diff --git a/share/man/man5/pf.conf.5 b/share/man/man5/pf.conf.5 index da55f00293bb..f04b0799741e 100644 --- a/share/man/man5/pf.conf.5 +++ b/share/man/man5/pf.conf.5 @@ -1,3426 +1,3431 @@ .\" $OpenBSD: pf.conf.5,v 1.406 2009/01/31 19:37:12 sobrado Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2002, Daniel Hartmeier .\" All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" .\" - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above .\" copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following .\" disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided .\" with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS .\" "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT .\" LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS .\" FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE .\" COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, .\" BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; .\" LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER .\" CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT .\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN .\" ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE .\" POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd June 6, 2024 +.Dd June 24, 2024 .Dt PF.CONF 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm pf.conf .Nd packet filter configuration file .Sh DESCRIPTION The .Xr pf 4 packet filter modifies, drops or passes packets according to rules or definitions specified in .Nm pf.conf . .Sh STATEMENT ORDER There are eight types of statements in .Nm pf.conf : .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Cm Macros User-defined variables may be defined and used later, simplifying the configuration file. Macros must be defined before they are referenced in .Nm pf.conf . .It Cm Tables Tables provide a mechanism for increasing the performance and flexibility of rules with large numbers of source or destination addresses. .It Cm Options Options tune the behaviour of the packet filtering engine. .It Cm Ethernet Filtering Ethernet filtering provides rule-based blocking or passing of Ethernet packets. .It Cm Traffic Normalization Li (e.g. Em scrub ) Traffic normalization protects internal machines against inconsistencies in Internet protocols and implementations. .It Cm Queueing Queueing provides rule-based bandwidth control. .It Cm Translation Li (Various forms of NAT) Translation rules specify how addresses are to be mapped or redirected to other addresses. .It Cm Packet Filtering Packet filtering provides rule-based blocking or passing of packets. .El .Pp With the exception of .Cm macros and .Cm tables , the types of statements should be grouped and appear in .Nm pf.conf in the order shown above, as this matches the operation of the underlying packet filtering engine. By default .Xr pfctl 8 enforces this order (see .Ar set require-order below). .Pp Comments can be put anywhere in the file using a hash mark .Pq Sq # , and extend to the end of the current line. .Pp Additional configuration files can be included with the .Ic include keyword, for example: .Bd -literal -offset indent include "/etc/pf/sub.filter.conf" .Ed .Sh MACROS Macros can be defined that will later be expanded in context. Macro names must start with a letter, and may contain letters, digits and underscores. Macro names may not be reserved words (for example .Ar pass , .Ar in , .Ar out ) . Macros are not expanded inside quotes. .Pp For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent ext_if = \&"kue0\&" all_ifs = \&"{\&" $ext_if lo0 \&"}\&" pass out on $ext_if from any to any pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 25 .Ed .Sh TABLES Tables are named structures which can hold a collection of addresses and networks. Lookups against tables in .Xr pf 4 are relatively fast, making a single rule with tables much more efficient, in terms of processor usage and memory consumption, than a large number of rules which differ only in IP address (either created explicitly or automatically by rule expansion). .Pp Tables can be used as the source or destination of filter rules, .Ar scrub rules or translation rules such as .Ar nat or .Ar rdr (see below for details on the various rule types). Tables can also be used for the redirect address of .Ar nat and .Ar rdr rules and in the routing options of filter rules, but only for .Ar round-robin pools. .Pp Tables can be defined with any of the following .Xr pfctl 8 mechanisms. As with macros, reserved words may not be used as table names. .Bl -tag -width "manually" .It Ar manually Persistent tables can be manually created with the .Ar add or .Ar replace option of .Xr pfctl 8 , before or after the ruleset has been loaded. .It Pa pf.conf Table definitions can be placed directly in this file, and loaded at the same time as other rules are loaded, atomically. Table definitions inside .Nm pf.conf use the .Ar table statement, and are especially useful to define non-persistent tables. The contents of a pre-existing table defined without a list of addresses to initialize it is not altered when .Nm pf.conf is loaded. A table initialized with the empty list, .Li { } , will be cleared on load. .El .Pp Tables may be defined with the following attributes: .Bl -tag -width persist .It Ar persist The .Ar persist flag forces the kernel to keep the table even when no rules refer to it. If the flag is not set, the kernel will automatically remove the table when the last rule referring to it is flushed. .It Ar const The .Ar const flag prevents the user from altering the contents of the table once it has been created. Without that flag, .Xr pfctl 8 can be used to add or remove addresses from the table at any time, even when running with .Xr securelevel 7 = 2. .It Ar counters The .Ar counters flag enables per-address packet and byte counters which can be displayed with .Xr pfctl 8 . Note that this feature carries significant memory overhead for large tables. .El .Pp For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent table \*(Ltprivate\*(Gt const { 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 } table \*(Ltbadhosts\*(Gt persist block on fxp0 from { \*(Ltprivate\*(Gt, \*(Ltbadhosts\*(Gt } to any .Ed .Pp creates a table called private, to hold RFC 1918 private network blocks, and a table called badhosts, which is initially empty. A filter rule is set up to block all traffic coming from addresses listed in either table. The private table cannot have its contents changed and the badhosts table will exist even when no active filter rules reference it. Addresses may later be added to the badhosts table, so that traffic from these hosts can be blocked by using .Bd -literal -offset indent # pfctl -t badhosts -Tadd 204.92.77.111 .Ed .Pp A table can also be initialized with an address list specified in one or more external files, using the following syntax: .Bd -literal -offset indent table \*(Ltspam\*(Gt persist file \&"/etc/spammers\&" file \&"/etc/openrelays\&" block on fxp0 from \*(Ltspam\*(Gt to any .Ed .Pp The files .Pa /etc/spammers and .Pa /etc/openrelays list IP addresses, one per line. Any lines beginning with a # are treated as comments and ignored. In addition to being specified by IP address, hosts may also be specified by their hostname. When the resolver is called to add a hostname to a table, .Em all resulting IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are placed into the table. IP addresses can also be entered in a table by specifying a valid interface name, a valid interface group or the .Em self keyword, in which case all addresses assigned to the interface(s) will be added to the table. .Sh OPTIONS .Xr pf 4 may be tuned for various situations using the .Ar set command. .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar set timeout .Pp .Bl -tag -width "src.track" -compact .It Ar interval Interval between purging expired states and fragments. .It Ar frag Seconds before an unassembled fragment is expired. .It Ar src.track Length of time to retain a source tracking entry after the last state expires. .El .Pp When a packet matches a stateful connection, the seconds to live for the connection will be updated to that of the .Ar proto.modifier which corresponds to the connection state. Each packet which matches this state will reset the TTL. Tuning these values may improve the performance of the firewall at the risk of dropping valid idle connections. .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar tcp.first The state after the first packet. .It Ar tcp.opening The state before the destination host ever sends a packet. .It Ar tcp.established The fully established state. .It Ar tcp.closing The state after the first FIN has been sent. .It Ar tcp.finwait The state after both FINs have been exchanged and the connection is closed. Some hosts (notably web servers on Solaris) send TCP packets even after closing the connection. Increasing .Ar tcp.finwait (and possibly .Ar tcp.closing ) can prevent blocking of such packets. .It Ar tcp.closed The state after one endpoint sends an RST. .El .Pp SCTP timeout are handled similar to TCP, but with its own set of states: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar sctp.first The state after the first packet. .It Ar sctp.opening The state before the destination host ever sends a packet. .It Ar sctp.established The fully established state. .It Ar sctp.closing The state after the first SHUTDOWN chunk has been sent. .It Ar sctp.closed The state after SHUTDOWN_ACK has been exchanged and the connection is closed. .El .Pp ICMP and UDP are handled in a fashion similar to TCP, but with a much more limited set of states: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar udp.first The state after the first packet. .It Ar udp.single The state if the source host sends more than one packet but the destination host has never sent one back. .It Ar udp.multiple The state if both hosts have sent packets. .It Ar icmp.first The state after the first packet. .It Ar icmp.error The state after an ICMP error came back in response to an ICMP packet. .El .Pp Other protocols are handled similarly to UDP: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar other.first .It Ar other.single .It Ar other.multiple .El .Pp Timeout values can be reduced adaptively as the number of state table entries grows. .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar adaptive.start When the number of state entries exceeds this value, adaptive scaling begins. All timeout values are scaled linearly with factor (adaptive.end - number of states) / (adaptive.end - adaptive.start). .It Ar adaptive.end When reaching this number of state entries, all timeout values become zero, effectively purging all state entries immediately. This value is used to define the scale factor, it should not actually be reached (set a lower state limit, see below). .El .Pp Adaptive timeouts are enabled by default, with an adaptive.start value equal to 60% of the state limit, and an adaptive.end value equal to 120% of the state limit. They can be disabled by setting both adaptive.start and adaptive.end to 0. .Pp The adaptive timeout values can be defined both globally and for each rule. When used on a per-rule basis, the values relate to the number of states created by the rule, otherwise to the total number of states. .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent set timeout tcp.first 120 set timeout tcp.established 86400 set timeout { adaptive.start 6000, adaptive.end 12000 } set limit states 10000 .Ed .Pp With 9000 state table entries, the timeout values are scaled to 50% (tcp.first 60, tcp.established 43200). .It Ar set loginterface Enable collection of packet and byte count statistics for the given interface or interface group. These statistics can be viewed using .Bd -literal -offset indent # pfctl -s info .Ed .Pp In this example .Xr pf 4 collects statistics on the interface named dc0: .Bd -literal -offset indent set loginterface dc0 .Ed .Pp One can disable the loginterface using: .Bd -literal -offset indent set loginterface none .Ed .It Ar set limit Sets hard limits on the memory pools used by the packet filter. See .Xr zone 9 for an explanation of memory pools. .Pp For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent set limit states 20000 .Ed .Pp sets the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used by state table entries (generated by .Ar pass rules which do not specify .Ar no state ) to 20000. Using .Bd -literal -offset indent set limit frags 20000 .Ed .Pp sets the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used for fragment reassembly (generated by the .Ar set reassemble option or .Ar scrub rules) to 20000. Using .Bd -literal -offset indent set limit src-nodes 2000 .Ed .Pp sets the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used for tracking source IP addresses (generated by the .Ar sticky-address and .Ar src.track options) to 2000. Using .Bd -literal -offset indent set limit table-entries 100000 .Ed .Pp sets the limit on the overall number of addresses that can be stored in tables to 100000. .Pp Various limits can be combined on a single line: .Bd -literal -offset indent set limit { states 20000, frags 20000, src-nodes 2000 } .Ed .It Ar set ruleset-optimization .Bl -tag -width xxxxxxxx -compact .It Ar none Disable the ruleset optimizer. .It Ar basic Enable basic ruleset optimization. This is the default behaviour. Basic ruleset optimization does four things to improve the performance of ruleset evaluations: .Pp .Bl -enum -compact .It remove duplicate rules .It remove rules that are a subset of another rule .It combine multiple rules into a table when advantageous .It re-order the rules to improve evaluation performance .El .Pp .It Ar profile Uses the currently loaded ruleset as a feedback profile to tailor the ordering of quick rules to actual network traffic. .El .Pp It is important to note that the ruleset optimizer will modify the ruleset to improve performance. A side effect of the ruleset modification is that per-rule accounting statistics will have different meanings than before. If per-rule accounting is important for billing purposes or whatnot, either the ruleset optimizer should not be used or a label field should be added to all of the accounting rules to act as optimization barriers. .Pp Optimization can also be set as a command-line argument to .Xr pfctl 8 , overriding the settings in .Nm . .It Ar set optimization Optimize state timeouts for one of the following network environments: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar normal A normal network environment. Suitable for almost all networks. .It Ar high-latency A high-latency environment (such as a satellite connection). .It Ar satellite Alias for .Ar high-latency . .It Ar aggressive Aggressively expire connections. This can greatly reduce the memory usage of the firewall at the cost of dropping idle connections early. .It Ar conservative Extremely conservative settings. Avoid dropping legitimate connections at the expense of greater memory utilization (possibly much greater on a busy network) and slightly increased processor utilization. .El .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent set optimization aggressive .Ed .It Ar set reassemble yes | no Op Cm no-df The .Cm reassemble option is used to enable or disable the reassembly of fragmented packets, and can be set to .Cm yes or .Cm no . If .Cm no-df is also specified, fragments with the .Dq dont-fragment bit set are reassembled too, instead of being dropped; the reassembled packet will have the .Dq dont-fragment bit cleared. The default value is .Cm no . .Pp This option is ignored if there are pre-FreeBSD 14 .Cm scrub rules present. .It Ar set block-policy The .Ar block-policy option sets the default behaviour for the packet .Ar block action: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxxxxxx -compact .It Ar drop Packet is silently dropped. .It Ar return A TCP RST is returned for blocked TCP packets, an SCTP ABORT chunk is returned for blocked SCTP packets, an ICMP UNREACHABLE is returned for blocked UDP packets, and all other packets are silently dropped. .El .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent set block-policy return .Ed .It Ar set fail-policy The .Ar fail-policy option sets the behaviour of rules which should pass a packet but were unable to do so. This might happen when a nat or route-to rule uses an empty table as list of targets or if a rule fails to create state or source node. The following .Ar block actions are possible: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxxxxxx -compact .It Ar drop Incoming packet is silently dropped. .It Ar return Incoming packet is dropped and TCP RST is returned for TCP packets, an SCTP ABORT chunk is returned for blocked SCTP packets, an ICMP UNREACHABLE is returned for UDP packets, and no response is sent for other packets. .El .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent set fail-policy return .Ed .It Ar set state-policy The .Ar state-policy option sets the default behaviour for states: .Pp .Bl -tag -width group-bound -compact .It Ar if-bound States are bound to interface. .It Ar floating States can match packets on any interfaces (the default). .El .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent set state-policy if-bound .Ed .It Ar set syncookies never | always | adaptive When .Cm syncookies are active, pf will answer each incoming TCP SYN with a syncookie SYNACK, without allocating any resources. Upon reception of the client's ACK in response to the syncookie SYNACK, pf will evaluate the ruleset and create state if the ruleset permits it, complete the three way handshake with the target host and continue the connection with synproxy in place. This allows pf to be resilient against large synflood attacks which would run the state table against its limits otherwise. Due to the blind answers to every incoming SYN syncookies share the caveats of synproxy, namely seemingly accepting connections that will be dropped later on. .Pp .Bl -tag -width adaptive -compact .It Cm never pf will never send syncookie SYNACKs (the default). .It Cm always pf will always send syncookie SYNACKs. .It Cm adaptive pf will enable syncookie mode when a given percentage of the state table is used up by half-open TCP connections, as in, those that saw the initial SYN but didn't finish the three way handshake. The thresholds for entering and leaving syncookie mode can be specified using .Bd -literal -offset indent set syncookies adaptive (start 25%, end 12%) .Ed .El .It Ar set state-defaults The .Ar state-defaults option sets the state options for states created from rules without an explicit .Ar keep state . For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent set state-defaults no-sync .Ed .It Ar set hostid The 32-bit .Ar hostid identifies this firewall's state table entries to other firewalls in a .Xr pfsync 4 failover cluster. By default the hostid is set to a pseudo-random value, however it may be desirable to manually configure it, for example to more easily identify the source of state table entries. .Bd -literal -offset indent set hostid 1 .Ed .Pp The hostid may be specified in either decimal or hexadecimal. .It Ar set require-order By default .Xr pfctl 8 enforces an ordering of the statement types in the ruleset to: .Em options , .Em normalization , .Em queueing , .Em translation , .Em filtering . Setting this option to .Ar no disables this enforcement. There may be non-trivial and non-obvious implications to an out of order ruleset. Consider carefully before disabling the order enforcement. .It Ar set fingerprints Load fingerprints of known operating systems from the given filename. By default fingerprints of known operating systems are automatically loaded from .Xr pf.os 5 in .Pa /etc but can be overridden via this option. Setting this option may leave a small period of time where the fingerprints referenced by the currently active ruleset are inconsistent until the new ruleset finishes loading. .Pp For example: .Pp .Dl set fingerprints \&"/etc/pf.os.devel\&" .It Ar set skip on Aq Ar ifspec List interfaces for which packets should not be filtered. Packets passing in or out on such interfaces are passed as if pf was disabled, i.e. pf does not process them in any way. This can be useful on loopback and other virtual interfaces, when packet filtering is not desired and can have unexpected effects. For example: .Pp .Dl set skip on lo0 .It Ar set debug Set the debug .Ar level to one of the following: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxxxxxxxxxx -compact .It Ar none Don't generate debug messages. .It Ar urgent Generate debug messages only for serious errors. .It Ar misc Generate debug messages for various errors. .It Ar loud Generate debug messages for common conditions. .El .It Ar set keepcounters Preserve rule counters across rule updates. Usually rule counters are reset to zero on every update of the ruleset. With .Ar keepcounters set pf will attempt to find matching rules between old and new rulesets and preserve the rule counters. .El .Sh ETHERNET FILTERING .Xr pf 4 has the ability to .Ar block and .Ar pass packets based on attributes of their Ethernet (layer 2) header. .Pp For each packet processed by the packet filter, the filter rules are evaluated in sequential order, from first to last. The last matching rule decides what action is taken. If no rule matches the packet, the default action is to pass the packet. .Pp The following actions can be used in the filter: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar block The packet is blocked. Unlike for layer 3 traffic the packet is always silently dropped. .It Ar pass The packet is passed; no state is created for layer 2 traffic. .El .Sh PARAMETERS The rule parameters specify the packets to which a rule applies. A packet always comes in on, or goes out through, one interface. Most parameters are optional. If a parameter is specified, the rule only applies to packets with matching attributes. Certain parameters can be expressed as lists, in which case .Xr pfctl 8 generates all needed rule combinations. .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar in No or Ar out This rule applies to incoming or outgoing packets. If neither .Ar in nor .Ar out are specified, the rule will match packets in both directions. .It Ar quick If a packet matches a rule which has the .Ar quick option set, this rule is considered the last matching rule, and evaluation of subsequent rules is skipped. .It Ar on Aq Ar ifspec This rule applies only to packets coming in on, or going out through, this particular interface or interface group. For more information on interface groups, see the .Ic group keyword in .Xr ifconfig 8 . .It Ar bridge-to Aq interface Packets matching this rule will be sent out of the specified interface without further processing. .It Ar proto Aq Ar protocol This rule applies only to packets of this protocol. Note that Ethernet protocol numbers are different from those used in .Xr ip 4 and .Xr ip6 4 . .It Xo .Ar from Aq Ar source .Ar to Aq Ar dest .Xc This rule applies only to packets with the specified source and destination MAC addresses. .It Xo Ar queue Aq Ar queue .Xc Packets matching this rule will be assigned to the specified queue. See .Sx QUEUEING for setup details. .Pp .It Ar tag Aq Ar string Packets matching this rule will be tagged with the specified string. The tag acts as an internal marker that can be used to identify these packets later on. This can be used, for example, to provide trust between interfaces and to determine if packets have been processed by translation rules. Tags are .Qq sticky , meaning that the packet will be tagged even if the rule is not the last matching rule. Further matching rules can replace the tag with a new one but will not remove a previously applied tag. A packet is only ever assigned one tag at a time. .It Ar tagged Aq Ar string Used to specify that packets must already be tagged with the given tag in order to match the rule. Inverse tag matching can also be done by specifying the ! operator before the tagged keyword. .El .Sh TRAFFIC NORMALIZATION Traffic normalization is a broad umbrella term for aspects of the packet filter which deal with verifying packets, packet fragments, spoofed traffic, and other irregularities. .Ss Scrub Scrub involves sanitising packet content in such a way that there are no ambiguities in packet interpretation on the receiving side. It is invoked with the .Cm scrub option, added to filter rules. .Pp Parameters are specified enclosed in parentheses. At least one of the following parameters must be specified: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar no-df Clears the .Ar dont-fragment bit from a matching IP packet. Some operating systems are known to generate fragmented packets with the .Ar dont-fragment bit set. This is particularly true with NFS. .Ar Scrub will drop such fragmented .Ar dont-fragment packets unless .Ar no-df is specified. .Pp Unfortunately some operating systems also generate their .Ar dont-fragment packets with a zero IP identification field. Clearing the .Ar dont-fragment bit on packets with a zero IP ID may cause deleterious results if an upstream router later fragments the packet. Using the .Ar random-id modifier (see below) is recommended in combination with the .Ar no-df modifier to ensure unique IP identifiers. .It Ar min-ttl Aq Ar number Enforces a minimum TTL for matching IP packets. .It Ar max-mss Aq Ar number Enforces a maximum MSS for matching TCP packets. .It Xo Ar set-tos Aq Ar string .No \*(Ba Aq Ar number .Xc Enforces a .Em TOS for matching IP packets. .Em TOS may be given as one of .Ar critical , .Ar inetcontrol , .Ar lowdelay , .Ar netcontrol , .Ar throughput , .Ar reliability , or one of the DiffServ Code Points: .Ar ef , .Ar va , .Ar af11 No ... Ar af43 , .Ar cs0 No ... Ar cs7 ; or as either hex or decimal. .It Ar random-id Replaces the IP identification field with random values to compensate for predictable values generated by many hosts. This option only applies to packets that are not fragmented after the optional fragment reassembly. .It Ar reassemble tcp Statefully normalizes TCP connections. .Ar reassemble tcp performs the following normalizations: .Pp .Bl -tag -width timeout -compact .It ttl Neither side of the connection is allowed to reduce their IP TTL. An attacker may send a packet such that it reaches the firewall, affects the firewall state, and expires before reaching the destination host. .Ar reassemble tcp will raise the TTL of all packets back up to the highest value seen on the connection. .It timestamp modulation Modern TCP stacks will send a timestamp on every TCP packet and echo the other endpoint's timestamp back to them. Many operating systems will merely start the timestamp at zero when first booted, and increment it several times a second. The uptime of the host can be deduced by reading the timestamp and multiplying by a constant. Also observing several different timestamps can be used to count hosts behind a NAT device. And spoofing TCP packets into a connection requires knowing or guessing valid timestamps. Timestamps merely need to be monotonically increasing and not derived off a guessable base time. .Ar reassemble tcp will cause .Ar scrub to modulate the TCP timestamps with a random number. .It extended PAWS checks There is a problem with TCP on long fat pipes, in that a packet might get delayed for longer than it takes the connection to wrap its 32-bit sequence space. In such an occurrence, the old packet would be indistinguishable from a new packet and would be accepted as such. The solution to this is called PAWS: Protection Against Wrapped Sequence numbers. It protects against it by making sure the timestamp on each packet does not go backwards. .Ar reassemble tcp also makes sure the timestamp on the packet does not go forward more than the RFC allows. By doing this, .Xr pf 4 artificially extends the security of TCP sequence numbers by 10 to 18 bits when the host uses appropriately randomized timestamps, since a blind attacker would have to guess the timestamp as well. .El .El .Pp For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent match in all scrub (no-df random-id max-mss 1440) .Ed .Ss Scrub ruleset (pre-FreeBSD 14) In order to maintain compatibility with older releases of FreeBSD .Ar scrub rules can also be specified in their own ruleset. In such case they are invoked with the .Ar scrub directive. If there are such rules present they determine packet reassembly behaviour. When no such rules are present the option .Ar set reassembly takes precedence. The .Ar scrub rules can take all parameters specified above for a .Ar scrub option of filter rules and 2 more parameters controlling fragment reassembly: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar fragment reassemble Using .Ar scrub rules, fragments can be reassembled by normalization. In this case, fragments are buffered until they form a complete packet, and only the completed packet is passed on to the filter. The advantage is that filter rules have to deal only with complete packets, and can ignore fragments. The drawback of caching fragments is the additional memory cost. This is the default behaviour unless no fragment reassemble is specified. .It Ar no fragment reassemble Do not reassemble fragments. .El .Pp For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent scrub in on $ext_if all fragment reassemble .Ed .Pp The .Ar no option prefixed to a scrub rule causes matching packets to remain unscrubbed, much in the same way as .Ar drop quick works in the packet filter (see below). This mechanism should be used when it is necessary to exclude specific packets from broader scrub rules. .Pp .Ar scrub rules in the .Ar scrub ruleset are evaluated for every packet before stateful filtering. This means excessive usage of them will cause performance penalty. .Ar scrub reassemble tcp rules must not have the direction (in/out) specified. .Sh QUEUEING with ALTQ The ALTQ system is currently not available in the GENERIC kernel nor as loadable modules. In order to use the herein after called queueing options one has to use a custom built kernel. Please refer to .Xr altq 4 to learn about the related kernel options. .Pp Packets can be assigned to queues for the purpose of bandwidth control. At least two declarations are required to configure queues, and later any packet filtering rule can reference the defined queues by name. During the filtering component of .Nm pf.conf , the last referenced .Ar queue name is where any packets from .Ar pass rules will be queued, while for .Ar block rules it specifies where any resulting ICMP or TCP RST packets should be queued. The .Ar scheduler defines the algorithm used to decide which packets get delayed, dropped, or sent out immediately. There are three .Ar schedulers currently supported. .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar cbq Class Based Queueing. .Ar Queues attached to an interface build a tree, thus each .Ar queue can have further child .Ar queues . Each queue can have a .Ar priority and a .Ar bandwidth assigned. .Ar Priority mainly controls the time packets take to get sent out, while .Ar bandwidth has primarily effects on throughput. .Ar cbq achieves both partitioning and sharing of link bandwidth by hierarchically structured classes. Each class has its own .Ar queue and is assigned its share of .Ar bandwidth . A child class can borrow bandwidth from its parent class as long as excess bandwidth is available (see the option .Ar borrow , below). .It Ar priq Priority Queueing. .Ar Queues are flat attached to the interface, thus, .Ar queues cannot have further child .Ar queues . Each .Ar queue has a unique .Ar priority assigned, ranging from 0 to 15. Packets in the .Ar queue with the highest .Ar priority are processed first. .It Ar hfsc Hierarchical Fair Service Curve. .Ar Queues attached to an interface build a tree, thus each .Ar queue can have further child .Ar queues . Each queue can have a .Ar priority and a .Ar bandwidth assigned. .Ar Priority mainly controls the time packets take to get sent out, while .Ar bandwidth primarily affects throughput. .Ar hfsc supports both link-sharing and guaranteed real-time services. It employs a service curve based QoS model, and its unique feature is an ability to decouple .Ar delay and .Ar bandwidth allocation. .El .Pp The interfaces on which queueing should be activated are declared using the .Ar altq on declaration. .Ar altq on has the following keywords: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Aq Ar interface Queueing is enabled on the named interface. .It Aq Ar scheduler Specifies which queueing scheduler to use. Currently supported values are .Ar cbq for Class Based Queueing, .Ar priq for Priority Queueing and .Ar hfsc for the Hierarchical Fair Service Curve scheduler. .It Ar bandwidth Aq Ar bw The maximum bitrate for all queues on an interface may be specified using the .Ar bandwidth keyword. The value can be specified as an absolute value or as a percentage of the interface bandwidth. When using an absolute value, the suffixes .Ar b , .Ar Kb , .Ar Mb , and .Ar Gb are used to represent bits, kilobits, megabits, and gigabits per second, respectively. The value must not exceed the interface bandwidth. If .Ar bandwidth is not specified, the interface bandwidth is used (but take note that some interfaces do not know their bandwidth, or can adapt their bandwidth rates). .It Ar qlimit Aq Ar limit The maximum number of packets held in the queue. The default is 50. .It Ar tbrsize Aq Ar size Adjusts the size, in bytes, of the token bucket regulator. If not specified, heuristics based on the interface bandwidth are used to determine the size. .It Ar queue Aq Ar list Defines a list of subqueues to create on an interface. .El .Pp In the following example, the interface dc0 should queue up to 5Mbps in four second-level queues using Class Based Queueing. Those four queues will be shown in a later example. .Bd -literal -offset indent altq on dc0 cbq bandwidth 5Mb queue { std, http, mail, ssh } .Ed .Pp Once interfaces are activated for queueing using the .Ar altq directive, a sequence of .Ar queue directives may be defined. The name associated with a .Ar queue must match a queue defined in the .Ar altq directive (e.g. mail), or, except for the .Ar priq .Ar scheduler , in a parent .Ar queue declaration. The following keywords can be used: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar on Aq Ar interface Specifies the interface the queue operates on. If not given, it operates on all matching interfaces. .It Ar bandwidth Aq Ar bw Specifies the maximum bitrate to be processed by the queue. This value must not exceed the value of the parent .Ar queue and can be specified as an absolute value or a percentage of the parent queue's bandwidth. If not specified, defaults to 100% of the parent queue's bandwidth. The .Ar priq scheduler does not support bandwidth specification. .It Ar priority Aq Ar level Between queues a priority level can be set. For .Ar cbq and .Ar hfsc , the range is 0 to 7 and for .Ar priq , the range is 0 to 15. The default for all is 1. .Ar Priq queues with a higher priority are always served first. .Ar Cbq and .Ar Hfsc queues with a higher priority are preferred in the case of overload. .It Ar qlimit Aq Ar limit The maximum number of packets held in the queue. The default is 50. .El .Pp The .Ar scheduler can get additional parameters with .Xo Aq Ar scheduler .Pf ( Aq Ar parameters ) . .Xc Parameters are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Fl .It Ar default Packets not matched by another queue are assigned to this one. Exactly one default queue is required. .It Ar red Enable RED (Random Early Detection) on this queue. RED drops packets with a probability proportional to the average queue length. .It Ar rio Enables RIO on this queue. RIO is RED with IN/OUT, thus running RED two times more than RIO would achieve the same effect. RIO is currently not supported in the GENERIC kernel. .It Ar ecn Enables ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) on this queue. ECN implies RED. .El .Pp The .Ar cbq .Ar scheduler supports an additional option: .Bl -tag -width Fl .It Ar borrow The queue can borrow bandwidth from the parent. .El .Pp The .Ar hfsc .Ar scheduler supports some additional options: .Bl -tag -width Fl .It Ar realtime Aq Ar sc The minimum required bandwidth for the queue. .It Ar upperlimit Aq Ar sc The maximum allowed bandwidth for the queue. .It Ar linkshare Aq Ar sc The bandwidth share of a backlogged queue. .El .Pp .Aq Ar sc is an acronym for .Ar service curve . .Pp The format for service curve specifications is .Ar ( m1 , d , m2 ) . .Ar m2 controls the bandwidth assigned to the queue. .Ar m1 and .Ar d are optional and can be used to control the initial bandwidth assignment. For the first .Ar d milliseconds the queue gets the bandwidth given as .Ar m1 , afterwards the value given in .Ar m2 . .Pp Furthermore, with .Ar cbq and .Ar hfsc , child queues can be specified as in an .Ar altq declaration, thus building a tree of queues using a part of their parent's bandwidth. .Pp Packets can be assigned to queues based on filter rules by using the .Ar queue keyword. Normally only one .Ar queue is specified; when a second one is specified it will instead be used for packets which have a .Em TOS of .Em lowdelay and for TCP ACKs with no data payload. .Pp To continue the previous example, the examples below would specify the four referenced queues, plus a few child queues. Interactive .Xr ssh 1 sessions get priority over bulk transfers like .Xr scp 1 and .Xr sftp 1 . The queues may then be referenced by filtering rules (see .Sx PACKET FILTERING below). .Bd -literal queue std bandwidth 10% cbq(default) queue http bandwidth 60% priority 2 cbq(borrow red) \e { employees, developers } queue developers bandwidth 75% cbq(borrow) queue employees bandwidth 15% queue mail bandwidth 10% priority 0 cbq(borrow ecn) queue ssh bandwidth 20% cbq(borrow) { ssh_interactive, ssh_bulk } queue ssh_interactive bandwidth 50% priority 7 cbq(borrow) queue ssh_bulk bandwidth 50% priority 0 cbq(borrow) block return out on dc0 inet all queue std pass out on dc0 inet proto tcp from $developerhosts to any port 80 \e queue developers pass out on dc0 inet proto tcp from $employeehosts to any port 80 \e queue employees pass out on dc0 inet proto tcp from any to any port 22 \e queue(ssh_bulk, ssh_interactive) pass out on dc0 inet proto tcp from any to any port 25 \e queue mail .Ed .Sh QUEUEING with dummynet Queueing can also be done with .Xr dummynet 4 . Queues and pipes can be created with .Xr dnctl 8 . .Pp Packets can be assigned to queues and pipes using .Ar dnqueue and .Ar dnpipe respectively. .Pp Both .Ar dnqueue and .Ar dnpipe take either a single pipe or queue number or two numbers as arguments. The first pipe or queue number will be used to shape the traffic in the rule direction, the second will be used to shape the traffic in the reverse direction. If the rule does not specify a direction the first packet to create state will be shaped according to the first number, and the response traffic according to the second. .Pp If the .Xr dummynet 4 module is not loaded any traffic sent into a queue or pipe will be dropped. .Sh TRANSLATION Translation rules modify either the source or destination address of the packets associated with a stateful connection. A stateful connection is automatically created to track packets matching such a rule as long as they are not blocked by the filtering section of .Nm pf.conf . The translation engine modifies the specified address and/or port in the packet, recalculates IP, TCP and UDP checksums as necessary, and passes it to the packet filter for evaluation. .Pp Since translation occurs before filtering the filter engine will see packets as they look after any addresses and ports have been translated. Filter rules will therefore have to filter based on the translated address and port number. Packets that match a translation rule are only automatically passed if the .Ar pass modifier is given, otherwise they are still subject to .Ar block and .Ar pass rules. .Pp The state entry created permits .Xr pf 4 to keep track of the original address for traffic associated with that state and correctly direct return traffic for that connection. .Pp Various types of translation are possible with pf: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar binat A .Ar binat rule specifies a bidirectional mapping between an external IP netblock and an internal IP netblock. .It Ar nat A .Ar nat rule specifies that IP addresses are to be changed as the packet traverses the given interface. This technique allows one or more IP addresses on the translating host to support network traffic for a larger range of machines on an "inside" network. Although in theory any IP address can be used on the inside, it is strongly recommended that one of the address ranges defined by RFC 1918 be used. These netblocks are: .Bd -literal 10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255 (all of net 10, i.e., 10/8) 172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255 (i.e., 172.16/12) 192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255 (i.e., 192.168/16) .Ed .It Pa rdr The packet is redirected to another destination and possibly a different port. .Ar rdr rules can optionally specify port ranges instead of single ports. rdr ... port 2000:2999 -\*(Gt ... port 4000 redirects ports 2000 to 2999 (inclusive) to port 4000. rdr ... port 2000:2999 -\*(Gt ... port 4000:* redirects port 2000 to 4000, 2001 to 4001, ..., 2999 to 4999. .El .Pp In addition to modifying the address, some translation rules may modify source or destination ports for .Xr tcp 4 or .Xr udp 4 connections; implicitly in the case of .Ar nat -rules and explicitly in the case of +rules and both implicitly and explicitly in the case of .Ar rdr rules. +A +.Ar rdr +rule may cause the source port to be modified if doing so avoids a conflict +with an existing connection. +A random source port in the range 50001-65535 is chosen in this case. Port numbers are never translated with a .Ar binat rule. .Pp Evaluation order of the translation rules is dependent on the type of the translation rules and of the direction of a packet. .Ar binat rules are always evaluated first. Then either the .Ar rdr rules are evaluated on an inbound packet or the .Ar nat rules on an outbound packet. Rules of the same type are evaluated in the same order in which they appear in the ruleset. The first matching rule decides what action is taken. .Pp The .Ar no option prefixed to a translation rule causes packets to remain untranslated, much in the same way as .Ar drop quick works in the packet filter (see below). If no rule matches the packet it is passed to the filter engine unmodified. .Pp Translation rules apply only to packets that pass through the specified interface, and if no interface is specified, translation is applied to packets on all interfaces. For instance, redirecting port 80 on an external interface to an internal web server will only work for connections originating from the outside. Connections to the address of the external interface from local hosts will not be redirected, since such packets do not actually pass through the external interface. Redirections cannot reflect packets back through the interface they arrive on, they can only be redirected to hosts connected to different interfaces or to the firewall itself. .Pp Note that redirecting external incoming connections to the loopback address, as in .Bd -literal -offset indent rdr on ne3 inet proto tcp to port smtp -\*(Gt 127.0.0.1 port spamd .Ed .Pp will effectively allow an external host to connect to daemons bound solely to the loopback address, circumventing the traditional blocking of such connections on a real interface. Unless this effect is desired, any of the local non-loopback addresses should be used as redirection target instead, which allows external connections only to daemons bound to this address or not bound to any address. .Pp See .Sx TRANSLATION EXAMPLES below. .Sh PACKET FILTERING .Xr pf 4 has the ability to .Ar block , .Ar pass and .Ar match packets based on attributes of their layer 3 (see .Xr ip 4 and .Xr ip6 4 ) and layer 4 (see .Xr icmp 4 , .Xr icmp6 4 , .Xr tcp 4 , .Xr sctp 4 , .Xr udp 4 ) headers. In addition, packets may also be assigned to queues for the purpose of bandwidth control. .Pp For each packet processed by the packet filter, the filter rules are evaluated in sequential order, from first to last. For .Ar block and .Ar pass , the last matching rule decides what action is taken. For .Ar match , rules are evaluated every time they match; the pass/block state of a packet remains unchanged. If no rule matches the packet, the default action is to pass the packet. .Pp The following actions can be used in the filter: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar block The packet is blocked. There are a number of ways in which a .Ar block rule can behave when blocking a packet. The default behaviour is to .Ar drop packets silently, however this can be overridden or made explicit either globally, by setting the .Ar block-policy option, or on a per-rule basis with one of the following options: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar drop The packet is silently dropped. .It Ar return-rst This applies only to .Xr tcp 4 packets, and issues a TCP RST which closes the connection. .It Ar return-icmp .It Ar return-icmp6 This causes ICMP messages to be returned for packets which match the rule. By default this is an ICMP UNREACHABLE message, however this can be overridden by specifying a message as a code or number. .It Ar return This causes a TCP RST to be returned for .Xr tcp 4 packets, an SCTP ABORT for SCTP and an ICMP UNREACHABLE for UDP and other packets. .El .Pp Options returning ICMP packets currently have no effect if .Xr pf 4 operates on a .Xr if_bridge 4 , as the code to support this feature has not yet been implemented. .Pp The simplest mechanism to block everything by default and only pass packets that match explicit rules is specify a first filter rule of: .Bd -literal -offset indent block all .Ed .It Ar match The packet is matched. This mechanism is used to provide fine grained filtering without altering the block/pass state of a packet. .Ar match rules differ from .Ar block and .Ar pass rules in that parameters are set for every rule a packet matches, not only on the last matching rule. For the following parameters, this means that the parameter effectively becomes "sticky" until explicitly overridden: .Ar queue , .Ar dnpipe , .Ar dnqueue , .Ar rtable , .Ar scrub . .It Ar pass The packet is passed; state is created unless the .Ar no state option is specified. .El .Pp By default .Xr pf 4 filters packets statefully; the first time a packet matches a .Ar pass rule, a state entry is created; for subsequent packets the filter checks whether the packet matches any state. If it does, the packet is passed without evaluation of any rules. After the connection is closed or times out, the state entry is automatically removed. .Pp This has several advantages. For TCP connections, comparing a packet to a state involves checking its sequence numbers, as well as TCP timestamps if a .Ar scrub reassemble tcp rule applies to the connection. If these values are outside the narrow windows of expected values, the packet is dropped. This prevents spoofing attacks, such as when an attacker sends packets with a fake source address/port but does not know the connection's sequence numbers. Similarly, .Xr pf 4 knows how to match ICMP replies to states. For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent pass out inet proto icmp all icmp-type echoreq .Ed .Pp allows echo requests (such as those created by .Xr ping 8 ) out statefully, and matches incoming echo replies correctly to states. .Pp Also, looking up states is usually faster than evaluating rules. If there are 50 rules, all of them are evaluated sequentially in O(n). Even with 50000 states, only 16 comparisons are needed to match a state, since states are stored in a binary search tree that allows searches in O(log2 n). .Pp Furthermore, correct handling of ICMP error messages is critical to many protocols, particularly TCP. .Xr pf 4 matches ICMP error messages to the correct connection, checks them against connection parameters, and passes them if appropriate. For example if an ICMP source quench message referring to a stateful TCP connection arrives, it will be matched to the state and get passed. .Pp Finally, state tracking is required for .Ar nat , binat No and Ar rdr rules, in order to track address and port translations and reverse the translation on returning packets. .Pp .Xr pf 4 will also create state for other protocols which are effectively stateless by nature. UDP packets are matched to states using only host addresses and ports, and other protocols are matched to states using only the host addresses. .Pp If stateless filtering of individual packets is desired, the .Ar no state keyword can be used to specify that state will not be created if this is the last matching rule. A number of parameters can also be set to affect how .Xr pf 4 handles state tracking. See .Sx STATEFUL TRACKING OPTIONS below for further details. .Sh PARAMETERS The rule parameters specify the packets to which a rule applies. A packet always comes in on, or goes out through, one interface. Most parameters are optional. If a parameter is specified, the rule only applies to packets with matching attributes. Certain parameters can be expressed as lists, in which case .Xr pfctl 8 generates all needed rule combinations. .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar in No or Ar out This rule applies to incoming or outgoing packets. If neither .Ar in nor .Ar out are specified, the rule will match packets in both directions. .It Ar log In addition to the action specified, a log message is generated. Only the packet that establishes the state is logged, unless the .Ar no state option is specified. The logged packets are sent to a .Xr pflog 4 interface, by default .Ar pflog0 . This interface is monitored by the .Xr pflogd 8 logging daemon, which dumps the logged packets to the file .Pa /var/log/pflog in .Xr pcap 3 binary format. .It Ar log (all) Used to force logging of all packets for a connection. This is not necessary when .Ar no state is explicitly specified. As with .Ar log , packets are logged to .Xr pflog 4 . .It Ar log (user) Logs the .Ux user ID of the user that owns the socket and the PID of the process that has the socket open where the packet is sourced from or destined to (depending on which socket is local). This is in addition to the normal information logged. .Pp Only the first packet logged via .Ar log (all, user) will have the user credentials logged when using stateful matching. .It Ar log (to Aq Ar interface ) Send logs to the specified .Xr pflog 4 interface instead of .Ar pflog0 . .It Ar quick If a packet matches a rule which has the .Ar quick option set, this rule is considered the last matching rule, and evaluation of subsequent rules is skipped. .It Ar on Aq Ar interface This rule applies only to packets coming in on, or going out through, this particular interface or interface group. For more information on interface groups, see the .Ic group keyword in .Xr ifconfig 8 . .It Aq Ar af This rule applies only to packets of this address family. Supported values are .Ar inet and .Ar inet6 . .It Ar proto Aq Ar protocol This rule applies only to packets of this protocol. Common protocols are .Xr icmp 4 , .Xr icmp6 4 , .Xr tcp 4 , .Xr sctp 4 , and .Xr udp 4 . For a list of all the protocol name to number mappings used by .Xr pfctl 8 , see the file .Pa /etc/protocols . .It Xo .Ar from Aq Ar source .Ar port Aq Ar source .Ar os Aq Ar source .Ar to Aq Ar dest .Ar port Aq Ar dest .Xc This rule applies only to packets with the specified source and destination addresses and ports. .Pp Addresses can be specified in CIDR notation (matching netblocks), as symbolic host names, interface names or interface group names, or as any of the following keywords: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxxxxxxxxxxxx -compact .It Ar any Any address. .It Ar no-route Any address which is not currently routable. .It Ar urpf-failed Any source address that fails a unicast reverse path forwarding (URPF) check, i.e. packets coming in on an interface other than that which holds the route back to the packet's source address. .It Aq Ar table Any address that matches the given table. .El .Pp Ranges of addresses are specified by using the .Sq - operator. For instance: .Dq 10.1.1.10 - 10.1.1.12 means all addresses from 10.1.1.10 to 10.1.1.12, hence addresses 10.1.1.10, 10.1.1.11, and 10.1.1.12. .Pp Interface names and interface group names can have modifiers appended: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxxxxxxxxxx -compact .It Ar :network Translates to the network(s) attached to the interface. .It Ar :broadcast Translates to the interface's broadcast address(es). .It Ar :peer Translates to the point-to-point interface's peer address(es). .It Ar :0 Do not include interface aliases. .El .Pp Host names may also have the .Ar :0 option appended to restrict the name resolution to the first of each v4 and non-link-local v6 address found. .Pp Host name resolution and interface to address translation are done at ruleset load-time. When the address of an interface (or host name) changes (under DHCP or PPP, for instance), the ruleset must be reloaded for the change to be reflected in the kernel. Surrounding the interface name (and optional modifiers) in parentheses changes this behaviour. When the interface name is surrounded by parentheses, the rule is automatically updated whenever the interface changes its address. The ruleset does not need to be reloaded. This is especially useful with .Ar nat . .Pp Ports can be specified either by number or by name. For example, port 80 can be specified as .Em www . For a list of all port name to number mappings used by .Xr pfctl 8 , see the file .Pa /etc/services . .Pp Ports and ranges of ports are specified by using these operators: .Bd -literal -offset indent = (equal) != (unequal) \*(Lt (less than) \*(Le (less than or equal) \*(Gt (greater than) \*(Ge (greater than or equal) : (range including boundaries) \*(Gt\*(Lt (range excluding boundaries) \*(Lt\*(Gt (except range) .Ed .Pp .Sq \*(Gt\*(Lt , .Sq \*(Lt\*(Gt and .Sq \&: are binary operators (they take two arguments). For instance: .Bl -tag -width Fl .It Ar port 2000:2004 means .Sq all ports \*(Ge 2000 and \*(Le 2004 , hence ports 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. .It Ar port 2000 \*(Gt\*(Lt 2004 means .Sq all ports \*(Gt 2000 and \*(Lt 2004 , hence ports 2001, 2002 and 2003. .It Ar port 2000 \*(Lt\*(Gt 2004 means .Sq all ports \*(Lt 2000 or \*(Gt 2004 , hence ports 1-1999 and 2005-65535. .El .Pp The operating system of the source host can be specified in the case of TCP rules with the .Ar OS modifier. See the .Sx OPERATING SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING section for more information. .Pp The host, port and OS specifications are optional, as in the following examples: .Bd -literal -offset indent pass in all pass in from any to any pass in proto tcp from any port \*(Le 1024 to any pass in proto tcp from any to any port 25 pass in proto tcp from 10.0.0.0/8 port \*(Gt 1024 \e to ! 10.1.2.3 port != ssh pass in proto tcp from any os "OpenBSD" .Ed .It Ar all This is equivalent to "from any to any". .It Ar group Aq Ar group Similar to .Ar user , this rule only applies to packets of sockets owned by the specified group. .It Ar user Aq Ar user This rule only applies to packets of sockets owned by the specified user. For outgoing connections initiated from the firewall, this is the user that opened the connection. For incoming connections to the firewall itself, this is the user that listens on the destination port. For forwarded connections, where the firewall is not a connection endpoint, the user and group are .Em unknown . .Pp All packets, both outgoing and incoming, of one connection are associated with the same user and group. Only TCP and UDP packets can be associated with users; for other protocols these parameters are ignored. .Pp User and group refer to the effective (as opposed to the real) IDs, in case the socket is created by a setuid/setgid process. User and group IDs are stored when a socket is created; when a process creates a listening socket as root (for instance, by binding to a privileged port) and subsequently changes to another user ID (to drop privileges), the credentials will remain root. .Pp User and group IDs can be specified as either numbers or names. The syntax is similar to the one for ports. The value .Em unknown matches packets of forwarded connections. .Em unknown can only be used with the operators .Cm = and .Cm != . Other constructs like .Cm user \*(Ge unknown are invalid. Forwarded packets with unknown user and group ID match only rules that explicitly compare against .Em unknown with the operators .Cm = or .Cm != . For instance .Cm user \*(Ge 0 does not match forwarded packets. The following example allows only selected users to open outgoing connections: .Bd -literal -offset indent block out proto { tcp, udp } all pass out proto { tcp, udp } all user { \*(Lt 1000, dhartmei } .Ed .It Xo Ar flags Aq Ar a .Pf / Ns Aq Ar b .No \*(Ba / Ns Aq Ar b .No \*(Ba any .Xc This rule only applies to TCP packets that have the flags .Aq Ar a set out of set .Aq Ar b . Flags not specified in .Aq Ar b are ignored. For stateful connections, the default is .Ar flags S/SA . To indicate that flags should not be checked at all, specify .Ar flags any . The flags are: (F)IN, (S)YN, (R)ST, (P)USH, (A)CK, (U)RG, (E)CE, and C(W)R. .Bl -tag -width Fl .It Ar flags S/S Flag SYN is set. The other flags are ignored. .It Ar flags S/SA This is the default setting for stateful connections. Out of SYN and ACK, exactly SYN may be set. SYN, SYN+PSH and SYN+RST match, but SYN+ACK, ACK and ACK+RST do not. This is more restrictive than the previous example. .It Ar flags /SFRA If the first set is not specified, it defaults to none. All of SYN, FIN, RST and ACK must be unset. .El .Pp Because .Ar flags S/SA is applied by default (unless .Ar no state is specified), only the initial SYN packet of a TCP handshake will create a state for a TCP connection. It is possible to be less restrictive, and allow state creation from intermediate .Pq non-SYN packets, by specifying .Ar flags any . This will cause .Xr pf 4 to synchronize to existing connections, for instance if one flushes the state table. However, states created from such intermediate packets may be missing connection details such as the TCP window scaling factor. States which modify the packet flow, such as those affected by .Ar nat , binat No or Ar rdr rules, .Ar modulate No or Ar synproxy state options, or scrubbed with .Ar reassemble tcp will also not be recoverable from intermediate packets. Such connections will stall and time out. .It Xo Ar icmp-type Aq Ar type .Ar code Aq Ar code .Xc .It Xo Ar icmp6-type Aq Ar type .Ar code Aq Ar code .Xc This rule only applies to ICMP or ICMPv6 packets with the specified type and code. Text names for ICMP types and codes are listed in .Xr icmp 4 and .Xr icmp6 4 . This parameter is only valid for rules that cover protocols ICMP or ICMP6. The protocol and the ICMP type indicator .Po .Ar icmp-type or .Ar icmp6-type .Pc must match. .It Xo Ar tos Aq Ar string .No \*(Ba Aq Ar number .Xc This rule applies to packets with the specified .Em TOS bits set. .Em TOS may be given as one of .Ar critical , .Ar inetcontrol , .Ar lowdelay , .Ar netcontrol , .Ar throughput , .Ar reliability , or one of the DiffServ Code Points: .Ar ef , .Ar va , .Ar af11 No ... Ar af43 , .Ar cs0 No ... Ar cs7 ; or as either hex or decimal. .Pp For example, the following rules are identical: .Bd -literal -offset indent pass all tos lowdelay pass all tos 0x10 pass all tos 16 .Ed .It Ar allow-opts By default, IPv4 packets with IP options or IPv6 packets with routing extension headers are blocked. When .Ar allow-opts is specified for a .Ar pass rule, packets that pass the filter based on that rule (last matching) do so even if they contain IP options or routing extension headers. For packets that match state, the rule that initially created the state is used. The implicit .Ar pass rule that is used when a packet does not match any rules does not allow IP options. .It Ar label Aq Ar string Adds a label (name) to the rule, which can be used to identify the rule. For instance, pfctl -s labels shows per-rule statistics for rules that have labels. .Pp The following macros can be used in labels: .Pp .Bl -tag -width $srcaddr -compact -offset indent .It Ar $if The interface. .It Ar $srcaddr The source IP address. .It Ar $dstaddr The destination IP address. .It Ar $srcport The source port specification. .It Ar $dstport The destination port specification. .It Ar $proto The protocol name. .It Ar $nr The rule number. .El .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent ips = \&"{ 1.2.3.4, 1.2.3.5 }\&" pass in proto tcp from any to $ips \e port \*(Gt 1023 label \&"$dstaddr:$dstport\&" .Ed .Pp expands to .Bd -literal -offset indent pass in inet proto tcp from any to 1.2.3.4 \e port \*(Gt 1023 label \&"1.2.3.4:\*(Gt1023\&" pass in inet proto tcp from any to 1.2.3.5 \e port \*(Gt 1023 label \&"1.2.3.5:\*(Gt1023\&" .Ed .Pp The macro expansion for the .Ar label directive occurs only at configuration file parse time, not during runtime. .It Ar ridentifier Aq Ar number Add an identifier (number) to the rule, which can be used to correlate the rule to pflog entries, even after ruleset updates. .It Xo Ar queue Aq Ar queue .No \*(Ba ( Aq Ar queue , .Aq Ar queue ) .Xc Packets matching this rule will be assigned to the specified queue. If two queues are given, packets which have a .Em TOS of .Em lowdelay and TCP ACKs with no data payload will be assigned to the second one. See .Sx QUEUEING for setup details. .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent pass in proto tcp to port 25 queue mail pass in proto tcp to port 22 queue(ssh_bulk, ssh_prio) .Ed .It Cm set prio Ar priority | Pq Ar priority , priority Packets matching this rule will be assigned a specific queueing priority. Priorities are assigned as integers 0 through 7. If the packet is transmitted on a .Xr vlan 4 interface, the queueing priority will be written as the priority code point in the 802.1Q VLAN header. If two priorities are given, packets which have a TOS of .Cm lowdelay and TCP ACKs with no data payload will be assigned to the second one. .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent pass in proto tcp to port 25 set prio 2 pass in proto tcp to port 22 set prio (2, 5) .Ed .It Ar tag Aq Ar string Packets matching this rule will be tagged with the specified string. The tag acts as an internal marker that can be used to identify these packets later on. This can be used, for example, to provide trust between interfaces and to determine if packets have been processed by translation rules. Tags are .Qq sticky , meaning that the packet will be tagged even if the rule is not the last matching rule. Further matching rules can replace the tag with a new one but will not remove a previously applied tag. A packet is only ever assigned one tag at a time. Packet tagging can be done during .Ar nat , .Ar rdr , .Ar binat or .Ar ether rules in addition to filter rules. Tags take the same macros as labels (see above). .It Ar tagged Aq Ar string Used with filter, translation or scrub rules to specify that packets must already be tagged with the given tag in order to match the rule. Inverse tag matching can also be done by specifying the .Cm !\& operator before the .Ar tagged keyword. .It Ar rtable Aq Ar number Used to select an alternate routing table for the routing lookup. Only effective before the route lookup happened, i.e. when filtering inbound. .It Xo Ar divert-to Aq Ar host .Ar port Aq Ar port .Xc Used to .Xr divert 4 packets to the given divert .Ar port . Historically .Ox pf has another meaning for this, and .Fx pf uses this syntax to support .Xr divert 4 instead. Hence, .Ar host has no meaning and can be set to anything like 127.0.0.1. If a packet is re-injected and does not change direction then it will not be re-diverted. .It Ar divert-reply It has no meaning in .Fx pf . .It Ar probability Aq Ar number A probability attribute can be attached to a rule, with a value set between 0 and 1, bounds not included. In that case, the rule will be honoured using the given probability value only. For example, the following rule will drop 20% of incoming ICMP packets: .Bd -literal -offset indent block in proto icmp probability 20% .Ed .It Ar prio Aq Ar number Only match packets which have the given queueing priority assigned. .El .Sh ROUTING If a packet matches a rule with a route option set, the packet filter will route the packet according to the type of route option. When such a rule creates state, the route option is also applied to all packets matching the same connection. .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar route-to The .Ar route-to option routes the packet to the specified interface with an optional address for the next hop. When a .Ar route-to rule creates state, only packets that pass in the same direction as the filter rule specifies will be routed in this way. Packets passing in the opposite direction (replies) are not affected and are routed normally. .It Ar reply-to The .Ar reply-to option is similar to .Ar route-to , but routes packets that pass in the opposite direction (replies) to the specified interface. Opposite direction is only defined in the context of a state entry, and .Ar reply-to is useful only in rules that create state. It can be used on systems with multiple external connections to route all outgoing packets of a connection through the interface the incoming connection arrived through (symmetric routing enforcement). .It Ar dup-to The .Ar dup-to option creates a duplicate of the packet and routes it like .Ar route-to . The original packet gets routed as it normally would. .El .Sh POOL OPTIONS For .Ar nat and .Ar rdr rules, (as well as for the .Ar route-to , .Ar reply-to and .Ar dup-to rule options) for which there is a single redirection address which has a subnet mask smaller than 32 for IPv4 or 128 for IPv6 (more than one IP address), a variety of different methods for assigning this address can be used: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar bitmask The .Ar bitmask option applies the network portion of the redirection address to the address to be modified (source with .Ar nat , destination with .Ar rdr ) . .It Ar random The .Ar random option selects an address at random within the defined block of addresses. .It Ar source-hash The .Ar source-hash option uses a hash of the source address to determine the redirection address, ensuring that the redirection address is always the same for a given source. An optional key can be specified after this keyword either in hex or as a string; by default .Xr pfctl 8 randomly generates a key for source-hash every time the ruleset is reloaded. .It Ar round-robin The .Ar round-robin option loops through the redirection address(es). .Pp When more than one redirection address is specified, .Ar round-robin is the only permitted pool type. .It Ar static-port With .Ar nat rules, the .Ar static-port option prevents .Xr pf 4 from modifying the source port on TCP and UDP packets. .It Xo Ar map-e-portset Aq Ar psid-offset .No / Aq Ar psid-len .No / Aq Ar psid .Xc With .Ar nat rules, the .Ar map-e-portset option enables the source port translation of MAP-E (RFC 7597) Customer Edge. In order to make the host act as a MAP-E Customer Edge, setting up a tunneling interface and pass rules for encapsulated packets are required in addition to the map-e-portset nat rule. .Pp For example: .Bd -literal -offset indent nat on $gif_mape_if from $int_if:network to any \e -> $ipv4_mape_src map-e-portset 6/8/0x34 .Ed .Pp sets PSID offset 6, PSID length 8, PSID 0x34. .El .Pp Additionally, the .Ar sticky-address option can be specified to help ensure that multiple connections from the same source are mapped to the same redirection address. This option can be used with the .Ar random and .Ar round-robin pool options. Note that by default these associations are destroyed as soon as there are no longer states which refer to them; in order to make the mappings last beyond the lifetime of the states, increase the global options with .Ar set timeout src.track . See .Sx STATEFUL TRACKING OPTIONS for more ways to control the source tracking. .Sh STATE MODULATION Much of the security derived from TCP is attributable to how well the initial sequence numbers (ISNs) are chosen. Some popular stack implementations choose .Em very poor ISNs and thus are normally susceptible to ISN prediction exploits. By applying a .Ar modulate state rule to a TCP connection, .Xr pf 4 will create a high quality random sequence number for each connection endpoint. .Pp The .Ar modulate state directive implicitly keeps state on the rule and is only applicable to TCP connections. .Pp For instance: .Bd -literal -offset indent block all pass out proto tcp from any to any modulate state pass in proto tcp from any to any port 25 flags S/SFRA modulate state .Ed .Pp Note that modulated connections will not recover when the state table is lost (firewall reboot, flushing the state table, etc...). .Xr pf 4 will not be able to infer a connection again after the state table flushes the connection's modulator. When the state is lost, the connection may be left dangling until the respective endpoints time out the connection. It is possible on a fast local network for the endpoints to start an ACK storm while trying to resynchronize after the loss of the modulator. The default .Ar flags settings (or a more strict equivalent) should be used on .Ar modulate state rules to prevent ACK storms. .Pp Note that alternative methods are available to prevent loss of the state table and allow for firewall failover. See .Xr carp 4 and .Xr pfsync 4 for further information. .Sh SYN PROXY By default, .Xr pf 4 passes packets that are part of a .Xr tcp 4 handshake between the endpoints. The .Ar synproxy state option can be used to cause .Xr pf 4 itself to complete the handshake with the active endpoint, perform a handshake with the passive endpoint, and then forward packets between the endpoints. .Pp No packets are sent to the passive endpoint before the active endpoint has completed the handshake, hence so-called SYN floods with spoofed source addresses will not reach the passive endpoint, as the sender can't complete the handshake. .Pp The proxy is transparent to both endpoints, they each see a single connection from/to the other endpoint. .Xr pf 4 chooses random initial sequence numbers for both handshakes. Once the handshakes are completed, the sequence number modulators (see previous section) are used to translate further packets of the connection. .Ar synproxy state includes .Ar modulate state . .Pp Rules with .Ar synproxy will not work if .Xr pf 4 operates on a .Xr bridge 4 . .Pp Example: .Bd -literal -offset indent pass in proto tcp from any to any port www synproxy state .Ed .Sh STATEFUL TRACKING OPTIONS A number of options related to stateful tracking can be applied on a per-rule basis. .Ar keep state , .Ar modulate state and .Ar synproxy state support these options, and .Ar keep state must be specified explicitly to apply options to a rule. .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar max Aq Ar number Limits the number of concurrent states the rule may create. When this limit is reached, further packets that would create state will not match this rule until existing states time out. .It Ar no-sync Prevent state changes for states created by this rule from appearing on the .Xr pfsync 4 interface. .It Xo Aq Ar timeout .Aq Ar seconds .Xc Changes the timeout values used for states created by this rule. For a list of all valid timeout names, see .Sx OPTIONS above. .It Ar sloppy Uses a sloppy TCP connection tracker that does not check sequence numbers at all, which makes insertion and ICMP teardown attacks way easier. This is intended to be used in situations where one does not see all packets of a connection, e.g. in asymmetric routing situations. Cannot be used with modulate or synproxy state. .It Ar pflow States created by this rule are exported on the .Xr pflow 4 interface. .El .Pp Multiple options can be specified, separated by commas: .Bd -literal -offset indent pass in proto tcp from any to any \e port www keep state \e (max 100, source-track rule, max-src-nodes 75, \e max-src-states 3, tcp.established 60, tcp.closing 5) .Ed .Pp When the .Ar source-track keyword is specified, the number of states per source IP is tracked. .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar source-track rule The maximum number of states created by this rule is limited by the rule's .Ar max-src-nodes and .Ar max-src-states options. Only state entries created by this particular rule count toward the rule's limits. .It Ar source-track global The number of states created by all rules that use this option is limited. Each rule can specify different .Ar max-src-nodes and .Ar max-src-states options, however state entries created by any participating rule count towards each individual rule's limits. .El .Pp The following limits can be set: .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar max-src-nodes Aq Ar number Limits the maximum number of source addresses which can simultaneously have state table entries. .It Ar max-src-states Aq Ar number Limits the maximum number of simultaneous state entries that a single source address can create with this rule. .El .Pp For stateful TCP connections, limits on established connections (connections which have completed the TCP 3-way handshake) can also be enforced per source IP. .Pp .Bl -tag -width xxxx -compact .It Ar max-src-conn Aq Ar number Limits the maximum number of simultaneous TCP connections which have completed the 3-way handshake that a single host can make. .It Xo Ar max-src-conn-rate Aq Ar number .No / Aq Ar seconds .Xc Limit the rate of new connections over a time interval. The connection rate is an approximation calculated as a moving average. .El .Pp Because the 3-way handshake ensures that the source address is not being spoofed, more aggressive action can be taken based on these limits. With the .Ar overload Aq Ar table state option, source IP addresses which hit either of the limits on established connections will be added to the named table. This table can be used in the ruleset to block further activity from the offending host, redirect it to a tarpit process, or restrict its bandwidth. .Pp The optional .Ar flush keyword kills all states created by the matching rule which originate from the host which exceeds these limits. The .Ar global modifier to the flush command kills all states originating from the offending host, regardless of which rule created the state. .Pp For example, the following rules will protect the webserver against hosts making more than 100 connections in 10 seconds. Any host which connects faster than this rate will have its address added to the .Aq bad_hosts table and have all states originating from it flushed. Any new packets arriving from this host will be dropped unconditionally by the block rule. .Bd -literal -offset indent block quick from \*(Ltbad_hosts\*(Gt pass in on $ext_if proto tcp to $webserver port www keep state \e (max-src-conn-rate 100/10, overload \*(Ltbad_hosts\*(Gt flush global) .Ed .Sh OPERATING SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING Passive OS Fingerprinting is a mechanism to inspect nuances of a TCP connection's initial SYN packet and guess at the host's operating system. Unfortunately these nuances are easily spoofed by an attacker so the fingerprint is not useful in making security decisions. But the fingerprint is typically accurate enough to make policy decisions upon. .Pp The fingerprints may be specified by operating system class, by version, or by subtype/patchlevel. The class of an operating system is typically the vendor or genre and would be .Ox for the .Xr pf 4 firewall itself. The version of the oldest available .Ox release on the main FTP site would be 2.6 and the fingerprint would be written .Pp .Dl \&"OpenBSD 2.6\&" .Pp The subtype of an operating system is typically used to describe the patchlevel if that patch led to changes in the TCP stack behavior. In the case of .Ox , the only subtype is for a fingerprint that was normalized by the .Ar no-df scrub option and would be specified as .Pp .Dl \&"OpenBSD 3.3 no-df\&" .Pp Fingerprints for most popular operating systems are provided by .Xr pf.os 5 . Once .Xr pf 4 is running, a complete list of known operating system fingerprints may be listed by running: .Pp .Dl # pfctl -so .Pp Filter rules can enforce policy at any level of operating system specification assuming a fingerprint is present. Policy could limit traffic to approved operating systems or even ban traffic from hosts that aren't at the latest service pack. .Pp The .Ar unknown class can also be used as the fingerprint which will match packets for which no operating system fingerprint is known. .Pp Examples: .Bd -literal -offset indent pass out proto tcp from any os OpenBSD block out proto tcp from any os Doors block out proto tcp from any os "Doors PT" block out proto tcp from any os "Doors PT SP3" block out from any os "unknown" pass on lo0 proto tcp from any os "OpenBSD 3.3 lo0" .Ed .Pp Operating system fingerprinting is limited only to the TCP SYN packet. This means that it will not work on other protocols and will not match a currently established connection. .Pp Caveat: operating system fingerprints are occasionally wrong. There are three problems: an attacker can trivially craft his packets to appear as any operating system he chooses; an operating system patch could change the stack behavior and no fingerprints will match it until the database is updated; and multiple operating systems may have the same fingerprint. .Sh BLOCKING SPOOFED TRAFFIC "Spoofing" is the faking of IP addresses, typically for malicious purposes. The .Ar antispoof directive expands to a set of filter rules which will block all traffic with a source IP from the network(s) directly connected to the specified interface(s) from entering the system through any other interface. .Pp For example, the line .Bd -literal -offset indent antispoof for lo0 .Ed .Pp expands to .Bd -literal -offset indent block drop in on ! lo0 inet from 127.0.0.1/8 to any block drop in on ! lo0 inet6 from ::1 to any .Ed .Pp For non-loopback interfaces, there are additional rules to block incoming packets with a source IP address identical to the interface's IP(s). For example, assuming the interface wi0 had an IP address of 10.0.0.1 and a netmask of 255.255.255.0, the line .Bd -literal -offset indent antispoof for wi0 inet .Ed .Pp expands to .Bd -literal -offset indent block drop in on ! wi0 inet from 10.0.0.0/24 to any block drop in inet from 10.0.0.1 to any .Ed .Pp Caveat: Rules created by the .Ar antispoof directive interfere with packets sent over loopback interfaces to local addresses. One should pass these explicitly. .Sh FRAGMENT HANDLING The size of IP datagrams (packets) can be significantly larger than the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the network. In cases when it is necessary or more efficient to send such large packets, the large packet will be fragmented into many smaller packets that will each fit onto the wire. Unfortunately for a firewalling device, only the first logical fragment will contain the necessary header information for the subprotocol that allows .Xr pf 4 to filter on things such as TCP ports or to perform NAT. .Pp Besides the use of .Ar set reassemble option or .Ar scrub rules as described in .Sx TRAFFIC NORMALIZATION above, there are three options for handling fragments in the packet filter. .Pp One alternative is to filter individual fragments with filter rules. If no .Ar scrub rule applies to a fragment or .Ar set reassemble is set to .Cm no , it is passed to the filter. Filter rules with matching IP header parameters decide whether the fragment is passed or blocked, in the same way as complete packets are filtered. Without reassembly, fragments can only be filtered based on IP header fields (source/destination address, protocol), since subprotocol header fields are not available (TCP/UDP port numbers, ICMP code/type). The .Ar fragment option can be used to restrict filter rules to apply only to fragments, but not complete packets. Filter rules without the .Ar fragment option still apply to fragments, if they only specify IP header fields. For instance, the rule .Bd -literal -offset indent pass in proto tcp from any to any port 80 .Ed .Pp never applies to a fragment, even if the fragment is part of a TCP packet with destination port 80, because without reassembly this information is not available for each fragment. This also means that fragments cannot create new or match existing state table entries, which makes stateful filtering and address translation (NAT, redirection) for fragments impossible. .Pp It's also possible to reassemble only certain fragments by specifying source or destination addresses or protocols as parameters in .Ar scrub rules. .Pp In most cases, the benefits of reassembly outweigh the additional memory cost, and it's recommended to use .Ar set reassemble option or .Ar scrub rules with the .Ar fragment reassemble modifier to reassemble all fragments. .Pp The memory allocated for fragment caching can be limited using .Xr pfctl 8 . Once this limit is reached, fragments that would have to be cached are dropped until other entries time out. The timeout value can also be adjusted. .Pp When forwarding reassembled IPv6 packets, pf refragments them with the original maximum fragment size. This allows the sender to determine the optimal fragment size by path MTU discovery. .Sh ANCHORS Besides the main ruleset, .Xr pfctl 8 can load rulesets into .Ar anchor attachment points. An .Ar anchor is a container that can hold rules, address tables, and other anchors. .Pp An .Ar anchor has a name which specifies the path where .Xr pfctl 8 can be used to access the anchor to perform operations on it, such as attaching child anchors to it or loading rules into it. Anchors may be nested, with components separated by .Sq / characters, similar to how file system hierarchies are laid out. The main ruleset is actually the default anchor, so filter and translation rules, for example, may also be contained in any anchor. .Pp An anchor can reference another .Ar anchor attachment point using the following kinds of rules: .Bl -tag -width xxxx .It Ar nat-anchor Aq Ar name Evaluates the .Ar nat rules in the specified .Ar anchor . .It Ar rdr-anchor Aq Ar name Evaluates the .Ar rdr rules in the specified .Ar anchor . .It Ar binat-anchor Aq Ar name Evaluates the .Ar binat rules in the specified .Ar anchor . .It Ar anchor Aq Ar name Evaluates the filter rules in the specified .Ar anchor . .It Xo Ar load anchor .Aq Ar name .Ar from Aq Ar file .Xc Loads the rules from the specified file into the anchor .Ar name . .El .Pp When evaluation of the main ruleset reaches an .Ar anchor rule, .Xr pf 4 will proceed to evaluate all rules specified in that anchor. .Pp Matching filter and translation rules marked with the .Ar quick option are final and abort the evaluation of the rules in other anchors and the main ruleset. If the .Ar anchor itself is marked with the .Ar quick option, ruleset evaluation will terminate when the anchor is exited if the packet is matched by any rule within the anchor. .Pp .Ar anchor rules are evaluated relative to the anchor in which they are contained. For example, all .Ar anchor rules specified in the main ruleset will reference anchor attachment points underneath the main ruleset, and .Ar anchor rules specified in a file loaded from a .Ar load anchor rule will be attached under that anchor point. .Pp Rules may be contained in .Ar anchor attachment points which do not contain any rules when the main ruleset is loaded, and later such anchors can be manipulated through .Xr pfctl 8 without reloading the main ruleset or other anchors. For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent ext_if = \&"kue0\&" block on $ext_if all anchor spam pass out on $ext_if all pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any \e to $ext_if port smtp .Ed .Pp blocks all packets on the external interface by default, then evaluates all rules in the .Ar anchor named "spam", and finally passes all outgoing connections and incoming connections to port 25. .Bd -literal -offset indent # echo \&"block in quick from 1.2.3.4 to any\&" \&| \e pfctl -a spam -f - .Ed .Pp This loads a single rule into the .Ar anchor , which blocks all packets from a specific address. .Pp The anchor can also be populated by adding a .Ar load anchor rule after the .Ar anchor rule: .Bd -literal -offset indent anchor spam load anchor spam from "/etc/pf-spam.conf" .Ed .Pp When .Xr pfctl 8 loads .Nm pf.conf , it will also load all the rules from the file .Pa /etc/pf-spam.conf into the anchor. .Pp Optionally, .Ar anchor rules can specify packet filtering parameters using the same syntax as filter rules. When parameters are used, the .Ar anchor rule is only evaluated for matching packets. This allows conditional evaluation of anchors, like: .Bd -literal -offset indent block on $ext_if all anchor spam proto tcp from any to any port smtp pass out on $ext_if all pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to $ext_if port smtp .Ed .Pp The rules inside .Ar anchor spam are only evaluated for .Ar tcp packets with destination port 25. Hence, .Bd -literal -offset indent # echo \&"block in quick from 1.2.3.4 to any" \&| \e pfctl -a spam -f - .Ed .Pp will only block connections from 1.2.3.4 to port 25. .Pp Anchors may end with the asterisk .Pq Sq * character, which signifies that all anchors attached at that point should be evaluated in the alphabetical ordering of their anchor name. For example, .Bd -literal -offset indent anchor "spam/*" .Ed .Pp will evaluate each rule in each anchor attached to the .Li spam anchor. Note that it will only evaluate anchors that are directly attached to the .Li spam anchor, and will not descend to evaluate anchors recursively. .Pp Since anchors are evaluated relative to the anchor in which they are contained, there is a mechanism for accessing the parent and ancestor anchors of a given anchor. Similar to file system path name resolution, if the sequence .Dq .. appears as an anchor path component, the parent anchor of the current anchor in the path evaluation at that point will become the new current anchor. As an example, consider the following: .Bd -literal -offset indent # echo ' anchor "spam/allowed" ' | pfctl -f - # echo -e ' anchor "../banned" \en pass' | \e pfctl -a spam/allowed -f - .Ed .Pp Evaluation of the main ruleset will lead into the .Li spam/allowed anchor, which will evaluate the rules in the .Li spam/banned anchor, if any, before finally evaluating the .Ar pass rule. .Pp Filter rule .Ar anchors can also be loaded inline in the ruleset within a brace ('{' '}') delimited block. Brace delimited blocks may contain rules or other brace-delimited blocks. When anchors are loaded this way the anchor name becomes optional. .Bd -literal -offset indent anchor "external" on $ext_if { block anchor out { pass proto tcp from any to port { 25, 80, 443 } } pass in proto tcp to any port 22 } .Ed .Pp Since the parser specification for anchor names is a string, any reference to an anchor name containing .Sq / characters will require double quote .Pq Sq \&" characters around the anchor name. .Sh SCTP CONSIDERATIONS .Xr pf 4 supports .Xr sctp 4 connections. It can match ports, track state and NAT SCTP traffic. However, it will not alter port numbers during nat or rdr translations. Doing so would break SCTP multihoming. .Sh TRANSLATION EXAMPLES This example maps incoming requests on port 80 to port 8080, on which a daemon is running (because, for example, it is not run as root, and therefore lacks permission to bind to port 80). .Bd -literal # use a macro for the interface name, so it can be changed easily ext_if = \&"ne3\&" # map daemon on 8080 to appear to be on 80 rdr on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 -\*(Gt 127.0.0.1 port 8080 .Ed .Pp If the .Ar pass modifier is given, packets matching the translation rule are passed without inspecting the filter rules: .Bd -literal rdr pass on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 -\*(Gt 127.0.0.1 \e port 8080 .Ed .Pp In the example below, vlan12 is configured as 192.168.168.1; the machine translates all packets coming from 192.168.168.0/24 to 204.92.77.111 when they are going out any interface except vlan12. This has the net effect of making traffic from the 192.168.168.0/24 network appear as though it is the Internet routable address 204.92.77.111 to nodes behind any interface on the router except for the nodes on vlan12. (Thus, 192.168.168.1 can talk to the 192.168.168.0/24 nodes.) .Bd -literal nat on ! vlan12 from 192.168.168.0/24 to any -\*(Gt 204.92.77.111 .Ed .Pp In the example below, the machine sits between a fake internal 144.19.74.* network, and a routable external IP of 204.92.77.100. The .Ar no nat rule excludes protocol AH from being translated. .Bd -literal # NO NAT no nat on $ext_if proto ah from 144.19.74.0/24 to any nat on $ext_if from 144.19.74.0/24 to any -\*(Gt 204.92.77.100 .Ed .Pp In the example below, packets bound for one specific server, as well as those generated by the sysadmins are not proxied; all other connections are. .Bd -literal # NO RDR no rdr on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from any to $server port 80 no rdr on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from $sysadmins to any port 80 rdr on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from any to any port 80 -\*(Gt 127.0.0.1 \e port 80 .Ed .Pp This longer example uses both a NAT and a redirection. The external interface has the address 157.161.48.183. On localhost, we are running .Xr ftp-proxy 8 , waiting for FTP sessions to be redirected to it. The three mandatory anchors for .Xr ftp-proxy 8 are omitted from this example; see the .Xr ftp-proxy 8 manpage. .Bd -literal # NAT # Translate outgoing packets' source addresses (any protocol). # In this case, any address but the gateway's external address is mapped. nat on $ext_if inet from ! ($ext_if) to any -\*(Gt ($ext_if) # NAT PROXYING # Map outgoing packets' source port to an assigned proxy port instead of # an arbitrary port. # In this case, proxy outgoing isakmp with port 500 on the gateway. nat on $ext_if inet proto udp from any port = isakmp to any -\*(Gt ($ext_if) \e port 500 # BINAT # Translate outgoing packets' source address (any protocol). # Translate incoming packets' destination address to an internal machine # (bidirectional). binat on $ext_if from 10.1.2.150 to any -\*(Gt $ext_if # Translate packets arriving on $peer_if addressed to 172.22.16.0/20 # to the corresponding address in 172.21.16.0/20 (bidirectional). binat on $peer_if from 172.21.16.0/20 to any -> 172.22.16.0/20 # RDR # Translate incoming packets' destination addresses. # As an example, redirect a TCP and UDP port to an internal machine. rdr on $ext_if inet proto tcp from any to ($ext_if) port 8080 \e -\*(Gt 10.1.2.151 port 22 rdr on $ext_if inet proto udp from any to ($ext_if) port 8080 \e -\*(Gt 10.1.2.151 port 53 # RDR # Translate outgoing ftp control connections to send them to localhost # for proxying with ftp-proxy(8) running on port 8021. rdr on $int_if proto tcp from any to any port 21 -\*(Gt 127.0.0.1 port 8021 .Ed .Pp In this example, a NAT gateway is set up to translate internal addresses using a pool of public addresses (192.0.2.16/28) and to redirect incoming web server connections to a group of web servers on the internal network. .Bd -literal # NAT LOAD BALANCE # Translate outgoing packets' source addresses using an address pool. # A given source address is always translated to the same pool address by # using the source-hash keyword. nat on $ext_if inet from any to any -\*(Gt 192.0.2.16/28 source-hash # RDR ROUND ROBIN # Translate incoming web server connections to a group of web servers on # the internal network. rdr on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 \e -\*(Gt { 10.1.2.155, 10.1.2.160, 10.1.2.161 } round-robin .Ed .Sh FILTER EXAMPLES .Bd -literal # The external interface is kue0 # (157.161.48.183, the only routable address) # and the private network is 10.0.0.0/8, for which we are doing NAT. # Reassemble incoming traffic set reassemble yes # use a macro for the interface name, so it can be changed easily ext_if = \&"kue0\&" # block and log everything by default block return log on $ext_if all # block anything coming from source we have no back routes for block in from no-route to any # block packets whose ingress interface does not match the one in # the route back to their source address block in from urpf-failed to any # block and log outgoing packets that do not have our address as source, # they are either spoofed or something is misconfigured (NAT disabled, # for instance), we want to be nice and do not send out garbage. block out log quick on $ext_if from ! 157.161.48.183 to any # silently drop broadcasts (cable modem noise) block in quick on $ext_if from any to 255.255.255.255 # block and log incoming packets from reserved address space and invalid # addresses, they are either spoofed or misconfigured, we cannot reply to # them anyway (hence, no return-rst). block in log quick on $ext_if from { 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, \e 192.168.0.0/16, 255.255.255.255/32 } to any # ICMP # pass out/in certain ICMP queries and keep state (ping) # state matching is done on host addresses and ICMP id (not type/code), # so replies (like 0/0 for 8/0) will match queries # ICMP error messages (which always refer to a TCP/UDP packet) are # handled by the TCP/UDP states pass on $ext_if inet proto icmp all icmp-type 8 code 0 # UDP # pass out all UDP connections and keep state pass out on $ext_if proto udp all # pass in certain UDP connections and keep state (DNS) pass in on $ext_if proto udp from any to any port domain # TCP # pass out all TCP connections and modulate state pass out on $ext_if proto tcp all modulate state # pass in certain TCP connections and keep state (SSH, SMTP, DNS, IDENT) pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port { ssh, smtp, domain, \e auth } # Do not allow Windows 9x SMTP connections since they are typically # a viral worm. Alternately we could limit these OSes to 1 connection each. block in on $ext_if proto tcp from any os {"Windows 95", "Windows 98"} \e to any port smtp # IPv6 # pass in/out all IPv6 traffic: note that we have to enable this in two # different ways, on both our physical interface and our tunnel pass quick on gif0 inet6 pass quick on $ext_if proto ipv6 # Packet Tagging # three interfaces: $int_if, $ext_if, and $wifi_if (wireless). NAT is # being done on $ext_if for all outgoing packets. tag packets in on # $int_if and pass those tagged packets out on $ext_if. all other # outgoing packets (i.e., packets from the wireless network) are only # permitted to access port 80. pass in on $int_if from any to any tag INTNET pass in on $wifi_if from any to any block out on $ext_if from any to any pass out quick on $ext_if tagged INTNET pass out on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 # tag incoming packets as they are redirected to spamd(8). use the tag # to pass those packets through the packet filter. rdr on $ext_if inet proto tcp from \*(Ltspammers\*(Gt to port smtp \e tag SPAMD -\*(Gt 127.0.0.1 port spamd block in on $ext_if pass in on $ext_if inet proto tcp tagged SPAMD .Ed .Sh GRAMMAR Syntax for .Nm in BNF: .Bd -literal line = ( option | ether-rule | pf-rule | nat-rule | binat-rule | rdr-rule | antispoof-rule | altq-rule | queue-rule | trans-anchors | anchor-rule | anchor-close | load-anchor | table-rule | include ) option = "set" ( [ "timeout" ( timeout | "{" timeout-list "}" ) ] | [ "ruleset-optimization" [ "none" | "basic" | "profile" ]] | [ "optimization" [ "default" | "normal" | "high-latency" | "satellite" | "aggressive" | "conservative" ] ] [ "limit" ( limit-item | "{" limit-list "}" ) ] | [ "loginterface" ( interface-name | "none" ) ] | [ "block-policy" ( "drop" | "return" ) ] | [ "state-policy" ( "if-bound" | "floating" ) ] [ "state-defaults" state-opts ] [ "require-order" ( "yes" | "no" ) ] [ "fingerprints" filename ] | [ "skip on" ifspec ] | [ "debug" ( "none" | "urgent" | "misc" | "loud" ) ] [ "keepcounters" ] ) ether-rule = "ether" etheraction [ ( "in" | "out" ) ] [ "quick" ] [ "on" ifspec ] [ "bridge-to" interface-name ] [ etherprotospec ] etherhosts [ "l3" hosts ] [ etherfilteropt-list ] pf-rule = action [ ( "in" | "out" ) ] [ "log" [ "(" logopts ")"] ] [ "quick" ] [ "on" ifspec ] [ route ] [ af ] [ protospec ] hosts [ filteropt-list ] logopts = logopt [ "," logopts ] logopt = "all" | "user" | "to" interface-name etherfilteropt-list = etherfilteropt-list etherfilteropt | etherfilteropt etherfilteropt = "tag" string | "tagged" string | "queue" ( string ) | "ridentifier" number | "label" string filteropt-list = filteropt-list filteropt | filteropt filteropt = user | group | flags | icmp-type | icmp6-type | "tos" tos | ( "no" | "keep" | "modulate" | "synproxy" ) "state" [ "(" state-opts ")" ] | "fragment" | "no-df" | "min-ttl" number | "set-tos" tos | "max-mss" number | "random-id" | "reassemble tcp" | fragmentation | "allow-opts" | "label" string | "tag" string | [ ! ] "tagged" string | "set prio" ( number | "(" number [ [ "," ] number ] ")" ) | "queue" ( string | "(" string [ [ "," ] string ] ")" ) | "rtable" number | "probability" number"%" | "prio" number | "dnpipe" ( number | "(" number "," number ")" ) | "dnqueue" ( number | "(" number "," number ")" ) | "ridentifier" number nat-rule = [ "no" ] "nat" [ "pass" [ "log" [ "(" logopts ")" ] ] ] [ "on" ifspec ] [ af ] [ protospec ] hosts [ "tag" string ] [ "tagged" string ] [ "-\*(Gt" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" ) [ portspec ] [ pooltype ] [ "static-port" ] [ "map-e-portset" number "/" number "/" number ] ] binat-rule = [ "no" ] "binat" [ "pass" [ "log" [ "(" logopts ")" ] ] ] [ "on" interface-name ] [ af ] [ "proto" ( proto-name | proto-number ) ] "from" address [ "/" mask-bits ] "to" ipspec [ "tag" string ] [ "tagged" string ] [ "-\*(Gt" address [ "/" mask-bits ] ] rdr-rule = [ "no" ] "rdr" [ "pass" [ "log" [ "(" logopts ")" ] ] ] [ "on" ifspec ] [ af ] [ protospec ] hosts [ "tag" string ] [ "tagged" string ] [ "-\*(Gt" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" ) [ portspec ] [ pooltype ] ] antispoof-rule = "antispoof" [ "log" ] [ "quick" ] "for" ifspec [ af ] [ "label" string ] [ "ridentifier" number ] table-rule = "table" "\*(Lt" string "\*(Gt" [ tableopts-list ] tableopts-list = tableopts-list tableopts | tableopts tableopts = "persist" | "const" | "counters" | "file" string | "{" [ tableaddr-list ] "}" tableaddr-list = tableaddr-list [ "," ] tableaddr-spec | tableaddr-spec tableaddr-spec = [ "!" ] tableaddr [ "/" mask-bits ] tableaddr = hostname | ifspec | "self" | ipv4-dotted-quad | ipv6-coloned-hex altq-rule = "altq on" interface-name queueopts-list "queue" subqueue queue-rule = "queue" string [ "on" interface-name ] queueopts-list subqueue anchor-rule = "anchor" [ string ] [ ( "in" | "out" ) ] [ "on" ifspec ] [ af ] [ protospec ] [ hosts ] [ filteropt-list ] [ "{" ] anchor-close = "}" trans-anchors = ( "nat-anchor" | "rdr-anchor" | "binat-anchor" ) string [ "on" ifspec ] [ af ] [ "proto" ] [ protospec ] [ hosts ] load-anchor = "load anchor" string "from" filename queueopts-list = queueopts-list queueopts | queueopts queueopts = [ "bandwidth" bandwidth-spec ] | [ "qlimit" number ] | [ "tbrsize" number ] | [ "priority" number ] | [ schedulers ] schedulers = ( cbq-def | priq-def | hfsc-def ) bandwidth-spec = "number" ( "b" | "Kb" | "Mb" | "Gb" | "%" ) etheraction = "pass" | "block" action = "pass" | "match" | "block" [ return ] | [ "no" ] "scrub" return = "drop" | "return" | "return-rst" [ "( ttl" number ")" ] | "return-icmp" [ "(" icmpcode [ [ "," ] icmp6code ] ")" ] | "return-icmp6" [ "(" icmp6code ")" ] icmpcode = ( icmp-code-name | icmp-code-number ) icmp6code = ( icmp6-code-name | icmp6-code-number ) ifspec = ( [ "!" ] ( interface-name | interface-group ) ) | "{" interface-list "}" interface-list = [ "!" ] ( interface-name | interface-group ) [ [ "," ] interface-list ] route = ( "route-to" | "reply-to" | "dup-to" ) ( routehost | "{" routehost-list "}" ) [ pooltype ] af = "inet" | "inet6" etherprotospec = "proto" ( proto-number | "{" etherproto-list "}" ) etherproto-list = proto-number [ [ "," ] etherproto-list ] protospec = "proto" ( proto-name | proto-number | "{" proto-list "}" ) proto-list = ( proto-name | proto-number ) [ [ "," ] proto-list ] etherhosts = "from" macaddress "to" macaddress macaddress = mac | mac "/" masklen | mac "&" mask hosts = "all" | "from" ( "any" | "no-route" | "urpf-failed" | "self" | host | "{" host-list "}" ) [ port ] [ os ] "to" ( "any" | "no-route" | "self" | host | "{" host-list "}" ) [ port ] ipspec = "any" | host | "{" host-list "}" host = [ "!" ] ( address [ "/" mask-bits ] | "\*(Lt" string "\*(Gt" ) redirhost = address [ "/" mask-bits ] routehost = "(" interface-name [ address [ "/" mask-bits ] ] ")" address = ( interface-name | interface-group | "(" ( interface-name | interface-group ) ")" | hostname | ipv4-dotted-quad | ipv6-coloned-hex ) host-list = host [ [ "," ] host-list ] redirhost-list = redirhost [ [ "," ] redirhost-list ] routehost-list = routehost [ [ "," ] routehost-list ] port = "port" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" ) portspec = "port" ( number | name ) [ ":" ( "*" | number | name ) ] os = "os" ( os-name | "{" os-list "}" ) user = "user" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" ) group = "group" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" ) unary-op = [ "=" | "!=" | "\*(Lt" | "\*(Le" | "\*(Gt" | "\*(Ge" ] ( name | number ) binary-op = number ( "\*(Lt\*(Gt" | "\*(Gt\*(Lt" | ":" ) number op-list = ( unary-op | binary-op ) [ [ "," ] op-list ] os-name = operating-system-name os-list = os-name [ [ "," ] os-list ] flags = "flags" ( [ flag-set ] "/" flag-set | "any" ) flag-set = [ "F" ] [ "S" ] [ "R" ] [ "P" ] [ "A" ] [ "U" ] [ "E" ] [ "W" ] icmp-type = "icmp-type" ( icmp-type-code | "{" icmp-list "}" ) icmp6-type = "icmp6-type" ( icmp-type-code | "{" icmp-list "}" ) icmp-type-code = ( icmp-type-name | icmp-type-number ) [ "code" ( icmp-code-name | icmp-code-number ) ] icmp-list = icmp-type-code [ [ "," ] icmp-list ] tos = ( "lowdelay" | "throughput" | "reliability" | [ "0x" ] number ) state-opts = state-opt [ [ "," ] state-opts ] state-opt = ( "max" number | "no-sync" | timeout | "sloppy" | "source-track" [ ( "rule" | "global" ) ] | "max-src-nodes" number | "max-src-states" number | "max-src-conn" number | "max-src-conn-rate" number "/" number | "overload" "\*(Lt" string "\*(Gt" [ "flush" ] | "if-bound" | "floating" | "pflow" ) fragmentation = [ "fragment reassemble" ] timeout-list = timeout [ [ "," ] timeout-list ] timeout = ( "tcp.first" | "tcp.opening" | "tcp.established" | "tcp.closing" | "tcp.finwait" | "tcp.closed" | "sctp.first" | "sctp.opening" | "sctp.established" | "sctp.closing" | "sctp.closed" | "udp.first" | "udp.single" | "udp.multiple" | "icmp.first" | "icmp.error" | "other.first" | "other.single" | "other.multiple" | "frag" | "interval" | "src.track" | "adaptive.start" | "adaptive.end" ) number limit-list = limit-item [ [ "," ] limit-list ] limit-item = ( "states" | "frags" | "src-nodes" ) number pooltype = ( "bitmask" | "random" | "source-hash" [ ( hex-key | string-key ) ] | "round-robin" ) [ sticky-address ] subqueue = string | "{" queue-list "}" queue-list = string [ [ "," ] string ] cbq-def = "cbq" [ "(" cbq-opt [ [ "," ] cbq-opt ] ")" ] priq-def = "priq" [ "(" priq-opt [ [ "," ] priq-opt ] ")" ] hfsc-def = "hfsc" [ "(" hfsc-opt [ [ "," ] hfsc-opt ] ")" ] cbq-opt = ( "default" | "borrow" | "red" | "ecn" | "rio" ) priq-opt = ( "default" | "red" | "ecn" | "rio" ) hfsc-opt = ( "default" | "red" | "ecn" | "rio" | linkshare-sc | realtime-sc | upperlimit-sc ) linkshare-sc = "linkshare" sc-spec realtime-sc = "realtime" sc-spec upperlimit-sc = "upperlimit" sc-spec sc-spec = ( bandwidth-spec | "(" bandwidth-spec number bandwidth-spec ")" ) include = "include" filename .Ed .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width "/etc/protocols" -compact .It Pa /etc/hosts Host name database. .It Pa /etc/pf.conf Default location of the ruleset file. The file has to be created manually as it is not installed with a standard installation. .It Pa /etc/pf.os Default location of OS fingerprints. .It Pa /etc/protocols Protocol name database. .It Pa /etc/services Service name database. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr altq 4 , .Xr carp 4 , .Xr icmp 4 , .Xr icmp6 4 , .Xr ip 4 , .Xr ip6 4 , .Xr pf 4 , .Xr pflow 4 , .Xr pfsync 4 , .Xr tcp 4 , .Xr sctp 4 , .Xr udp 4 , .Xr hosts 5 , .Xr pf.os 5 , .Xr protocols 5 , .Xr services 5 , .Xr ftp-proxy 8 , .Xr pfctl 8 , .Xr pflogd 8 .Sh HISTORY The .Nm file format first appeared in .Ox 3.0 . diff --git a/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c b/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c index 4fcad7e578a8..4b703d3d02da 100644 --- a/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c +++ b/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c @@ -1,785 +1,841 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause * * Copyright (c) 2001 Daniel Hartmeier * Copyright (c) 2002 - 2008 Henning Brauer * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided * with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER * CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN * ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Effort sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. * * $OpenBSD: pf_lb.c,v 1.2 2009/02/12 02:13:15 sthen Exp $ */ #include #include "opt_pf.h" #include "opt_inet.h" #include "opt_inet6.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define DPFPRINTF(n, x) if (V_pf_status.debug >= (n)) printf x static void pf_hash(struct pf_addr *, struct pf_addr *, struct pf_poolhashkey *, sa_family_t); static struct pf_krule *pf_match_translation(struct pf_pdesc *, struct mbuf *, int, struct pfi_kkif *, struct pf_addr *, u_int16_t, struct pf_addr *, uint16_t, int, struct pf_kanchor_stackframe *); static int pf_get_sport(sa_family_t, uint8_t, struct pf_krule *, struct pf_addr *, uint16_t, struct pf_addr *, uint16_t, struct pf_addr *, uint16_t *, uint16_t, uint16_t, struct pf_ksrc_node **); #define mix(a,b,c) \ do { \ a -= b; a -= c; a ^= (c >> 13); \ b -= c; b -= a; b ^= (a << 8); \ c -= a; c -= b; c ^= (b >> 13); \ a -= b; a -= c; a ^= (c >> 12); \ b -= c; b -= a; b ^= (a << 16); \ c -= a; c -= b; c ^= (b >> 5); \ a -= b; a -= c; a ^= (c >> 3); \ b -= c; b -= a; b ^= (a << 10); \ c -= a; c -= b; c ^= (b >> 15); \ } while (0) /* * hash function based on bridge_hash in if_bridge.c */ static void pf_hash(struct pf_addr *inaddr, struct pf_addr *hash, struct pf_poolhashkey *key, sa_family_t af) { u_int32_t a = 0x9e3779b9, b = 0x9e3779b9, c = key->key32[0]; switch (af) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: a += inaddr->addr32[0]; b += key->key32[1]; mix(a, b, c); hash->addr32[0] = c + key->key32[2]; break; #endif /* INET */ #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: a += inaddr->addr32[0]; b += inaddr->addr32[2]; mix(a, b, c); hash->addr32[0] = c; a += inaddr->addr32[1]; b += inaddr->addr32[3]; c += key->key32[1]; mix(a, b, c); hash->addr32[1] = c; a += inaddr->addr32[2]; b += inaddr->addr32[1]; c += key->key32[2]; mix(a, b, c); hash->addr32[2] = c; a += inaddr->addr32[3]; b += inaddr->addr32[0]; c += key->key32[3]; mix(a, b, c); hash->addr32[3] = c; break; #endif /* INET6 */ } } static struct pf_krule * pf_match_translation(struct pf_pdesc *pd, struct mbuf *m, int off, struct pfi_kkif *kif, struct pf_addr *saddr, u_int16_t sport, struct pf_addr *daddr, uint16_t dport, int rs_num, struct pf_kanchor_stackframe *anchor_stack) { struct pf_krule *r, *rm = NULL; struct pf_kruleset *ruleset = NULL; int tag = -1; int rtableid = -1; int asd = 0; r = TAILQ_FIRST(pf_main_ruleset.rules[rs_num].active.ptr); while (r != NULL) { struct pf_rule_addr *src = NULL, *dst = NULL; struct pf_addr_wrap *xdst = NULL; if (r->action == PF_BINAT && pd->dir == PF_IN) { src = &r->dst; if (r->rpool.cur != NULL) xdst = &r->rpool.cur->addr; } else { src = &r->src; dst = &r->dst; } pf_counter_u64_add(&r->evaluations, 1); if (pfi_kkif_match(r->kif, kif) == r->ifnot) r = r->skip[PF_SKIP_IFP].ptr; else if (r->direction && r->direction != pd->dir) r = r->skip[PF_SKIP_DIR].ptr; else if (r->af && r->af != pd->af) r = r->skip[PF_SKIP_AF].ptr; else if (r->proto && r->proto != pd->proto) r = r->skip[PF_SKIP_PROTO].ptr; else if (PF_MISMATCHAW(&src->addr, saddr, pd->af, src->neg, kif, M_GETFIB(m))) r = r->skip[src == &r->src ? PF_SKIP_SRC_ADDR : PF_SKIP_DST_ADDR].ptr; else if (src->port_op && !pf_match_port(src->port_op, src->port[0], src->port[1], sport)) r = r->skip[src == &r->src ? PF_SKIP_SRC_PORT : PF_SKIP_DST_PORT].ptr; else if (dst != NULL && PF_MISMATCHAW(&dst->addr, daddr, pd->af, dst->neg, NULL, M_GETFIB(m))) r = r->skip[PF_SKIP_DST_ADDR].ptr; else if (xdst != NULL && PF_MISMATCHAW(xdst, daddr, pd->af, 0, NULL, M_GETFIB(m))) r = TAILQ_NEXT(r, entries); else if (dst != NULL && dst->port_op && !pf_match_port(dst->port_op, dst->port[0], dst->port[1], dport)) r = r->skip[PF_SKIP_DST_PORT].ptr; else if (r->match_tag && !pf_match_tag(m, r, &tag, pd->pf_mtag ? pd->pf_mtag->tag : 0)) r = TAILQ_NEXT(r, entries); else if (r->os_fingerprint != PF_OSFP_ANY && (pd->proto != IPPROTO_TCP || !pf_osfp_match(pf_osfp_fingerprint(pd, m, off, &pd->hdr.tcp), r->os_fingerprint))) r = TAILQ_NEXT(r, entries); else { if (r->tag) tag = r->tag; if (r->rtableid >= 0) rtableid = r->rtableid; if (r->anchor == NULL) { rm = r; if (rm->action == PF_NONAT || rm->action == PF_NORDR || rm->action == PF_NOBINAT) { rm = NULL; } break; } else pf_step_into_anchor(anchor_stack, &asd, &ruleset, rs_num, &r, NULL, NULL); } if (r == NULL) pf_step_out_of_anchor(anchor_stack, &asd, &ruleset, rs_num, &r, NULL, NULL); } if (tag > 0 && pf_tag_packet(m, pd, tag)) return (NULL); if (rtableid >= 0) M_SETFIB(m, rtableid); return (rm); } static int pf_get_sport(sa_family_t af, u_int8_t proto, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr, uint16_t sport, struct pf_addr *daddr, uint16_t dport, struct pf_addr *naddr, uint16_t *nport, uint16_t low, uint16_t high, struct pf_ksrc_node **sn) { struct pf_state_key_cmp key; struct pf_addr init_addr; bzero(&init_addr, sizeof(init_addr)); if (pf_map_addr(af, r, saddr, naddr, NULL, &init_addr, sn)) return (1); if (proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) { if (*nport == htons(ICMP_ECHO)) { low = 1; high = 65535; } else return (0); /* Don't try to modify non-echo ICMP */ } #ifdef INET6 if (proto == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) { if (*nport == htons(ICMP6_ECHO_REQUEST)) { low = 1; high = 65535; } else return (0); /* Don't try to modify non-echo ICMP */ } #endif /* INET6 */ bzero(&key, sizeof(key)); key.af = af; key.proto = proto; key.port[0] = dport; PF_ACPY(&key.addr[0], daddr, key.af); do { PF_ACPY(&key.addr[1], naddr, key.af); /* * port search; start random, step; * similar 2 portloop in in_pcbbind */ if (proto == IPPROTO_SCTP) { key.port[1] = sport; if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_IN)) { *nport = sport; return (0); } else { return (1); /* Fail mapping. */ } } else if (!(proto == IPPROTO_TCP || proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) || (low == 0 && high == 0)) { /* * XXX bug: icmp states don't use the id on both sides. * (traceroute -I through nat) */ key.port[1] = sport; if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_IN)) { *nport = sport; return (0); } } else if (low == high) { key.port[1] = htons(low); if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_IN)) { *nport = htons(low); return (0); } } else { uint32_t tmp; uint16_t cut; if (low > high) { tmp = low; low = high; high = tmp; } /* low < high */ cut = arc4random() % (1 + high - low) + low; /* low <= cut <= high */ for (tmp = cut; tmp <= high && tmp <= 0xffff; ++tmp) { key.port[1] = htons(tmp); if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_IN)) { *nport = htons(tmp); return (0); } } tmp = cut; for (tmp -= 1; tmp >= low && tmp <= 0xffff; --tmp) { key.port[1] = htons(tmp); if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_IN)) { *nport = htons(tmp); return (0); } } } switch (r->rpool.opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) { case PF_POOL_RANDOM: case PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN: /* * pick a different source address since we're out * of free port choices for the current one. */ if (pf_map_addr(af, r, saddr, naddr, NULL, &init_addr, sn)) return (1); break; case PF_POOL_NONE: case PF_POOL_SRCHASH: case PF_POOL_BITMASK: default: return (1); } } while (! PF_AEQ(&init_addr, naddr, af) ); return (1); /* none available */ } static int pf_get_mape_sport(sa_family_t af, u_int8_t proto, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr, uint16_t sport, struct pf_addr *daddr, uint16_t dport, struct pf_addr *naddr, uint16_t *nport, struct pf_ksrc_node **sn) { uint16_t psmask, low, highmask; uint16_t i, ahigh, cut; int ashift, psidshift; ashift = 16 - r->rpool.mape.offset; psidshift = ashift - r->rpool.mape.psidlen; psmask = r->rpool.mape.psid & ((1U << r->rpool.mape.psidlen) - 1); psmask = psmask << psidshift; highmask = (1U << psidshift) - 1; ahigh = (1U << r->rpool.mape.offset) - 1; cut = arc4random() & ahigh; if (cut == 0) cut = 1; for (i = cut; i <= ahigh; i++) { low = (i << ashift) | psmask; if (!pf_get_sport(af, proto, r, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, naddr, nport, low, low | highmask, sn)) return (0); } for (i = cut - 1; i > 0; i--) { low = (i << ashift) | psmask; if (!pf_get_sport(af, proto, r, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, naddr, nport, low, low | highmask, sn)) return (0); } return (1); } u_short pf_map_addr(sa_family_t af, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr, struct pf_addr *naddr, struct pfi_kkif **nkif, struct pf_addr *init_addr, struct pf_ksrc_node **sn) { u_short reason = 0; struct pf_kpool *rpool = &r->rpool; struct pf_addr *raddr = NULL, *rmask = NULL; struct pf_srchash *sh = NULL; /* Try to find a src_node if none was given and this is a sticky-address rule. */ if (*sn == NULL && r->rpool.opts & PF_POOL_STICKYADDR && (r->rpool.opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_NONE) *sn = pf_find_src_node(saddr, r, af, &sh, false); /* If a src_node was found or explicitly given and it has a non-zero route address, use this address. A zeroed address is found if the src node was created just a moment ago in pf_create_state and it needs to be filled in with routing decision calculated here. */ if (*sn != NULL && !PF_AZERO(&(*sn)->raddr, af)) { /* If the supplied address is the same as the current one we've * been asked before, so tell the caller that there's no other * address to be had. */ if (PF_AEQ(naddr, &(*sn)->raddr, af)) { reason = PFRES_MAPFAILED; goto done; } PF_ACPY(naddr, &(*sn)->raddr, af); if (nkif) *nkif = (*sn)->rkif; if (V_pf_status.debug >= PF_DEBUG_NOISY) { printf("pf_map_addr: src tracking maps "); pf_print_host(saddr, 0, af); printf(" to "); pf_print_host(naddr, 0, af); if (nkif) printf("@%s", (*nkif)->pfik_name); printf("\n"); } goto done; } mtx_lock(&rpool->mtx); /* Find the route using chosen algorithm. Store the found route in src_node if it was given or found. */ if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_NOROUTE) { reason = PFRES_MAPFAILED; goto done_pool_mtx; } if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_DYNIFTL) { switch (af) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: if (rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_acnt4 < 1 && (rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN) { reason = PFRES_MAPFAILED; goto done_pool_mtx; } raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_addr4; rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_mask4; break; #endif /* INET */ #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: if (rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_acnt6 < 1 && (rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN) { reason = PFRES_MAPFAILED; goto done_pool_mtx; } raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_addr6; rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_mask6; break; #endif /* INET6 */ } } else if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_TABLE) { if ((rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN) { reason = PFRES_MAPFAILED; goto done_pool_mtx; /* unsupported */ } } else { raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.v.a.addr; rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.v.a.mask; } switch (rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) { case PF_POOL_NONE: PF_ACPY(naddr, raddr, af); break; case PF_POOL_BITMASK: PF_POOLMASK(naddr, raddr, rmask, saddr, af); break; case PF_POOL_RANDOM: if (init_addr != NULL && PF_AZERO(init_addr, af)) { switch (af) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: rpool->counter.addr32[0] = htonl(arc4random()); break; #endif /* INET */ #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: if (rmask->addr32[3] != 0xffffffff) rpool->counter.addr32[3] = htonl(arc4random()); else break; if (rmask->addr32[2] != 0xffffffff) rpool->counter.addr32[2] = htonl(arc4random()); else break; if (rmask->addr32[1] != 0xffffffff) rpool->counter.addr32[1] = htonl(arc4random()); else break; if (rmask->addr32[0] != 0xffffffff) rpool->counter.addr32[0] = htonl(arc4random()); break; #endif /* INET6 */ } PF_POOLMASK(naddr, raddr, rmask, &rpool->counter, af); PF_ACPY(init_addr, naddr, af); } else { PF_AINC(&rpool->counter, af); PF_POOLMASK(naddr, raddr, rmask, &rpool->counter, af); } break; case PF_POOL_SRCHASH: { unsigned char hash[16]; pf_hash(saddr, (struct pf_addr *)&hash, &rpool->key, af); PF_POOLMASK(naddr, raddr, rmask, (struct pf_addr *)&hash, af); break; } case PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN: { struct pf_kpooladdr *acur = rpool->cur; if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_TABLE) { if (!pfr_pool_get(rpool->cur->addr.p.tbl, &rpool->tblidx, &rpool->counter, af)) goto get_addr; } else if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_DYNIFTL) { if (!pfr_pool_get(rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_kt, &rpool->tblidx, &rpool->counter, af)) goto get_addr; } else if (pf_match_addr(0, raddr, rmask, &rpool->counter, af)) goto get_addr; try_next: if (TAILQ_NEXT(rpool->cur, entries) == NULL) rpool->cur = TAILQ_FIRST(&rpool->list); else rpool->cur = TAILQ_NEXT(rpool->cur, entries); if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_TABLE) { rpool->tblidx = -1; if (pfr_pool_get(rpool->cur->addr.p.tbl, &rpool->tblidx, &rpool->counter, af)) { /* table contains no address of type 'af' */ if (rpool->cur != acur) goto try_next; reason = PFRES_MAPFAILED; goto done_pool_mtx; } } else if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_DYNIFTL) { rpool->tblidx = -1; if (pfr_pool_get(rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_kt, &rpool->tblidx, &rpool->counter, af)) { /* table contains no address of type 'af' */ if (rpool->cur != acur) goto try_next; reason = PFRES_MAPFAILED; goto done_pool_mtx; } } else { raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.v.a.addr; rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.v.a.mask; PF_ACPY(&rpool->counter, raddr, af); } get_addr: PF_ACPY(naddr, &rpool->counter, af); if (init_addr != NULL && PF_AZERO(init_addr, af)) PF_ACPY(init_addr, naddr, af); PF_AINC(&rpool->counter, af); break; } } if (nkif) *nkif = rpool->cur->kif; if (*sn != NULL) { PF_ACPY(&(*sn)->raddr, naddr, af); if (nkif) (*sn)->rkif = *nkif; } if (V_pf_status.debug >= PF_DEBUG_NOISY && (rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_NONE) { printf("pf_map_addr: selected address "); pf_print_host(naddr, 0, af); if (nkif) printf("@%s", (*nkif)->pfik_name); printf("\n"); } done_pool_mtx: mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx); done: if (reason) { counter_u64_add(V_pf_status.counters[reason], 1); } return (reason); } struct pf_krule * pf_get_translation(struct pf_pdesc *pd, struct mbuf *m, int off, struct pfi_kkif *kif, struct pf_ksrc_node **sn, struct pf_state_key **skp, struct pf_state_key **nkp, struct pf_addr *saddr, struct pf_addr *daddr, uint16_t sport, uint16_t dport, struct pf_kanchor_stackframe *anchor_stack) { struct pf_krule *r = NULL; struct pf_addr *naddr; - uint16_t *nport; + uint16_t *nportp; uint16_t low, high; PF_RULES_RASSERT(); KASSERT(*skp == NULL, ("*skp not NULL")); KASSERT(*nkp == NULL, ("*nkp not NULL")); if (pd->dir == PF_OUT) { r = pf_match_translation(pd, m, off, kif, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, PF_RULESET_BINAT, anchor_stack); if (r == NULL) r = pf_match_translation(pd, m, off, kif, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, PF_RULESET_NAT, anchor_stack); } else { r = pf_match_translation(pd, m, off, kif, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, PF_RULESET_RDR, anchor_stack); if (r == NULL) r = pf_match_translation(pd, m, off, kif, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, PF_RULESET_BINAT, anchor_stack); } if (r == NULL) return (NULL); switch (r->action) { case PF_NONAT: case PF_NOBINAT: case PF_NORDR: return (NULL); } *skp = pf_state_key_setup(pd, saddr, daddr, sport, dport); if (*skp == NULL) return (NULL); *nkp = pf_state_key_clone(*skp); if (*nkp == NULL) { uma_zfree(V_pf_state_key_z, *skp); *skp = NULL; return (NULL); } - /* XXX We only modify one side for now. */ naddr = &(*nkp)->addr[1]; - nport = &(*nkp)->port[1]; + nportp = &(*nkp)->port[1]; switch (r->action) { case PF_NAT: if (pd->proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) { low = 1; high = 65535; } else { low = r->rpool.proxy_port[0]; high = r->rpool.proxy_port[1]; } if (r->rpool.mape.offset > 0) { if (pf_get_mape_sport(pd->af, pd->proto, r, saddr, - sport, daddr, dport, naddr, nport, sn)) { + sport, daddr, dport, naddr, nportp, sn)) { DPFPRINTF(PF_DEBUG_MISC, ("pf: MAP-E port allocation (%u/%u/%u)" " failed\n", r->rpool.mape.offset, r->rpool.mape.psidlen, r->rpool.mape.psid)); goto notrans; } } else if (pf_get_sport(pd->af, pd->proto, r, saddr, sport, - daddr, dport, naddr, nport, low, high, sn)) { + daddr, dport, naddr, nportp, low, high, sn)) { DPFPRINTF(PF_DEBUG_MISC, ("pf: NAT proxy port allocation (%u-%u) failed\n", r->rpool.proxy_port[0], r->rpool.proxy_port[1])); goto notrans; } break; case PF_BINAT: switch (pd->dir) { case PF_OUT: if (r->rpool.cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_DYNIFTL){ switch (pd->af) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: if (r->rpool.cur->addr.p.dyn-> pfid_acnt4 < 1) goto notrans; PF_POOLMASK(naddr, &r->rpool.cur->addr.p.dyn-> pfid_addr4, &r->rpool.cur->addr.p.dyn-> pfid_mask4, saddr, AF_INET); break; #endif /* INET */ #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: if (r->rpool.cur->addr.p.dyn-> pfid_acnt6 < 1) goto notrans; PF_POOLMASK(naddr, &r->rpool.cur->addr.p.dyn-> pfid_addr6, &r->rpool.cur->addr.p.dyn-> pfid_mask6, saddr, AF_INET6); break; #endif /* INET6 */ } } else PF_POOLMASK(naddr, &r->rpool.cur->addr.v.a.addr, &r->rpool.cur->addr.v.a.mask, saddr, pd->af); break; case PF_IN: if (r->src.addr.type == PF_ADDR_DYNIFTL) { switch (pd->af) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: if (r->src.addr.p.dyn-> pfid_acnt4 < 1) goto notrans; PF_POOLMASK(naddr, &r->src.addr.p.dyn->pfid_addr4, &r->src.addr.p.dyn->pfid_mask4, daddr, AF_INET); break; #endif /* INET */ #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: if (r->src.addr.p.dyn->pfid_acnt6 < 1) goto notrans; PF_POOLMASK(naddr, &r->src.addr.p.dyn->pfid_addr6, &r->src.addr.p.dyn->pfid_mask6, daddr, AF_INET6); break; #endif /* INET6 */ } } else PF_POOLMASK(naddr, &r->src.addr.v.a.addr, &r->src.addr.v.a.mask, daddr, pd->af); break; } break; case PF_RDR: { + struct pf_state_key_cmp key; + uint16_t cut, low, high, nport; + if (pf_map_addr(pd->af, r, saddr, naddr, NULL, NULL, sn)) goto notrans; if ((r->rpool.opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) == PF_POOL_BITMASK) PF_POOLMASK(naddr, naddr, &r->rpool.cur->addr.v.a.mask, daddr, pd->af); /* Do not change SCTP ports. */ if (pd->proto == IPPROTO_SCTP) break; if (r->rpool.proxy_port[1]) { uint32_t tmp_nport; tmp_nport = ((ntohs(dport) - ntohs(r->dst.port[0])) % (r->rpool.proxy_port[1] - r->rpool.proxy_port[0] + 1)) + r->rpool.proxy_port[0]; /* Wrap around if necessary. */ if (tmp_nport > 65535) tmp_nport -= 65535; - *nport = htons((uint16_t)tmp_nport); + nport = htons((uint16_t)tmp_nport); } else if (r->rpool.proxy_port[0]) - *nport = htons(r->rpool.proxy_port[0]); + nport = htons(r->rpool.proxy_port[0]); + else + nport = dport; + + /* + * Update the destination port. + */ + *nportp = nport; + + /* + * Do we have a source port conflict in the stack state? Try to + * modulate the source port if so. Note that this is racy since + * the state lookup may not find any matches here but will once + * pf_create_state() actually instantiates the state. + */ + bzero(&key, sizeof(key)); + key.af = pd->af; + key.proto = pd->proto; + key.port[0] = sport; + PF_ACPY(&key.addr[0], saddr, key.af); + key.port[1] = nport; + PF_ACPY(&key.addr[1], naddr, key.af); + + if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_OUT)) + break; + + low = 50001; /* XXX-MJ PF_NAT_PROXY_PORT_LOW/HIGH */ + high = 65535; + cut = arc4random() % (1 + high - low) + low; + for (uint32_t tmp = cut; + tmp <= high && tmp <= UINT16_MAX; tmp++) { + key.port[0] = htons(tmp); + if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_OUT)) { + /* Update the source port. */ + (*nkp)->port[0] = htons(tmp); + goto out; + } + } + for (uint32_t tmp = cut - 1; tmp >= low; tmp--) { + key.port[0] = htons(tmp); + if (!pf_find_state_all_exists(&key, PF_OUT)) { + /* Update the source port. */ + (*nkp)->port[0] = htons(tmp); + goto out; + } + } + + DPFPRINTF(PF_DEBUG_MISC, + ("pf: RDR source port allocation failed\n")); + if (0) { +out: + DPFPRINTF(PF_DEBUG_MISC, + ("pf: RDR source port allocation %u->%u\n", + ntohs(sport), ntohs((*nkp)->port[0]))); + } break; } default: panic("%s: unknown action %u", __func__, r->action); } /* Return success only if translation really happened. */ if (bcmp(*skp, *nkp, sizeof(struct pf_state_key_cmp))) return (r); notrans: uma_zfree(V_pf_state_key_z, *nkp); uma_zfree(V_pf_state_key_z, *skp); *skp = *nkp = NULL; *sn = NULL; return (NULL); } diff --git a/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/Makefile b/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/Makefile index 4a16642a967b..2b3cb9fbd858 100644 --- a/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/Makefile +++ b/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/Makefile @@ -1,88 +1,89 @@ PACKAGE= tests TESTSDIR= ${TESTSBASE}/sys/netpfil/pf BINDIR= ${TESTSDIR} TESTS_SUBDIRS+= ioctl ATF_TESTS_SH+= altq \ anchor \ debug \ divert-to \ dup \ ether \ forward \ fragmentation_compat \ fragmentation_pass \ fragmentation_no_reassembly \ get_state \ icmp \ icmp6 \ if_enc \ limits \ loginterface \ killstate \ macro \ map_e \ match \ mbuf \ modulate \ names \ nat \ pass_block \ pflog \ pflow \ pfsync \ prio \ proxy \ rdr \ ridentifier \ route_to \ rtable \ rules_counter \ scrub_compat \ scrub_pass \ sctp \ set_skip \ set_tos \ src_track \ status \ syncookie \ synproxy \ table \ tcp \ tos ATF_TESTS_PYTEST+= frag6.py ATF_TESTS_PYTEST+= nat66.py ATF_TESTS_PYTEST+= sctp.py # Allow tests to run in parallel in their own jails TEST_METADATA+= execenv="jail" TEST_METADATA+= execenv_jail_params="vnet allow.raw_sockets" PROGS= divapp ${PACKAGE}FILES+= CVE-2019-5597.py \ CVE-2019-5598.py \ daytime_inetd.conf \ echo_inetd.conf \ fragcommon.py \ frag-overindex.py \ frag-overlimit.py \ frag-overreplace.py \ pfsync_defer.py \ pft_ether.py \ pft_read_ipfix.py \ + rdr-srcport.py \ utils.subr ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_CVE-2019-5597.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_CVE-2019-5598.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_fragcommon.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_frag-overindex.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_frag-overlimit.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_frag-overreplace.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_pfsync_defer.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_pft_ether.py= 0555 ${PACKAGE}FILESMODE_pft_read_ipfix.py= 0555 .include diff --git a/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/rdr-srcport.py b/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/rdr-srcport.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..633580582711 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/rdr-srcport.py @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# +# A helper script which accepts TCP connections and writes the remote port +# number to the stream. +# + +import socket + +def main(): + s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) + s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) + s.bind(('0.0.0.0', 8888)) + s.listen(5) + + while True: + cs, addr = s.accept() + cs.sendall(str(addr[1]).encode()) + cs.close() + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/rdr.sh b/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/rdr.sh index b7ec80b4d85e..135bfd42c1f4 100644 --- a/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/rdr.sh +++ b/tests/sys/netpfil/pf/rdr.sh @@ -1,127 +1,227 @@ # # # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause # # Copyright © 2023 Tom Jones # # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions # are met: # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the # documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND # ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE # IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE # ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE # FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL # DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS # OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT # LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY # OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF # SUCH DAMAGE. . $(atf_get_srcdir)/utils.subr atf_test_case "tcp_v6" "cleanup" tcp_v6_head() { atf_set descr 'TCP rdr with IPv6' atf_set require.user root atf_set require.progs scapy python3 } # # Test that rdr works for TCP with IPv6. # # a <-----> b <-----> c # # Test configures three jails (a, b and c) and connects them together with b as # a router between a and c. # # TCP traffic to b on port 80 is redirected to c on port 8000 # # Test for incorrect checksums after the rewrite by looking at a packet capture (see bug 210860) # tcp_v6_body() { pft_init j="rdr:tcp_v6" epair_one=$(vnet_mkepair) epair_two=$(vnet_mkepair) echo $epair_one echo $epair_two vnet_mkjail ${j}a ${epair_one}b vnet_mkjail ${j}b ${epair_one}a ${epair_two}a vnet_mkjail ${j}c ${epair_two}b # configure addresses for b jexec ${j}b ifconfig lo0 up jexec ${j}b ifconfig ${epair_one}a inet6 2001:db8:a::1/64 up no_dad jexec ${j}b ifconfig ${epair_two}a inet6 2001:db8:b::1/64 up no_dad # configure addresses for a jexec ${j}a ifconfig lo0 up jexec ${j}a ifconfig ${epair_one}b inet6 2001:db8:a::2/64 up no_dad # configure addresses for c jexec ${j}c ifconfig lo0 up jexec ${j}c ifconfig ${epair_two}b inet6 2001:db8:b::2/64 up no_dad # enable forwarding in the b jail jexec ${j}b sysctl net.inet6.ip6.forwarding=1 # add routes so a and c can find each other jexec ${j}a route add -inet6 2001:db8:b::0/64 2001:db8:a::1 jexec ${j}c route add -inet6 2001:db8:a::0/64 2001:db8:b::1 jexec ${j}b pfctl -e pft_set_rules ${j}b \ "rdr on ${epair_one}a proto tcp from any to any port 80 -> 2001:db8:b::2 port 8000" # Check that a can reach c over the router atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore \ jexec ${j}a ping -6 -c 1 2001:db8:b::2 # capture packets on c so we can look for incorrect checksums jexec ${j}c tcpdump --immediate-mode -w ${PWD}/${j}.pcap tcp and port 8000 & tcpdumppid=$! # start a web server and give it a second to start jexec ${j}c python3 -m http.server & sleep 1 # http directly from a to c -> a ---> b atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore \ jexec ${j}a fetch -T 1 -o /dev/null -q "http://[2001:db8:b::2]:8000" # http from a to b with a redirect -> a ---> b atf_check -s exit:0 -o ignore \ jexec ${j}a fetch -T 1 -o /dev/null -q "http://[2001:db8:a::1]:80" # ask tcpdump to stop so we can check the packet capture jexec ${j}c kill -s SIGINT $tcpdumppid # Check for 'incorrect' in packet capture, this should tell us if # checksums are bad with rdr rules count=$(jexec ${j}c tcpdump -vvvv -r ${PWD}/${j}.pcap | grep incorrect | wc -l) atf_check_equal " 0" "$count" } tcp_v6_cleanup() { pft_cleanup } + +atf_test_case "srcport" "cleanup" +srcport_head() +{ + atf_set descr 'TCP rdr srcport modulation' + atf_set require.user root + atf_set require.progs python3 + atf_set timeout 9999 +} + +# +# Test that rdr works for multiple TCP with same srcip and srcport. +# +# Four jails, a, b, c, d, are used: +# - jail d runs a server on port 8888, +# - jail a makes connections to the server, routed through jails b and c, +# - jail b uses NAT to rewrite source addresses and ports to the same 2-tuple, +# avoiding the need to use SO_REUSEADDR in jail a, +# - jail c uses a redirect rule to map the destination address to the same +# address and port, resulting in a NAT state conflict. +# +# In this case, the rdr rule should also rewrite the source port (again) to +# resolve the state conflict. +# +srcport_body() +{ + pft_init + + j="rdr:srcport" + epair1=$(vnet_mkepair) + epair2=$(vnet_mkepair) + epair3=$(vnet_mkepair) + + echo $epair_one + echo $epair_two + + vnet_mkjail ${j}a ${epair1}a + vnet_mkjail ${j}b ${epair1}b ${epair2}a + vnet_mkjail ${j}c ${epair2}b ${epair3}a + vnet_mkjail ${j}d ${epair3}b + + # configure addresses for a + jexec ${j}a ifconfig lo0 up + jexec ${j}a ifconfig ${epair1}a inet 198.51.100.50/24 up + jexec ${j}a ifconfig ${epair1}a inet alias 198.51.100.51/24 + jexec ${j}a ifconfig ${epair1}a inet alias 198.51.100.52/24 + + # configure addresses for b + jexec ${j}b ifconfig lo0 up + jexec ${j}b ifconfig ${epair1}b inet 198.51.100.1/24 up + jexec ${j}b ifconfig ${epair2}a inet 198.51.101.2/24 up + + # configure addresses for c + jexec ${j}c ifconfig lo0 up + jexec ${j}c ifconfig ${epair2}b inet 198.51.101.3/24 up + jexec ${j}c ifconfig ${epair2}b inet alias 198.51.101.4/24 + jexec ${j}c ifconfig ${epair2}b inet alias 198.51.101.5/24 + jexec ${j}c ifconfig ${epair3}a inet 203.0.113.1/24 up + + # configure addresses for d + jexec ${j}d ifconfig lo0 up + jexec ${j}d ifconfig ${epair3}b inet 203.0.113.50/24 up + + jexec ${j}b sysctl net.inet.ip.forwarding=1 + jexec ${j}c sysctl net.inet.ip.forwarding=1 + jexec ${j}b pfctl -e + jexec ${j}c pfctl -e + + pft_set_rules ${j}b \ + "set debug misc" \ + "nat on ${epair2}a inet from 198.51.100.0/24 to any -> ${epair2}a static-port" + + pft_set_rules ${j}c \ + "set debug misc" \ + "rdr on ${epair2}b proto tcp from any to ${epair2}b port 7777 -> 203.0.113.50 port 8888" + + jexec ${j}a route add default 198.51.100.1 + jexec ${j}c route add 198.51.100.0/24 198.51.101.2 + jexec ${j}d route add 198.51.101.0/24 203.0.113.1 + + jexec ${j}d python3 $(atf_get_srcdir)/rdr-srcport.py & + sleep 1 + + echo a | jexec ${j}a nc -w 3 -s 198.51.100.50 -p 1234 198.51.101.3 7777 > port1 + + jexec ${j}a nc -s 198.51.100.51 -p 1234 198.51.101.4 7777 > port2 & + jexec ${j}a nc -s 198.51.100.52 -p 1234 198.51.101.5 7777 > port3 & + sleep 1 + + atf_check -o inline:"1234" cat port1 + atf_check -o match:"[0-9]+" -o not-inline:"1234" cat port2 + atf_check -o match:"[0-9]+" -o not-inline:"1234" cat port3 +} + +srcport_cleanup() +{ + pft_cleanup +} + atf_init_test_cases() { atf_add_test_case "tcp_v6" + atf_add_test_case "srcport" }