diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c index c9c220c3b56d..fd29ca424848 100644 --- a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c +++ b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c @@ -1,4289 +1,4290 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD * * Copyright (c) 1999 Poul-Henning Kamp. * Copyright (c) 2008 Bjoern A. Zeeb. * Copyright (c) 2009 James Gritton. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include "opt_ddb.h" #include "opt_inet.h" #include "opt_inet6.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef DDB #include #endif /* DDB */ #include #define PRISON0_HOSTUUID_MODULE "hostuuid" MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON, "prison", "Prison structures"); static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON_RACCT, "prison_racct", "Prison racct structures"); /* Keep struct prison prison0 and some code in kern_jail_set() readable. */ #ifdef INET #ifdef INET6 #define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP4_SADDRSEL|PR_IP6_SADDRSEL #else #define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP4_SADDRSEL #endif #else /* !INET */ #ifdef INET6 #define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL PR_IP6_SADDRSEL #else #define _PR_IP_SADDRSEL 0 #endif #endif /* prison0 describes what is "real" about the system. */ struct prison prison0 = { .pr_id = 0, .pr_name = "0", .pr_ref = 1, .pr_uref = 1, .pr_path = "/", .pr_securelevel = -1, .pr_devfs_rsnum = 0, .pr_childmax = JAIL_MAX, .pr_hostuuid = DEFAULT_HOSTUUID, .pr_children = LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(prison0.pr_children), #ifdef VIMAGE .pr_flags = PR_HOST|PR_VNET|_PR_IP_SADDRSEL, #else .pr_flags = PR_HOST|_PR_IP_SADDRSEL, #endif .pr_allow = PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC, }; MTX_SYSINIT(prison0, &prison0.pr_mtx, "jail mutex", MTX_DEF); struct bool_flags { const char *name; const char *noname; unsigned flag; }; struct jailsys_flags { const char *name; unsigned disable; unsigned new; }; /* allprison, allprison_racct and lastprid are protected by allprison_lock. */ struct sx allprison_lock; SX_SYSINIT(allprison_lock, &allprison_lock, "allprison"); struct prisonlist allprison = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(allprison); LIST_HEAD(, prison_racct) allprison_racct; int lastprid = 0; static int do_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct prison *pr); static void prison_complete(void *context, int pending); static void prison_deref(struct prison *pr, int flags); static char *prison_path(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2); static void prison_remove_one(struct prison *pr); #ifdef RACCT static void prison_racct_attach(struct prison *pr); static void prison_racct_modify(struct prison *pr); static void prison_racct_detach(struct prison *pr); #endif /* Flags for prison_deref */ #define PD_DEREF 0x01 #define PD_DEUREF 0x02 #define PD_LOCKED 0x04 #define PD_LIST_SLOCKED 0x08 #define PD_LIST_XLOCKED 0x10 /* * Parameter names corresponding to PR_* flag values. Size values are for kvm * as we cannot figure out the size of a sparse array, or an array without a * terminating entry. */ static struct bool_flags pr_flag_bool[] = { {"persist", "nopersist", PR_PERSIST}, #ifdef INET {"ip4.saddrsel", "ip4.nosaddrsel", PR_IP4_SADDRSEL}, #endif #ifdef INET6 {"ip6.saddrsel", "ip6.nosaddrsel", PR_IP6_SADDRSEL}, #endif }; const size_t pr_flag_bool_size = sizeof(pr_flag_bool); static struct jailsys_flags pr_flag_jailsys[] = { {"host", 0, PR_HOST}, #ifdef VIMAGE {"vnet", 0, PR_VNET}, #endif #ifdef INET {"ip4", PR_IP4_USER, PR_IP4_USER}, #endif #ifdef INET6 {"ip6", PR_IP6_USER, PR_IP6_USER}, #endif }; const size_t pr_flag_jailsys_size = sizeof(pr_flag_jailsys); /* Make this array full-size so dynamic parameters can be added. */ static struct bool_flags pr_flag_allow[NBBY * NBPW] = { {"allow.set_hostname", "allow.noset_hostname", PR_ALLOW_SET_HOSTNAME}, {"allow.sysvipc", "allow.nosysvipc", PR_ALLOW_SYSVIPC}, {"allow.raw_sockets", "allow.noraw_sockets", PR_ALLOW_RAW_SOCKETS}, {"allow.chflags", "allow.nochflags", PR_ALLOW_CHFLAGS}, {"allow.mount", "allow.nomount", PR_ALLOW_MOUNT}, {"allow.quotas", "allow.noquotas", PR_ALLOW_QUOTAS}, {"allow.socket_af", "allow.nosocket_af", PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF}, {"allow.mlock", "allow.nomlock", PR_ALLOW_MLOCK}, {"allow.reserved_ports", "allow.noreserved_ports", PR_ALLOW_RESERVED_PORTS}, {"allow.read_msgbuf", "allow.noread_msgbuf", PR_ALLOW_READ_MSGBUF}, }; const size_t pr_flag_allow_size = sizeof(pr_flag_allow); #define JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW (PR_ALLOW_SET_HOSTNAME | PR_ALLOW_RESERVED_PORTS) #define JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS 2 #define JAIL_DEFAULT_DEVFS_RSNUM 0 static unsigned jail_default_allow = JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW; static int jail_default_enforce_statfs = JAIL_DEFAULT_ENFORCE_STATFS; static int jail_default_devfs_rsnum = JAIL_DEFAULT_DEVFS_RSNUM; #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) static unsigned jail_max_af_ips = 255; #endif /* * Initialize the parts of prison0 that can't be static-initialized with * constants. This is called from proc0_init() after creating thread0 cpuset. */ void prison0_init(void) { uint8_t *file, *data; size_t size; prison0.pr_cpuset = cpuset_ref(thread0.td_cpuset); prison0.pr_osreldate = osreldate; strlcpy(prison0.pr_osrelease, osrelease, sizeof(prison0.pr_osrelease)); /* If we have a preloaded hostuuid, use it. */ file = preload_search_by_type(PRISON0_HOSTUUID_MODULE); if (file != NULL) { data = preload_fetch_addr(file); size = preload_fetch_size(file); if (data != NULL) { /* * The preloaded data may include trailing whitespace, almost * certainly a newline; skip over any whitespace or * non-printable characters to be safe. */ while (size > 0 && data[size - 1] <= 0x20) { data[size--] = '\0'; } if (validate_uuid(data, size, NULL, 0) == 0) { (void)strlcpy(prison0.pr_hostuuid, data, size + 1); } else if (bootverbose) { printf("hostuuid: preload data malformed: '%s'", data); } } } if (bootverbose) printf("hostuuid: using %s\n", prison0.pr_hostuuid); } /* * struct jail_args { * struct jail *jail; * }; */ int sys_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap) { uint32_t version; int error; struct jail j; error = copyin(uap->jail, &version, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (error) return (error); switch (version) { case 0: { struct jail_v0 j0; /* FreeBSD single IPv4 jails. */ bzero(&j, sizeof(struct jail)); error = copyin(uap->jail, &j0, sizeof(struct jail_v0)); if (error) return (error); j.version = j0.version; j.path = j0.path; j.hostname = j0.hostname; j.ip4s = htonl(j0.ip_number); /* jail_v0 is host order */ break; } case 1: /* * Version 1 was used by multi-IPv4 jail implementations * that never made it into the official kernel. */ return (EINVAL); case 2: /* JAIL_API_VERSION */ /* FreeBSD multi-IPv4/IPv6,noIP jails. */ error = copyin(uap->jail, &j, sizeof(struct jail)); if (error) return (error); break; default: /* Sci-Fi jails are not supported, sorry. */ return (EINVAL); } return (kern_jail(td, &j)); } int kern_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail *j) { struct iovec optiov[2 * (4 + nitems(pr_flag_allow) #ifdef INET + 1 #endif #ifdef INET6 + 1 #endif )]; struct uio opt; char *u_path, *u_hostname, *u_name; struct bool_flags *bf; #ifdef INET uint32_t ip4s; struct in_addr *u_ip4; #endif #ifdef INET6 struct in6_addr *u_ip6; #endif size_t tmplen; int error, enforce_statfs; bzero(&optiov, sizeof(optiov)); opt.uio_iov = optiov; opt.uio_iovcnt = 0; opt.uio_offset = -1; opt.uio_resid = -1; opt.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE; opt.uio_rw = UIO_READ; opt.uio_td = td; /* Set permissions for top-level jails from sysctls. */ if (!jailed(td->td_ucred)) { for (bf = pr_flag_allow; bf < pr_flag_allow + nitems(pr_flag_allow) && bf->flag != 0; bf++) { optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, (jail_default_allow & bf->flag) ? bf->name : bf->noname); optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = strlen(optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base) + 1; opt.uio_iovcnt += 2; } optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "enforce_statfs"; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("enforce_statfs"); opt.uio_iovcnt++; enforce_statfs = jail_default_enforce_statfs; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = &enforce_statfs; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof(enforce_statfs); opt.uio_iovcnt++; } tmplen = MAXPATHLEN + MAXHOSTNAMELEN + MAXHOSTNAMELEN; #ifdef INET ip4s = (j->version == 0) ? 1 : j->ip4s; if (ip4s > jail_max_af_ips) return (EINVAL); tmplen += ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr); #else if (j->ip4s > 0) return (EINVAL); #endif #ifdef INET6 if (j->ip6s > jail_max_af_ips) return (EINVAL); tmplen += j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr); #else if (j->ip6s > 0) return (EINVAL); #endif u_path = malloc(tmplen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); u_hostname = u_path + MAXPATHLEN; u_name = u_hostname + MAXHOSTNAMELEN; #ifdef INET u_ip4 = (struct in_addr *)(u_name + MAXHOSTNAMELEN); #endif #ifdef INET6 #ifdef INET u_ip6 = (struct in6_addr *)(u_ip4 + ip4s); #else u_ip6 = (struct in6_addr *)(u_name + MAXHOSTNAMELEN); #endif #endif optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "path"; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("path"); opt.uio_iovcnt++; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_path; error = copyinstr(j->path, u_path, MAXPATHLEN, &optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); if (error) { free(u_path, M_TEMP); return (error); } opt.uio_iovcnt++; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "host.hostname"; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("host.hostname"); opt.uio_iovcnt++; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_hostname; error = copyinstr(j->hostname, u_hostname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, &optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); if (error) { free(u_path, M_TEMP); return (error); } opt.uio_iovcnt++; if (j->jailname != NULL) { optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "name"; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("name"); opt.uio_iovcnt++; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_name; error = copyinstr(j->jailname, u_name, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, &optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); if (error) { free(u_path, M_TEMP); return (error); } opt.uio_iovcnt++; } #ifdef INET optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "ip4.addr"; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("ip4.addr"); opt.uio_iovcnt++; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_ip4; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr); if (j->version == 0) u_ip4->s_addr = j->ip4s; else { error = copyin(j->ip4, u_ip4, optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); if (error) { free(u_path, M_TEMP); return (error); } } opt.uio_iovcnt++; #endif #ifdef INET6 optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = "ip6.addr"; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = sizeof("ip6.addr"); opt.uio_iovcnt++; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_base = u_ip6; optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len = j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr); error = copyin(j->ip6, u_ip6, optiov[opt.uio_iovcnt].iov_len); if (error) { free(u_path, M_TEMP); return (error); } opt.uio_iovcnt++; #endif KASSERT(opt.uio_iovcnt <= nitems(optiov), ("kern_jail: too many iovecs (%d)", opt.uio_iovcnt)); error = kern_jail_set(td, &opt, JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_ATTACH); free(u_path, M_TEMP); return (error); } /* * struct jail_set_args { * struct iovec *iovp; * unsigned int iovcnt; * int flags; * }; */ int sys_jail_set(struct thread *td, struct jail_set_args *uap) { struct uio *auio; int error; /* Check that we have an even number of iovecs. */ if (uap->iovcnt & 1) return (EINVAL); error = copyinuio(uap->iovp, uap->iovcnt, &auio); if (error) return (error); error = kern_jail_set(td, auio, uap->flags); free(auio, M_IOV); return (error); } int kern_jail_set(struct thread *td, struct uio *optuio, int flags) { struct nameidata nd; #ifdef INET struct in_addr *ip4; #endif #ifdef INET6 struct in6_addr *ip6; #endif struct vfsopt *opt; struct vfsoptlist *opts; struct prison *pr, *deadpr, *mypr, *ppr, *tpr; struct vnode *root; char *domain, *errmsg, *host, *name, *namelc, *p, *path, *uuid; char *g_path, *osrelstr; struct bool_flags *bf; struct jailsys_flags *jsf; #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) struct prison *tppr; void *op; #endif unsigned long hid; size_t namelen, onamelen, pnamelen; int born, created, cuflags, descend, enforce; int error, errmsg_len, errmsg_pos; int gotchildmax, gotenforce, gothid, gotrsnum, gotslevel; int jid, jsys, len, level; int childmax, osreldt, rsnum, slevel; int fullpath_disabled; #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) int ii, ij; #endif #ifdef INET int ip4s, redo_ip4; #endif #ifdef INET6 int ip6s, redo_ip6; #endif uint64_t pr_allow, ch_allow, pr_flags, ch_flags; unsigned tallow; char numbuf[12]; error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_SET); if (!error && (flags & JAIL_ATTACH)) error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH); if (error) return (error); mypr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison; if ((flags & JAIL_CREATE) && mypr->pr_childmax == 0) return (EPERM); if (flags & ~JAIL_SET_MASK) return (EINVAL); /* * Check all the parameters before committing to anything. Not all * errors can be caught early, but we may as well try. Also, this * takes care of some expensive stuff (path lookup) before getting * the allprison lock. * * XXX Jails are not filesystems, and jail parameters are not mount * options. But it makes more sense to re-use the vfsopt code * than duplicate it under a different name. */ error = vfs_buildopts(optuio, &opts); if (error) return (error); #ifdef INET ip4 = NULL; #endif #ifdef INET6 ip6 = NULL; #endif g_path = NULL; cuflags = flags & (JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_UPDATE); if (!cuflags) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "no valid operation (create or update)"); goto done_errmsg; } error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "jid", &jid, sizeof(jid)); if (error == ENOENT) jid = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "securelevel", &slevel, sizeof(slevel)); if (error == ENOENT) gotslevel = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else gotslevel = 1; error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "children.max", &childmax, sizeof(childmax)); if (error == ENOENT) gotchildmax = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else gotchildmax = 1; error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "enforce_statfs", &enforce, sizeof(enforce)); if (error == ENOENT) gotenforce = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else if (enforce < 0 || enforce > 2) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } else gotenforce = 1; error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "devfs_ruleset", &rsnum, sizeof(rsnum)); if (error == ENOENT) gotrsnum = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else gotrsnum = 1; pr_flags = ch_flags = 0; for (bf = pr_flag_bool; bf < pr_flag_bool + nitems(pr_flag_bool); bf++) { vfs_flagopt(opts, bf->name, &pr_flags, bf->flag); vfs_flagopt(opts, bf->noname, &ch_flags, bf->flag); } ch_flags |= pr_flags; for (jsf = pr_flag_jailsys; jsf < pr_flag_jailsys + nitems(pr_flag_jailsys); jsf++) { error = vfs_copyopt(opts, jsf->name, &jsys, sizeof(jsys)); if (error == ENOENT) continue; if (error != 0) goto done_free; switch (jsys) { case JAIL_SYS_DISABLE: if (!jsf->disable) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } pr_flags |= jsf->disable; break; case JAIL_SYS_NEW: pr_flags |= jsf->new; break; case JAIL_SYS_INHERIT: break; default: error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } ch_flags |= jsf->new | jsf->disable; } if ((flags & (JAIL_CREATE | JAIL_UPDATE | JAIL_ATTACH)) == JAIL_CREATE && !(pr_flags & PR_PERSIST)) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "new jail must persist or attach"); goto done_errmsg; } #ifdef VIMAGE if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_VNET)) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "vnet cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_errmsg; } #endif #ifdef INET if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "ip4 cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_errmsg; } #endif #ifdef INET6 if ((flags & JAIL_UPDATE) && (ch_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "ip6 cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_errmsg; } #endif pr_allow = ch_allow = 0; for (bf = pr_flag_allow; bf < pr_flag_allow + nitems(pr_flag_allow) && bf->flag != 0; bf++) { vfs_flagopt(opts, bf->name, &pr_allow, bf->flag); vfs_flagopt(opts, bf->noname, &ch_allow, bf->flag); } ch_allow |= pr_allow; error = vfs_getopt(opts, "name", (void **)&name, &len); if (error == ENOENT) name = NULL; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { if (len == 0 || name[len - 1] != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; goto done_free; } } error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.hostname", (void **)&host, &len); if (error == ENOENT) host = NULL; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { ch_flags |= PR_HOST; pr_flags |= PR_HOST; if (len == 0 || host[len - 1] != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; goto done_free; } } error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.domainname", (void **)&domain, &len); if (error == ENOENT) domain = NULL; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { ch_flags |= PR_HOST; pr_flags |= PR_HOST; if (len == 0 || domain[len - 1] != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if (len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; goto done_free; } } error = vfs_getopt(opts, "host.hostuuid", (void **)&uuid, &len); if (error == ENOENT) uuid = NULL; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { ch_flags |= PR_HOST; pr_flags |= PR_HOST; if (len == 0 || uuid[len - 1] != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if (len > HOSTUUIDLEN) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; goto done_free; } } #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32 if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) { uint32_t hid32; error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid32, sizeof(hid32)); hid = hid32; } else #endif error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid, sizeof(hid)); if (error == ENOENT) gothid = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { gothid = 1; ch_flags |= PR_HOST; pr_flags |= PR_HOST; } #ifdef INET error = vfs_getopt(opts, "ip4.addr", &op, &ip4s); if (error == ENOENT) ip4s = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else if (ip4s & (sizeof(*ip4) - 1)) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } else { ch_flags |= PR_IP4_USER; pr_flags |= PR_IP4_USER; if (ip4s > 0) { ip4s /= sizeof(*ip4); if (ip4s > jail_max_af_ips) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "too many IPv4 addresses"); goto done_errmsg; } ip4 = malloc(ip4s * sizeof(*ip4), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); bcopy(op, ip4, ip4s * sizeof(*ip4)); /* * IP addresses are all sorted but ip[0] to preserve * the primary IP address as given from userland. * This special IP is used for unbound outgoing * connections as well for "loopback" traffic in case * source address selection cannot find any more fitting * address to connect from. */ if (ip4s > 1) qsort(ip4 + 1, ip4s - 1, sizeof(*ip4), prison_qcmp_v4); /* * Check for duplicate addresses and do some simple * zero and broadcast checks. If users give other bogus * addresses it is their problem. * * We do not have to care about byte order for these * checks so we will do them in NBO. */ for (ii = 0; ii < ip4s; ii++) { if (ip4[ii].s_addr == INADDR_ANY || ip4[ii].s_addr == INADDR_BROADCAST) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if ((ii+1) < ip4s && (ip4[0].s_addr == ip4[ii+1].s_addr || ip4[ii].s_addr == ip4[ii+1].s_addr)) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } } } } #endif #ifdef INET6 error = vfs_getopt(opts, "ip6.addr", &op, &ip6s); if (error == ENOENT) ip6s = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else if (ip6s & (sizeof(*ip6) - 1)) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } else { ch_flags |= PR_IP6_USER; pr_flags |= PR_IP6_USER; if (ip6s > 0) { ip6s /= sizeof(*ip6); if (ip6s > jail_max_af_ips) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "too many IPv6 addresses"); goto done_errmsg; } ip6 = malloc(ip6s * sizeof(*ip6), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); bcopy(op, ip6, ip6s * sizeof(*ip6)); if (ip6s > 1) qsort(ip6 + 1, ip6s - 1, sizeof(*ip6), prison_qcmp_v6); for (ii = 0; ii < ip6s; ii++) { if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6[ii])) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if ((ii+1) < ip6s && (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[0], &ip6[ii+1]) || IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[ii], &ip6[ii+1]))) { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } } } } #endif #if defined(VIMAGE) && (defined(INET) || defined(INET6)) if ((ch_flags & PR_VNET) && (ch_flags & (PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP6_USER))) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "vnet jails cannot have IP address restrictions"); goto done_errmsg; } #endif error = vfs_getopt(opts, "osrelease", (void **)&osrelstr, &len); if (error == ENOENT) osrelstr = NULL; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { if (flags & JAIL_UPDATE) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "osrelease cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_errmsg; } if (len == 0 || osrelstr[len - 1] != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if (len >= OSRELEASELEN) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; vfs_opterror(opts, "osrelease string must be 1-%d bytes long", OSRELEASELEN - 1); goto done_errmsg; } } error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "osreldate", &osreldt, sizeof(osreldt)); if (error == ENOENT) osreldt = 0; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { if (flags & JAIL_UPDATE) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "osreldate cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_errmsg; } if (osreldt == 0) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "osreldate cannot be 0"); goto done_errmsg; } } fullpath_disabled = 0; root = NULL; error = vfs_getopt(opts, "path", (void **)&path, &len); if (error == ENOENT) path = NULL; else if (error != 0) goto done_free; else { if (flags & JAIL_UPDATE) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "path cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_errmsg; } if (len == 0 || path[len - 1] != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto done_free; } if (len < 2 || (len == 2 && path[0] == '/')) path = NULL; else { NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_SYSSPACE, path, td); error = namei(&nd); if (error) goto done_free; root = nd.ni_vp; NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF); g_path = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); strlcpy(g_path, path, MAXPATHLEN); error = vn_path_to_global_path(td, root, g_path, MAXPATHLEN); if (error == 0) path = g_path; else if (error == ENODEV) { /* means sysctl debug.disablefullpath == 1 */ fullpath_disabled = 1; } else { /* exit on other errors */ goto done_free; } if (root->v_type != VDIR) { error = ENOTDIR; vput(root); goto done_free; } VOP_UNLOCK(root, 0); if (fullpath_disabled) { /* Leave room for a real-root full pathname. */ if (len + (path[0] == '/' && strcmp(mypr->pr_path, "/") ? strlen(mypr->pr_path) : 0) > MAXPATHLEN) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; vrele(root); goto done_free; } } } } /* * Find the specified jail, or at least its parent. * This abuses the file error codes ENOENT and EEXIST. */ pr = NULL; ppr = mypr; if (cuflags == JAIL_CREATE && jid == 0 && name != NULL) { namelc = strrchr(name, '.'); jid = strtoul(namelc != NULL ? namelc + 1 : name, &p, 10); if (*p != '\0') jid = 0; } sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); if (jid != 0) { /* * See if a requested jid already exists. There is an * information leak here if the jid exists but is not within * the caller's jail hierarchy. Jail creators will get EEXIST * even though they cannot see the jail, and CREATE | UPDATE * will return ENOENT which is not normally a valid error. */ if (jid < 0) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "negative jid"); goto done_unlock_list; } pr = prison_find(jid); if (pr != NULL) { ppr = pr->pr_parent; /* Create: jid must not exist. */ if (cuflags == JAIL_CREATE) { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); error = EEXIST; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d already exists", jid); goto done_unlock_list; } if (!prison_ischild(mypr, pr)) { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); pr = NULL; } else if (pr->pr_uref == 0) { if (!(flags & JAIL_DYING)) { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d is dying", jid); goto done_unlock_list; } else if ((flags & JAIL_ATTACH) || (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST)) { /* * A dying jail might be resurrected * (via attach or persist), but first * it must determine if another jail * has claimed its name. Accomplish * this by implicitly re-setting the * name. */ if (name == NULL) name = prison_name(mypr, pr); } } } if (pr == NULL) { /* Update: jid must exist. */ if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE) { error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d not found", jid); goto done_unlock_list; } } } /* * If the caller provided a name, look for a jail by that name. * This has different semantics for creates and updates keyed by jid * (where the name must not already exist in a different jail), * and updates keyed by the name itself (where the name must exist * because that is the jail being updated). */ namelc = NULL; if (name != NULL) { namelc = strrchr(name, '.'); if (namelc == NULL) namelc = name; else { /* * This is a hierarchical name. Split it into the * parent and child names, and make sure the parent * exists or matches an already found jail. */ if (pr != NULL) { if (strncmp(name, ppr->pr_name, namelc - name) || ppr->pr_name[namelc - name] != '\0') { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "cannot change jail's parent"); goto done_unlock_list; } } else { *namelc = '\0'; ppr = prison_find_name(mypr, name); if (ppr == NULL) { error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found", name); goto done_unlock_list; } mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx); *namelc = '.'; } namelc++; } if (namelc[0] != '\0') { pnamelen = (ppr == &prison0) ? 0 : strlen(ppr->pr_name) + 1; name_again: deadpr = NULL; FOREACH_PRISON_CHILD(ppr, tpr) { if (tpr != pr && tpr->pr_ref > 0 && !strcmp(tpr->pr_name + pnamelen, namelc)) { if (pr == NULL && cuflags != JAIL_CREATE) { mtx_lock(&tpr->pr_mtx); if (tpr->pr_ref > 0) { /* * Use this jail * for updates. */ if (tpr->pr_uref > 0) { pr = tpr; break; } deadpr = tpr; } mtx_unlock(&tpr->pr_mtx); } else if (tpr->pr_uref > 0) { /* * Create, or update(jid): * name must not exist in an * active sibling jail. */ error = EEXIST; if (pr != NULL) mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" already exists", name); goto done_unlock_list; } } } /* If no active jail is found, use a dying one. */ if (deadpr != NULL && pr == NULL) { if (flags & JAIL_DYING) { mtx_lock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); if (deadpr->pr_ref == 0) { mtx_unlock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); goto name_again; } pr = deadpr; } else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE) { error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" is dying", name); goto done_unlock_list; } } /* Update: name must exist if no jid. */ else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE && pr == NULL) { error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found", name); goto done_unlock_list; } } } /* Update: must provide a jid or name. */ else if (cuflags == JAIL_UPDATE && pr == NULL) { error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "update specified no jail"); goto done_unlock_list; } /* If there's no prison to update, create a new one and link it in. */ if (pr == NULL) { for (tpr = mypr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent) if (tpr->pr_childcount >= tpr->pr_childmax) { error = EPERM; vfs_opterror(opts, "prison limit exceeded"); goto done_unlock_list; } created = 1; mtx_lock(&ppr->pr_mtx); if (ppr->pr_ref == 0) { mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx); error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found", prison_name(mypr, ppr)); goto done_unlock_list; } ppr->pr_ref++; ppr->pr_uref++; mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx); pr = malloc(sizeof(*pr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); if (jid == 0) { /* Find the next free jid. */ jid = lastprid + 1; findnext: if (jid == JAIL_MAX) jid = 1; TAILQ_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) { if (tpr->pr_id < jid) continue; if (tpr->pr_id > jid || tpr->pr_ref == 0) { TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(tpr, pr, pr_list); break; } if (jid == lastprid) { error = EAGAIN; vfs_opterror(opts, "no available jail IDs"); free(pr, M_PRISON); prison_deref(ppr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); goto done_releroot; } jid++; goto findnext; } lastprid = jid; } else { /* * The jail already has a jid (that did not yet exist), * so just find where to insert it. */ TAILQ_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) if (tpr->pr_id >= jid) { TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(tpr, pr, pr_list); break; } } if (tpr == NULL) TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&allprison, pr, pr_list); LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ppr->pr_children, pr, pr_sibling); for (tpr = ppr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent) tpr->pr_childcount++; pr->pr_parent = ppr; pr->pr_id = jid; /* Set some default values, and inherit some from the parent. */ if (namelc == NULL) namelc = ""; if (path == NULL) { path = "/"; root = mypr->pr_root; vref(root); } strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, DEFAULT_HOSTUUID, HOSTUUIDLEN); pr->pr_flags |= PR_HOST; #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) #ifdef VIMAGE if (!(pr_flags & PR_VNET)) #endif { #ifdef INET if (!(ch_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP4 | PR_IP4_USER; else if (!(pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) { pr->pr_flags |= ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP4; if (ppr->pr_ip4 != NULL) { pr->pr_ip4s = ppr->pr_ip4s; pr->pr_ip4 = malloc(pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); bcopy(ppr->pr_ip4, pr->pr_ip4, pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4)); } } #endif #ifdef INET6 if (!(ch_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP6 | PR_IP6_USER; else if (!(pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) { pr->pr_flags |= ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP6; if (ppr->pr_ip6 != NULL) { pr->pr_ip6s = ppr->pr_ip6s; pr->pr_ip6 = malloc(pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); bcopy(ppr->pr_ip6, pr->pr_ip6, pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6)); } } #endif } #endif /* Source address selection is always on by default. */ pr->pr_flags |= _PR_IP_SADDRSEL; pr->pr_securelevel = ppr->pr_securelevel; pr->pr_allow = JAIL_DEFAULT_ALLOW & ppr->pr_allow; pr->pr_enforce_statfs = jail_default_enforce_statfs; pr->pr_devfs_rsnum = ppr->pr_devfs_rsnum; pr->pr_osreldate = osreldt ? osreldt : ppr->pr_osreldate; if (osrelstr == NULL) strlcpy(pr->pr_osrelease, ppr->pr_osrelease, sizeof(pr->pr_osrelease)); else strlcpy(pr->pr_osrelease, osrelstr, sizeof(pr->pr_osrelease)); LIST_INIT(&pr->pr_children); mtx_init(&pr->pr_mtx, "jail mutex", NULL, MTX_DEF | MTX_DUPOK); TASK_INIT(&pr->pr_task, 0, prison_complete, pr); #ifdef VIMAGE /* Allocate a new vnet if specified. */ pr->pr_vnet = (pr_flags & PR_VNET) ? vnet_alloc() : ppr->pr_vnet; #endif /* * Allocate a dedicated cpuset for each jail. * Unlike other initial settings, this may return an error. */ error = cpuset_create_root(ppr, &pr->pr_cpuset); if (error) { prison_deref(pr, PD_LIST_XLOCKED); goto done_releroot; } mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); /* * New prisons do not yet have a reference, because we do not * want others to see the incomplete prison once the * allprison_lock is downgraded. */ } else { created = 0; /* * Grab a reference for existing prisons, to ensure they * continue to exist for the duration of the call. */ pr->pr_ref++; #if defined(VIMAGE) && (defined(INET) || defined(INET6)) if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) && (ch_flags & (PR_IP4_USER | PR_IP6_USER))) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "vnet jails cannot have IP address restrictions"); goto done_deref_locked; } #endif #ifdef INET if (PR_IP4_USER & ch_flags & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags)) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "ip4 cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_deref_locked; } #endif #ifdef INET6 if (PR_IP6_USER & ch_flags & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags)) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "ip6 cannot be changed after creation"); goto done_deref_locked; } #endif } /* Do final error checking before setting anything. */ if (gotslevel) { if (slevel < ppr->pr_securelevel) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } } if (gotchildmax) { if (childmax >= ppr->pr_childmax) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } } if (gotenforce) { if (enforce < ppr->pr_enforce_statfs) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } } if (gotrsnum) { /* * devfs_rsnum is a uint16_t */ if (rsnum < 0 || rsnum > 65535) { error = EINVAL; goto done_deref_locked; } /* * Nested jails always inherit parent's devfs ruleset */ if (jailed(td->td_ucred)) { if (rsnum > 0 && rsnum != ppr->pr_devfs_rsnum) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } else rsnum = ppr->pr_devfs_rsnum; } } #ifdef INET if (ip4s > 0) { if (ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) { /* * Make sure the new set of IP addresses is a * subset of the parent's list. Don't worry * about the parent being unlocked, as any * setting is done with allprison_lock held. */ for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++) if (ip4[0].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr) break; if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } if (ip4s > 1) { for (ii = ij = 1; ii < ip4s; ii++) { if (ip4[ii].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr) continue; for (; ij < ppr->pr_ip4s; ij++) if (ip4[ii].s_addr == ppr->pr_ip4[ij].s_addr) break; if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) break; } if (ij == ppr->pr_ip4s) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } } } /* * Check for conflicting IP addresses. We permit them * if there is no more than one IP on each jail. If * there is a duplicate on a jail with more than one * IP stop checking and return error. */ #ifdef VIMAGE for (tppr = ppr; tppr != &prison0; tppr = tppr->pr_parent) if (tppr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) break; #else tppr = &prison0; #endif FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(tppr, tpr, descend) { if (tpr == pr || #ifdef VIMAGE (tpr != tppr && (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)) || #endif tpr->pr_uref == 0) { descend = 0; continue; } if (!(tpr->pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER)) continue; descend = 0; if (tpr->pr_ip4 == NULL || (ip4s == 1 && tpr->pr_ip4s == 1)) continue; for (ii = 0; ii < ip4s; ii++) { if (prison_check_ip4_locked(tpr, &ip4[ii]) == 0) { error = EADDRINUSE; vfs_opterror(opts, "IPv4 addresses clash"); goto done_deref_locked; } } } } #endif #ifdef INET6 if (ip6s > 0) { if (ppr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) { /* * Make sure the new set of IP addresses is a * subset of the parent's list. */ for (ij = 0; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++) if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[0], &ppr->pr_ip6[ij])) break; if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } if (ip6s > 1) { for (ii = ij = 1; ii < ip6s; ii++) { if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[ii], &ppr->pr_ip6[0])) continue; for (; ij < ppr->pr_ip6s; ij++) if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL( &ip6[ii], &ppr->pr_ip6[ij])) break; if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) break; } if (ij == ppr->pr_ip6s) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } } } /* Check for conflicting IP addresses. */ #ifdef VIMAGE for (tppr = ppr; tppr != &prison0; tppr = tppr->pr_parent) if (tppr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) break; #else tppr = &prison0; #endif FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(tppr, tpr, descend) { if (tpr == pr || #ifdef VIMAGE (tpr != tppr && (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET)) || #endif tpr->pr_uref == 0) { descend = 0; continue; } if (!(tpr->pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER)) continue; descend = 0; if (tpr->pr_ip6 == NULL || (ip6s == 1 && tpr->pr_ip6s == 1)) continue; for (ii = 0; ii < ip6s; ii++) { if (prison_check_ip6_locked(tpr, &ip6[ii]) == 0) { error = EADDRINUSE; vfs_opterror(opts, "IPv6 addresses clash"); goto done_deref_locked; } } } } #endif onamelen = namelen = 0; if (namelc != NULL) { /* Give a default name of the jid. Also allow the name to be * explicitly the jid - but not any other number, and only in * normal form (no leading zero/etc). */ if (namelc[0] == '\0') snprintf(namelc = numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), "%d", jid); else if ((strtoul(namelc, &p, 10) != jid || namelc[0] < '1' || namelc[0] > '9') && *p == '\0') { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "name cannot be numeric (unless it is the jid)"); goto done_deref_locked; } /* * Make sure the name isn't too long for the prison or its * children. */ pnamelen = (ppr == &prison0) ? 0 : strlen(ppr->pr_name) + 1; onamelen = strlen(pr->pr_name + pnamelen); namelen = strlen(namelc); if (pnamelen + namelen + 1 > sizeof(pr->pr_name)) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; goto done_deref_locked; } FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, tpr, descend) { if (strlen(tpr->pr_name) + (namelen - onamelen) >= sizeof(pr->pr_name)) { error = ENAMETOOLONG; goto done_deref_locked; } } } if (pr_allow & ~ppr->pr_allow) { error = EPERM; goto done_deref_locked; } /* * Let modules check their parameters. This requires unlocking and * then re-locking the prison, but this is still a valid state as long * as allprison_lock remains xlocked. */ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_CHECK, opts); if (error != 0) { prison_deref(pr, created ? PD_LIST_XLOCKED : PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); goto done_releroot; } mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); /* At this point, all valid parameters should have been noted. */ TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) { if (!opt->seen && strcmp(opt->name, "errmsg")) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "unknown parameter: %s", opt->name); goto done_deref_locked; } } /* Set the parameters of the prison. */ #ifdef INET redo_ip4 = 0; if (pr_flags & PR_IP4_USER) { pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP4; free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON); pr->pr_ip4s = ip4s; pr->pr_ip4 = ip4; ip4 = NULL; FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { #ifdef VIMAGE if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { descend = 0; continue; } #endif if (prison_restrict_ip4(tpr, NULL)) { redo_ip4 = 1; descend = 0; } } } #endif #ifdef INET6 redo_ip6 = 0; if (pr_flags & PR_IP6_USER) { pr->pr_flags |= PR_IP6; free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON); pr->pr_ip6s = ip6s; pr->pr_ip6 = ip6; ip6 = NULL; FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { #ifdef VIMAGE if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { descend = 0; continue; } #endif if (prison_restrict_ip6(tpr, NULL)) { redo_ip6 = 1; descend = 0; } } } #endif if (gotslevel) { pr->pr_securelevel = slevel; /* Set all child jails to be at least this level. */ FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) if (tpr->pr_securelevel < slevel) tpr->pr_securelevel = slevel; } if (gotchildmax) { pr->pr_childmax = childmax; /* Set all child jails to under this limit. */ FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED_LEVEL(pr, tpr, descend, level) if (tpr->pr_childmax > childmax - level) tpr->pr_childmax = childmax > level ? childmax - level : 0; } if (gotenforce) { pr->pr_enforce_statfs = enforce; /* Pass this restriction on to the children. */ FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) if (tpr->pr_enforce_statfs < enforce) tpr->pr_enforce_statfs = enforce; } if (gotrsnum) { pr->pr_devfs_rsnum = rsnum; /* Pass this restriction on to the children. */ FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) tpr->pr_devfs_rsnum = rsnum; } if (namelc != NULL) { if (ppr == &prison0) strlcpy(pr->pr_name, namelc, sizeof(pr->pr_name)); else snprintf(pr->pr_name, sizeof(pr->pr_name), "%s.%s", ppr->pr_name, namelc); /* Change this component of child names. */ FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { bcopy(tpr->pr_name + onamelen, tpr->pr_name + namelen, strlen(tpr->pr_name + onamelen) + 1); bcopy(pr->pr_name, tpr->pr_name, namelen); } } if (path != NULL) { /* Try to keep a real-rooted full pathname. */ if (fullpath_disabled && path[0] == '/' && strcmp(mypr->pr_path, "/")) snprintf(pr->pr_path, sizeof(pr->pr_path), "%s%s", mypr->pr_path, path); else strlcpy(pr->pr_path, path, sizeof(pr->pr_path)); pr->pr_root = root; } if (PR_HOST & ch_flags & ~pr_flags) { if (pr->pr_flags & PR_HOST) { /* * Copy the parent's host info. As with pr_ip4 above, * the lack of a lock on the parent is not a problem; * it is always set with allprison_lock at least * shared, and is held exclusively here. */ strlcpy(pr->pr_hostname, pr->pr_parent->pr_hostname, sizeof(pr->pr_hostname)); strlcpy(pr->pr_domainname, pr->pr_parent->pr_domainname, sizeof(pr->pr_domainname)); strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, pr->pr_parent->pr_hostuuid, sizeof(pr->pr_hostuuid)); pr->pr_hostid = pr->pr_parent->pr_hostid; } } else if (host != NULL || domain != NULL || uuid != NULL || gothid) { /* Set this prison, and any descendants without PR_HOST. */ if (host != NULL) strlcpy(pr->pr_hostname, host, sizeof(pr->pr_hostname)); if (domain != NULL) strlcpy(pr->pr_domainname, domain, sizeof(pr->pr_domainname)); if (uuid != NULL) strlcpy(pr->pr_hostuuid, uuid, sizeof(pr->pr_hostuuid)); if (gothid) pr->pr_hostid = hid; FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_HOST) descend = 0; else { if (host != NULL) strlcpy(tpr->pr_hostname, pr->pr_hostname, sizeof(tpr->pr_hostname)); if (domain != NULL) strlcpy(tpr->pr_domainname, pr->pr_domainname, sizeof(tpr->pr_domainname)); if (uuid != NULL) strlcpy(tpr->pr_hostuuid, pr->pr_hostuuid, sizeof(tpr->pr_hostuuid)); if (gothid) tpr->pr_hostid = hid; } } } if ((tallow = ch_allow & ~pr_allow)) { /* Clear allow bits in all children. */ FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) tpr->pr_allow &= ~tallow; } pr->pr_allow = (pr->pr_allow & ~ch_allow) | pr_allow; /* * Persistent prisons get an extra reference, and prisons losing their * persist flag lose that reference. Only do this for existing prisons * for now, so new ones will remain unseen until after the module * handlers have completed. */ born = pr->pr_uref == 0; if (!created && (ch_flags & PR_PERSIST & (pr_flags ^ pr->pr_flags))) { if (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) { pr->pr_ref++; pr->pr_uref++; } else { pr->pr_ref--; pr->pr_uref--; } } pr->pr_flags = (pr->pr_flags & ~ch_flags) | pr_flags; pr->pr_flags &= ~PR_REMOVE; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); #ifdef RACCT if (racct_enable && created) prison_racct_attach(pr); #endif /* Locks may have prevented a complete restriction of child IP * addresses. If so, allocate some more memory and try again. */ #ifdef INET while (redo_ip4) { ip4s = pr->pr_ip4s; ip4 = malloc(ip4s * sizeof(*ip4), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); redo_ip4 = 0; FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { #ifdef VIMAGE if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { descend = 0; continue; } #endif if (prison_restrict_ip4(tpr, ip4)) { if (ip4 != NULL) ip4 = NULL; else redo_ip4 = 1; } } mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } #endif #ifdef INET6 while (redo_ip6) { ip6s = pr->pr_ip6s; ip6 = malloc(ip6s * sizeof(*ip6), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK); mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); redo_ip6 = 0; FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED(pr, tpr, descend) { #ifdef VIMAGE if (tpr->pr_flags & PR_VNET) { descend = 0; continue; } #endif if (prison_restrict_ip6(tpr, ip6)) { if (ip6 != NULL) ip6 = NULL; else redo_ip6 = 1; } } mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } #endif /* Let the modules do their work. */ sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock); if (born) { error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_CREATE, opts); if (error) { (void)osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_REMOVE, NULL); prison_deref(pr, created ? PD_LIST_SLOCKED : PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); goto done_errmsg; } } error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_SET, opts); if (error) { if (born) (void)osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_REMOVE, NULL); prison_deref(pr, created ? PD_LIST_SLOCKED : PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); goto done_errmsg; } /* Attach this process to the prison if requested. */ if (flags & JAIL_ATTACH) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); error = do_jail_attach(td, pr); if (error) { vfs_opterror(opts, "attach failed"); if (!created) prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF); goto done_errmsg; } } #ifdef RACCT if (racct_enable && !created) { if (!(flags & JAIL_ATTACH)) sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); prison_racct_modify(pr); if (!(flags & JAIL_ATTACH)) sx_slock(&allprison_lock); } #endif td->td_retval[0] = pr->pr_id; /* * Now that it is all there, drop the temporary reference from existing * prisons. Or add a reference to newly created persistent prisons * (which was not done earlier so that the prison would not be publicly * visible). */ if (!created) { prison_deref(pr, (flags & JAIL_ATTACH) ? PD_DEREF : PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); } else { if (pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); pr->pr_ref++; pr->pr_uref++; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } if (!(flags & JAIL_ATTACH)) sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); } goto done_free; done_deref_locked: prison_deref(pr, created ? PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED : PD_DEREF | PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); goto done_releroot; done_unlock_list: sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); done_releroot: if (root != NULL) vrele(root); done_errmsg: if (error) { if (vfs_getopt(opts, "errmsg", (void **)&errmsg, &errmsg_len) == 0 && errmsg_len > 0) { errmsg_pos = 2 * vfs_getopt_pos(opts, "errmsg") + 1; if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) bcopy(errmsg, optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, errmsg_len); else copyout(errmsg, optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, errmsg_len); } } done_free: #ifdef INET free(ip4, M_PRISON); #endif #ifdef INET6 free(ip6, M_PRISON); #endif if (g_path != NULL) free(g_path, M_TEMP); vfs_freeopts(opts); return (error); } /* * struct jail_get_args { * struct iovec *iovp; * unsigned int iovcnt; * int flags; * }; */ int sys_jail_get(struct thread *td, struct jail_get_args *uap) { struct uio *auio; int error; /* Check that we have an even number of iovecs. */ if (uap->iovcnt & 1) return (EINVAL); error = copyinuio(uap->iovp, uap->iovcnt, &auio); if (error) return (error); error = kern_jail_get(td, auio, uap->flags); if (error == 0) error = copyout(auio->uio_iov, uap->iovp, uap->iovcnt * sizeof (struct iovec)); free(auio, M_IOV); return (error); } int kern_jail_get(struct thread *td, struct uio *optuio, int flags) { struct bool_flags *bf; struct jailsys_flags *jsf; struct prison *pr, *mypr; struct vfsopt *opt; struct vfsoptlist *opts; char *errmsg, *name; int error, errmsg_len, errmsg_pos, i, jid, len, locked, pos; unsigned f; if (flags & ~JAIL_GET_MASK) return (EINVAL); /* Get the parameter list. */ error = vfs_buildopts(optuio, &opts); if (error) return (error); errmsg_pos = vfs_getopt_pos(opts, "errmsg"); mypr = td->td_ucred->cr_prison; /* * Find the prison specified by one of: lastjid, jid, name. */ sx_slock(&allprison_lock); error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "lastjid", &jid, sizeof(jid)); if (error == 0) { TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) { if (pr->pr_id > jid && prison_ischild(mypr, pr)) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); if (pr->pr_ref > 0 && (pr->pr_uref > 0 || (flags & JAIL_DYING))) break; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } } if (pr != NULL) goto found_prison; error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "no jail after %d", jid); goto done_unlock_list; } else if (error != ENOENT) goto done_unlock_list; error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "jid", &jid, sizeof(jid)); if (error == 0) { if (jid != 0) { pr = prison_find_child(mypr, jid); if (pr != NULL) { if (pr->pr_uref == 0 && !(flags & JAIL_DYING)) { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d is dying", jid); goto done_unlock_list; } goto found_prison; } error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail %d not found", jid); goto done_unlock_list; } } else if (error != ENOENT) goto done_unlock_list; error = vfs_getopt(opts, "name", (void **)&name, &len); if (error == 0) { if (len == 0 || name[len - 1] != '\0') { error = EINVAL; goto done_unlock_list; } pr = prison_find_name(mypr, name); if (pr != NULL) { if (pr->pr_uref == 0 && !(flags & JAIL_DYING)) { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" is dying", name); goto done_unlock_list; } goto found_prison; } error = ENOENT; vfs_opterror(opts, "jail \"%s\" not found", name); goto done_unlock_list; } else if (error != ENOENT) goto done_unlock_list; vfs_opterror(opts, "no jail specified"); error = ENOENT; goto done_unlock_list; found_prison: /* Get the parameters of the prison. */ pr->pr_ref++; locked = PD_LOCKED; td->td_retval[0] = pr->pr_id; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "jid", &pr->pr_id, sizeof(pr->pr_id)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; i = (pr->pr_parent == mypr) ? 0 : pr->pr_parent->pr_id; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "parent", &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopts(opts, "name", prison_name(mypr, pr)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "cpuset.id", &pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id, sizeof(pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopts(opts, "path", prison_path(mypr, pr)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; #ifdef INET error = vfs_setopt_part(opts, "ip4.addr", pr->pr_ip4, pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip4)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; #endif #ifdef INET6 error = vfs_setopt_part(opts, "ip6.addr", pr->pr_ip6, pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(*pr->pr_ip6)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; #endif error = vfs_setopt(opts, "securelevel", &pr->pr_securelevel, sizeof(pr->pr_securelevel)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "children.cur", &pr->pr_childcount, sizeof(pr->pr_childcount)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "children.max", &pr->pr_childmax, sizeof(pr->pr_childmax)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.hostname", pr->pr_hostname); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.domainname", pr->pr_domainname); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopts(opts, "host.hostuuid", pr->pr_hostuuid); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; #ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD32 if (SV_PROC_FLAG(td->td_proc, SV_ILP32)) { uint32_t hid32 = pr->pr_hostid; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "host.hostid", &hid32, sizeof(hid32)); } else #endif error = vfs_setopt(opts, "host.hostid", &pr->pr_hostid, sizeof(pr->pr_hostid)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "enforce_statfs", &pr->pr_enforce_statfs, sizeof(pr->pr_enforce_statfs)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "devfs_ruleset", &pr->pr_devfs_rsnum, sizeof(pr->pr_devfs_rsnum)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; for (bf = pr_flag_bool; bf < pr_flag_bool + nitems(pr_flag_bool); bf++) { i = (pr->pr_flags & bf->flag) ? 1 : 0; error = vfs_setopt(opts, bf->name, &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; i = !i; error = vfs_setopt(opts, bf->noname, &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; } for (jsf = pr_flag_jailsys; jsf < pr_flag_jailsys + nitems(pr_flag_jailsys); jsf++) { f = pr->pr_flags & (jsf->disable | jsf->new); i = (f != 0 && f == jsf->disable) ? JAIL_SYS_DISABLE : (f == jsf->new) ? JAIL_SYS_NEW : JAIL_SYS_INHERIT; error = vfs_setopt(opts, jsf->name, &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; } for (bf = pr_flag_allow; bf < pr_flag_allow + nitems(pr_flag_allow) && bf->flag != 0; bf++) { i = (pr->pr_allow & bf->flag) ? 1 : 0; error = vfs_setopt(opts, bf->name, &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; i = !i; error = vfs_setopt(opts, bf->noname, &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; } i = (pr->pr_uref == 0); error = vfs_setopt(opts, "dying", &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; i = !i; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "nodying", &i, sizeof(i)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopt(opts, "osreldate", &pr->pr_osreldate, sizeof(pr->pr_osreldate)); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; error = vfs_setopts(opts, "osrelease", pr->pr_osrelease); if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) goto done_deref; /* Get the module parameters. */ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); locked = 0; error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_GET, opts); if (error) goto done_deref; prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); /* By now, all parameters should have been noted. */ TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) { if (!opt->seen && strcmp(opt->name, "errmsg")) { error = EINVAL; vfs_opterror(opts, "unknown parameter: %s", opt->name); goto done_errmsg; } } /* Write the fetched parameters back to userspace. */ error = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) { if (opt->pos >= 0 && opt->pos != errmsg_pos) { pos = 2 * opt->pos + 1; optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_len = opt->len; if (opt->value != NULL) { if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) { bcopy(opt->value, optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_base, opt->len); } else { error = copyout(opt->value, optuio->uio_iov[pos].iov_base, opt->len); if (error) break; } } } } goto done_errmsg; done_deref: prison_deref(pr, locked | PD_DEREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); goto done_errmsg; done_unlock_list: sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); done_errmsg: if (error && errmsg_pos >= 0) { vfs_getopt(opts, "errmsg", (void **)&errmsg, &errmsg_len); errmsg_pos = 2 * errmsg_pos + 1; if (errmsg_len > 0) { if (optuio->uio_segflg == UIO_SYSSPACE) bcopy(errmsg, optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, errmsg_len); else copyout(errmsg, optuio->uio_iov[errmsg_pos].iov_base, errmsg_len); } } vfs_freeopts(opts); return (error); } /* * struct jail_remove_args { * int jid; * }; */ int sys_jail_remove(struct thread *td, struct jail_remove_args *uap) { struct prison *pr, *cpr, *lpr, *tpr; int descend, error; error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_REMOVE); if (error) return (error); sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); pr = prison_find_child(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, uap->jid); if (pr == NULL) { sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); return (EINVAL); } /* Remove all descendants of this prison, then remove this prison. */ pr->pr_ref++; if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pr->pr_children)) { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); lpr = NULL; FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, cpr, descend) { mtx_lock(&cpr->pr_mtx); if (cpr->pr_ref > 0) { tpr = cpr; cpr->pr_ref++; } else { /* Already removed - do not do it again. */ tpr = NULL; } mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); if (lpr != NULL) { mtx_lock(&lpr->pr_mtx); prison_remove_one(lpr); sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); } lpr = tpr; } if (lpr != NULL) { mtx_lock(&lpr->pr_mtx); prison_remove_one(lpr); sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); } mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); } prison_remove_one(pr); return (0); } static void prison_remove_one(struct prison *pr) { struct proc *p; int deuref; /* * Mark the prison as doomed, so it doesn't accidentally come back * to life. It may still be explicitly brought back by jail_set(2). */ pr->pr_flags |= PR_REMOVE; /* If the prison was persistent, it is not anymore. */ deuref = 0; if (pr->pr_flags & PR_PERSIST) { pr->pr_ref--; deuref = PD_DEUREF; pr->pr_flags &= ~PR_PERSIST; } /* * jail_remove added a reference. If that's the only one, remove * the prison now. */ KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0, ("prison_remove_one removing a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); if (pr->pr_ref == 1) { prison_deref(pr, deuref | PD_DEREF | PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); return; } mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); /* * Kill all processes unfortunate enough to be attached to this prison. */ sx_slock(&allproc_lock); FOREACH_PROC_IN_SYSTEM(p) { PROC_LOCK(p); if (p->p_state != PRS_NEW && p->p_ucred && p->p_ucred->cr_prison == pr) kern_psignal(p, SIGKILL); PROC_UNLOCK(p); } sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock); /* Remove the temporary reference added by jail_remove. */ prison_deref(pr, deuref | PD_DEREF); } /* * struct jail_attach_args { * int jid; * }; */ int sys_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap) { struct prison *pr; int error; error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH); if (error) return (error); /* * Start with exclusive hold on allprison_lock to ensure that a possible * PR_METHOD_REMOVE call isn't concurrent with jail_set or jail_remove. * But then immediately downgrade it since we don't need to stop * readers. */ sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock); pr = prison_find_child(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, uap->jid); if (pr == NULL) { sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); return (EINVAL); } /* * Do not allow a process to attach to a prison that is not * considered to be "alive". */ if (pr->pr_uref == 0) { mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); return (EINVAL); } return (do_jail_attach(td, pr)); } static int do_jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct prison *pr) { struct proc *p; struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; int error; /* * XXX: Note that there is a slight race here if two threads * in the same privileged process attempt to attach to two * different jails at the same time. It is important for * user processes not to do this, or they might end up with * a process root from one prison, but attached to the jail * of another. */ pr->pr_ref++; pr->pr_uref++; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); /* Let modules do whatever they need to prepare for attaching. */ error = osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_ATTACH, td); if (error) { prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF | PD_LIST_SLOCKED); return (error); } sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); /* * Reparent the newly attached process to this jail. */ p = td->td_proc; error = cpuset_setproc_update_set(p, pr->pr_cpuset); if (error) goto e_revert_osd; vn_lock(pr->pr_root, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); if ((error = change_dir(pr->pr_root, td)) != 0) goto e_unlock; #ifdef MAC if ((error = mac_vnode_check_chroot(td->td_ucred, pr->pr_root))) goto e_unlock; #endif VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0); if ((error = pwd_chroot_chdir(td, pr->pr_root))) goto e_revert_osd; newcred = crget(); PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); newcred->cr_prison = pr; proc_set_cred(p, newcred); setsugid(p); #ifdef RACCT racct_proc_ucred_changed(p, oldcred, newcred); crhold(newcred); #endif PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef RCTL rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, newcred); crfree(newcred); #endif prison_deref(oldcred->cr_prison, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF); crfree(oldcred); /* * If the prison was killed while changing credentials, die along * with it. */ if (pr->pr_flags & PR_REMOVE) { PROC_LOCK(p); kern_psignal(p, SIGKILL); PROC_UNLOCK(p); } return (0); e_unlock: VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0); e_revert_osd: /* Tell modules this thread is still in its old jail after all. */ (void)osd_jail_call(td->td_ucred->cr_prison, PR_METHOD_ATTACH, td); prison_deref(pr, PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF); return (error); } /* * Returns a locked prison instance, or NULL on failure. */ struct prison * prison_find(int prid) { struct prison *pr; sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED); TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) { if (pr->pr_id == prid) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); if (pr->pr_ref > 0) return (pr); mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } } return (NULL); } /* * Find a prison that is a descendant of mypr. Returns a locked prison or NULL. */ struct prison * prison_find_child(struct prison *mypr, int prid) { struct prison *pr; int descend; sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED); FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(mypr, pr, descend) { if (pr->pr_id == prid) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); if (pr->pr_ref > 0) return (pr); mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } } return (NULL); } /* * Look for the name relative to mypr. Returns a locked prison or NULL. */ struct prison * prison_find_name(struct prison *mypr, const char *name) { struct prison *pr, *deadpr; size_t mylen; int descend; sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED); mylen = (mypr == &prison0) ? 0 : strlen(mypr->pr_name) + 1; again: deadpr = NULL; FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(mypr, pr, descend) { if (!strcmp(pr->pr_name + mylen, name)) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); if (pr->pr_ref > 0) { if (pr->pr_uref > 0) return (pr); deadpr = pr; } mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } } /* There was no valid prison - perhaps there was a dying one. */ if (deadpr != NULL) { mtx_lock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); if (deadpr->pr_ref == 0) { mtx_unlock(&deadpr->pr_mtx); goto again; } } return (deadpr); } /* * See if a prison has the specific flag set. */ int prison_flag(struct ucred *cred, unsigned flag) { /* This is an atomic read, so no locking is necessary. */ return (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & flag); } int prison_allow(struct ucred *cred, unsigned flag) { /* This is an atomic read, so no locking is necessary. */ return (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & flag); } /* * Remove a prison reference. If that was the last reference, remove the * prison itself - but not in this context in case there are locks held. */ void prison_free_locked(struct prison *pr) { int ref; mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED); ref = --pr->pr_ref; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); if (ref == 0) taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &pr->pr_task); } void prison_free(struct prison *pr) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); prison_free_locked(pr); } /* * Complete a call to either prison_free or prison_proc_free. */ static void prison_complete(void *context, int pending) { struct prison *pr = context; sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); prison_deref(pr, pr->pr_uref ? PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF | PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED : PD_LOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED); } /* * Remove a prison reference (usually). This internal version assumes no * mutexes are held, except perhaps the prison itself. If there are no more * references, release and delist the prison. On completion, the prison lock * and the allprison lock are both unlocked. */ static void prison_deref(struct prison *pr, int flags) { struct prison *ppr, *tpr; int ref, lasturef; if (!(flags & PD_LOCKED)) mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); for (;;) { if (flags & PD_DEUREF) { KASSERT(pr->pr_uref > 0, ("prison_deref PD_DEUREF on a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); pr->pr_uref--; lasturef = pr->pr_uref == 0; if (lasturef) pr->pr_ref++; KASSERT(prison0.pr_uref != 0, ("prison0 pr_uref=0")); } else lasturef = 0; if (flags & PD_DEREF) { KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0, ("prison_deref PD_DEREF on a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); pr->pr_ref--; } ref = pr->pr_ref; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); /* * Tell the modules if the last user reference was removed * (even it sticks around in dying state). */ if (lasturef) { if (!(flags & (PD_LIST_SLOCKED | PD_LIST_XLOCKED))) { sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); flags |= PD_LIST_XLOCKED; } (void)osd_jail_call(pr, PR_METHOD_REMOVE, NULL); mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); ref = --pr->pr_ref; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } /* If the prison still has references, nothing else to do. */ if (ref > 0) { if (flags & PD_LIST_SLOCKED) sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); else if (flags & PD_LIST_XLOCKED) sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); return; } if (flags & PD_LIST_SLOCKED) { if (!sx_try_upgrade(&allprison_lock)) { sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); } } else if (!(flags & PD_LIST_XLOCKED)) sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); TAILQ_REMOVE(&allprison, pr, pr_list); LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_sibling); ppr = pr->pr_parent; for (tpr = ppr; tpr != NULL; tpr = tpr->pr_parent) tpr->pr_childcount--; sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); #ifdef VIMAGE if (pr->pr_vnet != ppr->pr_vnet) vnet_destroy(pr->pr_vnet); #endif if (pr->pr_root != NULL) vrele(pr->pr_root); mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx); #ifdef INET free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON); #endif #ifdef INET6 free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON); #endif if (pr->pr_cpuset != NULL) cpuset_rel(pr->pr_cpuset); osd_jail_exit(pr); #ifdef RACCT if (racct_enable) prison_racct_detach(pr); #endif free(pr, M_PRISON); /* Removing a prison frees a reference on its parent. */ pr = ppr; mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); flags = PD_DEREF | PD_DEUREF; } } void prison_hold_locked(struct prison *pr) { mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED); KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0, ("Trying to hold dead prison %p (jid=%d).", pr, pr->pr_id)); pr->pr_ref++; } void prison_hold(struct prison *pr) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); prison_hold_locked(pr); mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } void prison_proc_hold(struct prison *pr) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); KASSERT(pr->pr_uref > 0, ("Cannot add a process to a non-alive prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); pr->pr_uref++; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } void prison_proc_free(struct prison *pr) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); KASSERT(pr->pr_uref > 0, ("Trying to kill a process in a dead prison (jid=%d)", pr->pr_id)); if (pr->pr_uref > 1) pr->pr_uref--; else { /* * Don't remove the last user reference in this context, which * is expected to be a process that is not only locked, but * also half dead. */ pr->pr_ref++; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &pr->pr_task); return; } mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } /* * Check if a jail supports the given address family. * * Returns 0 if not jailed or the address family is supported, EAFNOSUPPORT * if not. */ int prison_check_af(struct ucred *cred, int af) { struct prison *pr; int error; KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); pr = cred->cr_prison; #ifdef VIMAGE /* Prisons with their own network stack are not limited. */ if (prison_owns_vnet(cred)) return (0); #endif error = 0; switch (af) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_IP4) && pr->pr_ip4 == NULL) error = EAFNOSUPPORT; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } break; #endif #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: if (pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) { mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); if ((pr->pr_flags & PR_IP6) && pr->pr_ip6 == NULL) error = EAFNOSUPPORT; mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } break; #endif case AF_LOCAL: case AF_ROUTE: break; default: if (!(pr->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF)) error = EAFNOSUPPORT; } return (error); } /* * Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred (wrapper to * prison_check_ip[46]). * * Returns 0 if jail doesn't restrict the address family or if address belongs * to jail, EADDRNOTAVAIL if the address doesn't belong, or EAFNOSUPPORT if * the jail doesn't allow the address family. IPv4 Address passed in in NBO. */ int prison_if(struct ucred *cred, struct sockaddr *sa) { #ifdef INET struct sockaddr_in *sai; #endif #ifdef INET6 struct sockaddr_in6 *sai6; #endif int error; KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__)); KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("%s: sa is NULL", __func__)); #ifdef VIMAGE if (prison_owns_vnet(cred)) return (0); #endif error = 0; switch (sa->sa_family) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: sai = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; error = prison_check_ip4(cred, &sai->sin_addr); break; #endif #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: sai6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; error = prison_check_ip6(cred, &sai6->sin6_addr); break; #endif default: if (!(cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF)) error = EAFNOSUPPORT; } return (error); } /* * Return 0 if jails permit p1 to frob p2, otherwise ESRCH. */ int prison_check(struct ucred *cred1, struct ucred *cred2) { return ((cred1->cr_prison == cred2->cr_prison || prison_ischild(cred1->cr_prison, cred2->cr_prison)) ? 0 : ESRCH); } /* * Return 1 if p2 is a child of p1, otherwise 0. */ int prison_ischild(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) { for (pr2 = pr2->pr_parent; pr2 != NULL; pr2 = pr2->pr_parent) if (pr1 == pr2) return (1); return (0); } /* * Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail, otherwise 0. */ int jailed(struct ucred *cred) { return (cred->cr_prison != &prison0); } /* * Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail and that jail does not * have its own virtual network stack, otherwise 0. */ int jailed_without_vnet(struct ucred *cred) { if (!jailed(cred)) return (0); #ifdef VIMAGE if (prison_owns_vnet(cred)) return (0); #endif return (1); } /* * Return the correct hostname (domainname, et al) for the passed credential. */ void getcredhostname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size) { struct prison *pr; /* * A NULL credential can be used to shortcut to the physical * system's hostname. */ pr = (cred != NULL) ? cred->cr_prison : &prison0; mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx); strlcpy(buf, pr->pr_hostname, size); mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx); } void getcreddomainname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size) { mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_domainname, size); mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); } void getcredhostuuid(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size) { mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_hostuuid, size); mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); } void getcredhostid(struct ucred *cred, unsigned long *hostid) { mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); *hostid = cred->cr_prison->pr_hostid; mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); } void getjailname(struct ucred *cred, char *name, size_t len) { mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); strlcpy(name, cred->cr_prison->pr_name, len); mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx); } #ifdef VIMAGE /* * Determine whether the prison represented by cred owns * its vnet rather than having it inherited. * * Returns 1 in case the prison owns the vnet, 0 otherwise. */ int prison_owns_vnet(struct ucred *cred) { /* * vnets cannot be added/removed after jail creation, * so no need to lock here. */ return (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & PR_VNET ? 1 : 0); } #endif /* * Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see" * status of a mount point. * Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise. * XXX: This function should be called cr_canseemount() and should be * placed in kern_prot.c. */ int prison_canseemount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp) { struct prison *pr; struct statfs *sp; size_t len; pr = cred->cr_prison; if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 0) return (0); if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) return (0); if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 2) return (ENOENT); /* * If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see * all mount-points from inside a jail. * This is ugly check, but this is the only situation when jail's * directory ends with '/'. */ if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0) return (0); len = strlen(pr->pr_path); sp = &mp->mnt_stat; if (strncmp(pr->pr_path, sp->f_mntonname, len) != 0) return (ENOENT); /* * Be sure that we don't have situation where jail's root directory * is "/some/path" and mount point is "/some/pathpath". */ if (sp->f_mntonname[len] != '\0' && sp->f_mntonname[len] != '/') return (ENOENT); return (0); } void prison_enforce_statfs(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, struct statfs *sp) { char jpath[MAXPATHLEN]; struct prison *pr; size_t len; pr = cred->cr_prison; if (pr->pr_enforce_statfs == 0) return; if (prison_canseemount(cred, mp) != 0) { bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, "[restricted]", sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); return; } if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) { /* * Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from * the valid path left there. */ bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); *sp->f_mntonname = '/'; return; } /* * If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see * all mount-points from inside a jail. */ if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0) return; len = strlen(pr->pr_path); strlcpy(jpath, sp->f_mntonname + len, sizeof(jpath)); /* * Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from * the valid path left there. */ bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); if (*jpath == '\0') { /* Should never happen. */ *sp->f_mntonname = '/'; } else { strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, jpath, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname)); } } /* * Check with permission for a specific privilege is granted within jail. We * have a specific list of accepted privileges; the rest are denied. */ int prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv) { if (!jailed(cred)) return (0); #ifdef VIMAGE /* * Privileges specific to prisons with a virtual network stack. * There might be a duplicate entry here in case the privilege * is only granted conditionally in the legacy jail case. */ switch (priv) { #ifdef notyet /* * NFS-specific privileges. */ case PRIV_NFS_DAEMON: case PRIV_NFS_LOCKD: #endif /* * Network stack privileges. */ case PRIV_NET_BRIDGE: case PRIV_NET_GRE: case PRIV_NET_BPF: case PRIV_NET_RAW: /* Dup, cond. in legacy jail case. */ case PRIV_NET_ROUTE: case PRIV_NET_TAP: case PRIV_NET_SETIFMTU: case PRIV_NET_SETIFFLAGS: case PRIV_NET_SETIFCAP: case PRIV_NET_SETIFDESCR: case PRIV_NET_SETIFNAME : case PRIV_NET_SETIFMETRIC: case PRIV_NET_SETIFPHYS: case PRIV_NET_SETIFMAC: case PRIV_NET_SETLANPCP: case PRIV_NET_ADDMULTI: case PRIV_NET_DELMULTI: case PRIV_NET_HWIOCTL: case PRIV_NET_SETLLADDR: case PRIV_NET_ADDIFGROUP: case PRIV_NET_DELIFGROUP: case PRIV_NET_IFCREATE: case PRIV_NET_IFDESTROY: case PRIV_NET_ADDIFADDR: case PRIV_NET_DELIFADDR: case PRIV_NET_LAGG: case PRIV_NET_GIF: case PRIV_NET_SETIFVNET: case PRIV_NET_SETIFFIB: + case PRIV_NET_ME: /* * 802.11-related privileges. */ case PRIV_NET80211_VAP_GETKEY: case PRIV_NET80211_VAP_MANAGE: #ifdef notyet /* * ATM privileges. */ case PRIV_NETATM_CFG: case PRIV_NETATM_ADD: case PRIV_NETATM_DEL: case PRIV_NETATM_SET: /* * Bluetooth privileges. */ case PRIV_NETBLUETOOTH_RAW: #endif /* * Netgraph and netgraph module privileges. */ case PRIV_NETGRAPH_CONTROL: #ifdef notyet case PRIV_NETGRAPH_TTY: #endif /* * IPv4 and IPv6 privileges. */ case PRIV_NETINET_IPFW: case PRIV_NETINET_DIVERT: case PRIV_NETINET_PF: case PRIV_NETINET_DUMMYNET: case PRIV_NETINET_CARP: case PRIV_NETINET_MROUTE: case PRIV_NETINET_RAW: case PRIV_NETINET_ADDRCTRL6: case PRIV_NETINET_ND6: case PRIV_NETINET_SCOPE6: case PRIV_NETINET_ALIFETIME6: case PRIV_NETINET_IPSEC: case PRIV_NETINET_BINDANY: #ifdef notyet /* * NCP privileges. */ case PRIV_NETNCP: /* * SMB privileges. */ case PRIV_NETSMB: #endif /* * No default: or deny here. * In case of no permit fall through to next switch(). */ if (cred->cr_prison->pr_flags & PR_VNET) return (0); } #endif /* VIMAGE */ switch (priv) { /* * Allow ktrace privileges for root in jail. */ case PRIV_KTRACE: #if 0 /* * Allow jailed processes to configure audit identity and * submit audit records (login, etc). In the future we may * want to further refine the relationship between audit and * jail. */ case PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT: case PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT: case PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT: #endif /* * Allow jailed processes to manipulate process UNIX * credentials in any way they see fit. */ case PRIV_CRED_SETUID: case PRIV_CRED_SETEUID: case PRIV_CRED_SETGID: case PRIV_CRED_SETEGID: case PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS: case PRIV_CRED_SETREUID: case PRIV_CRED_SETREGID: case PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID: case PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID: /* * Jail implements visibility constraints already, so allow * jailed root to override uid/gid-based constraints. */ case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS: case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS: /* * Jail implements inter-process debugging limits already, so * allow jailed root various debugging privileges. */ case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED: case PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID: case PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV: /* * Allow jail to set various resource limits and login * properties, and for now, exceed process resource limits. */ case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT: case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN: case PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT: /* * System V and POSIX IPC privileges are granted in jail. */ case PRIV_IPC_READ: case PRIV_IPC_WRITE: case PRIV_IPC_ADMIN: case PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE: case PRIV_MQ_ADMIN: /* * Jail operations within a jail work on child jails. */ case PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH: case PRIV_JAIL_SET: case PRIV_JAIL_REMOVE: /* * Jail implements its own inter-process limits, so allow * root processes in jail to change scheduling on other * processes in the same jail. Likewise for signalling. */ case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED: case PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET: case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED: case PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID: /* * Allow jailed processes to write to sysctls marked as jail * writable. */ case PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL: /* * Allow root in jail to manage a variety of quota * properties. These should likely be conditional on a * configuration option. */ case PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA: case PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA: /* * Since Jail relies on chroot() to implement file system * protections, grant many VFS privileges to root in jail. * Be careful to exclude mount-related and NFS-related * privileges. */ case PRIV_VFS_READ: case PRIV_VFS_WRITE: case PRIV_VFS_ADMIN: case PRIV_VFS_EXEC: case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP: case PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE: /* XXXRW: Slightly surprising. */ case PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV: case PRIV_VFS_CHOWN: case PRIV_VFS_CHROOT: case PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID: case PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT: case PRIV_VFS_LINK: case PRIV_VFS_SETGID: case PRIV_VFS_STAT: case PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE: /* * As in the non-jail case, non-root users are expected to be * able to read kernel/physical memory (provided /dev/[k]mem * exists in the jail and they have permission to access it). */ case PRIV_KMEM_READ: return (0); /* * Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of * setting system flags. */ case PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS: if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_CHFLAGS) return (0); else return (EPERM); /* * Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of * mounting/unmounting file systems. */ case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT: case PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT: case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER: case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER: if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_MOUNT && cred->cr_prison->pr_enforce_statfs < 2) return (0); else return (EPERM); /* * Conditionnaly allow locking (unlocking) physical pages * in memory. */ case PRIV_VM_MLOCK: case PRIV_VM_MUNLOCK: if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_MLOCK) return (0); else return (EPERM); /* * Conditionally allow jailed root to bind reserved ports. */ case PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT: if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_RESERVED_PORTS) return (0); else return (EPERM); /* * Allow jailed root to reuse in-use ports. */ case PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT: return (0); /* * Allow jailed root to set certain IPv4/6 (option) headers. */ case PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS: return (0); /* * Conditionally allow creating raw sockets in jail. */ case PRIV_NETINET_RAW: if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_RAW_SOCKETS) return (0); else return (EPERM); /* * Since jail implements its own visibility limits on netstat * sysctls, allow getcred. This allows identd to work in * jail. */ case PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED: return (0); /* * Allow jailed root to set loginclass. */ case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGINCLASS: return (0); /* * Do not allow a process inside a jail to read the kernel * message buffer unless explicitly permitted. */ case PRIV_MSGBUF: if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_READ_MSGBUF) return (0); return (EPERM); default: /* * In all remaining cases, deny the privilege request. This * includes almost all network privileges, many system * configuration privileges. */ return (EPERM); } } /* * Return the part of pr2's name that is relative to pr1, or the whole name * if it does not directly follow. */ char * prison_name(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) { char *name; /* Jails see themselves as "0" (if they see themselves at all). */ if (pr1 == pr2) return "0"; name = pr2->pr_name; if (prison_ischild(pr1, pr2)) { /* * pr1 isn't locked (and allprison_lock may not be either) * so its length can't be counted on. But the number of dots * can be counted on - and counted. */ for (; pr1 != &prison0; pr1 = pr1->pr_parent) name = strchr(name, '.') + 1; } return (name); } /* * Return the part of pr2's path that is relative to pr1, or the whole path * if it does not directly follow. */ static char * prison_path(struct prison *pr1, struct prison *pr2) { char *path1, *path2; int len1; path1 = pr1->pr_path; path2 = pr2->pr_path; if (!strcmp(path1, "/")) return (path2); len1 = strlen(path1); if (strncmp(path1, path2, len1)) return (path2); if (path2[len1] == '\0') return "/"; if (path2[len1] == '/') return (path2 + len1); return (path2); } /* * Jail-related sysctls. */ static SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, jail, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Jails"); static int sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { struct xprison *xp; struct prison *pr, *cpr; #ifdef INET struct in_addr *ip4 = NULL; int ip4s = 0; #endif #ifdef INET6 struct in6_addr *ip6 = NULL; int ip6s = 0; #endif int descend, error; xp = malloc(sizeof(*xp), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison; error = 0; sx_slock(&allprison_lock); FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT(pr, cpr, descend) { #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) again: #endif mtx_lock(&cpr->pr_mtx); #ifdef INET if (cpr->pr_ip4s > 0) { if (ip4s < cpr->pr_ip4s) { ip4s = cpr->pr_ip4s; mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); ip4 = realloc(ip4, ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); goto again; } bcopy(cpr->pr_ip4, ip4, cpr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr)); } #endif #ifdef INET6 if (cpr->pr_ip6s > 0) { if (ip6s < cpr->pr_ip6s) { ip6s = cpr->pr_ip6s; mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); ip6 = realloc(ip6, ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); goto again; } bcopy(cpr->pr_ip6, ip6, cpr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr)); } #endif if (cpr->pr_ref == 0) { mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); continue; } bzero(xp, sizeof(*xp)); xp->pr_version = XPRISON_VERSION; xp->pr_id = cpr->pr_id; xp->pr_state = cpr->pr_uref > 0 ? PRISON_STATE_ALIVE : PRISON_STATE_DYING; strlcpy(xp->pr_path, prison_path(pr, cpr), sizeof(xp->pr_path)); strlcpy(xp->pr_host, cpr->pr_hostname, sizeof(xp->pr_host)); strlcpy(xp->pr_name, prison_name(pr, cpr), sizeof(xp->pr_name)); #ifdef INET xp->pr_ip4s = cpr->pr_ip4s; #endif #ifdef INET6 xp->pr_ip6s = cpr->pr_ip6s; #endif mtx_unlock(&cpr->pr_mtx); error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, xp, sizeof(*xp)); if (error) break; #ifdef INET if (xp->pr_ip4s > 0) { error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, ip4, xp->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr)); if (error) break; } #endif #ifdef INET6 if (xp->pr_ip6s > 0) { error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, ip6, xp->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr)); if (error) break; } #endif } sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); free(xp, M_TEMP); #ifdef INET free(ip4, M_TEMP); #endif #ifdef INET6 free(ip6, M_TEMP); #endif return (error); } SYSCTL_OID(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, list, CTLTYPE_STRUCT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_list, "S", "List of active jails"); static int sysctl_jail_jailed(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { int error, injail; injail = jailed(req->td->td_ucred); error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &injail, sizeof(injail)); return (error); } SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jailed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_jailed, "I", "Process in jail?"); static int sysctl_jail_vnet(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { int error, havevnet; #ifdef VIMAGE struct ucred *cred = req->td->td_ucred; havevnet = jailed(cred) && prison_owns_vnet(cred); #else havevnet = 0; #endif error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &havevnet, sizeof(havevnet)); return (error); } SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, vnet, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_vnet, "I", "Jail owns vnet?"); #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) SYSCTL_UINT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jail_max_af_ips, CTLFLAG_RW, &jail_max_af_ips, 0, "Number of IP addresses a jail may have at most per address family (deprecated)"); #endif /* * Default parameters for jail(2) compatibility. For historical reasons, * the sysctl names have varying similarity to the parameter names. Prisons * just see their own parameters, and can't change them. */ static int sysctl_jail_default_allow(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { struct prison *pr; int allow, error, i; pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison; allow = (pr == &prison0) ? jail_default_allow : pr->pr_allow; /* Get the current flag value, and convert it to a boolean. */ i = (allow & arg2) ? 1 : 0; if (arg1 != NULL) i = !i; error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &i, 0, req); if (error || !req->newptr) return (error); i = i ? arg2 : 0; if (arg1 != NULL) i ^= arg2; /* * The sysctls don't have CTLFLAGS_PRISON, so assume prison0 * for writing. */ mtx_lock(&prison0.pr_mtx); jail_default_allow = (jail_default_allow & ~arg2) | i; mtx_unlock(&prison0.pr_mtx); return (0); } SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, set_hostname_allowed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, PR_ALLOW_SET_HOSTNAME, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", "Processes in jail can set their hostnames (deprecated)"); SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, socket_unixiproute_only, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, (void *)1, PR_ALLOW_SOCKET_AF, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", "Processes in jail are limited to creating UNIX/IP/route sockets only (deprecated)"); SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, sysvipc_allowed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, PR_ALLOW_SYSVIPC, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", "Processes in jail can use System V IPC primitives (deprecated)"); SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, allow_raw_sockets, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, PR_ALLOW_RAW_SOCKETS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", "Prison root can create raw sockets (deprecated)"); SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, chflags_allowed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, PR_ALLOW_CHFLAGS, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", "Processes in jail can alter system file flags (deprecated)"); SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_allowed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, PR_ALLOW_MOUNT, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", "Processes in jail can mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems (deprecated)"); static int sysctl_jail_default_level(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { struct prison *pr; int level, error; pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison; level = (pr == &prison0) ? *(int *)arg1 : *(int *)((char *)pr + arg2); error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &level, 0, req); if (error || !req->newptr) return (error); *(int *)arg1 = level; return (0); } SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, enforce_statfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, &jail_default_enforce_statfs, offsetof(struct prison, pr_enforce_statfs), sysctl_jail_default_level, "I", "Processes in jail cannot see all mounted file systems (deprecated)"); SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, devfs_ruleset, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, &jail_default_devfs_rsnum, offsetof(struct prison, pr_devfs_rsnum), sysctl_jail_default_level, "I", "Ruleset for the devfs filesystem in jail (deprecated)"); /* * Nodes to describe jail parameters. Maximum length of string parameters * is returned in the string itself, and the other parameters exist merely * to make themselves and their types known. */ SYSCTL_NODE(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, param, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Jail parameters"); int sysctl_jail_param(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { int i; long l; size_t s; char numbuf[12]; switch (oidp->oid_kind & CTLTYPE) { case CTLTYPE_LONG: case CTLTYPE_ULONG: l = 0; #ifdef SCTL_MASK32 if (!(req->flags & SCTL_MASK32)) #endif return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &l, sizeof(l))); case CTLTYPE_INT: case CTLTYPE_UINT: i = 0; return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &i, sizeof(i))); case CTLTYPE_STRING: snprintf(numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), "%jd", (intmax_t)arg2); return (sysctl_handle_string(oidp, numbuf, sizeof(numbuf), req)); case CTLTYPE_STRUCT: s = (size_t)arg2; return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, &s, sizeof(s))); } return (0); } /* * CTLFLAG_RDTUN in the following indicates jail parameters that can be set at * jail creation time but cannot be changed in an existing jail. */ SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, jid, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RDTUN, "I", "Jail ID"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, parent, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "I", "Jail parent ID"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(, name, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, "Jail name"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(, path, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, MAXPATHLEN, "Jail root path"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, securelevel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "I", "Jail secure level"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, osreldate, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RDTUN, "I", "Jail value for kern.osreldate and uname -K"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(, osrelease, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, OSRELEASELEN, "Jail value for kern.osrelease and uname -r"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, enforce_statfs, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "I", "Jail cannot see all mounted file systems"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, devfs_ruleset, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "I", "Ruleset for in-jail devfs mounts"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, persist, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail persistence"); #ifdef VIMAGE SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, vnet, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RDTUN, "E,jailsys", "Virtual network stack"); #endif SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(, dying, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "B", "Jail is in the process of shutting down"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(children, "Number of child jails"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_children, cur, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "I", "Current number of child jails"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_children, max, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "I", "Maximum number of child jails"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(host, CTLFLAG_RW, "Jail host info"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, hostname, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, "Jail hostname"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, domainname, CTLFLAG_RW, MAXHOSTNAMELEN, "Jail NIS domainname"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_host, hostuuid, CTLFLAG_RW, HOSTUUIDLEN, "Jail host UUID"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_host, hostid, CTLTYPE_ULONG | CTLFLAG_RW, "LU", "Jail host ID"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(cpuset, "Jail cpuset"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_cpuset, id, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD, "I", "Jail cpuset ID"); #ifdef INET SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(ip4, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, "Jail IPv4 address virtualization"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRUCT(_ip4, addr, CTLFLAG_RW, sizeof(struct in_addr), "S,in_addr,a", "Jail IPv4 addresses"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_ip4, saddrsel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Do (not) use IPv4 source address selection rather than the " "primary jail IPv4 address."); #endif #ifdef INET6 SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(ip6, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, "Jail IPv6 address virtualization"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRUCT(_ip6, addr, CTLFLAG_RW, sizeof(struct in6_addr), "S,in6_addr,a", "Jail IPv6 addresses"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_ip6, saddrsel, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Do (not) use IPv6 source address selection rather than the " "primary jail IPv6 address."); #endif SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_NODE(allow, "Jail permission flags"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, set_hostname, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may set hostname"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, sysvipc, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may use SYSV IPC"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, raw_sockets, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may create raw sockets"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, chflags, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may alter system file flags"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, quotas, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may set file quotas"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, socket_af, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may create sockets other than just UNIX/IPv4/IPv6/route"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, mlock, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may lock (unlock) physical pages in memory"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, reserved_ports, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may bind sockets to reserved ports"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, read_msgbuf, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may read the kernel message buffer"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SUBNODE(allow, mount, "Jail mount/unmount permission flags"); SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow_mount, , CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW, "B", "Jail may mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems in general"); /* * Add a dynamic parameter allow., or allow... Return * its associated bit in the pr_allow bitmask, or zero if the parameter was * not created. */ unsigned prison_add_allow(const char *prefix, const char *name, const char *prefix_descr, const char *descr) { struct bool_flags *bf; struct sysctl_oid *parent; char *allow_name, *allow_noname, *allowed; #ifndef NO_SYSCTL_DESCR char *descr_deprecated; #endif unsigned allow_flag; if (prefix ? asprintf(&allow_name, M_PRISON, "allow.%s.%s", prefix, name) < 0 || asprintf(&allow_noname, M_PRISON, "allow.%s.no%s", prefix, name) < 0 : asprintf(&allow_name, M_PRISON, "allow.%s", name) < 0 || asprintf(&allow_noname, M_PRISON, "allow.no%s", name) < 0) { free(allow_name, M_PRISON); return 0; } /* * See if this parameter has already beed added, i.e. a module was * previously loaded/unloaded. */ mtx_lock(&prison0.pr_mtx); for (bf = pr_flag_allow; bf < pr_flag_allow + nitems(pr_flag_allow) && bf->flag != 0; bf++) { if (strcmp(bf->name, allow_name) == 0) { allow_flag = bf->flag; goto no_add; } } /* * Find a free bit in prison0's pr_allow, failing if there are none * (which shouldn't happen as long as we keep track of how many * potential dynamic flags exist). */ for (allow_flag = 1;; allow_flag <<= 1) { if (allow_flag == 0) goto no_add; if ((prison0.pr_allow & allow_flag) == 0) break; } /* * Note the parameter in the next open slot in pr_flag_allow. * Set the flag last so code that checks pr_flag_allow can do so * without locking. */ for (bf = pr_flag_allow; bf->flag != 0; bf++) if (bf == pr_flag_allow + nitems(pr_flag_allow)) { /* This should never happen, but is not fatal. */ allow_flag = 0; goto no_add; } prison0.pr_allow |= allow_flag; bf->name = allow_name; bf->noname = allow_noname; bf->flag = allow_flag; mtx_unlock(&prison0.pr_mtx); /* * Create sysctls for the parameter, and the back-compat global * permission. */ parent = prefix ? SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(&sysctl___security_jail_param_allow), OID_AUTO, prefix, 0, 0, prefix_descr) : &sysctl___security_jail_param_allow; (void)SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(parent), OID_AUTO, name, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_param, "B", descr); if ((prefix ? asprintf(&allowed, M_TEMP, "%s_%s_allowed", prefix, name) : asprintf(&allowed, M_TEMP, "%s_allowed", name)) >= 0) { #ifndef NO_SYSCTL_DESCR (void)asprintf(&descr_deprecated, M_TEMP, "%s (deprecated)", descr); #endif (void)SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(NULL, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(&sysctl___security_jail), OID_AUTO, allowed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, allow_flag, sysctl_jail_default_allow, "I", descr_deprecated); #ifndef NO_SYSCTL_DESCR free(descr_deprecated, M_TEMP); #endif free(allowed, M_TEMP); } return allow_flag; no_add: mtx_unlock(&prison0.pr_mtx); free(allow_name, M_PRISON); free(allow_noname, M_PRISON); return allow_flag; } /* * The VFS system will register jail-aware filesystems here. They each get * a parameter allow.mount.xxxfs and a flag to check when a jailed user * attempts to mount. */ void prison_add_vfs(struct vfsconf *vfsp) { #ifdef NO_SYSCTL_DESCR vfsp->vfc_prison_flag = prison_add_allow("mount", vfsp->vfc_name, NULL, NULL); #else char *descr; (void)asprintf(&descr, M_TEMP, "Jail may mount the %s file system", vfsp->vfc_name); vfsp->vfc_prison_flag = prison_add_allow("mount", vfsp->vfc_name, NULL, descr); free(descr, M_TEMP); #endif } #ifdef RACCT void prison_racct_foreach(void (*callback)(struct racct *racct, void *arg2, void *arg3), void (*pre)(void), void (*post)(void), void *arg2, void *arg3) { struct prison_racct *prr; ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_slock(&allprison_lock); if (pre != NULL) (pre)(); LIST_FOREACH(prr, &allprison_racct, prr_next) (callback)(prr->prr_racct, arg2, arg3); if (post != NULL) (post)(); sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock); } static struct prison_racct * prison_racct_find_locked(const char *name) { struct prison_racct *prr; ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_XLOCKED); if (name[0] == '\0' || strlen(name) >= MAXHOSTNAMELEN) return (NULL); LIST_FOREACH(prr, &allprison_racct, prr_next) { if (strcmp(name, prr->prr_name) != 0) continue; /* Found prison_racct with a matching name? */ prison_racct_hold(prr); return (prr); } /* Add new prison_racct. */ prr = malloc(sizeof(*prr), M_PRISON_RACCT, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK); racct_create(&prr->prr_racct); strcpy(prr->prr_name, name); refcount_init(&prr->prr_refcount, 1); LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allprison_racct, prr, prr_next); return (prr); } struct prison_racct * prison_racct_find(const char *name) { struct prison_racct *prr; ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); prr = prison_racct_find_locked(name); sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); return (prr); } void prison_racct_hold(struct prison_racct *prr) { ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); refcount_acquire(&prr->prr_refcount); } static void prison_racct_free_locked(struct prison_racct *prr) { ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_XLOCKED); if (refcount_release(&prr->prr_refcount)) { racct_destroy(&prr->prr_racct); LIST_REMOVE(prr, prr_next); free(prr, M_PRISON_RACCT); } } void prison_racct_free(struct prison_racct *prr) { int old; ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_UNLOCKED); old = prr->prr_refcount; if (old > 1 && atomic_cmpset_int(&prr->prr_refcount, old, old - 1)) return; sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); prison_racct_free_locked(prr); sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); } static void prison_racct_attach(struct prison *pr) { struct prison_racct *prr; ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_XLOCKED); prr = prison_racct_find_locked(pr->pr_name); KASSERT(prr != NULL, ("cannot find prison_racct")); pr->pr_prison_racct = prr; } /* * Handle jail renaming. From the racct point of view, renaming means * moving from one prison_racct to another. */ static void prison_racct_modify(struct prison *pr) { #ifdef RCTL struct proc *p; struct ucred *cred; #endif struct prison_racct *oldprr; ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_slock(&allproc_lock); sx_xlock(&allprison_lock); if (strcmp(pr->pr_name, pr->pr_prison_racct->prr_name) == 0) { sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock); return; } oldprr = pr->pr_prison_racct; pr->pr_prison_racct = NULL; prison_racct_attach(pr); /* * Move resource utilisation records. */ racct_move(pr->pr_prison_racct->prr_racct, oldprr->prr_racct); #ifdef RCTL /* * Force rctl to reattach rules to processes. */ FOREACH_PROC_IN_SYSTEM(p) { PROC_LOCK(p); cred = crhold(p->p_ucred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); rctl_proc_ucred_changed(p, cred); crfree(cred); } #endif sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock); prison_racct_free_locked(oldprr); sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock); } static void prison_racct_detach(struct prison *pr) { ASSERT_RACCT_ENABLED(); sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SA_UNLOCKED); if (pr->pr_prison_racct == NULL) return; prison_racct_free(pr->pr_prison_racct); pr->pr_prison_racct = NULL; } #endif /* RACCT */ #ifdef DDB static void db_show_prison(struct prison *pr) { struct bool_flags *bf; struct jailsys_flags *jsf; #if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) int ii; #endif unsigned f; #ifdef INET char ip4buf[INET_ADDRSTRLEN]; #endif #ifdef INET6 char ip6buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; #endif db_printf("prison %p:\n", pr); db_printf(" jid = %d\n", pr->pr_id); db_printf(" name = %s\n", pr->pr_name); db_printf(" parent = %p\n", pr->pr_parent); db_printf(" ref = %d\n", pr->pr_ref); db_printf(" uref = %d\n", pr->pr_uref); db_printf(" path = %s\n", pr->pr_path); db_printf(" cpuset = %d\n", pr->pr_cpuset ? pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id : -1); #ifdef VIMAGE db_printf(" vnet = %p\n", pr->pr_vnet); #endif db_printf(" root = %p\n", pr->pr_root); db_printf(" securelevel = %d\n", pr->pr_securelevel); db_printf(" devfs_rsnum = %d\n", pr->pr_devfs_rsnum); db_printf(" children.max = %d\n", pr->pr_childmax); db_printf(" children.cur = %d\n", pr->pr_childcount); db_printf(" child = %p\n", LIST_FIRST(&pr->pr_children)); db_printf(" sibling = %p\n", LIST_NEXT(pr, pr_sibling)); db_printf(" flags = 0x%x", pr->pr_flags); for (bf = pr_flag_bool; bf < pr_flag_bool + nitems(pr_flag_bool); bf++) if (pr->pr_flags & bf->flag) db_printf(" %s", bf->name); for (jsf = pr_flag_jailsys; jsf < pr_flag_jailsys + nitems(pr_flag_jailsys); jsf++) { f = pr->pr_flags & (jsf->disable | jsf->new); db_printf(" %-16s= %s\n", jsf->name, (f != 0 && f == jsf->disable) ? "disable" : (f == jsf->new) ? "new" : "inherit"); } db_printf(" allow = 0x%x", pr->pr_allow); for (bf = pr_flag_allow; bf < pr_flag_allow + nitems(pr_flag_allow) && bf->flag != 0; bf++) if (pr->pr_allow & bf->flag) db_printf(" %s", bf->name); db_printf("\n"); db_printf(" enforce_statfs = %d\n", pr->pr_enforce_statfs); db_printf(" host.hostname = %s\n", pr->pr_hostname); db_printf(" host.domainname = %s\n", pr->pr_domainname); db_printf(" host.hostuuid = %s\n", pr->pr_hostuuid); db_printf(" host.hostid = %lu\n", pr->pr_hostid); #ifdef INET db_printf(" ip4s = %d\n", pr->pr_ip4s); for (ii = 0; ii < pr->pr_ip4s; ii++) db_printf(" %s %s\n", ii == 0 ? "ip4.addr =" : " ", inet_ntoa_r(pr->pr_ip4[ii], ip4buf)); #endif #ifdef INET6 db_printf(" ip6s = %d\n", pr->pr_ip6s); for (ii = 0; ii < pr->pr_ip6s; ii++) db_printf(" %s %s\n", ii == 0 ? "ip6.addr =" : " ", ip6_sprintf(ip6buf, &pr->pr_ip6[ii])); #endif } DB_SHOW_COMMAND(prison, db_show_prison_command) { struct prison *pr; if (!have_addr) { /* * Show all prisons in the list, and prison0 which is not * listed. */ db_show_prison(&prison0); if (!db_pager_quit) { TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) { db_show_prison(pr); if (db_pager_quit) break; } } return; } if (addr == 0) pr = &prison0; else { /* Look for a prison with the ID and with references. */ TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) if (pr->pr_id == addr && pr->pr_ref > 0) break; if (pr == NULL) /* Look again, without requiring a reference. */ TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) if (pr->pr_id == addr) break; if (pr == NULL) /* Assume address points to a valid prison. */ pr = (struct prison *)addr; } db_show_prison(pr); } #endif /* DDB */ diff --git a/sys/net/if_me.c b/sys/net/if_me.c index 7bfe73c05344..319196c6b089 100644 --- a/sys/net/if_me.c +++ b/sys/net/if_me.c @@ -1,684 +1,684 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2014, 2018 Andrey V. Elsukov * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define MEMTU (1500 - sizeof(struct mobhdr)) static const char mename[] = "me"; static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_IFME, mename, "Minimal Encapsulation for IP"); /* Minimal forwarding header RFC 2004 */ struct mobhdr { uint8_t mob_proto; /* protocol */ uint8_t mob_flags; /* flags */ #define MOB_FLAGS_SP 0x80 /* source present */ uint16_t mob_csum; /* header checksum */ struct in_addr mob_dst; /* original destination address */ struct in_addr mob_src; /* original source addr (optional) */ } __packed; struct me_softc { struct ifnet *me_ifp; u_int me_fibnum; struct in_addr me_src; struct in_addr me_dst; CK_LIST_ENTRY(me_softc) chain; CK_LIST_ENTRY(me_softc) srchash; }; CK_LIST_HEAD(me_list, me_softc); #define ME2IFP(sc) ((sc)->me_ifp) #define ME_READY(sc) ((sc)->me_src.s_addr != 0) #define ME_RLOCK_TRACKER struct epoch_tracker me_et #define ME_RLOCK() epoch_enter_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &me_et) #define ME_RUNLOCK() epoch_exit_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &me_et) #define ME_WAIT() epoch_wait_preempt(net_epoch_preempt) #ifndef ME_HASH_SIZE #define ME_HASH_SIZE (1 << 4) #endif VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(struct me_list *, me_hashtbl) = NULL; VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(struct me_list *, me_srchashtbl) = NULL; #define V_me_hashtbl VNET(me_hashtbl) #define V_me_srchashtbl VNET(me_srchashtbl) #define ME_HASH(src, dst) (V_me_hashtbl[\ me_hashval((src), (dst)) & (ME_HASH_SIZE - 1)]) #define ME_SRCHASH(src) (V_me_srchashtbl[\ fnv_32_buf(&(src), sizeof(src), FNV1_32_INIT) & (ME_HASH_SIZE - 1)]) static struct sx me_ioctl_sx; SX_SYSINIT(me_ioctl_sx, &me_ioctl_sx, "me_ioctl"); static int me_clone_create(struct if_clone *, int, caddr_t); static void me_clone_destroy(struct ifnet *); VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(struct if_clone *, me_cloner); #define V_me_cloner VNET(me_cloner) #ifdef VIMAGE static void me_reassign(struct ifnet *, struct vnet *, char *); #endif static void me_qflush(struct ifnet *); static int me_transmit(struct ifnet *, struct mbuf *); static int me_ioctl(struct ifnet *, u_long, caddr_t); static int me_output(struct ifnet *, struct mbuf *, const struct sockaddr *, struct route *); static int me_input(struct mbuf *, int, int, void *); static int me_set_tunnel(struct me_softc *, in_addr_t, in_addr_t); static void me_delete_tunnel(struct me_softc *); SYSCTL_DECL(_net_link); static SYSCTL_NODE(_net_link, IFT_TUNNEL, me, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Minimal Encapsulation for IP (RFC 2004)"); #ifndef MAX_ME_NEST #define MAX_ME_NEST 1 #endif VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(int, max_me_nesting) = MAX_ME_NEST; #define V_max_me_nesting VNET(max_me_nesting) SYSCTL_INT(_net_link_me, OID_AUTO, max_nesting, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_VNET, &VNET_NAME(max_me_nesting), 0, "Max nested tunnels"); static uint32_t me_hashval(in_addr_t src, in_addr_t dst) { uint32_t ret; ret = fnv_32_buf(&src, sizeof(src), FNV1_32_INIT); return (fnv_32_buf(&dst, sizeof(dst), ret)); } static struct me_list * me_hashinit(void) { struct me_list *hash; int i; hash = malloc(sizeof(struct me_list) * ME_HASH_SIZE, M_IFME, M_WAITOK); for (i = 0; i < ME_HASH_SIZE; i++) CK_LIST_INIT(&hash[i]); return (hash); } static void vnet_me_init(const void *unused __unused) { V_me_cloner = if_clone_simple(mename, me_clone_create, me_clone_destroy, 0); } VNET_SYSINIT(vnet_me_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_IFATTACHDOMAIN, SI_ORDER_ANY, vnet_me_init, NULL); static void vnet_me_uninit(const void *unused __unused) { if (V_me_hashtbl != NULL) { free(V_me_hashtbl, M_IFME); V_me_hashtbl = NULL; ME_WAIT(); free(V_me_srchashtbl, M_IFME); } if_clone_detach(V_me_cloner); } VNET_SYSUNINIT(vnet_me_uninit, SI_SUB_PROTO_IFATTACHDOMAIN, SI_ORDER_ANY, vnet_me_uninit, NULL); static int me_clone_create(struct if_clone *ifc, int unit, caddr_t params) { struct me_softc *sc; sc = malloc(sizeof(struct me_softc), M_IFME, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); sc->me_fibnum = curthread->td_proc->p_fibnum; ME2IFP(sc) = if_alloc(IFT_TUNNEL); ME2IFP(sc)->if_softc = sc; if_initname(ME2IFP(sc), mename, unit); ME2IFP(sc)->if_mtu = MEMTU;; ME2IFP(sc)->if_flags = IFF_POINTOPOINT|IFF_MULTICAST; ME2IFP(sc)->if_output = me_output; ME2IFP(sc)->if_ioctl = me_ioctl; ME2IFP(sc)->if_transmit = me_transmit; ME2IFP(sc)->if_qflush = me_qflush; #ifdef VIMAGE ME2IFP(sc)->if_reassign = me_reassign; #endif ME2IFP(sc)->if_capabilities |= IFCAP_LINKSTATE; ME2IFP(sc)->if_capenable |= IFCAP_LINKSTATE; if_attach(ME2IFP(sc)); bpfattach(ME2IFP(sc), DLT_NULL, sizeof(u_int32_t)); return (0); } #ifdef VIMAGE static void me_reassign(struct ifnet *ifp, struct vnet *new_vnet __unused, char *unused __unused) { struct me_softc *sc; sx_xlock(&me_ioctl_sx); sc = ifp->if_softc; if (sc != NULL) me_delete_tunnel(sc); sx_xunlock(&me_ioctl_sx); } #endif /* VIMAGE */ static void me_clone_destroy(struct ifnet *ifp) { struct me_softc *sc; sx_xlock(&me_ioctl_sx); sc = ifp->if_softc; me_delete_tunnel(sc); bpfdetach(ifp); if_detach(ifp); ifp->if_softc = NULL; sx_xunlock(&me_ioctl_sx); ME_WAIT(); if_free(ifp); free(sc, M_IFME); } static int me_ioctl(struct ifnet *ifp, u_long cmd, caddr_t data) { struct ifreq *ifr = (struct ifreq *)data; struct sockaddr_in *src, *dst; struct me_softc *sc; int error; switch (cmd) { case SIOCSIFMTU: if (ifr->ifr_mtu < 576) return (EINVAL); ifp->if_mtu = ifr->ifr_mtu; return (0); case SIOCSIFADDR: ifp->if_flags |= IFF_UP; case SIOCSIFFLAGS: case SIOCADDMULTI: case SIOCDELMULTI: return (0); } sx_xlock(&me_ioctl_sx); sc = ifp->if_softc; if (sc == NULL) { error = ENXIO; goto end; } error = 0; switch (cmd) { case SIOCSIFPHYADDR: src = &((struct in_aliasreq *)data)->ifra_addr; dst = &((struct in_aliasreq *)data)->ifra_dstaddr; if (src->sin_family != dst->sin_family || src->sin_family != AF_INET || src->sin_len != dst->sin_len || src->sin_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { error = EINVAL; break; } if (src->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY || dst->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) { error = EADDRNOTAVAIL; break; } error = me_set_tunnel(sc, src->sin_addr.s_addr, dst->sin_addr.s_addr); break; case SIOCDIFPHYADDR: me_delete_tunnel(sc); break; case SIOCGIFPSRCADDR: case SIOCGIFPDSTADDR: if (!ME_READY(sc)) { error = EADDRNOTAVAIL; break; } src = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ifr->ifr_addr; memset(src, 0, sizeof(*src)); src->sin_family = AF_INET; src->sin_len = sizeof(*src); switch (cmd) { case SIOCGIFPSRCADDR: src->sin_addr = sc->me_src; break; case SIOCGIFPDSTADDR: src->sin_addr = sc->me_dst; break; } error = prison_if(curthread->td_ucred, sintosa(src)); if (error != 0) memset(src, 0, sizeof(*src)); break; case SIOCGTUNFIB: ifr->ifr_fib = sc->me_fibnum; break; case SIOCSTUNFIB: - if ((error = priv_check(curthread, PRIV_NET_GRE)) != 0) + if ((error = priv_check(curthread, PRIV_NET_ME)) != 0) break; if (ifr->ifr_fib >= rt_numfibs) error = EINVAL; else sc->me_fibnum = ifr->ifr_fib; break; default: error = EINVAL; break; } end: sx_xunlock(&me_ioctl_sx); return (error); } static int me_lookup(const struct mbuf *m, int off, int proto, void **arg) { const struct ip *ip; struct me_softc *sc; if (V_me_hashtbl == NULL) return (0); MPASS(in_epoch(net_epoch_preempt)); ip = mtod(m, const struct ip *); CK_LIST_FOREACH(sc, &ME_HASH(ip->ip_dst.s_addr, ip->ip_src.s_addr), chain) { if (sc->me_src.s_addr == ip->ip_dst.s_addr && sc->me_dst.s_addr == ip->ip_src.s_addr) { if ((ME2IFP(sc)->if_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) return (0); *arg = sc; return (ENCAP_DRV_LOOKUP); } } return (0); } /* * Check that ingress address belongs to local host. */ static void me_set_running(struct me_softc *sc) { if (in_localip(sc->me_src)) ME2IFP(sc)->if_drv_flags |= IFF_DRV_RUNNING; else ME2IFP(sc)->if_drv_flags &= ~IFF_DRV_RUNNING; } /* * ifaddr_event handler. * Clear IFF_DRV_RUNNING flag when ingress address disappears to prevent * source address spoofing. */ static void me_srcaddr(void *arg __unused, const struct sockaddr *sa, int event __unused) { const struct sockaddr_in *sin; struct me_softc *sc; /* Check that VNET is ready */ if (V_me_hashtbl == NULL) return; MPASS(in_epoch(net_epoch_preempt)); sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; CK_LIST_FOREACH(sc, &ME_SRCHASH(sin->sin_addr.s_addr), srchash) { if (sc->me_src.s_addr != sin->sin_addr.s_addr) continue; me_set_running(sc); } } static int me_set_tunnel(struct me_softc *sc, in_addr_t src, in_addr_t dst) { struct me_softc *tmp; sx_assert(&me_ioctl_sx, SA_XLOCKED); if (V_me_hashtbl == NULL) { V_me_hashtbl = me_hashinit(); V_me_srchashtbl = me_hashinit(); } if (sc->me_src.s_addr == src && sc->me_dst.s_addr == dst) return (0); CK_LIST_FOREACH(tmp, &ME_HASH(src, dst), chain) { if (tmp == sc) continue; if (tmp->me_src.s_addr == src && tmp->me_dst.s_addr == dst) return (EADDRNOTAVAIL); } me_delete_tunnel(sc); sc->me_dst.s_addr = dst; sc->me_src.s_addr = src; CK_LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ME_HASH(src, dst), sc, chain); CK_LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ME_SRCHASH(src), sc, srchash); me_set_running(sc); if_link_state_change(ME2IFP(sc), LINK_STATE_UP); return (0); } static void me_delete_tunnel(struct me_softc *sc) { sx_assert(&me_ioctl_sx, SA_XLOCKED); if (ME_READY(sc)) { CK_LIST_REMOVE(sc, chain); CK_LIST_REMOVE(sc, srchash); ME_WAIT(); sc->me_src.s_addr = 0; sc->me_dst.s_addr = 0; ME2IFP(sc)->if_drv_flags &= ~IFF_DRV_RUNNING; if_link_state_change(ME2IFP(sc), LINK_STATE_DOWN); } } static uint16_t me_in_cksum(uint16_t *p, int nwords) { uint32_t sum = 0; while (nwords-- > 0) sum += *p++; sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff); sum += (sum >> 16); return (~sum); } static int me_input(struct mbuf *m, int off, int proto, void *arg) { struct me_softc *sc = arg; struct mobhdr *mh; struct ifnet *ifp; struct ip *ip; int hlen; ifp = ME2IFP(sc); /* checks for short packets */ hlen = sizeof(struct mobhdr); if (m->m_pkthdr.len < sizeof(struct ip) + hlen) hlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr); if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip) + hlen) m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct ip) + hlen); if (m == NULL) goto drop; mh = (struct mobhdr *)mtodo(m, sizeof(struct ip)); /* check for wrong flags */ if (mh->mob_flags & (~MOB_FLAGS_SP)) { m_freem(m); goto drop; } if (mh->mob_flags) { if (hlen != sizeof(struct mobhdr)) { m_freem(m); goto drop; } } else hlen = sizeof(struct mobhdr) - sizeof(struct in_addr); /* check mobile header checksum */ if (me_in_cksum((uint16_t *)mh, hlen / sizeof(uint16_t)) != 0) { m_freem(m); goto drop; } #ifdef MAC mac_ifnet_create_mbuf(ifp, m); #endif ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); ip->ip_dst = mh->mob_dst; ip->ip_p = mh->mob_proto; ip->ip_sum = 0; ip->ip_len = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - hlen); if (mh->mob_flags) ip->ip_src = mh->mob_src; memmove(mtodo(m, hlen), ip, sizeof(struct ip)); m_adj(m, hlen); m_clrprotoflags(m); m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = ifp; m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |= (CSUM_IP_CHECKED | CSUM_IP_VALID); M_SETFIB(m, ifp->if_fib); hlen = AF_INET; BPF_MTAP2(ifp, &hlen, sizeof(hlen), m); if_inc_counter(ifp, IFCOUNTER_IPACKETS, 1); if_inc_counter(ifp, IFCOUNTER_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len); if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_MONITOR) != 0) m_freem(m); else netisr_dispatch(NETISR_IP, m); return (IPPROTO_DONE); drop: if_inc_counter(ifp, IFCOUNTER_IERRORS, 1); return (IPPROTO_DONE); } static int me_output(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m, const struct sockaddr *dst, struct route *ro __unused) { uint32_t af; if (dst->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) bcopy(dst->sa_data, &af, sizeof(af)); else af = dst->sa_family; m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = af; return (ifp->if_transmit(ifp, m)); } #define MTAG_ME 1414491977 static int me_transmit(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m) { ME_RLOCK_TRACKER; struct mobhdr mh; struct me_softc *sc; struct ip *ip; uint32_t af; int error, hlen, plen; ME_RLOCK(); #ifdef MAC error = mac_ifnet_check_transmit(ifp, m); if (error != 0) goto drop; #endif error = ENETDOWN; sc = ifp->if_softc; if (sc == NULL || !ME_READY(sc) || (ifp->if_flags & IFF_MONITOR) != 0 || (ifp->if_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 || (ifp->if_drv_flags & IFF_DRV_RUNNING) == 0 || (error = if_tunnel_check_nesting(ifp, m, MTAG_ME, V_max_me_nesting)) != 0) { m_freem(m); goto drop; } af = m->m_pkthdr.csum_data; if (af != AF_INET) { error = EAFNOSUPPORT; m_freem(m); goto drop; } if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip)) m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct ip)); if (m == NULL) { error = ENOBUFS; goto drop; } ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); /* Fragmented datagramms shouldn't be encapsulated */ if (ip->ip_off & htons(IP_MF | IP_OFFMASK)) { error = EINVAL; m_freem(m); goto drop; } mh.mob_proto = ip->ip_p; mh.mob_src = ip->ip_src; mh.mob_dst = ip->ip_dst; if (in_hosteq(sc->me_src, ip->ip_src)) { hlen = sizeof(struct mobhdr) - sizeof(struct in_addr); mh.mob_flags = 0; } else { hlen = sizeof(struct mobhdr); mh.mob_flags = MOB_FLAGS_SP; } BPF_MTAP2(ifp, &af, sizeof(af), m); plen = m->m_pkthdr.len; ip->ip_src = sc->me_src; ip->ip_dst = sc->me_dst; m->m_flags &= ~(M_BCAST|M_MCAST); M_SETFIB(m, sc->me_fibnum); M_PREPEND(m, hlen, M_NOWAIT); if (m == NULL) { error = ENOBUFS; goto drop; } if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct ip) + hlen) m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct ip) + hlen); if (m == NULL) { error = ENOBUFS; goto drop; } memmove(mtod(m, void *), mtodo(m, hlen), sizeof(struct ip)); ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); ip->ip_len = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len); ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_MOBILE; ip->ip_sum = 0; mh.mob_csum = 0; mh.mob_csum = me_in_cksum((uint16_t *)&mh, hlen / sizeof(uint16_t)); bcopy(&mh, mtodo(m, sizeof(struct ip)), hlen); error = ip_output(m, NULL, NULL, IP_FORWARDING, NULL, NULL); drop: if (error) if_inc_counter(ifp, IFCOUNTER_OERRORS, 1); else { if_inc_counter(ifp, IFCOUNTER_OPACKETS, 1); if_inc_counter(ifp, IFCOUNTER_OBYTES, plen); } ME_RUNLOCK(); return (error); } static void me_qflush(struct ifnet *ifp __unused) { } static const struct srcaddrtab *me_srcaddrtab = NULL; static const struct encaptab *ecookie = NULL; static const struct encap_config me_encap_cfg = { .proto = IPPROTO_MOBILE, .min_length = sizeof(struct ip) + sizeof(struct mobhdr) - sizeof(in_addr_t), .exact_match = ENCAP_DRV_LOOKUP, .lookup = me_lookup, .input = me_input }; static int memodevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data) { switch (type) { case MOD_LOAD: me_srcaddrtab = ip_encap_register_srcaddr(me_srcaddr, NULL, M_WAITOK); ecookie = ip_encap_attach(&me_encap_cfg, NULL, M_WAITOK); break; case MOD_UNLOAD: ip_encap_detach(ecookie); ip_encap_unregister_srcaddr(me_srcaddrtab); break; default: return (EOPNOTSUPP); } return (0); } static moduledata_t me_mod = { "if_me", memodevent, 0 }; DECLARE_MODULE(if_me, me_mod, SI_SUB_PSEUDO, SI_ORDER_ANY); MODULE_VERSION(if_me, 1); diff --git a/sys/sys/priv.h b/sys/sys/priv.h index 948a6c28bb69..0a75944e29e8 100644 --- a/sys/sys/priv.h +++ b/sys/sys/priv.h @@ -1,540 +1,541 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD * * Copyright (c) 2006 nCircle Network Security, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed by Robert N. M. Watson for the TrustedBSD * Project under contract to nCircle Network Security, Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR, NCIRCLE NETWORK SECURITY, * INC., OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Privilege checking interface for BSD kernel. */ #ifndef _SYS_PRIV_H_ #define _SYS_PRIV_H_ /* * Privilege list, sorted loosely by kernel subsystem. * * Think carefully before adding or reusing one of these privileges -- are * there existing instances referring to the same privilege? Third party * vendors may request the assignment of privileges to be used in loadable * modules. Particular numeric privilege assignments are part of the * loadable kernel module ABI, and should not be changed across minor * releases. * * When adding a new privilege, remember to determine if it's appropriate * for use in jail, and update the privilege switch in prison_priv_check() * in kern_jail.c as necessary. */ /* * Track beginning of privilege list. */ #define _PRIV_LOWEST 1 /* * The remaining privileges typically correspond to one or a small * number of specific privilege checks, and have (relatively) precise * meanings. They are loosely sorted into a set of base system * privileges, such as the ability to reboot, and then loosely by * subsystem, indicated by a subsystem name. */ #define _PRIV_ROOT 1 /* Removed. */ #define PRIV_ACCT 2 /* Manage process accounting. */ #define PRIV_MAXFILES 3 /* Exceed system open files limit. */ #define PRIV_MAXPROC 4 /* Exceed system processes limit. */ #define PRIV_KTRACE 5 /* Set/clear KTRFAC_ROOT on ktrace. */ #define PRIV_SETDUMPER 6 /* Configure dump device. */ #define PRIV_REBOOT 8 /* Can reboot system. */ #define PRIV_SWAPON 9 /* Can swapon(). */ #define PRIV_SWAPOFF 10 /* Can swapoff(). */ #define PRIV_MSGBUF 11 /* Can read kernel message buffer. */ #define PRIV_IO 12 /* Can perform low-level I/O. */ #define PRIV_KEYBOARD 13 /* Reprogram keyboard. */ #define PRIV_DRIVER 14 /* Low-level driver privilege. */ #define PRIV_ADJTIME 15 /* Set time adjustment. */ #define PRIV_NTP_ADJTIME 16 /* Set NTP time adjustment. */ #define PRIV_CLOCK_SETTIME 17 /* Can call clock_settime. */ #define PRIV_SETTIMEOFDAY 18 /* Can call settimeofday. */ #define _PRIV_SETHOSTID 19 /* Removed. */ #define _PRIV_SETDOMAINNAME 20 /* Removed. */ /* * Audit subsystem privileges. */ #define PRIV_AUDIT_CONTROL 40 /* Can configure audit. */ #define PRIV_AUDIT_FAILSTOP 41 /* Can run during audit fail stop. */ #define PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT 42 /* Can get proc audit properties. */ #define PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT 43 /* Can set proc audit properties. */ #define PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT 44 /* Can submit an audit record. */ /* * Credential management privileges. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETUID 50 /* setuid. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETEUID 51 /* seteuid to !ruid and !svuid. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETGID 52 /* setgid. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETEGID 53 /* setgid to !rgid and !svgid. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS 54 /* Set process additional groups. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETREUID 55 /* setreuid. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETREGID 56 /* setregid. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID 57 /* setresuid. */ #define PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID 58 /* setresgid. */ #define PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS 59 /* Exempt bsd.seeothergids. */ #define PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS 60 /* Exempt bsd.seeotheruids. */ /* * Debugging privileges. */ #define PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED 80 /* Exempt debugging other users. */ #define PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID 81 /* Exempt debugging setuid proc. */ #define PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV 82 /* Exempt unprivileged debug limit. */ #define PRIV_DEBUG_DENIED 83 /* Exempt P2_NOTRACE. */ /* * Dtrace privileges. */ #define PRIV_DTRACE_KERNEL 90 /* Allow use of DTrace on the kernel. */ #define PRIV_DTRACE_PROC 91 /* Allow attaching DTrace to process. */ #define PRIV_DTRACE_USER 92 /* Process may submit DTrace events. */ /* * Firmware privilegs. */ #define PRIV_FIRMWARE_LOAD 100 /* Can load firmware. */ /* * Jail privileges. */ #define PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH 110 /* Attach to a jail. */ #define PRIV_JAIL_SET 111 /* Set jail parameters. */ #define PRIV_JAIL_REMOVE 112 /* Remove a jail. */ /* * Kernel environment privileges. */ #define PRIV_KENV_SET 120 /* Set kernel env. variables. */ #define PRIV_KENV_UNSET 121 /* Unset kernel env. variables. */ /* * Loadable kernel module privileges. */ #define PRIV_KLD_LOAD 130 /* Load a kernel module. */ #define PRIV_KLD_UNLOAD 131 /* Unload a kernel module. */ /* * Privileges associated with the MAC Framework and specific MAC policy * modules. */ #define PRIV_MAC_PARTITION 140 /* Privilege in mac_partition policy. */ #define PRIV_MAC_PRIVS 141 /* Privilege in the mac_privs policy. */ /* * Process-related privileges. */ #define PRIV_PROC_LIMIT 160 /* Exceed user process limit. */ #define PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN 161 /* Can call setlogin. */ #define PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT 162 /* Can raise resources limits. */ #define PRIV_PROC_SETLOGINCLASS 163 /* Can call setloginclass(2). */ /* * System V IPC privileges. */ #define PRIV_IPC_READ 170 /* Can override IPC read perm. */ #define PRIV_IPC_WRITE 171 /* Can override IPC write perm. */ #define PRIV_IPC_ADMIN 172 /* Can override IPC owner-only perm. */ #define PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE 173 /* Exempt IPC message queue limit. */ /* * POSIX message queue privileges. */ #define PRIV_MQ_ADMIN 180 /* Can override msgq owner-only perm. */ /* * Performance monitoring counter privileges. */ #define PRIV_PMC_MANAGE 190 /* Can administer PMC. */ #define PRIV_PMC_SYSTEM 191 /* Can allocate a system-wide PMC. */ /* * Scheduling privileges. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED 200 /* Exempt scheduling other users. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_SETPRIORITY 201 /* Can set lower nice value for proc. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_RTPRIO 202 /* Can set real time scheduling. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_SETPOLICY 203 /* Can set scheduler policy. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_SET 204 /* Can set thread scheduler. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_SETPARAM 205 /* Can set thread scheduler params. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET 206 /* Can manipulate cpusets. */ #define PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET_INTR 207 /* Can adjust IRQ to CPU binding. */ /* * POSIX semaphore privileges. */ #define PRIV_SEM_WRITE 220 /* Can override sem write perm. */ /* * Signal privileges. */ #define PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED 230 /* Exempt signalling other users. */ #define PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID 231 /* Non-conserv signal setuid proc. */ /* * Sysctl privileges. */ #define PRIV_SYSCTL_DEBUG 240 /* Can invoke sysctl.debug. */ #define PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITE 241 /* Can write sysctls. */ #define PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL 242 /* Can write sysctls, jail permitted. */ /* * TTY privileges. */ #define PRIV_TTY_CONSOLE 250 /* Set console to tty. */ #define PRIV_TTY_DRAINWAIT 251 /* Set tty drain wait time. */ #define PRIV_TTY_DTRWAIT 252 /* Set DTR wait on tty. */ #define PRIV_TTY_EXCLUSIVE 253 /* Override tty exclusive flag. */ #define _PRIV_TTY_PRISON 254 /* Removed. */ #define PRIV_TTY_STI 255 /* Simulate input on another tty. */ #define PRIV_TTY_SETA 256 /* Set tty termios structure. */ /* * UFS-specific privileges. */ #define PRIV_UFS_EXTATTRCTL 270 /* Can configure EAs on UFS1. */ #define PRIV_UFS_QUOTAOFF 271 /* quotaoff(). */ #define PRIV_UFS_QUOTAON 272 /* quotaon(). */ #define PRIV_UFS_SETUSE 273 /* setuse(). */ /* * ZFS-specific privileges. */ #define PRIV_ZFS_POOL_CONFIG 280 /* Can configure ZFS pools. */ #define PRIV_ZFS_INJECT 281 /* Can inject faults in the ZFS fault injection framework. */ #define PRIV_ZFS_JAIL 282 /* Can attach/detach ZFS file systems to/from jails. */ /* * NFS-specific privileges. */ #define PRIV_NFS_DAEMON 290 /* Can become the NFS daemon. */ #define PRIV_NFS_LOCKD 291 /* Can become NFS lock daemon. */ /* * VFS privileges. */ #define PRIV_VFS_READ 310 /* Override vnode DAC read perm. */ #define PRIV_VFS_WRITE 311 /* Override vnode DAC write perm. */ #define PRIV_VFS_ADMIN 312 /* Override vnode DAC admin perm. */ #define PRIV_VFS_EXEC 313 /* Override vnode DAC exec perm. */ #define PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP 314 /* Override vnode DAC lookup perm. */ #define PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE 315 /* Can use free block reserve. */ #define PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV 316 /* Can chflags() a device node. */ #define PRIV_VFS_CHOWN 317 /* Can set user; group to non-member. */ #define PRIV_VFS_CHROOT 318 /* chroot(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID 319 /* Can retain sugid bits on change. */ #define PRIV_VFS_EXCEEDQUOTA 320 /* Exempt from quota restrictions. */ #define PRIV_VFS_EXTATTR_SYSTEM 321 /* Operate on system EA namespace. */ #define PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT 322 /* fchroot(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_FHOPEN 323 /* Can fhopen(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_FHSTAT 324 /* Can fhstat(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_FHSTATFS 325 /* Can fhstatfs(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_GENERATION 326 /* stat() returns generation number. */ #define PRIV_VFS_GETFH 327 /* Can retrieve file handles. */ #define PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA 328 /* getquota(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_LINK 329 /* bsd.hardlink_check_uid */ #define PRIV_VFS_MKNOD_BAD 330 /* Was: mknod() can mark bad inodes. */ #define PRIV_VFS_MKNOD_DEV 331 /* Can mknod() to create dev nodes. */ #define PRIV_VFS_MKNOD_WHT 332 /* Can mknod() to create whiteout. */ #define PRIV_VFS_MOUNT 333 /* Can mount(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER 334 /* Can manage other users' file systems. */ #define PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_EXPORTED 335 /* Can set MNT_EXPORTED on mount. */ #define PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_PERM 336 /* Override dev node perms at mount. */ #define PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_SUIDDIR 337 /* Can set MNT_SUIDDIR on mount. */ #define PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER 338 /* Can perform a non-user mount. */ #define PRIV_VFS_SETGID 339 /* Can setgid if not in group. */ #define PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA 340 /* setquota(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE 341 /* Can set sticky bit on file. */ #define PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS 342 /* Can modify system flags. */ #define PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT 343 /* Can unmount(). */ #define PRIV_VFS_STAT 344 /* Override vnode MAC stat perm. */ /* * Virtual memory privileges. */ #define PRIV_VM_MADV_PROTECT 360 /* Can set MADV_PROTECT. */ #define PRIV_VM_MLOCK 361 /* Can mlock(), mlockall(). */ #define PRIV_VM_MUNLOCK 362 /* Can munlock(), munlockall(). */ #define PRIV_VM_SWAP_NOQUOTA 363 /* * Can override the global * swap reservation limits. */ #define PRIV_VM_SWAP_NORLIMIT 364 /* * Can override the per-uid * swap reservation limits. */ /* * Device file system privileges. */ #define PRIV_DEVFS_RULE 370 /* Can manage devfs rules. */ #define PRIV_DEVFS_SYMLINK 371 /* Can create symlinks in devfs. */ /* * Random number generator privileges. */ #define PRIV_RANDOM_RESEED 380 /* Closing /dev/random reseeds. */ /* * Network stack privileges. */ #define PRIV_NET_BRIDGE 390 /* Administer bridge. */ #define PRIV_NET_GRE 391 /* Administer GRE. */ #define _PRIV_NET_PPP 392 /* Removed. */ #define _PRIV_NET_SLIP 393 /* Removed. */ #define PRIV_NET_BPF 394 /* Monitor BPF. */ #define PRIV_NET_RAW 395 /* Open raw socket. */ #define PRIV_NET_ROUTE 396 /* Administer routing. */ #define PRIV_NET_TAP 397 /* Can open tap device. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFMTU 398 /* Set interface MTU. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFFLAGS 399 /* Set interface flags. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFCAP 400 /* Set interface capabilities. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFNAME 401 /* Set interface name. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFMETRIC 402 /* Set interface metrics. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFPHYS 403 /* Set interface physical layer prop. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFMAC 404 /* Set interface MAC label. */ #define PRIV_NET_ADDMULTI 405 /* Add multicast addr. to ifnet. */ #define PRIV_NET_DELMULTI 406 /* Delete multicast addr. from ifnet. */ #define PRIV_NET_HWIOCTL 407 /* Issue hardware ioctl on ifnet. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETLLADDR 408 /* Set interface link-level address. */ #define PRIV_NET_ADDIFGROUP 409 /* Add new interface group. */ #define PRIV_NET_DELIFGROUP 410 /* Delete interface group. */ #define PRIV_NET_IFCREATE 411 /* Create cloned interface. */ #define PRIV_NET_IFDESTROY 412 /* Destroy cloned interface. */ #define PRIV_NET_ADDIFADDR 413 /* Add protocol addr to interface. */ #define PRIV_NET_DELIFADDR 414 /* Delete protocol addr on interface. */ #define PRIV_NET_LAGG 415 /* Administer lagg interface. */ #define PRIV_NET_GIF 416 /* Administer gif interface. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFVNET 417 /* Move interface to vnet. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFDESCR 418 /* Set interface description. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETIFFIB 419 /* Set interface fib. */ #define PRIV_NET_VXLAN 420 /* Administer vxlan. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETLANPCP 421 /* Set LAN priority. */ #define PRIV_NET_SETVLANPCP PRIV_NET_SETLANPCP /* Alias Set VLAN priority */ +#define PRIV_NET_ME 423 /* Administer ME interface. */ /* * 802.11-related privileges. */ #define PRIV_NET80211_VAP_GETKEY 440 /* Query VAP 802.11 keys. */ #define PRIV_NET80211_VAP_MANAGE 441 /* Administer 802.11 VAP */ #define PRIV_NET80211_VAP_SETMAC 442 /* Set VAP MAC address */ #define PRIV_NET80211_CREATE_VAP 443 /* Create a new VAP */ /* * Placeholder for AppleTalk privileges, not supported anymore. */ #define _PRIV_NETATALK_RESERVEDPORT 450 /* Bind low port number. */ /* * ATM privileges. */ #define PRIV_NETATM_CFG 460 #define PRIV_NETATM_ADD 461 #define PRIV_NETATM_DEL 462 #define PRIV_NETATM_SET 463 /* * Bluetooth privileges. */ #define PRIV_NETBLUETOOTH_RAW 470 /* Open raw bluetooth socket. */ /* * Netgraph and netgraph module privileges. */ #define PRIV_NETGRAPH_CONTROL 480 /* Open netgraph control socket. */ #define PRIV_NETGRAPH_TTY 481 /* Configure tty for netgraph. */ /* * IPv4 and IPv6 privileges. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT 490 /* Bind low port number. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_IPFW 491 /* Administer IPFW firewall. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_DIVERT 492 /* Open IP divert socket. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_PF 493 /* Administer pf firewall. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_DUMMYNET 494 /* Administer DUMMYNET. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_CARP 495 /* Administer CARP. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_MROUTE 496 /* Administer multicast routing. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_RAW 497 /* Open netinet raw socket. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED 498 /* Query netinet pcb credentials. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_ADDRCTRL6 499 /* Administer IPv6 address scopes. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_ND6 500 /* Administer IPv6 neighbor disc. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_SCOPE6 501 /* Administer IPv6 address scopes. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_ALIFETIME6 502 /* Administer IPv6 address lifetimes. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_IPSEC 503 /* Administer IPSEC. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT 504 /* Allow [rapid] port/address reuse. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS 505 /* Set certain IPv4/6 header options. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_BINDANY 506 /* Allow bind to any address. */ #define PRIV_NETINET_HASHKEY 507 /* Get and set hash keys for IPv4/6. */ /* * Placeholders for IPX/SPX privileges, not supported any more. */ #define _PRIV_NETIPX_RESERVEDPORT 520 /* Bind low port number. */ #define _PRIV_NETIPX_RAW 521 /* Open netipx raw socket. */ /* * NCP privileges. */ #define PRIV_NETNCP 530 /* Use another user's connection. */ /* * SMB privileges. */ #define PRIV_NETSMB 540 /* Use another user's connection. */ /* * VM86 privileges. */ #define PRIV_VM86_INTCALL 550 /* Allow invoking vm86 int handlers. */ /* * Set of reserved privilege values, which will be allocated to code as * needed, in order to avoid renumbering later privileges due to insertion. */ #define _PRIV_RESERVED0 560 #define _PRIV_RESERVED1 561 #define _PRIV_RESERVED2 562 #define _PRIV_RESERVED3 563 #define _PRIV_RESERVED4 564 #define _PRIV_RESERVED5 565 #define _PRIV_RESERVED6 566 #define _PRIV_RESERVED7 567 #define _PRIV_RESERVED8 568 #define _PRIV_RESERVED9 569 #define _PRIV_RESERVED10 570 #define _PRIV_RESERVED11 571 #define _PRIV_RESERVED12 572 #define _PRIV_RESERVED13 573 #define _PRIV_RESERVED14 574 #define _PRIV_RESERVED15 575 /* * Define a set of valid privilege numbers that can be used by loadable * modules that don't yet have privilege reservations. Ideally, these should * not be used, since their meaning is opaque to any policies that are aware * of specific privileges, such as jail, and as such may be arbitrarily * denied. */ #define PRIV_MODULE0 600 #define PRIV_MODULE1 601 #define PRIV_MODULE2 602 #define PRIV_MODULE3 603 #define PRIV_MODULE4 604 #define PRIV_MODULE5 605 #define PRIV_MODULE6 606 #define PRIV_MODULE7 607 #define PRIV_MODULE8 608 #define PRIV_MODULE9 609 #define PRIV_MODULE10 610 #define PRIV_MODULE11 611 #define PRIV_MODULE12 612 #define PRIV_MODULE13 613 #define PRIV_MODULE14 614 #define PRIV_MODULE15 615 /* * DDB(4) privileges. */ #define PRIV_DDB_CAPTURE 620 /* Allow reading of DDB capture log. */ /* * Arla/nnpfs privileges. */ #define PRIV_NNPFS_DEBUG 630 /* Perforn ARLA_VIOC_NNPFSDEBUG. */ /* * cpuctl(4) privileges. */ #define PRIV_CPUCTL_WRMSR 640 /* Write model-specific register. */ #define PRIV_CPUCTL_UPDATE 641 /* Update cpu microcode. */ /* * Capi4BSD privileges. */ #define PRIV_C4B_RESET_CTLR 650 /* Load firmware, reset controller. */ #define PRIV_C4B_TRACE 651 /* Unrestricted CAPI message tracing. */ /* * OpenAFS privileges. */ #define PRIV_AFS_ADMIN 660 /* Can change AFS client settings. */ #define PRIV_AFS_DAEMON 661 /* Can become the AFS daemon. */ /* * Resource Limits privileges. */ #define PRIV_RCTL_GET_RACCT 670 #define PRIV_RCTL_GET_RULES 671 #define PRIV_RCTL_GET_LIMITS 672 #define PRIV_RCTL_ADD_RULE 673 #define PRIV_RCTL_REMOVE_RULE 674 /* * mem(4) privileges. */ #define PRIV_KMEM_READ 680 /* Open mem/kmem for reading. */ #define PRIV_KMEM_WRITE 681 /* Open mem/kmem for writing. */ /* * Track end of privilege list. */ #define _PRIV_HIGHEST 682 /* * Validate that a named privilege is known by the privilege system. Invalid * privileges presented to the privilege system by a priv_check interface * will result in a panic. This is only approximate due to sparse allocation * of the privilege space. */ #define PRIV_VALID(x) ((x) > _PRIV_LOWEST && (x) < _PRIV_HIGHEST) #ifdef _KERNEL /* * Privilege check interfaces, modeled after historic suser() interfaces, but * with the addition of a specific privilege name. No flags are currently * defined for the API. Historically, flags specified using the real uid * instead of the effective uid, and whether or not the check should be * allowed in jail. */ struct thread; struct ucred; int priv_check(struct thread *td, int priv); int priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv, int flags); #endif #endif /* !_SYS_PRIV_H_ */