 0;
uint32_t i = 0;
int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int));
if (basew == NULL)
return -1;
base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params);
for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) {
csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i];
}
csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8));
int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8;
unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes];
to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes);
int csum_basew[params->len_2];
base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params);
for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) {
basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i];
}
for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) {
setChainADRS(addr, i);
gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, basew[i], params->w-1-basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr);
}
free(basew);
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c
index 9b30ba935a7b..d066ca253a89 100644
--- a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c
+++ b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c
@@ -1,445 +1,445 @@
/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
* NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
* under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
* DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define PAM_SM_AUTH
#define PAM_SM_SESSION
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/pam_modules.h>
#include <security/openpam.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#define __bounded__(x, y, z)
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#define ssh_add_identity(auth, key, comment) \
- ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0, 0)
+ ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0, 0, NULL)
extern char **environ;
struct pam_ssh_key {
struct sshkey *key;
char *comment;
};
static const char *pam_ssh_prompt = "SSH passphrase: ";
static const char *pam_ssh_have_keys = "pam_ssh_have_keys";
static const char *pam_ssh_keyfiles[] = {
".ssh/id_rsa", /* SSH2 RSA key */
".ssh/id_dsa", /* SSH2 DSA key */
".ssh/id_ecdsa", /* SSH2 ECDSA key */
".ssh/id_ed25519", /* SSH2 Ed25519 key */
NULL
};
static const char *pam_ssh_agent = "/usr/bin/ssh-agent";
static char str_ssh_agent[] = "ssh-agent";
static char str_dash_s[] = "-s";
static char *const pam_ssh_agent_argv[] = { str_ssh_agent, str_dash_s, NULL };
static char *const pam_ssh_agent_envp[] = { NULL };
/*
* Attempts to load a private key from the specified file in the specified
* directory, using the specified passphrase. If successful, returns a
* struct pam_ssh_key containing the key and its comment.
*/
static struct pam_ssh_key *
pam_ssh_load_key(const char *dir, const char *kfn, const char *passphrase,
int nullok)
{
char fn[PATH_MAX];
struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
struct sshkey *key;
char *comment;
int ret;
if (snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s/%s", dir, kfn) > (int)sizeof(fn))
return (NULL);
/*
* If the key is unencrypted, OpenSSL ignores the passphrase, so
* it will seem like the user typed in the right one. This allows
* a user to circumvent nullok by providing a dummy passphrase.
* Verify that the key really *is* encrypted by trying to load it
* with an empty passphrase, and if the key is not encrypted,
* accept only an empty passphrase.
*/
ret = sshkey_load_private(fn, "", &key, &comment);
if (ret == 0 && !(*passphrase == '\0' && nullok)) {
sshkey_free(key);
return (NULL);
}
if (ret != 0)
ret = sshkey_load_private(fn, passphrase, &key, &comment);
if (ret != 0) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed to load key from %s", fn);
return (NULL);
}
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "loaded '%s' from %s", comment, fn);
if ((psk = malloc(sizeof(*psk))) == NULL) {
sshkey_free(key);
free(comment);
return (NULL);
}
psk->key = key;
psk->comment = comment;
return (psk);
}
/*
* Wipes a private key and frees the associated resources.
*/
static void
pam_ssh_free_key(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused,
void *data, int pam_err __unused)
{
struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
psk = data;
sshkey_free(psk->key);
free(psk->comment);
free(psk);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
const char **kfn, *passphrase, *user;
const void *item;
struct passwd *pwd;
struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
int nkeys, nullok, pam_err, pass;
nullok = (openpam_get_option(pamh, "nullok") != NULL);
/* PEM is not loaded by default */
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
/* get user name and home directory */
pam_err = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
pwd = getpwnam(user);
if (pwd == NULL)
return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN);
if (pwd->pw_dir == NULL)
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
nkeys = 0;
pass = (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &item) == PAM_SUCCESS &&
item != NULL);
load_keys:
/* get passphrase */
pam_err = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK,
&passphrase, pam_ssh_prompt);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
/* switch to user credentials */
pam_err = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwd);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
/* try to load keys from all keyfiles we know of */
for (kfn = pam_ssh_keyfiles; *kfn != NULL; ++kfn) {
psk = pam_ssh_load_key(pwd->pw_dir, *kfn, passphrase, nullok);
if (psk != NULL) {
pam_set_data(pamh, *kfn, psk, pam_ssh_free_key);
++nkeys;
}
}
/* switch back to arbitrator credentials */
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
/*
* If we tried an old token and didn't get anything, and
* try_first_pass was specified, try again after prompting the
* user for a new passphrase.
*/
if (nkeys == 0 && pass == 1 &&
openpam_get_option(pamh, "try_first_pass") != NULL) {
pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, NULL);
pass = 0;
goto load_keys;
}
/* no keys? */
if (nkeys == 0)
return (PAM_AUTH_ERR);
pam_set_data(pamh, pam_ssh_have_keys, NULL, NULL);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Parses a line from ssh-agent's output.
*/
static void
pam_ssh_process_agent_output(pam_handle_t *pamh, FILE *f)
{
char *line, *p, *key, *val;
size_t len;
while ((line = fgetln(f, &len)) != NULL) {
if (len < 4 || strncmp(line, "SSH_", 4) != 0)
continue;
/* find equal sign at end of key */
for (p = key = line; p < line + len; ++p)
if (*p == '=')
break;
if (p == line + len || *p != '=')
continue;
*p = '\0';
/* find semicolon at end of value */
for (val = ++p; p < line + len; ++p)
if (*p == ';')
break;
if (p == line + len || *p != ';')
continue;
*p = '\0';
/* store key-value pair in environment */
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "got %s: %s", key, val);
pam_setenv(pamh, key, val, 1);
}
}
/*
* Starts an ssh agent and stores the environment variables derived from
* its output.
*/
static int
pam_ssh_start_agent(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
int agent_pipe[2];
pid_t pid;
FILE *f;
/* get a pipe which we will use to read the agent's output */
if (pipe(agent_pipe) == -1)
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
/* start the agent */
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "starting an ssh agent");
pid = fork();
if (pid == (pid_t)-1) {
/* failed */
close(agent_pipe[0]);
close(agent_pipe[1]);
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
}
if (pid == 0) {
int fd;
/* child: drop privs, close fds and start agent */
setgid(getegid());
setuid(geteuid());
close(STDIN_FILENO);
open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
dup2(agent_pipe[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
dup2(agent_pipe[1], STDERR_FILENO);
for (fd = 3; fd < getdtablesize(); ++fd)
close(fd);
execve(pam_ssh_agent, pam_ssh_agent_argv, pam_ssh_agent_envp);
_exit(127);
}
/* parent */
close(agent_pipe[1]);
if ((f = fdopen(agent_pipe[0], "r")) == NULL)
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
pam_ssh_process_agent_output(pamh, f);
fclose(f);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Adds previously stored keys to a running agent.
*/
static int
pam_ssh_add_keys_to_agent(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
const struct pam_ssh_key *psk;
const char **kfn;
const void *item;
char **envlist, **env;
int fd, pam_err;
/* switch to PAM environment */
envlist = environ;
if ((environ = pam_getenvlist(pamh)) == NULL) {
environ = envlist;
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
}
/* get a connection to the agent */
if (ssh_get_authentication_socket(&fd) != 0) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed to connect to the agent");
pam_err = PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
goto end;
}
/* look for keys to add to it */
for (kfn = pam_ssh_keyfiles; *kfn != NULL; ++kfn) {
pam_err = pam_get_data(pamh, *kfn, &item);
if (pam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && item != NULL) {
psk = item;
if (ssh_add_identity(fd, psk->key, psk->comment) == 0)
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG,
"added %s to ssh agent", psk->comment);
else
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "failed "
"to add %s to ssh agent", psk->comment);
/* we won't need the key again, so wipe it */
pam_set_data(pamh, *kfn, NULL, NULL);
}
}
pam_err = PAM_SUCCESS;
/* disconnect from agent */
ssh_close_authentication_socket(fd);
end:
/* switch back to original environment */
for (env = environ; *env != NULL; ++env)
free(*env);
free(environ);
environ = envlist;
return (pam_err);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *user;
const void *data;
int pam_err;
/* no keys, no work */
if (pam_get_data(pamh, pam_ssh_have_keys, &data) != PAM_SUCCESS &&
openpam_get_option(pamh, "want_agent") == NULL)
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
/* switch to user credentials */
pam_err = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
pwd = getpwnam(user);
if (pwd == NULL)
return (PAM_USER_UNKNOWN);
pam_err = openpam_borrow_cred(pamh, pwd);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
return (pam_err);
/* start the agent */
pam_err = pam_ssh_start_agent(pamh);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
return (pam_err);
}
/* we have an agent, see if we can add any keys to it */
pam_err = pam_ssh_add_keys_to_agent(pamh);
if (pam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
/* XXX ignore failures */
}
openpam_restore_cred(pamh);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_EXTERN int
pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused,
int argc __unused, const char *argv[] __unused)
{
const char *ssh_agent_pid;
char *end;
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((ssh_agent_pid = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AGENT_PID")) == NULL) {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "no ssh agent");
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
pid = (pid_t)strtol(ssh_agent_pid, &end, 10);
if (*ssh_agent_pid == '\0' || *end != '\0') {
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "invalid ssh agent pid");
return (PAM_SESSION_ERR);
}
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_DEBUG, "killing ssh agent %d", (int)pid);
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1 ||
(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1 && errno != ECHILD))
return (PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
}
PAM_MODULE_ENTRY("pam_ssh");
diff --git a/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile b/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile
index bc4319e61746..98ba4ae0a443 100644
--- a/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile
+++ b/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile
@@ -1,60 +1,65 @@
# $FreeBSD$
.include <src.opts.mk>
.include "${SRCTOP}/secure/ssh.mk"
LIB= ssh
PRIVATELIB= true
SHLIB_MAJOR= 5
-SRCS= ssh_api.c ssherr.c sshbuf.c sshkey.c sshbuf-getput-basic.c \
+SRCS= ssh_api.c ssherr.c \
+ sshbuf.c sshkey.c sshbuf-getput-basic.c \
sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c krl.c bitmap.c
SRCS+= authfd.c authfile.c \
canohost.c channels.c cipher.c cipher-aes.c cipher-aesctr.c \
cipher-ctr.c cleanup.c \
- compat.c crc32.c fatal.c hostfile.c \
- log.c match.c moduli.c nchan.c packet.c opacket.c \
- readpass.c ttymodes.c xmalloc.c addrmatch.c \
- atomicio.c dispatch.c mac.c uuencode.c misc.c utf8.c \
- monitor_fdpass.c rijndael.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c dh.c \
+ compat.c fatal.c hostfile.c \
+ log.c match.c moduli.c nchan.c packet.c \
+ readpass.c ttymodes.c xmalloc.c addr.c addrmatch.c \
+ atomicio.c dispatch.c mac.c misc.c utf8.c \
+ monitor_fdpass.c rijndael.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c \
+ ssh-ed25519-sk.c ssh-rsa.c dh.c \
msg.c progressmeter.c dns.c entropy.c umac.c umac128.c \
ssh-pkcs11.c smult_curve25519_ref.c \
- poly1305.c chacha.c cipher-chachapoly.c \
- ssh-ed25519.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c hmac.c \
- sc25519.c ge25519.c fe25519.c ed25519.c verify.c hash.c \
+ poly1305.c chacha.c cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c \
+ ssh-ed25519.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c \
+ hmac.c sc25519.c ge25519.c fe25519.c ed25519.c verify.c hash.c \
kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c kexecdh.c kexc25519.c \
- kexdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhc.c kexc25519c.c \
- kexdhs.c kexgexs.c kexecdhs.c kexc25519s.c \
- platform-pledge.c platform-tracing.c platform-misc.c
+ kexgexc.c kexgexs.c \
+ kexsntrup761x25519.c sntrup761.c kexgen.c \
+ sftp-realpath.c platform-pledge.c platform-tracing.c platform-misc.c \
+ sshbuf-io.c
+SRCS+= ssh-sk-client.c
+
PACKAGE= ssh
# gss-genr.c should be in $SRCS but causes linking problems, so it is
# compiled directly into sshd instead.
# Portability layer
SRCS+= bcrypt_pbkdf.c blowfish.c bsd-misc.c bsd-signal.c explicit_bzero.c \
fmt_scaled.c freezero.c glob.c \
libressl-api-compat.c \
openssl-compat.c port-net.c \
- realpath.c recallocarray.c strtonum.c timingsafe_bcmp.c vis.c xcrypt.c
+ recallocarray.c strtonum.c timingsafe_bcmp.c vis.c xcrypt.c
.if ${MK_LDNS} == "no"
SRCS+= getrrsetbyname.c
.else
LDNSDIR= ${SRCTOP}/contrib/ldns
CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1 -I${LDNSDIR}
SRCS+= getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
LIBADD+= ldns
.endif
.if ${MK_GSSAPI} != "no" && ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -include krb5_config.h
SRCS+= krb5_config.h
.endif
NO_LINT=
LIBADD+= crypto crypt z
.include <bsd.lib.mk>
.PATH: ${SSHDIR} ${SSHDIR}/openbsd-compat
diff --git a/secure/usr.bin/scp/Makefile b/secure/usr.bin/scp/Makefile
index 34caf79cf8bd..c071f5198902 100644
--- a/secure/usr.bin/scp/Makefile
+++ b/secure/usr.bin/scp/Makefile
@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
# $FreeBSD$
.include <src.opts.mk>
.include "${SRCTOP}/secure/ssh.mk"
PROG= scp
-SRCS= scp.c
+SRCS= scp.c sftp-common.c sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c progressmeter.c
PACKAGE= ssh
LIBADD= ssh
.if ${MK_LDNS} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1
#DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS}
#LDADD+= -lldns
.endif
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
.PATH: ${SSHDIR}
diff --git a/secure/usr.bin/ssh-add/Makefile b/secure/usr.bin/ssh-add/Makefile
index 173b46c78e0d..162ea60a29d0 100644
--- a/secure/usr.bin/ssh-add/Makefile
+++ b/secure/usr.bin/ssh-add/Makefile
@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
# $FreeBSD$
.include <src.opts.mk>
.include "${SRCTOP}/secure/ssh.mk"
PROG= ssh-add
-SRCS+= ssh-add.c
+SRCS+= ssh-add.c ssh-sk-client.c
PACKAGE= ssh
LIBADD= ssh
.if ${MK_LDNS} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1
#DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS}
#LDADD+= -lldns
.endif
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
.PATH: ${SSHDIR}
diff --git a/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile b/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile
index e32a6b84302f..b53b645e8576 100644
--- a/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile
+++ b/secure/usr.bin/ssh-keygen/Makefile
@@ -1,20 +1,21 @@
# $FreeBSD$
.include <src.opts.mk>
.include "${SRCTOP}/secure/ssh.mk"
PROG= ssh-keygen
-SRCS= ssh-keygen.c
+# XXX ssh-sk-client.c in libssh maybe?
+SRCS= ssh-keygen.c sshsig.c ssh-sk-client.c
PACKAGE= ssh
LIBADD= ssh
.if ${MK_LDNS} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1
.endif
LIBADD+= crypto
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
.PATH: ${SSHDIR}
diff --git a/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile b/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile
index 66f4fc248d15..a34732f868c7 100644
--- a/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile
+++ b/secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile
@@ -1,73 +1,73 @@
# $FreeBSD$
.include <src.opts.mk>
.include "${SRCTOP}/secure/ssh.mk"
CONFS= moduli sshd_config
CONFSDIR= /etc/ssh
PROG= sshd
SRCS= sshd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-passwd.c \
audit.c audit-bsm.c audit-linux.c platform.c \
sshpty.c sshlogin.c servconf.c serverloop.c \
auth.c auth2.c auth-options.c session.c \
auth2-chall.c groupaccess.c \
auth-bsdauth.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c \
auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c \
monitor.c monitor_wrap.c auth-krb5.c \
auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c gss-serv-krb5.c \
loginrec.c auth-pam.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c md5crypt.c \
- sftp-server.c sftp-common.c \
+ srclimit.c sftp-server.c sftp-common.c \
sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-systrace.c sandbox-darwin.c \
sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-pledge.c \
sandbox-solaris.c uidswap.c
PACKAGE= ssh
# gss-genr.c really belongs in libssh; see src/secure/lib/libssh/Makefile
SRCS+= gss-genr.c
MAN= sshd.8 sshd_config.5
# Don't rebuild based on moduli.c
moduli: .MADE
# pam should always happen before ssh here for static linking
LIBADD= pam ssh util
.if ${MK_LDNS} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -DHAVE_LDNS=1
#DPADD+= ${LIBLDNS}
#LDADD+= -lldns
.endif
.if ${MK_AUDIT} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -DUSE_BSM_AUDIT=1 -DHAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR=1
LIBADD+= bsm
.endif
.if ${MK_BLACKLIST_SUPPORT} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -DUSE_BLACKLIST=1 -I${SRCTOP}/contrib/blacklist/include
SRCS+= blacklist.c
LIBADD+= blacklist
LDFLAGS+=-L${LIBBLACKLISTDIR}
.endif
.if ${MK_GSSAPI} != "no" && ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -include krb5_config.h
SRCS+= krb5_config.h
LIBADD+= gssapi_krb5 gssapi krb5
.endif
.if ${MK_TCP_WRAPPERS} != "no"
CFLAGS+= -DLIBWRAP=1
LIBADD+= wrap
.endif
LIBADD+= crypto
.if defined(LOCALBASE)
CFLAGS+= -DXAUTH_PATH=\"${LOCALBASE}/bin/xauth\"
.endif
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
.PATH: ${SSHDIR}

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Sun, Nov 24, 5:12 PM (1 d, 23 h)
Storage Engine
chunks
Storage Format
Chunks
Storage Handle
DhL_nhrvOGWw
Default Alt Text
(7 MB)

Event Timeline