diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh b/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh index 70a444e4eff4..107c049c4175 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/setup_ci.sh @@ -1,115 +1,117 @@ #!/bin/sh case $(./config.guess) in *-darwin*) brew install automake exit 0 ;; esac TARGETS=$@ PACKAGES="" INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="no" +export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive #echo "Setting up for '$TARGETS'" set -ex lsb_release -a if [ "${TARGETS}" = "kitchensink" ]; then TARGETS="kerberos5 libedit pam sk selinux" fi for TARGET in $TARGETS; do case $TARGET in default|without-openssl|without-zlib|c89) # nothing to do ;; kerberos5) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES heimdal-dev" #PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libkrb5-dev" ;; libedit) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libedit-dev" ;; *pam) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libpam0g-dev" ;; sk) INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="yes" PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libfido2-dev libu2f-host-dev libcbor-dev" ;; selinux) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libselinux1-dev selinux-policy-dev" ;; hardenedmalloc) INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC=yes ;; openssl-noec) INSTALL_OPENSSL=OpenSSL_1_1_1k SSLCONFOPTS="no-ec" ;; openssl-*) INSTALL_OPENSSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-) case ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} in + 1.1.1_stable) INSTALL_OPENSSL="OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable" ;; 1.*) INSTALL_OPENSSL="OpenSSL_$(echo ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} | tr . _)" ;; 3.*) INSTALL_OPENSSL="openssl-${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ;; esac PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools" ;; libressl-*) INSTALL_LIBRESSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-) case ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} in master) ;; *) INSTALL_LIBRESSL="v$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)" ;; esac PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools" ;; valgrind*) PACKAGES="$PACKAGES valgrind" ;; *) echo "Invalid option '${TARGET}'" exit 1 ;; esac done if [ "yes" = "$INSTALL_FIDO_PPA" ]; then sudo apt update -qq - sudo apt install software-properties-common - sudo apt-add-repository ppa:yubico/stable + sudo apt install -qy software-properties-common + sudo apt-add-repository -y ppa:yubico/stable fi if [ "x" != "x$PACKAGES" ]; then sudo apt update -qq sudo apt install -qy $PACKAGES fi if [ "${INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC}" = "yes" ]; then (cd ${HOME} && git clone https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc.git && cd ${HOME}/hardened_malloc && make -j2 && sudo cp libhardened_malloc.so /usr/lib/) fi if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ]; then (cd ${HOME} && git clone https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git && cd ${HOME}/openssl && git checkout ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} && ./config no-threads shared ${SSLCONFOPTS} \ --prefix=/opt/openssl && make && sudo make install_sw) fi if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}" ]; then (mkdir -p ${HOME}/libressl && cd ${HOME}/libressl && git clone https://github.com/libressl-portable/portable.git && cd ${HOME}/libressl/portable && git checkout ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} && sh update.sh && sh autogen.sh && ./configure --prefix=/opt/libressl && make -j2 && sudo make install) fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml index 289b18b7f621..152ddaa4fba6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml +++ b/crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml @@ -1,76 +1,81 @@ name: C/C++ CI on: push: branches: [ master, ci ] pull_request: branches: [ master ] jobs: ci: if: github.repository != 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted' strategy: fail-fast: false matrix: # First we test all OSes in the default configuration. os: [ubuntu-20.04, ubuntu-18.04, macos-10.15, macos-11.0] configs: [default] # Then we include any extra configs we want to test for specific VMs. # Valgrind slows things down quite a bit, so start them first. include: - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-1 } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-2 } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-3 } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-4 } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: valgrind-unit } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: c89 } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: pam } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: kitchensink } - { os: ubuntu-20.04, configs: hardenedmalloc } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-master } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-2.2.9 } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-2.8.3 } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-3.0.2 } - - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-3.2.5 } + - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-3.2.6 } + - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-3.3.4 } + - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: libressl-3.4.0 } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-master } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-noec } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.0.1 } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.0.1u } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.0.2u } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.1.0h } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.1.1 } - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.1.1k } + - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-3.0.0 } + - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-1.1.1_stable } # stable branch + - { os: ubuntu-latest, configs: openssl-3.0 } # stable branch - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: pam } - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: kerberos5 } - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: libedit } - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: sk } - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: selinux } - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: kitchensink } - { os: ubuntu-18.04, configs: without-openssl } - { os: macos-10.15, configs: pam } - { os: macos-11.0, configs: pam } runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v2 - name: setup CI system run: ./.github/setup_ci.sh ${{ matrix.configs }} - name: autoreconf run: autoreconf - name: configure run: ./.github/configure.sh ${{ matrix.configs }} - name: make run: make -j2 - name: make tests run: ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.configs }} env: TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS: 1 - name: save logs if: failure() uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2 with: name: ${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.configs }}-logs path: | config.h config.log regress/*.log regress/valgrind-out/ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog index 288e90bbfe51..9e660ec37ef3 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog +++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog @@ -1,13703 +1,13611 @@ +commit bf944e3794eff5413f2df1ef37cddf96918c6bde +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Sep 27 00:03:19 2021 +1000 + + initgroups needs grp.h + +commit 8c5b5655149bd76ea21026d7fe73ab387dbc3bc7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 26 14:01:11 2021 +0000 + + upstream: openssh-8.8 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12357794602ac979eb7312a1fb190c453f492ec4 + +commit f3cbe43e28fe71427d41cfe3a17125b972710455 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 26 14:01:03 2021 +0000 + + upstream: need initgroups() before setresgid(); reported by anton@, + + ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6aa003ee658b316960d94078f2a16edbc25087ce + +commit 8acaff41f7518be40774c626334157b1b1c5583c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Sep 26 22:16:36 2021 +1000 + + update version numbers for release + +commit d39039ddc0010baa91c70a0fa0753a2699bbf435 +Author: kn@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 25 09:40:33 2021 +0000 + + upstream: RSA/SHA-1 is not used by default anymore + + OK dtucker deraadt djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 055c51a221c3f099dd75c95362f902da1b8678c6 + +commit 9b2ee74e3aa8c461eb5552a6ebf260449bb06f7e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 24 11:08:03 2021 +1000 + + Move the fgrep replacement to hostkey-rotate.sh. + + The fgrep replacement for buggy greps doesn't work in the sftp-glob test + so move it to just where we know it's needed. + +commit f7039541570d4b66d76e6f574544db176d8d5c02 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 24 08:04:14 2021 +1000 + + Replacement function for buggy fgrep. + + GNU (f)grep <=2.18, as shipped by FreeBSD<=12 and NetBSD<=9 will + occasionally fail to find ssh host keys in the hostkey-rotate test. + If we have those versions, use awk instead. + +commit f6a660e5bf28a01962af87568e118a2d2e79eaa0 +Author: David Manouchehri +Date: Thu Sep 23 17:03:18 2021 -0400 + + Don't prompt for yes/no questions. + +commit 7ed1a3117c09f8c3f1add35aad77d3ebe1b85b4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 20 06:53:56 2021 +0000 + + upstream: fix missing -s in SYNOPSYS and usage() as well as a + + capitalisation mistake; spotted by jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ed8ee085c7503c60578941d8b45f3a61d4c9710 + +commit 8c07170135dde82a26886b600a8bf6fb290b633d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 20 04:02:13 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Fix "Allocated port" debug message + + for unix domain sockets. From peder.stray at gmail.com via github PR#272, + ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d5ef3fbdcdd29ebb0792b5022a4942db03f017e + +commit 277d3c6adfb128b4129db08e3d65195d94b55fe7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 20 01:55:42 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Switch scp back to use the old protocol by default, ahead of + + release. We'll wait a little longer for people to pick up sftp-server(8) that + supports the extension that scp needs for ~user paths to continue working in + SFTP protocol mode. Discussed with deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f281f603a705fba317ff076e7b11bcf2df941871 + +commit ace19b34cc15bea3482be90450c1ed0cd0dd0669 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 18 02:03:25 2021 +0000 + + upstream: better error message for ~user failures when the + + sftp-server lacks the expand-path extension; ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c1d965d389411f7e86f0a445158bf09b8f9e4bc + +commit 6b1238ba971ee722a310d95037b498ede5539c03 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 16 15:22:22 2021 +0000 + + upstream: make some more scp-in-SFTP mode better match Unix idioms + + suggested by deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f2439404ed4cf0b0be8bf49a1ee734836e1ac87 + +commit e694f8ac4409931e67d08ac44ed251b20b10a957 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 16 15:11:19 2021 +0000 + + upstream: allow log_stderr==2 to prefix log messages with argv[0] + + use this to make scp's SFTP mode error messages more scp-like + + prompted by and ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e821dbde423fc2280e47414bdc22aaa5b4e0733 + +commit 8a7a06ee505cb833e613f74a07392e9296286c30 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 17 13:03:31 2021 +1000 + + Test against LibreSSL 3.2.6, 3.3.4, 3.4.0. + +commit c25c84074a47f700dd6534995b4af4b456927150 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 16 05:36:03 2021 +0000 + + upstream: missing space character in ssh -G output broke the + + t-sshcfgparse regression test; spotted by anton@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcc36fae2f233caac4baa8e58482da4aa350eed0 + +commit a4bee1934bf5e5575fea486628f4123d6a29dff8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 15 06:56:01 2021 +0000 + + upstream: allow CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs=none in ssh_config; ok + + markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668a82ba8e56d731b26ffc5703213bfe071df623 + +commit d0fffc88c8fe90c1815c6f4097bc8cbcabc0f3dd +Author: mbuhl@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 14 11:04:21 2021 +0000 + + upstream: put back the mux_ctx memleak fix for SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT + + OK mfriedl@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1aba1da828956cacaadb81a637338734697d9798 + +commit 19b3d846f06697c85957ab79a63454f57f8e22d6 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 11 09:05:50 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Do not ignore SIGINT while waiting for input if editline(3) + + is not used. Instead, in non-interactive mode, exit sftp(1), like for other + serious errors. As pointed out by dtucker@, when compiled without editline(3) + support in portable OpenSSH, the el == NULL branch is also used for + interactive mode. In that case, discard the input line and provide a fresh + prompt to the user just like in the case where editline(3) is used. OK djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d06f4d3ebba62115527fafacf38370d09dfb393 + +commit ba61123eef9c6356d438c90c1199a57a0d7bcb0a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 11 00:40:24 2021 +0000 + + upstream: when using SFTP protocol, continue transferring files after a + + transfer error occurs. This matches original scp/rcp behaviour. ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfe4558d71dd09707e9b5d6e7d2e53b793da69fa + +commit b0ec59a708b493c6f3940336b1a537bcb64dd2a7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 10 11:38:38 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Document that non-interactive commands are run via the user's + + shell using the -c flag. ok jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f0d912077732eead10423afd1acf4fc0ceec477 + +commit 66a658b5d9e009ea11f8a0ca6e69c7feb2d851ea +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 10 10:26:02 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Document behaviour of arguments following non-interactive + + commands. Prompted by github PR#139 from EvanTheB, feedback & ok djm@ jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc758d1fe0471dfab4304fcad6cd4ecc3d79162a + +commit 1d47e28e407d1f95fdf8f799be23f48dcfa5206b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 10 07:11:11 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Clarify which file's attributes -p preserves, and that + + it's specifically the file mode bits. bz#3340 from calestyo at scientia.net, + ok djm@ jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09e6098ed1c4be00c730873049825f8ee7cb884 + +commit b344db7a413478e4c21e4cadba4a970ad3e6128a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 10 05:46:09 2021 +0000 + + upstream: openssh-7.4 was incorrectly listed twice; spotted by + + Dmitry Belyavskiy, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b823ae448f6e899927ce7b04225ac9e489f58ef + +commit 9136d6239ad7a4a293e0418a49b69e70c76d58b8 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 9 06:17:39 2021 +0000 + + upstream: - move CAVEATS to its correct order - use the term + + "legacy" protocol rather than "original", as the latter made the text + misleading - uppercase SCP + + ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8479255746d5fa76a358ee59e7340fecf4245ff0 + +commit 2d678c5e3bdc2f5c99f7af5122e9d054925d560d +Author: David Carlier +Date: Wed Sep 8 19:49:54 2021 +0100 + + Disable tracing on FreeBSD using procctl. + + Placed at the start of platform_disable_tracing() to prevent declaration + after code errors from strict C89 compilers (in the unlikely event that + more than one method is enabled). + +commit 73050fa38fb36ae3326d768b574806352b97002d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 8 23:31:39 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Use the SFTP protocol by default. The original scp/rcp + + protocol remains available via the -O flag. + + Note that ~user/ prefixed paths in SFTP mode require a protocol extension + that was first shipped in OpenSSH 8.7. + + ok deraadt, after baking in snaps for a while without incident + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23588976e28c281ff5988da0848cb821fec9213c + +commit c4565e69ffa2485cff715aa842ea7a350296bfb6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 8 21:09:49 2021 +1000 + + Really fix test on OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable. + +commit 79f1bb5f56cef3ae9276207316345b8309248478 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 8 18:51:39 2021 +1000 + + Correct OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable identifier. + +commit b6255593ed5ccbe5e7d3d4b26b2ad31ad4afc232 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 8 18:39:44 2021 +1000 + + Increment nfds when coming from startup_pipe. + + If we have to increase nfds because startup_pipe[0] is above any of the + descriptors passed in the fd_sets, we also need to add 1 to nfds since + select takes highest FD number plus one. bz#3345 from yaroslav.kuzmin + at vmssoftware.com. + +commit a3e92a6794817df6012ac8546aea19652cc91b61 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 8 13:45:10 2021 +1000 + + Tests for OpenSSL 3.0.0 release & 1.1.1 branch. + +commit 4afe431da98ec1cf6a2933fe5658f4fd68dee9e2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 8 03:23:44 2021 +0000 + + upstream: correct my mistake in previous fix; spotted by halex + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cc62d92e3f70006bf02468fc146bfc36fffa183 + +commit ca0e455b9331213ff9505a21b94c38e34faa2bba +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 7 06:03:51 2021 +0000 + + upstream: avoid NULL deref in -Y find-principals. Report and fix + + from Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón + MIME-Version: 1.0 + Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 + Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6238486f8ecc888d6ccafcd9ad99e621bb41f1e0 + +commit 37616807f150fb46610bbd5031c31af4857ad1e9 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 6 00:36:01 2021 +0000 + + upstream: revision 1.381 neglected to remove + + sChallengeResponseAuthentication from the enum. Noticed by + christos@zoulas.com. OK dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b533283a4dd6d04a867da411a4c7a8fbc90e34ff + +commit 7acb3578cdfec0b3d34501408071f7a96c1684ea +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Sep 5 20:45:42 2021 +1000 + + Correct version_num for OpenSSL dev branch. + +commit 65bb01111320dfd0d25e21e1fd4d3f2b77532669 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Sep 5 19:37:39 2021 +1000 + + Test against OpenSSL 3 branch as well as dev. + + Now that OpenSSL development has moved to 3.1, test against the most + recent version of the openssl-3.0 branch too. + +commit 864ed0d5e04a503b97202c776b7cf3f163f3eeaa +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Sep 5 19:33:22 2021 +1000 + + OpenSSL development is now 3.1.* + +commit a60209a586a928f92ab323bf23bd07f57093342e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 07:43:23 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Use .Cm instead of .Dq in StrictHostKeyChecking list for + + consistency. Patch from scop via github PR#257, ok jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3652a91564570779431802c31224fb4a9cf39872 + +commit 8d1d9eb6de37331e872700e9e399a3190cca1242 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 07:27:03 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Mention using ssh -i for specifying the public key file + + in the case where the private key is loaded into ssh-agent but is not present + locally. Based on patch from rafork via github PR#215, ok jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2282e83b0ff78d2efbe705883b67240745fa5bb2 + +commit eb4362e5e3aa7ac26138b11e44d8c191910aff64 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 05:25:50 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Refer to KEX "algorithms" instead of "methods" to match + + other references and improve consistency. Patch from scop via github PR#241, + ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 840bc94ff6861b28d8603c8e8c16499bfb65e32c + +commit b3318946ce5725da43c4bf7eeea1b73129c47d2a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 05:12:25 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Remove redundant attrib_clear in upload_dir_internal. + + The subsequent call to stat_to_attrib clears the struct as its first step + anyway. From pmeinhardt via github PR#220, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5234fc6d7425b607e179acb3383f21716f3029e + +commit 7cc3fe28896e653956a6a2eed0a25d551b83a029 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 3 04:11:13 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Add test for client termination status on signal. + + Based on patch from Alexxz via github PR#235 with some tweaks, to + match patch in bz#3281. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d87c7446fb8b5f8b45894fbbd6875df326e729e2 + +commit 5428b0d239f6b516c81d1dd15aa9fe9e60af75d4 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 2 21:03:54 2021 +0000 + + upstream: sys/param.h is not needed for any visible reason + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bdea2d0c75692e4c5777670ac039d4b01c1f368 + +commit 1ff38f34b4c4545eb28106629cafa1e0496bc726 +Author: Shchelkunov Artem +Date: Wed Aug 11 18:07:58 2021 +0500 + + Fix memory leak in error path. + + *info is allocated via xstrdup but was leaked in the PAM_AUTH_ERR path. + From github PR#266. + +commit cb37e2f0c0ca4fef844ed7edc5d0e3b7d0e83f6a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 1 03:16:06 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Fix ssh-rsa fallback for old PuTTY interop tests. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a19ac929da604843a5b5f0f48d2c0eb6e0773d37 + +commit 8b02ef0f28dc24cda8cbcd8b7eb02bda8f8bbe59 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 1 00:50:27 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Add a function to skip remaining tests. + + Many tests skip tests for various reasons but not in a consistent way and + don't always clean up, so add that and switch the tests that do that over. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72d2ec90a3ee8849486956a808811734281af735 + +commit d486845c07324c04240f1674ac513985bd356f66 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 31 07:13:59 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Specify path to PuTTY keys. + + Portable needs this and it makes no difference on OpenBSD, so resync + them. (Id sync only, Portable already had this.) + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 33f6f66744455886d148527af8368811e4264162 + +commit d22b299115e27606e846b23490746f69fdd4fb38 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 31 06:13:23 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Better compat tests with old PuTTY. + + When running PuTTY interop tests and using a PuTTY version older than + 0.76, re-enable the ssh-rsa host key algorithm (the 256 and 512 variants + of RSA were added some time between 0.73 and 0.76). + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e6138d6987aa705fa1e4f216db0bb386e1ff38e1 + +commit 87ad70d605c3e39c9b8aa275db27120d7cc09b77 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 31 17:04:50 2021 +1000 + + Resync PuTTY interop tests. + + Resync behaviour when REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY is not set with OpenBSD. + +commit e47b82a7bf51021afac218bf59a3be121827653d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 31 01:25:27 2021 +0000 + + upstream: Specify hostkeyalgorithms in SSHFP test. + + Specify host key algorithms in sshd's default set for the SSHFP test, + from djm@. Make the reason for when the test is skipped a bit clearer. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4f923dfc761480d5411de17ea6f0b30de3e32cea + +commit 7db3e0a9e8477c018757b59ee955f7372c0b55fb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 30 01:15:45 2021 +0000 + + upstream: adapt to RSA/SHA1 deprectation + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 952397c39a22722880e4de9d1c50bb1a14f907bb + +commit 2344750250247111a6c3c6a4fe84ed583a61cc11 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Aug 29 23:53:10 2021 +0000 + + upstream: After years of forewarning, disable the RSA/SHA-1 + + signature algorithm by default. It is feasible to create colliding SHA1 + hashes, so we need to deprecate its use. + + RSA/SHA-256/512 remains available and will be transparently selected + instead of RSA/SHA1 for most SSH servers released in the last five+ + years. There is no need to regenerate RSA keys. + + The use of RSA/SHA1 can be re-enabled by adding "ssh-rsa" to the + PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms directives on the client and server. + + ok dtucker deraadt + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 189bcc4789c7254e09e23734bdd5def8354ff1d5 + +commit 56c4455d3b54b7d481c77c82115c830b9c8ce328 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Aug 29 23:44:07 2021 +0000 + + upstream: wrap at 80 columns + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47ca2286d6b52a9747f34da16d742879e1a37bf0 + +commit 95401eea8503943449f712e5f3de52fc0bc612c5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 20 18:14:13 2021 +1000 + + Replace shell function with ssh-keygen -A. + + Prevents the init script in the SysV package from trying (and failing) + to generate unsupported key types. Remove now-unused COMMENT_OUT_ECC. + ok tim@ + +commit d83ec9ed995a76ed1d5c65cf10b447222ec86131 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Aug 20 15:39:05 2021 +1000 + + Remove obsolete Redhat PAM config and init script. + commit e1a596186c81e65a34ce13076449712d3bf97eb4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 20 14:03:49 2021 +1000 depend commit 5450606c8f7f7a0d70211cea78bc2dab74ab35d1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 20 13:59:43 2021 +1000 update version numbers commit feee2384ab8d694c770b7750cfa76a512bdf8246 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 20 03:22:55 2021 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.7 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8769dff0fd76ae3193d77bf83b439adee0f300cd commit 9a2ed62173cc551b2b5f479460bb015b19499de8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 20 10:48:13 2021 +1000 Also check pid in pselect_notify_setup. Spotted by djm@. commit deaadcb93ca15d4f38aa38fb340156077792ce87 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 20 08:39:33 2021 +1000 Prefix pselect functions to clarify debug messages commit 10e45654cff221ca60fd35ee069df67208fcf415 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 20 08:30:42 2021 +1000 Fix race in pselect replacement code. On the second and subsequent calls to pselect the notify_pipe was not added to the select readset, opening up a race that om G. Christensen discovered on multiprocessor Solaris <=9 systems. Also reinitialize notify_pipe if the pid changes. This will prevent a parent and child from using the same FD, although this is not an issue in the current structure it might be in future. commit 464ba22f1e38d25402e5ec79a9b8d34a32df5a3f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Aug 18 12:51:30 2021 +1000 Check compiler for c99 declarations after code. The sntrup761 reference code contains c99-style declarations after code so don't try to build that if the compiler doesn't support it. commit 7d878679a4b155a359d32104ff473f789501748d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Aug 17 15:12:04 2021 +1000 Remove trailing backslash on regress-unit-binaries commit b71b2508f17c68c5d9dbbe537686d81cedb9a781 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Aug 17 07:59:27 2021 +1000 Put stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H. From Tom G. Christensen. commit 6a24567a29bd7b4ab64e1afad859ea845cbc6b8c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Aug 16 14:13:02 2021 +1000 Improve github test driver script. - use a trap to always output any failed regress logs (since the script sets -e, the existing log output is never invoked). - pass LTESTS and SKIP_LTESTS when re-running with sshd options (eg. UsePAM). commit b467cf13705f59ed348b620722ac098fe31879b7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Aug 16 11:32:23 2021 +1000 Remove deprecated ubuntu-16.04 test targets. Github has deprecated ubuntu-16.04 and it will be removed on 20 September. commit 20e6eefcdf78394f05e453d456c1212ffaa6b6a4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Aug 15 23:25:26 2021 +1000 Skip agent ptrace test on hurd. commit 7c9115bbbf958fbf85259a061c1122e2d046aabf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Aug 15 19:37:22 2021 +1000 Add hurd test target. commit 7909a566f6c6a78fcd30708dc49f4e4f9bb80ce3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Aug 15 12:45:10 2021 +1000 Skip scp3 tests on all dfly58 and 60 configs. commit e65198e52cb03534e8c846d1bca74c310b1526de Author: Tim Rice Date: Sat Aug 14 13:08:07 2021 -0700 openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h: put bsd-signal.h before bsd-misc.h to get sigset_t from signal.h needed for the pselect replacement. commit e50635640f79920d9375e0155cb3f4adb870eee5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 13 13:21:00 2021 +1000 Test OpenSSH from OpenBSD head on 6.8 and 6.9. commit e0ba38861c490c680117b7fe0a1d61a181cd00e7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 13 13:00:14 2021 +1000 Skip scp3 test on dragonfly 58 and 60. The tests hang, so skip until we figure them out. commit dcce2a2bcf007bf817a2fb0dce3db83fa9201e92 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 12 23:59:25 2021 +0000 upstream: mention that CASignatureAlgorithms accepts +/- similarly to the other algorithm list directives; ok jmc bz#3335 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d46b53995817052c78e2dce9dbd133963b073d9 commit 090a82486e5d7a8f7f16613d67e66a673a40367f Author: schwarze@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 12 09:59:00 2021 +0000 upstream: In the editline(3) branch of the sftp(1) event loop, handle SIGINT rather than ignoring it, such that the user can use Ctrl-C to discard the currently edited command line and get a fresh prompt, just like in ftp(1), bc(1), and in shells. It is critical to not use ssl_signal() for this particular case because that function unconditionally sets SA_RESTART, but here we need the signal to interrupt the read(2) in the el_gets(3) event loop. OK dtucker@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8025115a773f52e9bb562eaab37ea2e021cc7299 commit e1371e4f58404d6411d9f95eb774b444cea06a26 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 11 14:07:54 2021 +0000 upstream: scp: tweak man page and error message for -3 by default Now that the -3 option is enabled by default, flip the documentation and error message logic from "requires -3" to "blocked by -R". ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a872592118444fb3acda5267b2a8c3d4c4252020 commit 49f46f6d77328a3d10a758522b670a3e8c2235e7 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 11 14:05:19 2021 +0000 upstream: scp: do not spawn ssh with two -s flags for remote-to-remote copies Do not add another "-s" to the argument vector every time an SFTP connection is initiated. Instead, introduce a subsystem flag to do_cmd() and add "-s" when the flag is set. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25df69759f323661d31b2e1e790faa22e27966c1 commit 2a2cd00783e1da45ee730b7f453408af1358ef5b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 11 08:55:04 2021 +0000 upstream: test -Oprint-pubkey OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d51afb6d1f287975fb6fddd7a2c00a3bc5094e0 commit b9f4635ea5bc33ed5ebbacf332d79bae463b0f54 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 11 08:54:17 2021 +0000 upstream: when verifying sshsig signatures, support an option (-Oprint-pubkey) to dump the full public key to stdout; based on patch from Fabian Stelzer; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0598000e5b9adfb45d42afa76ff80daaa12fc3e2 commit 750c1a45ba4e8ad63793d49418a0780e77947b9b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 11 05:21:32 2021 +0000 upstream: oops, missed one more %p OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7e62818d1564cc5cd9086eaf7a51cbd1a9701eb commit b5aa27b69ab2e1c13ac2b5ad3f8f7d389bad7489 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 11 05:20:17 2021 +0000 upstream: remove a bunch of %p in format strings; leftovers of debuggings past. prompted by Michael Forney, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4853a0d6c9cecaba9ecfcc19066e52d3a8dcb2ac commit 419aa01123db5ff5dbc68b2376ef23b222862338 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Aug 11 09:21:09 2021 +1000 Add includes.h to compat tests. On platforms where closefrom returns void (eg glibc>=2.34) the prototype for closefrom in its compat tests would cause compile errors. Remove this and have the tests pull in the compat headers in the same way as the main code. bz#3336. commit 931f592f26239154eea3eb35a086585897b1a185 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 10 03:35:45 2021 +0000 upstream: adapt to scp -M flag change; make scp3.sh test SFTP mode too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 43fea26704a0f0b962b53c1fabcb68179638f9c0 commit 391ca67fb978252c48d20c910553f803f988bd37 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 10 03:33:34 2021 +0000 upstream: Prepare for a future where scp(1) uses the SFTP protocol by default. Replace recently added -M option to select the protocol with -O (olde) and -s (SFTP) flags, and label the -s flag with a clear warning that it will be removed in the near future (so no, don't use it in scripts!). prompted by/feedback from deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ad72cc6f0023c9be9e316d8b30eb6d8d749cfc commit bfdd4b722f124a4fa9173d20dd64dd0fc69856be Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 23:56:36 2021 +0000 upstream: make scp -3 the default for remote-to-remote copies. It provides a much better and more intuitive user experience and doesn't require exposing credentials to the source host. thanks naddy@ for catching the missing argument in usage() "Yes please!" - markus@ "makes a lot of sense" - deraadt@ "the right thing to do" - dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0d2af5f0965c5192ba5b2fa461c9f9b130e5dd9 commit 2f7a3b51cef689ad9e93d0c6c17db5a194eb5555 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 23:49:31 2021 +0000 upstream: make scp in SFTP mode try to use relative paths as much as possible. Previosuly, it would try to make relative and ~/-rooted paths absolute before requesting transfers. prompted by and much discussion deraadt@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46639d382ea99546a4914b545fa7b00fa1be5566 commit 2ab864010e0a93c5dd95116fb5ceaf430e2fc23c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 23:47:44 2021 +0000 upstream: SFTP protocol extension to allow the server to expand ~-prefixed paths, in particular ~user ones. Allows scp in sftp mode to accept these paths, like scp in rcp mode does. prompted by and much discussion deraadt@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d794def9e4de348e1e777f6030fc9bafdfff392 commit 41b019ac067f1d1f7d99914d0ffee4d2a547c3d8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 23:44:32 2021 +0000 upstream: when scp is in SFTP mode, try to deal better with ~ prefixed paths. ~user paths aren't supported, but ~/ paths will be accepted and prefixed with the SFTP server starting directory (more to come) prompted by and discussed with deraadt@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 263a071f14555c045fd03132a8fb6cbd983df00d commit b4b3f3da6cdceb3fd168b5fab69d11fba73bd0ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 07:21:01 2021 +0000 upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok markus@ (this was originally committed as r1.223 along with unrelated stuff that I rolled back in r1.224) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1261fd667ad918484889ed3d7aec074f3956a74b commit 2ae7771749e0b4cecb107f9d4860bec16c3f4245 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 07:19:12 2021 +0000 upstream: rever r1.223 - I accidentally committed unrelated changes OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb73f3865b2647a27dd94db73d6589506a9625f9 commit 986abe94d481a1e82a01747360bd767b96b41eda Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 07:16:09 2021 +0000 upstream: show only the final path component in the progress meter; more useful with long paths (that may truncate) and better matches traditional scp behaviour; spotted by naddy@ ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26b544d0074f03ebb8a3ebce42317d8d7ee291a3 commit 2b67932bb3176dee4fd447af4368789e04a82b93 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 9 07:13:54 2021 +0000 upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef9dab5ef5ae54a6a4c3b15d380568e94263456c commit 724eb900ace30661d45db2ba01d0f924d95ecccb Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Aug 8 08:49:09 2021 +0000 upstream: xstrdup environment variable used by ForwardAgent. bz#3328 from goetze at dovetail.com, ok djm@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760320dac1c3b26904284ba417a7d63fccc5e742 commit 86b4cb3a884846b358305aad17a6ef53045fa41f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Aug 8 08:27:28 2021 +0000 upstream: Although it's POSIX, not all shells used in Portable support the implicit 'in "$@"' after 'for i'. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c9aec6bca4868f85d2742b6ba5223fce110bdbc commit f2ccf6c9f395923695f22345e626dfd691227aaf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Aug 8 17:39:56 2021 +1000 Move portable specific settings down. This brings the top hunk of the file back in sync with OpenBSD so patches to the CVS Id should apply instead of always being rejected. commit 71b0eb997e220b0fc9331635af409ad84979f2af Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Aug 8 07:27:52 2021 +0000 upstream: Move setting of USER further down the startup In portable we have to change this and having it in the same hunk as the CVS Id string means applying changes fails every. single. time. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87cd603eb6db58c9b430bf90adacb7f90864429b commit f0aca2706c710a0da1a4be705f825a807cd15400 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Aug 8 06:38:33 2021 +0000 upstream: Drop -q in ssh-log-wrapper.sh to preserve logs. scp and sftp like to add -q to the command line passed to ssh which overrides the LogLevel we set in the config files and suppresses output to the debug logs so drop any "-q" from the invoked ssh. In the one case where we actually want to use -q in the banner test, call the ssh binary directly bypassing the logging wrapper. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e2c97d3c964bda33a751374c56f65cdb29755b75 commit cf27810a649c5cfae60f8ce66eeb25caa53b13bc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 01:57:08 2021 +0000 upstream: Fix prototype mismatch for do_cmd. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c1598bb5237a7ae0be99152f185e0071163714d commit 85de69f64665245786e28c81ab01fe18b0e2a149 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 01:55:01 2021 +0000 upstream: sftp-client.c needs poll.h remove unused variable OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 233ac6c012cd23af62f237167a661db391055a16 commit 397c4d72e50023af5fe3aee5cc2ad407a6eb1073 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Aug 7 11:30:57 2021 +1000 Include poll.h and friends for struct pollfd. commit a9e2c533195f28627f205682482d9da384c4c52e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:14:17 2021 +0000 upstream: do_upload() used a near-identical structure for tracking expected status replies from the server to what do_download() was using. Refactor it to use the same structure and factor out some common code into helper functions. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c167df8ab6df4a5292c32421922b0cf379e9054 commit 7b1cbcb7599d9f6a3bbad79d412604aa1203b5ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:12:09 2021 +0000 upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode follow symlinks like traditional scp(1) ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97255e55be37e8e26605e4ba1e69f9781765d231 commit 133b44e500422df68c9c25c3b6de35c0263132f1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:10:49 2021 +0000 upstream: fix incorrect directory permissions on scp -3 transfers; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64b2abaa5635a2be65ee2e77688ad9bcebf576c2 commit 98b59244ca10e62ff67a420856770cb700164f59 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:09:57 2021 +0000 upstream: a bit more debugging of file attributes being sent/received over the wire OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f68c4e207b08ef95200a8b2de499d422808e089b commit c677e65365d6f460c084e41e0c4807bb8a9cf601 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:08:52 2021 +0000 upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode output better match original scp(1) by suppressing "Retrieving [path]" lines that were emitted to support the interactive sftp(1) client. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06be293df5f156a18f366079be2f33fa68001acc commit 48cd39b7a4e5e7c25101c6d1179f98fe544835cd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:07:18 2021 +0000 upstream: factor out a structure duplicated between downloading and crossloading; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96eede24d520569232086a129febe342e4765d39 commit 318c06bb04ee21a0cfa6b6022a201eacaa53f388 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:06:30 2021 +0000 upstream: use sftp_client crossloading to implement scp -3 feedback/ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7db4c0086cfc12afc9cfb71d4c2fd3c7e9416ee9 commit de7115b373ba0be3861c65de9b606a3e0e9d29a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:02:41 2021 +0000 upstream: support for "cross"-loading files/directories, i.e. downloading from one SFTP server while simultaneously uploading to another. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3982878e29d8df0fa4ddc502f5ff6126ac714235 commit a50bd0367ff2063bbc70a387740a2aa6914de094 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:01:29 2021 +0000 upstream: factor our SSH2_FXP_OPEN calls into their own function; "looks fine" markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3dea2153f08855c6d9dacc01973248944adeffb commit e3c0ba05873cf3d3f7d19d595667a251026b2d84 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 7 00:00:33 2021 +0000 upstream: prepare for scp -3 implemented via sftp OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194aac0dd87cb175334b71c2a30623a5ad55bb44 commit 395d8fbdb094497211e1461cf0e2f80af5617e0a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 6 09:00:18 2021 +0000 upstream: Make diff invocation more portable. POSIX does not require diff to have -N, so compare in both directions with just -r, which should catch missing files in either directory. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e2ec8594556a6f369ed5a0a90c6806419b845f7 commit d247a73ce27b460138599648d9c637c6f2b77605 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 4 21:28:00 2021 +0000 upstream: regression test for scp -3 OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b44375d125c827754a1f722ec6b6b75b634de05d commit 35c8e41a6f6d8ad76f8d1cd81ac2ea23d0d993b2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 6 05:04:42 2021 +0000 upstream: Document "ProxyJump none". bz#3334. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78cc6f55731f2cd35c3a41d5352ac1ee419eba7 commit 911ec6411821bda535d09778df7503b92f0eafab Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 4 01:34:55 2021 +0000 upstream: Allow for different (but POSIX compliant) behaviour of basename(3) and prevent a use-after-free in that case in the new sftp-compat code. POSIX allows basename(3) to either return a pointer to static storage or modify the passed string and return a pointer to that. OpenBSD does the former and works as is, but on other platforms "filename" points into "tmp" which was just freed. This makes the freeing of tmp consistent with the other variable in the loop. Pinpointed by the -portable Valgrind regress test. ok djm@ deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 750f3c19bd4440e4210e30dd5d7367386e833374 commit 6df1fecb5d3e51f3a8027a74885c3a44f6cbfcbd Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 4 11:05:11 2021 +1000 use openbsd-compat glob.h is required commit 9ebd1828881dfc9014a344587934a5ce7db6fa1b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Aug 3 21:03:23 2021 +1000 Missing space between macro arg and punctuation. From jmc@ commit 0fd3f62eddc7cf54dcc9053be6f58998f3eb926a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Aug 3 21:02:33 2021 +1000 Avoid lines >80 chars. From jmc@ commit af5d8094d8b755e1daaf2e20ff1dc252800b4c9b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 3 01:05:24 2021 +0000 upstream: regression tests for scp SFTP protocol support; mostly by Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 ok markus OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 36f1458525bcb111741ec8547eaf58b13cddc715 commit e4673b7f67ae7740131a4ecea29a846593049a91 Author: anton@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jul 29 15:34:09 2021 +0000 upstream: Treat doas with arguments as a valid SUDO variable. Allows one to specify SUDO="doas -n" which I do while running make regress. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4fe5814b5010dbf0885500d703bea06048d11005 commit 197e29f1cca190d767c4b2b63a662f9a9e5da0b3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 2 23:38:27 2021 +0000 upstream: support for using the SFTP protocol for file transfers in scp, via a new "-M sftp" option. Marked as experimental for now. Some corner-cases exist, in particular there is no attempt to provide bug-compatibility with scp's weird "double shell" quoting rules. Mostly by Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 with some tweaks by me. ok markus@ Thanks jmc@ for improving the scp.1 bits. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce4c9157ff17b650ace571c9f7793d92874051c commit dd533c7ab79d61a7796b77b64bd81b098e0d7f9f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 30 14:28:13 2021 +0000 upstream: fix a formatting error and add some Xr; from debian at helgefjell de removed references to rlogin etc. as no longer relevant; suggested by djm ok djm dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c431c303068d3aec5bb18573a0bd5e0cd77c5ae commit c7cd347a8823819411222c1e10a0d26747d0fd5c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 30 14:25:01 2021 +0000 upstream: fix a formatting error and mark up known_hosts consistently; issues reported by debian at helgefjell de ok djm dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1fd8d21dc77f507685443832df0c9700481b0ce commit 4455aec2e4fc90f64ae4fc47e78ebc9c18721738 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 28 05:57:42 2021 +0000 upstream: no need to talk about version 2 with the -Q option, so rewrite the text to read better; issue reported by debian at helgefjell de ok djm dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59fe2e8219c37906740ad062e0fdaea487dbe9cf commit bec429338e9b30d2c7668060e82608286a8a4777 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 27 14:28:46 2021 +0000 upstream: word fix; reported by debian at helgefjell de OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c6fd22142422a25343c5bd1a618f31618f41ece commit efad4deb5a1f1cf79ebefd63c6625059060bfbe1 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 27 14:14:25 2021 +0000 upstream: standardise the grammar in the options list; issue reported by debian at helgefjell de ok dtucker djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac15575045d82f4b205a42cc7d5207fe4c3f8e6 commit 1e11fb24066f3fc259ee30db3dbb2a3127e05956 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Aug 2 18:56:29 2021 +1000 Check for RLIMIT_NOFILE before trying to use it. commit 0f494236b49fb48c1ef33669f14822ca4f3ce2f4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 27 17:45:34 2021 +1000 lastenv is only used in setenv. Prevents an unused variable warning on platforms that have setenv but not unsetenv. commit a1f78e08bdb3eaa88603ba3c6e01de7c8671e28a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 26 12:45:30 2021 +1000 Move SUDO to "make test" command line. Environment variables don't get passed by vmrun, so move to command line. commit 02e624273b9c78a49a01239159b8c09b8409b1a0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jul 25 23:26:36 2021 +1000 Set SUDO for tests and cleanup. commit 460ae5d93051bab70239ad823dd784822d58baad Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jul 25 22:37:55 2021 +1000 Pass OPENSSL=no to make tests too. commit b398f499c68d74ebe3298b73757cf3f36e14e0cb Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 25 12:27:37 2021 +0000 upstream: Skip unit and makefile-based key conversion tests when we're building with OPENSSL=no. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 20455ed9a977c93f846059d1fcb48e29e2c8d732 commit 727ce36c8c5941bde99216d27109405907caae4f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 25 12:13:03 2021 +0000 upstream: Replace OPENSSL as the variable that points to the openssl binary with OPENSSL_BIN. This will allow us to use the OPENSSL variable from mk.conf or the make(1) command line indicating if we're building with our without OpenSSL, and ultimately get the regress tests working in the OPENSSL=no configuration. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d788fade3264d7803e5b54cae8875963f688c4e commit 55e17101a9075f6a63af724261c5744809dcb95c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 24 02:57:28 2021 +0000 upstream: Skip RFC4716 format import and export tests when built without OpenSSL. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d2c2d5d38c1acc2b88cc99cfe00a2eb8bb39dfa4 commit f5ccb5895d39cd627ad9e7b2c671d2587616100d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 24 02:51:14 2021 +0000 upstream: Don't omit ssh-keygen -y from usage when built without OpenSSL. It is actually available, albeit only for ed25519 keys. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a254c33d0e6a55c30c6b016a8d298d3cb7a7674 commit 819d57ac23469f1f03baa8feb38ddefbada90fdc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 24 02:08:13 2021 +0000 upstream: Exclude key conversion options from usage when built without OpenSSL since those are not available, similar to what we currently do with the moduli screening options. We can also use this to skip the conversion regression tests in this case. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c82caa398cf99cd4518c23bba5a2fc66b16bafe commit b6673b1d2ee90b4690ee84f634efe40225423c38 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 24 13:02:51 2021 +1000 Test OpenBSD upstream with and without OpenSSL. commit 9d38074b5453c1abbdf888e80828c278d3b886ac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 24 01:54:23 2021 +0000 upstream: test for first-match-wins in authorized_keys environment= options OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1517c90276fe84b5dc5821c59f88877fcc34c0e8 commit 2b76f1dd19787e784711ea297ad8fc938b4484fd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 05:53:02 2021 +0000 upstream: Simplify keygen-convert by using $SSH_KEYTYPES directly. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cdbe408ec3671ea9ee9b55651ee551370d2a4108 commit 7d64a9fb587ba9592f027f7a2264226c713d6579 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 24 01:55:19 2021 +0000 upstream: don't leak environment= variable when it is not the first match OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fbdc3dfe0032deaf003fd937eeb4d434ee4efe0 commit db2130e2340bf923e41c791aa9cd27b9e926042c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 06:01:17 2021 +0000 upstream: punctuation; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64be152e378c45975073ab1c07e0db7eddd15806 commit 03190d10980c6fc9124e988cb2df13101f266507 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 05:56:47 2021 +0000 upstream: mention in comment that read_passphrase(..., RP_ALLOW_STDIN) will try to use askpass first. bz3314 convert a couple of debug() -> debug_f() while here OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e812aebc28fcc5db06d4710e0f73613dee545c commit 1653ece6832b2b304d46866b262d5f69880a9ec7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 05:07:16 2021 +0000 upstream: Test conversion of ed25519 and ecdsa keys too. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3676d2d00e58e0d6d37f2878f108cc2b83bbe4bb commit 8b7af02dcf9d2b738787efd27da7ffda9859bed2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 04:56:21 2021 +0000 upstream: Add test for exporting pubkey from a passphrase-protected private key. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: da99d93e7b235fbd5b5aaa01efc411225e6ba8ac commit 441095d4a3e5048fe3c87a6c5db5bc3383d767fb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 03:54:55 2021 +0000 upstream: regression test for time-limited signature keys OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a6f3bd900dbee0a3c96f1ff23e032c93ab392bc commit 9e1882ef6489a7dd16b6d7794af96629cae61a53 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 05:24:02 2021 +0000 upstream: note successful authentication method in final "Authenticated to ..." message and partial auth success messages (all at LogLevel=verbose) ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06834b89ceb89f8f16c5321d368a66c08f441984 commit a917e973a1b90b40ff1e950df083364b48fc6c78 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 04:04:52 2021 +0000 upstream: Add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart to the ssh(1) -f flag. Last part of GHPR231 from Volker Diels-Grabsch. ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b18aeda12efdebe2093d55263c90fe4ea0bce0d3 commit e0c5088f1c96a145eb6ea1dee438010da78f9ef5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 04:00:59 2021 +0000 upstream: Add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows the config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) commandline. Patch from Volker Diels-Grabsch via GHPR231; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66ddf3f15c76796d4dcd22ff464aed1edd62468e commit e3957e21ffdc119d6d04c0b1686f8e2fe052f5ea Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 03:57:20 2021 +0000 upstream: make authorized_keys environment="..." directives first-match-wins and more strictly limit their maximum number; prompted by OOM reported by OSS-fuzz (35470). feedback and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f63fc10dcd995e7aed9c378ad879161af83121 commit d0bb1ce731762c55acb95817df4d5fab526c7ecd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 23 03:37:52 2021 +0000 upstream: Let allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1) signatures support key lifetimes, and allow the verification mode to specify a signature time to check at. This is intended for use by git to support signing objects using ssh keys. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e2c67b7dcd94f0610194d1e8e4907829a40cf31 commit 44142068dc7ef783d135e91ff954e754d2ed432e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 19 08:48:33 2021 +0000 upstream: Use SUDO when setting up hostkey. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 990cf4481cab8dad62e90818a9b4b36c533851a7 commit 6b67f3f1d1d187597e54a139cc7785c0acebd9a2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 19 05:08:54 2021 +0000 upstream: Increase time margin for rekey tests. Should help reliability on very heavily loaded hosts. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c28a0fce3ea89ebde441d7091464176e9730533 commit 7953e1bfce9e76bec41c1331a29bc6cff9d416b8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 19 13:47:51 2021 +1000 Add sshfp-connect.sh file missed in previous. commit b75a80fa8369864916d4c93a50576155cad4df03 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 19 03:13:28 2021 +0000 upstream: Ensure that all returned SSHFP records for the specified host name and hostkey type match instead of only one. While there, simplify the code somewhat and add some debugging. Based on discussion in bz#3322, ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a6a0a476eb7f9dfe8fe2c05a1a395e3e9b22ee4 commit 1cc1fd095393663cd72ddac927d82c6384c622ba Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 19 02:21:50 2021 +0000 upstream: Id sync only, -portable already has this. Put dh_set_moduli_file call inside ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. Fixes build with OPENSSL=no. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af54abbebfb12bcde6219a44d544e18204defb15 commit 33abbe2f4153f5ca5c874582f6a7cc91ae167485 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 19 02:46:34 2021 +0000 upstream: Add test for host key verification via SSHFP records. This requires some external setup to operate so is disabled by default (see comments in sshfp-connect.sh). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c52c461bd1df3a803d17498917d156ef64512fd9 commit f0cd000d8e3afeb0416dce1c711c3d7c28d89bdd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 19 02:29:28 2021 +0000 upstream: Add ed25519 key and test SSHFP export of it. Only test RSA SSHFP export if we have RSA functionality compiled in. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4ff5181b8c9a5862e7f0ecdd96108622333a9af commit 0075511e27e5394faa28edca02bfbf13b9a6693e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 19 00:16:26 2021 +0000 upstream: Group keygen tests together. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07e2d25c527bb44f03b7c329d893a1f2d6c5c40c commit 034828820c7e62652e7c48f9ee6b67fb7ba6fa26 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 18 23:10:10 2021 +0000 upstream: Add test for ssh-keygen printing of SSHFP records. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fde9566b56eeb980e149bbe157a884838507c46b commit 52c3b6985ef1d5dadb4c4fe212f8b3a78ca96812 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 17 00:38:11 2021 +0000 upstream: wrap some long lines OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f5186b1466656762dae37d3e569438d900c350d commit 43ec991a782791d0b3f42898cd789f99a07bfaa4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jul 17 00:36:53 2021 +0000 upstream: fix sftp on ControlPersist connections, broken by recent SessionType change; spotted by sthen@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c5ddc5698790ae6ff50d2a4f8f832f0eeeaa234 commit 073f45c236550f158c9a94003e4611c07dea5279 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 16 09:00:23 2021 +0000 upstream: Explicitly check for and start time-based rekeying in the client and server mainloops. Previously the rekey timeout could expire but rekeying would not start until a packet was sent or received. This could cause us to spin in select() on the rekey timeout if the connection was quiet. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4356cf50d7900f3df0a8f2117d9e07c91b9ff987 commit ef7c4e52d5d840607f9ca3a302a4cbb81053eccf Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 14 06:46:38 2021 +0000 upstream: reorder SessionType; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7dd0b39e942b1caf4976a0b1cf0fed33d05418c commit 8aa2f9aeb56506dca996d68ab90ab9c0bebd7ec3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:50 2021 +1000 Make whitespace consistent. commit 4f4297ee9b8a39f4dfd243a74c5f51f9e7a05723 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 14 11:26:12 2021 +1000 Add ARM64 Linux self-hosted runner. commit eda8909d1b0a85b9c3804a04d03ec6738fd9dc7f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 13 23:48:36 2021 +0000 upstream: add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no session) and -s (subsystem) command-line flags. Part of GHPR#231 by Volker Diels-Grabsch with some minor tweaks; feedback and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 726ee931dd4c5cc7f1d7a187b26f41257f9a2d12 commit 7ae69f2628e338ba6e0eae7ee8a63bcf8fea7538 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 12 02:12:22 2021 +0000 upstream: fix some broken tests; clean up output OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1d5038edb511dc4ce1622344c1e724626a253566 commit f5fc6a4c3404bbf65c21ca6361853b33d78aa87e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 12 18:00:05 2021 +1000 Add configure-time detection for SSH_TIME_T_MAX. Should fix printing cert times exceeding INT_MAX (bz#3329) on platforms were time_t is a long long. The limit used is for the signed type, so if some system has a 32bit unsigned time_t then the lower limit will still be imposed and we would need to add some way to detect this. Anyone using an unsigned 64bit can let us know when it starts being a problem. commit fd2d06ae4442820429d634c0a8bae11c8e40c174 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 12 06:22:57 2021 +0000 upstream: Make limit for time_t test unconditional in the format_absolute_time fix for bz#3329 that allows printing of timestamps past INT_MAX. This was incorrectly included with the previous commit. Based on discussion with djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 835936f6837c86504b07cabb596b613600cf0f6e commit 6c29b387cd64a57b0ec8ae7d2c8d02789d88fcc3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 12 06:08:57 2021 +0000 upstream: Use existing format_absolute_time() function when printing cert validity instead of doing it inline. Part of bz#3329. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a13d4e3c4f59644c23745eb02a09b2a4e717c00c commit 99981d5f8bfa383791afea03f6bce8454e96e323 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 9 09:55:56 2021 +0000 upstream: silence redundant error message; reported by Fabian Stelzer OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9349a703016579a60557dafd03af2fe1d44e6aa2 commit e86097813419b49d5bff5c4b51d1c3a5d4d2d804 Author: John Ericson Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500 Re-indent krb5 section after pkg-config addition. commit 32dd2daa56c294e40ff7efea482c9eac536d8cbb Author: John Ericson Date: Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500 Support finding Kerberos via pkg-config This makes cross compilation easier. commit def7a72234d7e4f684d72d33a0f7229f9eee0aa4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 9 14:34:06 2021 +1000 Update comments about EGD to include prngd. commit b5d23150b4e3368f4983fd169d432c07afeee45a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 5 01:21:07 2021 +0000 upstream: Fix a couple of whitespace things. Portable already has these so this removes two diffs between the two. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 769f017ebafd8e741e337b3e9e89eb5ac73c9c56 commit 8f57be9f279b8e905f9883066aa633c7e67b31cf Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 5 01:16:46 2021 +0000 upstream: Order includes as per style(9). Portable already has these so this removes a handful of diffs between the two. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bd7452d809b199c19bfc49511a798f414eb4a77 commit b75624f8733b3ed9e240f86cac5d4a39dae11848 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 5 00:50:25 2021 +0000 upstream: Remove comment referencing now-removed RhostsRSAAuthentication. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d864bfbd99a1d4429a58e301688f3be464827a9 commit b67eb12f013c5441bb4f0893a97533582ad4eb13 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jul 5 00:25:42 2021 +0000 upstream: allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote, and scp -3 remote to remote copies. with & ok dtucker bz#1164 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9b550f3a85ffbb079b6720833da31317901d6dd commit 8c4ef0943e574f614fc7c6c7e427fd81ee64ab87 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 2 07:20:44 2021 +0000 upstream: Remove obsolete comments about SSHv1 auth methods. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6060f70966f362d8eb4bec3da2f6c4712fbfb98f commit 88908c9b61bcb99f16e8d398fc41e2b3b4be2003 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 23:00:19 2021 +1000 Remove reference to ChallengeResponse. challenge_response_authentication was removed from the struct, keeping kbd_interactive_authentication. commit 321874416d610ad2158ce6112f094a4862c2e37f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 20:38:09 2021 +1000 Move signal.h up include order to match upstream. commit 4fa83e2d0e32c2dd758653e0359984bbf1334f32 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 20:36:06 2021 +1000 Remove old OpenBSD version marker. Looks like an accidental leftover from a sync. commit 9d5e31f55d5f3899b72645bac41a932d298ad73b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 20:34:19 2021 +1000 Remove duplicate error on error path. There's an extra error() call on the listen error path, it looks like its removal was missed during an upstream sync. commit 888c459925c7478ce22ff206c9ac1fb812a40caf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 20:32:46 2021 +1000 Remove some whitespace not in upstream. Reduces diff vs OpenBSD by a small amount. commit 4d2d4d47a18d93f3e0a91a241a6fdb545bbf7dc2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 19:27:43 2021 +1000 Replace remaining references to ChallengeResponse. Portable had a few additional references to ChallengeResponse related to UsePAM, replaces these with equivalent keyboard-interactive ones. commit 53237ac789183946dac6dcb8838bc3b6b9b43be1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 19:23:28 2021 +1000 Sync remaining ChallengeResponse removal. These were omitted from commit 88868fd131. commit 2c9e4b319f7e98744b188b0f58859d431def343b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 3 19:17:31 2021 +1000 Disable rocky84 to figure out why agent test fails commit bfe19197a92b7916f64a121fbd3c179abf15e218 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 2 15:43:28 2021 +1000 Remove now-unused SSHv1 enums. sRhostsRSAAuthentication and sRSAAuthentication are protocol 1 options and are no longer used. commit c73b02d92d72458a5312bd098f32ce88868fd131 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 2 05:11:20 2021 +0000 upstream: Remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication in favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in SSHv1, the latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were treated as somewhat but not entirely equivalent. We retain the old name as deprecated alias so config files continue to work and a reference in the man page for people looking for it. Prompted by bz#3303 which pointed out the discrepancy between the two when used with Match. Man page help & ok jmc@, with & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c1bff8e5c9852cfcdab1f3ea94dfef5a22f3b7e commit f841fc9c8c7568a3b5d84a4cc0cefacb7dbc16b9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 2 15:20:32 2021 +1000 Fix ifdefs around get_random_bytes_prngd. get_random_bytes_prngd() is used if either of PRNGD_PORT or PRNGD_SOCKET are defined, so adjust ifdef accordingly. commit 0767627cf66574484b9c0834500b42ea04fe528a Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 2 14:30:23 2021 +1000 wrap get_random_bytes_prngd() in ifdef avoid unused static function warning commit f93fdc4de158386efe1116bd44c5b3f4a7a82c25 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jun 28 13:06:37 2021 +1000 Add rocky84 test target. commit d443006c0ddfa7f6a5bd9c0ae92036f3d5f2fa3b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 25 06:30:22 2021 +0000 upstream: fix decoding of X.509 subject name; from Leif Thuresson via bz3327 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ea2e28f39750dd388b7e317bc43dd997a217ae8 commit 2a5704ec142202d387fda2d6872fd4715ab81347 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 25 06:20:39 2021 +0000 upstream: Use better language to refer to the user. From l1ving via github PR#250, ok jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07ca3526626996613e128aeddf7748c93c4d6bbf commit 4bdf7a04797a0ea1c431a9d54588417c29177d19 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 25 03:38:17 2021 +0000 upstream: Replace SIGCHLD/notify_pipe kludge with pselect. Previously sshd's SIGCHLD handler would wake up select() by writing a byte to notify_pipe. We can remove this by blocking SIGCHLD, checking for child terminations then passing the original signal mask through to pselect. This ensures that the pselect will immediately wake up if a child terminates between wait()ing on them and the pselect. In -portable, for platforms that do not have pselect the kludge is still there but is hidden behind a pselect interface. Based on other changes for bz#2158, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 202c85de0b3bdf1744fe53529a05404c5480d813 commit c9f7bba2e6f70b7ac1f5ea190d890cb5162ce127 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 25 15:08:18 2021 +1000 Move closefrom() to before first malloc. When built against tcmalloc, tcmalloc allocates a descriptor for its internal use, so calling closefrom() afterward causes the descriptor number to be reused resulting in a corrupted connection. Moving the closefrom a little earlier should resolve this. From kircherlike at outlook.com via bz#3321, ok djm@ commit 7ebfe4e439853b88997c9cfc2ff703408a1cca92 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 18 20:41:45 2021 +1000 Put second -lssh in link line for sftp-server. When building --without-openssl the recent port-prngd.c change adds a dependency on atomicio, but since nothing else in sftp-server uses it, the linker may not find it. Add a second -lssh similar to other binaries. commit e409d7966785cfd9f5970e66a820685c42169717 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 18 18:34:08 2021 +1000 Try EGD/PRNGD if random device fails. When built --without-openssl, try EGD/PRGGD (if configured) as a last resort before failing. commit e43a898043faa3a965dbaa1193cc60e0b479033d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 18 18:32:51 2021 +1000 Split EGD/PRNGD interface into its own file. This will allow us to use it when building --without-openssl. commit acb2887a769a1b1912cfd7067f3ce04fad240260 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jun 17 21:03:19 2021 +1000 Handle GIDs > 2^31 in getgrouplist. When compiled in 32bit mode, the getgrouplist implementation may fail for GIDs greater than LONG_MAX. Analysis and change from ralf.winkel at tui.com. commit 31fac20c941126281b527605b73bff30a8f02edd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 10 09:46:28 2021 +0000 upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile here too. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6bfb0d455d493f24839034a629c5306f84dbd409 commit a3a58acffc8cc527f8fc6729486d34e4c3d27643 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 10 09:43:51 2021 +0000 upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile in case it was created with a very restrictive umask. This resyncs with -portable. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07fd2af06df759d4f64b82c59094accca1076a5d commit 249ad4ae51cd3bc235e75a4846eccdf8b1416611 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 10 09:37:59 2021 +0000 upstream: Set umask when creating hostkeys to prevent excessive permissions warning. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 382841db0ee28dfef7f7bffbd511803e1b8ab0ef commit 9d0892153c005cc65897e9372b01fa66fcbe2842 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 10 03:45:31 2021 +0000 upstream: Add regress test for SIGHUP restart while handling active and unauthenticated clients. Should catch anything similar to the pselect bug just fixed in sshd.c. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b3c19b5e75e43af1ebcb9586875b3ae3a4cac73 commit 73f6f191f44440ca3049b9d3c8e5401d10b55097 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 10 03:14:14 2021 +0000 upstream: Continue accept loop when pselect returns -1, eg if it was interrupted by a signal. This should prevent the hang discovered by sthen@ wherein sshd receives a SIGHUP while it has an unauthenticated child and goes on to a blocking read on a notify_pipe. feedback deraadt@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0243c1c5544fca0974dae92cd4079543a3fceaa0 commit c785c0ae134a8e8b5c82b2193f64c632a98159e4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 22:30:27 2021 +0000 upstream: test that UserKnownHostsFile correctly accepts multiple arguments; would have caught readconf.c r1.356 regression OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71ca54e66c2a0211b04999263e56390b1f323a6a commit 1a6f6b08e62c78906a3032e8d9a83e721c84574e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 22:06:12 2021 +0000 upstream: fix regression in r1.356: for ssh_config options that accepted multiple string arguments, ssh was only recording the first. Reported by Lucas via bugs@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7cbf182f7449bf1cb7c5b4452667dc2b41170d6d commit 78e30af3e2b2dd540a341cc827c6b98dd8b0a6de Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 07:40:12 2021 +0000 upstream: test argv_split() optional termination on comments OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fd1c4a27a409897437c010cfd79c54b639a059c commit a023138957ea2becf1c7f93fcc42b0aaac6f2b03 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 07:05:27 2021 +0000 upstream: Add testcases from bz#3319 for IPQoS and TunnelDevice being overridden on the command line. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 801674d5d2d02abd58274a78cab2711f11de14a8 commit 660cea10b2cdc11f13ba99c89b1bbb368a4d9ff2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 06:52:43 2021 +0000 upstream: sprinkle some "# comment" at end of configuration lines to test comment handling OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cb82fbf40bda5c257a9f742c63b1798e5a8fdda7 commit acc9c32dcb6def6c7d3688bceb4c0e59bd26b411 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 06:51:47 2021 +0000 upstream: more descriptive failure message OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5300f6faf1d9e99c0cd10827b51756c5510e3509 commit ce04dd4eae23d1c9cf7c424a702f48ee78573bc1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 7 01:16:34 2021 +0000 upstream: test AuthenticationMethods inside a Match block as well as in the main config section OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebe0a686621b7cb8bb003ac520975279c28747f7 commit 9018bd821fca17e26e92f7a7e51d9b24cd62f2db Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 7 00:00:50 2021 +0000 upstream: prepare for stricter sshd_config parsing that will refuse a config that has {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups} on a line with no subsequent arguments. Such lines are permitted but are nonsensical noops ATM OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ef65463fcbc0bd044e27f3fe400ea56eb4b8f650 commit a10f929d1ce80640129fc5b6bc1acd9bf689169e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 07:09:42 2021 +0000 upstream: switch sshd_config parsing to argv_split() similar to the previous commit, this switches sshd_config parsing to the newer tokeniser. Config parsing will be a little stricter wrt quote correctness and directives appearing without arguments. feedback and ok markus@ tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who caught bugs OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c4305631d20c2d194661504ce11e1f68b20d93e commit ea9e45c89a4822d74a9d97fef8480707d584da4d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 07:07:15 2021 +0000 upstream: Switch ssh_config parsing to use argv_split() This fixes a couple of problems with the previous tokeniser, strdelim() 1. strdelim() is permissive wrt accepting '=' characters. This is intended to allow it to tokenise "Option=value" but because it cannot keep state, it will incorrectly split "Opt=val=val2". 2. strdelim() has rudimentry handling of quoted strings, but it is incomplete and inconsistent. E.g. it doesn't handle escaped quotes inside a quoted string. 3. It has no support for stopping on a (unquoted) comment. Because of this readconf.c r1.343 added chopping of lines at '#', but this caused a regression because these characters may legitimately appear inside quoted strings. The new tokeniser is stricter is a number of cases, including #1 above but previously it was also possible for some directives to appear without arguments. AFAIK these were nonsensical in all cases, and the new tokeniser refuses to accept them. The new code handles quotes much better, permitting quoted space as well as escaped closing quotes. Finally, comment handling should be fixed - the tokeniser will terminate only on unquoted # characters. feedback & ok markus@ tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who caught bugs OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc72fd12af9d5398f4d9e159d671f9269c5b14d5 commit d786424986c04d1d375f231fda177c8408e05c3e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 07:02:46 2021 +0000 upstream: Check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values supplied on the command line. bz#3319, ok markus. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b08b898c324debb9195e6865d8999406938f74 commit aae4b4d3585b9f944d7dbd3c9e5ba0006c55e457 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 8 06:54:40 2021 +0000 upstream: Allow argv_split() to optionally terminate tokenisation when it encounters an unquoted comment. Add some additional utility function for working with argument vectors, since we'll be switching to using them to parse ssh/sshd_config shortly. ok markus@ as part of a larger diff; tested in snaps OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd9c108cef2f713f24e3bc5848861d221bb3a1ac commit da9f9acaac5bab95dca642b48e0c8182b246ab69 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jun 7 19:19:23 2021 +1000 Save logs on failure for upstream test commit 76883c60161e5f3808787085a27a8c37f8cc4e08 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jun 7 14:36:32 2021 +1000 Add obsdsnap-i386 upstream test target. commit d45b9c63f947ec5ec314696e70281f6afddc0ac3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 7 03:38:38 2021 +0000 upstream: fix debug message when finding a private key to match a certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it would print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be showing the private key's path. Patch from Alex Sherwin via GHPR247 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5af3be66d0f22c371dc1fe6195e774a18b2327b commit 530739d42f6102668aecd699be0ce59815c1eceb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jun 6 11:34:16 2021 +0000 upstream: Match host certificates against host public keys, not private keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in a ssh-agent. Reported by Miles Zhou in bz3524; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25f5bf70003126d19162862d9eb380bf34bac22a commit 4265215d7300901fd7097061c7517688ade82f8e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jun 6 03:40:39 2021 +0000 upstream: Client-side workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4: this release allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails to advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes clients of these server to incorrectly match PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and potentially refuse to offer valid keys. Reported by and based on patch from Gordon Messmer via bz3213, thanks also for additional analysis by Jakub Jelen. ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6d0b7351d5d44c45f3daaa26efac65847a564f7 commit bda270d7fb8522d43c21a79a4b02a052d7c64de8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jun 6 03:17:02 2021 +0000 upstream: degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to invoke it. Reported by Hector Martin via bz3318 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd9d1839c41811616ede4da467e25746fcd9b967 commit d345d5811afdc2d6923019b653cdd93c4cc95f76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jun 6 03:15:39 2021 +0000 upstream: the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly marked as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it unavailable in sftp-server read-only mode. Spotted by Hector Martin via bz3318 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f054465230787e37516c4b57098fc7975e00f067 commit 2b71010d9b43d7b8c9ec1bf010beb00d98fa765a Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jun 5 13:47:00 2021 +0000 upstream: PROTOCOL.certkeys: update reference from IETF draft to RFC Also fix some typos. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e855b6c5a22b5b13f8ffa3897a868e40d349b44 commit aa99b2d9a3e45b943196914e8d8bf086646fdb54 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 4 23:41:29 2021 +1000 Clear notify_pipe from readset if present. Prevents leaking an implementation detail to the caller. commit 6de8dadf6b4d0627d35bca0667ca44b1d61c2c6b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 4 23:24:25 2021 +1000 space->tabs. commit c8677065070ee34c05c7582a9c2f58d8642e552d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 4 18:39:48 2021 +1000 Add pselect implementation for platforms without. This is basically the existing notify_pipe kludge from serverloop.c moved behind a pselect interface. It works by installing a signal handler that writes to a pipe that the select is watching, then calls the original handler. The select call in serverloop will become pselect soon, at which point the kludge will be removed from thereand will only exist in the compat layer. Original code by markus, help from djm. commit 7cd7f302d3a072748299f362f9e241d81fcecd26 Author: Vincent Brillault Date: Sun May 24 09:15:06 2020 +0200 auth_log: dont log partial successes as failures By design, 'partial' logins are successful logins, so initially with authenticated set to 1, for which another authentication is required. As a result, authenticated is always reset to 0 when partial is set to 1. However, even if authenticated is 0, those are not failed login attempts, similarly to attempts with authctxt->postponed set to 1. commit e7606919180661edc7f698e6a1b4ef2cfb363ebf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 4 06:19:07 2021 +0000 upstream: The RB_GENERATE_STATIC(3) macro expands to a series of function definitions and not a statement, so there should be no semicolon following them. Patch from Michael Forney OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c975dd180580f0bdc0a4d5b7d41ab1f5e9b7bedd commit c298c4da574ab92df2f051561aeb3e106b0ec954 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 4 05:59:18 2021 +0000 upstream: rework authorized_keys example section, removing irrelevant stuff, de-wrapping the example lines and better aligning the examples with common usage and FAQs; ok jmc OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d59f1c9281f828148e2a2e49eb9629266803b75c commit d9cb35bbec5f623589d7c58fc094817b33030f35 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 4 05:10:03 2021 +0000 upstream: adjust SetEnv description to clarify $TERM handling OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b8cc0124856bc1094949d55615e5c44390bcb22 commit 771f57a8626709f2ad207058efd68fbf30d31553 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 4 05:09:08 2021 +0000 upstream: Switch the listening select loop from select() to pselect() and mask signals while checking signal flags, umasking for pselect and restoring afterwards. Also restore signals before sighup_restart so they don't remain blocked after restart. This prevents a race where a SIGTERM or SIGHUP can arrive between checking the flag and calling select (eg if sshd is processing a new connection) resulting in sshd not shutting down until the next time it receives a new connection. bz#2158, with & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf85bf880fd78e00d7478657644fcda97b9a936f commit f64f8c00d158acc1359b8a096835849b23aa2e86 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 4 05:02:40 2021 +0000 upstream: allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is otherwise handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config to set TERM to something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of "xterm-256color") for destinations that lack terminfo entries. feedback and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b1ef4d5bc159c7d9d589d05e3017433e2d5758 commit 60107677dc0ce1e93c61f23c433ad54687fcd9f5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 4 04:02:21 2021 +0000 upstream: correct extension name "no-presence-required" => "no-touch-required" document "verify-required" option OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1879ff4062cf61d79b515e433aff0bf49a6c55c5 commit ecc186e46e3e30f27539b4311366dfda502f0a08 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 2 13:54:11 2021 +1000 Retire fbsd7 test target. It's the slowest of the selfhosted targets (since it's 32bit but has most of the crypto algos). We still have coverage for 32bit i386. commit 5de0867b822ec48b5eec9abde0f5f95d1d646546 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 2 11:21:40 2021 +1000 Check for $OPENSSL in md5 fallback too. commit 1db69d1b6542f8419c04cee7fd523a4a11004be2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 2 11:17:54 2021 +1000 Add dfly60 target. commit a3f2dd955f1c19cad387a139f0e719af346ca6ef Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 2 00:17:45 2021 +0000 upstream: Merge back shell portability changes bringing it back in sync with -portable. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c07905ba931e66ad7d849b87b7d19648007175d1 commit 9d482295c9f073e84d75af46b720a1c0f7ec2867 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jun 1 23:56:20 2021 +0000 upstream: Use a default value for $OPENSSL, allowing it to be overridden. Do the same in the PuTTY tests since it's needed there and not exported by test-exec.sh. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c49dcd6aa7602a8606b7afa192196ca1fa65de16 commit 07660b3c99f8ea74ddf4a440e55c16c9f7fb3dd1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 24 10:25:18 2021 +0000 upstream: Find openssl binary via environment variable. This allows overriding if necessary (eg in -portable where we're testing against a specific version of OpenSSL). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 491f39cae9e762c71aa4bf045803d077139815c5 commit 1a4d1da9188d7c88f646b61f0d6a3b34f47c5439 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 21 04:03:47 2021 +0000 upstream: fix memleak in test OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e529d0982aa04666604936df43242e97a7a6f81 commit 60455a5d98065a73ec9a1f303345856bbd49aecc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 21 03:59:01 2021 +0000 upstream: also check contents of remaining string OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d526fa07253f4eebbc7d6205a0ab3d491ec71a28 commit 39f6cd207851d7b67ca46903bfce4a9f615b5b1c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 21 03:48:07 2021 +0000 upstream: unit test for misc.c:strdelim() that mostly servces to highlight its inconsistencies OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8d2bf970fcc01ccc6e36a5065f89b9c7fa934195 commit 7a3a1dd2c7d4461962acbcc0ebee9445ba892be0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 27 21:23:15 2021 +1000 Put minix3 config in the host-specific block. commit 59a194825f12fff8a7f75d91bf751ea17645711b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 31 06:48:42 2021 +0000 upstream: Hash challenge supplied by client during FIDO key enrollment prior to passing it to libfido2, which does expect a hash. There is no effect for users who are simply generating FIDO keys using ssh-keygen - by default we generate a random 256 bit challenge, but people building attestation workflows around our tools should now have a more consistent experience (esp. fewer failures when they fail to guess the magic 32-byte challenge length requirement). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8d5363a6a7ca3b23dc28f3ca69470472959f2b5 commit eb68e669bc8ab968d4cca5bf1357baca7136a826 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 27 21:14:15 2021 +1000 Include login_cap.h for login_getpwclass override. On minix3, login_getpwclass is __RENAME'ed to __login_getpwclass50 so without this the include overriding login_getpwclass causes a compile error. commit 2063af71422501b65c7a92a5e14c0e6a3799ed89 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 27 21:13:38 2021 +1000 Add minix3 test target. commit 2e1efcfd9f94352ca5f4b6958af8a454f8cf48cd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 26 01:47:24 2021 +0000 upstream: fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered when the update removed more host keys than remain present. Fix tested by reporter James Cook, via bugs@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44f641f6ee02bb957f0c1d150495b60cf7b869d3 commit 9acd76e6e4d2b519773e7119c33cf77f09534909 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sun May 23 18:22:57 2021 +0000 upstream: ssh: The client configuration keyword is "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms" This fixes a mistake that slipped in when "HostbasedKeyTypes" was renamed to "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms". Bug report by zack@philomathiclife.com OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d745a7e8e50b2589fc56877f322ea204bc784f38 commit 078a0e60c92700da4c536c93c007257828ccd05b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue May 25 11:40:47 2021 +1000 Rename README.md to ci-status.md. The original intent was to provide a status page for the CIs configured in that directory, but it had the side effect of replacing the top-level README.md. commit 7be4ac813662f68e89f23c50de058a49aa32f7e4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 19 01:24:05 2021 +0000 upstream: restore blocking status on stdio fds before close ssh(1) needs to set file descriptors to non-blocking mode to operate but it was not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell, e.g. > $ cat > test.sh << _EOF > #!/bin/sh > { > ssh -Fnone -oLogLevel=verbose ::1 hostname > cat /usr/share/dict/words > } | sleep 10 > _EOF > $ ./test.sh > Authenticated to ::1 ([::1]:22). > Transferred: sent 2352, received 2928 bytes, in 0.1 seconds > Bytes per second: sent 44338.9, received 55197.4 > cat: stdout: Resource temporarily unavailable This restores the blocking status for fds 0,1,2 (stdio) before ssh(1) abandons/closes them. This was reported as bz3280 and GHPR246; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cc67346f05aa85a598bddf2383fcfcc3aae61ce commit c4902e1a653c67fea850ec99c7537f358904c0af Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 17 11:43:16 2021 +0000 upstream: fix breakage of -W forwaring introduced in 1.554; reported by naddy@ and sthen@, ok sthen@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f72558e643a26dc4150cff6e5097b5502f6c85fd commit afea01381ad1fcea1543b133040f75f7542257e6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 17 07:22:45 2021 +0000 upstream: Regenerate moduli. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83c93a2a07c584c347ac6114d6329b18ce515557 commit be2866d6207b090615ff083c9ef212b603816a56 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon May 17 09:40:23 2021 +1000 Handle Android libc returning NULL pw->pw_passwd Reported by Luke Dashjr commit 5953c143008259d87342fb5155bd0b8835ba88e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 14 05:20:32 2021 +0000 upstream: fix previous: test saved no_shell_flag, not the one that just got clobbered OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8deace085d9d941b2d02f810243b9c302e5355d commit 1e9fa55f4dc4b334651d569d3448aaa3841f736f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 14 03:09:48 2021 +0000 upstream: Fix ssh started with ControlPersist incorrectly executing a shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified. bz3290 reported by Richard Schwab; patch from markus@ ok me OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ea4af16a95687302f7690bdbe36a6aabf87e1 commit d1320c492f655d8f5baef8c93899d79dded217a5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 12 11:34:30 2021 +0000 upstream: Clarify language about moduli. While both ends of the connection do need to use the same parameters (ie groups), the DH-GEX protocol takes care of that and both ends do not need the same contents in the moduli file, which is what the previous text suggested. ok djm@ jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0c18cc8e79c2fbf537a432a9070ed94e96a622a commit d3cc4d650ce3e59f3e370b101778b0e8f1c02c4d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 7 04:11:51 2021 +0000 upstream: include pid in LogVerbose spam OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aacb86f96ee90c7cb84ec27452374285f89a7f00 commit e3c032333be5fdbbaf2751f6f478e044922b4ec4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 7 03:09:38 2021 +0000 upstream: don't sigdie() in signal handler in privsep child process; this can end up causing sandbox violations per bz3286; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7f40b2141dca4287920da68ede812bff7ccfdda commit a4039724a3f2abac810735fc95cf9114a3856049 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 7 09:23:40 2021 +0000 upstream: Increase ConnectionAttempts from 4 to 10 as the tests occasionally time out on heavily loaded hosts. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 29a8cdef354fc9da471a301f7f65184770434f3a commit c0d7e36e979fa3cdb60f5dcb6ac9ad3fd018543b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 7 02:26:55 2021 +0000 upstream: dump out a usable private key string too; inspired by Tyson Whitehead OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 65572d5333801cb2f650ebc778cbdc955e372058 commit 24fee8973abdf1c521cd2c0047d89e86d9c3fc38 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 7 02:29:40 2021 +0000 upstream: correct mistake in spec - the private key blobs are encoded verbatim and not as strings (i.e. no 4-byte length header) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3606b5d443d72118c5b76c4af6dd87a5d5a4f837 commit f43859159cc62396ad5d080f0b1f2635a67dac02 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 4 22:53:52 2021 +0000 upstream: Don't pass NULL as a string in debugging as it does not work on some platforms in -portable. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937c892c99aa3c9c272a8ed78fa7c2aba3a44fc9 commit ac31aa3c6341905935e75f0539cf4a61bbe99779 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 3 00:16:45 2021 +0000 upstream: more debugging for UpdateHostKeys signature failures OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee95f03875e1725df15d5e4bea3e73493d57d36 commit 8e32e97e788e0676ce83018a742203614df6a2b3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat May 1 20:07:47 2021 +1000 Add obsd69 test target. commit f06893063597c5bb9d9e93f851c4070e77d2fba9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 30 04:29:53 2021 +0000 upstream: a little debugging in the main mux process for status confirmation failures in multiplexed sessions OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6e27b87c95176107597035424e1439c3232bcb49 commit e65cf00da6bc31e5f54603b7feb7252dc018c033 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 30 04:02:52 2021 +0000 upstream: Remove now-unused skey function prototypes leftover from skey removal. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2fc36d519fd37c6f10ce74854c628561555a94c3 commit ae5f9b0d5c8126214244ee6b35aae29c21028133 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 29 13:01:50 2021 +1000 Wrap sntrup761x25519 inside ifdef. From balu.gajjala at gmail.com via bz#3306. commit 70a8dc138a6480f85065cdb239915ad4b7f928cf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 28 14:44:07 2021 +1000 Add status badges for Actions-based tests. commit 40b59024cc3365815381474cdf4fe423102e391b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 28 12:22:11 2021 +1000 Add obsdsnap (OpenBSD snapshot) test target. commit e627067ec8ef9ae8e7a638f4dbac91d52dee3e6d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 28 11:35:28 2021 +1000 Add test building upstream OpenBSD source. commit 1b8108ebd12fc4ed0fb39ef94c5ba122558ac373 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 27 14:22:20 2021 +1000 Test against OpenSSL 1.1.0h instead of 1.1.0g. 1.1.0g requires a perl glob module that's not installed by default. commit 9bc20efd39ce8525be33df3ee009f5a4564224f1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 27 12:37:59 2021 +1000 Use the default VM type for libcrypto ver tests. commit 9f79e80dc40965c2e73164531250b83b176c1eea Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 27 12:24:10 2021 +1000 Always build OpenSSL shared. This is the default for current versions but we need it to test against earlier versions. commit b3cc9fbdff2782eca79e33e02ac22450dc63bce9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 27 09:18:02 2021 +1000 Fix custom OpenSSL tests. Check out specified OpenSSL version. Install custom libcrypto where configure expects to find it. Remove unneeded OpenSSL config time options. Older OpenSSL versions were not make -j safe so remove it. commit 77532609874a99a19e3e2eb2d1b7fa93aef963bb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 26 17:18:25 2021 +1000 Export CC and CFLAGS for c89 test. commit 33f62dfbe865f4de77980ab88774bf1eb5e4e040 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 26 17:13:44 2021 +1000 Add c89 here too. commit da9d59f526fce58e11cba49cd8eb011dc0bf5677 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 26 15:34:23 2021 +1000 Add test against OpenSSL w/out ECC. commit 29e194a752359ebf85bf7fce100f23a0477fc4de Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 26 14:49:59 2021 +1000 Ensure we can still build with C89. commit a38016d369d21df5d35f761f2b67e175e132ba22 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 26 14:29:03 2021 +1000 Interop test agains PuTTY. commit 095b0307a77be8803768857cc6c0963fa52ed85b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 26 14:02:03 2021 +1000 Support testing against arbitary libcrytpo vers. Add tests against various LibreSSL and OpenSSL versions. commit b16082aa110fa7128ece2a9037ff420c4a285317 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 26 13:35:44 2021 +1000 Add fbsd10 test target. commit 2c805f16b24ea37cc051c6018fcb05defab6e57a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Apr 25 14:15:02 2021 +1000 Disable compiler hardening on nbsd4. The system compiler supports -fstack-protector-all, but using it will result in an internal compiler error on some files. commit 6a5d39305649da5dff1934ee54292ee0cebd579d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Apr 25 13:01:34 2021 +1000 Add nbsd3, nbsd4 and nbsd9 test targets. commit d1aed05bd2e4ae70f359a394dc60a2d96b88f78c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Apr 24 22:03:46 2021 +1000 Comment out nbsd2 test target for now. commit a6b4ec94e5bd5a8a18cd2c9942d829d2e5698837 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Apr 24 17:52:24 2021 +1000 Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker. commit 3737c9f66ee590255546c4b637b6d2be669a11eb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 19:49:46 2021 +1000 Replace "==" (a bashism) with "=". commit a116b6f5be17a1dd345b7d54bf8aa3779a28a0df Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 16:34:48 2021 +1000 Add nbsd2 test target. commit 196bf2a9bb771f45d9b0429cee7d325962233c44 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 14:54:10 2021 +1000 Add obsd68 test target. commit e3ba6574ed69e8b7af725cf5e8a9edaac04ff077 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 14:53:32 2021 +1000 Remove dependency on bash. commit db1f9ab8feb838aee9f5b99c6fd3f211355dfdcf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 14:41:13 2021 +1000 Add obsd67 test target. commit c039a6bf79192fe1daa9ddcc7c87dd98e258ae7c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 11:08:23 2021 +1000 Re-add macos-11.0 test target. commit a6db3a47b56adb76870d59225ffb90a65bc4daf2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 10:28:28 2021 +1000 Add openindiana test target. commit 3fe7e73b025c07eda46d78049f1da8ed7dfc0c69 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 23 10:26:35 2021 +1000 Test krb5 on Solaris 11 too. commit f57fbfe5eb02df1a91f1a237c4d27165afd87c13 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 22 22:27:26 2021 +1000 Don't always set SUDO. Rely on sourcing configs to set as appropriate. commit e428f29402fb6ac140b52f8f12e06ece7bb104a0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 22 22:26:08 2021 +1000 Remove now-unused 2nd arg to configs. commit cb4ff640d79b3c736879582139778f016bbb2cd7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 21 01:08:04 2021 +1000 Add win10 test target. commit 4457837238072836b2fa3107d603aac809624983 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 20 23:31:29 2021 +1000 Add nbsd8 test target. commit bd4fba22e14da2fa196009010aabec5a8ba9dd42 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Apr 17 09:55:47 2021 +1000 Add obsd51 target. commit 9403d0e805c77a5741ea8c3281bbe92558c2f125 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 16 18:14:25 2021 +1000 Add fbsd13 target. commit e86968280e358e62649d268d41f698d64d0dc9fa Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 16 13:55:25 2021 +1000 depend commit 2fb25ca11e8b281363a2a2a4dec4c497a1475d9a Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 16 13:53:02 2021 +1000 crank version in README and RPM spec files commit b2b60ebab0cb77b5bc02d364d72e13db882f33ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 16 03:42:00 2021 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.6 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5f3e133c846127ec114812248bc17eff07c3e19 commit faf2b86a46c9281d237bcdec18c99e94a4eb820a Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 15 16:24:31 2021 +0000 upstream: do not pass file/func to monitor; noted by Ilja van Sprundel; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ae5c063845c410283cbdce685515dcd19479fa commit 2dc328023f60212cd29504fc05d849133ae47355 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Apr 14 11:42:55 2021 +1000 sshd don't exit on transient read errors openssh-8.5 introduced a regression that would cause sshd to exit because of transient read errors on the network socket (e.g. EINTR, EAGAIN). Reported by balu.gajjala AT gmail.com via bz3297 commit d5d6b7d76d171a2e6861609dcd92e714ee62ad88 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Apr 10 18:45:00 2021 +1000 perform report_failed_grab() inline commit ea996ce2d023aa3c6d31125e2c3ebda1cb42db8c Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Apr 10 18:22:57 2021 +1000 dedicated gnome-ssk-askpass3 source Compatibility with Wayland requires that we use the gdk_seat_grab() API for grabbing mouse/keyboard, however these API don't exist in Gtk+2. This branches gnome-ssk-askpass2.c => gnome-ssk-askpass3.c and makes the changes to use the gdk_seat_grab() instead of grabbing mouse/focus separately via GDK. In the future, we can also use the branched file to avoid some API that has been soft-deprecated in GTK+3, e.g. gtk_widget_modify_fg commit bfa5405da05d906ffd58216eb77c4375b62d64c2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 8 15:18:15 2021 +1000 Ensure valgrind-out exists. Normally the regress tests would create it, but running the unit tests on their own would fail because the directory did not exist. commit 1f189181f3ea09a9b08aa866f78843fec800874f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 8 15:17:19 2021 +1000 Pass OBJ to unit test make invocation. At least the Valgrind unit tests uses $OBJ. commit f42b550c281d28bd19e9dd6ce65069164f3482b0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 8 14:20:12 2021 +1000 Add pattern for valgrind-unit. commit 19e534462710e98737478fd9c44768b50c27c4c6 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 8 13:31:08 2021 +1000 Run unit tests under valgrind. Run a separate build for the unit tests under Valgrind. They take long enough that running in parallel with the other Valgrind tests helps. commit 80032102d05e866dc2a48a5caf760cf42c2e090e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Apr 8 13:25:57 2021 +1000 ifdef out MIN and MAX. In -portable, defines.h ensures that these are defined, so redefining potentially causes a warning. We don't just delete it to make any future code syncs a little but easier. bz#3293. commit d1bd184046bc310c405f45da3614a1dc5b3e521a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 7 10:23:51 2021 +1000 Remove only use of warn(). The warn() function is only used in one place in portable and does not exist upstream. Upgrade the only instance it's used to fail() (the privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect, from back when that was new) and remove the now-unused function. commit fea8f4b1aa85026ad5aee5ad8e1599a8d5141fe0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 7 10:18:32 2021 +1000 Move make_tmpdir() into portable-specific area. Reduces diff vs OpenBSD and makes it more likely diffs will apply cleanly. commit 13e5fa2acffd26e754c6ee1d070d0afd035d4cb7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 6 23:57:56 2021 +0000 upstream: Add TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to print the elapsed time in seconds of each test. This depends on "date +%s" which is not specified by POSIX but is commonly implemented. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec3c8c19ff49b2192116a0a646ee7c9b944e8a9c commit ef4f46ab4387bb863b471bad124d46e8d911a79a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 7 09:59:15 2021 +1000 Move the TEST_SSH_PORT section down a bit. This groups the portable-specific changes together and makes it a little more likely that patches will apply cleanly. commit 3674e33fa70dfa1fe69b345bf576113af7b7be11 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 7 10:05:10 2021 +1000 Further split Valgrind tests. Even split in two, the Valgrind tests take by far the longest to run, so split them four ways to further increase parallelism. commit 961af266b861e30fce1e26170ee0dbb5bf591f29 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 6 23:24:30 2021 +0000 upstream: include "ssherr.h" not ; from Balu Gajjala via bz#3292 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9535cd9966eb2e69e73d1ede1f44905c30310bd commit e7d0a285dbdd65d8df16123ad90f15e91862f959 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Apr 7 08:50:38 2021 +1000 wrap struct rlimit in HAVE_GETRLIMIT too commit f283a6c2e0a9bd9369e18462acd00be56fbe5b0d Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Apr 7 08:20:35 2021 +1000 wrap getrlimit call in HAVE_GETRLIMIT; bz3291 commit 679bdc4a5c9244f427a7aee9c14b0a0ed086da1f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 6 09:07:33 2021 +0000 upstream: Don't check return value of unsetenv(). It's part of the environment setup and not part of the actual test, and some platforms -portable runs on declare it as returning void, which prevents the test from compiling. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f08543ee3cdebc404f2951f3e388cc82b844a1 commit 320af2f3de6333aa123f1b088eca146a245e968a Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Apr 4 11:36:56 2021 +0000 upstream: remove stray inserts; from matthias schmidt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c36ebdc54e14bbf1daad70c6a05479a073d5c63 commit 801f710953b24dd2f21939171c622eac77c7484d Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Apr 4 06:11:24 2021 +0000 upstream: missing comma; from kawashima james OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31cec6bf26c6db4ffefc8a070715ebef274e68ea commit b3ca08cb174266884d44ec710a84cd64c12414ea Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 5 23:46:42 2021 +1000 Install libcbor with libfido2. commit f3ca8af87a4c32ada660da12ae95cf03d190c083 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Apr 3 18:21:08 2021 +1100 enable authopt and misc unit tests Neither were wired into the build, both required some build adaptations for -portable commit dc1b45841fb97e3d7f655ddbcfef3839735cae5f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 06:58:30 2021 +0000 upstream: typos in comments; GHPR#180 from Vill =?UTF-8?q?e=20Skytt=C3=A4?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c732381ae0e2b680c79e67c40c1814b7ceed2c commit 53ea05e09b04fd7b6dea66b42b34d65fe61b9636 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 06:55:52 2021 +0000 upstream: sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists with reality. GHPR#174 from Matt Hazinski OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f05e4ca54d7e67b90fe58fe1bdb1d2a37e0e2696 commit 57ed647ee07bb883a2f2264231bcd1df6a5b9392 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Apr 3 17:47:37 2021 +1100 polish whitespace for portable files commit 31d8d231eb9377df474746a822d380c5d68d7ad6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 06:18:40 2021 +0000 upstream: highly polished whitespace, mostly fixing spaces-for-tab and bad indentation on continuation lines. Prompted by GHPR#185 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5c81f0cbdcc6144df1ce468ec1bac366d8ad6e9 commit 34afde5c73b5570d6f8cce9b49993b23b77bfb86 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 05:54:14 2021 +0000 upstream: whitespace (tab after space) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e2b3f7674e985d3f7c27ff5028e690ba1c2efd4 commit 7cd262c1c5a08cc7f4f30e3cab108ef089d0a57b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Apr 3 16:59:10 2021 +1100 Save config.h and config.log on failure too. commit 460aee9298f365357e9fd26851c22e0dca51fd6a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 05:46:41 2021 +0000 upstream: fix incorrect plural; from Ville Skyt =?UTF-8?q?t=C3=A4=20via=20GHPR#181?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92f31754c6296d8f403d7c293e09dc27292d22c9 commit 082804c14e548cada75c81003a3c68ee098138ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 05:40:39 2021 +0000 upstream: ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit - some PKCS#11 providers get upset if C_Initialize is not matched with C_Finalize. From Adithya Baglody via GHPR#234; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8e770e03b416ee9a58f9762e162add900f832b6 commit 464ebc82aa926dd132ec75a0b064574ef375675e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 05:28:43 2021 +0000 upstream: unused variable OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85f6a394c8e0f60d15ecddda75176f112007b205 commit dc3c0be8208c488e64a8bcb7d9efad98514e0ffb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 3 05:21:46 2021 +0000 upstream: Fix two problems in string->argv conversion: 1) multiple backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and 2) quoted space in the middle of a string was being incorrectly split. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit A unit test for these cases has already been committed prompted by and based on GHPR#223 by Eero Häkkinen; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d7ef27abb4eeeaf6e167e9312e4abe9e89faf1e4 commit f75bcbba58a08c670727ece5e3f8812125969799 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Apr 3 16:22:48 2021 +1100 missing bits from 259d648e commit 4cbc4a722873d9b68cb5496304dc050d7168df78 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 31 21:59:26 2021 +0000 upstream: cannot effectively test posix-rename extension after changes in feature advertisment. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e390bf88d379162aaa81b60ed86b34cb0c54d29 commit 259d648e63e82ade4fe2c2c73c8b67fe57d9d049 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 19 04:23:50 2021 +0000 upstream: add a test for misc.c:argv_split(), currently fails OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ad6b96d6ebeb9643b698b3575bdd6f78bb144200 commit 473ddfc2d6b602cb2d1d897e0e5c204de145cd9a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 19 03:25:01 2021 +0000 upstream: split OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f6c03c0e4c58b3b9e04b161757b8c10dc8378c34 commit 1339800fef8d0dfbfeabff71b34670105bcfddd2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 31 22:16:34 2021 +0000 upstream: Use new limits@openssh.com protocol extension to let the client select good limits based on what the server supports. Split the download and upload buffer sizes to allow them to be chosen independently. In practice (and assuming upgraded sftp/sftp-server at each end), this increases the download buffer 32->64KiB and the upload buffer 32->255KiB. Patches from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ebd61c80d85b951b794164acc4b2f2fd8e88606c commit 6653c61202d104e59c8e741329fcc567f7bc36b8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 31 21:58:07 2021 +0000 upstream: do not advertise protocol extensions that have been disallowed by the command-line options (e.g. -p/-P/-R); ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a8a76b3f5131741aca4b41bfab8d101c9926205 commit 71241fc05db4bbb11bb29340b44b92e2575373d8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Mar 29 15:14:25 2021 +1100 gnome-ssh-askpass3 is a valid target here commit 8a9520836e71830f4fccca066dba73fea3d16bda Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 19 02:22:34 2021 +0000 upstream: return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117b31cf3c807993077b596bd730c24da9e9b816 commit 1269b8a686bf1254b03cd38af78167a04aa6ec88 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 19 02:18:28 2021 +0000 upstream: increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are borderline nonsensical but not explicitly banned by the spec. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger, feedback deraadt@ ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e67d60d81bde7b84a742b4ee5a34001bdf80d9c commit 860b67604416640e8db14f365adc3f840aebcb1f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 16 06:15:43 2021 +0000 upstream: don't let logging clobber errno before use OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6cca370005c270c277c51c111bb6911e1680ec commit 5ca8a9216559349c56e09039c4335636fd85c241 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Mar 13 14:40:43 2021 +1100 Only call dh_set_moduli_file if using OpenSSL. Fixes link failure when configuring --without-openssl since dh.c is not linked in. commit 867a7dcf003c51d5a83f83565771a35f0d9530ac Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Mar 13 13:52:53 2021 +1100 Don't install moduli during tests. Now that we have TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE pointing to the moduli in the soure directory we don't need to install the file to prevent warnings about it being missing. commit 0c054538fccf92b4a028008321d3711107bee6d5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Mar 13 13:51:26 2021 +1100 Point TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE at our own moduli. This will allow the test to run without requiring a moduli file installed at the configured default path. commit 4d48219c72ab0c71238806f057f0e9630b7dd25c Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 12 05:18:01 2021 +0000 upstream: spelling OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478bc3db04f62f1048ed6e1765400f3ab325e60f commit 88057eb6df912abf2678ea5c846d9d9cbc92752c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 12 04:08:19 2021 +0000 upstream: Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX. This will allow us to run tests against arbitrary moduli files without having to install them. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8df99d60b14ecaaa28f3469d01fc7f56bff49f66 commit f07519a2af96109325b5a48b1af18b57601074ca Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 12 03:43:40 2021 +0000 upstream: pwcopy() struct passwd that we're going to reuse across a bunch of library calls; bz3273 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6eafa977b2e44607b1b121f5de855107809b762 commit 69d6d4b0c8a88d3d1288415605f36e2df61a2f12 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 10 06:32:27 2021 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac6c252d2a5be8fbad4c66d9d35db507c9dac5b commit e5895e8ecfac65086ea6b34d0d168409a66a15e1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 10 04:58:45 2021 +0000 upstream: no need to reset buffer after send_msg() as that is done for us; patch from Mike Frysinger OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 565516495ff8362a38231e0f1a087b8ae66da59c commit 721948e67488767df0fa0db71ff2578ee2bb9210 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 13 01:52:16 2021 +0000 upstream: Add TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE variable to allow overriding of the moduli file used during the test run. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: be10f785263120edb64fc87db0e0d6570a10220a commit 82fef71e20ffef425b932bec26f5bc46aa1ed41c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Mar 12 15:58:57 2021 +1100 Allow (but return EACCES) fstatat64 in sandbox. This is apparently used in some configurations of OpenSSL when glibc has getrandom(). bz#3276, patch from Kris Karas, ok djm@ commit 1cd67ee15ce3d192ab51be22bc4872a6a7a4b6d9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Mar 12 13:16:10 2021 +1100 Move generic includes outside of ifdef. This ensures that the macros in log.h are defined in the case where either of --with-solaris-projects or --with-solaris-privs are used without --with-solaris-contracts. bz#3278. commit 2421a567a8862fe5102a4e7d60003ebffd1313dd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Mar 10 17:41:21 2021 +1100 Import regenerated moduli file. commit e99080c05d9d48dbbdb022538533d53ae1bd567d Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 6 20:36:31 2021 +0000 upstream: Fix PRINT macro, the suffix param to sshlog() was missing. Also remove redundant __func__ prefix from PRINT calls as the macro already adds __FILE__, __func__ and __LINE__. From Christos Zoulas. OK dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01fdfa9c5541151b5461d9d7d6ca186a3413d949 commit 160db17fc678ceb5e3fd4a7e006cc73866f484aa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 3 22:41:49 2021 +0000 upstream: don't sshbuf_get_u32() into an enum; reported by goetze AT dovetail.com via bz3269 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99a30a8f1df9bd72be54e21eee5c56a0f050921a commit cffd033817a5aa388764b6661855dcdaabab0588 Author: sthen@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 3 21:40:16 2021 +0000 upstream: typo in other_hostkeys_message() display output, ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 276f58afc97b6f5826e0be58380b737603dbf5f5 commit 7fe141b96b13bd7dc67ca985e14d55b9bd8a03fd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 3 08:42:52 2021 +0000 upstream: needs FILE*; from Mike Frysinger OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dddb3aa9cb5792eeeaa37a1af67b5a3f25ded41d commit d2afd717e62d76bb41ab5f3ab4ce6f885c8edc98 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 2 21:31:47 2021 +1100 update depend commit f0c4eddf7cf224ebcac1f07ac8afdb30c6e9fe0a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 2 21:30:14 2021 +1100 update relnotes URL commit 67a8bb7fe62a381634db4c261720092e7d514a3d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 2 21:29:54 2021 +1100 update RPM spec version numbers commit 0a4b23b11b9a4e6eec332dd5c6ab2ac6f62aa164 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 2 01:48:18 2021 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.5 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 185e85d60fe042b8f8fa1ef29d4ef637bdf397d6 commit de3866383b6720ad4cad83be76fe4c8aa111a249 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Mar 1 21:13:24 2021 +1100 Only upload config logs if configure fails. commit 85ff2a564ce838f8690050081176c1de1fb33116 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 28 22:56:30 2021 +0000 upstream: Add %k to list of keywords. From =?UTF-8?q?=20Eero=20H=C3=A4kkinenvia=20bz#3267?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c87f39a048cee2a7d1c8bab951b2f716256865e commit e774bac35933e71f924f4301786e7fb5bbe1422f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 28 01:50:47 2021 +0000 upstream: Do not try to reset signal handler for signal 0 in subprocess. Prevents spurious debug message. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f9785e292dcf304457566ad4637effd27ad1d46 commit 351c5dbbd74ce300c4f058112f9731c867c6e225 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 27 23:42:37 2021 +0000 upstream: fix alphabetic ordering of options; spotted by Iain Morgan OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f955fec617d74af0feb5b275831a9fee813d7ad5 commit 0d1c9dbe578597f8d45d3ac7690df10d32d743e5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 27 12:25:25 2021 +1100 zlib is now optional. commit b7c6ee7b437d9adfd19ef49d6c0f19f13f26f9b3 Author: Jeffrey H. Johnson <61629094+johnsonjh@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat Feb 27 01:04:58 2021 +0000 Fix punctuatio and typo in README.md. Some very minor fixes, missing 's' and punctuation. commit 6248b86074804983e8f7a2058856a516dbfe2924 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 26 16:45:50 2021 +1100 Revert "ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified." This reverts commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c. Apologies - I accidentally pushed this. commit 493339a940b13be6071629c3c2dd5a3b6fc17023 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 26 15:45:38 2021 +1100 detech BSD libc hash functions in libbsd / libmd Some Linux distributions are shipping the BSD-style hashing functions (e.g. SHA256Update) in libbsd and/or libmd. Detect this situation to avoid header/replacement clashes later. ok dtucker@ commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c Author: Dmitrii Turlupov Date: Thu Feb 4 16:27:31 2021 +0300 ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified. Allows the -b and -B options to be used together. For example, when the interface is in the VRF. commit 1fe4d70df94d3bcc2b35fd57cad6b5fc4b2d7b16 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 26 04:18:42 2021 +0000 upstream: remove this KEX fuzzer; it's awkward to use and doesn't play nice with popular fuzzing drivers like libfuzzer. AFAIK nobody has used it but me. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cad919522b3ce90c147c95abaf81b0492ac296c9 commit 24a3a67bd7421740d08803b84bd784e764107928 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 26 11:49:19 2021 +1100 Remove macos-11.00 PAM test target too. These are failing apparently due to some kind of infrastructure problem, making it look like every commit is busted. commit 473201783f732ca8b0ec528b56aa55fa0d8cf717 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 26 00:16:58 2021 +0000 upstream: a bit more debugging behind #ifdef DEBUG_SK OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9fbce14945721061cb322f0084c2165d33d1993 commit fd9fa76a344118fe1ef10b9a6c9e85d39599e9a8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 26 01:15:10 2021 +1100 Remove macos-11.0 from the test target list. It has been consistently failing for the past few days with a github actions internal error. commit 476ac8e9d33dbf96ef97aab812b8d7089d0cdc24 Author: Philip Hands Date: Wed Feb 24 23:43:16 2021 +0100 tidy the $INSTALLKEY_SH code layout a little SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 78178aa5017222773e4c23d9001391eeaeca8983 commit 983e05ef3b81329d76d6a802b39ad0d1f637c06c Author: Jakub Jelen Date: Tue Sep 29 10:02:45 2020 +0000 if unable to add a missing newline, fail SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 76b25e18f55499ea9edb4c4d6dc4a80bebc36d95 commit 3594b3b015f6014591da88ba71bf6ff010be7411 Author: Philip Hands Date: Tue Oct 13 14:12:58 2020 +0200 use $AUTH_KEY_DIR, now that we have it since that was a change made since jjelen's commit was written also, quote the variables SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 588cd8e5cbf95f3443d92b9ab27c5d73ceaf6616 commit 333e25f7bc43cee6e36f766e39dad6f9918b318c Author: Jakub Jelen Date: Tue Sep 29 10:00:01 2020 +0000 restorecon the correct directory if using different path for authorized_keys file SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 791a3df47b48412c726bff6f7b1d190721e65d51 commit 9beeab8a37a49a9e3ffb1972fff6621ee5bd7a71 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 25 03:27:34 2021 +0000 upstream: s/PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes/PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms/ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3dbc005fa29f69dc23d97e433b6dffed6fe7cb69 commit 2dd9870c16ddbd83740adeead5030d6840288c8f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 24 23:12:35 2021 +0000 upstream: Rename pubkeyacceptedkeytypes to pubkeyacceptedalgorithms in test to match change to config-dump output. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c9a4ad50306be873d032819d5e55c24eb74d5d commit b9225c3a1c3f5827e31d5d64a71b8e0504a25619 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 24 01:18:08 2021 +0000 upstream: Put obsolete aliases for hostbasedalgorithms and pubkeyacceptedalgorithms after their current names so that the config-dump mode finds and uses the current names. Spotted by Phil Pennock. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5dd10e93cccfaff3aaaa09060c917adff04a9b15 commit 8b8b60542d6652b2c91e0ef9e9cc81bcb65e6b42 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 23 21:55:08 2021 +0000 upstream: lots more s/key types/signature algorithms/ mostly in HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms and HostKeyAlgorithms; prompted by Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f719de4385b1a89e4323b2549c66aae050129cb commit 0aeb508aaabc4818970c90831e3d21843c3c6d09 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 23 21:50:18 2021 +0000 upstream: Correct reference to signature algorithms as keys; from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f7ecee86fc811aa0f8e21e7a872eee044b4be5 commit f186a020f2ba5f9c462a23293750e29ba0a746b1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 23 16:05:22 2021 +1100 Add a couple more test VMs. commit ffcdd3d90e74176b3bb22937ad1f65a6c1cd3f9d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 22 08:09:27 2021 +1100 Valgrind test: split and move up list. Since the valgrind test takes so long it approaches the limit allowed by github, move it to the head of the list so it's the first one started and split the longest tests out into a second instance that runs concurrently with the first. commit c3b1636770785cc2830dedd0f22ef7d3d3491d6d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 23 00:05:31 2021 +0000 upstream: warn when the user specifies a ForwardAgent path that does not exist and exit if ExitOnForwardFailure is set; bz3264 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72f7875865e723e464c71bf8692e83110699bf26 commit 5fcb0514949d61aadaf4a89cf16eb78fb47491ec Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 20 13:34:02 2021 +1100 Disable rlimit sandbox, doesn't work with valgrind Only run regress tests, runing unit tests as well makes it run longer than allowed y github. commit bb0b9bf45396c19486080d3eb0a159f94de7e6ba Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 20 13:06:25 2021 +1100 Upload valgrind logs on failure. commit ebb3b75e974cb241c6b9b9f5881b09c7bd32b651 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 19 22:18:50 2021 +1100 Rename "vm" to "os" in selfhosted to match c-cpp. Should make it easier to share code or maybe merge at some point. commit 76c0be0fe0465cb2b975dbd409f8d38b55e55bcb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 19 22:15:22 2021 +1100 Upload regress failure logs in c-cpp too. commit 8751b6c3136f5225c40f41bbf29aa29e15795f6e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 19 22:13:36 2021 +1100 Comment out Solaris 64bit PAM build... until I can figure out why it's failing. commit e9f6d563c06886b277c6b9abafa99fa80726dc48 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 19 10:20:17 2021 +1100 Actually run Valgrind tests. commit 41d232e226624f1a81c17091c36b44c9010aae62 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Feb 19 10:16:56 2021 +1100 Add test against Valgrind. commit e6528d91f12fba05f0ea64224091c9d0f38bdf1d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 16:30:01 2021 +1100 Add fbsd12 test target. commit 6506cb2798d98ff03a7cc06567c392a81f540680 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 15:21:13 2021 +1100 Remove unused arg. commit 93c31a623973b0fad508214593aab6ca94b11dcb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 14:54:07 2021 +1100 Add DEBUG_SK to kitchensink builds. commit 65085740d3574eeb3289d592f042df62c2689bb0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 14:53:14 2021 +1100 Add bbone test target (arm32). commit 63238f5aed66148b8d6ca7bd5fb347d624200155 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 18 02:49:35 2021 +0000 upstream: Fix the hostkeys rotation extension documentation The documentation was lacking the needed want-reply field in the initial global request. https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/218 by dbussink OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 051824fd78edf6d647a0b9ac011bf88e28775054 commit 34c5ef6e2d06d9f0e20cb04a9aebf67a6f96609a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 18 02:15:07 2021 +0000 upstream: make names in function prototypes match those in definition from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by ZenithalHourlyRate OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c736307bf3f2c7cb24d6f82f244eee959485acd commit 88e3d4de31ab4f14cac658e9e0c512043b15b146 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 18 02:13:58 2021 +0000 upstream: unbreak SK_DEBUG builds from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by ZenithalHourlyRate OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d7259ce1b04d025411464decfa2f1a097b43eb commit 788cbc5b74a53956ba9fff11e1ca506271a3597f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 18 00:30:17 2021 +0000 upstream: sftp-server: implement limits@openssh.com extension This is a simple extension that allows the server to clearly communicate transfer limits it is imposing so the client doesn't have to guess, or force the user to manually tune. This is particularly useful when an attempt to use too large of a value causes the server to abort the connection. Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f96293221e5aa24102d9bf30e4f4ef04d5f4fb51 commit 324449a68d510720d0e4dfcc8e9e5a702fe6a48f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 18 12:06:25 2021 +1100 support OpenSSL 3.x cipher IV API change OpenSSL renamed the "get current CIPHER_CTX" IV operation in 3.x. This uses the new name if available. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/13411 bz#3238 ok dtucker@ commit 845fe9811c047063d935eca89188ed55c993626b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 18 11:25:38 2021 +1100 prefer login_getpwclass() to login_getclass() FreeBSD has login_getpwclass() that does some special magic for UID=0. Prefer this to login_getclass() as its easier to emulate the former with the latter. Based on FreeBSD PR 37416 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@ commit d0763c8d566119cce84d9806e419badf20444b02 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 10:45:27 2021 +1100 Fixing quoting for installing moduli on target guest. commit b3afc243bc820f323a09e3218e9ec8a30a3c1933 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 10:27:16 2021 +1100 Install moduli on target not host. commit f060c2bc85d59d111fa18a12eb3872ee4b9f7e97 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 18 10:33:58 2021 +1100 don't free string returned by login_getcapstr(3) OpenBSD and NetBSD require the caller to free strings returned bu the login_* functions, but FreeBSD requires that callers don't. Fortunately in this case, we can harmlessly leak as the process is about to exec the shell/command. From https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28617 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@ commit bc9b0c25703215501da28aa7a6539f96c0fa656f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 10:10:00 2021 +1100 Skip unit tests on sol11 to speed things up. commit 161873035c12cc22211fc73d07170ade47746bc5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 10:09:27 2021 +1100 Remove SKIP_UNIT as it needs to be a make arg. commit 1c293868e4b4e8e74e3ea15b8dff90f6b089967a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 10:05:03 2021 +1100 Always intall moduli. Allows us to run tests without falling back to a fixed modulus. Ensure that the directory exists. commit 5c8f41ad100601ec2fdcbccdfe92890c31f81bbe Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 09:59:09 2021 +1100 Quote SSHD_CONFOPTS in case it contains spaces. commit 4653116c1f5384ea7006e6396d9b53c33d218975 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 18 09:51:18 2021 +1100 Fix labels on targets (dots vs underscores). commit 4512047f57ca3c6e8cd68f0cc69be59e98b25287 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 17 21:47:48 2021 +1100 More compact representation of config matrix. commit 0406cd09f05c2e419b113dd4c0eac8bc34ec915b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 17 21:19:18 2021 +1100 Skip unit tests on hosted VMs to speed things up. commit 4582612e6147d766c336198c498740242fb8f1ec Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 17 20:21:29 2021 +1100 Merge macos and ubuntu tests. commit 09f4b84654b71099559492e9aed5e1a38bf24815 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 17 18:41:30 2021 +1100 Convert most github hosted tests to new config structure. commit 65380ff7e054be1454e5ab4fd7bb9c66f8fcbaa9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 17 18:27:36 2021 +1100 Only run selfhosted tests from selfhosted repo. commit f031366535650b88248ed7dbf23033afdf466240 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 15 14:11:43 2021 +1100 Add self-hosted runners for VMs of other platforms. Github only hosts a limited number of platforms, and the runner code is only supported on slightly wider range of platforms. To increase our test coverage beyond that, we run the runner natively on a VM host, where it runs a jobs that boot VMs of other platforms, waits for them to come up then runs the build and test by ssh'ing into the guest. This means that the minimum dependencies for the guests are quite low (basically just sshd, a compiler and make). The interface to the VM host is fairly simple (basically 3 scripts: vmstartup, vmrun and vmshutdown), but those are specific to the VM host so are not in the public repo. We also mount the working directory on the host via sshfs, so things like artifact upload by the runner also work. As part of this we are moving the per-test-target configs into a single place (.github/configs) where there will be referenced by a single short "config" key. I plan to make the github-hosted runners use this too. The self-hosted runners are run off a private repo on github since that prevents third parties from accessing them[0], and since runner quota is limited on private repos, we avoid running the tests we run on the public repo. [0] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/hosting-your-own-runners/about-self-hosted-runners#self-hosted-runner-security-with-public-repositories commit 64bbd7444d658ef7ee14a7ea5ccc7f5810279ee7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 17 03:59:00 2021 +0000 upstream: Make sure puttygen is new enough to successfully run the PuTTY interop tests, otherwise skip them. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 34565bb50b8aec58331ed02a5e9e0a9a929bef51 commit da0a9afcc446a30ca49dd216612c41ac3cb1f2d4 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 15 20:43:15 2021 +0000 upstream: ssh: add PermitRemoteOpen for remote dynamic forwarding with SOCKS ok djm@, dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64fe7b6360acc4ea56aa61b66498b5ecc0a96a7c commit b696858a7f9db72a83d02cb6edaca4b30a91b386 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 15 20:36:35 2021 +0000 upstream: factor out opt_array_append; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 571bc5dd35f99c5cf9de6aaeac428b168218e74a commit ad74fc127cc45567e170e8c6dfa2cfd9767324ec Author: dlg@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 15 11:09:22 2021 +0000 upstream: ProxyJump takes "none" to disable processing like ProxyCommand does ok djm@ jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 941a2399da2193356bdc30b879d6e1692f18b6d3 commit 16eacdb016ccf38dd9959c78edd3a6282513aa53 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 12 03:49:09 2021 +0000 upstream: sftp: add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation patch from Mike Frysinger OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c114db88d505864075bfe7888b7c8745549715b commit e04fd6dde16de1cdc5a4d9946397ff60d96568db Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 12 03:14:18 2021 +0000 upstream: factor SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION parsing into its own function and remove an unused variable; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1a938657fbf7ef0ba5e73b30365734a0cc96559 commit 1bb130ed34721d46452529d094d9bbf045607d79 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 11 10:18:05 2021 +1100 Add __NR_futex_time64 to seccomp sandbox. This is apparently needed for (some) 32 bit platforms with glibc 2.33. Patch from nix at esperi.org.uk and jjelen at redhat.com via bz#3260. commit f88a7a431212a16e572ecabd559e632f369c363e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 6 09:37:01 2021 +1100 Add a hostname function for systems that don't have it. Some systems don't have a hostname command (it's not required by POSIX). The do have uname -n (which is), but as found by tim@ some others (eg UnixWare) do not report the FQDN from uname -n. commit 5e385a71ef2317856f37c91a98658eb12eb5a89c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 5 22:03:40 2021 +0000 upstream: Roll back the hostname->uname change in rev 1.10. It turns out uname -n doesn't do what we need for some platforms in portable, so we'll fix the original problem (that some other platforms don't have hostname at all) by providing wrapper function to implement it. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 827a707d6201d5a8e196a8c28aec1d2c76c52341 commit b446c214279de50ed8388e54897eb1be5281c894 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 5 06:01:58 2021 +0000 upstream: hostname is not specified by POSIX but uname -n is, so use the latter for portability. Patch from Geert Hendrickx via github PR#208. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6a79c7c4d141a0d05ade4a042eb57dddbce89f3 commit 1cb6ce98d658e5fbdae025a3bd65793980e3b5d9 Author: David Carlier Date: Sat Nov 21 12:22:23 2020 +0000 Using explicit_memset for the explicit_bzero compatibility layer. Favoriting the native implementation in this case. commit 2e0beff67def2120f4b051b1016d7fbf84823e78 Author: Luca Weiss Date: Sun Nov 8 14:19:23 2020 +0100 Deny (non-fatal) statx in preauth privsep child. commit a35d3e911e193a652bd09eed40907e3e165b0a7b Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 5 02:20:23 2021 +0000 upstream: Remove debug message from sigchld handler. While this works on OpenBSD it can cause problems on other platforms. From kircherlike at outlook.com via bz#3259, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e241d7ac1ee77e3de3651780b5dc47b283a7668 commit 69338ab46afe9e3dfb7762ad65351d854077c998 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 2 22:36:59 2021 +0000 upstream: whitespace OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 544bb092e03fcbecb420196cd0f70af13ea868ad commit f71219a01d8f71c4b3ed7e456337a84ddba1653e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 2 22:36:46 2021 +0000 upstream: fix memleaks in private key deserialisation; enforce more consistency between redundant fields in private key certificate and private key body; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dec344e414d47f0a7adc13aecf3760fe58101240 commit 3287790e78bf5b53c4a3cafb67bb5aa03e3910f0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 2 22:35:14 2021 +0000 upstream: memleak on error path; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2091a36d6ca3980c81891a6c4bdc544e63cb13a8 commit 3dd0c64e08f1bba21d71996d635c7256c8c139d1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 31 22:55:29 2021 +0000 upstream: more strictly enforce KEX state-machine by banning packet types once they are received. Fixes memleak caused by duplicate SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (spotted by portable OpenSSH kex_fuzz via oss-fuzz #30078). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 87331c715c095b587d5c88724694cdeb701c9def commit 7a92a324a2e351fabd0ba8ef9b434d3b12d54ee3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 31 10:50:10 2021 +0000 upstream: Set linesize returned by getline to zero when freeing and NULLing the returned string. OpenBSD's getline handles this just fine, but some implementations used by -portable do not. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d7bd5169d3397654247db9655cc69a9908d165c commit a5dfc5bae8c16e2a7caf564758d812c7672480b5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 30 16:32:29 2021 +1100 allow a fuzz case to contain more than one request loop until input buffer empty, no message consumed or 256 messages processed commit 0ef24ad60204022f7e33b6e9d171172c50514132 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 30 16:28:23 2021 +1100 expect fuzz cases to have length prefix might make life a little easier for the fuzzer, e.g. it can now produce valid (multi-request) messages by smashing two cases together. commit de613f2713d2dfcd3b03c00e5558a40997f52712 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 30 12:03:30 2021 +1100 ssh-agent fuzzer commit 7e96c877bcb2fb645355a687b8cb7347987c1c58 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 30 12:02:46 2021 +1100 move keys out of kex_fuzz.cc into separate header add certificates and missing key types commit 76f46d75664fdaa1112739ca523ff85ee4eb52b4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 30 12:02:10 2021 +1100 some fixed test data (mostly keys) for fuzzing commit 7c2e3d6de1f2edb0c8b4725b4c2b56360e032b19 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 30 00:56:38 2021 +0000 upstream: add a SK_DUMMY_INTEGRATE define that allows the dummy security key middleware to be directly linked; useful for writing fuzzers, etc. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0ebd00159b58ebd85e61d8270fc02f1e45df1544 commit 1a4b92758690faa12f49079dd3b72567f909466d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 29 06:29:46 2021 +0000 upstream: fix the values of enum sock_type OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18d048f4dbfbb159ff500cfc2700b8fb1407facd commit 8afaa7d7918419d3da6c0477b83db2159879cb33 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 29 06:28:10 2021 +0000 upstream: give typedef'd struct a struct name; makes the fuzzer I'm writing a bit easier OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1052ab521505a4d8384d67acb3974ef81b8896cb commit 1e660115f0c7c4a750cd31e468ff889f33dd8088 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 29 11:09:14 2021 +1100 fuzz diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 kex too commit be5f0048ea2aaeddd27be7dcca23aaad345fa16c Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 29 11:03:35 2021 +1100 support for running kex fuzzer with null cipher commit 3d59e88c0e42182c3749b446ccd9027933c84be4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 28 20:55:16 2021 +1100 make with -j2 to use available CPUs. commit 66dd9ddb5d2ea8c407908c8e8468c9d6e71db05b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 28 14:31:01 2021 +1100 Add test against openssl head and libressl head. commit 237dbb34e24b6b7ea888d54bda4d17da0a0fd0fa Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 28 14:30:50 2021 +1100 Remove whitespace. commit d983e1732b8135d7ee8d92290d6dce35f736ab88 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 27 23:49:46 2021 +0000 upstream: fix leak: was double allocating kex->session_id buffer OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3765f4cc3ae1df874dba9102a3588ba7b48b8183 commit 1134a48cdcef8e7363b9f6c73ebdd24405066738 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 28 08:57:31 2021 +1100 correct kex name in disabled code commit 67f47f1965abafc1830a287761125c2f4790857e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 27 10:15:08 2021 +0000 upstream: this needs kex.h now OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5a42166c5aa002197217421a971e48be7cb5d41 commit 39be3dc209f28f9c1ebfeba42adde8963b01e1cd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 27 10:05:28 2021 +0000 upstream: make ssh->kex->session_id a sshbuf instead of u_char*/size_t and use that instead of global variables containing copies of it. feedback/ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4b1b1ca4afd2e37cb9f64f737b30a6a7f96af68 commit 4ca6a1fac328477c642329676d6469dba59019a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 27 09:26:53 2021 +0000 upstream: remove global variable used to stash compat flags and use the purpose-built ssh->compat variable instead; feedback/ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c4f200e112dae6bcf99f5bae1a5629288378a06 commit bba229b6f3328171f5e3ae85de443002523c0452 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jan 27 12:34:07 2021 +1100 Install moduli file before tests. Reduces warnings during test runs. commit 1b83185593a90a73860a503d753a95ca6d726c00 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jan 27 11:58:26 2021 +1100 Run one test with -Werror to catch warnings. commit d1532d90074b212054d5fd965f833231b09982f5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 27 00:37:26 2021 +0000 upstream: Logical not bitwise or. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d4dc855cf04951b93c45caa383e1ac9af0a3b0e5 commit 507b448a2465a53ab03a88acbc71cc51b48ca6ac Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 15:40:17 2021 +0000 upstream: move HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms to the right place in alphabetical order OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d766820d33dd874d944c14b0638239adb522c7ec commit e26c980778b228bdd42b8353cc70101cf49b731b Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 11:25:01 2021 +0000 upstream: Remove unused variables leftover from refactoring. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b3ad58bff828fcf874e54b2fc27a4cf1d9505e8 commit e9f78d6b06fc323bba1890b2dc3b8423138fb35c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 05:32:21 2021 +0000 upstream: Rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, which more accurately reflects its effect. This matches a previous change to PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous names are retained as aliases. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49451c382adc6e69d3fa0e0663eeef2daa4b199e commit 48d0d7a4dd31154c4208ec39029d60646192f978 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 26 14:48:07 2021 +1100 Disable sntrup761 if compiler doesn't support VLAs. The sntrup761 code sourced from supercop uses variable length arrays. Although widely supported, they are not part of the ANSI C89 spec so if the compiler does not support VLAs, disable the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com KEX method by replacing the kex functions with no-op ones similar to what we do in kexecdh.c. This should allow OpenSSH to build with a plain C89 compiler again. Spotted by tim@, ok djm@. commit 37c70ea8d4f3664a88141bcdf0bf7a16bd5fd1ac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 00:54:49 2021 +0000 upstream: refactor key constraint parsing in ssh-agent Key constraints parsing code previously existed in both the "add regular key" and "add smartcard key" path. This unifies them but also introduces more consistency checking: duplicated constraints and constraints that are nonsensical for a particular situation (e.g. FIDO provider for a smartcard key) are now banned. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 511cb1b1c021ee1d51a4c2d649b937445de7983c commit e0e8bee8024fa9e31974244d14f03d799e5c0775 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 00:53:31 2021 +0000 upstream: more ssh-agent refactoring Allow confirm_key() to accept an additional reason suffix Factor publickey userauth parsing out into its own function and allow it to optionally return things it parsed out of the message to its caller. feedback/ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29006515617d1aa2d8b85cd2bf667e849146477e commit dfe18a295542c169ffde8533b3d7fe42088e2de7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 00:51:30 2021 +0000 upstream: make struct hostkeys public; I have no idea why I made it opaque originally. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e50780b34d4bbe628d69b2405b024dd749d982f3 commit 3b44f2513cae89c920e8fe927b9bc910a1c8c65a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 00:49:30 2021 +0000 upstream: move check_host_cert() from sshconnect,c to sshkey.c and refactor it to make it more generally usable and testable. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 536f489f5ff38808c1fa711ba58d4579b636f9e4 commit 1fe16fd61bb53944ec510882acc0491abd66ff76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 00:47:47 2021 +0000 upstream: use recallocarray to allocate the agent sockets table; also clear socket entries that are being marked as unused. spinkle in some debug2() spam to make it easier to watch an agent do its thing. ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74582c8e82e96afea46f6c7b6813a429cbc75922 commit cb7b22ea20a01332c81c0ddcb3555ad50de9cce2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 26 00:46:17 2021 +0000 upstream: factor out common code in the agent client Add a ssh_request_reply_decode() function that sends a message to the agent, reads and parses a success/failure reply. Use it for all requests that only expect success/failure ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0c1f4d5e6cfa525d62581e2b8de93be0cb85adb commit d1e578afe7cd48140ad6e92a453f9b035363fd7f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 25 06:00:17 2021 +0000 upstream: make ssh hostbased authentication send the signature algorithm in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets instead of the key type. This make HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is supposed to - filter on signature algorithm and not key type. spotted with dtucker@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25bffe19f0326972f5728170f7da81d5f45c78c6 commit 95eca1e195a3b41baa1a725c2c5af8a09d885e4b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 23 18:26:05 2021 +1100 ifdef new instance of sin6_scope_id Put inside HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID similar to existing instance. Should fix error on UnixWare 7. commit 6ffdcdda128045226dda7fbb3956407978028a1e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 18 11:43:34 2021 +0000 upstream: Fix long->int for convtime tests here too. Spotted by tobhe@. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a87094f5863312d00938afba771d25f788c849d0 commit b55b7565f15327d82ad7acbddafa90b658c5f0af Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 22 02:46:40 2021 +0000 upstream: PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes->PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms here too. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b64a640f8ce8c21d9314da9df7ce2420eefde3a commit ee9c0da8035b3168e8e57c1dedc2d1b0daf00eec Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 22 02:44:58 2021 +0000 upstream: Rename PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. While the two were originally equivalent, this actually specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. Some key types (eg RSA) can be used by multiple algorithms (eg ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-512) so the old name is becoming increasingly misleading. The old name is retained as an alias. Prompted by bz#3253, help & ok djm@, man page help jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0346b2f73f54c43d4e001089759d149bfe402ca5 commit a8e798feabe36d02de292bcfd274712cae1d8d17 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 15 02:58:11 2021 +0000 upstream: Change types in convtime() unit test to int to match change its new type. Add tests for boundary conditions and fix convtime to work up to INT_MAX. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ba2b81e9a3257fff204b020affe85b604a44f97e commit 9bde1a420626da5007bf7ab499fa2159b9eddf72 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 15 04:31:25 2021 +0000 upstream: Make output buffer larger to prevent potential truncation warnings from compilers not smart enough to know the strftime calls won't ever fully fill "to" and "from". ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83733f1b01b82da88b9dd1769475952aff10bdd7 commit 02da325f10b214219eae2bb1bc2d3bf0c2f13f9f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 15 02:58:11 2021 +0000 upstream: Change types in convtime() unit test to int to match change its new type. Add tests for boundary conditions and fix convtime to work up to INT_MAX. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dc0475f1484ac2f47facdfcf9221f9472145de commit 5339ab369c225b40bc64d5ec3374f5c91b3ad609 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 15 02:32:41 2021 +0000 upstream: In waitfd(), when poll returns early we are subtracting the elapsed time from the timeout each loop, so we only want to measure the elapsed time the poll() in that loop, not since the start of the function. Spotted by chris.xj.zhu at gmail.com, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 199df060978ee9aa89b8041a3dfaf1bf7ae8dd7a commit a164862dfa863b54b7897f66e1dd75437f086c11 Author: rob@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 14 19:45:06 2021 +0000 upstream: Minor grammatical correction. OK jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de0fad0581e212b2750751e479b79c18ff8cac02 commit 8635e7df7e3a3fbb4a4f6cd5a7202883b2506087 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jan 13 18:00:57 2021 +1100 Merge Mac OS X targets into a single config. commit ac112ade990585c511048ed4edaf2d9fc92b61f0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 12 19:22:47 2021 +1100 Add Mac OS X test targets. commit 1050109b4b2884bf50fd1b3aa084c7fd0a42ae90 Author: anatasluo Date: Mon Jan 11 13:51:39 2021 +0000 Remove duplicated declaration in fatal.c . commit 7d0f8a3369579dfe398536eb4e3da7bc15da9599 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 11 04:48:22 2021 +0000 upstream: Correct spelling of persourcenetblocksize in config-dump mode. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecdc49e2b6bde6b6b0e52163d621831f6ac7b13d commit ba328bd7a6774f30daaf90b83f1933cc4afc866c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 9 12:31:46 2021 +0000 upstream: Adjust kexfuzz to addr.c/addrmatch.c split. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1d8d23bb548078020be2fb52c4c643efb190f0eb commit b08ef25552443e94c0857d5e3806dd019ccc55d7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 9 12:24:30 2021 +0000 upstream: Update unittests for addr.c/addrmatch.c split. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: de2b415fb7af084a91c6ef147a90482d8f771eef commit 6d30673fedec2d251f4962c526fd0451f70c4d97 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 11 02:12:57 2021 +0000 upstream: Change convtime() from returning long to returning int. On platforms where sizeof(int) != sizeof(long), convtime could accept values >MAX_INT which subsequently truncate when stored in an int during config parsing. bz#3250, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8fc932683d6b4660d52f50911d62bd6639c5db31 commit 7a57adb8b07b2ad0aead4b2e09ee18edc04d0481 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 9 12:51:12 2021 +0000 upstream: add a comma to previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9139433701c0aa86a0d3a6c7afe10d1c9c2e0869 commit 3a923129534b007c2e24176a8655dec74eca9c46 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 9 12:10:02 2021 +0000 upstream: Add PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize options which provide more fine grained MaxStartups limits. Man page help jmc@, feedback & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2f68664e3d02c0895b35aa751c48a2af622047b commit d9a2bc71693ea27461a78110005d5a2d8b0c6a50 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 9 11:58:50 2021 +0000 upstream: Move address handling functions out into their own file in order to reuse them for per-source maxstartups limiting. Supplement with some additional functions from djm's flowtools that we'll also need. ok djm@ (as part of a larger diff). OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3e7d9ccc6c9b82e25cfef0ec83598e8e2327cbf commit b744914fcb76d70761f1b667de95841b3fc80a56 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 9 00:36:05 2021 +1100 Add test against Graphene hardened malloc. commit 6cb52d5bf771f6769b630fce35a8e9b8e433044f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 8 04:49:13 2021 +0000 upstream: make CheckHostIP default to 'no'. It doesn't provide any perceptible value and makes it much harder for hosts to change host keys, particularly ones that use IP-based load-balancing. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0db98413e82074f78c7d46784b1286d08aee78f0 commit 309b642e1442961b5e57701f095bcd4acd2bfb5f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 8 15:50:41 2021 +1100 Run tests with sudo for better coverage. commit c336644351fa3c715a08b7a292e309e72792e71e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 8 14:26:32 2021 +1100 Add Ubuntu 16.04 and 20.04 test targets. commit 4c7af01f9dcc1606dec033e7665a042cb0d8ec52 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 8 02:57:24 2021 +0000 upstream: If a signature operation on a FIDO key fails with a "incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the user, then request a PIN and retry the operation. This smoothes over a few corner cases including FIDO devices that require PINs for all hosted credentials, biometric FIDO devices that fall back to requiring PIN when reading the biometric failed, devices that don't implement reading credProtect status for downloaded keys and probably a few more cases that I haven't though of yet. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 176db8518933d6a5bbf81a2e3cf62447158dc878 commit 64ddd0fe68c4a7acf99b78624f8af45e919cd317 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 8 02:44:14 2021 +0000 upstream: don't try to use timespeccmp(3) directly as a qsort(3) comparison function - it returns 0/1 and not the -1/0/1 that qsort expectes. fixes sftp "ls -ltr" under some circumstances. Based on patch by Masahiro Matsuya via bz3248. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65b5e9f18bb0d10573868c3516de6e5170adb163 commit 599df78f3008cf78af21f8977be3e1dd085f8e2e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 8 02:33:13 2021 +0000 upstream: Update the sntrup761 creation script and generated code: - remove unneeded header files and typedefs and rely on crypto_api.h - add defines to map types used to the crypto_api ones instead of typedefs. This prevents typedef name collisions in -portable. - remove CRYPTO_NAMESPACE entirely instead of making it a no-op - delete unused functions and make the remaining ones that aren't exported static. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b9d0cf3acd5a3c1091da8afe00c904d38cf5783 commit 16448ff529affda7e2a15ee7c3200793abde0759 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 8 02:19:24 2021 +0000 upstream: mention that DisableForwarding is valid in a sshd_config Match block reported by Fredrik Eriksson in bz3239 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a71c3d84b597f5e43e4b40d5232797daf0993f6 commit 91bac5e95b1b0debf9b2b4f05c20dcfa96b368b9 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 4 21:58:58 2021 +0000 upstream: estructure sntrup761.sh to process all files in a single list, which will make it easier to reorder. Re-inline int32_MINMAX. ok tobhe@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d145c6c19b08bb93c9e14bfaa7af589d90f144c0 commit 4d96a3ebab2224f17e639a15078e03be1ad3736d Author: tobhe@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 3 18:05:21 2021 +0000 upstream: Prevent redefinition of `crypto_int32' error with gcc3. Fixes compilation on luna88k. Feedback millert@ Found by and ok aoyama@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f305ddfe575a26cc53431af3fde3f4aeebed9ba6 commit a23954eeb930ccc8a66a2710153730769dba31b6 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 1 22:00:49 2021 +1100 Undef int32 after sort routines. This prevents typedef'ing crypto_int32 twice, in sntrup761.c and crypto_api.h, which some compilers (at least some GCCs) don't accept. commit 148b8a661c3f93e4b6d049ee902de3d521261fbc Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 31 12:47:22 2020 +1100 fix: missing pieces of previous commit commit 3d999be7b987c848feda718cfcfcdc005ddf670d Author: tobhe@openbsd.org Date: Wed Dec 30 14:13:28 2020 +0000 upstream: Use int64_t for intermediate values in int32_MINMAX to prevent signed 32-bit integer overflow. Found by and ok djm@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f0704768e34cf45fdd792bac4011c6971881bb3 commit 5c1953bf98732da5a76c706714ac066dbfa015ac Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 29 12:40:54 2020 +1100 adapt KEX fuzzer to PQ kex change commit 659864fe81dbc57eeed3769c462679d83e026640 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 29 01:02:15 2020 +0000 upstream: Adapt to replacement of sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com. Also test sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com in unittests/kex OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cfa3506b2b077a9cac1877fb521efd2641b6030c commit 2c71cec020219d69df84055c59eba5799a1233ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 29 00:59:15 2020 +0000 upstream: Update/replace the experimental post-quantim hybrid key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime (coupled with X25519). The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org method is replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com. Per the authors, sntrup4591761 was replaced almost two years ago by sntrup761. The sntrup761 implementaion, like sntrup4591761 before it, is public domain code extracted from the SUPERCOP cryptography benchmark suite (https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html). Thanks for Daniel J Bernstein for guidance on algorithm selection. Patch from Tobias Heider; feedback & ok markus@ and myself (note this both the updated method and the one that it replaced are disabled by default) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf582b772d81ee24e911bb6f4b2aecfd39338ae commit 09d070ccc3574ae0d7947d212ed53c7268ef7e1f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 22 07:40:26 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak the description of KnownHostsCommand in ssh_conf.5, and add entries for it to the -O list in scp.1 and sftp.1; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba31ebea03f38f8d218857f7ce16a500c3e4aff commit 931c93389a80e32272712459b1102d303844453d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 22 19:43:55 2020 +1100 whitespace at EOL commit 397b1c4d393f97427283a4717e9015a2bd31b8a5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 22 19:42:37 2020 +1100 whitespace at EOL commit 33fa3ac547e5349ca34681cce6727b2f933dff0a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 22 19:21:26 2020 +1100 Improve AIX text. commit 0f2e21c9dca89598b694932b5b05848380a23ec0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 22 18:56:54 2020 +1100 Include stdio.h for FILE in misc.h. Fixes build on at least OpenBSD. commit 3e9811e57b57ee66b0f70d99d7258da3153b0e8a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 22 18:31:50 2020 +1100 ensure $LOGNAME is set in tests commit 3eb647cbb34d87a063aa7714256c6e56103fffda Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 22 06:47:24 2020 +0000 upstream: more detail for failing tests OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c68c0e5a521cad7e7f68e54c54ebf86d6c10ee1d commit 2873f19570d4d8758be24dbf78332be9a779009b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 22 06:03:36 2020 +0000 upstream: regress test for KnownHostsCommand OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ffc77464320b6dabdcfa0a72e0df02659233a38a commit 0121aa87bab9ad2365de2d07f2832b56d5ff9871 Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 22 03:05:31 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove lines accidentally left behind in the ProxyJump parsing fix r1.345. ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe767c108c8117bea33767b080ff62eef2c55f5c commit da4bf0db942b5f0278f33238b86235e5813d7a5a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 22 00:15:22 2020 +0000 upstream: add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand that allows the client to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to the usual files. The command accepts bunch of %-expansions, including details of the connection and the offered server host key. Note that the command may be invoked up to three times per connection (see the manpage for details). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2433cff4fb323918ae968da6ff38feb99b4d33d0 commit a34e14a5a0071de2036826a00197ce38c8b4ba8b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 22 00:12:22 2020 +0000 upstream: move subprocess() from auth.c to misc.c make privilege dropping optional but allow it via callbacks (to avoid need to link uidswap.c everywhere) add some other flags (keep environment, disable strict path safety check) that make this more useful for client-side use. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80ea9fdcc156f1a18e9c166122c759fae1637bf commit 649205fe388b56acb3481a1b2461f6b5b7c6efa6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 21 22:48:41 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove explicit rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se test since the cipher was removed. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: aa93cddb4ecd9bc21446a79008a1a53050e64f17 commit 03e93c753d7c223063ad8acaf9a30aa511e5f931 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 21 11:09:32 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove the pre-standardization cipher rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc which was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and disabled by default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly documented in ssh.1 in 2001. This will reduce the amount of work the cipher/kex regression tests need to do by a little bit. ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb460acc18290a998fd70910b19c29b4e4f199ad commit a11ca015879eab941add8c6bdaaec7d41107c6f5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 21 09:19:53 2020 +0000 upstream: properly fix ProxyJump parsing; Thanks to tb@ for pointing out my error (parse_ssh_uri() can return -1/0/1, that I missed). Reported by Raf Czlonka via bugs@ ok tb@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a2991a3794bcaf1ca2b025212cce11cdb5f6b7d6 commit d97fb879724f1670bf55d9adfea7278a93c33ae2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 21 01:31:06 2020 +0000 upstream: adapt to API change in hostkeys_foreach()/load_hostkeys() OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dcb468514f32da49a446372453497dc6eeafdbf3 commit bf7eb3c266b7fd4ddda108fcf72b860af2af6406 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 16 14:02:24 2020 +0000 upstream: few more things needs match.c and addrmatch.c now that log.c calls match_pattern_list() OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f7c95c76b150d0aeb00a67858b9579b7d1b2db74 commit 2c64f24e27a5e72a7f59e515fc4f4985355237ae Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Dec 21 14:02:56 2020 +1100 Pull in missing rev 1.2. commit 0f504f592d15d8047e466eb7453067a6880992a8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 20 23:40:19 2020 +0000 upstream: plumb ssh_conn_info through to sshconnect.c; feedback/ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8d14a09cda3f1dc55df08f8a4889beff74e68b0 commit 729b05f59ded35483acef90a6f88aa03eae33b29 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 20 23:38:00 2020 +0000 upstream: allow UserKnownHostsFile=none; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c46d515eac94a35a1d50d5fd71c4b1ca53334b48 commit b4c7cd1185c5dc0593d47eafcc1a34fda569dd1d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 20 23:36:51 2020 +0000 upstream: load_hostkeys()/hostkeys_foreach() variants for FILE* Add load_hostkeys_file() and hostkeys_foreach_file() that accept a FILE* argument instead of opening the file directly. Original load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() are implemented using these new interfaces. Add a u_int note field to the hostkey_entry and hostkey_foreach_line structs that is passed directly from the load_hostkeys() and hostkeys_foreach() call. This is a lightweight way to annotate results between different invocations of load_hostkeys(). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ff6db13ec9ee4edfa658b2c38baad0f505d8c20 commit 06fbb386bed666581095cb9cbc7a900e02bfe1b7 Author: tobhe@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 19 22:09:21 2020 +0000 upstream: Print client kem key with correct length. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91689e14a4fc6c270e265a32d1c8faba63a45755 commit 0ebead6593e2441e4af2735bbe2cd097607cd0d3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 17 23:28:50 2020 +0000 upstream: fix possible error("%s", NULL) on error paths OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b3833c2cb985453ecca1d76803ebb8f3b736a11 commit d060bc7f6e6244f001e658208f53e3e2ecbbd382 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 17 23:26:11 2020 +0000 upstream: refactor client percent_expand() argument passing; consolidate the common arguments into a single struct and pass that around instead of using a bunch of globals. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 035e6d7ca9145ad504f6af5a021943f1958cd19b commit 43026da035cd266db37df1f723d5575056150744 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 17 23:10:27 2020 +0000 upstream: prepare readconf.c for fuzzing; remove fatal calls and fix some (one-off) memory leaks; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91c6aec57b0e7aae9190de188e9fe8933aad5ec5 commit bef92346c4a808f33216e54d6f4948f9df2ad7c1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 14 03:13:12 2020 +0000 upstream: use _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR instead of hardcoded .ssh in path OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c1048468813107baa872f5ee33ba51623630e01 commit a5ab499bd2644b4026596fc2cb24a744fa310666 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Dec 4 14:01:27 2020 +1100 basic KEX fuzzer; adapted from Markus' unittest commit 021ff33e383c77b11badd60cec5b141a3e3fa532 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Dec 4 13:57:43 2020 +1100 use options that work with recent clang commit e4d1a0b40add800b6e9352b40c2223e44acc3a45 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 4 02:41:10 2020 +0000 upstream: shuffle a few utility functions into sftp-client.c; from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fdeb1aae1f6149b193f12cd2af158f948c514a2a commit ace12dc64f8e3a2496ca48d36b53cb3c0a090755 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 4 02:29:56 2020 +0000 upstream: make ssh_free(NULL) a no-op OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42cb285d94789cefe6608db89c63040ab0a80fa0 commit 3b98b6e27f8a122dbfda9966b1afeb3e371cce91 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 4 02:29:25 2020 +0000 upstream: memleak of DH public bignum; found with libfuzzer OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e913b542c3764b100b1571fdb0d0e5cc086fe97 commit 553b90feedd7da5b90901d73005f86705456d686 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 4 02:27:57 2020 +0000 upstream: fix minor memleak of kex->hostkey_alg on rekex OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3969c74966d4ccdfeff5e5f0df0791919aef50 commit ac0364b85e66eb53da2f9618f699ba6bd195ceea Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 4 02:27:08 2020 +0000 upstream: typos: s/hex/kex/ in error messages OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43a026c9571dd779ec148de1829cf5a6b6651905 commit ee22db7c5885a1d90219202c0695bc621aa0409b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 4 02:25:13 2020 +0000 upstream: make program name be const OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ece25680ec637fdf20502721ccb0276691df5384 commit 2bcbf679de838bb77a8bd7fa18e100df471a679c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 30 05:36:39 2020 +0000 upstream: Ignore comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config, similar to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320, with & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdbf9fc5bc72b1a14266f5f61723ed57307a6db4 commit b755264e7d3cdf1de34e18df1af4efaa76a3c015 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 28 12:52:32 2020 +0000 upstream: Include cipher.h for declaration of cipher_by_name. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ddfebbca03ca0e14e00bbad9d35f94b99655d032 commit 022def7bd16c3426a95e25f57cb259d54468341c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 28 03:27:59 2020 +0000 upstream: check result of strchr() against NULL rather than searched-for characters; from zhongjubin@huawei.com OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6f57de1d4a4d25f8db2d44e8d58d847e247a4fe commit 57bf03f0217554afb8980f6697a7a0b88658d0a9 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 27 10:12:30 2020 +0000 upstream: Document ssh-keygen -Z, sanity check its argument earlier and provide a better error message if it's not correct. Prompted by bz#2879, ok djm@ jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 484178a173e92230fb1803fb4f206d61f7b58005 commit 33313ebc1c7135085676db62189e3520341d6b73 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 27 00:49:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Set the specified TOS/DSCP for interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of the SSH session is time-sensitive (due to server side login grace periods) and is frequently interactive (e.g. entering passwords). The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after authentication completes. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f31ab10d9233363a6d2c9996007083ba43a093f1 commit b2bcec13f17ce9174238a704e91d52203e916432 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 27 00:37:10 2020 +0000 upstream: clean up passing of struct passwd from monitor to preauth privsep process. No longer copy entire struct w/ pointer addresses, but pass remaining scalar fields explicitly, Prompted by Yuichiro NAITO, feedback Thorsten Glaser; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9925df75a56732c43f3663e70dd15ff413ab3e53 commit 19af04e2231155d513e24fdc81fbec2217ae36a6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 22 22:38:26 2020 +0000 upstream: when loading PKCS#11 keys, include the key fingerprints and provider/slot information in debug output. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 969a089575d0166a9a364a9901bb6a8d9b8a1431 commit 9b9465ea856e15b9e9890b4ecb4110d7106e7766 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 22 22:37:11 2020 +0000 upstream: when mentioning that the host key has changed, don't report the type because it is ambiguous as to whether it referred to the known or new host key. bz3216; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d5ce4a83dbcf44e340a572e361decad8aab7bad commit 637017a7dd3281d3f2df804993cc27c30dbfda47 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 25 17:38:46 2020 +1100 Use "=" not "==" in string test. POSIX says "=" is string comparison and some shells (eg HP-UX) will complain about "==". commit 9880f3480f9768897f3b8e714d5317fb993bc5b3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 20 17:16:51 2020 +1100 Restore correct flags during localtime_r check. We were restoring the wrong thing CPPFLAGS (we used CFLAGS) for any platform that doesn't have localtime_r. commit 41935882f4e82de60dbd6e033eabe79e1b963518 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 20 03:16:56 2020 +0000 upstream: When doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with write and execute permissions in the interim so that we can actually complete the transfer, then set the directory permission as the final step. (The execute bit is only likely to be an issue with a non-POSIX server). bz#3222, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a82606212f2796e31f0e1af94a63355a7ad5d903 commit 0f90440ca70abab947acbd77795e9f130967956c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 20 13:37:54 2020 +1100 Add new pselect6_time64 syscall on ARM. This is apparently needed on armhfp/armv7hl. bz#3232, patch from jjelen at redhat.com. commit 3a7c46c72b6a1f643b1fc3589cd20d8320c3d9e1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 20 02:14:16 2020 +0000 upstream: Explicitly initialize all members of the find_by_key_ctx struct. Initializing a single member should be enough (the spec says the remainder should be initialized as per the static rules) but some GCCs warn on this which prevents us testing with -Werror on those. ok deraadt@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 687126e60a27d30f02614760ef3c3ae4e8d6af28 commit 076cb616b87d1ea1d292973fcd0ba38c08ea6832 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 19 23:05:05 2020 +0000 upstream: draft-ietf-secsh-architecture is now RFC4251. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cb0bb58c2711fb5ed519507659be1dcf179ed403 commit 85cceda21f1471548e04111aefe2c4943131c1c8 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 17 11:23:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Specify that the KDF function is bcrypt. Based on github PR#214 from rafork, ok markus@, mdoc correction jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8f2853e7edbcd483f31b50da77ab80ffa18b4ef commit 5b9720f9adbd70ba5a994f407fe07a7d016d8d65 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 15 22:34:58 2020 +0000 upstream: revert r1.341; it breaks ProxyJump; reported by sthen@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ac2f945b26cb86d936eed338f77861d6da8356a commit 04088725ec9c44880c01799b588cd4ba47b3e8bc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 13 07:30:44 2020 +0000 upstream: scrub keyboard-interactive authentication prompts coming from the server through asmprintf() prior to display; suggested by and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31fe93367645c37fbfe4691596bf6cf1e3972a58 commit 5442b491d0ee4bb82f6341ad0ee620ef3947f8c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 13 04:53:12 2020 +0000 upstream: prefix keyboard interactive prompts with (user@host) to make it easier to determine which connection they are associated with in cases like scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224 ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e6189b04b46c867662f8a6759cf3ecb5f59170 commit 2992e4e7014ac1047062acfdbbf6feb156fef616 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 13 17:56:11 2020 +1100 Remove use of TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME. It was only set by the recently removed AC_HEADER_TIME macro, replace with simple inclusions of both sys/time.h and time.h. Should prevent mis-detection of struct timespec. commit e3f27006f15abacb7e89fda3f5e9a0bd420b7e38 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 13 14:20:43 2020 +1100 Revert "detect Linux/X32 systems" This reverts commit 5b56bd0affea7b02b540bdbc4d1d271b0e4fc885. The approach used was incorrect; discussion in bz#3085 commit e51dc7fab61df36e43f3bc64b673f88d388cab91 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 13 13:22:15 2020 +1100 SELinux has deprecated security_context_t (it was only ever a char* anyway) commit b79add37d118276d67f3899987b9f0629c9449c3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 13 13:43:30 2020 +1100 Remove obsolete AC_HEADER_TIME macro. AC_HEADER_TIME is marked as obsolete in autoconf-2.70 and as far as I can tell everything we have that might be old enough to need it doesn't. commit d5d05cdb3d4efd4a618aa52caab5bec73097c163 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 12 22:56:00 2020 +0000 upstream: when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, display any other host names/addresses already associated with the key. E.g. > The authenticity of host 'test (10.0.0.1)' can't be established. > ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:milU4MODXm8iJQI18wlsbPG7Yup+34fuNNmV08qDnax. > This host key is known by the following other names/addresses: > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:1: host.example.org,10.0.0.1 > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:2: [hashed name] > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:3: [hashed name] > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:4: host > ~/.ssh/known_hosts:5: [host]:2222 > Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6f58a77b49f1368b5883b3a1f776447cfcc7ef4 commit 819b44e8b9af6ce18d3ec7505b9f461bf7991a1f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 12 22:38:57 2020 +0000 upstream: Prevent integer overflow when ridiculously large ConnectTimeout is specified, capping the effective value (for most platforms) at 24 days. bz#3229, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62d4c4b7b87d111045f8e9f28b5b532d17ac5bc0 commit add926dd1bbe3c4db06e27cab8ab0f9a3d00a0c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 11 05:22:32 2020 +0000 upstream: fix logic error that broke URI parsing in ProxyJump directives; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96d48839b1704882a0e9a77898f5e14b2d222705 commit 4340dd43928dfe746cb7e75fe920b63c0d909a9a Author: claudio@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 10 07:46:20 2020 +0000 upstream: Free the previously allocated msg buffer after writing it out. OK djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18c055870fc75e4cb9f926c86c7543e2e21d7fa4 commit fcf429a4c69d30d8725612a55b37181594da8ddf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 11 12:30:46 2020 +1100 Prevent excessively long username going to PAM. This is a mitigation for a buffer overflow in Solaris' PAM username handling (CVE-2020-14871), and is only enabled for Sun-derived PAM implementations. This is not a problem in sshd itself, it only prevents sshd from being used as a vector to attack Solaris' PAM. It does not prevent the bug in PAM from being exploited via some other PAM application. Based on github PR#212 from Mike Scott but implemented slightly differently. ok tim@ djm@ commit 10dce8ff68ef615362cfcab0c0cc33ce524e7682 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 8 23:19:03 2020 +0000 upstream: unbreak; missing NULL check OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6613dfab488123f454d348ef496824476b8c11c0 commit d5a0cd4fc430c8eda213a4010a612d4778867cd9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 8 22:37:24 2020 +0000 upstream: when requesting a security key touch on stderr, inform the user once the touch has been recorded; requested by claudio@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b76ee444490e546b9ea7f879e4092ee0d256233 commit 292bcb2479deb27204e3ff796539c003975a5f7a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Nov 9 00:33:35 2020 +1100 Remove preprocessor directive from log macro calls. Preprocessor directives inside macro calls, such as the new log macros, are undefined behaviour and do not work with, eg old GCCs. Put the entire log call inside the ifdef for OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521. commit 71693251b7cbb7dd89aaac18815147124732d0d3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 8 12:10:20 2020 +0000 upstream: Add a comment documenting the source of the moduli group sizes. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aec0725ce607630caaa62682624c6763b350391c commit 4d94b031ff88b015f0db57e140f481bff7ae1a91 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Nov 8 11:46:12 2020 +0000 upstream: Replace WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs in log calls with a macro. The log calls are themselves now macros, and preprocessor directives inside macro arguments are undefined behaviour which some compilers (eg old GCCs) choke on. It also makes the code tidier. ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc12a9029833d222043aecd252d654965c351a69 commit 6d2564b94e51184eb0b73b97d13a36ad50b4f810 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 6 17:11:16 2020 +1100 Fix function body for variadic macro test. AC_LANG_PROGRAM puts its second argument inside main() so we don't need to do it ourselves. commit 586f9bd2f5980e12f8cf0d3c2a761fa63175da52 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 6 16:53:24 2020 +1100 Remove AC_PROC_CC_C99 obsoleted in autoconf 2.70. Since we only use it to make sure we can handle variadic macros, explicitly check only for that. with & ok djm@ commit a019e353df04de1b2ca78d91b39c393256044ad7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 6 13:56:41 2020 +1100 Replace AC_TRY_COMPILE obsoleted in autoconf 2.70. Replace with the equivalent AC_COMPILE_IFELSE. commit 771b7795c0ef6a2fb43b4c6c66b615c2085cb9cd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 6 13:55:33 2020 +1100 Move AC_PROG_CC_C99 to immediately afer AC_PROG_CC. This puts the related C version selection output in the same place. commit e5591161f21ab493c6284a85ac3c0710ad94998f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 6 13:54:17 2020 +1100 AC_CHECK_HEADER() is obsoleted in autoconf 2.70. Replace with the non-obsoleted AC_CHECK_HEADERS(). commit 05bcd0cadf160fd4826a2284afa7cba6ec432633 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 3 22:53:12 2020 +0000 upstream: fold consecutive '*' wildcards to mitigate combinatorial explosion of recursive searches; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d18bcb39c40fb8a1ab61153db987e7d11dd3792b commit 7d680448db5858dc76307663f78d0b8d3c2b4a3d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 30 01:50:07 2020 +0000 upstream: print reason in fatal error message when kex_assemble_namelist() fails OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9975ee8db6c98d6f32233d88051b2077ca63dab commit 95d1109fec7e89ad21f2a97e92bde1305d32a353 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 29 03:13:06 2020 +0000 upstream: fix sshd_config SetEnv directive inside Match blocks; part of github PR#201 from github user manuelm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9772e3748abff3ad65ae8fc43d026ed569b1d2bc commit b12b835dc022ba161afe68348e05a83dfbcb1515 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 29 03:01:18 2020 +0000 upstream: fix type of nid in type_bits_valid(); github PR#202 from github user thingsconnected OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 769d2b040dec7ab32d323daf54b854dd5dcb5485 commit 1a14c13147618144d1798c36a588397ba9008fcc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 29 02:52:43 2020 +0000 upstream: whitespace; no code change OpenBSD-Commit-ID: efefc1c47e880887bdee8cd2127ca93177eaad79 commit 815209abfdd2991fb92ad7d2e33374916cdcbcf4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 29 02:47:23 2020 +0000 upstream: UpdateHostkeys: fixed/better detection of host keys that exist under other names and addresses; spotted by and debugged with lots of help from jca@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5113d7f550bbd48243db1705afbf16b63792d4b7 commit a575cf44e59a65506c67bddb62a712208a7a279c Author: Duncan Eastoe Date: Wed Oct 21 10:11:10 2020 +0100 session.c: use "denylist" terminology Follow upstream (6d755706a0059eb9e2d63517f288b75cbc3b4701) language improvements in this portable-specific code. commit 33267feaffd5d98aa56d2f0b3a99ec352effe938 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 27 16:46:31 2020 +1100 Remove checks for strict POSIX mkdtemp() We needed a mkdtemp() that accepted template paths that did not end in XXXXXX a long time ago for KRB4, but that code is long deprecated. We no longer need to replace mkdtemp() for strictly following POSIX. ok dtucker@ commit 492d70e18bad5a8c97d05f5eddac817171e88d2c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 26 00:39:04 2020 +0000 upstream: Minor man page fixes (capitalization, commas) identified by the manpage-l10n project via bz#3223. feedback deraadt@, ok jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab83af0daf18369244a72daaec6c4a58a9eb7e2c commit eab2888cfc6cc4e2ef24bd017da9835a0f365f3f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 19 22:49:23 2020 +0000 upstream: Adapt XMSS to new logging infrastructure. With markus@, ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c35ec3aa0f710e4e3325187ceff4fa3791686de commit f7bd11e4941620991f3e727cd0131b01f0311a58 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 19 08:07:08 2020 +0000 upstream: fix SEGV on fatal() errors spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 75f155a1ac61e364ed00dc379e2c42df81067ce2 commit 7715a3b171049afa1feffb1d5a1245dfac36ce99 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 19 10:54:41 2020 +1100 Use fatal_fr not fatal_r when passing r. Caught by the PAM -Werror tinderbox build. commit 816036f142ecd284c12bb3685ae316a68d2ef190 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 18 11:32:01 2020 +0000 upstream: use the new variant log macros instead of prepending __func__ and appending ssh_err(r) manually; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f14b80bcfa85414b2a1a6ff714fb5362687ace8 commit 9e2c4f64224f68fb84c49b5182e449f94b0dc985 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 18 11:21:59 2020 +0000 upstream: variants of the log methods that append a ssherr.h string from a supplied error code; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aed98c4435d48d036ae6740300f6a8357b7cc0bf commit 28cb0a4b03940d1ee576eb767a81a4113bdc917e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 18 11:14:27 2020 +0000 upstream: remove a level of macro indirection; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c529d06e902c5d1a6b231e1bec6157f76dc67c9 commit 9cac1db52e6c4961c447910fe02cd68a3b2f9460 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 18 11:13:45 2020 +0000 upstream: add some variant log.h calls that prepend the calling function name; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be1b2e2455b271ddb7457bc195c5367644f4e48 commit d55dfed34ef6ef1f028d552a90d5f3dba8dd6f7b Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 17 22:55:24 2020 +1100 missing header commit 999d7cb79a3a73d92a6dfbf174c33da0d984c7a2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 17 22:47:52 2020 +1100 sync regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c commit 3554b4afa38b3483a3302f1be18eaa6f843bb260 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 17 01:28:20 2020 +0000 upstream: make the log functions that exit (sshlogdie(), sshfatal(), etc) have identical signatures. Makes things a bit more consistent... OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd0ae124733389d7c0042e135c71ee9091362eb9 commit 616029a85ad7529b24bb8c4631d9607c0d6e7afe Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 16 14:34:33 2020 +0000 upstream: add space between macro arg and punctuation; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb81e2ed5a77832fe62ab30a915ae67cda57633e commit f812a36cee5727147bc897d34ab9af068dd4561e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 17 12:03:34 2020 +1100 check for and require a C99 capable compiler recent logging changes use __VA_ARGS__. commit f9ea6515202b59a1e2d5b885cafc1b12eff33016 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 17 11:51:20 2020 +1100 logging is now macros, remove function pointers commit 0f938f998626e8359324f803157cd7c9f8f403e2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 17 11:42:26 2020 +1100 adapt sk-dummy's fatal implementation to changes commit afbd9ec9e2dbad04834ce7ce53e58740434f32a5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 17 11:33:13 2020 +1100 fix netcat build problem commit 793b583d097381730adaf6f68bed3c343139a013 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 16 13:26:13 2020 +0000 upstream: LogVerbose keyword for ssh and sshd Allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line pattern- lists. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c294c25732d1b4fe7e345cb3e044df00531a6356 commit 752250caabda3dd24635503c4cd689b32a650794 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 16 13:24:45 2020 +0000 upstream: revised log infrastructure for OpenSSH log functions receive function, filename and line number of caller. We can use this to selectively enable logging via pattern-lists. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51a472610cbe37834ce6ce4a3f0e0b1ccc95a349 commit acadbb3402b70f72f14d9a6930ad41be97c2f9dc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 16 02:37:12 2020 +0000 upstream: use do_log2 instead of function pointers to different log functions OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 88077b826d348c58352a6b394755520f4e484480 commit 95b0bcfd1531d59e056ae8af27bb741391f26ab0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 14 00:55:17 2020 +0000 upstream: make UpdateHostkeys still more conservative: refuse to proceed if one of the keys offered by the server is already in known_hosts under another name. This avoid collisions between address entries for different host aliases when CheckHostIP=yes Also, do not attempt to fix known_hosts with incomplete host/ip matches when there are no new or deprecated hostkeys. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95c19842f7c41f9bd9c92aa6441a278c0fd0c4a3 commit a336ce8c2c55547cc00e0070a18c55f30bb53fb6 Author: kn@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 12 08:36:36 2020 +0000 upstream: Zap unused family parameter from ssh_connect_direct() sshconnect.c r1.241 from 2013 made it unused; found while reading code. OK djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 219ba6d7f9925d0b7992918612680399d86712b5 commit e545d94b713effab8e6c7dfabbfb76c1d84d7498 Author: Philip Hands Date: Sun Oct 4 00:15:46 2020 +0200 shift contents of long $() into filter_ids() This was prompted by the fact that posh does not deal with $() that contains comments where the comment includes an odd number of single-quotes. It seems to get befuddled into trying to find the matching quote. Regardless, making a function for filtering the unneeded ids seems much neater than avoiding apostrophes, so that's what I've done. SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 3dab3366a584427045c8a690a93282f02c09cf24 commit fd360174596047b52aa1cddda74d85012a03ca4b Author: Philip Hands Date: Sat Oct 3 23:15:16 2020 +0200 combine if/elif to avoid duplication of the action SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 42aeb1cc53d3f7f6e78edc210fb121fda0834914 commit f7c3a39b016dd77709ecbf18da8282f967b86cd7 Author: Philip Hands Date: Sat Oct 3 21:45:16 2020 +0200 shellcheck tidyage SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 5b08f840e78ac544288b3983010a1b0585e966fd commit 108676c3f26be6c873db0dd8754063699908727b Author: Philip Hands Date: Sat Oct 3 21:10:03 2020 +0200 tidy up test of $SCRATCH_DIR creation SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 2d8b22d96c105d87743ffe8874887b06f8989b93 commit a9c9e91a82bc1a2cf801b4e3ef27a941dbd27717 Author: Philip Hands Date: Wed Sep 16 16:13:30 2020 +0200 add -s flag: to install keys via SFTP This is prompted by: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3201 Thanks go to Matthias Blümel for the idea, and the helpful patch, from which this patch grew. SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: f7c76dc64427cd20287a6868f672423b62057614 commit f92424970c02b78852ff149378c7f2616ada4ccf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 11 22:14:38 2020 +0000 upstream: UpdateHostkeys: check for keys under other names Stop UpdateHostkeys from automatically removing deprecated keys from known_hosts files if the same keys exist under a different name or address to the host that is being connected to. This avoids UpdateHostkeys from making known_hosts inconsistent in some cases. For example, multiple host aliases sharing address-based known_hosts on different lines, or hosts that resolves to multiple addresses. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6444a705ba504c3c8ccddccd8d1b94aa33bd11c1 commit d98f14b5328922ae3085e07007d820c4f655b57a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 11 22:13:37 2020 +0000 upstream: UpdateHostkeys: better CheckHostIP handling When preparing to update the known_hosts file, fully check both entries for both the host and the address (if CheckHostIP enabled) and ensure that, at the end of the operation, entries for both are recorded. Make sure this works with HashKnownHosts too, which requires maintaining a list of entry-types seen across the whole file for each key. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 374dc263103f6b343d9671f87dbf81ffd0d6abdd commit af5941ae9b013aac12585e84c4cf494f3728982f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 11 22:12:44 2020 +0000 upstream: UpdateHostkeys: better detect manual host entries Disable UpdateHostkeys if the known_hosts line has more than two entries in the pattern-list. ssh(1) only writes "host" or "host,ip" lines so anything else was added by a different tool or by a human. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e434828191fb5f3877d4887c218682825aa59820 commit 6247812c76f70b2245f3c23f5074665b3d436cae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 8 01:15:16 2020 +0000 upstream: don't misdetect comma-separated hostkey names as wildcards; spotted by naddy@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b874edfec7fc324a21b130bdb42f912177739ce commit 67146c7d022a170be3cdad2f5f40259a663fb266 Author: wangxp006 Date: Thu Oct 8 17:49:59 2020 +0800 fix TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS var commit 3205eaa3f8883a34fa4559ddef6c90d1067c5cce Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 8 00:31:05 2020 +0000 upstream: clarify conditions for UpdateHostkeys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9cba714cf6aeed769f998ccbe8c483077a618e27 commit e8dfca9bfeff05de87160407fb3e6a5717fa3dcb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 7 06:38:16 2020 +0000 upstream: remove GlobalKnownHostsFile for this test after UpdateHostkeys change OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a940ad79d59343319613ba8fc46b6ef24aa3f8e1 commit 4aa2717d7517cff4bc423a6cfba3a2defb055aea Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 7 02:26:28 2020 +0000 upstream: Disable UpdateHostkeys when hostkey checking fails If host key checking fails (i.e. a wrong host key is recorded for the server) and the user elects to continue (via StrictHostKeyChecking=no), then disable UpdateHostkeys for the session. reminded by Mark D. Baushke; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98b524f121f4252309dd21becd8c4cacb0c6042a commit 04c06d04475f1f673e9d9743710d194453fe3888 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 7 02:25:43 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix UpdateHostkeys/HashKnownHosts/CheckHostIP bug When all of UpdateHostkeys, HashKnownHosts and ChechHostIP were enabled and new host keys were learned, known_hosts IP entries were not being recorded for new host keys. reported by matthieu@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a654a8290bd1c930aac509e8158cf85e42e49cb7 commit b70e33711291f3081702133175a41cccafc0212a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 7 02:24:51 2020 +0000 upstream: don't UpdateHostkeys when the hostkey is verified by the GlobalKnownHostsFile file, support only UserKnownHostsFile matches suggested by Mark D. Baushke; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eabb771a6add676c398d38a143a1aff5f04abbb9 commit aa623142e426ca1ab9db77b06dcc9b1b70bd102b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 7 02:22:23 2020 +0000 upstream: revert kex->flags cert hostkey downgrade back to a plain key (commitid VtF8vozGOF8DMKVg). We now do this a simpler way that needs less plumbing. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb92d25b216bff8c136da818ac2221efaadf18ed commit f4f14e023cafee1cd9ebe4bb0db4029e6e1fafac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 7 02:20:35 2020 +0000 upstream: simply disable UpdateHostkeys when a certificate successfully authenticated the host; simpler than the complicated plumbing via kex->flags we have now. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80e39644eed75717d563a7f177e8117a0e14f42c commit e79957e877db42c4c68fabcf6ecff2268e53acb5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 7 02:18:45 2020 +0000 upstream: disable UpdateHostkeys by default if VerifyHostKeyDNS is enabled; suggested by Mark D. Baushke OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85a1b88592c81bc85df7ee7787dbbe721a0542bf commit 3d4c2016bae1a6f14b48c1150a4c79ca4c9968bd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 6 07:12:04 2020 +0000 upstream: Agent protocol draft is now at rev 4. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c01ea3aae48aab45e01b7421b0fca2dad5e7837 commit af889a40ffc113af9105c03d7b32131eb4372d50 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 4 09:45:01 2020 +0000 upstream: when ordering host key algorithms in the client, consider the ECDSA key subtype; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3097686f853c61ff61772ea35f8b699931392ece commit 2d39fc9f7e039351daa3d6aead1538ac29258add Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 4 03:04:02 2020 +0000 upstream: Allow full range of UIDs and GIDs for sftp chown and chgrp on 32bit platforms instead of being limited by LONG_MAX. bz#3206, found by booking00 at sina.cn, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373b7bbf1f15ae482d39567ce30d18b51c9229b5 commit 396d32f3a1a16e54df2a76b2a9b237868580dcbe Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 3 09:22:26 2020 +0000 upstream: There are lots of place where we want to redirect stdin, stdout and/or stderr to /dev/null. Factor all these out to a single stdfd_devnull() function that allows selection of which of these to redirect. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3033ba5a4c47cacfd5def020d42cabc52fad3099 commit 1286981d08b8429a64613215ce8bff3f6b32488a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 3 08:30:47 2020 +0000 upstream: enable UpdateHostkeys by default when the configuration has not overridden UserKnownHostsFile; ok markus@ "The timing is perfect" deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62df71c9c5242da5763cb473c2a2deefbd0cef60 commit 332f21537293d66508f7342dc643bc7fe45f0f69 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 3 08:12:59 2020 +0000 upstream: disable UpdateHostkeys when a wildcard hostname pattern is encountered or when a certificate host key is in use. feedback/ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6e5575af7e6732322be82ec299e09051a5413bd commit 13cee44ef907824083d89cb9395adbbd552e46c1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 3 08:11:28 2020 +0000 upstream: record when the host key checking code downgrades a certificate host key to a plain key. This occurs when the user connects to a host with a certificate host key but no corresponding CA key configured in known_hosts; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ada81853ff9ee7824c62f440bcf4ad62030c901 commit 12ae8f95e2e0c273e9e7ef930b01a028ef796a3f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 3 04:15:06 2020 +0000 upstream: prefer ed25519 signature algorithm variants to ECDSA; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82187926fca96d35a5b5afbc091afa84e0966e5b commit e5ed753add7aa8eed6b167e44db6240a76404db2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 3 03:40:38 2020 +0000 upstream: want time.h here too OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fafee8f1108c64ad8b282f9a1ed5ea830d8c58a7 commit 66bd9fdf8b7762eb6a85cabbb1ae4ed955679f60 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Sat Oct 3 02:18:33 2020 +0000 upstream: split introductory paragraph, and insert ominous words about the glob issue, which cannot be fully fixed and really requires completely replacing scp with a completely different subsystem. team effort to find the right words.. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58e1f72d292687f63eb357183036ee242513691c commit 86cc8ce002ea10e88a4c5d622a8fdfab8a7d261f Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 3 13:38:55 2020 +1000 use relative rather than system include here commit 922cfac5ed5ead9f796f7d39f012dd653dc5c173 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 3 13:38:41 2020 +1000 add some openbsd-compat licenses we missed commit ce941c75ea9cd6c358508a5b206809846c8d9240 Author: Philip Hands Date: Sat Oct 3 00:20:07 2020 +0200 un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful commit 18ea5f4b88e303677d2003b95e5cb864b439e442 Author: Philip Hands Date: Fri Oct 2 21:30:10 2020 +0200 ksh doesn't grok 'local' and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's see how things go without it. commit d9e727dcc04a52caaac87543ea1d230e9e6b5604 Author: Oleg Date: Thu Oct 1 12:09:08 2020 +0300 Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id commit a1a856d50c89be3206f320baa4bfb32fff4e826f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 30 09:11:39 2020 +0000 upstream: Regen moduli. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04967f8c43e9854ac34b917bcd6f5ac96c53a693 commit fa1fe3ead7069d90d3c67d62137ad66acfcc9f48 Author: HARUYAMA Seigo Date: Sun Sep 27 20:06:20 2020 +0900 Restore first section title of INSTALL commit 279261e1ea8150c7c64ab5fe7cb4a4ea17acbb29 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Sep 27 17:25:01 2020 +1000 update version numbers commit 58ca6ab6ff035ed12b5078e3e9c7199fe72c8587 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Sep 27 07:22:05 2020 +0000 upstream: openssh 8.4 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a29e5b372d2c00e297da8a35a3b87c9beb3b4a58 commit 9bb8a303ce05ff13fb421de991b495930be103c3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Sep 22 10:07:43 2020 +1000 sync with upstream ssh-copy-id rev f0da1a1b7 commit 0a4a5571ada76b1b012bec9cf6ad1203fc19ec8d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Sep 21 07:29:09 2020 +0000 upstream: close stdin when forking after authentication too; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43db17e4abc3e6b4a7b033aa8cdab326a7cb6c24 commit d14fe25e6c3b89f8af17e2894046164ac3b45688 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Sep 20 23:31:46 2020 +0000 upstream: close stdout/stderr after "ssh -f ..." forking bz#3137, ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2d83cc4dea1665651a7aa924ad1ed6bcaaab3e2 commit 53a33a0d745179c02108589e1722457ca8ae4372 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Sep 20 15:57:09 2020 +1000 .depend commit 107eb3eeafcd390e1fa7cc7672a05e994d14013e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Sep 20 05:47:25 2020 +0000 upstream: cap channel input buffer size at 16MB; avoids high memory use when peer advertises a large window but is slow to consume the data we send (e.g. because of a slow network) reported by Pierre-Yves David fix with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1452771f5e5e768876d3bfe2544e3866d6ade216 commit acfe2ac5fe033e227ad3a56624fbbe4af8b5da04 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Sep 18 22:02:53 2020 +1000 libfido2 1.5.0 is recommended commit 52a03e9fca2d74eef953ddd4709250f365ca3975 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 18 08:16:38 2020 +0000 upstream: handle multiple messages in a single read() PR#183 by Dennis Kaarsemaker; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8570bb4d02d00cf70b98590716ea6a7d1cce68d1 commit dc098405b2939146e17567a25b08fc6122893cdf Author: pedro martelletto Date: Fri Sep 18 08:57:29 2020 +0200 configure.ac: add missing includes when testing, make sure to include the relevant header files that declare the types of the functions used by the test: - stdio.h for printf(); - stdlib.h for exit(); - string.h for strcmp(); - unistd.h for unlink(), _exit(), fork(), getppid(), sleep(). commit b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 18 05:23:03 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the best-preference default algorithm. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f commit f93b187ab900c7d12875952cc63350fe4de8a0a8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Sep 18 14:55:48 2020 +1000 control over the colours in gnome-ssh-askpass[23] Optionally set the textarea colours via $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR and $GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR. These accept the usual three or six digit hex colours. commit 9d3d36bdb10b66abd1af42e8655502487b6ba1fa Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Sep 18 14:50:38 2020 +1000 focus improvement for gnome-ssh-askpass[23] When serving a SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none information dialog, ensure then doesn't immediately close the dialog. Instead, require an explicit to reach the close button, or . commit d6f507f37e6c75a899db0ef8224e72797c5563b6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 16 03:07:31 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove unused buf, last user was removed when switching to the sshbuf API. Patch from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 250fa17f0cec01039cc4abd95917d9746e24c889 commit c3c786c3a0973331ee0922b2c51832a3b8d7f20f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 9 21:57:27 2020 +0000 upstream: For the hostkey confirmation message: > Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? compare the fingerprint case sensitively; spotted Patrik Lundin ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73097afee1b3a5929324e345ba4a4a42347409f2 commit f2950baf0bafe6aa20dfe2e8d1ca4b23528df617 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Sep 11 14:45:23 2020 +1000 New config-build-time dependency on automake. commit 600c1c27abd496372bd0cf83d21a1c119dfdf9a5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Sep 6 21:56:36 2020 +1000 Add aclocal.m4 and config.h.in~ to .gitignore. aclocal.m4 is now generated by autoreconf. commit 4bf7e1d00b1dcd3a6b3239f77465c019e61c6715 Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:03 2020 +0200 Quote the definition of OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD autoreconf complains about underquoted definition of OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD after aclocal.m4 has been and now is beeing recreated. Quote OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD as suggested. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior commit a2f3ae386b5f7938ed3c565ad71f30c4f7f010f1 Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:02 2020 +0200 Move the local m4 macros The `aclocal' step is skipped during `autoreconf' because aclocal.m4 is present. Move the current aclocal.m4 which contains local macros into the m4/ folder. With this change the aclocal.m4 will be re-created during changes to the m4/ macro. This is needed so the `aclocal' can fetch m4 macros from the system if they are references in the configure script. This is a prerequisite to use PKG_CHECK_MODULES. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior commit 8372bff3a895b84fd78a81dc39da10928b662f5a Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Sat Sep 5 17:50:01 2020 +0200 Remove HAVE_MMAP and BROKEN_MMAP BROKEN_MMAP is no longer defined since commit 1cfd5c06efb12 ("Remove portability support for mmap") this commit also removed other HAVE_MMAP user. I didn't find anything that defines HAVE_MMAP. The check does not trigger because compression on server side is by default COMP_DELAYED (2) so it never triggers. Remove remaining HAVE_MMAP and BROKEN_MMAP bits. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior commit bbf20ac8065905f9cb9aeb8f1df57fcab52ee2fb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 9 03:10:21 2020 +0000 upstream: adapt to SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR crank OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0f3e76bdc8f9dbd9d22707c7bdd86051d5112ab8 commit 9afe2a150893b20bdf9eab764978d817b9a7b783 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 28 03:17:13 2020 +0000 upstream: Ensure that address/mask mismatches are flagged at config-check time. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8f5f4c2c0bf00e6ceae7a1755a444666de0ea5c2 commit c76773524179cb654ff838dd43ba1ddb155bafaa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 9 03:08:01 2020 +0000 upstream: when writing an attestation blob for a FIDO key, record all the data needed to verify the attestation. Previously we were missing the "authenticator data" that is included in the signature. spotted by Ian Haken feedback Pedro Martelletto and Ian Haken; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8439896e63792b2db99c6065dd9a45eabbdb7e0a commit c1c44eeecddf093a7983bd91e70b446de789b363 Author: pedro martelletto Date: Tue Sep 1 17:01:55 2020 +0200 configure.ac: fix libfido2 back-compat - HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROD -> HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT; - check for fido_dev_get_touch_begin(), so that HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN gets defined. commit 785f0f315bf7ac5909e988bb1ac3e019fb5e1594 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 31 04:33:17 2020 +0000 upstream: refuse to add verify-required (PINful) FIDO keys to ssh-agent until the agent supports them properly OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 125bd55a8df32c87c3ec33c6ebe437673a3d037e commit 39e88aeff9c7cb6862b37ad1a87a03ebbb38c233 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 31 00:17:41 2020 +0000 upstream: Add RCS IDs to the few files that are missing them; from Pedro Martelletto OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39aa37a43d0c75ec87f1659f573d3b5867e4a3b3 commit 72730249b38a676da94a1366b54a6e96e6928bcb Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Aug 28 03:15:52 2020 +0000 upstream: Check that the addresses supplied to Match Address and Match LocalAddress are valid when parsing in config-test mode. This will catch address/mask mismatches before they cause problems at runtime. Found by Daniel Stocker, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d0b10c69fad5d8fda4c703e7c6804935289378b commit 2a3a9822311a565a9df48ed3b6a3c972f462bd7d Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 12:34:00 2020 +0000 upstream: sentence fix; from pedro martelletto OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f95b84a1e94e9913173229f3787448eea2f8a575 commit ce178be0d954b210c958bc2b9e998cd6a7aa73a9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 27 20:01:52 2020 +1000 tweak back-compat for older libfido2 commit d6f45cdde031acdf434bbb27235a1055621915f4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 09:46:04 2020 +0000 upstream: debug()-print a little info about FIDO-specific key fields via "ssh-keygen -vyf /path/key" OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf315c4fe77db43947d111b00155165cb6b577cf commit b969072cc3d62d05cb41bc6d6f3c22c764ed932f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 09:43:28 2020 +0000 upstream: skip a bit more FIDO token selection logic when only a single token is attached. with Pedro Martelletto OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e4a324bd9814227ec1faa8cb619580e661cca9ac commit 744df42a129d7d7db26947b7561be32edac89f88 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 06:15:22 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92714b6531e244e4da401b2defaa376374e24be7 commit e32479645ce649b444ba5c6e7151304306a09654 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 03:55:22 2020 +0000 upstream: adapt to API changes OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5f147990cb67094fe554333782ab268a572bb2dd commit bbcc858ded3fbc46abfa7760e40389e3ca93884c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 27 12:37:12 2020 +1000 degrade semi-gracefully when libfido2 is too old commit 9cbbdc12cb6a2ab1e9ffe9974cca91d213c185c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 01:15:36 2020 +0000 upstream: dummy firmware needs to match API version numner crank (for verify-required resident keys) even though it doesn't implement this feature OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 86579ea2891e18e822e204413d011b2ae0e59657 commit c1e76c64956b424ba260fd4eec9970e5b5859039 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 02:11:09 2020 +0000 upstream: remove unreachable code I forgot to delete in r1.334 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ed6078251a0959ee8deda443b9ae42484fd8b18 commit 0caff05350bd5fc635674c9e051a0322faba5ae3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 01:08:45 2020 +0000 upstream: Request PIN ahead of time for certain FIDO actions When we know that a particular action will require a PIN, such as downloading resident keys or generating a verify-required key, request the PIN before attempting it. joint work with Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 863182d38ef075bad1f7d20ca485752a05edb727 commit b649b3daa6d4b8ebe1bd6de69b3db5d2c03c9af0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 01:08:19 2020 +0000 upstream: preserve verify-required for resident FIDO keys When downloading a resident, verify-required key from a FIDO token, preserve the verify-required in the private key that is written to disk. Previously we weren't doing that because of lack of support in the middleware API. from Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@ and myself OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 201c46ccdd227cddba3d64e1bdbd082afa956517 commit 642e06d0df983fa2af85126cf4b23440bb2985bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 01:07:51 2020 +0000 upstream: major rework of FIDO token selection logic When PINs are in use and multiple FIDO tokens are attached to a host, we cannot just blast requests at all attached tokens with the PIN specified as this will cause the per-token PIN failure counter to increment. If this retry counter hits the token's limit (usually 3 attempts), then the token will lock itself and render all (web and SSH) of its keys invalid. We don't want this. So this reworks the key selection logic for the specific case of multiple keys being attached. When multiple keys are attached and the operation requires a PIN, then the user must touch the key that they wish to use first in order to identify it. This may require multiple touches, but only if there are multiple keys attached AND (usually) the operation requires a PIN. The usual case of a single key attached should be unaffected. Work by Pedro Martelletto; ok myself and markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 637d3049ced61b7a9ee796914bbc4843d999a864 commit 801c9f095e6d8b7b91aefd98f5001c652ea13488 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 01:07:09 2020 +0000 upstream: support for requiring user verified FIDO keys in sshd This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt. Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag through and adding ways to require it. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a2313aae153e043d57763d766bb6d55c4e276e6 commit 9b8ad93824c682ce841f53f3b5762cef4e7cc4dc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 27 01:06:18 2020 +0000 upstream: support for user-verified FIDO keys FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token. This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that requires a PIN before each authentication. feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15 commit 1196d7f49d4fbc90f37e550de3056561613b0960 Author: cheloha@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 12 01:23:45 2020 +0000 upstream: ssh-keyscan(1): simplify conloop() with timercmp(3), timersub(3); ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a102acb544f840d33ad73d40088adab4a687fa27 commit d0a195c89e26766d3eb8f3e4e2a00ebc98b57795 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 11 09:49:57 2020 +0000 upstream: let ssh_config(5)'s AddKeysToAgent keyword accept a time limit for keys in addition to its current flag options. Time-limited keys will automatically be removed from ssh-agent after their expiry time has passed; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 792e71cacbbc25faab5424cf80bee4a006119f94 commit e9c2002891a7b8e66f4140557a982978f372e5a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 11 09:45:54 2020 +0000 upstream: let the "Confirm user presence for key ..." ssh-askpass notification respect $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c1a616b348779bda3b9ad46bf592741f8e206c1 commit eaf8672b1b52db2815a229745f4e4b08681bed6d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 21 00:04:13 2020 +1000 Remove check for 'ent' command. It was added in 8d1fd57a9 for measuring entropy of ssh_prng_cmds which has long since been removed and there are no other references to it. commit 05c215de8d224e094a872d97d45f37f60c06206b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Aug 17 21:34:32 2020 +1000 Wrap stdint.h include in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit eaf2765efe8bc74feba85c34295d067637fc6635 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Aug 10 13:24:09 2020 +1000 sync memmem.c with OpenBSD commit ed6bef77f5bb5b8f9ca2914478949e29f2f0a780 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 7 17:12:16 2020 +1000 Always send any PAM account messages. If the PAM account stack reaturns any messages, send them to the user not just if the check succeeds. bz#2049, ok djm@ commit a09e98dcae1e26f026029b7142b0e0d10130056f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 7 15:37:37 2020 +1000 Output test debug logs on failure. commit eb122b1eebe58b29a83a507ee814cbcf8aeded1b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 7 15:11:42 2020 +1000 Add ability to specify exact test target. commit c2ec7a07f8caabb4d8e00c66e7cd46bf2cd1e922 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 7 14:21:15 2020 +1000 Document --without-openssl and --without-zlib. commit 651bb3a31949bbdc3a78b2ede95a77bce0c72984 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Aug 7 14:15:11 2020 +1000 Add without-openssl without-zlib test target. commit 9499f2bb01dc1032ae155999b2d7764b9491341f Author: Stefan Schindler Date: Wed Aug 5 19:00:52 2020 +0200 Add CI with prepare script * Only use heimdal kerberos implementation * Fetch yubico/libfido2 (see: https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) * Add one target for * all features * each feature alone * no features commit ea1f649046546a860f68b97ddc3015b7e44346ca Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 5 08:58:57 2020 +1000 support NetBSD's utmpx.ut_ss address field bz#960, ok dtucker commit 32c63e75a70a0ed9d6887a55fcb0e4531a6ad617 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 4 14:59:21 2020 +1000 wrap a declaration in the same ifdefs as its use avoids warnings on NetBSD commit c9e3be9f4b41fda32a2a0138d54c7a6b563bc94d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 4 14:58:46 2020 +1000 undef TAILQ_CONCAT and friends Needed for NetBSD. etc that supply these macros commit 2d8a3b7e8b0408dfeb933ac5cfd3a58f5bac49af Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 3 02:53:51 2020 +0000 upstream: ensure that certificate extensions are lexically sorted. Previously if the user specified a custom extension then the everything would be in order except the custom ones. bz3198 ok dtucker markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d97deb90587b06cb227c66ffebb2d9667bf886f0 commit a8732d74cb8e72f0c6366015687f1e649f60be87 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 3 02:43:41 2020 +0000 upstream: allow -A to explicitly enable agent forwarding in scp and sftp. The default remains to not forward an agent, even when ssh_config enables it. ok jmc dtucker markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36cc526aa3b0f94e4704b8d7b969dd63e8576822 commit ab9105470a83ed5d8197959a1b1f367399958ba1 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon Aug 3 02:42:49 2020 +0000 upstream: clang -Wimplicit-fallthrough does not recognise /* FALLTHROUGH */ comments, which is the style we currently use, and gives too many boring warnings. ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07b5031e9f49f2b69ac5e85b8da4fc9e393992a0 commit ced327b9fb78c94d143879ef4b2a02cbc5d38690 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 31 04:19:37 2020 +0000 upstream: Also compare username when checking for JumpHost loops. bz#3057, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bbc1d138adb34c54f3c03a15a91f75dbf418782 commit ae7527010c44b3376b85d036a498f136597b2099 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jul 31 15:19:04 2020 +1000 Remove AC_REVISION. It hasn't been useful since we switched to git in 2014. ok djm@ commit 89fc3f414be0ce4e8008332a9739a7d721269e50 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 28 19:40:30 2020 +1000 Use argv in OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE test. configure.ac is not detecting -Wextra in compilers that implement the option. The problem is that -Wextra implies -Wunused-parameter, and the C excerpt used by aclocal.m4 does not use argv. Patch from pedro at ambientworks.net, ok djm@ commit 62c81ef531b0cc7ff655455dd34f5f0c94f48e82 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 20 22:12:07 2020 +1000 Skip ECDSA-SK webauthn test when built w/out ECC commit 3ec9a6d7317236a9994887d8bd5d246af403a00d Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 20 13:09:25 2020 +1000 Add ssh-sk-helper and manpage to RPM spec file Based on patch from Fabio Pedretti commit a2855c048b3f4b17d8787bd3f24232ec0cd79abe Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 07:09:24 2020 +0000 upstream: Add %k to the TOKENs for Match Exec for consistency with the other keywords that recently got %k. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1857d1c40f270cbc254fca91e66110641dddcfdb commit 69860769fa9f4529d8612ec055ae11912f7344cf Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 05:59:05 2020 +0000 upstream: fix macro slip in previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 624e47ab209450ad9ad5c69f54fa69244de5ed9a commit 40649bd0822883b684183854b16d0b8461d5697b Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 07:10:24 2020 +0000 upstream: Add test for '%k' (HostKeyAlias) TOKEN. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8ed1ba1a811790031aad3fcea860a34ad7910456 commit 6736fe680704a3518cb4f3f8f6723b00433bd3dd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 03:26:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Add tests for expansions on UserKnownHostsFile. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bccf8060306c841bbcceb1392644f906a4d6ca51 commit 287dc6396e0f9cb2393f901816dbd7f2a7dfbb5f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 03:51:32 2020 +0000 upstream: log error message for process_write() write failures OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f733d7b3b05e3c68967dc18dfe39b9e8fad29851 commit 8df5774a42d2eaffe057bd7f293fc6a4b1aa411c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 03:43:42 2020 +0000 upstream: Add a '%k' TOKEN that expands to the effective HostKey of the destination. This allows, eg, keeping host keys in individual files using "UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k". bz#1654, ok djm@, jmc@ (man page bits) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7084d723c9cc987a5c47194219efd099af5beadc commit c4f239944a4351810fd317edf408bdcd5c0102d9 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 17 03:23:10 2020 +0000 upstream: Add %-TOKEN, environment variable and tilde expansion to UserKnownHostsFile, allowing the file to be automagically split up in the configuration (eg bz#1654). ok djm@, man page parts jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e1b406caf147638bb51558836a72d6cc0bd1b18 commit dbaaa01daedb423c38124a72c471982fb08a16fb Author: solene@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 07:50:46 2020 +0000 upstream: - Add [-a rounds] in ssh-keygen man page and usage() - Reorder parameters list in the first usage() case - Sentence rewording ok dtucker@ jmc@ noticed usage() missed -a flag too OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f06b9afe91cc96f260b929a56e9930caecbde246 commit 69924a92c3af7b99a7541aa544a2334ec0fb092c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 05:40:05 2020 +0000 upstream: start sentence with capital letter; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab06581d51b2b4cc1b4aab781f7f3cfa56cad973 commit 5b56bd0affea7b02b540bdbc4d1d271b0e4fc885 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 17 13:15:50 2020 +1000 detect Linux/X32 systems This is a frankenstein monster of AMD64 instructions/calling conventions but with a 4GB address space. Allegedly deprecated but people still run into it causing weird sandbox failures, e.g. bz#3085 commit 9c9ddc1391d6af8d09580a2424ab467d0a5df3c7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 06:43:16 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix previous by calling the correct function. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 821cdd1dff9c502cceff4518b6afcb81767cad5a commit f1a4798941b4372bfe5e46f1c0f8672fe692d9e4 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 05:36:50 2020 +0000 upstream: Update test to match recent change in match.c OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 965bda1f95f09a765050707340c73ad755f41167 commit d7e71be4fd57b7c7e620d733cdf2333b27bfa924 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 15 15:30:43 2020 +1000 Adjust portable code to match changes in 939d787d, commit fec89f32a84fd0aa1afc81deec80a460cbaf451a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 04:27:34 2020 +0000 upstream: Add default for number of rounds (-a). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cb7e9aa04ace01a98e63e4bd77f34a42ab169b15 commit aaa8b609a7b332be836cd9a3b782422254972777 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 14 23:57:01 2020 +0000 upstream: allow some additional control over the use of ssh-askpass via $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE, including force-enable/disable. bz#69 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a1e6cbbf6241ddc4405c4246caa2c249f149eb2 commit 6368022cd4dd508671c4999a59ec5826df098530 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jul 7 02:47:21 2020 +0000 upstream: correct recently broken comments OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 964d9a88f7de1d0eedd3f8070b43fb6e426351f1 commit 6d755706a0059eb9e2d63517f288b75cbc3b4701 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jul 5 23:59:45 2020 +0000 upstream: some language improvements; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 939d787d571b4d5da50b3b721fd0b2ac236acaa8 commit b0c1e8384d5e136ebdf895d1434aea7dd8661a1c Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 10:12:26 2020 +0000 upstream: update setproctitle after re-exec; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc92d122f9184ec2a9471ade754b80edd034ce8b commit cd119a5ec2bf0ed5df4daff3bd14f8f7566dafd3 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 10:11:33 2020 +0000 upstream: keep ignoring HUP after fork+exec; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7679985a84ee5ceb09839905bb6f3ddd568749a2 commit 8af4a743693ccbea3e15fc9e93edbeb610fa94f4 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 10:10:17 2020 +0000 upstream: don't exit the listener on send_rexec_state errors; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57cbd757d130d3f45b7d41310b3a15eeec137d5c commit 03da4c2b70468f04ed1c08518ea0a70e67232739 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 15 04:55:47 2020 +0000 upstream: Use $OBJ to find key files. Fixes test when run on an obj directory (on OpenBSD) or out of tree (in Portable). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 938fa8ac86adaa527d64a305bd2135cfbb1c0a17 commit 73f20f195ad18f1cf633eb7d8be95dc1b6111eea Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 4 23:11:23 2020 +1000 Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit aa6fa4bf3023fa0e5761cd8f4b2cd015d2de74dd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 07:25:18 2020 +0000 upstream: put back the mux_ctx memleak fix, but only for channels of type SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER; Specifically SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels should not have this structure freed. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b213ae60405f77439e2b06262f054760c9d325 commit d8195914eb43b20b13381f4e5a74f9f8a14f0ded Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 07:17:35 2020 +0000 upstream: revert r1.399 - the lifetime of c->mux_ctx is more complex; simply freeing it here causes other problems OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fee8ca94e2485faa783839541962be2834c5ed commit 20b5fab9f773b3d3c7f06cb15b8f69a2c081ee80 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 07:02:37 2020 +0000 upstream: avoid tilde_expand_filename() in expanding ~/.ssh/rc - if sshd is in chroot mode, the likely absence of a password database will cause tilde_expand_filename() to fatal; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e20aee6159e8b79190d18dba1513fc1b7c8b7ee1 commit c8935081db35d73ee6355999142fa0776a2af912 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 06:46:41 2020 +0000 upstream: when redirecting sshd's log output to a file, undo this redirection after the session child process is forked(); ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6df86dd653c91f5bc8ac1916e7680d9d24690865 commit 183c4aaef944af3a1a909ffa01058c65bac55748 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 06:29:57 2020 +0000 upstream: start ClientAliveInterval bookkeeping before first pass through select() loop; fixed theoretical case where busy sshd may ignore timeouts from client; inspired by and ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96bfc4b1f86c7da313882a84755b2b47eb31957f commit 6fcfd303d67f16695198cf23d109a988e40eefb6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 3 15:28:27 2020 +1000 add check for fido_cred_set_prot() to configure commit f11b23346309e4d5138e733a49321aedd6eeaa2f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 05:09:06 2020 +0000 upstream: Only reset the serveralive check when we receive traffic from the server and ignore traffic from a port forwarding client, preventing a client from keeping a connection alive when it should be terminated. Based on a patch from jxraynor at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev and bz#2265, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a941a575a5cbc244c0ef5d7abd0422bbf02c2dcd commit adfdbf1211914b631c038f0867a447db7b519937 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 3 15:15:15 2020 +1000 sync sys-queue.h with OpenBSD upstream needed for TAILQ_CONCAT commit 1b90ddde49e2ff377204082b6eb130a096411dc1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jul 3 05:08:41 2020 +0000 upstream: fix memory leak of mux_ctx; patch from Sergiy Lozovsky via bz3189 ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db249bd4526fd42d0f4f43f72f7b8b7705253bde commit 55ef3e9cbd5b336bd0f89205716924886fcf86de Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jul 1 16:28:31 2020 +0000 upstream: free kex in ssh_packet_close; ok djm semarie OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbc181e90d3d32fd97b10d75e68e374270e070a2 commit e1c401109b61f7dbc199b5099933d579e7fc5dc9 Author: bket@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jun 27 13:39:09 2020 +0000 upstream: Replace TAILQ concatenation loops with TAILQ_CONCAT OK djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454b40e09a117ddb833794358970a65b14c431ef commit 14beca57ac92d62830c42444c26ba861812dc837 Author: semarie@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 11:26:01 2020 +0000 upstream: backout 1.293 fix kex mem-leak in ssh_packet_close at markus request the change introduced a NULL deref in sshpkt_vfatal() (uses of ssh->kex after calling ssh_packet_clear_keys()) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c9a6721411461b0b1c28dc00930d7251a798484 commit 598c3a5e3885080ced0d7c40fde00f1d5cdbb32b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jun 26 16:07:12 2020 +1000 document a PAM spec problem in a frustrated comment commit 976c4f86286d52a0cb2aadf4a095d379c0da752e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 05:42:16 2020 +0000 upstream: avoid spurious error message when ssh-keygen creates files outside ~/.ssh; with dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0c662d44607e00ec78c266ee60752beb1c7e08 commit 32b2502a9dfdfded1ccdc1fd6dc2b3fe41bfc205 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jun 26 15:30:06 2020 +1000 missing ifdef SELINUX; spotted by dtucker commit e073106f370cdd2679e41f6f55a37b491f0e82fe Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 05:12:21 2020 +0000 upstream: regress test for ssh-add -d; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3a2e044be616afc7dd4f56c100179e83b33d8abf commit c809daaa1bad6b1c305b0e0b5440360f32546c84 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 15:16:23 2020 +0000 upstream: add test for mux w/-Oproxy; ok djm OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 764d5c696e2a259f1316a056e225e50023abb027 commit 3d06ff4bbd3dca8054c238d2a94c0da563ef7eee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 05:16:38 2020 +0000 upstream: handle EINTR in waitfd() and timeout_connect() helpers; bz#3071; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08fa87be50070bd8b754d9b1ebb1138d7bc9d8ee commit fe2ec0b9c19adeab0cd9f04b8152dc17f31c31e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 05:04:07 2020 +0000 upstream: allow "ssh-add -d -" to read keys to be deleted from stdin bz#3180; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15c7f10289511eb19fce7905c9cae8954e3857ff commit a3e0c376ffc11862fa3568b28188bd12965973e1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 05:03:36 2020 +0000 upstream: constify a few things; ok dtucker (as part of another diff) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c17fc987085994d752304bd20b1ae267a9bcdf6 commit 74344c3ca42c3f53b00b025daf09ae7f6aa38076 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 05:02:03 2020 +0000 upstream: Defer creation of ~/.ssh by ssh(1) until we attempt to write to it so we don't leave an empty .ssh directory when it's not needed. Use the same function to replace the code in ssh-keygen that does the same thing. bz#3156, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c073b569be1a60f4de36f491a4339bc4ae870f commit c9e24daac6324fcbdba171392c325bf9ccc3c768 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 26 04:45:11 2020 +0000 upstream: Expand path to ~/.ssh/rc rather than relying on it being relative to the current directory, so that it'll still be found if the shell startup changes its directory. Since the path is potentially longer, make the cmd buffer that uses it dynamically sized. bz#3185, with & ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36e33ff01497af3dc8226d0c4c1526fc3a1e46bf commit 07f5f369a25e228a7357ef6c57205f191f073d99 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 15:12:09 2020 +0000 upstream: fix kex mem-leak in ssh_packet_close; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2e9533f393620383afd0b68ef435de8d5e8abe4 commit e35995088cd6691a712bfd586bae8084a3a922ba Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 15:10:38 2020 +0000 upstream: fix ssh -O proxy w/mux which got broken by no longer making ssh->kex optional in packet.c revision 1.278 ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b65df04a064c2c6277359921d2320c90ab7d917 commit 250246fef22b87a54a63211c60a2def9be431fbd Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 15:09:53 2020 +0000 upstream: support loading big sshd_config files w/o realloc; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9238e810074ac907f0cf8cee1737ac04983171 commit 89b54900ac61986760452f132bbe3fb7249cfdac Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 15:08:53 2020 +0000 upstream: allow sshd_config longer than 256k; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83f40dd5457a64c1d3928eb4364461b22766beb3 commit e3fa6249e6d9ceb57c14b04dd4c0cfab12fa7cd5 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 24 15:07:33 2020 +0000 upstream: only call sshkey_xmss_init() once for KEY_XMSS_CERT; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0002ffb7f20f538b014d1d0735facd5a81ff096 commit 37f2da069c0619f2947fb92785051d82882876d7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 23:44:27 2020 +0000 upstream: some clarifying comments OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5268479000fd97bfa30ab819f3517139daa054a2 commit b659319a5bc9e8adf3c4facc51f37b670d2a7426 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 06:37:38 2020 +0000 upstream: updated argument name for -P in first synopsis was missed in previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d84dc3050469884ea91e29ee06a371713f2d0b7 commit 02a9222cbce7131d639984c2f6c71d1551fc3333 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 06:36:40 2020 +0000 upstream: supply word missing in previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16a38b049f216108f66c8b699aa046063381bd23 commit 5098b3b6230852a80ac6cef5d53a785c789a5a56 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jun 22 16:54:02 2020 +1000 missing files for webauthn/sshsig unit test commit 354535ff79380237924ac8fdc98f8cdf83e67da6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 06:00:06 2020 +0000 upstream: add support for verification of webauthn sshsig signature, and example HTML/JS to generate webauthn signatures in SSH formats (also used to generate the testdata/* for the test). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc575be5bb1796fdf4b8aaee0ef52a6671a0f6fb commit bb52e70fa5330070ec9a23069c311d9e277bbd6f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 05:58:35 2020 +0000 upstream: Add support for FIDO webauthn (verification only). webauthn is a standard for using FIDO keys in web browsers. webauthn signatures are a slightly different format to plain FIDO signatures - this support allows verification of these. Feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab7e3a9fb5782d99d574f408614d833379e564ad commit 64bc121097f377142f1387ffb2df7592c49935af Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 05:56:23 2020 +0000 upstream: refactor ECDSA-SK verification a little ahead of adding support for FIDO webauthn signature verification support; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9f478fd8e0c1bd17e511ce8694f010d8e32043e commit 12848191f8fe725af4485d3600e0842d92f8637f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 05:54:10 2020 +0000 upstream: support for RFC4648 base64url encoding; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef22c55e772dda05c112c88412c0797fec66eb4 commit 473b4af43db12127137c7fc1a10928313f5a16d2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 05:53:26 2020 +0000 upstream: better terminology for permissions; feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff2a71803b5ea57b83cc3fa9b3be42b70e462fb9 commit fc270baf264248c3ee3050b13a6c8c0919e6559f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 22 05:52:05 2020 +0000 upstream: better terminology for permissions; feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffb220b435610741dcb4de0e7fc68cbbdc876d2c commit 00531bb42f1af17ddabea59c3d9c4b0629000d27 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 19 07:21:42 2020 +0000 upstream: Correct synopsis and usage for the options accepted when passing a command to ssh-agent. ok jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b36f0679cb0cac0e33b361051b3406ade82ea846 commit b4556c8ad7177e379f0b60305a0cd70f12180e7c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 19 19:22:00 2020 +1000 Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker to bcrypt_pbkdf. commit 1babb8bb14c423011ca34c2f563bb1c51c8fbf1d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 19 19:10:47 2020 +1000 Extra brackets around sizeof() in bcrypt. Prevents following warning from clang 10: bcrypt_pbkdf.c:94:40: error: expression does not compute the number of elements in this array; element type is ´uint32_tÂ[...] place parentheses around the ´sizeof(uint64_t)´ expression to silence this warning commit 9e065729592633290e5ddb6852792913b2286545 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 19 18:47:56 2020 +1000 Add includes.h to new test. Fixes warnings eg "´bounded´ attribute directive ignor" from gcc. commit e684b1ea365e070433f282a3c1dabc3e2311ce49 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 19 18:38:39 2020 +1000 Skip OpenSSL specific tests w/out OpenSSL. Allows unit tests to pass when configure'ed --without-openssl. commit 80610e97a76407ca982e62fd051c9be03622fe7b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 19 17:15:27 2020 +1000 Hook sshsig tests up to Portable Makefiles. commit 5dba1fcabacaab46693338ec829b42a1293d1f52 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 19 05:07:09 2020 +0000 upstream: Test that ssh-agent exits when running as as subprocess of a specified command (ie "ssh-agent command"). Would have caught bz#3181. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 895b4765ba5153eefaea3160a7fe08ac0b6db8b3 commit 68e8294f6b04f9590ea227e63d3e129398a49e27 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 19 04:34:21 2020 +0000 upstream: run sshsig unit tests OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 706ef17e2b545b64873626e0e35553da7c06052a commit 5edfa1690e9a75048971fd8775f7c16d153779db Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 19 04:32:09 2020 +0000 upstream: basic unit test for sshsig.[ch], including FIDO keys verification only so far OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb1f946c8fc59206bc6a6666e577b5d5d7e45896 commit e95c0a0e964827722d29b4bc00d5c0ff4afe0ed2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 19 03:48:49 2020 +0000 upstream: basic unit test for FIDO kep parsing OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8089b88393dd916d7c95422b442a6fd4cfe00c82 commit 7775819c6de3e9547ac57b87c7dd2bfd28cefcc5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 18 23:34:19 2020 +0000 upstream: check public host key matches private; ok markus@ (as part of previous diff) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65a4f66436028748b59fb88b264cb8c94ce2ba63 commit c514f3c0522855b4d548286eaa113e209051a6d2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jun 18 23:33:38 2020 +0000 upstream: avoid spurious "Unable to load host key" message when sshd can load a private key but no public counterpart; with & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0713cbdf9aa1ff8ac7b1f78b09ac911af510f81b commit 7fafaeb5da365f4a408fec355dac04a774f27193 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 12 05:26:37 2020 +0000 upstream: correct RFC number; from HARUYAMA Seigo via GH PR191 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d03b6c96ca98bfbc23d3754c3c33e1fe0852e10 commit 3a7f654d5bcb20df24a134b6581b0d235da4564a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 5 06:18:07 2020 +0000 upstream: unbreak "sshd -ddd" - close of config passing fd happened too early. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49346e945c6447aca3e904e65fc400128d2f8ed0 commit 3de02be39e5c0c2208d9682a3844991651620fcc Author: Andreas Schwab Date: Mon May 25 11:10:44 2020 +0200 Add support for AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64 commit ea547eb0329c2f8da77a4ac05f6c330bd49bdaab Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 5 03:25:35 2020 +0000 upstream: make sshbuf_putb(b, NULL) a no-op OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 976fdc99b500e347023d430df372f31c1dd128f7 commit 69796297c812640415c6cea074ea61afc899cbaa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 5 03:24:36 2020 +0000 upstream: make sshbuf_dump() args const OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4a5accae750875d665b862504169769bcf663bd commit 670428895739d1f79894bdb2457891c3afa60a59 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 5 03:24:16 2020 +0000 upstream: wrap long line OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed405a12bd27bdc9c52e169bc5ff3529b4ebbbb2 commit 2f648cf222882719040906722b3593b01df4ad1a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jun 5 03:15:26 2020 +0000 upstream: Correct historical comment: provos@ modified OpenSSH to work with SSLeay (very quickly replaced by OpenSSL) not SSL in general. ok deraadt, historical context markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7209e07a2984b50411ed8ca5a4932da5030d2b90 commit 56548e4efcc3e3e8093c2eba30c75b23e561b172 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 3 08:23:18 2020 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54 commit 8da801f585dd9c534c0cbe487a3b1648036bf2fb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 5 13:20:10 2020 +1000 Test fallthrough in OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does not understand /* FALLTHROUGH */ comments and we don't use the __attribute__((fallthrough)) that it's looking for. This has the effect of turning off -Wimplicit-fallthrough where it does not currently help (particularly with -Werror). ok djm@ commit 049297de975b92adcc2db77e3fb7046c0e3c695d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jun 3 08:23:18 2020 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54 commit b458423a38a3140ac022ffcffcb332609faccfe3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jun 1 07:11:38 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove now-unused proto_spec and associated definitions. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e2b18e3aa6ee22a7b69c39f2d3bd679ec35c362 commit 5ad3c3a33ef038b55a14ebd31faeeec46073db2c Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 21:22:02 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix error message on close(2) and add printf format attributes. From Christos Zoulas, OK markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41523c999a9e3561fcc7082fd38ea2e0629ee07e commit 712ac1efb687a945a89db6aa3e998c1a17b38653 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 11:17:56 2020 +0000 upstream: Make dollar_expand variadic and pass a real va_list to vdollar_percent_expand. Fixes build error on arm64 spotted by otto@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181910d7ae489f40ad609b4cf4a20f3d068a7279 commit 837ffa9699a9cba47ae7921d2876afaccc027133 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 29 20:39:00 2020 +1000 Omit ToS setting if we don't have IPV6_TCLASS too. Fixes tests on old BSDs. commit f85b118d2150847cc333895296bc230e367be6b5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 09:02:44 2020 +0000 upstream: Pass a NULL instead of zeroed out va_list from dollar_expand. The original intent was in case there's some platform where va_list is not a pointer equivalent, but on i386 this chokes on the memset. This unbreaks that build, but will require further consideration. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b90afcd8e1137a1d863204060052aef415baaf7 commit ec1d50b01c84ff667240ed525f669454c4ebc8e9 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 05:48:39 2020 +0000 upstream: remove a stray .El; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ddfe6f8a15fe10209db6664ecbe7896f1d167c commit 058674a62ffe33f01d871d46e624bc2a2c22d91f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 04:32:26 2020 +0000 upstream: Add regression and unit tests for ${ENV} style environment variable expansion in various keywords (bz#3140). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4d9ceb95d89365b7b674bc26cf064c15a5bbb197 commit 0b15892fc47d6840eba1291a6be9be1a70bc8972 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 01:21:35 2020 +0000 upstream: Unit test for convtime. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cec4239efa2fc4c7062064f07a847e1cbdbcd5dd commit 188e332d1c8f9f24e5b6659e9680bf083f837df9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 05:37:03 2020 +0000 upstream: mention that wildcards are processed in lexical order; bz#3165 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8856f3d1612bd42e9ee606d89386cae456dd165c commit 4a1b46e6d032608b7ec00ae51c4e25b82f460b05 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 04:25:40 2020 +0000 upstream: Allow some keywords to expand shell-style ${ENV} environment variables on the client side. The supported keywords are CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent and IdentityFile, plus LocalForward and RemoteForward when used for Unix domain socket paths. This would for example allow forwarding of Unix domain socket paths that change at runtime. bz#3140, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a2e801fc2d4df2fe0e58f50d9c81b03822dffa commit c9bab1d3a9e183cef3a3412f57880a0374cc8cb2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 29 14:49:16 2020 +1000 depend commit 0b0d219313bf9239ca043f20b1a095db0245588f Author: sobrado Date: Thu Sep 3 23:06:28 2015 +0000 partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream synchronize synopsis and usage. commit 0f04c8467f589f85a523e19fd684c4f6c4ed9482 Author: chl Date: Sun Jul 26 19:12:28 2015 +0000 partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream remove unused variable ok tedu@ commit d6a81050ace2630b06c3c6dd39bb4eef5d1043f8 Author: tobias Date: Thu Mar 26 21:22:50 2015 +0000 partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream The code in socks.c writes multiple times in a row to a socket. If the socket becomes invalid between these calls (e.g. connection closed), write will throw SIGPIPE. With this patch, SIGPIPE is ignored so we can handle write's -1 return value (errno will be EPIPE). Ultimately, it leads to program exit, too -- but with nicer error message. :) with input by and ok djm commit bf3893dddd35e16def04bf48ed2ee1ad695b8f82 Author: tobias Date: Thu Mar 26 10:36:03 2015 +0000 partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream Check for short writes in fdpass(). Clean up while at it. ok djm commit e18435fec124b4c08eb6bbbbee9693dc04f4befb Author: jca Date: Sat Feb 14 22:40:22 2015 +0000 partial sync of regress/netcat.c with upstream Support for nc -T on IPv6 addresses. ok sthen@ commit 4c607244054a036ad3b2449a6cb4c15feb846a76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 03:14:02 2020 +0000 upstream: fix compilation on !HAVE_DLOPEN platforms; stub function was not updated to match API change. From Dale Rahn via beck@ ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b8d054afe34c9ac85e417dae702ef981917b836 commit 224418cf55611869a4ace1b8b07bba0dff77a9c3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 03:11:54 2020 +0000 upstream: fix exit status for downloading of FIDO resident keys; from Pedro Martelletto, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0da77dc24a1084798eedd83c39a002a9d231faef commit 1001dd148ed7c57bccf56afb40cb77482ea343a6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 29 01:20:46 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix multiplier in convtime when handling seconds after other units. bz#3171, spotted by ronf at timeheart.net, ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95b7a848e1083974a65fbb6ccb381d438e1dd5be commit 7af1e92cd289b7eaa9a683e9a6f2fddd98f37a01 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 27 22:37:53 2020 +0000 upstream: fix Include before Match in sshd_config; bz#3122 patch from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b0aaf135fe6732b5d326946042665dd3beba5f4 commit 0a9a611619b0a1fecd0195ec86a9885f5d681c84 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 27 21:59:11 2020 +0000 upstream: Do not call process_queued_listen_addrs() for every included file from sshd_config; patch from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ff603d6f06a7fab4881f12503b53024799d0a49 commit 16ea1fdbe736648f79a827219134331f8d9844fb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 27 21:25:18 2020 +0000 upstream: fix crash in recallocarray when deleting SendEnv variables; spotted by & ok sthen@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b881e8e849edeec5082b5c0a87d8d7cff091a8fd commit 47adfdc07f4f8ea0064a1495500244de08d311ed Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 27 22:35:19 2020 +0000 upstream: two new tests for Include in sshd_config, checking whether Port directives are processed correctly and handling of Include directives that appear before Match. Both tests currently fail. bz#3122 and bz#3169 - patch from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8ad5a4a385a63f0a1c59c59c763ff029b45715df commit 47faad8f794516c33864d866aa1b55d88416f94c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed May 27 23:26:23 2020 +1000 Document that libfido2 >= 1.4.0 is needed. commit 4be563994c0cbe9856e7dd3078909f41beae4a9c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 26 01:59:46 2020 +0000 upstream: fix memleak of signature; from Pedro Martelletto OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0a6eb07e77c001427d738b220dd024ddc64b2bb commit 0c111eb84efba7c2a38b2cc3278901a0123161b9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 26 01:26:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Restrict ssh-agent from signing web challenges for FIDO keys. When signing messages in ssh-agent using a FIDO key that has an application string that does not start with "ssh:", ensure that the message being signed is one of the forms expected for the SSH protocol (currently pubkey authentication and sshsig signatures). This prevents ssh-agent forwarding on a host that has FIDO keys attached granting the ability for the remote side to sign challenges for web authentication using those keys too. Note that the converse case of web browsers signing SSH challenges is already precluded because no web RP can have the "ssh:" prefix in the application string that we require. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ab6012574ed0352d2f097d307f4a988222d1b19 commit 9c5f64b6cb3a68b99915202d318b842c6c76cf14 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 26 01:09:05 2020 +0000 upstream: improve logging for MaxStartups connection throttling: have sshd log when it starts and stops throttling and periodically while in this state. bz#3055 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e07a09a62ab45d790d3d2d714f8cc09a9ac7ab9 commit 756c6f66aee83a5862a6f936a316f761532f3320 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 26 01:06:52 2020 +0000 upstream: add fmt_timeframe() (from bgpd) to format a time interval in a human- friendly format. Switch copyright for this file from BSD to MIT to make it easier to add Henning's copyright for this function. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 414a831c662df7e68893e5233e86f2cac081ccf9 commit 2a63ce5cd6d0e782783bf721462239b03757dd49 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 18 04:29:35 2020 +0000 upstream: avoid possible NULL deref; from Pedro Martelletto OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6099c3fbb70aa67eb106e84d8b43f1fa919b721 commit 4b307faf2fb0e63e51a550b37652f7f972df9676 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 15 08:34:03 2020 +0000 upstream: sshd listener must not block if reexecd sshd exits in write(2) on config_s[0] if the forked child exits early before finishing recv_rexec_state (e.g. with fatal()) because config_s[1] stays open in the parent. this prevents the parent from accepting new connections. ok djm, deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ccfeb939ccd55bda914dc3fe84582158c4a9ef commit af8b16fb2cce880341c0ee570ceb0d84104bdcc0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 15 03:57:33 2020 +0000 upstream: fix off-by-one error that caused sftp downloads to make one more concurrent request that desired. This prevented using sftp(1) in unpipelined request/response mode, which is useful when debugging. Patch from Stephen Goetze in bz#3054 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41b394ebe57037dbc43bdd0eef21ff0511191f28 commit d7d753e2979f2d3c904b03a08d30856cd2a6e892 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 13 22:38:41 2020 +0000 upstream: we are still aiming for pre-C99 ... OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a240fc9cbe60bc4e6c3d24d022eb4ab01fe1cb38 commit 2ad7b7e46408dbebf2a4efc4efd75a9544197d57 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 13 10:08:02 2020 +0000 upstream: Enable credProtect extension when generating a resident key. The FIDO 2.1 Client to Authenticator Protocol introduced a "credProtect" feature to better protect resident keys. This option allows (amone other possibilities) requiring a PIN prior to all operations that may retrieve the key handle. Patch by Pedro Martelletto; ok djm and markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 013bc06a577dcaa66be3913b7f183eb8cad87e73 commit 1e70dc3285fc9b4f6454975acb81e8702c23dd89 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 13 09:57:17 2020 +0000 upstream: always call fido_init(); previous behaviour only called fido_init() when SK_DEBUG was defined. Harmless with current libfido2, but this isn't guaranteed in the future. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7ea20ff2bcd98dd12015d748d3672d4f01f0864 commit f2d84f1b3fa68d77c99238d4c645d0266fae2a74 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 13 09:55:57 2020 +0000 upstream: preserve group/world read permission on known_hosts file across runs of "ssh-keygen -Rf /path". The old behaviour was to remove all rights for group/other. bz#3146 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc369d0e0b5dd826430c63fd5f4b269953448a8a commit 05a651400da6fbe12296c34e3d3bcf09f034fbbf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 13 09:52:41 2020 +0000 upstream: when ordering the hostkey algorithms to request from a server, prefer certificate types if the known_hosts files contain a key marked as a @cert-authority; bz#3157 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f194573e5bb7c01b69bbfaabc68f27c9fa5e0db commit 829451815ec207e14bd54ff5cf7e22046816f042 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue May 12 01:41:32 2020 +0000 upstream: fix non-ASCII quote that snuck in; spotted by Gabriel Kihlman OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04bcde311de2325d9e45730c744c8de079b49800 commit 5a442cec92c0efd6fffb4af84bf99c70af248ef3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon May 11 02:11:29 2020 +0000 upstream: clarify role of FIDO tokens in multi-factor authentictation; mostly from Pedro Martelletto OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fbe05685a1f99c74b1baca7130c5a03c2df7c0ac commit ecb2c02d994b3e21994f31a70ff911667c262f1f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 8 05:13:14 2020 +0000 upstream: fix compilation with DEBUG_KEXDH; bz#3160 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 832e771948fb45f2270e8b8895aac36d176ba17a commit 3ab6fccc3935e9b778ff52f9c8d40f215d58e01d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 14 12:22:09 2020 +1000 prefer ln to cp for temporary copy of sshd I saw failures on the reexec fallback test on Darwin 19.4 where fork()ed children of a process that had it's executable removed would instantly fail. Using ln to preserve the inode avoids this. commit f700d316c6b15a9cfbe87230d2dca81a5d916279 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed May 13 15:24:51 2020 +1000 Actually skip pty tests when needed. commit 08ce6b2210f46f795e7db747809f8e587429dfd2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed May 13 13:56:45 2020 +1000 Skip building sk-dummy library if no SK support. commit 102d106bc2e50347d0e545fad6ff5ce408d67247 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 13 12:08:34 2020 +1000 explicitly manage .depend and .depend.bak Bring back removal of .depend to give the file a known state before running makedepend, but manually move aside the current .depend file and restore it as .depend.bak afterwards so the stale .depend check works as expected. commit 83a6dc6ba1e03b3fa39d12a8522b8b0e68dd6390 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 13 12:03:42 2020 +1000 make depend commit 7c0bbed967abed6301a63e0267cc64144357a99a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 13 12:01:10 2020 +1000 revert removal of .depend before makedepend Commit 83657eac4 started removing .depend before running makedepend to reset the contents of .depend to a known state. Unfortunately this broke the depend-check step as now .depend.bak would only ever be created as an empty file. ok dtucker commit 58ad004acdcabf3b9f40bc3aaa206b25d998db8c Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 12 12:58:46 2020 +1000 prepare for 8.3 release commit 4fa9e048c2af26beb7dc2ee9479ff3323e92a7b5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 8 21:50:43 2020 +1000 Ensure SA_SIGNAL test only signals itself. When the test's child signals its parent and it exits the result of getppid changes. On Ubuntu 20.04 this results in the ppid being that of the GDM session, causing it to exit. Analysis and testing from pedro at ambientworks.net commit dc2da29aae76e170d22f38bb36f1f5d1edd5ec2b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 8 13:31:53 2020 +1000 sync config.guess/config.sub with latest versions ok dtucker@ commit a8265bd64c14881fc7f4fa592f46dfc66b911f17 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 6 20:58:01 2020 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.3; ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c8831ec88b9c750f5816aed9051031fb535d22c1 commit 955854cafca88e0cdcd3d09ca1ad4ada465364a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed May 6 20:57:38 2020 +0000 upstream: another case where a utimes() failure could make scp send a desynchronising error; reminded by Aymeric Vincent ok deraadt markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ea611d34d8ff6d703a7a8bf858aa5dbfbfa7381 commit 59d531553fd90196946743da391f3a27cf472f4e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 7 15:34:12 2020 +1000 Check if -D_REENTRANT is needed for localtime_r. On at least HP-UX 11.11, the localtime_r declararation is behind ifdef _REENTRANT. Check for and add if needed. commit c13403e55de8cdbb9da628ed95017b1d4c0f205f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue May 5 11:32:43 2020 +1000 Skip security key tests if ENABLE_SK not set. commit 4da393f87cd52d788c84112ee3f2191c9bcaaf30 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 04:03:14 2020 +0000 upstream: sure enough, some of the test data that we though were in new format were actually in the old format; fix from Michael Forney OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41a5c43a61b0f0b1691994dbf16dfb88e8af933 commit 15bfafc1db4c8792265ada9623a96f387990f732 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 04:00:29 2020 +0000 upstream: make mktestdata.sh generate old/new format keys that we expect. This script was written before OpenSSH switched to new-format private keys by default and was never updated to the change (until now) From Michael Forney OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 38cf354715c96852e5b71c2393fb6e7ad28b7ca7 commit 7882d2eda6ad3eb82220a85294de545d20ef82db Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 03:58:02 2020 +0000 upstream: portability fix for sed that always emil a newline even if the input does not contain one; from Michael Forney OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9190c3ddf0d2562ccc02c4a95fce0e392196bfc7 commit 8074f9499e454df0acdacea33598858a1453a357 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 03:36:25 2020 +0000 upstream: remove obsolete RSA1 test keys; spotted by Michael Forney OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6384ba889594e217d166908ed8253718ab0866da commit c697e46c314aa94574af0d393d80f23e0ebc9748 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat May 2 18:34:47 2020 +1000 Update .depend. commit 83657eac42941f270c4b02b2c46d9a21f616ef99 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat May 2 18:29:40 2020 +1000 Remove use of tail for 'make depend'. Not every tail supports +N and we can do with out it so just remove it. Prompted by mforney at mforney.org. commit d25d630d24c5a1c64d4e646510e79dc22d6d7b88 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat May 2 07:19:43 2020 +0000 upstream: we have a sshkey_save_public() function to save public keys; use it and save a bunch of redundant code. Patch from loic AT venez.fr; ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93e030a0ebcd0fd9054ab30db501ec63454ea5f commit e9dc9863723e111ae05e353d69df857f0169544a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 1 18:32:25 2020 +1000 Use LONG_LONG_MAX and friends if available. If we don't have LLONG_{MIN,MAX} but do have LONG_LONG_{MIN,MAX} then use those instead. We do calculate these values in configure, but it turns out that at least one compiler (old HP ANSI C) can't parse "-9223372036854775808LL" without mangling it. (It can parse "-9223372036854775807LL" which is presumably why its limits.h defines LONG_LONG_MIN as the latter minus 1.) Fixes rekey test when compiled with the aforementioned compiler. commit aad87b88fc2536b1ea023213729aaf4eaabe1894 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 06:31:42 2020 +0000 upstream: when receving a file in sink(), be careful to send at most a single error response after the file has been opened. Otherwise the source() and sink() can become desyncronised. Reported by Daniel Goujot, Georges-Axel Jaloyan, Ryan Lahfa, and David Naccache. ok deraadt@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c14d233c97349cb811a8f7921ded3ae7d9e0035 commit 31909696c4620c431dd55f6cd15db65c4e9b98da Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 06:28:52 2020 +0000 upstream: expose vasnmprintf(); ok (as part of other commit) markus deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e80cea441c599631a870fd40307d2ade5a7f9b5 commit 99ce9cefbe532ae979744c6d956b49f4b02aff82 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri May 1 04:23:11 2020 +0000 upstream: avoid NULL dereference when attempting to convert invalid ssh.com private keys using "ssh-keygen -i"; spotted by Michael Forney OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e56e6d26973967d11d13f56ea67145f435bf298 commit 6c6072ba8b079e6f5caa38b011a6f4570c14ed38 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 1 15:09:26 2020 +1000 See if SA_RESTART signals will interrupt select(). On some platforms (at least older HP-UXes such as 11.11, possibly others) setting SA_RESTART on signal handers will cause it to not interrupt select(), at least for calls that do not specify a timeout. Try to detect this and if found, don't use SA_RESTART. POSIX says "If SA_RESTART has been set for the interrupting signal, it is implementation-dependent whether select() restarts or returns with [EINTR]" so this behaviour is within spec. commit 90a0b434ed41f9c505662dba8782591818599cb3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 1 13:55:03 2020 +1000 fix reversed test commit c0dfd18dd1c2107c73d18f70cd164f7ebd434b08 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri May 1 13:29:16 2020 +1000 wrap sha2.h inclusion in #ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H commit a01817a9f63dbcbbc6293aacc4019993a4cdc7e3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 28 04:59:29 2020 +0000 upstream: adapt dummy FIDO middleware to API change; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8bb84ee500c2eaa5616044314dd0247709a1790f commit 261571ddf02ea38fdb5e4a97c69ee53f847ca5b7 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 30 18:28:37 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 41895450ce2294ec44a5713134491cc31f0c09fd commit 5de21c82e1d806d3e401b5338371e354b2e0a66f Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 30 17:12:20 2020 +0000 upstream: bring back debug() removed in rev 1.74; noted by pradeep kumar OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d134d22ab25979078a3b48d058557d49c402e65 commit ea14103ce9a5e13492e805f7e9277516ff5a4273 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 30 17:07:10 2020 +0000 upstream: run the 2nd ssh with BatchMode for scp -3 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77994fc8c7ca02d88e6d0d06d0f0fe842a935748 commit 59d2de956ed29aa5565ed5e5947a7abdb27ac013 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 28 04:02:29 2020 +0000 upstream: when signing a challenge using a FIDO toke, perform the hashing in the middleware layer rather than in ssh code. This allows middlewares that call APIs that perform the hashing implicitly (including Microsoft's AFAIK). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9fc8630aba26c75d5016884932f08a5a237f37d commit c9d10dbc0ccfb1c7568bbb784f7aeb7a0b5ded12 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Apr 26 09:38:14 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix comment typo. Patch from mforney at mforney.org. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3565f056003707a5e678e60e03f7a3efd0464a2b commit 4d2c87b4d1bde019cdd0f00552fcf97dd8b39940 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 25 06:59:36 2020 +0000 upstream: We've standardized on memset over bzero, replace a couple that had slipped in. ok deraadt markus djm. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5be055554ee93e6cc66b0053b590bef3728dbd6 commit 7f23f42123d64272a7b00754afa6b0841d676691 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 1 12:21:58 2020 +1000 Include sys/byteorder.h for htons and friends. These are usually in netinet/in.h but on HP-UX they are not defined if _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED is set. Only needed for netcat in the regression tests. commit d27cba58c972d101a5de976777e518f34ac779cb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri May 1 09:21:52 2020 +1000 Fix conditional for openssl-based chacha20. Fixes warnings or link errors when building against older OpenSSLs. ok djm commit 20819b962dc1467cd6fad5486a7020c850efdbee Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 24 15:07:55 2020 +1000 Error out if given RDomain if unsupported. If the config contained 'RDomain %D' on a platform that did not support it, the error would not be detected until runtime resulting in a broken sshd. Detect this earlier and error out if found. bz#3126, based on a patch from jjelen at redhat.com, tweaks and ok djm@ commit 2c1690115a585c624eed2435075a93a463a894e2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 24 03:33:21 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix incorrect error message for "too many known hosts files." bz#3149, patch from jjelen at redhat.com. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0fcb07ed5cf7fd54ce340471a747c24454235e5 commit 3beb7276e7a8aedd3d4a49f9c03b97f643448c92 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 24 02:19:40 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove leave_non_blocking() which is now dead code because nothing sets in_non_blocking_mode any more. Patch from michaael.meeks at collabora.com, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c403cefe97a5a99eca816e19cc849cdf926bd09c commit 8654e3561772f0656e7663a0bd6a1a8cb6d43300 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Apr 23 21:28:09 2020 +0000 upstream: ce examples of "Ar arg Ar arg" with "Ar arg arg" and stop the spread; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af0e952ea0f5e2019c2ce953ed1796eca47f0705 commit 67697e4a8246dd8423e44b8785f3ee31fee72d07 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Apr 24 11:10:18 2020 +1000 Update .depend. commit d6cc76176216fe3fac16cd20d148d75cb9c50876 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 22 14:07:00 2020 +1000 Mailing list is now closed to non-subscribers. While there, add a reference to the bugzilla. ok djm@ commit cecde6a41689d0ae585ec903b190755613a6de79 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 22 12:09:40 2020 +1000 Put the values from env vars back. This merges the values from the recently removed environment into make's command line arguments since we actually need those. commit 300c4322b92e98d3346efa0aec1c094c94d0f964 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 22 11:33:15 2020 +1000 Pass configure's egrep through to test-exec.sh. Use it to create a wrapper function to call it from tests. Fixes the keygen-comment test on platforms with impoverished default egrep (eg Solaris). commit c8d9796cfe046f00eb8b2096d2b7028d6a523a84 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 22 10:56:44 2020 +1000 Remove unneeded env vars from t-exec invocation. commit 01d4cdcd4514e99a4b6eb9523cd832bbf008d1d7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Apr 21 23:14:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Backslash '$' at then end of string. Prevents warning on some shells. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5dc27ab624c09d34078fd326b10e38c1ce9c741f commit 8854724ccefc1fa16f10b37eda2e759c98148caa Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Apr 21 18:27:23 2020 +1000 Sync rev 1.49. Prevent infinite for loop since i went from ssize_t to size_t. Patch from eagleoflqj via OpenSSH github PR#178, ok djm@, feedback & ok millert@ commit d00d07b6744d3b4bb7aca46c734ecd670148da23 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 20 04:44:47 2020 +0000 upstream: regression test for printing of private key fingerprints and key comments, mostly by loic AT venez.fr (slightly tweaked for portability) ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8dc6c4feaf4fe58b6d634cd89afac9a13fd19004 commit a98d5ba31e5e7e01317352f85fa63b846a960f8c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 20 04:43:57 2020 +0000 upstream: fix a bug I introduced in r1.406: when printing private key fingerprint of old-format key, key comments were not being displayed. Spotted by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d98e4f9eb168eea733d17e141e1ead9fe26e533 commit 32f2d0aad42c15e19bd3b07496076ca891573a58 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 07:16:07 2020 +0000 upstream: repair private key fingerprint printing to also print comment after regression caused by my recent pubkey loading refactor. Reported by loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8db49acbee6a6ccb2a4259135693b3cceedb89e commit 094dd513f4b42e6a3cebefd18d1837eb709b4d99 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 07:15:11 2020 +0000 upstream: refactor out some duplicate private key loading code; based on patch from loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5eff2476b0d8d0614924c55e350fb7bb9c84f45e commit 4e04f46f248f1708e39b900b76c9693c820eff68 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 06:12:41 2020 +0000 upstream: add space beteen macro arg and punctuation; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c93a6cbb4bf9468fc4c13e64bc1fd4efee201a44 commit 44ae009a0112081d0d541aeaa90088bedb6f21ce Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 04:27:03 2020 +0000 upstream: auth2-pubkey r1.89 changed the order of operations to checking AuthorizedKeysFile first and falling back to AuthorizedKeysCommand if no key was found in a file. Document this order here; bz3134 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afce0872cbfcfc1d4910ad7722e50f792a1dce12 commit f96f17f920f38ceea6f3c5cb0b075c46b8929fdc Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 17 14:07:15 2020 +1000 sys/sysctl.h is only used on OpenBSD so change the preprocessor test used to include it to check __OpenBSD__, matching the code that uses the symbols it declares. commit 54688e937a69c7aebef8a3d50cbd4c6345bab2ca Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 03:38:47 2020 +0000 upstream: fix reversed test that caused IdentitiesOnly=yes to not apply to keys loaded from a PKCS11Provider; bz3141, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3dd6424b94685671fe84c9b9dbe352fb659f677 commit 267cbc87b5b6e78973ac4d3c7a6f807ed226928c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 03:34:42 2020 +0000 upstream: mention that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are not considered for HostbasedAuthentication when the target user is root; bz3148 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe4c1256929e53f23af17068fbef47852f4bd752 commit c90f72d29e84b4a2709078bf5546a72c29a65177 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 03:30:05 2020 +0000 upstream: make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" ignore rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only" to allow .shosts files but not .rhosts. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d08d6930ed06377a80cf53923c1955e9589342e9 commit 321c7147079270f3a154f91b59e66219aac3d514 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 17 03:23:13 2020 +0000 upstream: allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks; bz3148, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e042467d703bce640b1f42c5d1a62bf3825736e8 commit ca5403b085a735055ec7b7cdcd5b91f2662df94c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 11 20:20:09 2020 +0000 upstream: add space between macro arg and punctuation; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e579e4d95eef13059c30931ea1f09ed8296b819c commit 8af0244d7b4a65eed2e62f9c89141c7c8e63f09d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Apr 15 10:58:02 2020 +1000 Add sys/syscall.h for syscall numbers. In some architecture/libc configurations we need to explicitly include sys/syscall.h for the syscall number (__NR_xxx) definitions. bz#3085, patch from blowfist at xroutine.net. commit 3779b50ee952078018a5d9e1df20977f4355df17 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 11 10:16:11 2020 +0000 upstream: Refactor private key parsing. Eliminates a fair bit of duplicated code and fixes oss-fuzz#20074 (NULL deref) caused by a missing key type check in the ECDSA_CERT parsing path. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4711981d88afb7196d228f7baad9be1d3b20f9c9 commit b6a4013647db67ec622c144a9e05dd768f1966b3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 10 00:54:03 2020 +0000 upstream: Add tests for TOKEN expansion of LocalForward and RemoteForward. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 90fcbc60d510eb114a2b6eaf4a06ff87ecd80a89 commit abc3e0a5179c13c0469a1b11fe17d832abc39999 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Apr 6 09:43:55 2020 +0000 upstream: Add utf8.c for asmprintf used by krl.c OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 433708d11165afdb189fe635151d21659dd37a37 commit 990687a0336098566c3a854d23cce74a31ec6fe2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 10 00:52:07 2020 +0000 upstream: Add TOKEN percent expansion to LocalFoward and RemoteForward when used for Unix domain socket forwarding. Factor out the code for the config keywords that use the most common subset of TOKENS into its own function. bz#3014, ok jmc@ (man page bits) djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bffc9f7e7b5cf420309a057408bef55171fd0b97 commit 2b13d3934d5803703c04803ca3a93078ecb5b715 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 8 00:10:37 2020 +0000 upstream: let sshkey_try_load_public() load public keys from the unencrypted envelope of private key files if not sidecar public key file is present. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 252a0a580e10b9a6311632530d63b5ac76592040 commit d01f39304eaab0352793b490a25e1ab5f59a5366 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 8 00:09:24 2020 +0000 upstream: simplify sshkey_try_load_public() ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05a5d46562aafcd70736c792208b1856064f40ad commit f290ab0833e44355fc006e4e67b92446c14673ef Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 8 00:08:46 2020 +0000 upstream: add sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type() Extracts a public key from the unencrypted envelope of a new-style OpenSSH private key. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44d7ab446e5e8c686aee96d5897b26b3939939aa commit 8d514eea4ae089626a55e11c7bc1745c8d9683e4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 8 00:07:19 2020 +0000 upstream: simplify sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type() Try new format parser for all key types first, fall back to PEM parser only for invalid format errors. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0173bbb3a5cface77b0679d4dca0e15eb5600b77 commit 421169d0e758351b105eabfcebf42378ebf17217 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 8 00:05:59 2020 +0000 upstream: check private key type against requested key type in new-style private decoding; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d44b3a34ce12ce5187fb6f6e441a88c8c51662 commit 6aabfb6d22b36d07f584cba97f4cdc4363a829da Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 8 00:04:32 2020 +0000 upstream: check that pubkey in private key envelope matches actual private key (this public key is currently unusued) ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 634a60b5e135d75f48249ccdf042f3555112049c commit c0f5b2294796451001fd328c44f0d00f1114eddf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Apr 8 00:01:52 2020 +0000 upstream: refactor private key parsing a little Split out the base64 decoding and private section decryption steps in to separate functions. This will make the decryption step easier to fuzz as well as making it easier to write a "load public key from new-format private key" function. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de31d80fb9062aa01901ddf040c286b64ff904e commit 8461a5b3db34ed0b5a4a18d82f64fd5ac8693ea8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Apr 6 20:54:34 2020 +1000 Include openssl-compat.h before checking ifdefs. Fixes problem where unsuitable chacha20 code in libressl would be used unintentionally. commit 931c50c5883a9910ea1ae9a371e4e815ec56b035 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Apr 6 10:04:56 2020 +1000 fix inverted test for LibreSSL version commit d1d5f728511e2338b7c994968d301d8723012264 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 4 23:04:41 2020 +0000 upstream: Indicate if we're using a cached key in trace output. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 409a7b0e59d1272890fda507651c0c3d2d3c0d89 commit a398251a4627367c78bc483c70c2ec973223f82c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Apr 5 08:43:57 2020 +1000 Use /usr/bin/xp4g/id if necessary. Solaris' native "id" doesn't support the options we use but the one in /usr/bin/xp4g does, so use that instead. commit db0fdd48335b5b01114f78c1a73a195235910f81 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Apr 4 22:14:26 2020 +0000 upstream: Some platforms don't have "hostname -s", so use cut to trim short hostname instead. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebcf36a6fdf287c9336b0d4f6fc9f793c05307a7 commit e7e59a9cc8eb7fd5944ded28f4d7e3ae0a5fdecd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 07:53:10 2020 +0000 upstream: Compute hash locally and re-enable %C tests. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 94d1366e8105274858b88a1f9ad2e62801e49770 commit abe2b245b3ac6c4801e99bc0f13289cd28211e22 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Apr 3 17:25:46 2020 +1100 prefer libcrypto chacha20-poly1305 where possible commit bc5c5d01ad668981f9e554e62195383bc12e8528 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 05:43:11 2020 +0000 upstream: Temporarily remove tests for '%C' since the hash contains the local hostname and it doesn't work on any machine except mine... spotted by djm@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d4c3585b9fcbbff14f4a5a5fde51dbd0d690401 commit 81624026989654955a657ebf2a1fe8b9994f3c87 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 06:07:57 2020 +0000 upstream: r1.522 deleted one too many lines; repair OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af8851fd7a99e4a887b19aa8f4c41a6b3d25477 commit 668cb3585ce829bd6e34d4a962c489bda1d16370 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 05:53:52 2020 +0000 upstream: sort -N and add it to usage(); OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b00e8db37c2b0a54c7831fed9e5f4db53ada332 commit 338ccee1e7fefa47f3d128c2541e94c5270abe0c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 05:48:57 2020 +0000 upstream: avoid another compiler warning spotted in -portable OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d29c51ac844b287c4c8bcaf04c63c7d9ba3b8c7 commit 9f8a42340bd9af86a99cf554dc39ecdf89287544 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 04:07:48 2020 +0000 upstream: this needs utf8.c too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 445040036cec714d28069a20da25553a04a28451 commit 92115ea7c3a834374720c350841fc729e7d5c8b2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 03:14:03 2020 +0000 upstream: Add percent_expand test for 'Match Exec'. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a41c14fd6a0b54d66aa1e9eebfb9ec962b41232f commit de34a440276ae855c38deb20f926d46752c62c9d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 04:43:24 2020 +0000 upstream: fix format string (use %llu for uint64, not %lld). spotted by Darren and his tinderbox tests OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b4587c3d9d46a7be9bdf028704201943fba96c2 commit 9cd40b829a5295cc81fbea8c7d632b2478db6274 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 04:34:15 2020 +0000 upstream: Add a flag to re-enable verbose output when in batch mode; requested in bz3135; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ad2ed0e6440562ba9c84b666a5bbddc1afe2e2b commit 6ce51a5da5d333a44e7c74c027f3571f70c39b24 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 04:32:21 2020 +0000 upstream: chacha20-poly1305 AEAD using libcrypto EVP_chacha20 Based on patch from Yuriy M. Kaminskiy. ok + lots of assistance along the way at a2k20 tb@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e08754c13d31258bae6c5e318cc96219d6b10f0 commit eba523f0a130f1cce829e6aecdcefa841f526a1a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 04:27:03 2020 +0000 upstream: make Chacha20-POLY1305 context struct opaque; ok tb@ as part of a larger diff at a2k20 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4609b7263284f95c9417ef60ed7cdbb7bf52cfd commit ebd29e90129cf18fedfcfe1de86e324228669295 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 04:06:26 2020 +0000 upstream: fix debug statement OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42c6edeeda5ce88b51a20d88c93be3729ce6b916 commit 7b4d8999f2e1a0cb7b065e3efa83e6edccfc7d82 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 04:03:51 2020 +0000 upstream: the tunnel-forwarding vs ExitOnForwardFailure fix that I committed earlier had an off-by-one. Fix this and add some debugging that would have made it apparent sooner. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 082f8f72b1423bd81bbdad750925b906e5ac6910 commit eece243666d44ceb710d004624c5c7bdc05454bc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 03:12:11 2020 +0000 upstream: %C expansion just added to Match Exec should include remote user not local user. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80f1d976938f2a55ee350c11d8b796836c8397e2 commit d5318a784d016478fc8da90a38d9062c51c10432 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 02:33:31 2020 +0000 upstream: Add regression test for percent expansions where possible. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7283be8b2733ac1cbefea3048a23d02594485288 commit 663e84bb53de2a60e56a44d538d25b8152b5c1cc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 02:40:32 2020 +0000 upstream: make failures when establishing "Tunnel" forwarding terminate the connection when ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled; bz3116; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef4b4808de0a419c17579b1081da768625c1d735 commit ed833da176611a39d3376d62154eb88eb440d31c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 02:27:12 2020 +0000 upstream: Make with config keywords support which percent_expansions more consistent. - %C is moved into its own function and added to Match Exec. - move the common (global) options into a macro. This is ugly but it's the least-ugly way I could come up with. - move IdentityAgent and ForwardAgent percent expansion to before the config dump to make it regression-testable. - document all of the above ok jmc@ for man page bits, "makes things less terrible" djm@ for the rest. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b65664bd6d8ae2a9afaf1a2438ddd1b614b1d75 commit 6ec7457171468da2bbd908b8cd63d298b0e049ea Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 02:26:56 2020 +0000 upstream: give ssh-keygen the ability to dump the contents of a binary key revocation list: ssh-keygen -lQf /path bz#3132; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b76afc4e3b74ab735dbde4e5f0cfa1f02356033b commit af628b8a6c3ef403644d83d205c80ff188c97f0c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Apr 3 02:25:21 2020 +0000 upstream: add allocating variant of the safe utf8 printer; ok dtucker as part of a larger diff OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 037e2965bd50eacc2ffb49889ecae41552744fa0 commit d8ac9af645f5519ac5211e9e1e4dc1ed00e9cced Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Mar 16 02:17:02 2020 +0000 upstream: Cast lifetime to u_long for comparison to prevent unsigned comparison warning on 32bit arches. Spotted by deraadt, ok djm. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a75b2540bff5ab4fa00b4d595db1df13bb0515a commit 0eaca933ae08b0a515edfccd5cc4a6b667034813 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Mar 14 20:58:46 2020 +1100 Include fido.h when checking for fido/credman.h. It's required for fido_dev_t, otherwise configure fails with when given --with-security-key-builtin. commit c7c099060f82ffe6a36d8785ecf6052e12fd92f0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 13 03:18:45 2020 +0000 upstream: some more speeling mistakes from OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 02471c079805471c546b7a69d9ab1d34e9a57443 commit 1d89232a4aa97fe935cd60b8d24d75c2f70d56c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 13 04:16:27 2020 +0000 upstream: improve error messages for some common PKCS#11 C_Login failure cases; based on patch from Jacob Hoffman-Andrews in bz3130; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8b849621b4a98e468942efd0a1c519c12ce089e commit 5becbec023f2037394987f85ed7f74b9a28699e0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 13 04:01:56 2020 +0000 upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() for kex_exchange_identification() errors. This ensures that the logged errors are consistent with other transport- layer errors and that the relevant IP addresses are logged. bz3129 ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c22891f0b9e1a6cd46771cedbb26ac96ec2e6ab commit eef88418f9e5e51910af3c5b23b5606ebc17af55 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 13 03:24:49 2020 +0000 upstream: Don't clear alarm timers in listening sshd. Previously these timers were used for regenerating the SSH1 ephemeral host keys but those are now gone so there's no need to clear the timers either. ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 280d2b885e4a1ce404632e8cc38fcb17be7dafc0 commit d081f017c20a3564255873ed99fd7d024cac540f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 13 03:17:07 2020 +0000 upstream: spelling errors in comments; no code change from OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ea64f6d84f7bac5636dbd38968592cb5eb924 commit c084a2d040f160bc2b83f13297e3e3ca3f5dbac6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 13 03:12:17 2020 +0000 upstream: when downloading FIDO2 resident keys from a token, don't prompt for a PIN until the token has told us that it needs one. Avoids double-prompting on devices that implement on-device authentication (e.g. a touchscreen PIN pad on the Trezor Model T). ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b78903dd4422d7d3204095a31692fb69130817 commit 955c4cf4c6a1417c28d4e1040702c4d9bf63645b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Mar 13 14:30:16 2020 +1100 sync fnmatch.c with upstream to fix another typo commit 397f217e8640e75bb719a8e87111b4bd848fb3df Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Mar 13 14:24:23 2020 +1100 another spelling error in comment commit def31bc5427579ec3f7f2ce99f2da1338fdc0c9f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Mar 13 14:23:07 2020 +1100 spelling mistakes from https://fossies.org/linux/misc/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz/codespell.html commit 8bdc3bb7cf4c82c3344cfcb82495a43406e87e83 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:54 2020 +0000 upstream: fix relative includes in sshd_config; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa29b0da3c93cbc3a1d4c6bcd58af43c00ffeb5b commit e32ef97a56ae03febfe307688858badae3a70e5a Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:29:14 2020 +0000 upstream: fix use-after-free in do_download_sk; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96b49623d297797d4fc069f1f09e13c8811f8863 commit 5732d58020309364bf31fa125354e399361006db Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:50 2020 +0000 upstream: do not leak oprincipals; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4691d9387eab36f8fda48f5d8009756ed13a7c4c commit 8fae395f34c2c52cdaf9919aa261d1848b4bb00b Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:28:27 2020 +0000 upstream: initialize seconds for debug message; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 293fbefe6d00b4812a180ba02e26170e4c855b81 commit 46e5c4c8ffcd1569bcd5d04803abaa2ecf3e4cff Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:50 2020 +0000 upstream: correct return code; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 319d09e3b7f4b2bc920c67244d9ff6426b744810 commit 31c39e7840893f1bfdcbe4f813b20d1d7e69ec3e Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:27:15 2020 +0000 upstream: principalsp is optional, pubkey required; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2cc3ea5018c28ed97edaccd7f17d2cc796f01024 commit e26a31757c5df2f58687cb9a4853d1418f39728e Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:26:21 2020 +0000 upstream: remove unused variables in ssh-pkcs11-helper; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13e572846d0d1b28f1251ddd2165e9cf18135ae1 commit 1b378c0d982d6ab522eda634b0e88cf1fca5e352 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:48 2020 +0000 upstream: return correct error in sshsk_ed25519_sig; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52bf733df220303c260fee4f165ec64b4a977625 commit fbff605e637b068061ab6784ff03e3874890c092 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:25:12 2020 +0000 upstream: fix possible null-deref in check_key_not_revoked; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80855e9d7af42bb6fcc16c074ba69876bfe5e3bf commit bc30b446841fc16e50ed6e75c56ccfbd37b9f281 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:24:39 2020 +0000 upstream: ssh_fetch_identitylist() returns the return value from ssh_request_reply() so we should also check against != 0 ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d0028769d03e665688c61bb5fd943e18614952 commit 7b4f70ddeb59f35283d77d8d9c834ca58f8cf436 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:23:17 2020 +0000 upstream: sshkey_cert_check_authority requires reason to be set; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f7a6f19540ed5749763c2f9530c0897c94aa552 commit 05efe270df1e925db0af56a806d18b5063db4b6d Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:21:28 2020 +0000 upstream: passphrase depends on kdfname, not ciphername (possible null-deref); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d39668edf5e790b5837df4926ee1141cec5471c commit 1ddf5682f3992bdacd29164891abb71a19c2cf61 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:44 2020 +0000 upstream: consistently check packet_timeout_ms against 0; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8fb8cb2c96c980f075069302534eaf830929928 commit 31f1ee54968ad84eb32375e4412e0318766b586b Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:20:02 2020 +0000 upstream: initialize cname in case ai_canonname is NULL or too long; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c27984636fdb1035d1642283664193e91aab6e37 commit a6134b02b5264b2611c8beae98bb392329452bba Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:19:21 2020 +0000 upstream: fix uninitialized pointers for forward_cancel; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 612778e6d87ee865d0ba97d0a335f141cee1aa37 commit 16d4f9961c75680aab374dee762a5baa0ad507af Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:16:21 2020 +0000 upstream: exit on parse failures in input_service_request; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a7e1bfded26051d5aa893c030229b1ee6a0d5d2 commit 5f25afe5216ba7f8921e04f79aa4ca0624eca820 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:38 2020 +0000 upstream: fix null-deref on calloc failure; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a313519579b392076b7831ec022dfdefbec8724a commit ff2acca039aef16a15fce409163df404858f7aa5 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:15:04 2020 +0000 upstream: exit if ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 fails; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0864ad4fe8bf28ab21fd1df766e0365c11bbc0dc commit 31c860a0212af2d5b6a129e3e8fcead51392ee1d Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:14:13 2020 +0000 upstream: pkcs11_register_provider: return < 0 on error; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfc8321315b787e4d40da4bdb2cbabd4154b0d97 commit 15be29e1e3318737b0768ca37d5b4a3fbe868ef0 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:13:29 2020 +0000 upstream: sshsig: return correct error, fix null-deref; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d1af7cd538b8b23e621cf7ab84f11e7a923edcd commit 6fb6f186cb62a6370fba476b6a03478a1e95c30d Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:12:55 2020 +0000 upstream: vasnmprintf allocates str and returns -1; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dae4c9e83d88471bf3b3f89e3da7a107b44df11c commit 714e1cbca17daa13f4f98978cf9e0695d4b2e0a4 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 18:11:10 2020 +0000 upstream: sshpkt_fatal() does not return; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7dfe847e28bd78208eb227b37f29f4a2a0929929 commit 9b47bd7b09d191991ad9e0506bb66b74bbc93d34 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 28 01:07:28 2020 +0000 upstream: no-touch-required certificate option should be an extension, not a critical option. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 626b22c5feb7be8a645e4b9a9bef89893b88600d commit dd992520bed35387fc010239abe1bdc0c2665e38 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 28 01:06:05 2020 +0000 upstream: better error message when trying to use a FIDO key function and SecurityKeyProvider is empty OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e56602c2ee8c82f835d30e4dc8ee2e4a7896be24 commit b81e66dbe0345aef4717911abcb4f589fff33a0a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 27 02:32:37 2020 +0000 upstream: Drop leading space from line count that was confusing ssh-keygen's screen mode. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3bcae7a754db3fc5ad3cab63dd46774edb35b8ae commit d5ba1c03278eb079438bb038266d80d7477d49cb Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 26 13:40:09 2020 +0000 upstream: change explicit_bzero();free() to freezero() While freezero() returns early if the pointer is NULL the tests for NULL in callers are left to avoid warnings about passing an uninitialised size argument across a function boundry. ok deraadt@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2660fa334fcc7cd05ec74dd99cb036f9ade6384a commit 9e3220b585c5be19a7431ea4ff8884c137b3a81c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 26 11:46:51 2020 +0000 upstream: Have sftp reject "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it since protocol 1 support has been removed. Spotted by shivakumar2696 at gmail.com, ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b79f95559a1c993214f4ec9ae3c34caa87e9d5de commit ade8e67bb0f07b12e5e47e7baeafbdc898de639f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 26 01:31:47 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove obsolete XXX comment. ok deraadt@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc462cc843947feea26a2e21c750b3a7469ff01b commit 7eb903f51eba051d7f65790bab92a28970ac1ccc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 24 04:27:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix typo. Patch from itoama at live.jp via github PR#173. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5cdaafab38bbdea0d07e24777d00bfe6f972568a commit b2491c289dd1b557a18a2aca04eeff5c157fc5ef Author: Nico Kadel-Garcia Date: Sat Oct 12 17:51:01 2019 -0400 Switch %define to %global for redhat/openssh.spec commit b18dcf6cca7c7aba1cc22e668e04492090ef0255 Author: mkontani Date: Fri Feb 21 00:54:49 2020 +0900 fix some typos and sentence commit 0001576a096f788d40c2c0a39121cff51bf961ad Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 21 00:04:43 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix some typos and an incorrect word in docs. Patch from itoama at live.jp via github PR#172. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 166ee8f93a7201fef431b9001725ab8b269d5874 commit 99ff8fefe4b2763a53778d06b5f74443c8701615 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 20 05:58:08 2020 +0000 upstream: Update moduli generation script to new ssh-keygen generation and screening command line flags. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5010ff08f7ad92082e87dde098b20f5c24921a8f commit 700d16f5e534d6de5a3b7105a74a7a6f4487b681 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 20 05:41:51 2020 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7b7b619c1452a459310b0cf4391c5757c6bdbc0f commit 4753b74ba0f09e4aacdaab5e184cd540352004d5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 20 16:42:50 2020 +1100 Import regenerated moduli. commit 11d427162778c18fa42917893a75d178679a2389 Author: HARUYAMA Seigo Date: Fri Feb 14 16:14:23 2020 +0900 Fix typos in INSTALL: s/avilable/available/ s/suppports/supports/ commit 264a966216137c9f4f8220fd9142242d784ba059 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 18 08:58:33 2020 +0000 upstream: Ensure that the key lifetime provided fits within the values allowed by the wire format (u32). Prevents integer wraparound of the timeout values. bz#3119, ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8afe6038b5cdfcf63360788f012a7ad81acc46a2 commit de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 18 08:49:49 2020 +0000 upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when using ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037 commit 30144865bfa06b12239cfabc37c45e5ddc369d97 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 16 21:15:43 2020 +0000 upstream: document -F none; with jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0eb93b75473d2267aae9200e02588e57778c84f2 commit 011052de73f3dbc53f50927ccf677266a9ade4f6 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 17 22:55:51 2020 +1100 Remove unused variable warning. commit 31c9348c5e4e94e9913ec64b3ca6e15f68ba19e5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 17 22:53:24 2020 +1100 Constify aix_krb5_get_principal_name. Prevents warning about discarding type qualifiers on AIX. commit 290c994336a2cfe03c5496bebb6580863f94b232 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:36 2020 +1100 Check if TILDE is already defined and undef. Prevents redefinition warning on AIX. commit 41a2e64ae480eda73ee0e809bbe743d203890938 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 17 22:51:00 2020 +1100 Prevent unused variable warning. commit d4860ec4efd25ba194337082736797fce0bda016 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 17 22:48:50 2020 +1100 Check if getpeereid is actually declared. Check in sys/socket.h (AIX) and unistd.h (FreeBSD, DragonFLy and OS X). Prevents undeclared function warning on at least some versions of AIX. commit 8aa3455b16fddea4c0144a7c4a1edb10ec67dcc8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 14 00:39:20 2020 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.2 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a1340ff65fad0d84b997ac58dd1b393dec7c19b commit 72f0ce33f0d5a37f31bad5800d1eb2fbdb732de6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Feb 12 09:28:35 2020 +1100 crank version numbers commit b763ed05bd1f1f15ae1727c86a4498546bc36ca8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 11 12:51:24 2020 +1100 Minor documentation update: - remove duplication of dependency information (it's all in INSTALL). - SSHFP is now an RFC. commit 14ccfdb7248e33b1dc8bbac1425ace4598e094cb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Feb 9 11:23:35 2020 +1100 Check if UINT32_MAX is defined before redefining. commit be075110c735a451fd9d79a864e01e2e0d9f19d2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 7 15:07:27 2020 +1100 typo; reported by Phil Pennock commit 963d71851e727ffdd2a97fe0898fad61d4a70ba1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 7 03:57:31 2020 +0000 upstream: sync the description of the $SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable with that of the SecurityKeyProvider ssh/sshd_config(5) directive, as the latter was more descriptive. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0488f09530524a7e53afca6b6e1780598022552f commit d4d9e1d40514e2746f9e05335d646512ea1020c6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 7 03:54:44 2020 +0000 upstream: Add ssh -Q key-sig for all key and signature types. Teach ssh -Q to accept ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5) algorithm keywords as an alias for the corresponding query. Man page help jmc@, ok djm@. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e110aee3db2fc4bc5bee2d893b7128fd622e0f8 commit fd68dc27864b099b552a6d9d507ca4b83afd6a76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 7 03:27:54 2020 +0000 upstream: fix two PIN entry bugs on FIDO keygen: 1) it would allow more than the intended number of prompts (3) and 2) it would SEGV too many incorrect PINs were entered; based on patch by Gabriel Kihlman OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c0011f28ba8bd8adf2014424b64960333da1718 commit 96bd895a0a0b3a36f81c14db8c91513578fc5563 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:48:23 2020 +0000 upstream: When using HostkeyAlgorithms to merely append or remove algorithms from the default set (i.e. HostkeyAlgorithms=+/-...), retain the default behaviour of preferring those algorithms that have existing keys in known_hosts; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 040e7fcc38ea00146b5d224ce31ce7a1795ee6ed commit c7288486731734a864b58d024b1395029b55bbc5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:46:31 2020 +0000 upstream: expand HostkeyAlgorithms prior to config dump, matching other algorithm lists; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66f0fca8cc5ce30405a2867bc115fff600671d0 commit a6ac5d36efc072b15690c65039754f8e44247bdf Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:34:58 2020 +0000 upstream: Add Include to the list of permitted keywords after a Match keyword. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 342e940538b13dd41e0fa167dc9ab192b9f6e2eb commit a47f6a6c0e06628eed0c2a08dc31a8923bcc37ba Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 6 22:30:54 2020 +0000 upstream: Replace "security key" with "authenticator" in program messages. This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key". ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e commit 849a9b87144f8a5b1771de6c85e44bfeb86be9a9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 6 11:28:14 2020 +1100 Don't look for UINT32_MAX in inttypes.h ... unless we are actually going to use it. Fixes build on HP-UX without the potential impact to other platforms of a header change shortly before release. commit a2437f8ed0c3be54ddd21630a93c68ebd168286f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 6 12:02:22 2020 +1100 depend commit 9716e8c4956acdd7b223d1642bfa376e07e7503d Author: Michael Forney Date: Wed Nov 27 19:17:26 2019 -0800 Fix sha2 MAKE_CLONE no-op definition The point of the dummy declaration is so that MAKE_CLONE(...) can have a trailing semicolon without introducing an empty declaration. So, the macro replacement text should *not* have a trailing semicolon, just like DEF_WEAK. commit d596b1d30dc158915a3979fa409d21ff2465b6ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 4 09:58:04 2020 +0000 upstream: require FIDO application strings to start with "ssh:"; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 94e9c1c066d42b76f035a3d58250a32b14000afb commit 501f3582438cb2cb1cb92be0f17be490ae96fb23 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 3 23:47:57 2020 +0000 upstream: revert enabling UpdateHostKeys by default - there are still corner cases we need to address; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff7ad941bfdc49fb1d8baa95fd0717a61adcad57 commit 072f3b832d2a4db8d9880effcb6c4d0dad676504 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 3 08:15:37 2020 +0000 upstream: use better markup for challenge and write-attestation, and rejig the challenge text a little; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f351e6da9edfdc907d5c3fdaf2e9ff3ab0a7a6f commit 262eb05a22cb1fabc3bc1746c220566490b80229 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 3 21:22:15 2020 +1100 mention libfido2 in dependencies section commit ccd3b247d59d3bde16c3bef0ea888213fbd6da86 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 3 19:40:12 2020 +1100 add clock_gettime64(2) to sandbox allowed syscalls bz3093 commit adffbe1c645ad2887ba0b6d24c194aa7a40c5735 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 2 09:45:34 2020 +0000 upstream: Output (none) in debug in the case in the CheckHostIP=no case as suggested by markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ab9117ee5261cbbd1868717fcc3142eea6385cf commit 58c819096a2167983e55ae686486ce317b69b2d1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 2 09:22:22 2020 +0000 upstream: Prevent possible null pointer deref of ip_str in debug. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37b252e2e6f690efed6682437ef75734dbc8addf commit 0facae7bc8d3f8f9d02d0f6bed3d163ff7f39806 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Feb 2 07:36:50 2020 +0000 upstream: shuffle the challenge keyword to keep the -O list sorted; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08efad608b790949a9a048d65578fae9ed5845fe commit 6fb3dd0ccda1c26b06223b87bcd1cab9ec8ec3cc Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 1 06:53:12 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c42851cdc88583402b4ab2b110a6348563626d3 commit 92725d4d3fde675acc0ca040b48f3d0c7be73b7f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 1 17:25:09 2020 +1100 Use sys-queue.h from compat library. Fixes build on platforms that don't have sys/queue.h (eg MUSL). commit 677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:25:08 2020 +0000 upstream: regress test for sshd_config Include directive; from Jakub Jelen OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0d9224de3297c7a5f51ba68d6e3725a2a9345fa4 commit d4f4cdd681ab6408a98419f398b75a55497ed324 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:13:04 2020 +0000 upstream: whitespace OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 564cf7a5407ecf5da2d94ec15474e07427986772 commit 245399dfb3ecebc6abfc2ef4ee2e650fa9f6942b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:11:25 2020 +0000 upstream: force early logging to stderr if debug_flag (-d) is set; avoids missing messages from re-exec config passing OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02484b8241c1f49010e7a543a7098e6910a8c9ff commit 7365f28a66d1c443723fbe6f4a2612ea6002901e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 23:08:08 2020 +0000 upstream: mistake in previous: filling the incorrect buffer OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 862ee84bd4b97b529f64aec5d800c3dcde952e3a commit c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 22:42:45 2020 +0000 upstream: Add a sshd_config "Include" directive to allow inclusion of files. This has sensible semantics wrt Match blocks and accepts glob(3) patterns to specify the included files. Based on patch by Jakub Jelen in bz2468; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36ed0e845b872e33f03355b936a4fff02d5794ff commit ba261a1dd33266168ead4f8f40446dcece4d1600 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 31 22:25:59 2020 +0000 upstream: spelling fix; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c079523c4b161725a4b15dd06348186da912402 commit 771891a044f763be0711493eca14b6b0082e030f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 22:25:34 2020 +0000 upstream: document changed default for UpdateHostKeys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25c390b21d142f78ac0106241d13441c4265fd2c commit d53a518536c552672c00e8892e2aea28f664148c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 22:19:32 2020 +0000 upstream: enable UpdateKnownHosts=yes if the configuration specifies only the default known_hosts files, otherwise select UpdateKnownHosts=ask; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab401a5ec4a33d2e1a9449eae6202e4b6d427df7 commit bb63ff844e818d188da4fed3c016e0a4eecbbf25 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 30 18:54:42 2020 +1100 Look in inttypes.h for UINT32_MAX. Should prevent warnings on at least some AIX versions. commit afeb6a960da23f0a5cbc4b80cca107c7504e932a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 07:21:38 2020 +0000 upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() instead of plain fatal() for ssh_packet_write_poll() failures here too as the former yields better error messages; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f7a6ca95bc2b716c2e948fc1370753be772d8e3 commit 65d6fd0a8a6f31c3ddf0c1192429a176575cf701 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:57 2020 +0000 upstream: check the return value of ssh_packet_write_poll() and call sshpkt_fatal() if it fails; avoid potential busy-loop under some circumstances. Based on patch by Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c79fe5cf4f0cd8074cb6db257c1394d5139408ec commit dce74eab0c0f9010dc84c62500a17771d0131ff3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:05 2020 +0000 upstream: have sshpkt_fatal() save/restore errno before we potentially call strerror() (via ssh_err()); ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5590df31d21405498c848245b85c24acb84ad787 commit 14ef4efe2bf4180e085ea6738fdbebc199458b0c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 29 08:17:49 2020 +0000 upstream: markus suggests a simplification to previous OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10bbfb6607ebbb9a018dcd163f0964941adf58de commit 101ebc3a8cfa78d2e615afffbef9861bbbabf1ff Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 29 07:51:30 2020 +0000 upstream: give more context to UpdateHostKeys messages, mentioning that the changes are validated by the existing trusted host key. Prompted by espie@ feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3d95f4a45f2692f4143b9e77bb241184dbb8dc5 commit 24c0f752adf9021277a7b0a84931bb5fe48ea379 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 28 08:01:34 2020 +0000 upstream: changes to support FIDO attestation Allow writing to disk the attestation certificate that is generated by the FIDO token at key enrollment time. These certificates may be used by an out-of-band workflow to prove that a particular key is held in trustworthy hardware. Allow passing in a challenge that will be sent to the card during key enrollment. These are needed to build an attestation workflow that resists replay attacks. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457dc3c3d689ba39eed328f0817ed9b91a5f78f6 commit 156bef36f93a48212383235bb8e3d71eaf2b2777 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 28 07:24:15 2020 +0000 upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask when in quiet mode; "work for me" matthieu@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d7b5eb91accf935ed9852650a826d86db2ddc7 commit ec8a759b4045e54d6b38e690ffee4cbffc53c7b7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 28 12:57:25 2020 +1100 compat for missing IPTOS_DSCP_LE in system headers commit 4594c7627680c4f41c2ad5fe412e55b7cc79b10c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 28 01:49:36 2020 +0000 upstream: make IPTOS_DSCP_LE available via IPQoS directive; bz2986, based on patch by veegish AT cyberstorm.mu OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9902bf4fbb4ea51de2193ac2b1d965bc5d99c425 commit da22216b5db3613325aa7b639f40dc017e4c6f69 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 27 20:51:32 2020 +0000 upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask if command is specified; ok djm@ sthen@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5bcc45eadb78896637d4143d289f1e42c2ef5d7 commit 1e1db0544fdd788e2e3fc21d972a7ccb7de6b4ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000 upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0 commit 0d1144769151edf65f74aee9a4c8545c37861695 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 26 15:09:15 2020 +1100 Move definition of UINT32_MAX. This allows us to always define it if needed not just if we also define the type ourself. commit f73ab8a811bc874c2fb403012aa8e4bfdcaf5ec7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000 upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0 commit 0373f9eba2b63455dceedbd3ac3d5dca306789ff Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 26 14:09:17 2020 +1100 Include signal.h to prevent redefintion of _NSIG. commit 638a45b5c1e20a8539100ca44166caad8abf26f8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 26 13:40:51 2020 +1100 Wrap stdint.h in tests inside HAVE_STDINT_H. commit 74dfc2c859c906eaab1f88a27fd883115ffb928f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:14:45 2020 +0000 upstream: for UpdateHostKeys, don't report errors for unsupported key types - just ignore them. spotted by and ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91769e443f6197c983932fc8ae9d39948727d473 commit b59618246c332e251160be0f1e0e88a7d4e2b0ae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 26 00:13:20 2020 +0000 upstream: downgrade error() for missing subsequent known_hosts files to debug() as it was intended to be; spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18cfea382cb52f2da761be524e309cc3d5354ef9 commit 469df611f778eec5950d556aabfe1d4efc227915 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:33:27 2020 +0000 upstream: clarify that BatchMode applies to all interactive prompts (e.g. host key confirmation) and not just password prompts. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97b001883d89d3fb1620d2e6b747c14a26aa9818 commit de40876c4a5d7c519d3d7253557572fdfc13db76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:28:06 2020 +0000 upstream: tidy headers; some junk snuck into sshbuf-misc.c and sshbuf-io.c doesn't need SSHBUF_INTERNAL set OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27a724d2e0b2619c1a1490f44093bbd73580d9e6 commit 6a107606355fa9547884cad6740e6144a7a7955b Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 26 10:28:21 2020 +1100 depend commit 59d01f1d720ebede4da42882f592d1093dac7adc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:13:09 2020 +0000 upstream: improve the error message for u2f enrollment errors by making ssh-keygen be solely responsible for printing the error message and convertint some more common error responses from the middleware to a useful ssherr.h status code. more detail remains visible via -v of course. also remove indepedent copy of sk-api.h declarations in sk-usbhid.c and just include it. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a8ffa870d9a3e0cfd76544bcdeef5c9fb1f1bb commit 99aa8035554ddb976348d2a9253ab3653019728d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 23:02:13 2020 +0000 upstream: factor out reading/writing sshbufs to dedicated functions; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc09e5f1950b7acc91b8fdf8015347782d2ecd3d commit 065064fcf455778b0918f783033b374d4ba37a92 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 22:49:38 2020 +0000 upstream: add a comment describing the ranges of channel IDs that we use; requested by markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83a1f09810ffa3a96a55fbe32675b34ba739e56b commit 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 22:41:01 2020 +0000 upstream: make sshd_config:ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the connection killing behaviour, rather than killing the connection after sending the first liveness test probe (regardless of whether the client was responsive) bz2627; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af79c35f4c9fa280643b6852f524bfcd9bccdaf commit bf986a9e2792555e0879a3145fa18d2b49436c74 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 22:36:22 2020 +0000 upstream: clarify order of AllowUsers/DenyUsers vs AllowGroups/DenyGroups; bz1690, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5637584ec30db9cf64822460f41b3e42c8f9facd commit 022ce92fa0daa9d78830baeb2bd2dc3f83c724ba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:17:18 2020 +0000 upstream: when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the comment. bz2564 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd8ca9340d7017631a27f4ed5358a4cfddec16f commit 0b813436bbf6546638b10c1fa71f54691bcf5e63 Author: tedu@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:09:14 2020 +0000 upstream: group14-sha1 is no longer a default algorithm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a96f04d5e9c2ff760c6799579dc44f69b4ff431d commit 3432b6e05d5c583c91c566c5708fed487cec79ac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:02:51 2020 +0000 upstream: reword HashKnownHosts description a little more; some people found the wording confusing (bz#2560) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac30896598694f07d498828690aecd424c496988 commit f80d7d6aa98d6eddc5df02412efee6db75673d4c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 07:01:00 2020 +0000 upstream: weaken the language for what HashKnownHosts provides with regards to known_hosts name privacy, it's not practical for this option to offer any guarantee that hostnames cannot be recovered from a disclosed known_hosts file (e.g. by brute force). OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13f1e3285f8acf7244e9770074296bcf446c6972 commit 846446bf3e7421e6671a4afd074bdf15eecd7832 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 06:40:20 2020 +0000 upstream: the GatewayPorts vs -R listen address selection logic is still confusing people, so add another comment explaining the special handling of "localhost"; bz#3258 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6bf0f0fbf1c7092bf0dbd9c6eab105970b5b53a commit 734f2f83f5ff86f2967a99d67be9ce22dd0394dd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 06:03:10 2020 +0000 upstream: mention that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name to address translation; prompted by bz3099 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dda8e54d566b29855e76bebf9cfecce573f5c23 commit e1e97cae19ff07b7a7f7e82556bc048c3c54af63 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 25 16:30:22 2020 +1100 include tunnel device path in error message commit 0ecd20bc9f0b9c7c697c9eb014613516c8f65834 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 04:48:26 2020 +0000 upstream: unrevert this: > revision 1.217 > date: 2019/11/27 03:34:04; author: dtucker; state: Exp; lines: +5 -7; commitid: wkiMn49XJyjzoJIs; > Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were > left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in > bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@ Darren was right the first time; ok dtucker@ "agreed" markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 641dd1b99a6bbd85b7160da462ae1be83432c7c8 commit a0c81d2402eedc514b9c9f25ef9604eb0576b86a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 02:57:53 2020 +0000 upstream: Move setting $NC into test-exec since it's now used by multiple tests, and in -portable we use our own local copy to avoid portability problems. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ceb78445fcaac317bec2fc51b3f0d9589048c114 commit e16dfa94f86358033531c4a97dcb51508ef84d49 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 25 13:05:42 2020 +1100 Put EC key export inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. Fixes link error when building against an OpenSSL that does not have ECC. commit 94a2e5951b374e1a89761ceaff72e66eb1946807 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:27:56 2020 +0000 upstream: Wait a bit longer for the multiplex master to become ready since on very slow hosts the current delay is not sufficient and the test will fail. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6d90c7475d67ac3a95610b64af700629ece51a48 commit b2df804f571d77b07059f087b90955ffbc2f67d4 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 10:08:17 2020 +0000 upstream: Add a connection test for proxycommand. This would have caught the problem caused by ssh.c rev 1.507 wherein Host and Hostname were swapped. Prompted by beck@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d218500ae6aca4c479c27318fb5b09ebc00f7aae commit c6f06fd38a257b9fcc7d6760f8fb6d505dccb628 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:22:31 2020 +0000 upstream: set UpdateKnownHosts=ask by default; bz#2894; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09cb3177f3a14c96428e14f347e976a8a531fee commit 7955633a554397bc24913cec9fd7285002935f7e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:21:08 2020 +0000 upstream: allow UpdateKnownHosts=yes to function when multiple known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys, ssh will now search subsequent known_hosts files, but will add new/changed host keys to the first specified file only. bz#2738 ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ded6d878a03e57d5aa20bab9c31f92e929dbc6c commit e5a278a62ab49dffe96929fa8d8506c6928dba90 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:06:48 2020 +0000 upstream: process security key provider via realpath() in agent, avoids malicious client from being able to cause agent to load arbitrary libraries into ssh-sk-helper. reported by puck AT puckipedia.com; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1086643df1b7eee4870825c687cf0c26a6145d1c commit 89a8d4525e8edd9958ed3df60cf683551142eae0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 25 00:03:36 2020 +0000 upstream: expose PKCS#11 key labels/X.509 subjects as comments Extract the key label or X.509 subject string when PKCS#11 keys are retrieved from the token and plumb this through to places where it may be used as a comment. based on https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/138 by Danielle Church feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cae1fda10d9e10971dea29520916e27cfec7ca35 commit a8c05c640873621681ab64d2e47a314592d5efa2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 23:56:01 2020 +0000 upstream: tweak proctitle to include sshd arguments, as these are frequently used to distinguish between multiple independent instances of the server. New proctitle looks like this: $ pgrep -lf sshd 12844 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups requested by sthen@ and aja@; ok aja@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf235a561c655a3524a82003cf7244ecb48ccc1e commit 8075fccbd4f70a4371acabcfb47562471ff0de6f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 23:54:40 2020 +0000 upstream: add xextendf() to extend a string with a format (reallocating as necessary). ok aja@ as part of a larger diff OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30796b50d330b3e0e201747fe40cdf9aa70a77f9 commit d15c8adf2c6f1a6b4845131074383eb9c3d05c3d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 05:33:01 2020 +0000 upstream: minor tweaks to ssh-keygen -Y find-principals: emit matched principals one per line to stdout rather than as comma- separated and with a free-text preamble (easy confusion opportunity) emit "not found" error to stderr fix up argument testing for -Y operations and improve error message for unsupported operations OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d9c9a671ab07fc04a48f543edfa85eae77da69c commit c3368a5d5ec368ef6bdf9971d6330ca0e3bdca06 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 00:28:57 2020 +0000 upstream: remove ssh-rsa (SHA1) from the list of allowed CA signature algorithms ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da3481fca8c81e6951f319a86b7be67502237f57 commit 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 00:27:04 2020 +0000 upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default to a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by the user; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9 commit 8dfb6a202c96cdf037c8ce05e53e32e0e0b7b454 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 00:00:31 2020 +0000 upstream: allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091, patch from Jakub Jelen ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a58edec8b9f07acab4b962a71a5125830d321b51 commit 72a8bea2d748c8bd7f076a8b39a52082c79ae95f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 23:31:52 2020 +0000 upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fixes based on feedback from Markus: use "principals" instead of principal, as allowed_signers lines may list multiple. When the signing key is a certificate, emit only principals that match the certificate principal list. NB. the command -Y name changes: "find-principal" => "find-principals" ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab575946ff9a55624cd4e811bfd338bf3b1d0faf commit 0585b5697201f5d8b32e6f1b0fee7e188268d30d Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 24 01:29:23 2020 +0000 upstream: Do not warn about permissions on symlinks. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 339d4cbae224bd8743ffad9c3afb0cf3cb66c357 commit 415192348a5737a960f6d1b292a17b64d55b542c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 11:19:12 2020 +0000 upstream: Handle zlib compression being disabled now that it's optional. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0af4fbc5168e62f89d0350de524bff1cb00e707a commit fbce7c1a898ae75286349822950682cf46346121 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 10:53:04 2020 +0000 upstream: Fix typo in comment. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1d7a6553208bf439378fd1cf686a828aceb353a commit ba247af8e9e302910e22881ef9d307a8afeef036 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 10:19:59 2020 +0000 upstream: When checking for unsafe directories, ignore non-directories (ie symlinks, where permissions are not relevant). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb6cfc8b022becb62b2dcb99ed3f072b3326e501 commit 74deb7029be4c00810443114aac9308875a81dae Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 22:17:24 2020 +1100 zlib is now optional. commit 633a2af47ee90291aaf93969aeee1e5046074c7c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 22:16:51 2020 +1100 Plumb WITH_ZLIB into configure. This allows zlib support to be disabled by ./configure --without-zlib. commit 7f8e66fea8c4e2a910df9067cb7638999b7764d5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 10:24:29 2020 +0000 upstream: Make zlib optional. This adds a "ZLIB" build time option that allows building without zlib compression and associated options. With feedback from markus@, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c6e1133a90fd15a3aa865bdedc53bab28b7910 commit 69ac4e33023b379e9a8e9b4b6aeeffa6d1fcf6fa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 07:54:04 2020 +0000 upstream: remove trailing period characters from pub/priv key pathnames - they make them needlessly more difficult to cut and paste without error; ok markus@ & dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcfd1a5723fcac0711feee7665edc66ae2335a commit 945bf52c3c815d95b1e842ebf6c910c3524bd5bb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 21:06:45 2020 +1100 Fix a couple of mysig_t leftovers. commit 84226b447d45fe4542613de68c2ca59a890d7c01 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 18:55:24 2020 +1100 Remove mysignal wrapper. We switched the main code to use sigaction(), so the wrapper is no longer used. commit 5533c2fb7ef21172fa3708d66b03faa2c6b3d93f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 07:16:38 2020 +0000 upstream: new sentence, new line; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6c3f2f36ec77e99198619b38a9f146655281925 commit 3bf2a6ac791d64046a537335a0f1d5e43579c5ad Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 07:10:22 2020 +0000 upstream: Replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce the potential for short read/write operations. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519 commit e027c044c796f3a01081a91bee55741204283f28 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 04:54:34 2020 +0000 upstream: missing header change from previous; spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 321ce74c0a5bbd0f02fa3f20cb5cf2a952c6b96f commit 7e1323102b1b04eef391b01e180710a2d408a7ab Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 03:42:41 2020 +0000 upstream: Check for and warn about StrictModes permission problems. ok tb@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4841704ccdee50ee7efc6035bc686695c6ac2991 commit 84de1c27f845d15c859db44e7070a46f45504b66 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 03:35:07 2020 +0000 upstream: Also test PuTTY chacha20. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7af6a0e8763b05f1f8eee6bca5f31fcb16151040 commit c7ed15a39695ecd5f1f21842d8d9cd22246d4ee2 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 03:24:38 2020 +0000 upstream: Also test PuTTY ecdh kex methods. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec4017dce612131842398a03e93007a869c2c133 commit c4b3a128954ee1b7fbcbda167baf8aca1a3d1c84 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 02:46:49 2020 +0000 upstream: Remove unsupported algorithms from list of defaults at run time and remove ifdef and distinct settings for OPENSSL=no case. This will make things much simpler for -portable where the exact set of algos depends on the configuration of both OpenSSH and the libcrypto it's linked against (if any). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0116d0183dcafc7a9c40ba5fe9127805c5dfdd2 commit 56cffcc09f8a2e661d2ba02e61364ae6f998b2b1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 23 02:43:48 2020 +0000 upstream: add a new signature operations "find-principal" to look up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-signers file. Work by Sebastian Kinne; ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f782cc7e18e38fcfafa62af53246a1dcfe74e5d commit 65cf8730de6876a56595eef296e07a86c52534a6 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 07:38:30 2020 +0000 upstream: Ignore whitespace when checking explict fingerprint. When confirming a host key using the fingerprint itself, ignore leading and trailing whitespace. ok deraadt@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cafd7f803bbdcd40c3a8f8f1a77747e6b6d8c011 commit 8d3af6ebdf524b34087a0a3ae415b5141ba10572 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 07:31:27 2020 +0000 upstream: Increase keyscan timeout from default. On slow hosts 3 concurrent keyscans can hit the default 5 second timeout, so increase to 15 seconds. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 16383dec166af369b7fb9948572856f5d544c93f commit 6c30c9adbeeed09a8a9e7a69974cfa1f1ddd1e9e Author: tedu@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 04:58:23 2020 +0000 upstream: remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from default kex to see what happens. general mostly ok OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 216b7b8462d2ef5f4531f26cb2cb839b2153dad9 commit 4a32c0ca44a2dc2a358f69b5d43c08e528b44b39 Author: claudio@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 04:51:51 2020 +0000 upstream: For ssh-keygen -lF only add a space after key fingerprint when there is a comment. This makes copy-paste of fingerprints into ssh easier. OK djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa01d95624f65c1eb4dc7c575d20d77c78010dfd commit 37d3b736506760e4ebc7fe56255f7b8ea823a00c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 04:49:16 2020 +0000 upstream: some __func__ and strerror(errno) here; no functional change OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ddd5f848b99ea560b31d3fba99ceed66cef37 commit e2031b05c74c98b141179ceab13a323cf17d01e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 22 02:25:21 2020 +0000 upstream: factor out parsing of allowed-signers lines OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ee6aeff608371826019ea85e55bfa87f79d06e commit 47160e1de8c2f638f0ef41cef42c976417b61778 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 22 10:30:13 2020 +1100 unbreak fuzzer support for recent ssh-sk.h changes commit 70d38c3cfd4550e8ee66cc3bf1b91aa339c91df5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 22:39:57 2020 +0000 upstream: expose the number of currently-authenticating connections along with the MaxStartups limit in the proctitle; suggestion from Philipp Marek, w/ feedback from Craig Miskell ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a6db2dc1641a5df8eddf7d6652176e359dffb3 commit a78c66d5d2144bd49779bc80a647346bd3d7233d Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 12:40:04 2020 +0000 upstream: document the default value of the ControlPersist option; ok dtucker@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0788e7f2b5a9d4e36d3d2ab378f73329320fef66 commit b46a6325849e40aa2e4b0d962a6f00f708f6576a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 22 09:28:32 2020 +1100 remove accidental change in f8c11461 commit 80d3bebcab96fe1d177e45906e10db16895da01d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 11:06:09 2020 +0000 upstream: don't #ifdef out the KRL code when compiling without libcrypto support; it works just fine and disabling it breaks a few tests. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f6272c4241eb4b04de78b012fe98b2b555ad44 commit f8c11461aa6db168fc5e7eeae448b4cbbf59642a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 08:06:27 2020 +0000 upstream: pass SSH_SK_HELPER explicitly past $SUDO to avoid it getting cleared; with dtucker@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 03178a0580324bf0dff28f7eac6c3edbc5407f8e commit b5fcb0ac1cc0ef01aeec1c089146298654ab3ae0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 07:07:31 2020 +0000 upstream: check access(ssh-sk-helper, X_OK) to provide friendly error message for misconfigured helper paths OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061bcc262155d12e726305c91394ac0aaf1f8341 commit 56bced43c14dc6fa2bfa1816007e441644105609 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 06:09:56 2020 +0000 upstream: Document sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org. Patch from jtesta@positronsecurity.com via github PR#151. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3d48168623045c258245c340a5a2af7dbb74edc commit 4a05d789b86314fef7303824f69defbc6b96ed60 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:56 2020 +0000 upstream: fix ssh-keygen not displaying authenticator touch prompt; reported by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d4f582fc194eb3897ebcbfe286c49958ba2859 commit 881aded0389d999375f926051491a944c6d8752b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:27 2020 +0000 upstream: a little more verbosity in sign_and_send_pubkey() debug messages OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6da47a0e6373f6683006f49bc2a516d197655508 commit b715fdc71bbd009d0caff691ab3fc04903c4aee8 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 18 21:16:43 2020 +0000 upstream: one more replacement "(security) key" -> "(FIDO) authenticator" OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 031bca03c1d1f878ab929facd561911f1bc68dfd commit 84911da1beeb6ed258a43468efb316cd39fb6855 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 18 15:45:41 2020 +0000 upstream: undo merge error and replace the term "security key" again OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 341749062c089cc360a7877e9ee3a887aecde395 commit e8c06c4ee708720efec12cd1a6f78a3c6d76b7f0 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 17 20:13:47 2020 +0000 upstream: Document loading of resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. * Rename -O to -K to keep "-O option" available. * Document -K. * Trim usage() message down to synopsis, like all other commands. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 015c2c4b28f8e19107adc80351b44b23bca4c78a commit 0d005d6372a067b59123dec8fc6dc905f2c09e1e Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 14 15:07:30 2020 +0000 upstream: sync ssh-keygen.1 and ssh-keygen's usage() with each other and reality ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdf64454f2c3604c25977c944e5b6262a3bcce92 commit b8a4ca2ebfddab862f7eb1ea2a07fb9f70330429 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 11 16:23:10 2020 +0000 upstream: revise the fix for reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command() Always put 'host' before 'host_arg' for consistency. ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ba5b25472779f1b1957295fcc6907bb961472a3 commit 57b181eaf2d34fd0a1b51ab30cb6983df784de5a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 10 23:43:26 2020 +0000 upstream: pass the log-on-stderr flag and log level through to ssh-sk-helper, making debugging a bit easier. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e7aea6bf5770d3f38b7c7bba891069256c5a49a commit a8bd5fdbdb7581afc7123a042a7cd6ca25357388 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 21 12:32:16 2020 +1100 Wrap copy_environment_blacklist() in #ifdef It's only needed for USE_PAM or HAVE_CYGWIN cases and will cause compiler warnings otherwise. commit 10ecc647fc1db8d2dde9f6b9b826b201dfc48b62 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 21 12:20:05 2020 +1100 depend commit b3f7009c9ffa5891283ed96e043001e09934a8d4 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 11:56:48 2020 +0100 Fix missing prototype warning for copy_environment This function is only used in this file, and only on Cygwin, so make it static and hide it behind HAVE_CYGWIN. Prevents missing prototype warning. commit 0c428c0e991e2c4fabc48cf5d9b8f84c9412e0c3 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 13:58:11 2020 +0100 configure.ac: fix ldns test When running ./configure --with-ldns, if ldns-config cannot be found, we add -Iyes/include to CPPFLAGS and -Lyes/lib to LDFLAGS. Fix that. commit 6089abf715e2784751c9f62697e09bb103295b93 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 12:13:26 2020 +0100 Make sshpam_password_change_required static. sshpam_password_change_required is only used in auth-pam.c, so make it static to prevent a mising prototype warning. commit 5a9b9c82851b7bc219dc3a65962a80803c76c102 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 12:24:51 2020 +0100 sandbox-darwin.c: fix missing prototypes. Include the right header just like the other sandbox files. Fixes missing prototype warnings for ssh_sandbox_* functions. commit 335dc93526942a650f6c69666b3f6ca44d0a2910 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 11:09:27 2020 +0100 Fix a few warnings when on Mac OS X. Include stdlib.h for calloc, malloc, free and setenv. commit 0488dc2d3050ea1a99ef5cf44afc50ffbf3f1315 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Mon Jan 20 10:32:23 2020 +0100 Fix building without openssl. This fixes the following when there are no openssl headers on the system: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c:34:10: fatal error: 'openssl/bn.h' file not found commit e6b7157b4ef29c83ec3a2d1d7c927e4b8898f9bb Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Wed Jan 15 16:08:55 2020 +0100 Add config.log to .gitignore commit 515e10ddf9644010b88cfd7ecf601f4306d42232 Author: Ruben Kerkhof Date: Wed Jan 15 16:16:31 2020 +0100 Fix typo in README.md, s/crytpo/crypto/ commit 1af3354aea3c4bfa5b5ecfb5d1ff3ad231c2073c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jan 15 16:22:36 2020 +1100 Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit 429170f273ce1b0140f8111a45ba69390d98de3a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 14:41:47 2020 +1100 Wrap stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H. commit a0989b60211b6f1c2313e1397c526d883a23a075 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 14:26:41 2020 +1100 Include compat header for definitions. commit e0cedcad51fe02683943bf4f1ad2961aa3f35313 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 09:42:52 2020 +1100 Improve search for 'struct timespec'. Make struct timespec test consistent with existing timeval test. Include time.h for timespec in compat header where required. commit acaf9e058594310001ce64468ed2923dc6323e81 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 12:43:03 2020 +1100 Update depend to remove rmd160.h. commit 26b2675b0c3e3efea11a52609073aec01736ec84 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 14 07:24:46 2020 +1100 Remove configure test & compat code for ripemd160. RIPEMD160 support was removed upstream in 2017, however we still had a configure test and compat code for it, so clean those up now. commit ed3ad71b17adcd1fb4431d145f53cee1c6a1135e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 9 03:28:38 2020 +0000 upstream: fix reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command(); spotted by anton@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db1c32478a01dfbc9c4db171de0f25907bea5775 commit cd53476383f0cf475f40ba8ac8deb6b76dd5ce4e Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 07:43:28 2020 +0000 upstream: put the fido options in a list, and tidy up the text a little; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 491ce15ae52a88b7a6a2b3b6708a14b4aacdeebb commit 30f704ebc0e9e32b3d12f5d9e8c1b705fdde2c89 Author: Jeremy Drake Date: Fri Oct 11 18:31:05 2019 -0700 Deny (non-fatal) ipc in preauth privsep child. As noted in openssh/openssh-portable#149, i386 does not have have _NR_shmget etc. Instead, it has a single ipc syscall (see man 2 ipc, https://linux.die.net/man/2/ipc). Add this syscall, if present, to the list of syscalls that seccomp will deny non-fatally. commit b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22 Author: Khem Raj Date: Tue Jan 7 16:26:45 2020 -0800 seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox. This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with upcoming glibc ( 2.31 ) commit 3cc60c899a92a469e5118310ba6b74cb57215618 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:39:30 2020 +0000 upstream: missing else in check_enroll_options() OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e058fb918fda56ddbbf0bee910101004cec421d4 commit ff5784e2698d6c41e9f39ce4df24968c1beeb2bb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:24:28 2020 +0000 upstream: fix error message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1eb52025658eb78ea6223181e552862198d3d505 commit dd2acc8b862c09751621995fba2d5fa6f4e24cc9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:07:50 2020 +0000 upstream: adapt sk-dummy to SK API changes also, make it pull prototypes directly from sk-api.c and #error if the expected version changes. This will make any future regress test breakage because of SK API changes much more apparent OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 79b07055de4feb988e31da71a89051ad5969829d commit c312ca077cd2a6c15545cd6b4d34ee2f69289174 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 6 02:00:46 2020 +0000 upstream: Extends the SK API to accept a set of key/value options for all operations. These are intended to future-proof the API a little by making it easier to specify additional fields for without having to change the API version for each. At present, only two options are defined: one to explicitly specify the device for an operation (rather than accepting the middleware's autoselection) and another to specify the FIDO2 username that may be used when generating a resident key. These new options may be invoked at key generation time via ssh-keygen -O This also implements a suggestion from Markus to avoid "int" in favour of uint32_t for the algorithm argument in the API, to make implementation of ssh-sk-client/helper a little easier. feedback, fixes and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 973ce11704609022ab36abbdeb6bc23c8001eabc commit 2ab335712d084d9ccaf3f53afc3fa9535329da87 Author: beck@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 5 16:28:22 2020 +0000 upstream: fix CanonicalizeHostname, broken by rev 1.507 Issue noticed and reported by Pierre-Olivier Martel ok dtucker@ markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 749f3168ec520609c35b0c4e1984e5fa47f16094 commit 69e44ba701b90b0f530d64c3fe4363ea86e50cd3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 6 09:02:53 2020 +1100 Fix typo: 'you' -> 'your'. bz#3108 from jmckitrick@gmail.com. commit 7652a57662969bd5c61448b3843ec6d407ad12be Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 6 08:56:46 2020 +1100 Remove auth-skey.c. S/Key support was removed in OpenSSH 7.8 but this file was missed. commit c593cc5e826c9f4ec506e22b629d37cabfaacff9 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 3 07:33:33 2020 +0000 upstream: the download resident keys option is -K (upper) not -k (lower); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71dc28a3e1fa7c553844abc508845bcf5766e091 commit ff31f15773ee173502eec4d7861ec56f26bba381 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 3 03:02:26 2020 +0000 upstream: what bozo decided to use 2020 as a future date in a regress test? OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b953df5a7e14081ff6cf495d4e8d40e153cbc3a commit 680eb7749a39d0e4d046e66cac4e51e8e3640b75 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 3 02:46:19 2020 +0000 upstream: implement recent SK API change to support resident keys and PIN prompting in the dummy middleware that we use for the tests. Should fix breakage spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 379cf9eabfea57aaf7f3f59dafde59889566c484 commit 86834fe6b54ac57b8528c30cf0b27e5cac5b7af7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 2 13:25:38 2020 +0000 upstream: Update keygen moduli screen test to match recent command line option change to ssh-keygen(1). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 744a72755004377e9669b662c13c6aa9ead8a0c3 commit 9039971887cccd95b209c479296f772a3a93e8e7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 2 22:40:09 2020 +0000 upstream: ability to download FIDO2 resident keys from a token via "ssh-keygen -K". This will save public/private keys into the current directory. This is handy if you move a token between hosts. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d57c1f9802f7850f00a117a1d36682a6c6d10da6 commit 878ba4350d57e905d6bb1865d8ff31bdfe5deab4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 2 22:38:33 2020 +0000 upstream: add sshkey_save_public(), to save a public key; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5d6f96a966d10d7fa689ff9aa9e1d6767ad5a076 commit 3b1382ffd5e71eff78db8cef0f3cada22ff29409 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 16:10:00 2019 +0000 upstream: simplify the list for moduli options - no need for -compact; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6492c72280482c6d072be46236b365cb359fc280 commit 0248ec7c763dee9ff730a589e3d166eac5c74d7c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 2 13:41:31 2020 +1100 ssh-sk-null.cc needs extern "C" {} commit 5ca4b414effe4b56f0cfe3058c92391aa8a43871 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 2 10:56:29 2020 +1100 add dummy ssh-sk API for linking with fuzzers commit c4b2664be7ba25e4c233315b25212dec29b727ab Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 30 21:04:09 2019 +1100 refresh depend commit 3093d12ff80927cf45da08d9f262a26680fb14ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:49:52 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove the -x option currently used for FIDO/U2F-specific key flags. Instead these flags may be specified via -O. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f23ebde2a8a7e1bf860a51055a711cffb8c328c1 commit ef65e7dbaa8fac3245aa2bfc9f7e09be7cba0d9d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:25:29 2019 +0000 upstream: document SK API changes in PROTOCOL.u2f ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52622363c103a3c4d3d546050480ffe978a32186 commit 43ce96427b76c4918e39af654e2fc9ee18d5d478 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:45 2019 +0000 upstream: translate and return error codes; retry on bad PIN Define some well-known error codes in the SK API and pass them back via ssh-sk-helper. Use the new "wrong PIN" error code to retry PIN prompting during ssh-keygen of resident keys. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9663c6a2bb7a0bc8deaccc6c30d9a2983b481620 commit d433596736a2cd4818f538be11fc94783f5c5236 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:03 2019 +0000 upstream: improve some error messages; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ccd8ddabb8df4f995107dd3b7ea58220e93cb81 commit c54cd1892c3e7f268b21e1f07ada9f0d9816ffc0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:23:28 2019 +0000 upstream: SK API and sk-helper error/PIN passing Allow passing a PIN via the SK API (API major crank) and let the ssh-sk-helper API follow. Also enhance the ssh-sk-helper API to support passing back an error code instead of a complete reply. Will be used to signal "wrong PIN", etc. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1bd6b0a2421646919a0c139b8183ad76d28fb71 commit 79fe22d9bc2868c5118f032ec1200ac9c2e3aaef Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:22:49 2019 +0000 upstream: implement loading resident keys in ssh-add "ssh-add -O" will load resident keys from a FIDO2 token and add them to a ssh-agent. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 608104ae957a7d65cb84e0a3a26c8f60e0df3290 commit 27753a8e21887d47fe6b5c78a4aed0efe558a850 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:59 2019 +0000 upstream: implement loading of resident keys in ssh-sk-helper feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b273c23769ea182c55c4a7b8f9cbd9181722011a commit 14cea36df397677b8f8568204300ef654114fd76 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:16 2019 +0000 upstream: resident keys support in SK API Adds a sk_load_resident_keys() function to the security key API that accepts a security key provider and a PIN and returns a list of keys. Implement support for this in the usbhid middleware. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e984e4e87f4999ce447a6178c4249a9174eff0 commit 2fe05fcb4a2695f190b4fcf27770b655586ab349 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:20:36 2019 +0000 upstream: Factor out parsing of struct sk_enroll_response We'll reuse this for extracting resident keys from a device. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bc1efd9c6897eac4df0983746cf6578c1542273 commit 4532bd01d57ee13c3ca881eceac1bf9da96a4d7e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 09:19:52 2019 +0000 upstream: basic support for generating FIDO2 resident keys "ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk|ed25519-sk -x resident" will generate a device-resident key. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e1b3c56a4b11d85047bd6c6c705b7eef4d58431 commit 3e60d18fba1b502c21d64fc7e81d80bcd08a2092 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 03:30:09 2019 +0000 upstream: remove single-letter flags for moduli options Move all moduli generation options to live under the -O flag. Frees up seven single-letter flags. NB. this change break existing ssh-keygen commandline syntax for moduli- related operations. Very few people use these fortunately. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d498f3eaf28128484826a4fcb343612764927935 commit 1e645fe767f27725dc7fd7864526de34683f7daf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 30 03:28:41 2019 +0000 upstream: prepare for use of ssh-keygen -O flag beyond certs Move list of available certificate options in ssh-keygen.1 to the CERTIFICATES section. Collect options specified by -O but delay parsing/validation of certificate options until we're sure that we're acting as a CA. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33e6bcc29cfca43606f6fa09bd84b955ee3a4106 commit 20ccd854245c598e2b47cc9f8d4955d645195055 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 27 08:28:44 2019 +0000 upstream: sort -Y internally in the options list, as is already done in synopsis; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86d033c5764404057616690d7be992e445b42274 commit 5b6c954751dd3677466cda7adb92e4f05446c96c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 27 08:25:07 2019 +0000 upstream: in the options list, sort -Y and -y; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24c2e6a3aeab6e050a0271ffc73fdff91c10dcaa commit 141df487ba699cfd1ec3dcd98186e7c956e99024 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 21 20:22:34 2019 +0000 upstream: Replace the term "security key" with "(FIDO) authenticator". The polysemous use of "key" was too confusing. Input from markus@. ok jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12eea973a44c8232af89f86e4269d71ae900ca8f commit fbd9729d4eadf2f7097b6017156387ac64302453 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 21 02:33:07 2019 +0000 upstream: unit tests for ForwardAgent=/path; from Eric Chiang OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f693f78290b2c17725dab2c614dffe4a88c8da commit e5b7cf8edca7e843adc125621e1dab14507f430a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 16 02:39:05 2019 +0000 upstream: test security key host keys in addition to user keys OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fb45326106669a27e4bf150575c321806e275b1 commit 40be78f503277bd91c958fa25ea9ef918a2ffd3d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Dec 21 02:19:13 2019 +0000 upstream: Allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent option to accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment variable in addition to yes/no. Patch by Eric Chiang, manpage by me; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98f2ed80bf34ea54d8b2ddd19ac14ebbf40e9265 commit 416f15372bfb5be1709a0ad1d00ef5d8ebfb9e0e Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 20:28:55 2019 +0000 upstream: SSH U2F keys can now be used as host keys. Fix a garden path sentence. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67d7971ca1a020acd6c151426c54bd29d784bd6b commit 68010acbcfe36167b3eece3115f3a502535f80df Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 02:42:42 2019 +0000 upstream: Move always unsupported keywords to be grouped with the other ones. Move oSecurityProvider to match the order in the OpCodes enum. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061e4505861ec1e02ba3a63e3d1b3be3cad458ec commit 8784b02dc49e1c98df4e7aca466be2f652ed4ad1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 02:29:21 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove obsolete opcodes from the configuation enum. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 395c202228872ce8d9044cc08552ac969f51e01b commit 345be6091bdc9be09c90a937d1320f97c01fab2a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 20 02:11:38 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove now-obsolete config options from example in comment. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35862beb0927b1cb0af476ec23cc07f6e3006101 commit ae024b22c4fd68e7f39681d605585889f9511108 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 19 15:09:30 2019 +0000 upstream: Document that security key-hosted keys can act as host keys. Update the list of default host key algorithms in ssh_config.5 and sshd_config.5. Copy the description of the SecurityKeyProvider option to sshd_config.5. ok jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edadf3566ab5e94582df4377fee3b8b702c7eca0 commit bc2dc091e0ac4ff6245c43a61ebe12c7e9ea0b7f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 19 03:50:01 2019 +0000 upstream: "Forward security" -> "Forward secrecy" since that's the correct term. Add "MAC" since we use that acronym in other man pages. ok naddy@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35529e511788586725fb63bda3459e10738c5f5 commit e905f7260d72bc0e33ef5f10a0db737ff6e77ba7 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 17 16:21:07 2019 +0000 upstream: cut obsolete lists of crypto algorithms from outline of how SSH works ok markus@ jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e34973f232ab48c4d4f5d07df48d501708b9160 commit f65cf1163ff01531ae02f3f9210391d0d692f699 Author: tobhe@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 16 13:58:53 2019 +0000 upstream: strdup may return NULL if memory allocation fails. Use the safer xstrdup which fatals on allocation failures. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b608d387120630753cbcb8110e0b019c0c9a0d0 commit 57634bfc5708477826c0be265ddc59b9d83e4886 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 16 03:16:58 2019 +0000 upstream: sort sk-* methods behind their plain key methods cousins for now OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c97e22c2b28c0d12ee389b8b4ef5f2ada7908828 commit b8df8fe920e697edcc69c520390b78c3b7ad9d84 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 17 19:46:15 2019 +1100 Mac OS X has PAM too. commit bf8de8b8251af69b5ce96a8faa69145af156af4d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 17 19:37:06 2019 +1100 Show portable tarball pattern in example. commit a19ef613e98141cc37c8acdeebe285b9dbe2531e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Dec 17 19:35:59 2019 +1100 OpenSSL is now optional. commit 1a7217ac063e48cf0082895aeee81ed2b8a57191 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 18:58:33 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to ssh-sk-client change OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 40481999a5928d635ab2e5b029e8239c112005ea commit a7fc1df246e80bfdabd09b069b91c72f9c578ca8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Dec 11 18:47:14 2019 +0000 upstream: it's no longer possible to disable privilege separation in sshd, so don't double the tests' work by trying both off/on OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d366665466dbd09e9b707305da884be3e7619c68 commit 3145d38ea06820a66c0f5e068f49af14fd2b7ac1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 20:59:23 2019 +0000 upstream: don't treat HostKeyAgent=none as a path either; avoids spurious warnings from the cfgparse regress test OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba49ea7a5c92b8a16cb9c2e975dbb163853afc54 commit 747e25192f436e71dd39e15d65aa32bca967533a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 20:57:15 2019 +0000 upstream: do not attempt to find an absolute path for sshd_config SecurityKeyProvider=internal - unbreaks cfgparse regress test OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2ddcf525c0dc3c8339522360c10b3c70f1fd641 commit 9b6e30b96b094ad787511a5b989253e3b8fe1789 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 19:47:10 2019 +0000 upstream: allow ssh-keyscan to find security key hostkeys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1fe822a7f714df19a7e7184e3a3bbfbf546811d3 commit 56584cce75f3d20aaa30befc7cbd331d922927f3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 15 18:57:30 2019 +0000 upstream: allow security keys to act as host keys as well as user keys. Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling, but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is less risk. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c commit 5af6fd5461bb709304e6979c8b7856c7af921c9e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Dec 16 13:55:56 2019 +1100 Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in seccomp sandbox. Needed on Linux ARM. bz#3100, patch from jjelen@redhat.com. commit fff8ff6dd580e1a72ba09a6775d185175cdc8d13 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Dec 15 18:27:02 2019 +1100 Put SK ECDSA bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. Fixes build when linking against OpenSSLs built with no-ec. commit 9244990ecdcfa36bb9371058111685b05f201c1e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 09:21:46 2019 +1100 remove a bunch of ENABLE_SK #ifdefs The ssh-sk-helper client API gives us a nice place to disable security key support when it is wasn't enabled at compile time, so we don't need to check everywere. Also, verification of security key signatures can remain enabled all the time - it has no additional dependencies. So sshd can accept security key pubkeys in authorized_keys, etc regardless of the host's support for dlopen, etc. commit a33ab1688b5c460a7e2a301418241ce1b13b2638 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 09:15:06 2019 +1100 ssh-sk-client.c needs includes.h commit 633778d567ad50b63d2a3bca5e1b97d279d236d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 08:40:33 2019 +1100 only link ssh-sk-helper against libfido2 commit 7b47b40b170db4d6f41da0479575f6d99dd7228a Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 08:20:52 2019 +1100 adapt Makefile to ssh-sk-client everywhere commit f45f3a8a12e2bee601046b916e6c5cd6eae08048 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 14 07:53:11 2019 +1100 fixup commit d21434766764d5babf99fc3937c19b625c0f6334 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 20:16:56 2019 +0000 upstream: actually commit the ssh-sk-helper client code; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd2ea776a5bbbf4d452989d3c3054cf25a5e0589 commit 611073fb40ecaf4ac65094e403edea3a08deb700 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 19:11:14 2019 +0000 upstream: perform security key enrollment via ssh-sk-helper too. This means that ssh-keygen no longer needs to link against ssh-sk-helper, and only ssh-sk-helper needs libfido2 and /dev/uhid* access; feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9464233fab95708d2ff059f8bee29c0d1f270800 commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:37 2019 +0000 upstream: allow sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, NULL); ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91482c1ada9adb283165d48dafbb88ae91c657bd commit b52ec0ba3983859514aa7b57d6100fa9759fe696 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:10 2019 +0000 upstream: use ssh-sk-helper for all security key signing operations This extracts and refactors the client interface for ssh-sk-helper from ssh-agent and generalises it for use by the other programs. This means that most OpenSSH tools no longer need to link against libfido2 or directly interact with /dev/uhid* requested by, feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1abcd3aea9a7460eccfbf8ca154cdfa62f1dc93f commit c33d46868c3d88e04a92610cdb429094aeeb5847 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Dec 11 22:19:47 2019 +0000 upstream: add a note about the 'extensions' field in the signed object OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67c01e0565b258e0818c1ccfe1f1aeaf9a0d4c7b commit a62f4e1960691f3aeb1f972e009788b29e2ae464 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 23:37:31 2019 +0000 upstream: some more corrections for documentation problems spotted by Ron Frederick document certifiate private key format correct flags type for sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc4e9a1ed7f9f7f9dd83e2e2c59327912e933e74 commit 22d4beb79622fc82d7111ac941269861fc7aef8d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 23:21:56 2019 +0000 upstream: loading security keys into ssh-agent used the extension constraint "sk-provider@openssh.com", not "sk@openssh.com"; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbfba09edbe023abadd5f59c1492df9073b0e51d commit 75f7f22a43799f6d25dffd9d6683de1601da05a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 22:43:19 2019 +0000 upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3 commit 516605f2d596884cedc2beed6b262716ec76f63d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 22:37:20 2019 +0000 upstream: when acting as a CA and using a security key as the CA key, remind the user to touch they key to authorise the signature. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe58733edd367362f9766b526a8b56827cc439c1 commit c4036fe75ea5a4d03a2a40be1f3660dcbbfa01b2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 10 22:36:08 2019 +0000 upstream: chop some unnecessary and confusing verbiage from the security key protocol description; feedback from Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 048c9483027fbf9c995e5a51b3ac502989085a42 commit 59175a350fe1091af7528b2971e3273aa7ca7295 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 6 03:06:08 2019 +0000 upstream: fix setting of $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT - it shouldn't be set when asking passphrases, only when confirming the use of a key (i.e. for ssh-agent keys added with "ssh-add -c keyfile") OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6643c82960d9427d5972eb702c917b3b838ecf89 commit 36eaa356d391a23a2d4e3a8aaa0223abc70b9822 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 6 02:55:21 2019 +0000 upstream: bring the __func__ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71a3a45b0fe1b8f680ff95cf264aa81f7abbff67 commit 483cc723d1ff3b7fdafc6239348040a608ebc78d Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 30 07:07:59 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak the Nd lines for a bit of consistency; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876651bdde06bc1e72dd4bd7ad599f42a6ce5a16 commit afffd310360b155df2133d1f5f1ab2f4e939b570 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:22:06 2019 +1100 Check if memmem is declared in system headers. If the system (or one of the dependencies) implements memmem but does not define the header, we would not declare it either resulting in compiler warnings. Check for declaration explicitly. bz#3102. commit ad8cd420797695f3b580aea1034b9de60bede9b9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:12:01 2019 +1100 Sort depends. commit 5e3abff39e01817f6866494416f2ada25c316018 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:09:34 2019 +1100 Sort .depend when rebuilding. This makes diffs more stable between makedepend implementations. commit 5df9d1f5c0943367d9b68435f4c82224ce11a73f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 11 13:06:43 2019 +1100 Update depend to include sk files. commit 9a967c5bbfca35835165f7d8a6165009f5b21872 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Dec 9 20:25:26 2019 +1100 Describe how to build libcrypto as PIC. While there, move the OpenSSL 1.1.0g caveat closer to the other version information. commit b66fa5da25c4b5b67cf9f0ce7af513f5a6a6a686 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Dec 9 17:23:22 2019 +1100 Recommend running LibreSSL or OpenSSL self-tests. commit fa7924008e838cded7e8a561356ffe5e06e0ed64 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Dec 6 14:17:26 2019 +1100 Wrap ECC specific bits in ifdef. Fixes tests when built against an OpenSSL configured with no-ec. commit 2ff822eabd7d4461743f22d3b9ba35ab76069df5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 29 20:21:36 2019 +1100 Wrap sha2.h include in ifdef. Fixes build --without-openssl on at least Fedora. commit 443848155ffcda65a6077aac118c861b503a093f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 15:10:21 2019 +1100 compile sk-dummy.so with no-PIE version of LDFLAGS This lets it pick up the -L path to libcrypto for example. commit 37f5b5346e4cc6a894245aa89d2930649bb7045b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 14:48:46 2019 +1100 includes.h for sk-dummy.c, dummy commit b218055e59a7c1a1816f7a55ca18e3f3c05d63a4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 12:32:23 2019 +1100 (yet) another x-platform fix for sk-dummy.so Check for -fPIC support from compiler Compile libopenbsd-compat -fPIC Don't mix -fPIE and -fPIC when compiling commit 0dedb703adcd98d0dbc4479f5f312a2bd3df2850 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 11:53:57 2019 +1100 needs includes.h for WITH_OPENSSL commit ef3853bb94c2c72e7eda0de6cec0bcb1da62058f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 29 11:52:23 2019 +1100 another attempt at sk-dummy.so working x-platform include a fatal() implementation to satisfy libopenbsd-compat clean up .lo and .so files .gitignore .lo and .so files commit d46ac56f1cbd5a855a2d5e7309f90d383dcf6431 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 29 00:13:29 2019 +0000 upstream: lots of dependencies go away here with ed25519 no longer needing the ssh_digest API. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 785847ec78cb580d141e29abce351a436d6b5d49 commit 7404b81f25a4a7847380c0f0cf7f1bea5f0a5cd3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 29 00:11:21 2019 +0000 upstream: perform hashing directly in crypto_hash_sha512() using libcrypto or libc SHA512 functions rather than calling ssh_digest_memory(); avoids many dependencies on ssh code that complicate standalone use of ed25519, as we want to do in sk-dummy.so OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a3c37593d3ba7add037b587cec44aaea088496d commit d39a865b7af93a7a9b5a64cf7cf0ef4396c80ba3 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 28 12:24:31 2019 +0000 upstream: improve the text for -A a little; input from naddy and djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9cdfb1d6dbb9887c4bf3bb25f9c7a94294c988d commit 9a0e01bd0c61f553ead96b5af84abd73865847b8 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 28 12:23:25 2019 +0000 upstream: reshuffle the text to read better; input from naddy, djmc, and dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0b2aca2b67614dda3d6618ea097bf0610c35013 commit 5ca52c0f2e5e7f7d01d8d557b994b5c2087bed00 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 28 18:09:07 2019 +1100 $< doesn't work as` I thought; explicily list objs commit 18e84bfdc5906a73405c3b42d7f840013bbffe34 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 28 05:20:54 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak wording OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd002ca1599b71331faca735ff5f6de29e32222e commit 8ef5bf9d03aa0f047711cff47f5ffbe3b33ff8c9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 28 13:12:30 2019 +1100 missing .SUFFIXES line makes make sad commit 323da82b8ea993b7f2c5793fd53b4f5ca105d19d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 28 09:53:42 2019 +1100 (hopefully) fix out of tree builds of sk-dummy.so commit d8b2838c5d19bf409d44ede4d32df8ee47aeb4cd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 22:32:11 2019 +0000 upstream: remove stray semicolon after closing brace of function; from Michael Forney OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda95acb799bb160d15e205ee126117cf33da3a7 commit 6e1d1bbf5a3eca875005e0c87f341a0a03799809 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 05:38:43 2019 +0000 upstream: Revert previous commit. The channels code still uses int in many places for channel ids so the INT_MAX check still makes sense. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 532e4b644791b826956c3c61d6ac6da39bac84bf commit 48989244658b9748b6801034ff4ffbdfc6b1520f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 27 16:03:12 2019 +1100 wire sk-dummy.so into test suite commit f79364bacaebde4f1c260318ab460fceacace02f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 05:00:17 2019 +0000 upstream: use error()+_exit() instead of fatal() to avoid running cleanup handlers in child process; spotted via weird regress failures in portable OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6902a9bb3987c7d347774444f7979b8a9ba7f412 commit 70ec5e5e2681bcd409a9df94a2fec6f57a750945 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 27 03:34:04 2019 +0000 upstream: Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad105b6a905284e780b1fd7ff118e1c346e90b5 commit ad44ca81bea83657d558aaef5a1d789a9032bac3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 23:43:10 2019 +0000 upstream: test FIDO2/U2F key types; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 367e06d5a260407619b4b113ea0bd7004a435474 commit c6efa8a91af1d4fdb43909a23a0a4ffa012155ad Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 23:41:23 2019 +0000 upstream: add dummy security key middleware based on work by markus@ This will allow us to test U2F/FIDO2 support in OpenSSH without requiring real hardware. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88b309464b8850c320cf7513f26d97ee1fdf9aae commit 8635afa1cdc21366d61730d943f3cf61861899c8 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 22:42:26 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak previous; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4c097364c75da320f1b291568db830fb1ee4883 commit e0d38ae9bc8c0de421605b9021d8144e4d8ff22b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 26 03:04:27 2019 +0000 upstream: more debugging; behind DEBUG_SK OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a978896227118557505999ddefc1f4c839818b60 commit 9281d4311b8abc63b88259f354944c53f9b0b3c7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 25 21:47:49 2019 +1100 unbreak fuzzers for recent security key changes commit c5f1cc993597fed0a9013743556b1567f476c677 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 10:32:35 2019 +0000 upstream: unbreak tests for recent security key changes OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2cdf2fcae9962ca4d711338f3ceec3c1391bdf95 commit 64988266820cc90a45a21672be9d762cbde8d34d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 06:53:04 2019 +0000 upstream: unbreak after security key support landed OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ab578b0dbeb2aa6d9969b54a9c1bad329c0dcba commit e65e25c81e22ea622e89a142a303726a3882384f Author: tb@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 21 05:18:47 2019 +0000 upstream: Remove workaround for broken 'openssl rsa -text' output that was fixed in libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c r1.24. ok dtucker inoguchi OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c260edfac177daa8fcce90141587cf04a95c4f5f commit 21377ec2a9378579ba4b44a681af7bbca77581f4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 10:23:36 2019 +0000 upstream: redundant test OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38fa7806c528a590d91ae560e67bd8b246c2d7a3 commit 664deef95a2e770812533439b8bdd3f3c291ae59 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:51 2019 +0000 upstream: document the "no-touch-required" certificate extension; ok markus, feedback deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47640122b13f825e9c404ea99803b2372246579d commit 26cb128b31efdd5395153f4943f5be3eddc07033 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Print a key touch reminder when generating a security key. Most keys require a touch to authorize the operation. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe8b23edbf33e1bb81741b9f25e9a63be5f6b68 commit daeaf4136927c2a82af1399022103d67ff03f74a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:55:58 2019 +0000 upstream: allow "ssh-keygen -x no-touch-required" when generating a security key keypair to request one that does not require a touch for each authentication attempt. The default remains to require touch. feedback deraadt; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 887e7084b2e89c0c62d1598ac378aad8e434bcbd commit 2e71263b80fec7ad977e098004fef7d122169d40 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:54:23 2019 +0000 upstream: add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their key to authorize them. feedback deraadt, ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e commit 0fddf2967ac51d518e300408a0d7e6adf4cd2634 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:52:46 2019 +0000 upstream: Add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the key). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e434a49802d4ed82bc0aa38cb985c198c407de commit b7e74ea072919b31391bc0f5ff653f80b9f5e84f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:51:37 2019 +0000 upstream: Add new structure for signature options This is populated during signature verification with additional fields that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags field. with and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49 commit d2b0f88178ec9e3f11b606bf1004ac2fe541a2c3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 25 00:38:17 2019 +0000 upstream: memleak in error path OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93488431bf02dde85a854429362695d2d43d9112 commit e2c0a21ade5e0bd7f0aab08d7eb9457f086681e9 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 22 06:50:30 2019 +0000 upstream: Wait for FD to be readable or writeable during a nonblocking connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when the server doesn't immediately send a banner (eg multiplexers like sslh) but is also slightly quicker for other connections since, unlike ssh1, ssh2 doesn't specify that the client should parse the server banner before sending its own. Patch from mnissler@chromium.org, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba9cd8480d1d9dd31d0ca0422ea155c26c5df1d commit 2f95d43dc222ce194622b706682e8de07c9cfb42 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 20 16:34:11 2019 +1100 Include openssl compat header. Fixes warning for ECDSA_SIG_set0 on OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1. commit a70d92f236576c032a45c39e68ca0d71e958d19d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 22:23:19 2019 +0000 upstream: adjust on-wire signature encoding for ecdsa-sk keys to better match ec25519-sk keys. Discussed with markus@ and Sebastian Kinne NB. if you are depending on security keys (already?) then make sure you update both your clients and servers. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 53d88d8211f0dd02a7954d3af72017b1a79c0679 commit 26369a5f7d9c4e4ef44a3e04910126e1bcea43d8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 22:21:15 2019 +0000 upstream: a little more information from the monitor when signature verification fails. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6a30071e0518cac512f9e10be3dc3500e2003f3 commit 4402d6c9b5bf128dcfae2429f1d41cdaa8849b6b Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 16:02:32 2019 +0000 upstream: revert previous: naddy pointed out what's meant to happen. rethink needed... OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb0fede8123ea7f725fd65e00d49241c40bd3421 commit 88056f881315233e990e4e04a815f8f96b4674e1 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 19 14:54:47 2019 +0000 upstream: -c and -s do not make sense with -k; reshuffle -k into the main synopsis/usage; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f881ba253da015398ae8758d973e3390754869bc commit 2cf262c21f35296c2ff718cfdb52e0473a1c3983 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 23:17:48 2019 +0000 upstream: document '$' environment variable expansion for SecurityKeyProvider; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76db507ebd336a573e1cd4146cc40019332c5799 commit f0edda81c5ebccffcce52b182c3033531a1aab71 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 23:16:49 2019 +0000 upstream: more missing mentions of ed25519-sk; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f242e53366f61697dffd53af881bc5daf78230ff commit 189550f5bc85148e85f4caa1f6b2fc623149a4ee Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 16:10:05 2019 +0000 upstream: additional missing stdarg.h includes when built without WITH_OPENSSL; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 881f9a2c4e2239849cee8bbf4faec9bab128f55b commit 723a5369864b338c48d22854bc2bb4ee5c083deb Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 16:08:57 2019 +0000 upstream: add the missing WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs after the ED25519-SK addition; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9545e1c273e506cf70e328cbb9d0129b6d62474 commit 478f4f98e4e93ae4ed1a8911dec4e5b75ea10f30 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Nov 19 08:52:24 2019 +1100 remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones ok dtucker@ commit 6a7ef310da100f876a257b7367e3b0766dac3994 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 18 22:22:04 2019 +1100 filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when compiling without ECC support in libcrypto. commit 64f56f1d1af3947a71a4c391f2c08747d19ee591 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 09:15:17 2019 +0000 upstream: LibreSSL change the format for openssl rsa -text output from "publicExponent" to "Exponent" so accept either. with djm. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b7e6c4bf700029a31c98be14600d4472fe0467e6 commit 4bfc0503ad94a2a7190686a89649567c20b8534f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:58:00 2019 +0000 upstream: fix a bug that prevented serialisation of ed25519-sk keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 066682b79333159cac04fcbe03ebd9c8dcc152a9 commit d88205417084f523107fbe1bc92061635cd57fd2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:36 2019 +0000 upstream: Fix incorrect error message when key certification fails OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7771bd77ee73f7116df37c734c41192943a73cee commit 740c4bc9875cbb4b9fc03fd5eac19df080f20df5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:02 2019 +0000 upstream: fix bug that prevented certification of ed25519-sk keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c8cc6f5de2cdd0ee3a81c3a9dee8d862645996 commit 85409cbb505d8c463ab6e2284b4039764c7243de Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 06:24:17 2019 +0000 upstream: allow *-sk key types to be turned into certificates OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd365ee343934862286d0b011aa77fa739d2a945 commit e2e1283404e06a22ac6135d057199e70dcadb8dd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:55:02 2019 +0000 upstream: mention ed25519-sk key/cert types here too; prompted by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e281977e4a4f121f3470517cbd5e483eee37b818 commit 97dc5d1d82865a7d20f1eb193b5c62ce684024e5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:50:45 2019 +0000 upstream: mention ed25519-sk in places where it is accepted; prompted by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 076d386739ebe7336c2137e583bc7a5c9538a442 commit 130664344862a8c7afd3e24d8d36ce40af41a99f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:34:47 2019 +0000 upstream: document ed25519-sk pubkey, private key and certificate formats OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 795a7c1c80315412e701bef90e31e376ea2f3c88 commit 71856e1142fc01628ce53098f8cfc74765464b35 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:29:50 2019 +0000 upstream: correct order or ecdsa-sk private key fields OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d4a0c13226a79f0080ce6cbe74f73b03ed8092e commit 93fa2a6649ae3e0626cbff25c985a4573d63e3f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 04:16:53 2019 +0000 upstream: correct description of fields in pub/private keys (was missing curve name); spotted by Sebastian Kinne OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a11340dc7ed16200342d384fb45ecd4fcce26e7 commit b497e920b409250309c4abe64229237b8f2730ba Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 18 15:05:04 2019 +1100 Teach the GTK2/3 ssh-askpass the new prompt hints ssh/ssh-agent now sets a hint environment variable $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT when running the askpass program. This is intended to allow the askpass to vary its UI across the three cases it supports: asking for a passphrase, confirming the use of a key and (recently) reminding a user to touch their security key. This adapts the gnome-ssh-askpass[23] to use these hints. Specifically, for SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=confirm it will skip the text input box and show only "yes"/"no" buttons. For SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none (used to remind users to tap their security key), it shows only a "close" button. Help wanted: adapt the other askpass programs in active use, including x11-ssh-askpass, lxqt-openssh-askpass, etc. commit 857f49e91eeae6feb781ef5f5e26c38ca3d953ec Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Nov 18 14:15:26 2019 +1100 Move ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. Found by -Wimplicit-fallthrough: one ECC case was not inside the ifdef. ok djm@ commit 6cf1c40096a79e5eedcf897c7cdb46bb32d4a3ee Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Nov 18 14:14:18 2019 +1100 Enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough if supported Suggested by djm. commit 103c51fd5f5ddc01cd6b5c1132e711765b921bf5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 18 01:59:48 2019 +0000 upstream: missing break in getopt switch; spotted by Sebastian Kinne OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f002dbf14dba5586e8407e90f0141148ade8e8fc commit 9a1225e8ca2ce1fe809910874935302234399a6d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 16 23:17:20 2019 +0000 upstream: tweak debug message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf336d3be0b7e3dd97920d7e7471146a281d2b9 commit 4103a3ec7c68493dbc4f0994a229507e943a86d3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 16 22:42:30 2019 +0000 upstream: a little debug() in the security key interface OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c70300609a5c8b19707207bb7ad4109e963b0e8 commit 05daa211de926f66f50b7380d637f84dc6341574 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 16 22:36:48 2019 +0000 upstream: always use ssh-sk-helper, even for the internal USB HID support. This avoid the need for a wpath pledge in ssh-agent. reported by jmc@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19f799c4d020b870741d221335dbfa5e76691c23 commit d431778a561d90131814f986b646299f9af33c8c Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 15:41:01 2019 +0000 upstream: fix typos in sk_enroll OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faa9bf779e008b3e64e2eb1344d9b7d83b3c4487 commit af90aec0443ec51e6b2d804cb91771d3905f8a6f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 11:16:28 2019 +0000 upstream: double word; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43d09bafa4ea9002078cb30ca9adc3dcc0b9c2b9 commit fd1a96490cef7f945a1b3b5df4e90c8a1070f425 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 06:00:20 2019 +0000 upstream: remove most uses of BN_CTX We weren't following the rules re BN_CTX_start/BN_CTX_end and the places we were using it didn't benefit from its use anyway. ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea9ba6c0d2e6f6adfe00b309a8f41842fe12fc7a commit 39b87104cdd47baf79ef77dc81de62cea07d119f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 18:56:54 2019 +1100 Add wrappers for other ultrix headers. Wrappers protect against multiple inclusions for headers that don't do it themselves. commit 134a74f4e0cf750931f1125beb2a3f40c54c8809 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 18:55:13 2019 +1100 Add SSIZE_MAX when we define ssize_t. commit 9c6d0a3a1ed77989d8c5436d8c3cc6c7045c0197 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 17:13:19 2019 +1100 Remove ultrix realpath hack. commit c63fba5e3472307167850bbd84187186af7fa9f0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 05:37:27 2019 +0000 upstream: unshield security key privkey before attempting signature in agent. spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb67d451665385b8a0a55371231c50aac67b91d2 commit d165bb5396e3f718480e6039ca2cf77f5a2c2885 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 05:26:56 2019 +0000 upstream: rewrite c99-ism OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c70cca29cfa7e6d9f7ec1d6d5dabea112499b3 commit 03e06dd0e6e1c0a9f4b4b9de7def8a44dcbf93a7 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 05:25:52 2019 +0000 upstream: only clang understands those new -W options OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0 commit 5c0bc273cba53f822b7d777bbb6c35d160d3b505 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:08:00 2019 +1100 configure flag to built-in security key support Require --with-security-key-builtin before enabling the built-in security key support (and consequent dependency on libfido2). commit fbcb9a7fa55300b8bd4c18bee024c6104c5a25d7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:06:30 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.48 date: 2019/02/04 16:45:40; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +16 -17; commitid: cpNtVC7erojNyctw; Make gl_pathc, gl_matchc and gl_offs size_t in glob_t to match POSIX. This requires a libc major version bump. OK deraadt@ commit 2cfb11abac85885de0cb888bbeb9a3e4303105ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:05:07 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.47 date: 2017/05/08 14:53:27; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +34 -21; commitid: sYfxfyUHAfarP8sE; Fix exponential CPU use with repeated '*' operators by changing '*' handling to be interative instead of recursive. Fix by Yves Orton, ported to OpenBSD glob.c by Ray Lai. OK tb@ commit 228dd595c7882bb9b161dbb7d4dca15c8a5f03f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:04:28 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.46 date: 2015/12/28 22:08:18; author: mmcc; state: Exp; lines: +5 -9; commitid: 0uXuF2O13NH9q2e1; Remove NULL-checks before free() and a few related dead assignments. ok and valuable input from millert@ commit a16f748690139b9f452485d97511ad5e578f59b2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:43 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.44 date: 2015/09/14 16:09:13; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +3 -5; commitid: iWfSX2BIn0sLw62l; remove null check before free. from Michael McConville ok semarie commit fd37cdeafe25adfcdc752280f535d28de7997ff1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:27 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.43 date: 2015/06/13 16:57:04; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; commitid: zOUKuqWBdOPOz1SZ; in glob() initialize the glob_t before the first failure check. from j@pureftpd.org ok millert stsp commit fd62769c3882adea118dccaff80a06009874a2d1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:01:20 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.42 date: 2015/02/05 12:59:57; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -1; commitid: DTQbfd4poqBW8iSJ; Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@ commit 2b6cba7ee2b8b36f393be739c860a9d2e5d8eb48 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 16:00:07 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.41 date: 2014/10/08 05:35:27; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: JwTGarRLHQKDgPh2; obvious realloc -> reallocarray conversion commit ab3600665387ae34785498558c4409e27f495b0b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 04:12:32 2019 +0000 upstream: don't consult dlopen whitelist for internal security key provider; spotted by dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfe5fbd17e4ff95dd85b9212181652b54444192e commit 19f8ec428db835f68c1cfd63587e9880ccd6486c Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 15:08:28 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.40 date: 2013/09/30 12:02:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +14 -15; Use PATH_MAX, NAME_MAX and LOGIN_NAME_MAX not MAXPATHNAMELEN, MAXNAMLEN or MAXLOGNAME where possible. OK deraadt@ commit bb7413db98e418d4af791244660abf6c829783f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 15:07:30 2019 +1100 upstream commit revision 1.39 date: 2012/01/20 07:09:42; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; the glob stat limit is way too low. bump to 2048. while here, failed stats should count against the limit too. ok deraadt sthen stsp commit 01362cf7cb979525c014714e2bccf799a46e772e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 03:41:57 2019 +0000 upstream: U2F tokens may return FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED when probed to see if they own a key handle. Handle this case so the find_device() look can work for them. Reported by Michael Forney OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ccd5b30a6ddfe4dba228b7159bf168601bd9166 commit cf62307bc9758105913dcb91b418e4968ac2244d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 14:01:00 2019 +1100 Add libfido2 to INSTALL. commit 69fbda1894349d1f420c842dfcbcc883239d1aa7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 15 13:42:15 2019 +1100 libcrypto is now optional. commit 45ffa369886e37930776d7c15dd8b973242d6ecc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 02:38:07 2019 +0000 upstream: show the "please touch your security key" notifier when using the (default) build-in security key support. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4707643aaa7124501d14e92d1364b20f312a6428 commit 49dc9fa928d77807c53bdc2898db7fb515fe5eb3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 02:37:24 2019 +0000 upstream: close the "touch your security key" notifier on the error path too OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7628bf80505c1aefbb1de7abc8bb5ee51826829 commit 22a82712e89bf17c27427aeba15795fb4011a0c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 02:20:06 2019 +0000 upstream: correct function name in debug message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2482c99d2ce448f39282493050f8a01e3ffc39ab commit 018e2902a65c22faded215a7c588492c948f108c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 15 00:32:40 2019 +0000 upstream: follow existing askpass logic for security key notifier: fall back to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT if no $SSH_ASKPASS environment variable is set. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cda753726b13fb797bf7a9f7a0b3022d9ade4520 commit 575d0042a94997c1eeb86a6dcfb30b3c7bdbcba3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 14 21:56:52 2019 +0000 upstream: remove debugging goop that snuck in to last commit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e commit 63a5b24f2dbdc9a4bf2182ac3db26731ddc617e8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 11:21:26 2019 +1100 don't fatal if libfido2 not found spotted by dtucker@ commit 129952a81c00c332721b4ba3ede868c720ad7f4e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 15 11:17:12 2019 +1100 correct object dependency commit 6bff9521ab9a9f7396d635755c342b72373bb4f9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 14 21:27:29 2019 +0000 upstream: directly support U2F/FIDO2 security keys in OpenSSH by linking against the (previously external) USB HID middleware. The dlopen() capability still exists for alternate middlewares, e.g. for Bluetooth, NFC and test/debugging. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14446cf170ac0351f0d4792ba0bca53024930069 commit 4f5e331cb8e11face3025aa6578662dde489c3ad Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 22:00:21 2019 +0000 upstream: in order to be able to figure out the number of signatures left on a shielded key, we need to transfer the number of signatures left from the private to the public key. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a5d0d260aeace47d372695fdae383ce9b962574 commit dffd02e297e6c2a4e86775f293eb1b0ff01fb3df Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 20:25:45 2019 +0000 upstream: fix check for sig_s; noted by qsa at qualys.com OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34198084e4afb424a859f52c04bb2c9668a52867 commit fc173aeb1526d4268db89ec5dfebaf8750dd26cd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 11:25:11 2019 +0000 upstream: When clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section 4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63 commit bf219920b70cafbf29ebc9890ef67d0efa54e738 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 07:53:10 2019 +0000 upstream: fix shield/unshield for xmss keys: - in ssh-agent we need to delay the call to shield until we have received key specific options. - when serializing xmss keys for shield we need to deal with all optional components (e.g. state might not be loaded). ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc2db82524b209468eb176d6b4d6b9486422f41f commit 40598b85d72a509566b7b2a6d57676c7231fed34 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 05:42:26 2019 +0000 upstream: remove size_t gl_pathc < 0 test, it is invalid. the return value from glob() is sufficient. discussed with djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c91203322db9caaf7efaf5ae90c794a91070be3c commit 72687c8e7c38736e3e64e833ee7aa8f9cd9efed1 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 13 04:47:52 2019 +0000 upstream: stdarg.h required more broadly; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5b15674cde1b54d6dbbae8faf30d47e6e5d6513 commit 1e0b248d47c96be944868a735553af8482300a07 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 14 16:08:17 2019 +1100 Put sshsk_sign call inside ifdef ENABLE_SK. Fixes build against OpenSSL configured without ECC. commit 546274a6f89489d2e6be8a8b62f2bb63c87a61fd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 23:27:31 2019 +1100 Remove duplicate __NR_clock_nanosleep commit b1c82f4b8adf3f42476d8a1f292df33fb7aa1a56 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 23:19:35 2019 +1100 seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox. seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() to make OpenSSH working with latest glibc. Patch from Jakub Jelen via bz #3093. commit 2b523d23804c13cb68db135b919fcf312c42b580 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 11:56:56 2019 +1100 Include stdarg.h for va_list in xmalloc.h. commit 245dcbdca5374296bdb9c48be6e24bdf6b1c0af7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 11:19:26 2019 +1100 Put headers inside ifdef _AIX. Prevents compile errors due to missing definitions (eg va_list) on non-AIX platforms. commit a4cc579c6ad2b2e54bdd6cc0d5e12c2288113a56 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 10:41:41 2019 +1100 Fix comment in match_usergroup_pattern_list. Spotted by balu.gajjala@gmail.com via bz#3092. commit fccff339cab5aa66f2554e0188b83f980683490b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:38:19 2019 +0000 upstream: allow an empty attestation certificate returned by a security key enrollment - these are possible for tokens that only offer self- attestation. This also needs support from the middleware. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 135eeeb937088ef6830a25ca0bbe678dfd2c57cc commit e44bb61824e36d0d181a08489c16c378c486a974 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:36:44 2019 +0000 upstream: security keys typically need to be tapped/touched in order to perform a signature operation. Notify the user when this is expected via the TTY (if available) or $SSH_ASKPASS if we can. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef90a99a85d4a2a07217a58efb4df8444818609 commit 4671211068441519011ac0e38c588317f4157ba1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:35:02 2019 +0000 upstream: pass SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT hint to y/n key confirm too OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08d46712e5e5f1bad0aea68e7717b7bec1ab8959 commit 5d1c1590d736694f41b03e686045f08fcae20d62 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:34:20 2019 +0000 upstream: dd API for performing one-shot notifications via tty or SSH_ASKPASS OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9484aea33aff5b62ce3642bf259546c7639f23f3 commit 166927fd410823eec8a7b2472463db51e0e6fef5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 22:32:48 2019 +0000 upstream: add xvasprintf() OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5e3671c05c121993b034db935bce1a7aa372247 commit 782093ec6cf64cc6c4078410093359869ea9329f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Nov 13 09:08:55 2019 +1100 Remove leftover if statement from sync. commit b556cc3cbf0c43f073bb41bba4e92ca709a1ec13 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:40 2019 +0000 upstream: remove extra layer for ed25519 signature; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7672d9d0278b4bf656a12d3aab0c0bfe92a8ae47 commit 3fcf69ace19e75cf9dcd7206f396adfcb29611a8 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:00 2019 +0000 upstream: check sig_r and sig_s for ssh-sk keys; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a1e6a85b5f465d447a3800f739e35c5b74e0abc commit 2c55744a56de0ffc81fe445a1e7fc5cd308712b3 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:33:08 2019 +0000 upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e commit fd1a3b5e38721b1d69aae2d9de1a1d9155dfa5c7 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:32:30 2019 +0000 upstream: update sk-api to version 2 for ed25519 support; ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77aa4d5b6ab17987d8a600907b49573940a0044a commit 7c32b51edbed5bd57870249c0a45dffd06be0002 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:45 2019 +0000 upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_assemble(); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af9ec838b9bc643786310b5caefc4ca4754e68c6 commit fe05a36dc0ea884c8c2395d53d804fe4f4202b26 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:18 2019 +0000 upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_inner_sig(); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f422d0052c6d948fe0e4b04bc961f37fdffa0910 commit e03a29e6554cd0c9cdbac0dae53dd79e6eb4ea47 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:50 2019 +0000 upstream: rename sshsk_ecdsa_sign() to sshsk_sign(); ok djm OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1524042e09d81e54c4470d7bfcc0194c5b46fe19 commit bc7b5d6187de625c086b5f639b25bbad17bbabfc Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:21 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_inner_sig(); ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07e41997b542f670a15d7e2807143fe01efef584 commit cef84a062db8cfeece26f067235dc440f6992c17 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:54 2019 +0000 upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(); ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2313761a3a84ccfe032874d638d3c363e0f14026 commit 7c096c456f33f3d2682736d4735cc10e790276e9 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:24 2019 +0000 upstream: implement ssh-ed25519-sk verification; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37906d93948a1e3d237c20e713d6ca8fbf7d13f6 commit ba5fb02bed1e556d0ce7b1740ae8a5f87b737491 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 13 08:48:30 2019 +1100 ignore ssh-sk-helper commit 78c96498947f711141f493a40d202c482cc59438 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 11 19:53:37 2019 +0000 upstream: skip demanding -fstack-protector-all on hppa. we never wrote a stack protector for reverse-stack architectures, and i don't think anyone else did either. a warning per compiled file is just annoying. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada commit aa1c9e37789f999979fe59df74ce5c8424861ac8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 8 03:54:02 2019 +0000 upstream: duplicate 'x' character in getopt(3) optstring OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c81caa0cb5798de3621eca16b7dd22e5d0d8a7 commit aa4c640dc362816d63584a16e786d5e314e24390 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Nov 7 08:38:38 2019 +0000 upstream: Fill in missing man page bits for U2F security key support: Mention the new key types, the ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk file, ssh's SecurityKeyProvider keyword, the SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable, and ssh-keygen's new -w and -x options. Copy the ssh-sk-helper man page from ssh-pkcs11-helper with minimal substitutions. ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef2e8f83d0c0ce11ad9b8c28945747e5ca337ac4 commit b236b27d6dada7f0542214003632b4e9b7aa1380 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 3 00:10:43 2019 +1100 Put sftp-realpath in libssh.a and remove it from the specific binary targets. commit 382c18c20cdcec45b5d21ff25b4a5e0df91a68c4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 3 00:09:21 2019 +1100 statfs might be defined in sys/mount.h. eg on old NetBSDs. commit 03ffc0951c305c8e3b5fdc260d65312a57f8f7ea Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 23:25:01 2019 +1100 Put stdint.h inside ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit 19cb64c4b42d4312ce12091fd9436dbd6898998c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 22:45:44 2019 +1100 Rebuild .depend. commit 3611bfe89b92ada5914526d8ff0919aeb967cfa7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 22:42:05 2019 +1100 Define __BSD_VISIBLE in fnmatch.h. .. since we use symbols defined only when it is when using the compat fnmatch. commit f5cc5816aaddb8eca3cba193f53e99d6a0b37d05 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 2 16:39:38 2019 +1100 Only enable U2F if OpenSSL supports ECC. This requires moving the U2F bits to below the OpenSSL parts so we have the required information. ok djm@ commit ad38406fc95fa223b0ef2edf8ff50508f8ab1cb6 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 12:10:43 2019 +0000 upstream: fix miscellaneous text problems; ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0cbf411a14d8fa0b269b69cbb1b4fc0ca699fe9f commit 9cac151c2dc76b8e5b727b2fa216f572e372170f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 18:26:07 2019 +1100 Add flags needed to build and work on Ultrix. commit 0e3c5bc50907d2058407641b5a3581b7eda91b7e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 18:24:29 2019 +1100 Hook up fnmatch for platforms that don't have it. commit b56dbfd9d967e5b6ce7be9f81f206112e19e1030 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 18:17:42 2019 +1100 Add missing bracket in realpath macro. commit 59ccb56f15e5e530e7c1b5a0b361749d8c6217d5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 17:32:47 2019 +1100 Import fnmatch.c from OpenBSD. commit 79d46de9fbea0f3c0e8ae7cf84effaba089071b0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 15:22:32 2019 +1100 Use sftp_realpath if no native realpath. commit bb4f003ed8c5f61ec74a66bcedc8ab19bf5b35c4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 15:06:16 2019 +1100 Configure flags for haiku from haikuports. Should build with the default flags with ./configure commit 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 03:54:33 2019 +0000 upstream: fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could turn in to a kill(-1); bz3084, reported by Gao Rui, ok dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac2742e04a69d4c34223505b6a32f6d686e18896 commit 03f9205f0fb49ea2507eacc143737a8511ae5a4e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 14:49:25 2019 +1100 conditionalise SK sign/verify on ENABLE_SK Spotted by Darren and his faux-Vax commit 5eb7b9563ff818e17de24231bf2d347d9db302c5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 14:41:07 2019 +1100 Add prototype for localtime_r if needed. commit d500b59a825f6a58f2abf7b04eb1992d81e45d58 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 1 13:42:12 2019 +1100 Check if IP_TOS is defined before using. commit 764d51e04460ec0da12e05e4777bc90c116accb9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 13:34:49 2019 +1100 autoconf pieces for U2F support Mostly following existing logic for PKCS#11 - turning off support when either libcrypto or dlopen(3) are unavailable. commit 45f17a159acfc5a8e450bfbcc2cffe72950ed7a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:32:05 2019 +0000 upstream: remove duplicate PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG on !WITH_OPENSSL path OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95a7cafad2a4665d57cabacc28031fabc0bea9fc commit db8d13f7925da7337df87248995c533e111637ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:06:52 2019 +0000 upstream: more additional source files OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8eaa25fb901594aee23b76eda99dca5b8db94c6f commit f89c5df65dd307739ff22319c2cf847d3b0c5ab4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:04:25 2019 +0000 upstream: additional source files here too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8809f8e1c8f7459e7096ab6b58d8e56cb2f483fd commit 02275afa1ecbfbd39f27d34c97090e76bec232ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 02:03:27 2019 +0000 upstream: additional source files here too OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 09297e484327f911fd353489518cceaa0c1b95ce commit dfc8f01b9886c7999e6e20acf3f7492cb8c80796 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 01:57:59 2019 +0000 upstream: adapt to extra sshkey_sign() argument and additional dependencies OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7a25604968486c4d6f81d06e8fbc7d17519de50e commit afa59e26eeb44a93f36f043f60b936eaddae77c4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 01:55:41 2019 +0000 upstream: skip security-key key types for tests until we have a dummy U2F middleware to use. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 37200462b44334a4ad45e6a1f7ad1bd717521a95 commit de871e4daf346a712c78fa4ab8f18b231a47cb85 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 1 00:52:35 2019 +0000 upstream: sort; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8264b0be01ec5a60602bd50fd49cc3c81162ea16 commit 2aae149a34b1b5dfbef423d3b7999a96818969bb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:37:33 2019 +0000 upstream: undo debugging bits that shouldn't have been committed OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf commit 3420e0464bd0e8fedcfa5fd20ad37bdc740ad5b4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 09:24:58 2019 +1100 depend commit b923a90abc7bccb11a513dc8b5c0f13a0ea9682c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:28:27 2019 +0000 upstream: fix -Wshadow warning OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3441eb04f872a00c2483c11a5f1570dfe775103c commit 9a14c64c38fc14d0029f1c7bc70cf62cc7f0fdf9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:23:19 2019 +0000 upstream: Refactor signing - use sshkey_sign for everything, including the new U2F signatures. Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this change is mechanically adding that. Suggested by / ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c commit 07da39f71d36fb547749a5b16aa8892e621a7e4a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:22:01 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh-agent support for U2F/FIDO keys feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb544a44bc32e45d2ec8bf652db2046f38360acb commit eebec620c9519c4839d781c4d5b6082152998f82 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:20:38 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh AddKeysToAgent support for U2F/FIDO keys feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac08e45c7f995fa71f8d661b3f582e38cc0a2f91 commit 486164d060314a7f8bca2a00f53be9e900c5e74d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:56 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh-add support for U2F/FIDO keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f88a5181c982687afedf3130c6ab2bba60f7644 commit b9dd14d3091e31fb836f69873d3aa622eb7b4a1c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:14 2019 +0000 upstream: add new agent key constraint for U2F/FIDO provider feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d880c380170704280b4003860a1744d286c7a172 commit 884416bdb10468f1252e4d7c13d51b43dccba7f6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:18:28 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh client support for U2F/FIDO keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb2cfa6cf7419a1895e06e398ea6d41516c5b0bc commit 01a0670f69c5b86e471e033b92145d6c7cc77c58 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:49 2019 +0000 upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need a separate list for user keys. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429 commit 23f38c2d8cda3fad24e214e1f0133c42435b54ee Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:09 2019 +0000 upstream: ssh-keygen support for generating U2F/FIDO keys OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce04f2b497ac9dd8c327f76f1e6c724fb1d1b37 commit ed3467c1e16b7396ff7fcf12d2769261512935ec Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:16:20 2019 +0000 upstream: U2F/FIDO middleware interface Supports enrolling (generating) keys and signatures. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73d1dd5939454f9c7bd840f48236cba41e8ad592 commit 02bb0768a937e50bbb236efc2bbdddb1991b1c85 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:15:14 2019 +0000 upstream: Initial infrastructure for U2F/FIDO support Key library support: including allocation, marshalling public/private keys and certificates, signature validation. feedback & ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a17615ba15e0f7932ac4360cb18fc9a9544e68c7 commit 57ecc10628b04c384cbba2fbc87d38b74cd1199d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 31 21:14:17 2019 +0000 upstream: Protocol documentation for U2F/FIDO keys in OpenSSH OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f3247317c2909870593aeb306dff848bc427915 commit f4fdcd2b7a2bbf5d8770d44565173ca5158d4dcb Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 1 08:36:16 2019 +1100 Missing unit test files commit 1bcd1169c5221688418fa38606e9c69055b72451 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Oct 29 19:45:03 2019 +1100 Add implementation of localtime_r. commit 2046ed16c1202431b0307674c33a123a113e8297 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 29 07:47:27 2019 +0000 upstream: Signal handler cleanup: remove leftover support for unreliable signals and now-unneeded save and restore of errno. ok deraadt@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dd8a1ebdd991c8629ba1f5237283341a93cd88 commit 70fc9a6ca4dd33cb2dd400a4dad5db9683a3d284 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 22 08:50:35 2019 +0000 upstream: fixes from lucas; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c4bfd2806c5bbc753788ffe19c5ee13aaf418b2 commit 702368aa4381c3b482368257ac574a87b5a80938 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 22 07:06:35 2019 +0000 upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987 commit 5fe81da22652f8caa63e9e3a1af519a85d36337e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 21:19:47 2019 +1100 Fix ifdefs to not mask needed bits. commit 7694e9d2fb5785bbdd0920dce7a160bd79feaf00 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 17:05:36 2019 +1100 Only use RLIMIT_NOFILE if it's defined. commit d561b0b2fa2531b4cc3bc70a7d657c6485c9fd0b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 16:09:04 2019 +1100 Make sure we have struct statfs before using. commit 2912596aecfcf48e5115c7a906d1e664f7717a4b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 16:06:59 2019 +1100 Define UINT32_MAX if needed. commit 7169e31121e8c8cc729b55154deb722ae495b316 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 16:00:45 2019 +1100 Move utimensat definition into timespec section. Since utimensat uses struct timespec, move it to the section where we define struct timespec when needed. commit 850ec1773d656cbff44d78a79e369dc262ce5853 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 15:57:22 2019 +1100 Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL. commit 6fc7e1c6fec3ba589869ae98e968c0e5e2e4695b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Oct 28 15:53:25 2019 +1100 Wrap poll.h includes in HAVE_POLL_H. commit 9239a18f96905cc1a353e861e33af093652f24e7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 24 14:39:49 2019 +1100 Add a function call stackprotector tests. Including a function call in the test programs for the gcc stack protector flag tests exercises more of the compiler and makes it more likely it'll detect problems. commit b9705393be4612fd5e29d0cd8e7cf2b66ed19eb7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Oct 22 18:09:22 2019 +1100 Import regenerated moduli file. commit 76ed2199491397e0f9902ade80d5271e4a9b2630 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 16 06:05:39 2019 +0000 upstream: potential NULL dereference for revoked hostkeys; reported by krishnaiah bommu OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ff685e7cc9dd2e3fe2e3dfcdcb9bc5c79f6506 commit 6500c3bc71bf4fe14972c1177e6b93f1164d07a4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 16 06:03:30 2019 +0000 upstream: free buf before return; reported by krishnaiah bommu OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 091bb23a6e913af5d4f72c50030b53ce1cef4de1 commit d7d116b6d9e6cb79cc235e9801caa683d3db3181 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 14 06:00:02 2019 +0000 upstream: memleak in error path; spotted by oss-fuzz, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6ed260cbbc297ab157ad63931802fb1ef7a4266 commit 9b9e3ca6945351eefb821ff783a4a8e6d9b98b9a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Oct 11 14:12:16 2019 +1100 Re-add SA_RESTART to mysignal. This makes mysignal implement reliable BSD semantics according to Stevens' APUE. This was first attempted in 2001 but was reverted due to problems with HP-UX 10.20 and select() and possibly grantpt(). Modern systems should be fine with it, but if any current platforms have a problem with it now we can disable it just for those. ok djm@ commit 0bd312a362168c1eae3cd6b3889395a78e6fd0f8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 09:42:03 2019 +1100 Fix ifdef typo for declaration of memmem. Fixes build on IRIX. bz#3081. commit 01ce1cd402d5eecde2bba35b67e08f5b266b37fd Author: Abhishek Arya Date: Tue Oct 8 20:19:18 2019 -0700 Update README.md commit 1ba130ac8fb2884307f658126f04578f8aef409e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 13:49:35 2019 +1100 add a fuzzer for private key parsing commit cdf1d0a9f5d18535e0a18ff34860e81a6d83aa5c Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 11:31:03 2019 +1100 prepare for 8.1 release commit 3b4e56d740b74324e2d7542957cad5a11518f455 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:57 2019 +0000 upstream: openssh-8.1 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3356bb34e2aa287f0e6d6773c9ae659dc680147d commit 29e0ecd9b4eb3b9f305e2240351f0c59cad9ef81 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:42 2019 +0000 upstream: fix an unreachable integer overflow similar to the XMSS case, and some other NULL dereferences found by fuzzing. fix with and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f81adbb95ef887ce586953e1cb225fa45c7a47b commit a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 9 00:02:57 2019 +0000 upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing. Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program. Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default. ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1 commit c2cc25480ba36ab48c1a577bebb12493865aad87 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 8 22:40:39 2019 +0000 upstream: Correct type for end-of-list sentinel; fixes initializer warnings on some platforms. ok deraadt. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a990dbc2dac25bdfa07e79321349c73fd991efa2 commit e827aedf8818e75c0016b47ed8fc231427457c43 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 7 23:10:38 2019 +0000 upstream: reversed test yielded incorrect debug message OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78bb512d04cfc238adb2c5b7504ac93eecf523b3 commit 8ca491d29fbe26e5909ce22b344c0a848dc28d55 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 8 17:05:57 2019 +1100 depend commit 86a0323374cbd404629e75bb320b3fa1c16aaa6b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Oct 9 09:36:06 2019 +1100 Make MAKE_CLONE no-op macro more correct. Similar to the previous change to DEF_WEAK, some compilers don't like the empty statement, so convert into a no-op function prototype. commit cfc1897a2002ec6c4dc879b24e8b3153c87ea2cf Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 09:06:35 2019 +1100 wrap stdint.h include in HAVE_STDINT_H make the indenting a little more consistent too.. Fixes Solaris 2.6; reported by Tom G. Christensen commit 13b3369830a43b89a503915216a23816d1b25744 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 8 15:32:02 2019 +1100 avoid "return (value)" in void-declared function spotted by Tim Rice; ok dtucker commit 0c7f8d2326d812b371f7afd63aff846973ec80a4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Oct 8 14:44:50 2019 +1100 Make DEF_WEAK more likely to be correct. Completely nop-ing out DEF_WEAK leaves an empty statemment which some compilers don't like. Replace with a no-op function template. ok djm@ commit b1e79ea8fae9c252399677a28707661d85c7d00c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Sun Oct 6 11:49:50 2019 +0000 upstream: Instead of running sed over the whole log to remove CRs, remove them only where it's needed (and confuses test(1) on at least OS X in portable). OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a6ab9b4bd1d33770feaf01b2dfb96f9e4189d2d0 commit 8dc7d6b75a7f746fdd056acd41dffc0a13557a4c Author: Eduardo Barretto Date: Tue May 9 13:33:30 2017 -0300 Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390) The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto commit 07f2c7f34951c04d2cd796ac6c80e47c56c4969e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 04:31:59 2019 +0000 upstream: fix memory leak in error path; bz#3074 patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d031853f3ecf47b35a0669588f4d9d8e3b307b3c commit b7fbc75e119170f4d15c94a7fda4a1050e0871d6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 04:13:39 2019 +0000 upstream: space OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 350648bcf00a2454e7ef998b7d88e42552b348ac commit 643ab68c79ac1644f4a31e36928c2bfc8a51db3c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 03:39:19 2019 +0000 upstream: more sshsig regress tests: check key revocation, the check-novalidate signature test mode and signing keys in ssh-agent. From Sebastian Kinne (slightly tweaked) OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b39566f5cec70140674658cdcedf38752a52e2e2 commit 714031a10bbe378a395a93cf1040f4ee1451f45f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 4 03:26:58 2019 +0000 upstream: Check for gmtime failure in moduli generation. Based on patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok djm@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c6a4cde0022188ac83737de08da0e875704eeaa commit 6918974405cc28ed977f802fd97a9c9a9b2e141b Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 3 17:07:50 2019 +0000 upstream: use a more common options order in SYNOPSIS and sync usage(); while here, no need for Bk/Ek; ok dtucker OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38715c3f10b166f599a2283eb7bc14860211bb90 commit feff96b7d4c0b99307f0459cbff128aede4a8984 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 09:50:50 2019 +0000 upstream: thinko in previous; spotted by Mantas =?UTF-8?q?=20Mikul=C4=97nas?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffa3f5a45e09752fc47d9041e2203ee2ec15b24d commit b5a89eec410967d6b712665f8cf0cb632928d74b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 08:07:13 2019 +0000 upstream: make signature format match PROTOCO =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20a=20string,=20not=20raw=20bytes.=20Spotted=20by=20Manta?= =?UTF-8?q?s=20Mikul=C4=97nas?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80fcc6d52893f80c6de2bedd65353cebfebcfa8f commit dc6f81ee94995deb11bbf7e19801022c5f6fd90a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 08:05:50 2019 +0000 upstream: ban empty namespace strings for s =?UTF-8?q?shsig;=20spotted=20by=20Mantas=20Mikul=C4=97nas?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c5bcf40bed8f4e826230176f4aa353c52aeb698 commit fa5bd8107e0e2b3e1e184f55d0f9320c119f65f0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Oct 2 14:30:55 2019 +1000 Put ssherr.h back as it's actually needed. commit 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602 Author: Lonnie Abelbeck Date: Tue Oct 1 09:05:09 2019 -0500 Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child. New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox. commit edd1d3a6261aecbf9a55944fd7be1db83571b46e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 2 10:54:28 2019 +1000 remove duplicate #includes Prompted by Jakub Jelen commit 13c508dfed9f25e6e54c984ad00a74ef08539e70 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 2 10:51:15 2019 +1000 typo in comment commit d0c3ac427f6c52b872d6617421421dd791664445 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 2 00:42:30 2019 +0000 upstream: remove some duplicate #includes OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed6827ab921eff8027669848ef4f70dc1da4098c commit 084682786d9275552ee93857cb36e43c446ce92c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 1 10:22:53 2019 +0000 upstream: revert unconditional forced login implemented in r1.41 of ssh-pkcs11.c; r1.45 added a forced login as a fallback for cases where the token returns no objects and this is less disruptive for users of tokens directly in ssh (rather than via ssh-agent) and in ssh-keygen bz3006, patch from Jakub Jelen; ok markus OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33d6df589b072094384631ff93b1030103b3d02e commit 6c91d42cce3f055917dc3fd2c305dfc5b3b584b3 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Sep 29 16:31:57 2019 +0000 upstream: group and sort single letter options; ok deraadt OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1480e760a2b582f79696cdcff70098e23fc603f commit 3b44bf39ff4d7ef5d50861e2e9dda62d2926d2fe Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 27 20:03:24 2019 +0000 upstream: fix the DH-GEX text in -a; because this required a comma, i added a comma to the first part, for balance... OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3464e9e82a41e8cdfe8f0a16d94266e43dbb58 commit 3e53ef28fab53094e3b19622ba0e9c3d5fe71273 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 24 12:50:46 2019 +0000 upstream: identity_file[] should be PATH_MAX, not the arbitrary number 1024 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e775f94ad47ce9ab37bd1410d7cf3b7ea98b11b7 commit 90d4b2541e8c907793233d9cbd4963f7624f4174 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 20 18:50:58 2019 +0000 upstream: new sentence, new line; OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35ca5ec07be460e95e7406af12eee04a77b6698 commit fbec7dba01b70b49ac47f56031310865dff86200 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Sep 30 18:01:12 2019 +1000 Include stdio.h for snprintf. Patch from vapier@gentoo.org. commit 0a403bfde71c4b82147473298d3a60b4171468bd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Sep 30 14:11:42 2019 +1000 Add SKIP_LTESTS for skipping specific tests. commit 4d59f7a5169c451ebf559aedec031ac9da2bf80c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Fri Sep 27 05:25:12 2019 +0000 upstream: Test for empty result in expected bits. Remove CRs from log as they confuse tools on some platforms. Re-enable the 3des-cbc test. OpenBSD-Regress-ID: edf536d4f29fc1ba412889b37247a47f1b49d250 commit 7c817d129e2d48fc8a6f7965339313023ec45765 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Sep 27 15:26:22 2019 +1000 Re-enable dhgex test. Since we've added larger fallback groups to dh.c this test will pass even if there is no moduli file installed on the system. - -commit c1e0a32fa852de6d1c82ece4f76add0ab0ca0eae -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Sep 24 21:17:20 2019 +1000 - - Add more ToS bits, currently only used by netcat. - -commit 5a273a33ca1410351cb484af7db7c13e8b4e8e4e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Sep 19 15:41:23 2019 +1000 - - Privsep is now required. - -commit 8aa2aa3cd4d27d14e74b247c773696349472ef20 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 16 03:23:02 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Allow testing signature syntax and validity without verifying - - that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or - unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name - "check-novalidate" - - from Sebastian Kinne - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b - -commit 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 13 04:52:34 2019 +0000 - - upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default - - ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062 - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa - -commit b36ee3fcb2f1601693b1b7fd60dd6bd96006ea75 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 13 04:36:43 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Plug mem leaks on error paths, based in part on github - - pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@. - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e - -commit 2aefdf1aef906cf7548a2e5927d35aacb55948d4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 13 04:31:19 2019 +0000 - - upstream: whitespace - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700 - -commit fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 13 04:27:35 2019 +0000 - - upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings - - From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118 - ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6 - -commit 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 13 04:07:42 2019 +0000 - - upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP - - connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via - Github PR140 - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf - -commit df780114278f406ef7cb2278802a2660092fff09 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 9 02:31:19 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Fix potential truncation warning. ok deraadt. - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d87b7e3a94ec935e8194e7fce41815e22804c3ff - -commit ec0e6243660bf2df30c620a6a0d83eded376c9c6 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Sep 13 13:14:39 2019 +1000 - - memleak of buffer in sshpam_query - - coverity report via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@ - -commit c17e4638e5592688264fc0349f61bfc7b4425aa5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Sep 13 13:12:42 2019 +1000 - - explicitly test set[ug]id() return values - - Legacy !_POSIX_SAVED_IDS path only; coverity report via Ed Maste - ok dtucker@ - -commit 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2 -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 14:45:34 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set - - by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g. - - HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519 - Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com - - ok djm@ dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97 - -commit c8bdd2db77ac2369d5cdee237656f266c8f41552 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 07:53:40 2019 +0000 - - upstream: key conversion should fail for !openssl builds, not fall - - through to the key generation code - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b957436adc43c4941e61d61958a193a708bc83c9 - -commit 823f6c37eb2d8191d45539f7b6fa877a4cb4ed3d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 06:08:11 2019 +0000 - - upstream: typo in previous - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c3b94110864771a6b80a0d8acaca34037c3c96e - -commit 6a710d3e06fd375e2c2ae02546b9541c488a2cdb -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Sep 8 14:48:11 2019 +1000 - - needs time.h for --without-openssl - -commit f61f29afda6c71eda26effa54d3c2e5306fd0833 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Sep 7 19:25:00 2019 +1000 - - make unittests pass for no-openssl case - -commit 105e1c9218940eb53473f55a9177652d889ddbad -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 05:59:41 2019 +0000 - - upstream: avoid compiling certain files that deeply depend on - - libcrypto when WITH_OPENSSL isn't set - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061 - -commit 670104b923dd97b1c06c0659aef7c3e52af571b2 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 05:23:55 2019 +0000 - - upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f - -commit be02d7cbde3d211ec2ed2320a1f7d86b2339d758 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 04:53:27 2019 +0000 - - upstream: lots of things were relying on libcrypto headers to - - transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them - explicitly - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080 - -commit d05aaaaadcad592abfaa44540928e0c61ef72ebb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 03:30:42 2019 +0000 - - upstream: remove leakmalloc reference; we used this early when - - refactoring but not since - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb28ebda8f7c490b87b37954044a6cdd43a7eb2c - -commit 1268f0bcd8fc844ac6c27167888443c8350005eb -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 04:24:06 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Check for RSA support before using it for the user key, - - otherwise use ed25519 which is supported when built without OpenSSL. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d23ddfe83c5062f00ac845d463f19a2ec78c0f7 - -commit fd7a2dec652b9efc8e97f03f118f935dce732c60 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 6 14:07:10 2019 +1000 - - Provide explicit path to configure-check. - - On some platforms (at least OpenBSD) make won't search VPATH for target - files, so building out-of-tree will fail at configure-check. Provide - explicit path. ok djm@ - -commit 00865c29690003b4523cc09a0e104724b9f911a4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 6 01:58:50 2019 +0000 - - upstream: better error code for bad arguments; inspired by - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfc263b6041de7f0ed921a1de0b81ddebfab1e0a - -commit afdf27f5aceb4973b9f5308f4310c6e3fd8db1fb -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 5 21:38:40 2019 +1000 - - revert config.h/config.h.in freshness checks - - turns out autoreconf and configure don't touch some files if their content - doesn't change, so the mtime can't be relied upon in a makefile rule - -commit a97609e850c57bd2cc2fe7e175fc35cb865bc834 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 5 20:54:39 2019 +1000 - - extend autoconf freshness test - - make it cover config.h.in and config.h separately - -commit 182297c10edb21c4856c6a38326fd04d81de41a5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 5 20:34:54 2019 +1000 - - check that configure/config.h is up to date - - Ensure they are newer than the configure.ac / aclocal.m4 source - -commit 7d6034bd020248e9fc0f8c39c71c858debd0d0c1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 5 10:05:51 2019 +0000 - - upstream: if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and - - refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab53bd6ddd54dd09e54a8bfbed1a984496f08b43 - -commit 76f09bd95917862101b740afb19f4db5ccc752bf -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 5 09:35:19 2019 +0000 - - upstream: sprinkle in some explicit errors here, otherwise the - - percolate all the way up to dispatch_run_fatal() and lose all meaninful - context - - to help with bz#3063; ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b2da83bb1c4a3471444b7910b2120ae36438a0a - -commit 0ea332497b2b2fc3995f72f6bafe9d664c0195b3 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 5 09:25:13 2019 +0000 - - upstream: only send ext_info for KEX_INITIAL; bz#2929 ok dtucker - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f5c6062f6863769f5447c6346f78c05d2e4a63 - -commit f23d91f9fa7f6f42e70404e000fac88aebfe3076 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 5 05:47:23 2019 +0000 - - upstream: macro fix; ok djm - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e891dd6c7996114cb32f0924cb7898ab55efde6e - -commit 8b57337c1c1506df2bb9f039d0628a6de618566b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 5 15:46:39 2019 +1000 - - update fuzzing makefile to more recent clang - -commit ae631ad77daf8fd39723d15a687cd4b1482cbae8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 5 15:45:32 2019 +1000 - - fuzzer for sshsig allowed_signers option parsing - -commit 69159afe24120c97e5ebaf81016c85968afb903e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 5 05:42:59 2019 +0000 - - upstream: memleak on error path; found by libfuzzer - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34d44cb0fb5bdb5fcbc6b02b804e71b20a7a5fc7 - -commit bab6feb01f9924758ca7129dba708298a53dde5f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 5 04:55:32 2019 +0000 - - upstream: expose allowed_signers options parsing code in header for - - fuzzing - - rename to make more consistent with philosophically-similar auth - options parsing API. - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c67600ef04187f98e2912ca57b60c22a8025b7c - -commit 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 4 20:31:15 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics. - - Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the - complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus - character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively. - - Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix, - so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for - all options supporting these semantics. - - Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417 - -commit db1e6f60f03641b2d17e0ab062242609f4ed4598 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 4 05:56:54 2019 +0000 - - upstream: tweak previous; - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0abd728aef6b5b35f6db43176aa83b7e3bf3ce27 - -commit 0f44e5956c7c816f6600f2a47be4d7bb5a8d711d -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 20:51:49 2019 +0000 - - upstream: repair typo and editing mishap - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d125ab720ca71ccf9baf83e08ddc8c12a328597e - -commit f4846dfc6a79f84bbc6356ae3184f142bacedc24 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 5 11:09:28 2019 +1000 - - Fuzzer harness for sshsig - -commit b08a6bc1cc7750c6f8a425d1cdbd86552fffc637 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Sep 3 18:45:42 2019 +1000 - - oops; missed including the actual file - -commit 1a72c0dd89f09754df443c9576dde624a17d7dd0 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Sep 3 18:44:10 2019 +1000 - - portability fixes for sshsig - -commit 6d6427d01304d967e58544cf1c71d2b4394c0522 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:45 2019 +0000 - - upstream: regress test for sshsig; feedback and ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c0974f2cdae8d9599b9d76a09680bae55d8a8b - -commit 59650f0eaf65115afe04c39abfb93a4fc994ec55 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:06 2019 +0000 - - upstream: only add plain keys to prevent any certs laying around - - from confusing the test. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b8f1508f822bc560b98dea910e61ecd76f34100f - -commit d637c4aee6f9b5280c13c020d7653444ac1fcaa5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:35:27 2019 +0000 - - upstream: sshsig tweaks and improvements from and suggested by - - Markus - - ok markus/me - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea4f46ad5a16b27af96e08c4877423918c4253e9 - -commit 2a9c9f7272c1e8665155118fe6536bebdafb6166 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:34:19 2019 +0000 - - upstream: sshsig: lightweight signature and verification ability - - for OpenSSH - - This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH. - Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify - - Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this - is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list - of allowed signers. - - Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me - - ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb - -commit 5485f8d50a5bc46aeed829075ebf5d9c617027ea -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:32:11 2019 +0000 - - upstream: move authorized_keys option parsing helpsers to misc.c - - and make them public; ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c18bcb2a687227b3478377c981c2d56af2638ea2 - -commit f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:31:20 2019 +0000 - - upstream: make get_sigtype public as sshkey_get_sigtype(); ok - - markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8 - -commit dd8002fbe63d903ffea5be7b7f5fc2714acab4a0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:30:47 2019 +0000 - - upstream: move advance_past_options to authfile.c and make it - - public; ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c - -commit c72d78ccbe642e08591a626e5de18381489716e0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:58 2019 +0000 - - upstream: move skip_space() to misc.c and make it public; ok - - markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caa77e8a3b210948e29ad3e28c5db00852961eae - -commit 06af3583f46e2c327fdd44d8a95b8b4e8dfd8db5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:15 2019 +0000 - - upstream: authfd: add function to check if key is in agent - - This commit adds a helper function which allows the caller to - check if a given public key is present in ssh-agent. - - work by Sebastian Kinne; ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d43c5826353e1fdc1af71eb42961b30782c7bd13 - -commit 2ab5a8464870cc4b29ddbe849bbbc255729437bf -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:28:30 2019 +0000 - - upstream: fix memleak in ssh_free_identitylist(); ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa51f77ae2c5330a1f61b2d22933f24a443f9abf - -commit 85443f165b4169b2a448b3e24bc1d4dc5b3156a4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 3 08:27:52 2019 +0000 - - upstream: factor out confirm_overwrite(); ok markus@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 304e95381b39c774c8fced7e5328b106a3ff0400 - -commit 9a396e33685633581c67d5ad9664570ef95281f2 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 2 23:46:46 2019 +0000 - - upstream: constify an argument - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 724bafc9f993746ad4303e95bede2c030de6233b - -commit b52c0c2e64988277a35a955a474d944967059aeb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 2 00:19:25 2019 +0000 - - upstream: downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" warning - - from log level error to debug. This is common when attempting to enumerate - keys on smartcard readers with no cards plugged in. bz#3058 ok dtucker@ - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb8839ddeb77c271390488af1b771041d43e49c6 - -commit 0713322e18162463c5ab5ddfb9f935055ca775d8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Sep 1 23:47:32 2019 +0000 - - upstream: print comment when printing pubkey from private - - bz#3052; ok dtucker - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a91b2a8d5f1053d34d7fce44523c53fb534ba914 - -commit 368f1cc2fbd6ad10c66bc1b67c2c04aebf8a04a8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Sep 2 10:28:42 2019 +1000 - - fixed test in OSX closefrom() replacement - - from likan_999.student AT sina.com - -commit 6b7c53498def19a14dd9587bf521ab6dbee8988f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Sep 2 10:22:02 2019 +1000 - - retain Solaris PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY in sftp-server - - Dropping this privilege removes the ability to create hard links to - files owned by other users. This is required for the legacy sftp rename - operation. - - bz#3036; approach ok Alex Wilson (the original author of the Solaris - sandbox/pledge replacement code) - -commit e50f808712393e86d69e42e9847cdf8d473412d7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 30 05:08:28 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Use ed25519 for most hostkey rotation tests since it's - - supported even when built without OpenSSL. Use RSA for the secondary type - test if supported, otherwise skip it. Fixes this test for !OpenSSL builds. - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 101cb34a84fd974c623bdb2e496f25a6e91be109 - -commit 5e4796c47dd8d6c38fb2ff0b3e817525fed6040d -Author: bluhm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 22 21:47:27 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Test did not compile due to missing symbols. Add source - - sshbuf-misc.c to regress as it was done in ssh make file. from Moritz Buhl - - OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5 - -commit e0e7e3d0e26f2c30697e6d0cfc293414908963c7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 30 14:26:19 2019 +1000 - - tweak warning flags - - Enable -Wextra if compiler supports it - - Set -Wno-error=format-truncation if available to prevent expected - string truncations in openbsd-compat from breaking -Werror builds - -commit 28744182cf90e0073b76a9e98de58a47e688b2c4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 30 13:21:38 2019 +1000 - - proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X - - Refactor closefrom() to use a single brute-force close() loop fallback. - - Based on patch from likan_999.student@sina.com in bz#3049. ok dtucker@ - -commit dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f -Author: kn@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 16 11:16:32 2019 +0000 - - upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics - - Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the - complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus - character to remove from or append to the default list respectively. - - Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix, - so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for - all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of - available elements via "ssh -Q ..."). - - Input and OK jmc - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57 - -commit c4736f39e66729ce2bf5b06ee6b391e092b48f47 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 16 06:35:27 2019 +0000 - - upstream: include sshbuf-misc.c in SRCS_BASE - - OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474 - -commit d0e51810f332fe44ebdba41113aacf319d35f5a5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Aug 24 15:12:11 2019 +1000 - - Fix pasto in fallback code. - - There is no parameter called "pathname", it should simply be "path". - bz#3059, patch from samuel at cendio.se. - -commit e83c989bfd9fc9838b7dfb711d1dc6da81814045 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 23 10:19:30 2019 +1000 - - use SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK to limit mmap protections - - Restrict to PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE), i.e. exclude PROT_EXEC - -commit f6906f9bf12c968debec3671bbf19926ff8a235b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 23 10:08:48 2019 +1000 - - allow mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only - - Used by some hardened heap allocators. Requested by Yegor - Timoshenko in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/142 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README b/crypto/openssh/README index 5c7f8647dc8e..329aaeda2ea9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/README +++ b/crypto/openssh/README @@ -1,52 +1,52 @@ -See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.7p1 for the release notes. +See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.8p1 for the release notes. Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or patch/pull-request management. This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other Unices. OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/ This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM support, EGD/PRNGD support and replacements for OpenBSD library functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris and UnixWare. This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository. The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for all logins, not just when using password authentication. There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. Please send bug reports and patches to https://bugzilla.mindrot.org or the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. To mitigate spam, the list only allows posting from subscribed addresses. Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[1]. Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on dependencies and how to install OpenSSH on your system. Damien Miller Miscellania - This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. References - [0] https://www.openssh.com/ [1] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c index 7e6f972681e9..81c19fb7c458 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c @@ -1,1399 +1,1400 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the * DARPA CHATS research program. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_PAM #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) extern char *__progname; # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname #endif /* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */ #else # define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */ #endif /* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) #else # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "misc.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "blacklist_client.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern u_int utmp_len; /* so we don't silently change behaviour */ #ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS # error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK" #endif /* * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if * this breaks. */ #ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK #include /* * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with* * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h * (e.g. Linux) */ typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; #else typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t; #define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit #define pthread_create fake_pthread_create #define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel #define pthread_join fake_pthread_join #endif struct pam_ctxt { sp_pthread_t pam_thread; int pam_psock; int pam_csock; int pam_done; }; static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *); static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt; #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* * Simulate threads with processes. */ static int sshpam_thread_status = -1; static sshsig_t sshpam_oldsig; static void sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig) { ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL) return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */ if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG) <= 0) { /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */ kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM); while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return; } } if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) && WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM) return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */ if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status)) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly"); if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly"); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void pthread_exit(void *value) { _exit(0); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr, void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg) { pid_t pid; struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg; sshpam_thread_status = -1; switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno)); return errno; case 0: close(ctx->pam_psock); ctx->pam_psock = -1; thread_start(arg); _exit(1); default: *thread = pid; close(ctx->pam_csock); ctx->pam_csock = -1; sshpam_oldsig = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler); return (0); } } static int pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread) { ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); return (kill(thread, SIGTERM)); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value) { int status; if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) return (sshpam_thread_status); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } return (status); } #endif static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL; static int sshpam_err = 0; static int sshpam_authenticated = 0; static int sshpam_session_open = 0; static int sshpam_cred_established = 0; static int sshpam_account_status = -1; static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0; static char **sshpam_env = NULL; static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL; static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL; static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL; static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL; /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST static char ** pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh) { /* * XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment. */ return NULL; } #endif #ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV static int pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value) { return PAM_SUCCESS; } #endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */ /* * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root. * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do * the right thing. */ #ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID static int sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) { int result; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized"); if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags); if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return result; } # define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b))) #endif static void sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd) { extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11; debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd); if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd; if (reqd) { saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag; saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag; saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag; auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; } else { if (saved_port) auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port; if (saved_agent) auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent; if (saved_x11) auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11; } } /* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */ static void import_environments(struct sshbuf *b) { char *env; u_int n, i, num_env; int r; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (n > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n); sshpam_account_status = (int)n; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0); /* Import environment from subprocess */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (num_env > 1024) fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024", __func__, num_env); sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env)); debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env); for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL; /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env); for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Errors are not fatal here */ if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r)); } /* * XXX this possibly leaks env because it is not documented * what pam_putenv() does with it. Does it copy it? Does it * take ownweship? We don't know, so it's safest just to leak. */ } #endif } /* * Conversation function for authentication thread. */ static int sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; u_char status; debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (data == NULL) { error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context"); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } ctxt = data; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return PAM_CONV_ERR; if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { free(reply); return PAM_CONV_ERR; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1) goto fail; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK) goto fail; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) goto fail; break; default: goto fail; } sshbuf_reset(buffer); } sshbuf_free(buffer); *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } /* * Authentication thread. */ static void * sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; struct pam_conv sshpam_conv; int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK extern char **environ; char **env_from_pam; u_int i; const char *pam_user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; char *tz = getenv("TZ"); sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; environ[0] = NULL; if (tz != NULL) if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1) error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s", strerror(errno)); if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) { setproctitle("%s [pam]", sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown"); } #endif sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv; sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&sshpam_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; if (!do_pam_account()) { sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; goto auth_fail; } if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_password_change_required(0); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Export any environment strings set in child */ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Count */ if (i > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */ env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle); for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Count */ if (i > INT_MAX) fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } #endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer); sshbuf_free(buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); auth_fail: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer); else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer); else ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer); sshbuf_free(buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */ } void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) { pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread); pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL); close(ctxt->pam_psock); close(ctxt->pam_csock); memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt)); cleanup_ctxt = NULL; } } static int sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL }; static int sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL }; void sshpam_cleanup(void) { if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor())) return; debug("PAM: cleanup"); pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv); if (sshpam_session_open) { debug("PAM: closing session"); pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT); sshpam_session_open = 0; } if (sshpam_cred_established) { debug("PAM: deleting credentials"); pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED); sshpam_cred_established = 0; } sshpam_authenticated = 0; pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } static int sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; #if defined(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) && defined(PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) /* Protect buggy PAM implementations from excessively long usernames */ if (strlen(user) >= PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) fatal("Username too long from %s port %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); #endif if (sshpam_handle == NULL) { if (ssh == NULL) { fatal("%s: called initially with no " "packet context", __func__); } } if (sshpam_handle != NULL) { /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0) return (0); pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user); sshpam_err = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle); sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_rhost == NULL) { /* * We need to cache these as we don't have packet context * during the kbdint flow. */ sshpam_rhost = xstrdup(auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns)); sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr( ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh)); } if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) { debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, sshpam_rhost); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } /* Put SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment too */ pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, sshpam_conninfo); } #ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE /* * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate. * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and * may not even set one (for tty-less connections) */ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\""); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh"); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } #endif return (0); } static void expose_authinfo(const char *caller) { char *auth_info; /* * Expose authentication information to PAM. * The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the * version suffix if the format of session_info changes. */ if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL) auth_info = xstrdup(""); else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string( sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller); do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info); free(auth_info); } static void * sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; int result, socks[2]; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); /* * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account * has previously failed. */ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0) return NULL; /* Initialize PAM */ if (sshpam_init(NULL, authctxt) == -1) { error("PAM: initialization failed"); return (NULL); } expose_authinfo(__func__); ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt); /* Start the authentication thread */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) { error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno)); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0]; ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1]; result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt); if (result != 0) { error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s", strerror(result)); close(socks[0]); close(socks[1]); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } cleanup_ctxt = ctxt; return (ctxt); } static int sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; size_t plen; u_char type; char *msg; size_t len, mlen; int r; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); *name = xstrdup(""); *info = xstrdup(""); *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); **prompts = NULL; plen = 0; *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int)); while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: *num = 1; len = plen + mlen + 1; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (0); case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: /* accumulate messages */ len = plen + mlen + 2; **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen); plen++; free(msg); break; case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: case PAM_MAXTRIES: if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) sshpam_account_status = 0; if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_AUTH_ERR: debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type)); if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) { + free(*info); *info = **prompts; **prompts = NULL; *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = -1; free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return 0; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_SUCCESS: if (**prompts != NULL) { /* drain any accumulated messages */ debug("PAM: %s", **prompts); if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts, strlen(**prompts))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(**prompts); **prompts = NULL; } if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid || (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) fatal("Internal error: PAM auth " "succeeded when it should have " "failed"); import_environments(buffer); *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = 1; free(msg); sshbuf_free(buffer); return (0); } BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(NULL, BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, sshpam_authctxt->user); error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg, sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; free(msg); ctxt->pam_done = -1; sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } } sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } /* * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied. * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that * vary processing time in proportion to password length. */ static char * fake_password(const char *wire_password) { const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; char *ret = NULL; size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0; if (l >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l); ret = malloc(l + 1); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < l; i++) ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)]; ret[i] = '\0'; return ret; } /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */ static int sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { struct sshbuf *buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; char *fake; int r; debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num); switch (ctxt->pam_done) { case 1: sshpam_authenticated = 1; return (0); case 0: break; default: return (-1); } if (num != 1) { error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num); return (-1); } if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (sshpam_authctxt->valid && (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 || options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { fake = fake_password(*resp); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(fake); } if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) { sshbuf_free(buffer); return (-1); } sshbuf_free(buffer); return (1); } static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); free(ctxt); /* * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before * the server process terminates. */ } KbdintDevice sshpam_device = { "pam", sshpam_init_ctx, sshpam_query, sshpam_respond, sshpam_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = { "pam", mm_sshpam_init_ctx, mm_sshpam_query, mm_sshpam_respond, mm_sshpam_free_ctx }; /* * This replaces auth-pam.c */ void start_pam(struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no"); if (sshpam_init(ssh, authctxt) == -1) fatal("PAM: initialisation failed"); } void finish_pam(void) { sshpam_cleanup(); } u_int do_pam_account(void) { debug("%s: called", __func__); if (sshpam_account_status != -1) return (sshpam_account_status); expose_authinfo(__func__); sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0); debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { sshpam_account_status = 0; return (sshpam_account_status); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) sshpam_password_change_required(1); sshpam_account_status = 1; return (sshpam_account_status); } void do_pam_setcred(int init) { sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (init) { debug("PAM: establishing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); } else { debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) { sshpam_cred_established = 1; return; } if (sshpam_authenticated) fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); else debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } static int sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; struct pam_response *reply; int i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: reply[i].resp = read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL) input[0] = '\0'; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL }; /* * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't * support that */ void do_pam_chauthtok(void) { if (use_privsep) fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)"); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&tty_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); debug("PAM: changing password"); sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } void do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh) { debug3("PAM: opening session"); expose_authinfo(__func__); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) sshpam_session_open = 1; else { sshpam_session_open = 0; auth_restrict_session(ssh); error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } } int is_pam_session_open(void) { return sshpam_session_open; } /* * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear * during the ssh authentication process. */ int do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) { int ret = 1; char *compound; size_t len; len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2; compound = xmalloc(len); snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value); ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound); free(compound); return (ret); } char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void) { return sshpam_env; } char ** fetch_pam_environment(void) { return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle)); } void free_pam_environment(char **env) { char **envp; if (env == NULL) return; for (envp = env; *envp; envp++) free(*envp); free(env); } /* * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later * display. */ static int sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int r, i; size_t len; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: if (sshpam_password == NULL) goto fail; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (len > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL }; /* * Attempt password authentication via PAM */ int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); char *fake = NULL; if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL) fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to " "initialise.", __func__); sshpam_password = password; sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; /* * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail). */ if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&passwd_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); sshpam_password = NULL; free(fake); if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) { debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s", authctxt->user); return 1; } else { debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s", authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); return 0; } } int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void) { return sshpam_maxtries_reached; } void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached) { if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached) return; sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1; options.password_authentication = 0; options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; } #endif /* USE_PAM */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c index fd72f371df98..1c714c845e18 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c @@ -1,4891 +1,4893 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.407 2021/05/19 01:24:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.408 2021/09/14 11:04:21 mbuhl Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "match.h" /* -- agent forwarding */ #define NUM_SOCKS 10 /* -- tcp forwarding */ /* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 /* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ #define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); /* * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local * network (which might be behind a firewall). */ /* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */ /* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */ /* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */ struct permission { char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */ char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */ int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */ Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/ }; /* * Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or * remote). */ struct permission_set { /* * List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the * user. */ u_int num_permitted_user; struct permission *permitted_user; /* * List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin. */ u_int num_permitted_admin; struct permission *permitted_admin; /* * If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted. This is the * case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway, * and the user could do anything after logging in. */ int all_permitted; }; /* Master structure for channels state */ struct ssh_channels { /* * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array * is dynamically extended as needed. */ Channel **channels; /* * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL */ u_int channels_alloc; /* * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is * updated in channel_new. */ int channel_max_fd; /* * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits * relevant to channels in the select bitmasks. * * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for * channels which have events pending. */ chan_fn **channel_pre; chan_fn **channel_post; /* -- tcp forwarding */ struct permission_set local_perms; struct permission_set remote_perms; /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ char *x11_saved_display; /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ char *x11_saved_proto; /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ char *x11_saved_data; u_int x11_saved_data_len; /* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ u_int x11_refuse_time; /* * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be * sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the * real data. */ u_char *x11_fake_data; u_int x11_fake_data_len; /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ int IPv4or6; }; /* helper */ static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype); static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host); /* non-blocking connect helpers */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *); static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* Setup helper */ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc); /* -- channel core */ void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc; if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL) fatal_f("allocation failed"); sc->channels_alloc = 10; sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels)); sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; channel_handler_init(sc); ssh->chanctxt = sc; } Channel * channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return NULL; } c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id]; if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id: channel free", id); return NULL; } return c; } Channel * channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id) { Channel *c; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id) return c; } return NULL; } /* * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages. * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. */ Channel * channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) return NULL; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: return c; } logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); return NULL; } /* * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd */ static void channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, rfd); sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, wfd); sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, efd); if (rfd != -1) fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); c->rfd = rfd; c->wfd = wfd; c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; c->efd = efd; c->extended_usage = extusage; if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0) debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd); #endif /* enable nonblocking mode */ c->restore_block = 0; if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) { /* * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering * with other programs that follow. */ if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) { c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD; set_nonblock(rfd); } if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) { c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD; set_nonblock(wfd); } if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) { c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD; set_nonblock(efd); } } else if (nonblock) { if (rfd != -1) set_nonblock(rfd); if (wfd != -1) set_nonblock(wfd); if (efd != -1) set_nonblock(efd); } } /* * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause * remote_name to be freed. */ Channel * channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int i, found; Channel *c; int r; /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) { /* Found a free slot. */ found = i; break; } } if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) { /* * There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand * the array. */ found = sc->channels_alloc; if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS) fatal_f("internal error: channels_alloc %d too big", sc->channels_alloc); sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc, sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels)); sc->channels_alloc += 10; debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc); } /* Initialize and return new channel. */ c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_set_max_size"); c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); c->self = found; c->type = type; c->ctype = ctype; c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); c->ctl_chan = -1; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return c; } static void channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc) { u_int i; int max = 0; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { max = MAXIMUM(max, c->rfd); max = MAXIMUM(max, c->wfd); max = MAXIMUM(max, c->efd); } } sc->channel_max_fd = max; } int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; int ret, fd = *fdp; if (fd == -1) return 0; if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) || (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) || (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0)) (void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0); /* restore blocking */ ret = close(fd); *fdp = -1; if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd) channel_find_maxfd(sc); return ret; } /* Close all channel fd/socket. */ static void channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd; channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); if (rfd != sock) channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd); if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd) channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd); if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); } static void fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm) { free(perm->host_to_connect); free(perm->listen_host); free(perm->listen_path); memset(perm, 0, sizeof(*perm)); } /* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */ static const char * fwd_ident(int who, int where) { if (who == FORWARD_ADM) { if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) return "admin local"; else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) return "admin remote"; } else if (who == FORWARD_USER) { if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) return "user local"; else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) return "user remote"; } fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where); } /* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */ static struct permission_set * permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; switch (where) { case FORWARD_LOCAL: return &sc->local_perms; break; case FORWARD_REMOTE: return &sc->remote_perms; break; default: fatal_f("invalid forwarding direction %d", where); } } /* Returns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */ static void permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp) { struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); switch (who) { case FORWARD_USER: *permpp = &pset->permitted_user; *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user; break; case FORWARD_ADM: *permpp = &pset->permitted_admin; *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin; break; default: fatal_f("invalid forwarding client %d", who); } } /* Adds an entry to the spcified forwarding list */ static int permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect, const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port, Channel *downstream) { struct permission **permp; u_int n, *npermp; permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); if (*npermp >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("%s overflow", fwd_ident(who, where)); *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp)); n = (*npermp)++; #define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s)) (*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect); (*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect; (*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host); (*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path); (*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port; (*permp)[n].downstream = downstream; #undef MAYBE_DUP return (int)n; } static void mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct permission *perm; int r; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (perm->downstream != c) continue; /* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */ debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u", c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ } } /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ void channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; char *s; u_int i, n; Channel *other; struct channel_confirm *cc; for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL) continue; n++; /* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT && other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY && other->mux_ctx == c) { other->mux_ctx = NULL; other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; } } debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); - if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c); - else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER) { + free(c->mux_ctx); + c->mux_ctx = NULL; + } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER) { free(c->mux_ctx); c->mux_ctx = NULL; } if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { s = channel_open_message(ssh); debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); free(s); } channel_close_fds(ssh, c); sshbuf_free(c->input); sshbuf_free(c->output); sshbuf_free(c->extended); c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL; free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = NULL; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; free(c->listening_addr); c->listening_addr = NULL; while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); } if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx); sc->channels[c->self] = NULL; freezero(c, sizeof(*c)); } void channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) if (sc->channels[i] != NULL) channel_free(ssh, sc->channels[i]); free(sc->channels); sc->channels = NULL; sc->channels_alloc = 0; sc->channel_max_fd = 0; free(sc->x11_saved_display); sc->x11_saved_display = NULL; free(sc->x11_saved_proto); sc->x11_saved_proto = NULL; free(sc->x11_saved_data); sc->x11_saved_data = NULL; sc->x11_saved_data_len = 0; free(sc->x11_fake_data); sc->x11_fake_data = NULL; sc->x11_fake_data_len = 0; } /* * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file * descriptors after a fork. */ void channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL) channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]); } /* * Stop listening to channels. */ void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); channel_free(ssh, c); break; } } } } /* * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or * more channel is overfull. */ int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh); Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) { debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u", c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize); return 0; } } return 1; } /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ int channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: return 1; default: fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return 0; } /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ int channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: return i; default: fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return -1; } /* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */ const char * channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c) { if (c->efd == -1) return "closed"; switch (c->extended_usage) { case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE: return "write"; case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ: return "read"; case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE: return "ignore"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } static char * channel_format_status(const Channel *c) { char *ret = NULL; xasprintf(&ret, "t%d %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu " "fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d", c->type, c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id, c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input), c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output), channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan); return ret; } /* * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for * newlines. */ char * channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *buf; Channel *c; u_int i; int r; char *cp, *ret; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: cp = channel_format_status(c); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n", c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) { free(cp); fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } free(cp); continue; default: fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string"); sshbuf_free(buf); return ret; } static void open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type) { int r; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { fatal_r(r, "%s: channel %i: open", where, c->self); } } void channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: send open", id); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } void channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: unknown channel id", id); return; } if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } } void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) { struct channel_confirm *cc; Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal_f("%d: bad id", id); cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); cc->cb = cb; cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb; cc->ctx = ctx; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); } void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->open_confirm = fn; c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx; } void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = fn; c->detach_close = do_close; } void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; } void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { logit_f("%d: bad id", id); return; } c->input_filter = ifn; c->output_filter = ofn; c->filter_ctx = ctx; c->filter_cleanup = cfn; } void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); int r; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } static void channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } static void channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->remote_window > 0 && sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window && sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) { FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: " "obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); else chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /** XXX check close conditions, too */ if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window) FD_SET(c->efd, readset); } /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ } /* * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. * XXX All this happens at the client side. * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok */ static int x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return -1; } /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12) return 0; /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; } else { debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", ucp[0]); return -1; } /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) return 0; /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) || memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); return -1; } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len || timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; } /* Check fake data length */ if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) { error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return -1; } /* * Received authentication protocol and data match * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real * data. */ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return 1; } static void channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output); /* c->force_drain = 1; */ if (ret == 1) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open(ssh, c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->output); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); } } static void channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /* try to decode a socks4 header */ static int channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { const u_char *p; char *host; u_int len, have, i, found, need; char username[256]; struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int16_t dest_port; struct in_addr dest_addr; } s4_req, s4_rsp; int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); have = sshbuf_len(input); len = sizeof(s4_req); if (have < len) return 0; p = sshbuf_ptr(input); need = 1; /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) { debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self); /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */ need = 2; } /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { if (p[i] == '\0') { found++; if (found == need) break; } if (i > 1024) { /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", c->self); return -1; } } if (found < need) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) { debug_r(r, "channels %d: decode socks4", c->self); return -1; } have = sshbuf_len(input); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { error("channel %d: decode socks4: unterminated user", c->self); return -1; } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); c->path = xstrdup(host); } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ have = sshbuf_len(input); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul " "terminated", c->self); return -1; } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", c->self, p); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(p); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); } c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command); if (s4_req.command != 1) { debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d", c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command); return -1; } s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self); return 1; } /* try to decode a socks5 header */ #define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000 #define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04 #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 static int channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { /* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */ struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int8_t reserved; u_int8_t atyp; } s5_req, s5_rsp; u_int16_t dest_port; char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; const u_char *p; u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (p[0] != 0x05) return -1; have = sshbuf_len(input); if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ if (have < 2) return 0; nmethods = p[1]; if (have < nmethods + 2) return 0; /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */ for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) { if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found", c->self); return -1; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); /* version, method */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self); c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); return 0; /* need more */ } debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self); if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1) return 0; /* need more */ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.version != 0x05 || s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT || s5_req.reserved != 0x00) { debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self); return -1; } switch (s5_req.atyp){ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4: addrlen = 4; af = AF_INET; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN: addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)]; af = -1; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6: addrlen = 16; af = AF_INET6; break; default: debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp); return -1; } need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) need++; if (have < need) return 0; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { /* host string length */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); } if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) { debug_r(r, "channel %d: parse addr/port", c->self); return -1; } dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname " "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr); } else { if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL) return -1; c->path = xstrdup(ntop); } c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command); s5_rsp.version = 0x05; s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS; s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */ s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self); return 1; } Channel * channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out, int nonblock) { Channel *c; debug_f("%s:%d", host_to_connect, port_to_connect); c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "stdio-forward", nonblock); c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); c->host_port = port_to_connect; c->listening_port = 0; c->force_drain = 1; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); return c; } /* dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { const u_char *p; u_int have; int ret; have = sshbuf_len(c->input); debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) { /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); return; } /* try to guess the protocol */ p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input); /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */ switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } else { /* switch to the next state */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); } } /* simulate read-error */ static void rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; chan_read_failed(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); sshbuf_reset(c->output); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } /* reverse dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { const u_char *p; u_int have, len; int r, ret; have = sshbuf_len(c->output); debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */ /* EOF received */ if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); rdynamic_close(ssh, c); return; } /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) return; /* try to guess the protocol */ p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output); switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: /* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */ ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self); /* send socks request to peer */ len = sshbuf_len(c->input); if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: rdynamic", c->self); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self); c->remote_window -= len; } } else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) { /* the connect failed */ rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } } /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ static void channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port; socklen_t addrlen; char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("X11 connection requested."); addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (c->single_connection) { oerrno = errno; debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); errno = oerrno; } if (newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } set_nodelay(newsock); remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", remote_ipaddr, remote_port); nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11"); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self); free(remote_ipaddr); } static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype) { char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock); char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); int r; if (remote_port == -1) { /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ free(remote_ipaddr); remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1"); remote_port = 65535; } free(c->remote_name); xasprintf(&c->remote_name, "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype); if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { /* target host, port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* target path */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* listen path */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else { /* listen address, port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } else { /* originator host and port */ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self); free(remote_ipaddr); free(local_ipaddr); } void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time) { ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; } /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ static void channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, nextstate; socklen_t addrlen; char *rtype; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.", c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == 0) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; } else { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-tcpip"; } addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) set_nodelay(newsock); nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; nc->host_port = c->host_port; if (c->path != NULL) nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype); } /* * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from * clients. */ static void channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; int r, newsock; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock == -1) { error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com"); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } static void channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int err = 0, sock, isopen, r; socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) return; if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); /* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */ isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH); if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) == -1) { err = errno; error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); } if (err == 0) { debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (isopen) { /* no message necessary */ } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i open confirm", c->self); } } else { debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", c->self, strerror(err)); /* Try next address, if any */ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { close(c->sock); c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt); return; } /* Exhausted all addresses */ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); if (isopen) { rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: failure", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } } } static int channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; int r, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (c->rfd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) return 1; errno = 0; len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD if (len <= 0) { #else if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", c->self, c->rfd, len); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; } else { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); } return -1; } if (c->input_filter != NULL) { if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); } } else if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put datagram", c->self); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put data", c->self); return 1; } static int channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */ size_t dlen, olen = 0; int r, len; if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) return 1; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ olen = sshbuf_len(c->output); if (c->output_filter != NULL) { if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); else chan_write_failed(ssh, c); return -1; } } else if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self); buf = data; } else { buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output); dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output); } if (c->datagram) { /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); free(data); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) goto write_fail; goto out; } #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ if (c->wfd_isatty) dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); #endif len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { write_fail: if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; } else { chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } return -1; } #ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis. We need to match the * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message * (4 byte channel id + buf) */ if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: ignore", c->self); } } #endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); out: c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int r; ssize_t len; if (!FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0) return 1; len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), sshbuf_len(c->extended)); debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); c->local_consumed += len; } return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; int r, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (c->efd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) return 1; len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd); } else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self); else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->efd == -1) return 1; /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); return 1; } static int channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { int r; if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, c->local_window, c->local_consumed); c->local_window += c->local_consumed; c->local_consumed = 0; } return 1; } static void channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_handle_efd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_check_window(ssh, c); } static u_int read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; ssize_t len; u_int rlen; int r; if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) { rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input); len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return sshbuf_len(c->input); if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", c->self, c->rfd, len); chan_read_failed(ssh, c); return 0; } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self); } return sshbuf_len(c->input); } static void channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int need; if (c->rfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) return; if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) return; if (c->mux_pause) return; /* * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to * avoid disrupting fd passing. */ if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ return; /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */ need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input)); #define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); return; } if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ return; if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) { debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return; } } static void channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { ssize_t len; int r; if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) return; len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return; if (len <= 0) { chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); } static void channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); } static void channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; int newsock; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("multiplexing control connection"); /* * Accept connection on control socket */ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addrlen = sizeof(addr); if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) { error_f("accept: %s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) == -1) { error_f("getpeereid failed: %s", strerror(errno)); close(newsock); return; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid()); close(newsock); return; } nc = channel_new(ssh, "multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; debug3_f("new mux channel %d fd %d", nc->self, nc->sock); /* establish state */ nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc); /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; } static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc) { chan_fn **pre, **post; if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL || (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL) fatal_f("allocation failed"); pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting; post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; sc->channel_pre = pre; sc->channel_post = post; } /* gc dead channels */ static void channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { if (c == NULL) return; if (c->detach_user != NULL) { if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close)) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL); /* if we still have a callback */ if (c->detach_user != NULL) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); } if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1)) return; debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); channel_free(ssh, c); } enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST }; static void channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post; u_int i, oalloc; Channel *c; time_t now; now = monotime(); if (unpause_secs != NULL) *unpause_secs = 0; for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->delayed) { if (table == CHAN_PRE) c->delayed = 0; else continue; } if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) { /* * Run handlers that are not paused. */ if (c->notbefore <= now) (*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c, readset, writeset); else if (unpause_secs != NULL) { /* * Collect the time that the earliest * channel comes off pause. */ debug3_f("chan %d: skip for %d more " "seconds", c->self, (int)(c->notbefore - now)); if (*unpause_secs == 0 || (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs) *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now; } } channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c); } if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0) debug3_f("first channel unpauses in %d seconds", (int)*unpause_secs); } /* * Create sockets before allocating the select bitmasks. * This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading * the network-input but before channel_prepare_select(). */ static void channel_before_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; Channel *c; u_int i, oalloc; for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN) channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(ssh, c); } } /* * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in * select bitmasks. */ void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs) { u_int n, sz, nfdset; channel_before_prepare_select(ssh); /* might update channel_max_fd */ n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, ssh->chanctxt->channel_max_fd); nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS); /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */ if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask)) fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n); sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask); /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { *readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *nallocp = sz; } *maxfdp = n; memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, *readsetp, *writesetp, minwait_secs); } /* * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have * events pending. */ void channel_after_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, readset, writeset, NULL); } /* * Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input. */ static void channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { size_t len, plen; const u_char *pkt; int r; if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: * tell peer, that we will not send more data: * send IEOF. * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still * in use. */ if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: " "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); else chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } return; } if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); if (c->datagram) { /* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self); /* * XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is * usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have * backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard) */ if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) { debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self); return; } /* Enqueue it */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send datagram", c->self); c->remote_window -= plen; return; } /* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */ if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; if (len == 0) return; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send data", c->self); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); c->remote_window -= len; } /* * Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode. */ static void channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { size_t len; int r; if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0) return; debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self, c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage); if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; if (len == 0) return; if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: data", c->self); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self); c->remote_window -= len; debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len); } /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; Channel *c; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered * incoming data. */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { /* XXX is this true? */ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); continue; } /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c); /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c); } } /* -- mux proxy support */ /* * When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal * with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages * from the ssh server: * 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens * in channel_proxy_downstream(): * - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server. * - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct * downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the * mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might * use conflicting channel IDs. * - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and * SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID * with the newly allocated channel ID. * 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY * channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID * is then translated back to the original mux client ID. * 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE * messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels. * 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the * downstream mux client are removed. * 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server * requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific * channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure * out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a * specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port. * 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently * not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified * easily. */ /* * receive packets from downstream mux clients: * channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs * on channel creation. */ int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream) { Channel *c = NULL; struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL; const u_char *cp; char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL; u_char type; size_t have; int ret = -1, r; u_int id, remote_id, listen_port; /* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); return -1; } if (have < 2) { error_f("short message"); return -1; } type = cp[1]; /* skip padlen + type */ cp += 2; have -= 2; if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3_f("channel %u: down->up: type %u", downstream->self, type); switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN: if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose"); channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: /* * Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we * need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'. */ if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; c->remote_id = remote_id; c->have_remote_id = 1; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose"); channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST: if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) { error_f("alloc"); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) { error_f("unsupported request %s", ctype); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse"); goto out; } if (listen_port > 65535) { error_f("tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u", listen_host, listen_port); goto out; } /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "", -1, listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream); listen_host = NULL; break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (have < 4) break; remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) { if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; } break; } if (modified) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "send"); goto out; } } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "send"); goto out; } } ret = 0; out: free(ctype); free(listen_host); sshbuf_free(original); sshbuf_free(modified); return ret; } /* * receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets * to correct downstream: * implemented as a helper for channel input handlers, * replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID. */ int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; Channel *downstream; const u_char *cp = NULL; size_t len; int r; /* * When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we * need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we * restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages, * so we can cleanup the channel. */ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY) return 0; if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL) return 0; switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE: case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST: break; default: debug2_f("channel %u: unsupported type %u", c->self, type); return 0; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc reply"); goto out; } /* get remaining payload (after id) */ cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len); if (cp == NULL) { error_f("no packet"); goto out; } /* translate id and send to muxclient */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose muxclient"); goto out; } /* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */ if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) debug3_f("channel %u: up->down: type %u", c->self, type); out: /* update state */ switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: /* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */ if (cp && len > 4) { c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); c->have_remote_id = 1; } break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; break; } sshbuf_free(b); return 1; } /* -- protocol input */ /* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */ static int channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) { u_int32_t id; int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) { error_r(r, "%s: parse id", where); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what); } if (id > INT_MAX) { error_r(r, "%s: bad channel id %u", where, id); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what); } return (int)id; } /* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */ static Channel * channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what); Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id); } return c; } int channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *data; size_t data_len, win_len; Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) return 0; /* Get the data. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get data", c->self); win_len = data_len; if (c->datagram) win_len += 4; /* string length header */ /* * The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we * must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window * updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { c->local_window -= win_len; c->local_consumed += win_len; return 0; } if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u", c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); return 0; } if (win_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u", c->self, win_len, c->local_window); return 0; } c->local_window -= win_len; if (c->datagram) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append datagram", c->self); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append data", c->self); return 0; } int channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *data; size_t data_len; u_int32_t tcode; Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", c->self); else ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data " "after EOF on channel %d.", c->self); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse tcode"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); } if (c->efd == -1 || c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); return 0; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse data"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); } if (data_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u", c->self, data_len, c->local_window); return 0; } debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len); /* XXX sshpkt_getb? */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0) error_fr(r, "append"); c->local_window -= data_len; return 0; } int channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof"); int r; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse data"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ieof message"); } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c); /* XXX force input close */ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0) chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } return 0; } int channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose"); int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse data"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid oclose message"); } chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); return 0; } int channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation"); u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket; int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open confirmation for " "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); /* * Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel * is now open. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "window/maxpacket"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open confirmation message"); } c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = remote_window; c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (c->open_confirm) { debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self); c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self); } debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); return 0; } static char * reason2txt(int reason) { switch (reason) { case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: return "administratively prohibited"; case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: return "connect failed"; case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: return "unknown channel type"; case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: return "resource shortage"; } return "unknown reason"; } int channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure"); u_int32_t reason; char *msg = NULL; int r; if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open failure for " "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse reason"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message"); } /* skip language */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse msg/lang"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message"); } logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self, reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); free(msg); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self); c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self); } /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return 0; } int channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust"); Channel *c; u_int32_t adjust; u_int new_rwin; int r; if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); return 0; } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse adjust"); ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message"); } debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust); if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) { fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", c->self, adjust, c->remote_window); } c->remote_window = new_rwin; return 0; } int channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm"); Channel *c; struct channel_confirm *cc; /* Reset keepalive timeout */ ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); debug2_f("type %d id %d", type, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { logit_f("%d: unknown", id); return 0; } if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0) ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid status confirm message"); if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); return 0; } /* -- tcp forwarding */ void channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af) { ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af; } /* * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'') * will bind to whatever address the client asked for. * * Special-case listen_addrs are: * * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6 * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6 * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set */ static const char * channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { const char *addr = NULL; int wildcard = 0; if (listen_addr == NULL) { /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */ if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports) wildcard = 1; } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) { if (((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) || *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 || (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) { wildcard = 1; /* * Notify client if they requested a specific listen * address and it was overridden. */ if (*listen_addr != '\0' && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 && strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Forwarding listen address " "\"%s\" overridden by server " "GatewayPorts", listen_addr); } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * Accept explicit localhost address when * GatewayPorts=yes. The "localhost" hostname is * deliberately skipped here so it will listen on all * available local address families. */ addr = listen_addr; } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6. */ addr = listen_addr; } if (wildcardp != NULL) *wildcardp = wildcard; return addr; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { Channel *c; int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; const char *host, *addr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; in_port_t *lport_p; is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) { host = fwd->connect_path; } else { host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; if (host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } } /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, fwd->listen_host, &wildcard, is_client, fwd_opts); debug3_f("type %d wildcard %d addr %s", type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr); /* * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { if (addr == NULL) { /* This really shouldn't happen */ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } else { error_f("getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } return 0; } if (allocated_listen_port != NULL) *allocated_listen_port = 0; for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { switch (ai->ai_family) { case AF_INET: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin_port; break; case AF_INET6: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin6_port; break; default: continue; } /* * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the * same port for all address families. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0) *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error_f("getnameinfo failed"); continue; } /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); continue; } set_reuseaddr(sock); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); /* Bind the socket to the address. */ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { /* * address can be in if use ipv6 address is * already bound */ if (!ai->ai_next) error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); else verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) { error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - * record what we got. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port == 0) { *allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock); debug("Allocated listen port %d", *allocated_listen_port); } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(host); c->host_port = fwd->connect_port; c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr); if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT)) c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port; else c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port; success = 1; } if (success == 0) error_f("cannot listen to port: %d", fwd->listen_port); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return success; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; const char *path; Channel *c; int port, sock; mode_t omask; switch (type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local connecting path too long: %s", fwd->connect_path); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_host; port = fwd->connect_port; } break; case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: path = fwd->listen_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; break; default: error_f("unexpected channel type %d", type); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { error("No forward path name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path); return 0; } debug3_f("type %d path %s", type, fwd->listen_path); /* Start a Unix domain listener. */ omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask); sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink); umask(omask); if (sock < 0) return 0; debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new(ssh, "unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "unix listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(path); c->host_port = port; c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); return 1; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->path == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { u_int i; int found = 0; const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_port != lport) continue; if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) { /* skip dynamic forwardings */ if (c->host_port == 0) continue; } else { if (c->host_port != cport) continue; } if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) || (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL)) continue; if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; if (path == NULL) { error_f("no path specified."); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_addr == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { debug2_f("close channel %d", i); channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } return found; } int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); } } /* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */ int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); } } /* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */ static int remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd) { int ret; char *lhost; /* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) return 1; if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port) return 0; /* Match hostnames case-insensitively */ lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); lowercase(lhost); ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host); free(lhost); return ret; } /* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */ static int check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; struct permission *perm; /* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */ permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } return permit && permit_adm; } /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) { ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "port forwarding refused"); if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) /* XXX always allowed, see remote_open_match() */ logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to " "remote forward to path \"%.100s\", " "but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), fwd->listen_path); else if(fwd->listen_host != NULL) logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to " "remote forward to host %.100s port %d, " "but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ); else logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to remote " "forward, but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, fwd_opts); } } /* * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for * this server. */ static const char * channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) { if (listen_host == NULL) { return "localhost"; } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) { return ""; } else return listen_host; } /* * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through * the secure channel to host:port from local side. * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with * channel_update_permission(). */ int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { int r, success = 0, idx = -1; char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path; int port_to_connect, listen_port; /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request streamlocal"); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "request tcpip-forward"); } /* Assume that server accepts the request */ success = 1; if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL; port_to_connect = listen_port = 0; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { if (fwd->listen_host != NULL) listen_host = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); listen_port = fwd->listen_port; } idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host_to_connect, port_to_connect, listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL); } return idx; } static int open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, int requestedport) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport) return 0; if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 && strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Note that in the listen host/port case * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host) * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host) */ static int open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate) { const char *allowed_host; if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport) return 0; if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL && requestedhost == NULL) return 1; allowed_host = translate ? channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) : allowed_open->listen_host; if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL || strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedpath) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL || strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from * local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; int r; u_int i; struct permission *perm = NULL; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0)) break; perm = NULL; } if (perm == NULL) { debug_f("requested forward not found"); return -1; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send cancel"); fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket * path from local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; int r; u_int i; struct permission *perm = NULL; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) break; perm = NULL; } if (perm == NULL) { debug_f("requested forward not found"); return -1; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send cancel"); fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. */ int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh, fwd->listen_path); } else { return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh, fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port); } } /* * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty. This is * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. */ void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0) pset->all_permitted = 1; } /* * Permit the specified host/port for forwarding. */ void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, char *host, int port) { int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL; struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d", fwd_ident(who, where), host, port); /* * Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set * host/port_to_connect. */ permission_set_add(ssh, who, where, local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0, local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL); pset->all_permitted = 0; } /* * Administratively disable forwarding. */ void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where) { channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } /* * Clear a list of permitted opens. */ void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where) { struct permission **permp; u_int *npermp; permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp)); *npermp = 0; } /* * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is * passed then they entry will be invalidated. */ void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport) { struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms; if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) { debug_f("index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d", idx, pset->num_permitted_user); return; } debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", newport, pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect, pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect); if (newport <= 0) fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]); else { pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port = (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; } } /* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ int permitopen_port(const char *p) { int port; if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0) return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT; if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0) return port; return -1; } /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) { int sock, saved_errno; struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { case AF_UNIX: /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */ sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr; strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop)); strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport)); break; case AF_INET: case AF_INET6: if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed"); continue; } break; default: continue; } if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype, cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) { if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1) fatal_f("set_nonblock(%d)", sock); if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) { debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): " "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); saved_errno = errno; close(sock); errno = saved_errno; continue; /* fail -- try next */ } if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX) set_nodelay(sock); debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) " "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock); cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next; return sock; } return -1; } static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) { free(cctx->host); if (cctx->aitop) { if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX) free(cctx->aitop); else freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); } memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); } /* * Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path, * passing back the failure reason if appropriate. */ static int connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype, char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; int sock = -1; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; struct addrinfo *ai; if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); return -1; } /* * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections. * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX. */ ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; ai->ai_socktype = socktype; ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); cctx->aitop = ai; } else { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = socktype; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop)) != 0) { if (errmsg != NULL) *errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } } cctx->host = xstrdup(name); cctx->port = port; cctx->ai = cctx->aitop; if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) { error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", name, port, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return sock; } /* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ static Channel * connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; int sock; memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, &cctx, NULL, NULL); if (sock == -1) { channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = port; c->path = xstrdup(host); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } /* * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel * that needs to deal with this connection. */ Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, listen_host, listen_port, 1)) { if (perm->downstream) return perm->downstream; if (perm->port_to_connect == 0) return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh, ctype, rname); return connect_to(ssh, perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", listen_port); return NULL; } Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i; struct permission *perm; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) { return connect_to(ssh, perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", path); return NULL; } /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; int sock; struct permission *perm; permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to connect to " "host %.100s port %d, but the request was denied.", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), host, port); if (reason != NULL) *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; return NULL; } memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, &cctx, reason, errmsg); if (sock == -1) { channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = port; c->path = xstrdup(host); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; struct permission *perm; permit = pset->all_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit = 1; break; } } } if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, " "but the request was denied.", path); return NULL; } return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); } void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct winsize ws; int r; u_int i; for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty || sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1) continue; channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %u; send window-change", i); } } /* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */ static Channel * rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname) { Channel *c; int r; c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->host_port = 0; c->path = NULL; /* * We need to open the channel before we have a FD, * so that we can get SOCKS header from peer. */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "channel %i; confirm", c->self); return c; } /* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */ static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; struct permission *perm; struct channel_connect cctx; u_int i, permit_adm = 1; int sock; if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; if (open_match(perm, c->path, c->host_port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } } if (!permit_adm) { debug_f("requested forward not permitted"); return -1; } memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL, NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL); if (sock == -1) channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); else { /* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH; c->connect_ctx = cctx; channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0); } return sock; } /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. */ int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; int display_number, sock; u_short port; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; if (chanids == NULL) return -1; for (display_number = x11_display_offset; display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; display_number++) { port = 6000 + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) #ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT) #endif ) { error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return -1; } else { debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", ai->ai_family); continue; } } if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); if (x11_use_localhost) set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) close(socks[n]); num_socks = 0; break; } socks[num_socks++] = sock; if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (num_socks > 0) break; } if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); return -1; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); nc->single_connection = single_connection; (*chanids)[n] = nc->self; } (*chanids)[n] = -1; /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ *display_numberp = display_number; return 0; } static int connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) { int sock; struct sockaddr_un addr; sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock == -1) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) return sock; close(sock); error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); return -1; } static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); } #ifdef __APPLE__ static int is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen) { struct stat sbuf; if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) { error("%s: display path too long", __func__); return 0; } if (display[0] != '/') return 0; if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { return 1; } else { char *dot = strrchr(path, '.'); if (dot != NULL) { *dot = '\0'; if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { return 1; } } } return 0; } #endif int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int display_number; const char *display; char buf[1024], *cp; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, sock = 0; /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (!display) { error("DISPLAY not set."); return -1; } /* * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a * connection to the real X server. */ #ifdef __APPLE__ /* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */ { char path[PATH_MAX]; if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) { debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd"); /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } } #endif /* * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] */ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || display[0] == ':') { /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: " "%.100s", display); return -1; } /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } /* * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. */ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); cp = strchr(buf, ':'); if (!cp) { error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } *cp = 0; /* * buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the * display number. */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { /* Create a socket. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock == -1) { debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } /* Connect it to the display. */ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Success */ break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (!ai) { error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); return -1; } set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } /* * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication * data, and enables authentication spoofing. * This should be called in the client only. */ void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id, const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) { struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; u_int i, value; const char *cp; char *new_data; int r, screen_number; if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL) sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) { error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); return; } cp = strchr(disp, ':'); if (cp) cp = strchr(cp, '.'); if (cp) screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL); else screen_number = 0; if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) { /* Save protocol name. */ sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); /* Extract real authentication data. */ sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) { fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " "authentication data: %.100s", data); } sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value; } sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len; /* Generate fake data of the same length. */ sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len; } /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); /* Send the request packet. */ channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send x11-req"); free(new_data); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c index bfcd50c263fd..da14d150791d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c @@ -1,2598 +1,2599 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.369 2021/07/23 04:04:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.370 2021/08/29 23:44:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" /* import options */ extern Options options; /* Control socket */ extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ extern char *host; /* * If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different * instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK. */ extern char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile * because this is updated in a signal handler. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0; /* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */ static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ static time_t server_alive_time; /* Time to do server_alive_check */ static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh); int session_ident = -1; /* Track escape per proto2 channel */ struct escape_filter_ctx { int escape_pending; int escape_char; }; /* Context for channel confirmation replies */ struct channel_reply_ctx { const char *request_type; int id; enum confirm_action action; }; /* Global request success/failure callbacks */ /* XXX move to struct ssh? */ struct global_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; global_confirm_cb *cb; void *ctx; int ref_count; }; TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm); static struct global_confirms global_confirms = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *); /* * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a * flag indicating that the window has changed. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void window_change_handler(int sig) { received_window_change_signal = 1; } /* * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void signal_handler(int sig) { received_signal = sig; quit_pending = 1; } /* * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. */ static void set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh) { if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) { /* some client connections are still open */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) debug2_f("cancel scheduled exit"); control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) { /* a client connection has recently closed */ control_persist_exit_time = monotime() + (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout; debug2_f("schedule exit in %d seconds", options.control_persist_timeout); } /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */ } #define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_" static int client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) { size_t i, dlen; if (display == NULL) return 0; dlen = strlen(display); for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) { debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]); return 0; } } return 1; } #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 int client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display, const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) { char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512]; char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; static char proto[512], data[512]; FILE *f; int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r; struct stat st; u_int now, x11_timeout_real; *_proto = proto; *_data = data; proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0'; if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { if (display != NULL) logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding", display); return -1; } if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) { debug("No xauth program."); xauth_path = NULL; } if (xauth_path != NULL) { /* * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does * not match an authorization entry. For this we * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum". * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal * is not perfect. */ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", display + 10)) < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) { error_f("display name too long"); return -1; } display = xdisplay; } if (trusted == 0) { /* * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie. * * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. */ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir)); if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) { error_f("mkdtemp: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } do_unlink = 1; if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile), "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) { error_f("xauthfile path too long"); rmdir(xauthdir); return -1; } if (timeout == 0) { /* auth doesn't time out */ xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " "untrusted 2>%s", xauth_path, xauthfile, display, SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL); } else { /* Add some slack to requested expiry */ if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; else { /* Don't overflow on long timeouts */ x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; } xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " "untrusted timeout %u 2>%s", xauth_path, xauthfile, display, SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real, _PATH_DEVNULL); } debug2_f("xauth command: %s", cmd); if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) { now = monotime() + 1; if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; else x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh, x11_refuse_time); } if (system(cmd) == 0) generated = 1; free(cmd); } /* * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step * above. */ if (trusted || generated) { xasprintf(&cmd, "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, xauth_path, generated ? "-f " : "" , generated ? xauthfile : "", display); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "r"); if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) got_data = 1; if (f) pclose(f); free(cmd); } } if (do_unlink) { unlink(xauthfile); rmdir(xauthdir); } /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */ if (!trusted && !got_data) { error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " "xauth key data not generated"); return -1; } /* * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise * for the local connection. */ if (!got_data) { u_int8_t rnd[16]; u_int i; logit("Warning: No xauth data; " "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) { snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rnd[i]); } } return 0; } /* * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if * appropriate. */ static void client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!received_window_change_signal) return; received_window_change_signal = 0; debug2_f("changed"); channel_send_window_changes(ssh); } static int client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct global_confirm *gc; if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; if (gc->cb != NULL) gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx); if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); freezero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); } ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0); return 0; } static void schedule_server_alive_check(void) { if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) server_alive_time = monotime() + options.server_alive_interval; } static void server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* boolean: want reply */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL); schedule_server_alive_check(); } /* * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on * one of the file descriptors). */ static void client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int timeout_secs; time_t minwait_secs = 0, now = monotime(); int r, ret; /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs); /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) && !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); return; } FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other * event pending, or a timeout expires. */ timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) timeout_secs = MAXIMUM(server_alive_time - now, 0); if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying) timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh)); set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh); if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, control_persist_exit_time - now); if (timeout_secs < 0) timeout_secs = 0; } if (minwait_secs != 0) timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs); if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs; tv.tv_usec = 0; tvp = &tv; } ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret == -1) { /* * We have to clear the select masks, because we return. * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags * set by the signal handlers. */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno == EINTR) return; /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); quit_pending = 1; } else if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && !FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp) && monotime() >= server_alive_time) /* * ServerAlive check is needed. We can't rely on the select * timing out since traffic on the client side such as port * forwards can keep waking it up. */ server_alive_check(ssh); } static void client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr) { /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout), sshbuf_len(bout)); if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr), sshbuf_len(berr)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); sshbuf_reset(bin); sshbuf_reset(bout); sshbuf_reset(berr); /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ received_window_change_signal = 1; enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } static void client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset) { char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; int r, len; /* * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of * the packet subsystem. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { schedule_server_alive_check(); /* Read as much as possible. */ len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == 0) { /* * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the * connection. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n", host)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); quit_pending = 1; return; } /* * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available. */ if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) len = 0; if (len == -1) { /* * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a * network problem. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n", host, strerror(errno))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); quit_pending = 1; return; } ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len); } } static void client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; char errmsg[256]; int r, tochan; /* * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate * one is fatal. */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY && (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)) cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE; /* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */ tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR && c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE; if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) { debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) { if (tochan) { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type); } else { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident) fatal("%s", errmsg); /* * If error occurred on mux client, append to * their stderr. */ if (tochan) { debug3_f("channel %d: mux request: %s", c->self, cr->request_type); if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); } else error("%s", errmsg); if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { /* * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode. */ if (c->self == session_ident) leave_raw_mode(0); else mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c); } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } } free(cr); } static void client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request, enum confirm_action action) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); cr->request_type = request; cr->action = action; channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm, client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); } void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) { struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc; /* Coalesce identical callbacks */ last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms); if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) { if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("last_gc->ref_count = %d", last_gc->ref_count); return; } gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc)); gc->cb = cb; gc->ctx = ctx; gc->ref_count = 1; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry); } static void process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh) { void (*handler)(int); char *s, *cmd; int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO); if (s == NULL) goto out; while (isspace((u_char)*s)) s++; if (*s == '-') s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */ if (*s == '\0') goto out; if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') { logit("Commands:"); logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request local forward"); logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request remote forward"); logit(" -D[bind_address:]port " "Request dynamic forward"); logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port " "Cancel local forward"); logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port " "Cancel remote forward"); logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port " "Cancel dynamic forward"); if (!options.permit_local_command) goto out; logit(" !args " "Execute local command"); goto out; } if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) { s++; ssh_local_cmd(s); goto out; } if (*s == 'K') { delete = 1; s++; } if (*s == 'L') local = 1; else if (*s == 'R') remote = 1; else if (*s == 'D') dynamic = 1; else { logit("Invalid command."); goto out; } while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) ; /* XXX update list of forwards in options */ if (delete) { /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */ if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) { logit("Bad forwarding close specification."); goto out; } if (remote) ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0; else if (dynamic) ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; else ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { logit("Unknown port forwarding."); goto out; } logit("Canceled forwarding."); } else { if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) { logit("Bad forwarding specification."); goto out; } if (local || dynamic) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } else { if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } logit("Forwarding port."); } out: ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); free(cmd); free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ #define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ struct escape_help_text { const char *cmd; const char *text; unsigned int flags; }; static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, }; static void print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client, int using_stderr) { unsigned int i, suppress_flags; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); suppress_flags = (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) { if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags) continue; if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n", escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n" "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after " "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } /* * Process the characters one by one. */ static int process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr, char *buf, int len) { pid_t pid; int r, bytes = 0; u_int i; u_char ch; char *s; struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ? NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) return 0; if (len <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) { /* Get one character at a time. */ ch = buf[i]; if (efc->escape_pending) { /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ /* Clear the flag now. */ efc->escape_pending = 0; /* Process the escaped character. */ switch (ch) { case '.': /* Terminate the connection. */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { chan_read_failed(ssh, c); chan_write_failed(ssh, c); if (c->detach_user) { c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL); } c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; sshbuf_reset(c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); return 0; } else quit_pending = 1; return -1; case 'Z' - 64: /* XXX support this for mux clients */ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { char b[16]; noescape: if (ch == 'Z' - 64) snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z"); else snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%s escape not available to " "multiplexed sessions\r\n", efc->escape_char, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); continue; } /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); /* We have been continued. */ continue; case 'B': if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); continue; case 'R': if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) logit("Server does not " "support re-keying"); else need_rekeying = 1; continue; case 'V': /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'v': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); continue; } if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) log_change_level(--options.log_level); if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_change_level(++options.log_level); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", efc->escape_char, ch, log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); continue; case '&': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; /* * Detach the program (continue to serve * connections, but put in background and no * more new connections). */ /* Restore tty modes. */ leave_raw_mode( options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* Stop listening for new connections. */ channel_stop_listening(ssh); if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c& " "[backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); /* Fork into background. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ /* The parent just exits. */ exit(0); } /* The child continues serving connections. */ /* fake EOF on stdin */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); return -1; case '?': print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char, (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), log_is_on_stderr()); continue; case '#': if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); s = channel_open_message(ssh); if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); free(s); continue; case 'C': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; process_cmdline(ssh); continue; default: if (ch != efc->escape_char) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, efc->escape_char)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); bytes++; } /* Escaped characters fall through here */ break; } } else { /* * The previous character was not an escape char. * Check if this is an escape. */ if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) { /* * It is. Set the flag and continue to * next character. */ efc->escape_pending = 1; continue; } } /* * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, * and append it to the buffer. */ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); bytes++; } return bytes; } /* * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as * there are packets available. * * Any unknown packets received during the actual * session cause the session to terminate. This is * intended to make debugging easier since no * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol * extensions must be negotiated during the * preparatory phase. */ static void client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending); } /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ /* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */ void * client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) { struct escape_filter_ctx *ret; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->escape_pending = 0; ret->escape_char = escape_char; return (void *)ret; } /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ void client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } int client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len) { if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return 0; return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended, buf, len); } static void client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); session_closed = 1; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } /* * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. */ int client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; double start_time, total_time; int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; u_int nalloc = 0; debug("Entering interactive session."); if (options.control_master && !option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) { debug("pledge: id"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) { debug("pledge: exec"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (options.update_hostkeys) { debug("pledge: filesystem full"); if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) || options.fork_after_authentication) { debug("pledge: proc"); if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } else { debug("pledge: network"); if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno)); } start_time = monotime_double(); /* Initialize variables. */ last_was_cr = 1; exit_status = -1; connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh); max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out); quit_pending = 0; /* Initialize buffer. */ if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); client_init_dispatch(ssh); /* * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode) * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1) */ if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); if (have_pty) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; if (session_ident != -1) { if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx( escape_char_arg)); } channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident, client_channel_closed, 0); } schedule_server_alive_check(); /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ while (!quit_pending) { /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh); if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh)) break; if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { debug("rekeying in progress"); } else if (need_rekeying) { /* manual rekey request */ debug("need rekeying"); if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "kex_start_rekex"); need_rekeying = 0; } else { /* * Make packets from buffered channel data, and * enqueue them for sending to the server. */ if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh)) channel_output_poll(ssh); /* * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a * message about it to the server if so. */ client_check_window_change(ssh); if (quit_pending) break; } /* * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes * available on one of the descriptors). */ max_fd2 = max_fd; client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset, &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); /* Buffer input from the connection. */ client_process_net_input(ssh, readset); if (quit_pending) break; /* A timeout may have triggered rekeying */ if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "cannot start rekeying"); /* * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the * sender. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) { if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__); } } /* * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the * timeout has expired without any active client * connections, then quit. */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) { debug("ControlPersist timeout expired"); break; } } } free(readset); free(writeset); /* Terminate the session. */ /* Stop watching for window change. */ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language tag */ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send disconnect"); channel_free_all(ssh); if (have_pty) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the * connection was deliberately terminated at this end. */ - if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE && received_signal == SIGTERM) { + if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE && + received_signal == SIGTERM) { received_signal = 0; exit_status = 0; } if (received_signal) { verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating * that the connection has been closed. */ if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf"); } /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer), sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_consume"); } /* Clear and free any buffers. */ sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer); /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ total_time = monotime_double() - start_time; ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time); if (total_time > 0) verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f", obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time); /* Return the exit status of the program. */ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); return exit_status; } /*********/ static Channel * client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack) { Channel *c = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *listen_address, *originator_address; u_int listen_port, originator_port; int r; /* Get rest of the packet */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); debug_f("listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); if (listen_port > 0xffff) error_f("invalid listen port"); else if (originator_port > 0xffff) error_f("invalid originator port"); else { c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh, listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); } if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error_f("alloc reply"); goto out; } /* reconstruct and send to muxclient */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "compose for muxclient"); goto out; } } out: sshbuf_free(b); free(originator_address); free(listen_address); return c; } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_path; int r; /* Get the remote path. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); debug_f("request: %s", listen_path); c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); free(listen_path); return c; } static Channel * client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *originator; u_int originator_port; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_x11) { error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return NULL; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); /* XXX check permission */ /* XXX range check originator port? */ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator, originator_port); free(originator); sock = x11_connect_display(ssh); if (sock < 0) return NULL; c = channel_new(ssh, "x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } static Channel * client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_agent) { error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock); } else { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock); } if (r != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug_fr(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket"); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } char * client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun, channel_open_fn *cb, void *cbctx) { Channel *c; int r, fd; char *ifname = NULL; if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) return 0; debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); /* Open local tunnel device */ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) { error("Tunnel device open failed."); return NULL; } debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif if (cb != NULL) channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, cb, cbctx); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); return ifname; } /* XXXX move to generic input handler */ static int client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype = NULL; int r; u_int rchan; size_t len; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan); } if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype); } else if (c != NULL) { debug("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__); } } else { debug("failure %s", ctype); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__); } r = 0; out: free(ctype); return r; } static int client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *rtype = NULL; u_char reply; u_int id, exitval; int r, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) return r; if (id <= INT_MAX) c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if (c == NULL) { error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: " "unknown channel", id); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0) goto out; if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval); success = 1; } else if ((int)id == session_ident) { /* Record exit value of local session */ success = 1; exit_status = exitval; } else { /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */ debug_f("no sink for exit-status on channel %d", id); } if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__); } r = 0; out: free(rtype); return r; } struct hostkeys_update_ctx { /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */ char *host_str, *ip_str; /* * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating * whether they already exist in known_hosts. * keys_match is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(). */ struct sshkey **keys; u_int *keys_match; /* mask of HKF_MATCH_* from hostfile.h */ int *keys_verified; /* flag for new keys verified by server */ size_t nkeys, nnew, nincomplete; /* total, new keys, incomplete match */ /* * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted). * Filled in by hostkeys_find(). */ struct sshkey **old_keys; size_t nold; /* Various special cases. */ int complex_hostspec; /* wildcard or manual pattern-list host name */ int ca_available; /* saw CA key for this host */ int old_key_seen; /* saw old key with other name/addr */ int other_name_seen; /* saw key with other name/addr */ }; static void hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { size_t i; if (ctx == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); free(ctx->keys); free(ctx->keys_match); free(ctx->keys_verified); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]); free(ctx->old_keys); free(ctx->host_str); free(ctx->ip_str); free(ctx); } /* * Returns non-zero if a known_hosts hostname list is not of a form that * can be handled by UpdateHostkeys. These include wildcard hostnames and * hostnames lists that do not follow the form host[,ip]. */ static int hostspec_is_complex(const char *hosts) { char *cp; /* wildcard */ if (strchr(hosts, '*') != NULL || strchr(hosts, '?') != NULL) return 1; /* single host/ip = ok */ if ((cp = strchr(hosts, ',')) == NULL) return 0; /* more than two entries on the line */ if (strchr(cp + 1, ',') != NULL) return 1; /* XXX maybe parse cp+1 and ensure it is an IP? */ return 0; } /* callback to search for ctx->keys in known_hosts */ static int hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i; struct sshkey **tmp; if (l->key == NULL) return 0; if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { /* Record if one of the keys appears on a non-matching line */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) { ctx->other_name_seen = 1; debug3_f("found %s key under different " "name/addr at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } } return 0; } /* Don't proceed if revocation or CA markers are present */ /* XXX relax this */ if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld has CA/revocation marker", l->path, l->linenum); ctx->complex_hostspec = 1; return 0; } /* If CheckHostIP is enabled, then check for mismatched hostname/addr */ if (ctx->ip_str != NULL && strchr(l->hosts, ',') != NULL) { if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST) == 0) { /* Record if address matched a different hostname. */ ctx->other_name_seen = 1; debug3_f("found address %s against different hostname " "at %s:%ld", ctx->ip_str, l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } else if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_IP) == 0) { /* Record if hostname matched a different address. */ ctx->other_name_seen = 1; debug3_f("found hostname %s against different address " "at %s:%ld", ctx->host_str, l->path, l->linenum); } } /* * UpdateHostkeys is skipped for wildcard host names and hostnames * that contain more than two entries (ssh never writes these). */ if (hostspec_is_complex(l->hosts)) { debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld complex host specification", l->path, l->linenum); ctx->complex_hostspec = 1; return 0; } /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) continue; debug3_f("found %s key at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); ctx->keys_match[i] |= l->match; return 0; } /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ debug3_f("deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1, sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) fatal_f("recallocarray failed nold = %zu", ctx->nold); ctx->old_keys = tmp; ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; l->key = NULL; return 0; } /* callback to search for ctx->old_keys in known_hosts under other names */ static int hostkeys_check_old(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i; int hashed; /* only care about lines that *don't* match the active host spec */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL) return 0; hashed = l->match & (HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->old_keys[i])) continue; debug3_f("found deprecated %s key at %s:%ld as %s", sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->old_keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum, hashed ? "[HASHED]" : l->hosts); ctx->old_key_seen = 1; break; } return 0; } /* * Check known_hosts files for deprecated keys under other names. Returns 0 * on success or -1 on failure. Updates ctx->old_key_seen if deprecated keys * exist under names other than the active hostname/IP. */ static int check_old_keys_othernames(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { size_t i; int r; debug2_f("checking for %zu deprecated keys", ctx->nold); for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { debug3_f("searching %s for %s / %s", options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)"); if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i], hostkeys_check_old, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) { debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]); continue; } error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", options.user_hostfiles[i]); return -1; } } return 0; } static void hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel) { do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys."); do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's " "existing trusted key."); } static void update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1; int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK; LogLevel loglevel = asking ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; char *fp, *response; size_t i; struct stat sb; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!ctx->keys_verified[i]) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if (first && asking) hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel); do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp); first = 0; free(fp); } for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if (first && asking) hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel); do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp); first = 0; free(fp); } if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) { leave_raw_mode(1); was_raw = 1; } response = NULL; for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) { free(response); response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? " "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO); if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) break; else if (quit_pending || response == NULL || strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; break; } else { do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter " "\"yes\" or \"no\""); } } if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL) options.update_hostkeys = 0; free(response); if (was_raw) enter_raw_mode(1); } if (options.update_hostkeys == 0) return; /* * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't * cancel the operation). */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { /* * NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we * just delete the hostname entries. */ if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) { debug_f("known hosts file %s does not " "exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]); } else { error_f("known hosts file %s " "inaccessible: %s", options.user_hostfiles[i], strerror(errno)); } continue; } if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0, options.hash_known_hosts, 0, options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s", options.user_hostfiles[i]); } } } static void client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i, ndone; struct sshbuf *signdata; int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype; const u_char *sig; size_t siglen; if (ctx->nnew == 0) fatal_f("ctx->nnew == 0"); /* sanity */ if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { error("Server failed to confirm ownership of " "private host keys"); hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); return; } kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain( sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)); if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_match[i] == 0. */ for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_match[i]) continue; /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */ sshbuf_reset(signdata); if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose signdata"); /* Extract and verify signature */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse sig"); goto out; } /* * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated * during KEX to the default (SHA1). */ use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA && sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA; debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using %s sigalg", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i, use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : "default"); if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); goto out; } /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */ ctx->keys_verified[i] = 1; ndone++; } /* Shouldn't happen */ if (ndone != ctx->nnew) fatal_f("ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", ndone, ctx->nnew); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { error_f("protocol error"); goto out; } /* Make the edits to known_hosts */ update_known_hosts(ctx); out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); } /* * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms. * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names. */ static int key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key) { const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key); const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms; if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) return 0; if (key->type == KEY_RSA && (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 || match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1)) return 1; return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1; } /* * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted. */ static int client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { const u_char *blob = NULL; size_t i, len = 0; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp; int r; char *fp; static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */ extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL; u_int want; if (hostkeys_seen) fatal_f("server already sent hostkeys"); if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK && options.batch_mode) return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */ if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0) return 1; ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "parse key"); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) { do_log2_fr(r, r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "convert key"); continue; } fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3_f("received %s key %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) { debug3_f("%s key not permitted by " "HostkeyAlgorithms", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Skip certs */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug3_f("%s key is a certificate; skipping", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Ensure keys are unique */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) { error_f("received duplicated %s host key", sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto out; } } /* Key is good, record it */ if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) fatal_f("recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", ctx->nkeys); ctx->keys = tmp; ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; } if (ctx->nkeys == 0) { debug_f("server sent no hostkeys"); goto out; } if ((ctx->keys_match = calloc(ctx->nkeys, sizeof(*ctx->keys_match))) == NULL || (ctx->keys_verified = calloc(ctx->nkeys, sizeof(*ctx->keys_verified))) == NULL) fatal_f("calloc failed"); get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL, options.port, &ctx->host_str, options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL); /* Find which keys we already know about. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) { debug_f("searching %s for %s / %s", options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)"); if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i], hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) { debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]); continue; } error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", options.user_hostfiles[i]); goto out; } } /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */ ctx->nnew = ctx->nincomplete = 0; want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | ( options.check_host_ip ? HKF_MATCH_IP : 0); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_match[i] == 0) ctx->nnew++; if ((ctx->keys_match[i] & want) != want) ctx->nincomplete++; } debug3_f("%zu server keys: %zu new, %zu retained, " "%zu incomplete match. %zu to remove", ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew - ctx->nincomplete, ctx->nincomplete, ctx->nold); if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold == 0) { debug_f("no new or deprecated keys from server"); goto out; } /* Various reasons why we cannot proceed with the update */ if (ctx->complex_hostspec) { debug_f("CA/revocation marker, manual host list or wildcard " "host pattern found, skipping UserKnownHostsFile update"); goto out; } if (ctx->other_name_seen) { debug_f("host key found matching a different name/address, " "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update"); goto out; } /* * If removing keys, check whether they appear under different * names/addresses and refuse to proceed if they do. This avoids * cases such as hosts with multiple names becoming inconsistent * with regards to CheckHostIP entries. * XXX UpdateHostkeys=force to override this (and other) checks? */ if (ctx->nold != 0) { if (check_old_keys_othernames(ctx) != 0) goto out; /* error already logged */ if (ctx->old_key_seen) { debug_f("key(s) for %s%s%s exist under other names; " "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update", ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ",", ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ctx->ip_str); goto out; } } if (ctx->nnew == 0) { /* * We have some keys to remove or fix matching for. * We can proceed to do this without requiring a fresh proof * from the server. */ update_known_hosts(ctx); goto out; } /* * We have received previously-unseen keys from the server. * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves. */ debug3_f("asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", ctx->nnew); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */ fatal_fr(r, "prepare hostkeys-prove"); if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_match[i]) continue; sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "assemble hostkeys-prove"); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send hostkeys-prove"); client_register_global_confirm( client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx); ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */ /* Success */ out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(buf); /* * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know * what the client does with its hosts file. */ return 1; } static int client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *rtype; u_char want_reply; int r, success = 0; if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0) goto out; debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0) success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh); if (want_reply) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(rtype); return r; } static void client_send_env(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *name, const char *val) { int r; debug("channel %d: setting env %s = \"%s\"", id, name, val); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send setenv"); } void client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd, char **env) { int i, j, matched, len, r; char *name, *val; Channel *c = NULL; debug2_f("id %d", id); if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel %d: unknown channel", id); ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (want_tty) { struct winsize ws; /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "build pty-req"); if (tiop == NULL) tiop = get_saved_tio(); ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send pty-req"); /* XXX wait for reply */ c->client_tty = 1; } /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */ if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) { debug("Sending environment."); for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(env[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; matched = 0; for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) { matched = 1; break; } } if (!matched) { debug3("Ignored env %s", name); free(name); continue; } client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val); free(name); } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val); free(name); } len = sshbuf_len(cmd); if (len > 0) { if (len > 900) len = 900; if (want_subsystem) { debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } else { debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send command"); } else { channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send shell"); } } static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request); /* rekeying */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); /* global request reply messages */ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); } void client_stop_mux(void) { if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we * should close when all active channels are closed. */ if (options.control_persist || options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE) { session_closed = 1; setproctitle("[stopped mux]"); } } /* client specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); ssh_kill_proxy_command(); _exit(i); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c index 3f153bd424f8..0dbea68c625f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c @@ -1,209 +1,208 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.118 2021/06/06 03:40:39 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.119 2021/09/10 05:46:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" /* determine bug flags from SSH protocol banner */ void compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version) { int i; static struct { char *pat; int bugs; } check[] = { { "OpenSSH_2.*," "OpenSSH_3.0*," "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_2*," "OpenSSH_3*," "OpenSSH_4*", SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_6.5*," "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_7.4*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE| SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74}, { "OpenSSH_7.0*," "OpenSSH_7.1*," "OpenSSH_7.2*," "OpenSSH_7.3*," - "OpenSSH_7.4*," "OpenSSH_7.5*," "OpenSSH_7.6*," "OpenSSH_7.7*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.2.18*," "1.2.19*," "1.2.20*," "1.2.21*," "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */ SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE| SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*OSU_0*," "OSU_1.0*," "OSU_1.1*," "OSU_1.2*," "OSU_1.3*," "OSU_1.4*," "OSU_1.5alpha1*," "OSU_1.5alpha2*," "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, { "PuTTY_Local:*," /* dev versions < Sep 2014 */ "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */ "PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */ "PuTTY_Release_0.60*," "PuTTY_Release_0.61*," "PuTTY_Release_0.62*," "PuTTY_Release_0.63*," "PuTTY_Release_0.64*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "FuTTY*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */ { "Probe-*", SSH_BUG_PROBE }, { "TeraTerm SSH*," "TTSSH/1.5.*," "TTSSH/2.1*," "TTSSH/2.2*," "TTSSH/2.3*," "TTSSH/2.4*," "TTSSH/2.5*," "TTSSH/2.6*," "TTSSH/2.70*," "TTSSH/2.71*," "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, { "WinSCP_release_4*," "WinSCP_release_5.0*," "WinSCP_release_5.1," "WinSCP_release_5.1.*," "WinSCP_release_5.5," "WinSCP_release_5.5.*," "WinSCP_release_5.6," "WinSCP_release_5.6.*," "WinSCP_release_5.7," "WinSCP_release_5.7.1," "WinSCP_release_5.7.2," "WinSCP_release_5.7.3," "WinSCP_release_5.7.4", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "ConfD-*", SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE }, { "Twisted_*", 0 }, { "Twisted*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { NULL, 0 } }; /* process table, return first match */ ssh->compat = 0; for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) { debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); ssh->compat = check[i].bugs; return; } } debug_f("no match: %s", version); } char * compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop) { if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) return cipher_prop; debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop); if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); debug2_f("compat cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop); if (*cipher_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported ciphers found"); return cipher_prop; } char * compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop) { if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5)) return pkalg_prop; debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop); if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); debug2_f("compat public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop); if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); return pkalg_prop; } char * compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p) { if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0) return p; debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p); if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL) fatal("match_filter_denylist failed"); } debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p); if (*p == '\0') fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); return p; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/config.h b/crypto/openssh/config.h index e0ad8dc1ecca..bb0e80e117c9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/config.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/config.h @@ -1,2084 +1,2090 @@ /* config.h. Generated from config.h.in by configure. */ /* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */ /* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */ /* #undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD */ /* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address */ /* #undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */ /* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */ /* #undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG */ /* System only supports IPv4 audit records */ /* #undef AU_IPv4 */ /* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */ /* #undef BIND_8_COMPAT */ /* The system has incomplete BSM API */ /* #undef BROKEN_BSM_API */ /* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */ /* #undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE */ /* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */ /* #undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO */ /* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */ /* #undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS */ /* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */ #define BROKEN_GLOB 1 /* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */ /* #undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA */ /* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name */ /* #undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME */ /* Can't do comparisons on readv */ /* #undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON */ /* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it */ /* #undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON */ /* Needed for NeXT */ /* #undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS */ /* Define if your setregid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETREGID */ /* Define if your setresgid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETRESGID */ /* Define if your setresuid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETRESUID */ /* Define if your setreuid() is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETREUID */ /* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */ /* #undef BROKEN_SETVBUF */ /* QNX shadow support is broken */ /* #undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ /* Define if your snprintf is busted */ /* #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF */ /* strndup broken, see APAR IY61211 */ /* #undef BROKEN_STRNDUP */ /* strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551 */ /* #undef BROKEN_STRNLEN */ /* strnvis detected broken */ #define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1 /* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */ /* #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */ /* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */ /* #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX */ /* Define if you have BSD auth support */ /* #undef BSD_AUTH */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */ /* #undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */ /* #undef CONF_UTMP_FILE */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */ /* #undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE */ /* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */ /* #undef CONF_WTMP_FILE */ /* Need to call setpgrp as root */ /* #undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING */ /* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */ #define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1 /* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */ /* #undef DISABLE_LOGIN */ /* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */ /* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE */ /* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */ /* #undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE */ /* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */ /* #undef DISABLE_SHADOW */ /* Define if you don't want to use utmp */ #define DISABLE_UTMP 1 /* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */ /* #undef DISABLE_UTMPX */ /* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */ #define DISABLE_WTMP 1 /* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */ #define DISABLE_WTMPX 1 /* Enable for PKCS#11 support */ #define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/ /* Enable for U2F/FIDO support */ #define ENABLE_SK /**/ /* Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support */ /* #undef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL */ /* define if fflush(NULL) does not work */ /* #undef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG */ /* File names may not contain backslash characters */ /* #undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH */ /* fsid_t has member val */ /* #undef FSID_HAS_VAL */ /* fsid_t has member __val */ /* #undef FSID_HAS___VAL */ /* getpgrp takes one arg */ #define GETPGRP_VOID 1 /* Conflicting defs for getspnam */ /* #undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS */ /* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */ #define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1 /* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */ #define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1 /* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */ /* #undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV */ /* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */ /* #undef GSSAPI */ /* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */ /* #undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ /* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */ /* #undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR */ /* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */ #define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */ #define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */ #define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_ASPRINTF 1 /* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */ /* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ */ /* Have attribute nonnull */ #define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1 /* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */ /* #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `auth_hostok' function. */ #define HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `auth_timeok' function. */ #define HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_B64_NTOP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_B64_PTON */ /* Define if you have the basename function. */ #define HAVE_BASENAME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */ #define HAVE_BCOPY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */ #define HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLF_ENC */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLF_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_BSTRING_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `bzero' function. */ #define HAVE_BZERO 1 /* calloc(0, x) returns NULL */ #define HAVE_CALLOC 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */ #define HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */ #define HAVE_CLOCK 1 /* Have clock_gettime */ #define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1 /* define if you have clock_t data type */ #define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */ #define HAVE_CLOSEFROM 1 /* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */ #define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1 /* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */ #define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */ #define HAVE_CRYPT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_CRYPT_H */ /* Define if you are on Cygwin */ /* #undef HAVE_CYGWIN */ /* Define if your libraries define daemon() */ #define HAVE_DAEMON 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `bzero', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_BZERO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `getpeereid', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `memmem', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `readv', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_READV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you don't. */ /* #undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB */ /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `UINT32_MAX', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG 0 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you don't. */ #define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT 0 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */ #define HAVE_DES_CRYPT 1 /* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */ /* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX */ /* Define if you have /dev/ptc */ /* #undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_key' function. */ #define HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_pqg' function. */ #define HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_key' function. */ #define HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_pqg' function. */ #define HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set_length' function. */ #define HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_DIRENT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */ #define HAVE_DIRFD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */ #define HAVE_DIRNAME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `dlopen' function. */ #define HAVE_DLOPEN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_key' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_pqg' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_key' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_pqg' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_get0' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_set0' function. */ #define HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_get0' function. */ #define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_set0' function. */ #define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EC_KEY_METHOD_new' function. */ #define HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_ELF_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */ #define HAVE_ENDGRENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_ENDUTENT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */ #define HAVE_ENDUTXENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */ #define HAVE_ERR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */ #define HAVE_ERRX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_ERR_H 1 /* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */ /* #undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_chacha20' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_free' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_new' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_SHA256 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha384' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_SHA384 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha512' function. */ #define HAVE_EVP_SHA512 1 /* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */ #define HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_memset' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_MEMSET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */ #define HAVE_FCHMOD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmodat' function. */ #define HAVE_FCHMODAT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */ #define HAVE_FCHOWN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchownat' function. */ #define HAVE_FCHOWNAT 1 /* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */ /* #undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_FCNTL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */ #define HAVE_FD_MASK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_FEATURES_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_prot' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_set_prot' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_begin' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_status' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_supports_cred_prot' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `flock' function. */ #define HAVE_FLOCK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `fnmatch' function. */ #define HAVE_FNMATCH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_FNMATCH_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */ #define HAVE_FREEADDRINFO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_FREEZERO */ /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */ #define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */ #define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */ #define HAVE_FSTATFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */ #define HAVE_FSTATVFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */ #define HAVE_FUTIMES 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */ #define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */ #define HAVE_GETADDRINFO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */ #define HAVE_GETCWD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */ #define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETGRSET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getline' function. */ #define HAVE_GETLINE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETLUID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */ #define HAVE_GETNAMEINFO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */ #define HAVE_GETOPT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_GETOPT_H 1 /* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */ #define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1 /* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */ #define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */ #define HAVE_GETPEEREID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */ #define HAVE_GETPGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */ #define HAVE_GETPGRP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETPWANAM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */ #define HAVE_GETRANDOM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */ #define HAVE_GETRLIMIT 1 /* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */ /* #undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getsid' function. */ #define HAVE_GETSID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */ #define HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */ #define HAVE_GETTTYENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETUTENT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETUTID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GETUTLINE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXLINE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */ #define HAVE_GETUTXUSER 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */ #define HAVE_GLOB 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_GLOB_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */ #define HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H */ /* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */ #define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT */ /* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_IAF_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_IA_H */ /* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_IFADDRS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */ #define HAVE_INET_ATON 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */ #define HAVE_INET_NTOA 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */ #define HAVE_INET_NTOP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */ #define HAVE_INNETGR 1 /* define if you have int64_t data type */ #define HAVE_INT64_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */ #define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_INTTYPES_H 1 /* define if you have intxx_t data type */ #define HAVE_INTXX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */ #define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */ #define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1 /* Define if you have isblank(3C). */ #define HAVE_ISBLANK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LANGINFO_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H */ /* Define if you want ldns support */ /* #undef HAVE_LDNS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBBSM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */ #define HAVE_LIBDL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1 /* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBIAF */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */ #define HAVE_LIBPAM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBPROC_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LIBUTIL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */ /* #undef HAVE_LIBXNET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */ #define HAVE_LIBZ 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LIMITS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */ #define HAVE_LLABS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LOCALE_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `localtime_r' function. */ #define HAVE_LOCALTIME_R 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGIN */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */ #define HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getpwclass' function. */ #define HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGIN_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGOUT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_LOGWTMP */ /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */ #define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */ #define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H */ /* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and to 0 otherwise. */ #define HAVE_MALLOC 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */ #define HAVE_MBLEN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */ #define HAVE_MBTOWC 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT */ /* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */ /* #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `memmem' function. */ #define HAVE_MEMMEM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */ #define HAVE_MEMMOVE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_MEMORY_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */ #define HAVE_MEMSET_S 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */ #define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1 /* define if you have mode_t data type */ #define HAVE_MODE_T 1 /* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */ #define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_NDIR_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_NETDB_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H 1 /* Define if you are on NeXT */ /* #undef HAVE_NEXT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */ #define HAVE_NL_LANGINFO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_NSLEEP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO */ /* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror */ /* #undef HAVE_OLD_PAM */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */ #define HAVE_OPENPTY 1 /* as a macro */ #define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `OPENSSL_init_crypto' function. */ #define HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version' function. */ #define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version_num' function. */ #define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM 1 /* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */ /* #undef HAVE_OSF_SIA */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */ #define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */ #define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_PATHS_H 1 /* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP */ /* define if you have pid_t data type */ #define HAVE_PID_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PLEDGE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */ #define HAVE_POLL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_POLL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PRCTL */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_PRIV_H */ +/* Define to 1 if you have the `procctl' function. */ +#define HAVE_PROCCTL 1 + /* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */ /* #undef HAVE_PROC_PID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `proc_pidinfo' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pselect' function. */ #define HAVE_PSELECT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PSTAT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_PTY_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */ #define HAVE_PUTUTXLINE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `raise' function. */ #define HAVE_RAISE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */ #define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H 1 /* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function, and to 0 otherwise. */ #define HAVE_REALLOC 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */ #define HAVE_REALLOCARRAY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */ #define HAVE_REALPATH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */ #define HAVE_RECVMSG 1 /* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */ #define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */ #define HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_crt_params' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_factors' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_key' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_dup' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_free' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_get_finish' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set1_name' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_finish' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_dec' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_enc' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_crt_params' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_factors' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_key' function. */ #define HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT */ /* define if you have sa_family_t data type */ #define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED */ /* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */ /* #undef HAVE_SECUREWARE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */ #define HAVE_SENDMSG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETEGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */ #define HAVE_SETENV 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETEUID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */ #define HAVE_SETGROUPENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */ #define HAVE_SETGROUPS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */ #define HAVE_SETLINEBUF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */ #define HAVE_SETLOGIN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETLUID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */ #define HAVE_SETPASSENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETPCRED */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETPPRIV */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */ #define HAVE_SETPROCTITLE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETREGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETRESGID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETRESUID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETREUID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */ #define HAVE_SETRLIMIT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */ #define HAVE_SETSID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SETUTENT */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */ #define HAVE_SETUTXDB 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */ #define HAVE_SETUTXENT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */ #define HAVE_SETVBUF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SET_ID */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256Update' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SHA2_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA384Update' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA512Update' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SHADOW_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */ #define HAVE_SIGACTION 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sighandler_t'. */ /* #undef HAVE_SIGHANDLER_T */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */ #define HAVE_SIGVEC 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */ #define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1 /* define if you have size_t data type */ #define HAVE_SIZE_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_SNPRINTF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */ #define HAVE_SOCKETPAIR 1 /* Have PEERCRED socket option */ /* #undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED */ /* define if you have ssize_t data type */ #define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1 /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ #define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1 /* Define if you have ut_ss in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */ #define HAVE_STATFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */ #define HAVE_STATVFS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STDDEF_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STDINT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasestr' function. */ #define HAVE_STRCASESTR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */ #define HAVE_STRDUP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */ #define HAVE_STRERROR 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */ #define HAVE_STRFTIME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STRINGS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_STRING_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */ #define HAVE_STRLCAT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */ #define HAVE_STRLCPY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */ #define HAVE_STRMODE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strndup' function. */ #define HAVE_STRNDUP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */ #define HAVE_STRNLEN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */ #define HAVE_STRNVIS 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */ #define HAVE_STRPTIME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */ #define HAVE_STRSEP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */ #define HAVE_STRSIGNAL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTOLL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTONUM 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTOUL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */ #define HAVE_STRTOULL 1 /* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1 /* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1 /* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1 /* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1 /* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1 /* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1 /* Define to 1 if `f_files' is a member of `struct statfs'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES 1 /* Define to 1 if `f_flags' is a member of `struct statfs'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS 1 /* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1 /* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM 1 /* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME 1 /* define if you have struct timespec */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1 /* define if you have struct timeval */ #define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_SWAP32 */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */ #define HAVE_SYSCONF 1 /* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_DIR_H 1 /* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */ #define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_FILE_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H */ /* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_NERR */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_POLL_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H */ +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#define HAVE_SYS_PROCCTL_H 1 + /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H 1 /* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_TIME_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */ #define HAVE_TCGETPGRP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */ #define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */ #define HAVE_TIME 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_TIME_H 1 /* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */ #define HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */ #define HAVE_TRUNCATE 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_TTYENT_H 1 /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */ /* #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP */ /* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */ #define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_UCRED_H */ /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */ #define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1 /* define if you have uintxx_t data type */ #define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */ #define HAVE_UNSETENV 1 /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */ #define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMP */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_USERSEC_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */ #define HAVE_USER_FROM_UID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */ #define HAVE_USLEEP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTIL_H */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `utimensat' function. */ #define HAVE_UTIMENSAT 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */ #define HAVE_UTIMES 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_UTIME_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTMPNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME */ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_UTMPX_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ /* #undef HAVE_UTMP_H */ /* define if you have u_char data type */ #define HAVE_U_CHAR 1 /* define if you have u_int data type */ #define HAVE_U_INT 1 /* define if you have u_int64_t data type */ #define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1 /* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */ #define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_VASPRINTF 1 /* Define if va_copy exists */ #define HAVE_VA_COPY 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_VIS_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */ #define HAVE_VSNPRINTF 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */ #define HAVE_WAITPID 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */ #define HAVE_WARN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #define HAVE_WCHAR_H 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */ #define HAVE_WCWIDTH 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */ #define HAVE__GETLONG 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */ /* #undef HAVE__GETPTY */ /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */ #define HAVE__GETSHORT 1 /* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */ #define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */ #define HAVE___B64_NTOP 1 /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */ #define HAVE___B64_PTON 1 /* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */ #define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1 /* Define if libc defines __progname */ #define HAVE___PROGNAME 1 /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ /* #undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS */ /* Define if __va_copy exists */ #define HAVE___VA_COPY 1 /* Define if compiler implements __func__ */ #define HAVE___func__ 1 /* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */ /* #undef HEIMDAL */ /* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */ /* #undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */ /* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */ /* #undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 */ /* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */ /* #undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ /* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */ /* #undef KRB5 */ /* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */ /* #undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ /* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */ /* #undef LIBWRAP */ /* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP. */ /* #undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO */ /* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */ /* #undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ /* max value of long long calculated by configure */ /* #undef LLONG_MAX */ /* min value of long long calculated by configure */ /* #undef LLONG_MIN */ /* Account locked with pw(1) */ #define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX "*LOCKED*" /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ /* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING */ /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ /* #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR */ /* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */ /* #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX */ /* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */ /* #undef MAIL_DIRECTORY */ /* Need setpgrp to for controlling tty */ /* #undef NEED_SETPGRP */ /* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args */ /* #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS */ /* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */ /* #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE */ /* SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select */ /* #undef NO_SA_RESTART */ /* Define to disable UID restoration test */ /* #undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST */ /* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */ /* #undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS */ /* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */ /* #undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID */ /* OpenSSL has ECC */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1 /* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1 /* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1 /* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */ #define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1 /* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */ #define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1 /* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */ #define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1 /* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */ /* #undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES */ /* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */ #define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1 /* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */ #define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org" /* Define to the full name of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_NAME "OpenSSH" /* Define to the full name and version of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_STRING "OpenSSH Portable" /* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_TARNAME "openssh" /* Define to the home page for this package. */ #define PACKAGE_URL "" /* Define to the version of this package. */ #define PACKAGE_VERSION "Portable" /* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */ /* #undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE */ /* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */ /* #undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */ /* must supply username to passwd */ /* #undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME */ /* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */ /* #undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID */ /* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ /* #undef PRNGD_PORT */ /* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ /* #undef PRNGD_SOCKET */ /* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */ /* #undef PTY_ZEROREAD */ /* Sandbox using capsicum */ #define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1 /* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */ /* #undef SANDBOX_DARWIN */ /* no privsep sandboxing */ /* #undef SANDBOX_NULL */ /* Sandbox using pledge(2) */ /* #undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE */ /* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */ /* #undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT */ /* Sandbox using seccomp filter */ /* #undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ /* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */ /* #undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE */ /* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */ #define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1 /* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */ /* #undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS */ /* Sandbox using systrace(4) */ /* #undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ /* Specify the system call convention in use */ /* #undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH */ /* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */ /* #undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID */ /* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_INT 4 /* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_LONG_INT 8 /* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT 8 /* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT 2 /* The size of `time_t', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_TIME_T 8 /* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */ #define SNPRINTF_CONST const /* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c */ /* #undef SPT_TYPE */ /* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */ /* #undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY */ /* sshd PAM service name */ /* #undef SSHD_PAM_SERVICE */ /* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */ /* #undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID */ /* Use audit debugging module */ /* #undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ /* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */ /* #undef SSH_IOBUFSZ */ /* non-privileged user for privilege separation */ #define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd" /* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF */ /* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */ #define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1 /* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_LINUX */ /* No layer 2 tunnel support */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 */ /* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD */ /* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */ /* #undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF */ /* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */ #define STDC_HEADERS 1 /* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */ /* #undef SUPERUSER_PATH */ /* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */ /* #undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND */ /* Support routing domains using Linux VRF */ /* #undef SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX */ /* Support passwords > 8 chars */ /* #undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ /* Specify default $PATH */ /* #undef USER_PATH */ /* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */ /* #undef USE_AFS */ /* Use BSM audit module */ /* #undef USE_BSM_AUDIT */ /* Use btmp to log bad logins */ /* #undef USE_BTMP */ /* Use libedit for sftp */ #define USE_LIBEDIT 1 /* Use Linux audit module */ /* #undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ /* Enable OpenSSL engine support */ #define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1 /* Define if you want to enable PAM support */ #define USE_PAM 1 /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */ /* #undef USE_PIPES */ /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */ /* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */ /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */ /* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS */ /* Define if you have Solaris projects */ /* #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */ /* compiler variable declarations after code */ #define VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE 1 /* compiler supports variable length arrays */ #define VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS 1 /* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */ /* #undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY */ /* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */ /* #undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ /* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C arrays) */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ /* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ /* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS */ /* Define if you want IRIX project management */ /* #undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ /* use libcrypto for cryptography */ #define WITH_OPENSSL 1 /* Define if you want SELinux support. */ /* #undef WITH_SELINUX */ /* Enable zlib */ #define WITH_ZLIB 1 /* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */ #if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD # if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__ # define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 # endif #else # ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN /* # undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ # endif #endif /* Define if xauth is found in your path */ #define XAUTH_PATH "/usr/local/bin/xauth" /* Enable large inode numbers on Mac OS X 10.5. */ #ifndef _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE # define _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE 1 #endif /* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */ /* #undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS */ /* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */ /* #undef _LARGE_FILES */ /* log for bad login attempts */ /* #undef _PATH_BTMP */ /* Full path of your "passwd" program */ #define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd" /* Specify location of ssh.pid */ #define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run" /* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */ /* #undef __res_state */ /* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */ /* #undef calloc */ /* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */ #ifndef __cplusplus /* #undef inline */ #endif /* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */ /* #undef malloc */ /* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */ /* #undef realloc */ /* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */ /* #undef socklen_t */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac index dfcef796a3f1..428f3ff55a87 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac +++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac @@ -1,5675 +1,5673 @@ # # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES # WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR # ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES # WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN # ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) AC_LANG([C]) AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h]) AC_PROG_CC([cc gcc]) # XXX relax this after reimplementing logit() etc. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports C99-style variadic macros]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ int f(int a, int b, int c) { return a + b + c; } #define F(a, ...) f(a, __VA_ARGS__) ]], [[return F(1, 2, -3);]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSH requires support for C99-style variadic macros]) ] ) AC_CANONICAL_HOST AC_C_BIGENDIAN # Checks for programs. AC_PROG_AWK AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_RANLIB AC_PROG_INSTALL AC_PROG_EGREP AC_PROG_MKDIR_P AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar]) AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat]) AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill]) AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff]) AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff awf]) AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh]) dnl select manpage formatter to be used to build "cat" format pages. if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatter found]) MANFMT="false" fi AC_SUBST([MANFMT]) dnl for buildpkg.sh AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no]) if test -x /sbin/sh; then AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh]) else AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh]) fi # System features AC_SYS_LARGEFILE if test -z "$AR" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***]) fi AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd]) if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"], [Full path of your "passwd" program]) fi dnl Since autoconf doesn't support it very well, we no longer allow users to dnl override LD, however keeping the hook here for now in case there's a use dnl use case we overlooked and someone needs to re-enable it. Unless a good dnl reason is found we'll be removing this in future. LD="$CC" AC_SUBST([LD]) AC_C_INLINE AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([LONG_LONG_MAX], [have_long_long_max=1], , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [ #include #include ]) openssl=yes AC_ARG_WITH([openssl], [ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl=no fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography]) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi use_stack_protector=1 use_toolchain_hardening=1 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_stack_protector=0 fi ]) AC_ARG_WITH([hardening], [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_toolchain_hardening=0 fi ]) # We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is # on by default" for things like -fPIE. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) WERROR="-Werror"], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) WERROR="" ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-error=format-truncation]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wextra]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-parameter], [-Wno-unused-parameter]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wimplicit-fallthrough]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing]) if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-mretpoline]) # clang OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,retpolineplt]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack]) # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number # of integer operations that should exercise this. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version]) GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'` case $GCC_VER in 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.8* | 2.9*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; *) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] ) # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror. if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \ -fstack-protector; do AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror" AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;} ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;} ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) break ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test]) break ] ) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" done fi if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99" AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"], [#include ] ) fi fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include __attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1, [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS, 1, [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler supports variable length arrays]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include ]], [[ int i; for (i=0; i<3; i++){int a[i]; a[i-1]=0;} exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE(VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS, [1], [compiler supports variable length arrays]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler accepts variable declarations after code]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include ]], [[ int a; a = 1; int b = 1; exit(a-b); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE(VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE, [1], [compiler variable declarations after code]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([rpath], [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then rpath_opt="" elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then rpath_opt="-R" else rpath_opt="$withval" fi ] ) # Allow user to specify flags AC_ARG_WITH([cflags], [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after], [ --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags], [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags], [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after], [ --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([libs], [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LIBS="$LIBS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([Werror], [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then werror_flags="-Werror" if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then werror_flags="$withval" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ blf.h \ bstring.h \ crypt.h \ crypto/sha2.h \ dirent.h \ endian.h \ elf.h \ err.h \ features.h \ fcntl.h \ floatingpoint.h \ fnmatch.h \ getopt.h \ glob.h \ ia.h \ iaf.h \ ifaddrs.h \ inttypes.h \ langinfo.h \ limits.h \ locale.h \ login.h \ maillock.h \ ndir.h \ net/if_tun.h \ netdb.h \ netgroup.h \ pam/pam_appl.h \ paths.h \ poll.h \ pty.h \ readpassphrase.h \ rpc/types.h \ security/pam_appl.h \ sha2.h \ shadow.h \ stddef.h \ stdint.h \ string.h \ strings.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/byteorder.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/file.h \ sys/mman.h \ sys/label.h \ sys/ndir.h \ sys/poll.h \ sys/prctl.h \ + sys/procctl.h \ sys/pstat.h \ sys/ptrace.h \ sys/random.h \ sys/select.h \ sys/stat.h \ sys/stream.h \ sys/stropts.h \ sys/strtio.h \ sys/statvfs.h \ sys/sysmacros.h \ sys/time.h \ sys/timers.h \ sys/vfs.h \ time.h \ tmpdir.h \ ttyent.h \ ucred.h \ unistd.h \ usersec.h \ util.h \ utime.h \ utmp.h \ utmpx.h \ vis.h \ wchar.h \ ]) # On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h] # to be included first. AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/audit.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H # include #endif ]) # sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif ]) # net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h. # sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([net/route.h sys/sysctl.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include ]) # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif ]) # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H # include #endif ]) # login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [ #include #include ]) # Messages for features tested for in target-specific section SIA_MSG="no" SPC_MSG="no" SP_MSG="no" SPP_MSG="no" # Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both # the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris). SOLARIS_PRIVS="no" # Check for some target-specific stuff case "$host" in *-*-aix*) # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. # It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are # not fatal. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #define testmacro foo #define testmacro bar]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)]) if (test -z "$blibpath"); then blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib" fi saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:" else flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath," fi for tryflags in $flags ;do if (test -z "$blibflags"); then LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])], [blibflags=$tryflags], []) fi done if (test -z "$blibflags"); then AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags]) fi LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1], [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate], [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE]) LIBS="$LIBS -ls" ]) ]) dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers. AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess, passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include ]) dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed], [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1], [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])], [], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb]) AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM], AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]), [], [ #include #include ] ) check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1 AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1], [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken]) dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1], [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this]) AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNDUP], 1, [strndup broken, see APAR IY61211]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNLEN], 1, [strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551]) ;; *-*-android*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) ;; *-*-cygwin*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()]) AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], [Define to disable UID restoration test]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1], [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1], [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size]) AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters]) # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes]) ;; *-*-dgux*) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1], [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-*-darwin*) use_pie=auto AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) exit(0); else exit(1); } ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1], [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1], [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) [#include ] AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too]) ) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h]) AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox" ]) # proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement. AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libproc.h]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([proc_pidinfo]) ;; *-*-dragonfly*) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt" TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-haiku*) LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd " CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE" AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx]) MANTYPE=man ;; *-*-hpux*) # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) maildir="/var/mail" LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])]) # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" fi ;; *-*-hpux11*) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1], [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 ;; esac # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10.26) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1], [Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database]) disable_ptmx_check=yes LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" ;; esac ;; *-*-irix5*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1], [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue)]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1], [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-irix6*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1], [Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C arrays)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX project management]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX audit trails]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1], [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) ;; *-*-linux*) no_dev_ptmx=1 use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics. dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE" AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1], [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM], [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP]) AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer]) inet6_default_4in6=yes case `uname -r` in 1.*|2.0.*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1], [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly]) ;; esac # tun(4) forwarding compat code AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h]) if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1], [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) fi AC_CHECK_HEADER([linux/if.h], AC_DEFINE([SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX], [1], [Support routing domains using Linux VRF]), [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [], [], [#include ]) # Obtain MIPS ABI case "$host" in mips*) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32 #error #endif ]])],[mips_abi="o32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32 #error #endif ]])],[mips_abi="n32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64 #error #endif ]])],[mips_abi="n64"],[AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown MIPS ABI]) ]) ]) ]) ;; esac AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture]) seccomp_audit_arch= case "$host" in x86_64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 ;; i*86-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 ;; arm*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM ;; aarch64*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 ;; s390x-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X ;; s390-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390 ;; powerpc64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64 ;; powerpc64le-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE ;; mips-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS ;; mipsel-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL ;; mips64-*) case "$mips_abi" in "n32") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 ;; "n64") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 ;; esac ;; mips64el-*) case "$mips_abi" in "n32") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 ;; "n64") seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 ;; esac ;; riscv64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64 ;; esac if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], [Specify the system call convention in use]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported]) fi ;; mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty]) SONY=1 ;; *-*-netbsd*) check_for_libcrypt_before=1 if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then rpath_opt="-R" fi CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE" AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1], [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it]) ;; *-*-freebsd*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload # and will crash if they cannot be opened. AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1], [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things]) ;; *-*-bsdi*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-next-*) conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp maildir=/usr/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT]) ;; *-*-openbsd*) use_pie=auto AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1], [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-solaris*) if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then rpath_opt="-R" fi AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty. AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1], [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid()]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd in case the name is longer than 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x]) sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'` if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h]) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts], [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris process contracts]) LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract" SPC_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects], [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris projects]) LIBS="$LIBS -lproject" SP_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs], [ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)], [ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support]) if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \ "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes AC_MSG_RESULT([found]) AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], [Define to disable UID restoration test]) AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris privileges]) SPP_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs]) fi ], ) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; *-*-sunos4*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx]) ;; *-ncr-sysv*) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-sni-sysv*) # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,) # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ]) IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog ;; # UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel. *-*-sysv4.2*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8 *-*-sysv5*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf" AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell check_for_libcrypt_later=1 case "$host" in *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x maildir=/var/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot]) ], , ) ;; *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; esac ;; *-*-sysv*) ;; # SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX *-*-sco3.2v4*) AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.") ;; # SCO OpenServer 5.x *-*-sco3.2v5*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" fi LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" no_dev_ptmx=1 AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid]) MANTYPE=man TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes ;; *-dec-osf*) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA]) no_osfsia="" AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia], [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled]) no_osfsia=1 fi ], ) if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1], [Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1], [Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" SIA_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) fi fi AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv]) ;; *-*-nto-qnx*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken]) enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login case "$host" in *-*-nto-qnx6*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) ;; esac ;; *-*-ultrix*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1]) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to for controlling tty]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Disable utmpx]) # DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we # don't get a controlling tty. AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Need to call setpgrp as root]) # On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes, # so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it. AC_MSG_WARN([creating compat wrappers for headers]) mkdir -p netinet for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'` cat >$header < ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ] ) dnl Checks for header files. # Checks for libraries. AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])]) dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname], ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [ save_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *s, buf[32]; strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); s = dirname(buf); if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { exit(1); } else { exit(0); } } ]])], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], ) LIBS="$save_LIBS" ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h]) fi ]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1], [Define if you have the basename function.])]) dnl zlib defaults to enabled zlib=yes AC_ARG_WITH([zlib], [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then zlib=no elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for zlib]) if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ZLIB], [1], [Enable zlib]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], , [ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" save_LIBS="$LIBS" dnl Check default zlib install dir if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" LIBS="$LIBS -lz" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***]) ] ) ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check], [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then zlib_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v; n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d); if (n != 3 && n != 4) exit(1); v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d; fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v); /* 1.1.4 is OK */ if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4) exit(0); /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */ if (v >= 1020300) exit(0); exit(2); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]), [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log *** Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-zlib-version-check". If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater. See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.]) else AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ] ) fi dnl UnixWare 2.x AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES]) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ] ) dnl Checks for libutil functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp]) # On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv # or libnsl. AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl]) # Some Linux distribtions ship the BSD libc hashing functions in # separate libraries. AC_SEARCH_LIBS([SHA256Update], [md bsd]) # "Particular Function Checks" # see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html AC_FUNC_STRFTIME AC_FUNC_MALLOC AC_FUNC_REALLOC # autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL; AC_MSG_CHECKING([if calloc(0, N) returns non-null]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); ]] )], [ func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes ], [ func_calloc_0_nonnull=no ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming same as malloc]) func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"] ) AC_MSG_RESULT([$func_calloc_0_nonnull]) if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 1, [calloc(0, x) returns non-null]) else AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(0, x) returns NULL]) AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc, [Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.]) fi # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support]) AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT], [ #include #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC FOUNDIT #endif ], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) # Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ #ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT #error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension" #endif glob_t g; g.gl_statv = NULL; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], , AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ struct dirent d; exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char)); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1], [Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory]) if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi # Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support TCPW_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers], [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then saved_LIBS="$LIBS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" if test -n "${withval}" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "${withval}/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0; ]], [[ hosts_access(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1], [Define if you want TCP Wrappers support]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap" TCPW_MSG="yes" ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) # Check whether user wants to use ldns LDNS_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)], [ ldns="" if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no]) if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" ldns=yes else LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`" ldns=yes fi elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" ldns=yes fi # Verify that it works. if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) LDNS_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } ]]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.]) ]) fi ]) # Check whether user wants libedit support LIBEDIT_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([libedit], [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit]) if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`" else LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses" fi OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'` AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp]) LIBEDIT_MSG="yes" AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ], [ $OTHERLIBS ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ int i = H_SETSIZE; el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ] ) fi ] ) AUDIT_MODULE=none AC_ARG_WITH([audit], [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)], [ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module]) case "$withval" in bsm) AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm]) AUDIT_MODULE=bsm dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])], [ #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H # include #endif ] ) AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])]) # These are optional AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module]) if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1], [The system has incomplete BSM API]) fi ;; linux) AC_MSG_RESULT([linux]) AUDIT_MODULE=linux dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module]) ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug AC_MSG_RESULT([debug]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module]) ;; no) AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval]) ;; esac ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([pie], [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi ] ) if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4 #error gcc is too old #endif ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) use_pie=no ] ) fi if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie]) # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither. AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported]) if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS" fi fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether -fPIC is accepted]) SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]] )], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) PICFLAG="-fPIC"; ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) PICFLAG=""; ]) CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" AC_SUBST([PICFLAG]) dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ auth_hostok \ auth_timeok \ Blowfish_initstate \ Blowfish_expandstate \ Blowfish_expand0state \ Blowfish_stream2word \ SHA256Update \ SHA384Update \ SHA512Update \ asprintf \ b64_ntop \ __b64_ntop \ b64_pton \ __b64_pton \ bcopy \ bcrypt_pbkdf \ bindresvport_sa \ blf_enc \ bzero \ cap_rights_limit \ clock \ closefrom \ dirfd \ endgrent \ err \ errx \ explicit_bzero \ explicit_memset \ fchmod \ fchmodat \ fchown \ fchownat \ flock \ fnmatch \ freeaddrinfo \ freezero \ fstatfs \ fstatvfs \ futimes \ getaddrinfo \ getcwd \ getgrouplist \ getline \ getnameinfo \ getopt \ getpagesize \ getpeereid \ getpeerucred \ getpgid \ _getpty \ getrlimit \ getrandom \ getsid \ getttyent \ glob \ group_from_gid \ inet_aton \ inet_ntoa \ inet_ntop \ innetgr \ llabs \ localtime_r \ login_getcapbool \ login_getpwclass \ md5_crypt \ memmem \ memmove \ memset_s \ mkdtemp \ ngetaddrinfo \ nsleep \ ogetaddrinfo \ openlog_r \ pledge \ poll \ prctl \ + procctl \ pselect \ pstat \ raise \ readpassphrase \ reallocarray \ realpath \ recvmsg \ recallocarray \ rresvport_af \ sendmsg \ setdtablesize \ setegid \ setenv \ seteuid \ setgroupent \ setgroups \ setlinebuf \ setlogin \ setpassent\ setpcred \ setproctitle \ setregid \ setreuid \ setrlimit \ setsid \ setvbuf \ sigaction \ sigvec \ snprintf \ socketpair \ statfs \ statvfs \ strcasestr \ strdup \ strerror \ strlcat \ strlcpy \ strmode \ strndup \ strnlen \ strnvis \ strptime \ strsignal \ strtonum \ strtoll \ strtoul \ strtoull \ swap32 \ sysconf \ tcgetpgrp \ timingsafe_bcmp \ truncate \ unsetenv \ updwtmpx \ utimensat \ user_from_uid \ usleep \ vasprintf \ vsnprintf \ waitpid \ warn \ ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero, memmem]) dnl Wide character support. AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth]) TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes} AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8"); if (loc != NULL) exit(0); exit(1); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT(yes), [AC_MSG_RESULT(no) TEST_SSH_UTF8=no], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) ) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) ]) disable_pkcs11= AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11], [ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then disable_pkcs11=1 fi ] ) disable_sk= AC_ARG_ENABLE([security-key], [ --disable-security-key disable U2F/FIDO support code [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then disable_sk=1 fi ] ) enable_sk_internal= AC_ARG_WITH([security-key-builtin], [ --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then enable_sk_internal=yes fi ] ) test "x$disable_sk" != "x" && enable_sk_internal="" AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen]) AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include ]) # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include const char *gai_strerror(int); ]], [[ char *str; str = gai_strerror(0); ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1], [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1], [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])]) dnl check if we need -D_REENTRANT for localtime_r declaration. AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [], [ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT" unset ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [], [ CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS" ], [ #include ] ) ], [ #include ] ) dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them. AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H # include #endif ]) dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD, getpeereid], , , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([readv, writev], , , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [ #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [ #include ]) # extra bits for select(2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1], [Define if your setresuid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1], [Define if your setresgid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working fflush(NULL)]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([FFLUSH_NULL_BUG], [1], [define if fflush(NULL) does not work])], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working]) ) dnl Checks for time functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time]) dnl Checks for utmp functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname]) dnl Checks for utmpx functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname]) dnl Checks for lastlog functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon], [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])] ) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1], [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize], [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])] ) # Check for broken snprintf if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ char b[5]; snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); exit(b[4]!='\0'); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf understands %zu]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ size_t a = 1, b = 2; char z[128]; snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b); exit(strcmp(z, "12")); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [snprintf does not understand %zu]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] ) fi # We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the # number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3) if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } ]], [[ char x[1]; if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; return 0; ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ] ) fi # On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio, # check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *. # This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; } ]], [[ snprintf(0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const], [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])]) # Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support NO_PEERCHECK="" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) NO_PEERCHECK=1 ]) fi dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ pid_t pid; int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { /* failed */ exit(1); } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */ waitpid(pid, &status, 0); if (WIFEXITED(status)) exit(WEXITSTATUS(status)); else exit(2); } else { /* child */ close(0); close(1); close(2); setsid(); openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */ else exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */ } ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (err != 0) { if (err == EAI_SYSTEM) perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM"); else fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(err)); exit(2); } sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) perror("socket"); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { if (errno == EBADF) exit(3); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) { perror("getnameinfo"); exit(2); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1], [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , , [#include #include #include ]) fi if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1], [Conflicting defs for getspnam]) ] ) fi dnl NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the dnl existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed dnl for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during dnl development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it. dnl Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible dnl implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option dnl if we're cross compiling. dnl dnl OpenBSD, 2001: strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag); dnl NetBSD: 2012, strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag); if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working strnvis]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); } ]], [[ char dst[16]; signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler); if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0) exit(0); exit(1) ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis detected broken])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming broken]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis assumed broken])] ) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include static void sighandler(int sig) { } ]], [[ int r; pid_t pid; struct sigaction sa; sa.sa_handler = sighandler; sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL); if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* child */ pid = getppid(); sleep(1); kill(pid, SIGTERM); sleep(1); if (getppid() == pid) /* if parent did not exit, shoot it */ kill(pid, SIGKILL); exit(0); } else { /* parent */ r = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } exit(r == -1 ? 0 : 1); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([NO_SA_RESTART], [1], [SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpgrp],[ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getpgrp accepts zero args]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[$ac_includes_default]], [[ getpgrp(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [1], [getpgrp takes zero args])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [0], [getpgrp takes one arg])] ) ]) # Search for OpenSSL saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir], [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ], [ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled]) fi if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then case "$withval" in # Relative paths ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval" esac if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check], [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) openssl_engine=no AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine], [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled]) fi openssl_engine=yes fi ] ) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log])]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) # Determine OpenSSL header version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.sslincver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent. AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num]) # Determine OpenSSL library version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); #ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION # define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION # define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM # define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay #endif if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(), OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` # Check version is supported. case "$ssl_library_ver" in 10000*|0*) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; 100*) ;; # 1.0.x 101000[[0123456]]*) # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613 AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; 101*) ;; # 1.1.x 200*) ;; # LibreSSL - 300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch. + 300*) ;; # OpenSSL 3 + 301*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch. *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Sanity check OpenSSL headers AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM # define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay #endif exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check". Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches. ]) else AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -ldl" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ] ) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ BN_is_prime_ex \ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ EVP_DigestInit_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_init \ HMAC_CTX_init \ RSA_generate_key_ex \ RSA_get_default_method \ ]) # OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro. AC_CHECK_FUNC(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a function]), AC_CHECK_DECL(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a macro]), , [[#include ]] ) ) # LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ OPENSSL_init_crypto \ DH_get0_key \ DH_get0_pqg \ DH_set0_key \ DH_set_length \ DH_set0_pqg \ DSA_get0_key \ DSA_get0_pqg \ DSA_set0_key \ DSA_set0_pqg \ DSA_SIG_get0 \ DSA_SIG_set0 \ ECDSA_SIG_get0 \ ECDSA_SIG_set0 \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \ RSA_get0_crt_params \ RSA_get0_factors \ RSA_get0_key \ RSA_set0_crt_params \ RSA_set0_factors \ RSA_set0_key \ RSA_meth_free \ RSA_meth_dup \ RSA_meth_set1_name \ RSA_meth_get_finish \ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \ RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \ RSA_meth_set_finish \ EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \ EVP_MD_CTX_new \ EVP_MD_CTX_free \ EVP_chacha20 \ ]) if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], [Enable OpenSSL engine support]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found]) ]) fi # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1], [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com \ aes256-gcm@openssh.com" ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1], [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void]) ] ) # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt]) fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt]) # Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512]) # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp256=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp384=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include ]],[[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ] )], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ) - COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EC_KEY_METHOD_new]) openssl_ecc=yes else openssl_ecc=no fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1], [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes - COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes - COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes - COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC]) - AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC]) else AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt]) fi # PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen(). enable_pkcs11=yes enable_sk=yes if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto" enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto" fi if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support" fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)" enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)" fi if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW" enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW" fi if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then enable_pkcs11="disabled by user" fi if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then enable_sk="disabled by user" fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable PKCS11]) if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support]) fi AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_pkcs11]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable U2F]) if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK], [], [Enable for U2F/FIDO support]) AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so]) else # Do not try to build sk-dummy library. AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [""]) fi AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_sk]) # Now check for built-in security key support. if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2= if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2]) if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`" else LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor" fi OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'` AC_CHECK_LIB([fido2], [fido_init], [ AC_SUBST([LIBFIDO2]) AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL], [], [Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support]) enable_sk="built-in" ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([no usable libfido2 found]) ], [ $OTHERLIBS ] ) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS $LIBFIDO2" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ fido_cred_prot \ fido_cred_set_prot \ fido_dev_get_touch_begin \ fido_dev_get_touch_status \ fido_dev_supports_cred_prot \ ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido.h], [], AC_MSG_ERROR([missing fido.h from libfido2])) AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido/credman.h], [], AC_MSG_ERROR([missing fido/credman.h from libfido2]), [#include ] ) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ arc4random \ arc4random_buf \ arc4random_stir \ arc4random_uniform \ ]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1], [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id]) ]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ### Configure cryptographic random number support # Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes ] ) fi # PRNGD TCP socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port], [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT], [ case "$withval" in no) withval="" ;; [[0-9]]*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then PRNGD_PORT="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT], [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ] ) # PRNGD Unix domain socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket], [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)], [ case "$withval" in yes) withval="/var/run/egd-pool" ;; no) withval="" ;; /*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket]) fi if test ! -r "$withval" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable]) fi PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"], [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ], [ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket]) # Insert other locations here for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"]) break; fi done if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) fi fi ] ) # Which randomness source do we use? if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1], [Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only]) RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options]) fi # Check for PAM libs PAM_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([pam], [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found]) fi saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , ) AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" PAM_MSG="yes" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then case "$LIBS" in *-ldl*) # libdl already in LIBS ;; *) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ;; esac fi fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([pam-service], [ --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSHD_PAM_SERVICE], ["$withval"], [sshd PAM service name]) fi ] ) # Check for older PAM if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif ]], [[ (void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1], [Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" ]) fi case "$host" in *-*-cygwin*) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER ;; *) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd ;; esac AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user], [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval fi ] ) if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) fi AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER]) if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [ #include #include ]) fi if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch; errno = 0; prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0); exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) # Disable seccomp filter as a target have_seccomp_filter=0 ] ) fi # Decide which sandbox style to use sandbox_arg="" AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox], [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)], [ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then sandbox_arg="" else sandbox_arg="$withval" fi ] ) # Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type # function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor # when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; struct timeval tv; fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(fd, &fds); rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero); setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) select_works_with_rlimit=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) select_works_with_rlimit=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) select_works_with_rlimit=yes] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int r; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1, [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support]) SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support]) SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host]) test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS]) test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers]) test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header]) test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function]) test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit]) SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges]) elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then SANDBOX_STYLE="none" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox]) fi # Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; fi # Check for long long datatypes AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double]) # Check datatype sizes AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([time_t], [], [[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H # include #endif ]] ) # Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX) if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 fi # compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them. if test -z "$have_llong_max" && test -z "$have_long_long_max"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include /* Why is this so damn hard? */ #ifdef __GNUC__ # undef __GNUC__ #endif #define __USE_ISOC99 #include #define DATA "conftest.llminmax" #define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a)) /* * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so * we do this the hard way. */ static int fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) { unsigned int i; int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; if (n < 0) if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); n /= 10; } do { if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) return -1; } while (i != 0); if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) return -1; return 0; } ]], [[ FILE *f; long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) exit(1); #if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); llmin = LLONG_MIN; llmax = LLONG_MAX; #else fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) llmax = i; llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ #endif /* Sanity check */ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); exit(2); } if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) exit(3); if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) exit(4); if (fclose(f) < 0) exit(5); exit(0); ]])], [ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL], [max value of long long calculated by configure]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long]) AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL], [min value of long long calculated by configure]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) fi AC_CHECK_DECLS([UINT32_MAX], , , [[ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif ]]) # More checks for data types AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type]) have_u_int=1 fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type]) have_intxx_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include #endif ]], [[ int64_t a; a = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type]) have_u_intxx_t=1 fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type]) have_u_int64_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1], [define if you have uintxx_t data type]) fi fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type]) fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif ]) TYPE_SOCKLEN_T AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t, sighandler_t], , , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_files, struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ] ) ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1], [define if you have sa_family_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1], [define if you have struct in6_addr data type]) dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , , [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #include ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1], [define if you have struct addrinfo data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval]) have_struct_timeval=1 fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timespec], ac_cv_have_struct_timespec, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H # include #endif ]], [[ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC], [1], [define if you have struct timespec]) have_struct_timespec=1 fi # We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail. if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ) fi dnl Checks for structure members OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_ss], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class, struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire], [], [], [[ #include #include ]]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state], [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])], [[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_accrights #error "msg_accrights is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_accrights = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_control #error "msg_control is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_control = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support], ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1], [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr]) fi # Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1], [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])], [ # Needed by our getrrsetbyname() AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [LIBS="$saved_LIBS" AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1], [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], , [#include ]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include extern struct __res_state _res; ]], [[ struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */ return 0; ]],)], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1], [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check whether user wants SELinux support SELINUX_MSG="no" LIBSELINUX="" AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then save_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1], [Define if you want SELinux support.]) SELINUX_MSG="yes" AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], , AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header])) AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon], [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" ], AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library])) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level]) LIBS="$save_LIBS $LIBSELINUX" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support KRB5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" else KRB5ROOT=${withval} fi AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support]) KRB5_MSG="yes" AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) use_pkgconfig_for_krb5= if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about kerberos5]) if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_krb5=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_krb5" = "xyes"; then K5CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5` K5LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support]) if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5-gssapi; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1], [Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol]) GSSCFLAGS="`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5-gssapi`" GSSLIBS="`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5-gssapi`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1], [Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) else AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH]) if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`" K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support]) if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1], [Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol]) GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`" GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1], [Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib" AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5" K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1" AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"]) AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" ]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgss" ], AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail])) ]) ]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], , [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], , AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail]) ) ] ) oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) fi fi if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) # include #endif ]]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) # Looking for programs, paths and files PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path], [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval fi ] ) AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH]) AC_ARG_WITH([xauth], [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then xauth_path=$withval fi ], [ TestPath="$PATH" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath]) if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" fi ] ) STRIP_OPT=-s AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip], [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then STRIP_OPT= fi ] ) AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT]) if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then XAUTH_PATH="undefined" AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"], [Define if xauth is found in your path]) XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) fi dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority. dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that. dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers. dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail. # Check for mail directory AC_ARG_WITH([maildir], [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory], [ if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"], [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR]) fi ],[ if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) else AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H #include #endif #define DATA "conftest.maildir" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); #if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (_PATH_MAIL) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0) exit(1); #else exit (2); #endif exit(0); ]])], [ maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir` maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \ | sed 's|/$||'` AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what]) if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) fi ], [ if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then # our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail]) ] ) fi ] ) # maildir if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test]) disable_ptmx_check=yes fi if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptmx]) have_dev_ptmx=1 ] ) fi fi if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptc]) have_dev_ptc=1 ] ) else AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test]) fi # Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above AC_ARG_WITH([mantype], [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type], [ case "$withval" in man|cat|doc) MANTYPE=$withval ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval]) ;; esac ] ) if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=man else MANTYPE=cat fi fi AC_SUBST([MANTYPE]) if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then mansubdir=man; else mansubdir=$MANTYPE; fi AC_SUBST([mansubdir]) # Check whether to enable MD5 passwords MD5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords], [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1], [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords]) MD5_MSG="yes" fi ] ) # Whether to disable shadow password support AC_ARG_WITH([shadow], [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) disable_shadow=yes fi ] ) if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include struct spwd sp; ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])], [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [ ]) if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi # Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1], [Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY]) else DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display], [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY]) DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" fi ] ) fi # check for /etc/default/login and use it if present. AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login], [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ], [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ] ) if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"], [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ]) if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1], [Define if your system has /etc/default/login]) fi fi dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \ test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then external_path_file=/etc/login.conf fi # Whether to mess with the default path SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" AC_ARG_WITH([default-path], [ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. Edit /etc/login.conf instead.]) elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in $external_path_file .]) fi user_path="$withval" SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" fi ], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf]) else if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, otherwise scp will not work.]) fi AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ /* find out what STDPATH is */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */ # define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH # else # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" # endif #endif #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.stdpath" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ] ) # make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work t_bindir="${bindir}" while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}` case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; esac case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac done echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work]) fi fi fi ] ) if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH]) AC_SUBST([user_path]) fi # Set superuser path separately to user path AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path], [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"], [Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser]) superuser_path=$withval fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(4in6, [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1], [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi ], [ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)]) fi ] ) # Whether to enable BSD auth support BSD_AUTH_MSG=no AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth], [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1], [Define if you have BSD auth support]) BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes fi ] ) # Where to place sshd.pid piddir=/var/run # make sure the directory exists if test ! -d $piddir ; then piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` case $piddir in NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac fi AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir], [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then piddir=$withval if test ! -d $piddir ; then AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **]) fi fi ] ) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"], [Specify location of ssh.pid]) AC_SUBST([piddir]) dnl allow user to disable some login recording features AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog], [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp], [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx], [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp], [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx], [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil], [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline], [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline], [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then conf_lastlog_location=$withval fi ] ) dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the dnl need for command-line parameters dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails dnl lastlog detection dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_lastlog_path=no ]) ]) if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then conf_lastlog_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **]) dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file]) fi dnl utmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_utmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_utmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file]) fi dnl wtmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_wtmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file]) fi dnl wtmpx detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmpx_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX]) fi else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file]) fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath" AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile]) fi AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [ if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running. dnl Add now. CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then TEST_SSH_IPV6=no else TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes fi AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8]) AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS]) AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms]) AC_SUBST([DEPEND], [$(cat $srcdir/.depend)]) CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}" LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}" # Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options. LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'` CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'` AC_SUBST([LDFLAGS_NOPIE]) AC_SUBST([CFLAGS_NOPIE]) AC_EXEEXT AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ survey.sh]) AC_OUTPUT # Print summary of options # Someone please show me a better way :) A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}` J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}` echo "" echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" echo " User binaries: $B" echo " System binaries: $C" echo " Configuration files: $D" echo " Askpass program: $E" echo " Manual pages: $F" echo " PID file: $G" echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H" if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file" echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work" else echo " sshd default user PATH: $I" if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If" echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" fi fi if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" fi echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11" echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk" echo "" echo " Host: ${host}" echo " Compiler: ${CC}" echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" fi echo "" if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" echo "" fi if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " echo "subdirectory" echo "" fi if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" echo "user can connect to your agent." echo "" fi if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec index 5fb81ce31491..2905db0e8c39 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec +++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec @@ -1,848 +1,848 @@ -%global ver 8.7p1 +%global ver 8.8p1 %global rel 1%{?dist} # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID %global sshd_uid 74 %global sshd_gid 74 # Version of ssh-askpass %global aversion 1.2.4.1 # Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %global no_x11_askpass 0 # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %global no_gnome_askpass 0 # Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) %global static_libcrypto 0 # Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) %global scard 0 # Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass %global gtk2 1 # Use build6x options for older RHEL builds # RHEL 7 not yet supported %if 0%{?rhel} > 6 %global build6x 0 %else %global build6x 1 %endif %if 0%{?fedora} >= 26 %global compat_openssl 1 %else %global compat_openssl 0 %endif # Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) %global kerberos5 1 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' %{?skip_x11_askpass:%global no_x11_askpass 1} %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1} # Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. # RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' %{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0} # Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier? %{?build_6x:%global build6x 1} # If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc. %if %{build6x} %global _sysconfdir /etc %endif # Options for static OpenSSL link: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1} # Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" %{?smartcard:%global scard 1} # Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no) %global rescue 0 %{?build_rescue:%global rescue 1} # Turn off some stuff for resuce builds %if %{rescue} %global kerberos5 0 %endif Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2. Name: openssh Version: %{ver} %if %{rescue} Release: %{rel}rescue %else Release: %{rel} %endif URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Applications/Internet BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot Obsoletes: ssh %if %{build6x} PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00 %else Requires: initscripts >= 5.20 %endif BuildRequires: perl %if %{compat_openssl} BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel %else BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1 BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1 %endif BuildRequires: /bin/login %if ! %{build6x} BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam %else BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h # Xt development tools BuildRequires: libXt-devel # Provides xmkmf BuildRequires: imake # Rely on relatively recent gtk BuildRequires: gtk2-devel %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} BuildRequires: pkgconfig %endif %if %{kerberos5} BuildRequires: krb5-devel BuildRequires: krb5-libs %endif %package clients Summary: OpenSSH clients. Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Group: Applications/Internet Obsoletes: ssh-clients %package server Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. Group: System Environment/Daemons Obsoletes: ssh-server Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 %if ! %{build6x} Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth %endif %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %package askpass-gnome Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %description SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries. This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. To make this package useful, you should also install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. %description clients OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients. %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh package installed. %description askpass OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %description askpass-gnome OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop environment. %prep %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build %if %{rescue} CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS %endif %configure \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ --with-md5-passwords \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-mantype=man \ --disable-strip \ %if %{scard} --with-smartcard \ %endif %if %{rescue} --without-pam \ %else --with-pam \ %endif %if %{kerberos5} --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \ %endif %if %{static_libcrypto} perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile %endif make %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} %configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh xmkmf -a make popd %endif # Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary # because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. %if %{gtk2} gtk2=yes %else gtk2=no %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} pushd contrib if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then make gnome-ssh-askpass2 mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass else make gnome-ssh-askpass1 mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass fi popd %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh %if %{build6x} install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %else install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %endif install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{scard} rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ %endif perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %triggerun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then touch /var/run/sshd.restart fi %triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1 # Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have. gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1} /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1} END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config # And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default # behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't # specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying # one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both. if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config fi %triggerpostun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || : fi fi %pre server %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : %{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || : %post server /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd %postun server /sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || : %preun server if [ "$1" = 0 ] then /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || : /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd fi %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %if ! %{rescue} %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-sk-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8* %endif %if %{scard} %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %files clients %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %if ! %{rescue} %attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %endif %if ! %{rescue} %files server %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} %files askpass-gnome %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %changelog * Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller - Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page. * Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker - Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements. - Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs. - Remove SSH1 from description. - Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be created. * Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia - Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility - Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time - Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM - Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel - Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility - Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option - Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf * Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice - test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass * Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller - Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config file using new AddressFamily directive * Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller - Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass (patch from bet@rahul.net) * Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller - Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks * Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller - Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs * Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client * Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little - Add Privsep user, group and directory * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 - bump and grind (through the build system) * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 - require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) - require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck - require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again - add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're building for 6.x * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 - update to 3.1p1 * Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 - update to SNAP-20020305 - drop debug patch, fixed upstream * Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 - update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) * Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 - add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key exchange, authentication, and named key support * Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 - remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole by gnome-libs-devel * Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix from Hugo van der Kooij) * Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 - update to 3.0.2p1 * Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 - update to 3.0.1p1 * Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) * Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 - merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream 3.0p1 spec file and init script * Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 3.0p1 - update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 - change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package - replace primes with moduli * Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 - incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs * Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 - Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd * Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 - fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) - configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) - pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) - mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) - refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug - change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) - pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) - clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) * Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 - add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) * Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 * Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions - pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) * Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) * Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) * Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 * Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - disable the gssapi patch * Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9p2 - refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch * Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD - add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem so that we can verify it - drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) - don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate - clear supplemental groups list at startup * Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config - add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not dealing with comments right * Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure from the upstream version * Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - finish marking strings in the init script for translation - modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by Pekka Savola) - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed * Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9 - drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS * Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) * Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown - remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue - make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid races in condrestart * Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) - bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like open connections) - require the version of openssl we had when we were built * Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and when to reinitialize them - add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata * Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p2 - call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually be group memberships * Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) - don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to three password attempts as it is) - remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely * Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise * Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. - Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) - Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) * Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Chuck the closing patch. - Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we specify any other HostKey values, which we do. * Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. - Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. * Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.1p1. - Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. - Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. - Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try adding id_rsa. * Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.0p1. - Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. - Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init script now. * Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). - Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which host the user is attempting a login from. - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. - Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). - Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). * Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd - i18n-tweak to initscript. * Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - More gettextizing. - Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). - Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). - Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. * Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Finish with the gettextizing. * Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) - Gettextize the init script. * Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. * Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. * Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" authentication. (#21268) * Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) - Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) * Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when doing keyboard-interactive authentication. * Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. - Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client will try it when the server disallows password authentication. - Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. * Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. - Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. * Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). - Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). - Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. * Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. - Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. * Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. - Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. * Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. - Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). * Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files it generates. * Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always build PAM authentication in. - Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. - Clean out no-longer-used patches. - Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only when neither exists. * Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) - Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will always find them in the right place. (#17909) - Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) - Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) * Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) - Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) * Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 20000823 snapshot. - Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} - Back out the pipe patch. * Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. - Move the init script back. - Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. * Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). * Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Move condrestart to server postun. - Move key generation to init script. - Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. - Clean up the init script a bit. * Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. * Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p2. - Use of strtok() considered harmful. * Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Get the build root out of the man pages. * Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add and use condrestart support in the init script. - Add newer initscripts as a prereq. * Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Build in new environment (release 2) - Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group * Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.1p1 * Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. - Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. - Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller - Added Jim Knoble's askpass * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old deleted file mode 100755 index 8a30f7da4a4a..000000000000 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old +++ /dev/null @@ -1,155 +0,0 @@ -#!/bin/bash -# -# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon -# -# chkconfig: 2345 55 25 -# description: OpenSSH server daemon -# -# processname: sshd -# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub -# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed -# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config -# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid - -# source function library -. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions - -# pull in sysconfig settings -[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd - -RETVAL=0 -prog="sshd" - -# Some functions to make the below more readable -KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd -RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid - -my_success() { - local msg - if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then - msg="$2" - else - msg="done" - fi - case "`type -type success`" in - function) - success "$1" - ;; - *) - echo -n "${msg}" - ;; - esac -} -my_failure() { - local msg - if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then - msg="$2" - else - msg="FAILED" - fi - case "`type -type failure`" in - function) - failure "$1" - ;; - *) - echo -n "${msg}" - ;; - esac -} -do_rsa_keygen() { - if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then - echo -n "Generating SSH2 RSA host key: " - if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then - chmod 600 $RSA_KEY - chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub - my_success "RSA key generation" - echo - else - my_failure "RSA key generation" - echo - exit 1 - fi - fi -} -do_dsa_keygen() { - if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then - echo -n "Generating SSH2 DSA host key: " - if $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then - chmod 600 $DSA_KEY - chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub - my_success "DSA key generation" - echo - else - my_failure "DSA key generation" - echo - exit 1 - fi - fi -} -do_restart_sanity_check() { - $SSHD -t - RETVAL=$? - if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then - my_failure "Configuration file or keys" - echo - fi -} - - -case "$1" in - start) - # Create keys if necessary - do_rsa_keygen; - do_dsa_keygen; - - echo -n "Starting sshd: " - if [ ! -f $PID_FILE ] ; then - sshd $OPTIONS - RETVAL=$? - if [ "$RETVAL" = "0" ] ; then - my_success "sshd startup" "sshd" - touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd - else - my_failure "sshd startup" "" - fi - fi - echo - ;; - stop) - echo -n "Shutting down sshd: " - if [ -f $PID_FILE ] ; then - killproc sshd - RETVAL=$? - [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd - fi - echo - ;; - restart) - do_restart_sanity_check - $0 stop - $0 start - RETVAL=$? - ;; - condrestart) - if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then - do_restart_sanity_check - $0 stop - $0 start - RETVAL=$? - fi - ;; - status) - status sshd - RETVAL=$? - ;; - *) - echo "Usage: sshd {start|stop|restart|status|condrestart}" - exit 1 - ;; -esac - -exit $RETVAL diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old b/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old deleted file mode 100644 index 26dcb34d9e94..000000000000 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -#%PAM-1.0 -auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay -auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so -account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so -password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so -password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok -session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so -session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so diff --git a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec index 6cd222e5a424..ee320c76d8d0 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec +++ b/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec @@ -1,245 +1,245 @@ # Default values for additional components %define build_x11_askpass 1 # Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation %define sshd_gid 65 %define sshd_uid 71 # The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use %define xversion 1.2.4.1 # Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1 %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0} Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh -Version: 8.7p1 +Version: 8.8p1 URL: https://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot PreReq: openssl Obsoletes: ssh Provides: ssh # # (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) # building prerequisites -- stuff for # OpenSSL (openssl-devel), # and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) # BuildPrereq: openssl BuildPrereq: zlib-devel #BuildPrereq: glibdev #BuildPrereq: gtkdev #BuildPrereq: gnlibsd %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System. Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Requires: openssh = %{version} Obsoletes: ssh-extras Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %if %{build_x11_askpass} BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel %endif %description Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. %description askpass Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %changelog * Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller - Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page. * Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan - Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check * Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan - Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH * Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller - Glob manpages to catch compressed files * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia - Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass * Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia - Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into his released tarfile - Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs - Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing message if an SSH host key is already in place - Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) * Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia - Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support - Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) * Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia - Made this package correct for SuSE. - Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. %prep %if %{build_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ %configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ --with-pam \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh make %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} %configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh xmkmf -a make cd .. %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin %endif %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %pre /usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || : /usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : %post /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A %{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd} %run_permissions %verifyscript %verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh %preun %stop_on_removal sshd %postun %restart_on_update sshd %{insserv_cleanup} %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* %doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-sk-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh %if %{build_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass %endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.c b/crypto/openssh/log.c index 42c6f9a60d3e..99bf046a792a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/log.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/log.c @@ -1,497 +1,500 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.59 2021/05/07 04:11:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.60 2021/09/16 15:11:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "log.h" #include "match.h" static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; static int log_on_stderr = 1; static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO; static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH; static const char *argv0; static log_handler_fn *log_handler; static void *log_handler_ctx; static char **log_verbose; static size_t nlog_verbose; extern char *__progname; #define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL) #define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL) /* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */ static struct { const char *name; SyslogFacility val; } log_facilities[] = { { "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON }, { "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER }, { "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH }, #ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV { "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV }, #endif { "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 }, { "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 }, { "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 }, { "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 }, { "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 }, { "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 }, { "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 }, { "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 }, { NULL, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET } }; static struct { const char *name; LogLevel val; } log_levels[] = { { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL }, { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR }, { "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO }, { "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE }, { "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, { "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, { "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 }, { "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 }, { NULL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET } }; LogLevel log_level_get(void) { return log_level; } SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *name) { int i; if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0) return log_facilities[i].val; return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; } const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility) { u_int i; for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) if (log_facilities[i].val == facility) return log_facilities[i].name; return NULL; } LogLevel log_level_number(char *name) { int i; if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0) return log_levels[i].val; return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; } const char * log_level_name(LogLevel level) { u_int i; for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++) if (log_levels[i].val == level) return log_levels[i].name; return NULL; } void log_verbose_add(const char *s) { char **tmp; /* Ignore failures here */ if ((tmp = recallocarray(log_verbose, nlog_verbose, nlog_verbose + 1, sizeof(*log_verbose))) != NULL) { log_verbose = tmp; if ((log_verbose[nlog_verbose] = strdup(s)) != NULL) nlog_verbose++; } } void log_verbose_reset(void) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < nlog_verbose; i++) free(log_verbose[i]); free(log_verbose); log_verbose = NULL; nlog_verbose = 0; } /* * Initialize the log. */ void log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) { #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; #endif argv0 = av0; if (log_change_level(level) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n", (int) level); exit(1); } log_handler = NULL; log_handler_ctx = NULL; log_on_stderr = on_stderr; if (on_stderr) return; switch (facility) { case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON: log_facility = LOG_DAEMON; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER: log_facility = LOG_USER; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH: log_facility = LOG_AUTH; break; #ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV: log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV; break; #endif case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6; break; case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7: log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7; break; default: fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n", (int) facility); exit(1); } /* * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong * facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here. */ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); closelog_r(&sdata); #else openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); closelog(); #endif } int log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level) { /* no-op if log_init has not been called */ if (argv0 == NULL) return 0; switch (new_log_level) { case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: log_level = new_log_level; return 0; default: return -1; } } int log_is_on_stderr(void) { return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO; } /* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */ void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile) { int fd; if (logfile == NULL) { if (log_stderr_fd != STDERR_FILENO) { close(log_stderr_fd); log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO; } return; } if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile, strerror(errno)); exit(1); } log_stderr_fd = fd; } #define MSGBUFSIZ 1024 void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx) { log_handler = handler; log_handler_ctx = ctx; } static void do_log(LogLevel level, int force, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, va_list args) { #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; #endif char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; char *txt = NULL; int pri = LOG_INFO; int saved_errno = errno; log_handler_fn *tmp_handler; + const char *progname = argv0 != NULL ? argv0 : __progname; if (!force && level > log_level) return; switch (level) { case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: if (!log_on_stderr) txt = "fatal"; pri = LOG_CRIT; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: if (!log_on_stderr) txt = "error"; pri = LOG_ERR; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: pri = LOG_INFO; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: pri = LOG_INFO; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: txt = "debug1"; pri = LOG_DEBUG; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: txt = "debug2"; pri = LOG_DEBUG; break; case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: txt = "debug3"; pri = LOG_DEBUG; break; default: txt = "internal error"; pri = LOG_ERR; break; } if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) { snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt); vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args); } else { vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args); } if (suffix != NULL) { snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", msgbuf, suffix); strlcpy(msgbuf, fmtbuf, sizeof(msgbuf)); } strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS); if (log_handler != NULL) { /* Avoid recursion */ tmp_handler = log_handler; log_handler = NULL; tmp_handler(level, force, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx); log_handler = tmp_handler; } else if (log_on_stderr) { - snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n", + snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s%s%.*s\r\n", + (log_on_stderr > 1) ? progname : "", + (log_on_stderr > 1) ? ": " : "", (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf); (void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf)); } else { #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) - openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); + openlog_r(progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf); closelog_r(&sdata); #else - openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); + openlog(progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf); closelog(); #endif } errno = saved_errno; } void sshlog(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc, LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args); va_end(args); } void sshlogdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc, LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, suffix, fmt, args); va_end(args); cleanup_exit(255); } void sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc, LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, suffix, fmt, args); va_end(args); _exit(1); } void sshlogv(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc, LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, va_list args) { char tag[128], fmt2[MSGBUFSIZ + 128]; int forced = 0; const char *cp; size_t i; snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "%.48s:%.48s():%d (pid=%ld)", (cp = strrchr(file, '/')) == NULL ? file : cp + 1, func, line, (long)getpid()); for (i = 0; i < nlog_verbose; i++) { if (match_pattern_list(tag, log_verbose[i], 0) == 1) { forced = 1; break; } } if (forced) snprintf(fmt2, sizeof(fmt2), "%s: %s", tag, fmt); else if (showfunc) snprintf(fmt2, sizeof(fmt2), "%s: %s", func, fmt); else strlcpy(fmt2, fmt, sizeof(fmt2)); do_log(level, forced, suffix, fmt2, args); } void sshlogdirect(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(level, forced, NULL, fmt, args); va_end(args); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c index fff1bf54f72c..b3632086368a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c @@ -1,205 +1,205 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2021 Darren Tucker (dtucker at dtucker net). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_PSELECT #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" /* for set_nonblock */ #ifndef HAVE_SIGHANDLER_T typedef void (*sighandler_t)(int); #endif static sighandler_t saved_sighandler[_NSIG]; /* * Set up the descriptors. Because they are close-on-exec, in the case * where sshd's re-exec fails notify_pipe will still point to a descriptor * that was closed by the exec attempt but if that descriptor has been * reopened then we'll attempt to use that. Ensure that notify_pipe is * outside of the range used by sshd re-exec but within NFDBITS (so we don't * need to expand the fd_sets). */ #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) static int pselect_notify_setup_fd(int *fd) { int r; if ((r = fcntl(*fd, F_DUPFD, REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD)) < 0 || fcntl(r, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0 || r >= FD_SETSIZE) return -1; (void)close(*fd); return (*fd = r); } /* * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid * the race between select() and child_terminated */ static pid_t notify_pid; static int notify_pipe[2]; static void pselect_notify_setup(void) { static int initialized; if (initialized && notify_pid == getpid()) return; if (notify_pid == 0) debug3_f("initializing"); else { debug3_f("pid changed, reinitializing"); if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) close(notify_pipe[0]); if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) close(notify_pipe[1]); } if (pipe(notify_pipe) == -1) { error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (pselect_notify_setup_fd(¬ify_pipe[0]) == -1 || pselect_notify_setup_fd(¬ify_pipe[1]) == -1) { error("fcntl(notify_pipe, ...) failed %s", strerror(errno)); close(notify_pipe[0]); close(notify_pipe[1]); } else { set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]); set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]); notify_pid = getpid(); debug3_f("pid %d saved %d pipe0 %d pipe1 %d", getpid(), notify_pid, notify_pipe[0], notify_pipe[1]); initialized = 1; return; } notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */ notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */ } static void pselect_notify_parent(void) { if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); } static void pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) { if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); } static void pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset) { char c; if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) { while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) debug2_f("reading"); FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset); } } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void pselect_sig_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pselect_notify_parent(); if (saved_sighandler[sig] != NULL) (*saved_sighandler[sig])(sig); /* call original handler */ errno = save_errno; } /* * A minimal implementation of pselect(2), built on top of select(2). */ int pselect(int nfds, fd_set *readfds, fd_set *writefds, fd_set *exceptfds, const struct timespec *timeout, const sigset_t *mask) { int ret, sig, saved_errno, unmasked = 0; sigset_t osig; struct sigaction sa, osa; struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL; if (timeout != NULL) { tv.tv_sec = timeout->tv_sec; tv.tv_usec = timeout->tv_nsec / 1000; tvp = &tv; } if (mask == NULL) /* no signal mask, just call select */ return select(nfds, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp); /* For each signal we're unmasking, install our handler if needed. */ for (sig = 0; sig < _NSIG; sig++) { if (sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP || sigismember(mask, sig)) continue; if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &sa) == 0 && sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN && sa.sa_handler != SIG_DFL) { unmasked = 1; if (sa.sa_handler == pselect_sig_handler) continue; sa.sa_handler = pselect_sig_handler; if (sigaction(sig, &sa, &osa) == 0) { debug3_f("installing signal handler for %s, " "previous %p", strsignal(sig), osa.sa_handler); saved_sighandler[sig] = osa.sa_handler; } } } if (unmasked) { pselect_notify_setup(); pselect_notify_prepare(readfds); - nfds = MAX(nfds, notify_pipe[0]); + nfds = MAX(nfds, notify_pipe[0] + 1); } /* Unmask signals, call select then restore signal mask. */ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, mask, &osig); ret = select(nfds, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp); saved_errno = errno; sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osig, NULL); if (unmasked) pselect_notify_done(readfds); errno = saved_errno; return ret; } #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssh/opensshd.init.in b/crypto/openssh/opensshd.init.in index 99e5a51ab8b7..251724805f7f 100755 --- a/crypto/openssh/opensshd.init.in +++ b/crypto/openssh/opensshd.init.in @@ -1,88 +1,68 @@ #!@STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL@ # Donated code that was put under PD license. # # Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being. umask 022 CAT=@CAT@ KILL=@KILL@ prefix=@prefix@ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'` [ X$PidFile = X ] || PIDFILE=$PidFile SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen -HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key -HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key -@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -HOST_KEY_ED25519=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ed25519_key - - -checkkeys() { - if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then - ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N "" - fi - if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then - ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N "" - fi -@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then -@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N "" -@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ fi - if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then - ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f ${HOST_KEY_ED25519} -N "" - fi -} stop_service() { if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}` fi if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then ${KILL} ${PID} else echo "Unable to read PID file" fi } start_service() { # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made - checkkeys + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -A # Start SSHD echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD sshd_rc=$? if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing." exit $sshd_rc fi echo done. } case $1 in 'start') start_service ;; 'stop') stop_service ;; 'restart') stop_service start_service ;; *) echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}" ;; esac diff --git a/crypto/openssh/platform-tracing.c b/crypto/openssh/platform-tracing.c index 4c80a282c493..740a266b9432 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/platform-tracing.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/platform-tracing.c @@ -1,51 +1,62 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2016 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PROCCTL_H +#include +#endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) #include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H #include /* For setpflags() and __PROC_PROTECT */ #endif #include +#include #include "log.h" void platform_disable_tracing(int strict) { +#if defined(HAVE_PROCCTL) && defined(PROC_TRACE_CTL) + /* On FreeBSD, we should make this process untraceable */ + int disable_trace = PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE; + + if (procctl(P_PID, getpid(), PROC_TRACE_CTL, &disable_trace) && strict) + fatal("unable to make the process untraceable"); +#endif #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0 && strict) fatal("unable to make the process undumpable"); #endif #if defined(HAVE_SETPFLAGS) && defined(__PROC_PROTECT) /* On Solaris, we should make this process untraceable */ if (setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, 1) != 0 && strict) fatal("unable to make the process untraceable"); #endif #ifdef PT_DENY_ATTACH /* Mac OS X */ if (ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0) == -1 && strict) fatal("unable to set PT_DENY_ATTACH"); #endif } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c index 7abefb6f5627..980388f03e1a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c @@ -1,3465 +1,3501 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.361 2021/07/23 04:04:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.363 2021/09/16 05:36:03 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" /* Format of the configuration file: # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order # that they are given in. Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi User foo Host fake.com Hostname another.host.name.real.org User blaah Port 34289 ForwardX11 no ForwardAgent no Host books.com RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 Ciphers 3des-cbc Host fascist.blob.com Port 23123 User tylonen PasswordAuthentication no Host puukko.hut.fi User t35124p ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p Host *.fr PublicKeyAuthentication no Host *.su Ciphers aes128-ctr PasswordAuthentication no Host vpn.fake.com Tunnel yes TunnelDevice 3 # Defaults for various options Host * ForwardAgent no ForwardX11 no PasswordAuthentication yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes TcpKeepAlive no IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity Port 22 EscapeChar ~ */ static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth); static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth); /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { oBadOption, oVersionAddendum, oHost, oMatch, oInclude, oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout, oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, oPasswordAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, oPermitRemoteOpen, oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent, oUser, oEscapeChar, oProxyCommand, oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oLogVerbose, oCiphers, oMacs, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, oVisualHostKey, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull, oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump, oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; /* Textual representations of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { /* Deprecated options */ { "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */ { "cipher", oDeprecated }, { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "useroaming", oDeprecated }, { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated }, /* Unsupported options */ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported }, /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, # else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, #endif #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, # else { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout }, { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure }, { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "skeyauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "tisauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, { "certificatefile", oCertificateFile }, { "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent }, { "identityagent", oIdentityAgent }, { "hostname", oHostname }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, { "ciphers", oCiphers }, { "macs", oMacs }, { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, { "localforward", oLocalForward }, { "permitremoteopen", oPermitRemoteOpen }, { "user", oUser }, { "host", oHost }, { "match", oMatch }, { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, { "compression", oCompression }, { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, { "syslogfacility", oLogFacility }, { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, { "logverbose", oLogVerbose }, { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, { "bindinterface", oBindInterface }, { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit }, { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout }, { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily }, { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval }, { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax }, { "sendenv", oSendEnv }, { "setenv", oSetEnv }, { "controlpath", oControlPath }, { "controlmaster", oControlMaster }, { "controlpersist", oControlPersist }, { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, { "include", oInclude }, { "tunnel", oTunnel }, { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, { "sessiontype", oSessionType }, { "stdinnull", oStdinNull }, { "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication }, { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains }, { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal }, { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink }, { "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys }, { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash }, { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys }, { "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms }, { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */ { "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */ { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "proxyjump", oProxyJump }, { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider }, { "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand }, { "hpndisabled", oDeprecated }, { "hpnbuffersize", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbuf", oDeprecated }, { "noneenabled", oUnsupported }, { "noneswitch", oUnsupported }, { "versionaddendum", oVersionAddendum }, { NULL, oBadOption } }; static const char *lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code); const char * kex_default_pk_alg(void) { static char *pkalgs; if (pkalgs == NULL) { char *all_key; all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); pkalgs = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); free(all_key); } return pkalgs; } char * ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host, const char *portstr, const char *user) { struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, user, strlen(user)) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0) fatal_f("mux digest failed"); ssh_digest_free(md); return tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); } /* * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an * error. */ void add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; int i; /* Don't add duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i)) return; } options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards, options->num_local_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; } /* * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is * an error. */ void add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; int i; /* Don't add duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i)) return; } options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards, options->num_remote_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; fwd->handle = newfwd->handle; fwd->allocated_port = 0; } static void clear_forwardings(Options *options) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) { free(options->local_forwards); options->local_forwards = NULL; } options->num_local_forwards = 0; for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) { free(options->remote_forwards); options->remote_forwards = NULL; } options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; } void add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided) { int i; if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) { if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path); return; } } options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] = userprovided; options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] = xstrdup(path); } void add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, int userprovided) { char *path; int i; if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ path = xstrdup(filename); else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path); free(path); return; } } options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] = userprovided; options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path; } int default_ssh_port(void) { static int port; struct servent *sp; if (port == 0) { sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } return port; } /* * Execute a command in a shell. * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit. */ static int execute_in_shell(const char *cmd) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int status; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (access(shell, X_OK) == -1) { fatal("Shell \"%s\" is not executable: %s", shell, strerror(errno)); } debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd); /* Fork and execute the command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[4]; if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1) fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd); argv[3] = NULL; execv(argv[0], argv); error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno)); /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); kill(getpid(), SIGTERM); _exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid == -1) fatal_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd); return -1; } debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); return WEXITSTATUS(status); } /* * Parse and execute a Match directive. */ static int match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int final_pass, int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum) { char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria; const char *ruser; int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; char uidstr[32]; /* * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we * must be prepared to use default values. */ port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port; ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user; if (final_pass) { host = xstrdup(options->hostname); } else if (options->hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */ host = percent_expand(options->hostname, "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL); } else { host = xstrdup(host_arg); } debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s", cp, host, original_host); while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { /* Terminate on comment */ if (*attrib == '#') { cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ break; } arg = criteria = NULL; this_result = 1; if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!')) attrib++; /* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) { error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined " "with other Match attributes", filename, linenum, oattrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#') cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ if (result) result = negate ? 0 : 1; goto out; } attributes++; /* criteria "final" and "canonical" have no argument */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0 || strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0) { /* * If the config requests "Match final" then remember * this so we can perform a second pass later. */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0 && want_final_pass != NULL) *want_final_pass = 1; r = !!final_pass; /* force bitmask member to boolean */ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'", filename, linenum, this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib); continue; } /* All other criteria require an argument */ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(host); r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(original_host); r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(ruser); r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { char *conn_hash_hex, *keyalias; if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(thishost, host, portstr, ruser); keyalias = options->host_key_alias ? options->host_key_alias : host; cmd = percent_expand(arg, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "k", keyalias, "l", thishost, "n", original_host, "p", portstr, "r", ruser, "u", pw->pw_name, "i", uidstr, (char *)NULL); free(conn_hash_hex); if (result != 1) { /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */ debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec " "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd); free(cmd); continue; } r = execute_in_shell(cmd); if (r == -1) { fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec " "'%.100s' error", filename, linenum, cmd); } criteria = xstrdup(cmd); free(cmd); /* Force exit status to boolean */ r = r == 0; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ", filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ", oattrib, criteria); free(criteria); } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); result = -1; goto out; } out: if (result != -1) debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; free(host); return result; } /* Remove environment variable by pattern */ static void rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum) { int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env; char *cp; /* Remove an environment variable */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) { cp = xstrdup(options->send_env[i]); if (!match_pattern(cp, arg + 1)) { free(cp); i++; continue; } debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s", filename, linenum, cp); free(cp); free(options->send_env[i]); options->send_env[i] = NULL; for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) { options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1]; options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL; } options->num_send_env--; /* NB. don't increment i */ } if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) { options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env, onum_send_env, options->num_send_env, sizeof(*options->send_env)); } } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. */ static OpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, const char *ignored_unknown) { int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) return keywords[i].opcode; if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1) return oIgnoredUnknownOption; error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return oBadOption; } /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = { { "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, { "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, { "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK }, { "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, { "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { "confirm", 3 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = { { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO }, { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK }, { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = { { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET }, { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT }, { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = { { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE }, { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_sessiontype[] = { { "none", SESSION_TYPE_NONE }, { "subsystem", SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM }, { "default", SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = { { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { #ifdef WITH_ZLIB { "yes", COMP_ZLIB }, #endif { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static int parse_multistate_value(const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum, const struct multistate *multistate_ptr) { int i; if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); return -1; } for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) return multistate_ptr[i].value; } return -1; } /* * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This * only sets those values that have not already been set. */ int process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags) { return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, NULL, 0); } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth) { char *str, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, *p, ch; char **cpptr, ***cppptr, fwdarg[256]; u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, max_entries = 0; int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; int remotefwd, dynamicfwd; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; long long val64; size_t len; struct Forward fwd; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; struct allowed_cname *cname; glob_t gl; const char *errstr; char **oav = NULL, **av; int oac = 0, ac; int ret = -1; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } str = line; /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&str); if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') return 0; /* Match lowercase keyword */ lowercase(keyword); /* Prepare to parse remainder of line */ if (str != NULL) str += strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') { error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return -1; } opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, options->ignored_unknown); if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) { error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum); return -1; } ac = oac; av = oav; switch (opcode) { case oBadOption: /* don't panic, but count bad options */ goto out; case oIgnore: argv_consume(&ac); break; case oIgnoredUnknownOption: debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; case oConnectTimeout: intptr = &options->connection_timeout; parse_time: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = -1; else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardAgent: intptr = &options->forward_agent; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = -1; multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value != -1) { if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; } /* ForwardAgent wasn't 'yes' or 'no', assume a path */ if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = 1; charptr = &options->forward_agent_sock_path; goto parse_agent_path; case oForwardX11: intptr = &options->forward_x11; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; parse_multistate: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum, multistate_ptr)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardX11Trusted: intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Timeout: intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout; goto parse_time; case oGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; goto parse_flag; case oExitOnForwardFailure: intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure; goto parse_flag; case oPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveDevices: charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; goto parse_string; case oPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; case oCheckHostIP: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oStrictHostKeyChecking: intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey; goto parse_multistate; case oCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case oTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; goto parse_flag; case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; goto parse_int; case oRekeyLimit: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) { error("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); goto out; } } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = val64; if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) { (void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case oIdentityFile: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_identity_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { error("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files " "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); goto out; } add_identity_file(options, NULL, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; case oCertificateFile: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_certificate_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) { error("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate " "files specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); goto out; } add_certificate_file(options, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; case oXAuthLocation: charptr=&options->xauth_location; goto parse_string; case oUser: charptr = &options->user; parse_string: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; parse_char_array: i = 0; value = *uintptr == 0; /* was array empty when we started? */ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (*activep && value) { if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) { error("%s line %d: too many %s " "entries.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } break; case oUserKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; goto parse_char_array; case oHostname: charptr = &options->hostname; goto parse_string; case oHostKeyAlias: charptr = &options->host_key_alias; goto parse_string; case oPreferredAuthentications: charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; goto parse_string; case oBindAddress: charptr = &options->bind_address; goto parse_string; case oBindInterface: charptr = &options->bind_interface; goto parse_string; case oPKCS11Provider: charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; goto parse_string; case oSecurityKeyProvider: charptr = &options->sk_provider; goto parse_string; case oKnownHostsCommand: charptr = &options->known_hosts_command; goto parse_command; case oProxyCommand: charptr = &options->proxy_command; /* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */ if (options->jump_host != NULL) charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */ parse_command: if (str == NULL) { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "="); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(str + len); argv_consume(&ac); break; case oProxyJump: if (str == NULL) { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "="); /* XXX use argv? */ if (parse_jump(str + len, options, *activep) == -1) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"", filename, linenum, str + len); goto out; } argv_consume(&ac); break; case oPort: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = a2port(arg); if (value <= 0) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && options->port == -1) options->port = value; break; case oConnectionAttempts: intptr = &options->connection_attempts; parse_int: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) { error("%s line %d: integer value %s.", filename, linenum, errstr); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oCiphers: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)){ error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case oMacs: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case oKexAlgorithms: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; parse_pubkey_algos: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*arg != '-' && !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) { error("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oCASignatureAlgorithms: charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case oLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) { error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case oLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) { error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); goto out; } if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case oLogVerbose: cppptr = &options->log_verbose; uintptr = &options->num_log_verbose; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) { *cppptr = xrecallocarray(*cppptr, *uintptr, *uintptr + 1, sizeof(**cppptr)); (*cppptr)[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } break; case oLocalForward: case oRemoteForward: case oDynamicForward: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward); dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward); if (!dynamicfwd) { arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') { if (remotefwd) dynamicfwd = 1; else { error("%.200s line %d: Missing target " "argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } } else { /* construct a string for parse_forward */ snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2); } } if (dynamicfwd) strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep) { if (remotefwd) { add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); } else { add_local_forward(options, &fwd); } } break; case oPermitRemoteOpen: uintptr = &options->num_permitted_remote_opens; cppptr = &options->permitted_remote_opens; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { *uintptr = 1; *cppptr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**cppptr)); (*cppptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg); } break; } while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { arg2 = xstrdup(arg); ch = '\0'; p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (p == NULL || ch == '/') { fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); } p = cleanhostname(p); /* * don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid * dependency on channels.[ch] here. */ if (arg == NULL || (strcmp(arg, "*") != 0 && a2port(arg) <= 0)) { fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in %s", filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); } if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { opt_array_append(filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode), cppptr, uintptr, arg2); } free(arg2); } break; case oClearAllForwardings: intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; goto parse_flag; case oHost: if (cmdline) { error("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); goto out; } *activep = 0; arg2 = NULL; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0) { argv_consume(&ac); break; } negated = *arg == '!'; if (negated) arg++; if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { if (negated) { debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host " "block because of negated match " "for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg); *activep = 0; argv_consume(&ac); break; } if (!*activep) arg2 = arg; /* logged below */ *activep = 1; } } if (*activep) debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg2); break; case oMatch: if (cmdline) { error("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); goto out; } value = match_cfg_line(options, &str, pw, host, original_host, flags & SSHCONF_FINAL, want_final_pass, filename, linenum); if (value < 0) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); goto out; } *activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value; /* * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail. */ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') argv_consume(&ac); break; case oEscapeChar: intptr = &options->escape_char; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else if (arg[1] == '\0') value = (u_char) arg[0]; else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; else { error("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; goto parse_multistate; case oEnableSSHKeysign: intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign; goto parse_flag; case oIdentitiesOnly: intptr = &options->identities_only; goto parse_flag; case oServerAliveInterval: intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case oServerAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case oSendEnv: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) { error("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (!*activep) continue; if (*arg == '-') { /* Removing an env var */ rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum); continue; } else { /* Adding an env var */ if (options->num_send_env >= INT_MAX) { error("%s line %d: too many send env.", filename, linenum); goto out; } options->send_env = xrecallocarray( options->send_env, options->num_send_env, options->num_send_env + 1, sizeof(*options->send_env)); options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } } break; case oSetEnv: value = options->num_setenv; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) { error("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (!*activep || value != 0) continue; /* Adding a setenv var */ if (options->num_setenv >= INT_MAX) { error("%s line %d: too many SetEnv.", filename, linenum); goto out; } options->setenv = xrecallocarray( options->setenv, options->num_setenv, options->num_setenv + 1, sizeof(*options->setenv)); options->setenv[options->num_setenv++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oControlPath: charptr = &options->control_path; goto parse_string; case oControlMaster: intptr = &options->control_master; multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster; goto parse_multistate; case oControlPersist: /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */ intptr = &options->control_persist; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist" " argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = 0; value2 = 0; /* timeout */ if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) value = 0; else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) value = 1; else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0) value = 1; else { error("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; options->control_persist_timeout = value2; } break; case oHashKnownHosts: intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case oTunnel: intptr = &options->tun_open; multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel; goto parse_multistate; case oTunnelDevice: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = a2tun(arg, &value2); if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && options->tun_local == -1) { options->tun_local = value; options->tun_remote = value2; } break; case oLocalCommand: charptr = &options->local_command; goto parse_command; case oPermitLocalCommand: intptr = &options->permit_local_command; goto parse_flag; case oRemoteCommand: charptr = &options->remote_command; goto parse_command; case oVisualHostKey: intptr = &options->visual_host_key; goto parse_flag; case oInclude: if (cmdline) { error("Include directive not supported as a " "command-line option"); goto out; } value = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* * Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration * files may begin with '~/' but system configurations * must not. If the path is relative, then treat it * as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or * /etc/ssh for system ones. */ if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0) { error("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (!path_absolute(arg) && *arg != '~') { xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s", (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ? "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg); } else arg2 = xstrdup(arg); memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl); if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) { debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no " "files",filename, linenum, arg2); free(arg2); continue; } else if (r != 0) { error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.", filename, linenum, arg2); goto out; } free(arg2); oactive = *activep; for (i = 0; i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) { debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s " "depth %d%s", filename, linenum, gl.gl_pathv[i], depth, oactive ? "" : " (parse only)"); r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i], pw, host, original_host, options, flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH), activep, want_final_pass, depth + 1); if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) { error("Can't open user config file " "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); globfree(&gl); goto out; } /* * don't let Match in includes clobber the * containing file's Match state. */ *activep = oactive; if (r != 1) value = -1; } globfree(&gl); } if (value != 0) ret = value; break; case oIPQoS: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) { error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case oRequestTTY: intptr = &options->request_tty; multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty; goto parse_multistate; case oSessionType: intptr = &options->session_type; multistate_ptr = multistate_sessiontype; goto parse_multistate; case oStdinNull: intptr = &options->stdin_null; goto parse_flag; case oForkAfterAuthentication: intptr = &options->fork_after_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oVersionAddendum: if (str == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(str + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else if (strchr(str + len, '\r') != NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", filename, linenum); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(str + len); } return 0; case oIgnoreUnknown: charptr = &options->ignored_unknown; goto parse_string; case oProxyUseFdpass: intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass; goto parse_flag; case oCanonicalDomains: value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) { error("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum, errstr); goto out; } if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) { error("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.", filename, linenum); goto out; } options->canonical_domains[ options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs: value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0; + i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { - /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */ - if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) + /* + * Either 'none' (only in first position), '*' for + * everything or 'list:list' + */ + if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { + if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { + error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " + "argument must appear alone.", + filename, linenum, keyword); + goto out; + } + arg2 = ""; + } else if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) { arg2 = arg; - else { + } else { lowercase(arg); if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL || arg2[1] == '\0') { error("%s line %d: " "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } *arg2 = '\0'; arg2++; } + i++; if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) { error("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.", filename, linenum); goto out; } cname = options->permitted_cnames + options->num_permitted_cnames++; cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg); cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2); } break; case oCanonicalizeHostname: intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname; multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname; goto parse_multistate; case oCanonicalizeMaxDots: intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots; goto parse_int; case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal: intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local; goto parse_flag; case oStreamLocalBindMask: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask " "argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8); if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) { error("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); goto out; } options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case oStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case oRevokedHostKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys; goto parse_string; case oFingerprintHash: intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oUpdateHostkeys: intptr = &options->update_hostkeys; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case oAddKeysToAgent: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm); value2 = 0; /* unlimited lifespan by default */ if (value == 3 && arg2 != NULL) { /* allow "AddKeysToAgent confirm 5m" */ if ((value2 = convtime(arg2)) == -1 || value2 > INT_MAX) { error("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); goto out; } } else if (value == -1 && arg2 == NULL) { if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) == -1 || value2 > INT_MAX) { error("%s line %d: unsupported option", filename, linenum); goto out; } value = 1; /* yes */ } else if (value == -1 || arg2 != NULL) { error("%s line %d: unsupported option", filename, linenum); goto out; } if (*activep && options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) { options->add_keys_to_agent = value; options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = value2; } break; case oIdentityAgent: charptr = &options->identity_agent; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); goto out; } parse_agent_path: /* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */ if ((arg2 = dollar_expand(&r, arg)) == NULL || r) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment expansion " "%s.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } free(arg2); /* check for legacy environment format */ if (arg[0] == '$' && arg[1] != '{' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) { error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.", filename, linenum, arg); goto out; } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oDeprecated: debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; case oUnsupported: error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; default: error("%s line %d: Unimplemented opcode %d", filename, linenum, opcode); goto out; } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if (ac > 0) { error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments " "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* success */ ret = 0; out: argv_free(oav, oac); return ret; } /* * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. */ int read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *want_final_pass) { int active = 1; return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host, options, flags, &active, want_final_pass, 0); } #define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16 static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth) { FILE *f; char *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; int linenum; int bad_options = 0; if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH) fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes"); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) { struct stat sb; if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); } debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); /* * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned * on/off by Host specifications. */ linenum = 0; while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { /* Update line number counter. */ linenum++; /* * Trim out comments and strip whitespace. * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages. */ if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, want_final_pass, depth) != 0) bad_options++; } free(line); fclose(f); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); return 1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } +/* + * Returns 1 if CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified, 0 otherwise. + * Allowed to be called on non-final configuration. + */ +int +config_has_permitted_cnames(Options *options) +{ + if (options->num_permitted_cnames == 1 && + strcasecmp(options->permitted_cnames[0].source_list, "none") == 0 && + strcmp(options->permitted_cnames[0].target_list, "") == 0) + return 0; + return options->num_permitted_cnames > 0; +} + /* * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. */ void initialize_options(Options * options) { memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); options->version_addendum = NULL; options->forward_agent = -1; options->forward_agent_sock_path = NULL; options->forward_x11 = -1; options->forward_x11_trusted = -1; options->forward_x11_timeout = -1; options->stdio_forward_host = NULL; options->stdio_forward_port = 0; options->clear_forwardings = -1; options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; options->compression = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->port = -1; options->address_family = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; options->num_identity_files = 0; memset(options->identity_keys, 0, sizeof(options->identity_keys)); options->num_certificate_files = 0; memset(options->certificates, 0, sizeof(options->certificates)); options->hostname = NULL; options->host_key_alias = NULL; options->proxy_command = NULL; options->jump_user = NULL; options->jump_host = NULL; options->jump_port = -1; options->jump_extra = NULL; options->user = NULL; options->escape_char = -1; options->num_system_hostfiles = 0; options->num_user_hostfiles = 0; options->local_forwards = NULL; options->num_local_forwards = 0; options->remote_forwards = NULL; options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->permitted_remote_opens = NULL; options->num_permitted_remote_opens = 0; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->num_log_verbose = 0; options->log_verbose = NULL; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; options->bind_interface = NULL; options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; options->sk_provider = NULL; options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; options->identities_only = - 1; options->rekey_limit = - 1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->verify_host_key_dns = -1; options->server_alive_interval = -1; options->server_alive_count_max = -1; options->send_env = NULL; options->num_send_env = 0; options->setenv = NULL; options->num_setenv = 0; options->control_path = NULL; options->control_master = -1; options->control_persist = -1; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; options->hash_known_hosts = -1; options->tun_open = -1; options->tun_local = -1; options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; options->remote_command = NULL; options->add_keys_to_agent = -1; options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = -1; options->identity_agent = NULL; options->visual_host_key = -1; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->request_tty = -1; options->session_type = -1; options->stdin_null = -1; options->fork_after_authentication = -1; options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1; options->ignored_unknown = NULL; options->num_canonical_domains = 0; options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1; options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1; options->canonicalize_hostname = -1; options->revoked_host_keys = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->update_hostkeys = -1; options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL; options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL; options->known_hosts_command = NULL; } /* * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed. */ void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options) { if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; } /* * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. */ int fill_default_options(Options * options) { char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig; int ret = 0, r; if (options->forward_agent == -1) options->forward_agent = 0; if (options->forward_x11 == -1) options->forward_x11 = 0; if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; /* * stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer * setting the values so they can be overridden. */ if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1) options->exit_on_forward_failure = options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; if (options->clear_forwardings == -1) options->clear_forwardings = options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) clear_forwardings(options); if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->batch_mode == -1) options->batch_mode = 0; if (options->check_host_ip == -1) options->check_host_ip = 0; if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK; if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = 0; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->port == -1) options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->connection_attempts == -1) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) { options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = 0; } if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, 0); #endif add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0); } if (options->escape_char == -1) options->escape_char = '~'; if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) { options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) { if (options->verify_host_key_dns <= 0 && (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0 || (options->num_user_hostfiles == 1 && strcmp(options-> user_hostfiles[0], _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE) == 0))) options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES; else options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO; } if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) { options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER; if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; if (options->identities_only == -1) options->identities_only = 0; if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; #if HAVE_LDNS if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) /* automatically trust a verified SSHFP record */ options->verify_host_key_dns = 1; #else if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; #endif if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) options->server_alive_interval = 0; if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->control_master == -1) options->control_master = 0; if (options->control_persist == -1) { options->control_persist = 0; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; } if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1) options->hash_known_hosts = 0; if (options->tun_open == -1) options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->tun_local == -1) options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->tun_remote == -1) options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->permit_local_command == -1) options->permit_local_command = 0; if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; if (options->request_tty == -1) options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; if (options->session_type == -1) options->session_type = SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT; if (options->stdin_null == -1) options->stdin_null = 0; if (options->fork_after_authentication == -1) options->fork_after_authentication = 0; if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0; if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal"); #else if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); #endif /* Expand KEX name lists */ all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac); def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex); def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ do { \ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \ defaults, all)) != 0) { \ error_fr(r, "%s", #what); \ goto fail; \ } \ } while (0) ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher); ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac); ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex); ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig); #undef ASSEMBLE #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pkcs11_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->known_hosts_command); if (options->jump_host != NULL && strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 && options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) { free(options->jump_host); options->jump_host = NULL; } + if (options->num_permitted_cnames == 1 && + !config_has_permitted_cnames(options)) { + /* clean up CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs=none */ + free(options->permitted_cnames[0].source_list); + free(options->permitted_cnames[0].target_list); + memset(options->permitted_cnames, '\0', + sizeof(*options->permitted_cnames)); + options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; + } /* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */ /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD); /* success */ ret = 0; fail: free(all_cipher); free(all_mac); free(all_kex); free(all_key); free(all_sig); free(def_cipher); free(def_mac); free(def_kex); free(def_key); free(def_sig); return ret; } void free_options(Options *o) { int i; if (o == NULL) return; #define FREE_ARRAY(type, n, a) \ do { \ type _i; \ for (_i = 0; _i < (n); _i++) \ free((a)[_i]); \ } while (0) free(o->forward_agent_sock_path); free(o->xauth_location); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose); free(o->log_verbose); free(o->ciphers); free(o->macs); free(o->hostkeyalgorithms); free(o->kex_algorithms); free(o->ca_sign_algorithms); free(o->hostname); free(o->host_key_alias); free(o->proxy_command); free(o->user); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); free(o->preferred_authentications); free(o->bind_address); free(o->bind_interface); free(o->pkcs11_provider); free(o->sk_provider); for (i = 0; i < o->num_identity_files; i++) { free(o->identity_files[i]); sshkey_free(o->identity_keys[i]); } for (i = 0; i < o->num_certificate_files; i++) { free(o->certificate_files[i]); sshkey_free(o->certificates[i]); } free(o->identity_agent); for (i = 0; i < o->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_host); free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_host); free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } free(o->local_forwards); for (i = 0; i < o->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } free(o->remote_forwards); free(o->stdio_forward_host); FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); free(o->send_env); FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); free(o->setenv); free(o->control_path); free(o->local_command); free(o->remote_command); FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { free(o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list); free(o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); } free(o->revoked_host_keys); free(o->hostbased_accepted_algos); free(o->pubkey_accepted_algos); free(o->jump_user); free(o->jump_host); free(o->jump_extra); free(o->ignored_unknown); explicit_bzero(o, sizeof(*o)); #undef FREE_ARRAY } struct fwdarg { char *arg; int ispath; }; /* * parse_fwd_field * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification. * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon * or sets it to NULL at end of string. * returns 0 on success, else non-zero. */ static int parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) { char *ep, *cp = *p; int ispath = 0; if (*cp == '\0') { *p = NULL; return -1; /* end of string */ } /* * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally. * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash? */ if (*cp == '[') { /* find matching ']' */ for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) { if (*ep == '/') ispath = 1; } /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */ if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0')) return -1; /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */ *ep++ = '\0'; if (*ep != '\0') *ep++ = '\0'; fwd->arg = cp + 1; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = ep; return 0; } for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { switch (*cp) { case '\\': memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); if (*cp == '\0') return -1; break; case '/': ispath = 1; break; case ':': *cp++ = '\0'; goto done; } } done: fwd->arg = *p; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = cp; return 0; } /* * parse_forward * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form: * dynamicfwd == 0 * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath * listenpath:connectpath * dynamicfwd == 1 * [listenhost:]listenport * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error */ int parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) { struct fwdarg fwdargs[4]; char *p, *cp; int i, err; memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd)); memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs)); /* * We expand environment variables before checking if we think they're * paths so that if ${VAR} expands to a fully qualified path it is * treated as a path. */ cp = p = dollar_expand(&err, fwdspec); if (p == NULL || err) return 0; /* skip leading spaces */ while (isspace((u_char)*cp)) cp++; for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0) break; } /* Check for trailing garbage */ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { i = 0; /* failure */ } switch (i) { case 1: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); } fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); break; case 2: if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); } break; case 3: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } break; case 4: fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg); break; default: i = 0; /* failure */ } free(p); if (dynamicfwd) { if (!(i == 1 || i == 2)) goto fail_free; } else { if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) { if (fwd->connect_path == NULL && fwd->listen_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) goto fail_free; if (fwd->connect_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; /* * XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not * match this host */ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; return (i); fail_free: free(fwd->connect_host); fwd->connect_host = NULL; free(fwd->connect_path); fwd->connect_path = NULL; free(fwd->listen_host); fwd->listen_host = NULL; free(fwd->listen_path); fwd->listen_path = NULL; return (0); } int parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active) { char *orig, *sdup, *cp; char *host = NULL, *user = NULL; int r, ret = -1, port = -1, first; active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL; orig = sdup = xstrdup(s); /* Remove comment and trailing whitespace */ if ((cp = strchr(orig, '#')) != NULL) *cp = '\0'; rtrim(orig); first = active; do { if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) break; if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL) cp = sdup; /* last */ else *cp++ = '\0'; if (first) { /* First argument and configuration is active */ r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port); if (r == -1 || (r == 1 && parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0)) goto out; } else { /* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */ r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (r == -1 || (r == 1 && parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)) goto out; } first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */ } while (cp != sdup); /* success */ if (active) { if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) { o->jump_host = xstrdup("none"); o->jump_port = 0; } else { o->jump_user = user; o->jump_host = host; o->jump_port = port; o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); user = host = NULL; if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) { o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s); o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0'; } } } ret = 0; out: free(orig); free(user); free(host); return ret; } int parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp) { char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; int r, port; r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, &user, &host, &port, &path); if (r == 0 && path != NULL) r = -1; /* path not allowed */ if (r == 0) { if (userp != NULL) { *userp = user; user = NULL; } if (hostp != NULL) { *hostp = host; host = NULL; } if (portp != NULL) *portp = port; } free(user); free(host); free(path); return r; } /* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */ static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case oAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: case oUpdateHostkeys: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); case oStrictHostKeyChecking: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey); case oControlMaster: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); case oTunnel: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel); case oRequestTTY: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty); case oSessionType: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_sessiontype); case oCanonicalizeHostname: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname); case oAddKeysToAgent: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm); case oFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); if (count == 0) printf(" none"); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } static void dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds) { const struct Forward *fwd; u_int i; /* oDynamicForward */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { fwd = &fwds[i]; if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0) continue; if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0) continue; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path); else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } if (code != oDynamicForward) { if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path); else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); } } printf("\n"); } } void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) { int i, r; char buf[8], *all_key; /* * Expand HostKeyAlgorithms name lists. This isn't handled in * fill_default_options() like the other algorithm lists because * the host key algorithms are by default dynamically chosen based * on the host's keys found in known_hosts. */ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "expand HostKeyAlgorithms"); free(all_key); /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */ dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user); dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host); dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port); /* Flag options */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family); dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master); dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign); dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings); dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure); dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); #endif /* GSSAPI */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(oSessionType, o->session_type); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStdinNull, o->stdin_null); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForkAfterAuthentication, o->fork_after_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key); dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys); /* Integer options */ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval); /* String options */ dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address); dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface); dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers); dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias); dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos); dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent); dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown); dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices); dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command); dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider); #endif dump_cfg_string(oSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider); dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications); dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos); dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys); dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(oKnownHostsCommand, o->known_hosts_command); /* Forwards */ dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards); /* String array options */ dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oLogVerbose, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose); /* Special cases */ /* PermitRemoteOpen */ if (o->num_permitted_remote_opens == 0) printf("%s any\n", lookup_opcode_name(oPermitRemoteOpen)); else dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oPermitRemoteOpen, o->num_permitted_remote_opens, o->permitted_remote_opens); /* AddKeysToAgent */ if (o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan <= 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent); else { printf("addkeystoagent%s %d\n", o->add_keys_to_agent == 3 ? " confirm" : "", o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan); } /* oForwardAgent */ if (o->forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent); else dump_cfg_string(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent_sock_path); /* oConnectTimeout */ if (o->connection_timeout == -1) printf("connecttimeout none\n"); else dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout); /* oTunnelDevice */ printf("tunneldevice"); if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(" any"); else printf(" %d", o->tun_local); if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(":any"); else printf(":%d", o->tun_remote); printf("\n"); /* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */ - if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) { - printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames"); - for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { - printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list, - o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); - } - printf("\n"); + printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames"); + if (o->num_permitted_cnames == 0) + printf(" none"); + for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { + printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list, + o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); } + printf("\n"); /* oControlPersist */ if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist); else dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout); /* oEscapeChar */ if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) printf("escapechar none\n"); else { vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0); printf("escapechar %s\n", buf); } /* oIPQoS */ printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); /* oRekeyLimit */ printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); /* oStreamLocalBindMask */ printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n", o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* oLogFacility */ printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */ if (o->jump_host == NULL) dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command); else { /* Check for numeric addresses */ i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL || strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port); printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", /* optional additional jump spec */ o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra, o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",", /* optional user */ o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user, o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@", /* opening [ if hostname is numeric */ i ? "[" : "", /* mandatory hostname */ o->jump_host, /* closing ] if hostname is numeric */ i ? "]" : "", /* optional port number */ o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":", o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h index f3ac60bd71ee..89f6ec84af12 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h @@ -1,241 +1,242 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.144 2021/07/23 04:04:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.145 2021/09/15 06:56:01 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration file. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef READCONF_H #define READCONF_H /* Data structure for representing option data. */ #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32 #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32 #define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path) struct allowed_cname { char *source_list; char *target_list; }; typedef struct { int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */ char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* Optional path of the agent. */ int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */ int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */ int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */ int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */ char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */ int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */ int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */ u_int num_log_verbose; /* Verbose log overrides */ char **log_verbose; int port; /* Port to connect. */ int address_family; int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before * giving up */ int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before * aborting connection attempt */ int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password * prompts. */ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ char *user; /* User to log in as. */ int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */ char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */ char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; char *preferred_authentications; char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ char *bind_interface; /* local interface for bind address */ char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */ char *sk_provider; /* Security key provider */ int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */ char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; int add_keys_to_agent; int add_keys_to_agent_lifespan; char *identity_agent; /* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */ /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_local_forwards; struct Forward *local_forwards; /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_remote_forwards; struct Forward *remote_forwards; int clear_forwardings; /* Restrict remote dynamic forwarding */ char **permitted_remote_opens; u_int num_permitted_remote_opens; /* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */ char *stdio_forward_host; int stdio_forward_port; int enable_ssh_keysign; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; int identities_only; int server_alive_interval; int server_alive_count_max; int num_send_env; char **send_env; int num_setenv; char **setenv; char *control_path; int control_master; int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */ int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */ int hash_known_hosts; int tun_open; /* tun(4) */ int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */ int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */ char *local_command; int permit_local_command; char *remote_command; int visual_host_key; int request_tty; int session_type; int stdin_null; int fork_after_authentication; int proxy_use_fdpass; int num_canonical_domains; char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; int canonicalize_hostname; int canonicalize_max_dots; int canonicalize_fallback_local; int num_permitted_cnames; struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; char *revoked_host_keys; int fingerprint_hash; int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */ char *hostbased_accepted_algos; char *pubkey_accepted_algos; char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */ char *jump_user; char *jump_host; int jump_port; char *jump_extra; char *known_hosts_command; char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */ } Options; #define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4 #define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0 #define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1 #define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2 #define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3 #define SESSION_TYPE_NONE 0 #define SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM 1 #define SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT 2 #define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */ #define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */ #define SSHCONF_FINAL 4 /* Final pass over config, after canon. */ #define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH 8 /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */ #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF 0 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW 1 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES 2 #define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK 3 const char *kex_default_pk_alg(void); char *ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host, const char *portstr, const char *user); void initialize_options(Options *); int fill_default_options(Options *); void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); void free_options(Options *o); int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int); int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, Options *, int, int *); int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int); int parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int); int parse_ssh_uri(const char *, char **, char **, int *); int default_ssh_port(void); int option_clear_or_none(const char *); +int config_has_permitted_cnames(Options *); void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host); void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int); void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int); #endif /* READCONF_H */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile index 810d74ce599d..0b5ad45d753a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile @@ -1,272 +1,273 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.116 2021/08/04 21:28:00 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.117 2021/09/03 04:11:13 dtucker Exp $ tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 # File based tests file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS) # Interop tests are not run by default interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop prep: test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out clean: for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done rm -rf $(OBJ).putty distclean: clean LTESTS= connect \ proxy-connect \ sshfp-connect \ connect-privsep \ connect-uri \ proto-version \ proto-mismatch \ exit-status \ + exit-status-signal \ envpass \ transfer \ banner \ rekey \ dhgex \ stderr-data \ stderr-after-eof \ broken-pipe \ try-ciphers \ yes-head \ login-timeout \ agent \ agent-getpeereid \ agent-timeout \ agent-ptrace \ agent-subprocess \ keyscan \ keygen-change \ keygen-comment \ keygen-convert \ keygen-knownhosts \ keygen-moduli \ keygen-sshfp \ key-options \ scp \ scp3 \ scp-uri \ sftp \ sftp-chroot \ sftp-cmds \ sftp-badcmds \ sftp-batch \ sftp-glob \ sftp-perm \ sftp-uri \ reconfigure \ dynamic-forward \ forwarding \ multiplex \ reexec \ brokenkeys \ sshcfgparse \ cfgparse \ cfgmatch \ cfgmatchlisten \ percent \ addrmatch \ localcommand \ forcecommand \ portnum \ keytype \ kextype \ cert-hostkey \ cert-userkey \ host-expand \ keys-command \ forward-control \ integrity \ krl \ multipubkey \ limit-keytype \ hostkey-agent \ hostkey-rotate \ principals-command \ cert-file \ cfginclude \ servcfginclude \ allow-deny-users \ authinfo \ sshsig \ knownhosts-command INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp EXTRA_TESTS= agent-pkcs11 #EXTRA_TESTS+= cipher-speed USERNAME= ${LOGNAME} CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \ authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \ authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \ banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \ ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \ expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \ hkr.* host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 host.ssh-dss host.ssh-ed25519 \ host.ssh-rsa host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \ key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \ key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* askpass \ known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \ revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ ssh-rsa_oldfmt knownhosts_command \ ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \ ssh_proxy_* sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config.* \ sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \ sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \ t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \ t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \ user_*key* user_ca* user_key* # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX" TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen CPPFLAGS=-I.. t1: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv t2: cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t3: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t4: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok t5: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok t6: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2 chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2 $(OBJ)/t7.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@ t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t8.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@ t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t9.out: test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t10.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@ t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null t11: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok $(OBJ)/t12.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@ t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ skip=no; \ for t in ""$${SKIP_LTESTS}; do \ if [ "x$${t}.sh" = "x$${TEST}" ]; then skip=yes; fi; \ done; \ if [ "x$${skip}" = "xno" ]; then \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ else \ echo skip test $${TEST} 1>&2; \ fi; \ done t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done t-extra: ${EXTRA_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done # Not run by default interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS} # Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile unit: set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \ V="" ; \ test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/authopt/test_authopt \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/authopt/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/misc/test_misc ; \ if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes" ; then \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \ fi \ fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh index ddeef01f1b73..2874100fa0f1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh @@ -1,57 +1,53 @@ -# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.11 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.13 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="disallow agent attach from other uid" UNPRIV=nobody ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then : else - echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" - exit 0 + skip "skipped (not supported on this platform)" fi case "x$SUDO" in xsudo) sudo=1;; xdoas|xdoas\ *) ;; x) - echo "need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV" - echo SKIPPED - exit 0 ;; + skip "need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV" ;; *) - echo "unsupported $SUDO - "doas" and "sudo" are allowed" - exit 0 ;; + skip "unsupported $SUDO - "doas" and "sudo" are allowed" ;; esac trace "start agent" eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" else chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1" fi if test -z "$sudo" ; then # doas ${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null else # sudo < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null fi r=$? if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2" fi trace "kill agent" ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null fi rm -f ${OBJ}/agent diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/exit-status-signal.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/exit-status-signal.sh new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1b3af0d84ddd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/exit-status-signal.sh @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# This test performs validation that ssh client is not successive on being terminated + +tid="exit status on signal" + +# spawn client in background +rm -f $OBJ/remote_pid +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $$ >'$OBJ'/remote_pid; sleep 444' & +ssh_pid=$! + +# wait for it to start +n=20 +while [ ! -f $OBJ/remote_pid ] && [ $n -gt 0 ]; do + n=$(($n - 1)) + sleep 1 +done + +kill $ssh_pid +wait $ssh_pid +exit_code=$? + +if [ $exit_code -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh client should fail on signal" +fi + diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh index 2852c457c259..0ae0c3dfcb44 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh @@ -1,124 +1,143 @@ # $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.9 2020/10/07 06:38:16 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey rotate" +# +# GNU (f)grep <=2.18, as shipped by FreeBSD<=12 and NetBSD<=9 will occasionally +# fail to find ssh host keys in the hostkey-rotate test. If we have those +# versions, use awk instead. +# See # https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=258616 +# +case `grep --version 2>&1 | awk '/GNU grep/{print $4}'` in +2.19) fgrep=good ;; +1.*|2.?|2.?.?|2.1?) fgrep=bad ;; # stock GNU grep +2.5.1*) fgrep=bad ;; # FreeBSD and NetBSD +*) fgrep=good ;; +esac +if test "x$fgrep" = "xbad"; then + fgrep() +{ + awk 'BEGIN{e=1} {if (index($0,"'$1'")>0){e=0;print}} END{exit e}' $2 +} +fi + rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig grep -vi 'globalknownhostsfile' $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy echo "GlobalKnownHostsFile=none" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy rm $OBJ/known_hosts # The "primary" key type is ed25519 since it's supported even when built # without OpenSSL. The secondary is RSA if it's supported. primary="ssh-ed25519" secondary="$primary" trace "prepare hostkeys" nkeys=0 all_algs="" for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1` test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs}," all_algs="${all_algs}$k" case "$k" in ssh-rsa) secondary="ssh-rsa" ;; esac done dossh() { # All ssh should succeed in this test ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed" } expect_nkeys() { _expected=$1 _message=$2 _n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed" [ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)" } check_key_present() { _type=$1 _kfile=$2 test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub" _kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \ fatal "awk failed" fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null } cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no" >$OBJ/known_hosts dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$primary -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no # Verify no additional keys learned expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys" check_key_present $primary || fail "unstrict didn't learn key" # Connect to sshd as usual verbose "learn additional hostkeys" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs # Check that other keys learned expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn keytype $k" done # Check each key type for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k" check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k correctly" done # Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn if [ "$primary" != "$secondary" ]; then verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey type=${secondary}" mv $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old rm -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary} ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${secondary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary} -N '' || \ fatal "ssh-keygen $secondary" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs # Check that the key was replaced expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${secondary} $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old && \ fail "old key present" check_key_present ${secondary} || fail "didn't learn changed key" fi # Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect verbose "learn new primary hostkey" ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${primary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen ed25519" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new ) \ > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Check new hostkey added dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${primary} || fail "current key missing" check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub || fail "new key missing" # Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd verbose "rotate primary hostkey" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new $OBJ/hkr.${primary} # Check old hostkey removed dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old && fail "old key present" check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key" # Connect again, forcing rotated key verbose "check rotate primary hostkey" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary} expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh index 33b6e7b423df..a3acf5e4d905 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh @@ -1,81 +1,81 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.6 2019/07/25 08:48:11 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.7 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized keys from command" if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" exit 0 fi rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args touch $OBJ/keys-command-args chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub` expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` # Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have # acceptable directory permissions. KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}.$$" trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${KEY_COMMAND}" 0 cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" #!/bin/sh echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7 test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 if test $# -eq 6 ; then test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2 test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3 test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4 test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5 test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6 fi exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}" _EOF $SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND" if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $KEY_COMMAND ; then echo "skipping: $KEY_COMMAND is unsuitable as AuthorizedKeysCommand" $SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND exit 0 fi if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments" ( grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak echo AuthorizedKeysFile none echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments" # Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed. ( grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak echo AuthorizedKeysFile none echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi else - echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)" + skip "$KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)" fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh index 708c288d73ae..5b8e25a27199 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-ciphers.sh @@ -1,26 +1,32 @@ -# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 03:35:07 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.11 2021/09/01 03:16:06 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty ciphers" if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then - echo "putty interop tests not enabled" - exit 0 + skip "putty interop tests not enabled" +fi + +# Re-enable ssh-rsa on older PuTTY versions. +oldver="`${PLINK} --version | awk '/plink: Release/{if ($3<0.76)print "yes"}'`" +if [ "x$oldver" = "xyes" ]; then + echo "HostKeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy fi for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr chacha20 ; do verbose "$tid: cipher $c" cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c rm -f ${COPY} env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done rm -f ${COPY} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh index 686d0e1af2e5..c75802a06103 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-kex.sh @@ -1,22 +1,28 @@ -# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.5 2020/01/23 03:24:38 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.9 2021/09/01 03:16:06 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty KEX" if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then - echo "putty interop tests not enabled" - exit 0 + skip "putty interop tests not enabled" +fi + +# Re-enable ssh-rsa on older PuTTY versions. +oldver="`${PLINK} --version | awk '/plink: Release/{if ($3<0.76)print "yes"}'`" +if [ "x$oldver" = "xyes" ]; then + echo "HostKeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy fi for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ecdh ; do verbose "$tid: kex $k" cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "KEX $k failed" fi done diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh index 14b41022f8a6..a6864f9515a7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/putty-transfer.sh @@ -1,44 +1,50 @@ -# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.11 2021/09/01 03:16:06 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty transfer data" if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then - echo "putty interop tests not enabled" - exit 0 + skip "putty interop tests not enabled" +fi + +# Re-enable ssh-rsa on older PuTTY versions. +oldver="`${PLINK} --version | awk '/plink: Release/{if ($3<0.76)print "yes"}'`" +if [ "x$oldver" = "xyes" ]; then + echo "HostKeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy fi if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then comp="0" else comp="0 1" fi for c in $comp; do verbose "$tid: compression $c" rm -f ${COPY} cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \ -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do trace "compression $c dd-size ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \ -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done done rm -f ${COPY} diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh index 5acc4d2de4a6..a7766fe63a2e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-chroot.sh @@ -1,31 +1,28 @@ -# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.7 2018/11/22 08:48:32 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.8 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sftp in chroot" CHROOT=/var/run FILENAME=testdata_${USER}.$$ PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME} trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${PRIVDATA}" 0 if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then - echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" - echo SKIPPED - exit 0 + skip "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" fi if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m chroot "$CHROOT" ; then - echo "skipped: $CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory" - exit 0 + skip "$CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory" fi $SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \ fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed" start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /" verbose "test $tid: get" ${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \ fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed" cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshfp-connect.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshfp-connect.sh index 06e91cdbb851..f78646922efe 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/sshfp-connect.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/sshfp-connect.sh @@ -1,66 +1,66 @@ -# $OpenBSD: sshfp-connect.sh,v 1.2 2021/07/19 08:48:33 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: sshfp-connect.sh,v 1.4 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. # This test requires external setup and thus is skipped unless # TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN is set. It requires: # 1) A DNSSEC-enabled domain, which TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN points to. # 2) A DNSSEC-validating resolver such as unwind(8). # 3) The following SSHFP records with fingerprints from rsa_openssh.pub # in that domain that are expected to succeed: # sshtest: valid sha1 and sha256 fingerprints. # sshtest-sha{1,256}, : valid fingerprints for that type only. # and the following records that are expected to fail: # sshtest-bad: invalid sha1 fingerprint and good sha256 fingerprint # sshtest-sha{1,256}-bad: invalid fingerprints for that type only. # # sshtest IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929 # sshtest IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6 # sshtest-sha1 IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929 # sshtest-sha256 IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6 # sshtest-bad IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6 # sshtest-bad IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B928 # sshtest-sha1-bad IN SSHFP 1 1 99D79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929 # sshtest-sha256-bad IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B5 tid="sshfp connect" -if [ ! -z "${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}" ] && \ - $SSH -Q key-plain | grep ssh-rsa >/dev/null; then - +if ! $SSH -Q key-plain | grep ssh-rsa >/dev/null; then + skip "RSA keys not supported." +elif [ -z "${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}" ]; then + skip "TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN not set." +else # Set RSA host key to match fingerprints above. mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $SUDO cp $SRC/rsa_openssh.prv $OBJ/host.ssh-rsa $SUDO chmod 600 $OBJ/host.ssh-rsa sed -e "s|$OBJ/ssh-rsa|$OBJ/host.ssh-rsa|" \ $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Zero out known hosts and key aliases to force use of SSHFP records. > $OBJ/known_hosts mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig sed -e "/HostKeyAlias.*localhost-with-alias/d" \ -e "/Hostname.*127.0.0.1/d" \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy for n in sshtest sshtest-sha1 sshtest-sha256; do trace "sshfp connect $n good fingerprint" host="${n}.dtucker.net" opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes " - opts="$opts -o HostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa" + opts="$opts -o HostKeyAlgorithms=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256" host="${n}.${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}" SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts $host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh sshfp connect failed" fi if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION: $SSH_CONNECTION" fi trace "sshfp connect $n bad fingerprint" host="${n}-bad.${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}" if ${SSH} $opts ${host} true; then fail "sshfp-connect succeeded with bad SSHFP record" fi done -else - echo SKIPPED: TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN not set. fi diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh index db6d6161aa2b..415422ef5573 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh +++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh @@ -1,735 +1,743 @@ -# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.86 2021/08/08 08:27:28 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.87 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. #SUDO=sudo if [ ! -x "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then STARTTIME=`date '+%s'` fi if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT" else PORT=4242 fi OBJ=$1 if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then echo '$OBJ not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then echo "not a directory: $OBJ" exit 2 fi SCRIPT=$2 if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then echo '$SCRIPT not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then echo "not a file: $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then true else echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK # Portable-specific settings. if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami` elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`whoami` elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`logname` else USER=`id -un` fi if test -z "$LOGNAME"; then LOGNAME="${USER}" export LOGNAME fi # Unbreak GNU head(1) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 export _POSIX2_VERSION case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in OSF1*) BIN_SH=xpg4 export BIN_SH ;; CYGWIN*) os=cygwin ;; esac # If configure tells us to use a different egrep, create a wrapper function # to call it. This means we don't need to change all the tests that depend # on a good implementation. if test "x${EGREP}" != "x"; then egrep () { ${EGREP} "$@" } fi SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` # defaults SSH=ssh SSHD=sshd SSHAGENT=ssh-agent SSHADD=ssh-add SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan SFTP=sftp SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server SCP=scp # Set by make_tmpdir() on demand (below). SSH_REGRESS_TMP= # Interop testing PLINK=plink PUTTYGEN=puttygen CONCH=conch # Tools used by multiple tests NC=$OBJ/netcat OPENSSL_BIN="${OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl}" if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;; *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;; *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;; *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER" != "x" ]; then SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER" != "x" ]; then SSH_SK_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_OPENSSL" != "x" ]; then OPENSSL_BIN="${TEST_SSH_OPENSSL}" fi # Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec case "$SSHD" in /*) ;; *) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;; esac case "$SSHAGENT" in /*) ;; *) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;; esac # Record the actual binaries used. SSH_BIN=${SSH} SSHD_BIN=${SSHD} SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT} SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD} SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN} SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN} SFTP_BIN=${SFTP} SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER} SCP_BIN=${SCP} if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then rm -rf $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb # When using sudo ensure low-priv tests can write pipes and logs. if [ "x$SUDO" != "x" ]; then chmod 777 $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb fi VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh` # Some tests are difficult to fix. case "$VG_TEST" in reexec) VG_SKIP=1 ;; sftp-chroot) if [ "x${SUDO}" != "x" ]; then VG_SKIP=1 fi ;; esac if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then VG_LEAK="--leak-check=no" if [ x"$VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS" != "x" ]; then VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full" fi VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*" VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}." VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --vgdb-prefix=$OBJ/valgrind-vgdb/" VG_PATH="valgrind" if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH" fi VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS" SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH" SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD" SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT" SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD" SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN" SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN" SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}" SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP" cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF #!/bin/sh exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@" EOF chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh" fi fi # Logfiles. # SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only # SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only # REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log fi if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log fi if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log fi # truncate logfiles >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE # Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..." # because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments. scp and sftp like # to use -q so we remove those to preserve our debug logging. In the rare # instance where -q is desirable -qq is equivalent and is not removed. SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh cat >$SSHLOGWRAP <${DATA} chmod u+w ${DATA} COPY=$OBJ/copy rm -f ${COPY} increase_datafile_size() { while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA} done } # these should be used in tests export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER SSH_SK_HELPER #echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP # Portable specific functions have_prog() { saved_IFS="$IFS" IFS=":" for i in $PATH do if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then IFS="$saved_IFS" return 0 fi done IFS="$saved_IFS" return 1 } jot() { awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }" } # Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h. config_defined () { str=$1 while test "x$2" != "x" ; do str="$str|$2" shift done egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 } md5 () { if have_prog md5sum; then md5sum elif have_prog openssl; then openssl md5 elif have_prog cksum; then cksum elif have_prog sum; then sum elif [ -x ${OPENSSL_BIN} ]; then ${OPENSSL_BIN} md5 else wc -c fi } # Some platforms don't have hostname at all, but on others uname -n doesn't # provide the fully qualified name we need, so in the former case we create # our own hostname function. if ! have_prog hostname; then hostname() { uname -n } fi make_tmpdir () { SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \ fatal "failed to create temporary directory" } # End of portable specific functions stop_sshd () { if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then echo no sshd running else if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for sshd: $pid else $SUDO kill $pid trace "wait for sshd to exit" i=0; while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done if test -f $PIDFILE; then if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then echo "sshd didn't exit " \ "port $PORT pid $pid" else echo "sshd died without cleanup" fi exit 1 fi fi fi fi } # helper cleanup () { if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID else kill $SSH_PID fi fi if [ "x$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" != "x" ]; then rm -rf "$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" fi stop_sshd if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then now=`date '+%s'` elapsed=$(($now - $STARTTIME)) echo elapsed $elapsed `basename $SCRIPT .sh` fi } start_debug_log () { echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE } save_debug_log () { echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log } trace () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } verbose () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } fail () { save_debug_log "FAIL: $@" RESULT=1 echo "$@" if test "x$TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL" != "x" ; then cleanup exit $RESULT fi } fatal () { save_debug_log "FATAL: $@" printf "FATAL: " fail "$@" cleanup exit $RESULT } +# Skip remaining tests in script. +skip () +{ + echo "SKIPPED: $@" + cleanup + exit $RESULT +} + RESULT=0 PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile trap fatal 3 2 # create server config cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config StrictModes no Port $PORT AddressFamily inet ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 #ListenAddress ::1 PidFile $PIDFILE AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u LogLevel DEBUG3 AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_* AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER EOF # This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable, # but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could # be abused to locally escalate privileges. if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then echo " StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config else # check and warn if excessive permissions are likely to cause failures. unsafe="" dir="${OBJ}" while test ${dir} != "/"; do if test -d "${dir}" && ! test -h "${dir}"; then perms=`ls -ld ${dir}` case "${perms}" in ?????w????*|????????w?*) unsafe="${unsafe} ${dir}" ;; esac fi dir=`dirname ${dir}` done if ! test -z "${unsafe}"; then cat <> $OBJ/sshd_config fi if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config fi # server config for proxy connects cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy # allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy # create client config cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config Host * Hostname 127.0.0.1 HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias Port $PORT User $USER GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts PubkeyAuthentication yes ChallengeResponseAuthentication no HostbasedAuthentication no PasswordAuthentication no BatchMode yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes LogLevel DEBUG3 EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config fi rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER SSH_SK_PROVIDER= if ! config_defined ENABLE_SK; then trace skipping sk-dummy elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" fi export SSH_SK_PROVIDER if ! test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"; then EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS='-P/*' # XXX want realpath(1)... echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_config echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy fi export EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS maybe_filter_sk() { if test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER" ; then grep -v ^sk else cat fi } SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do # generate user key if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then trace "generating key type $t" rm -f $OBJ/$t ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\ fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed" else trace "using cached key type $t" fi # setup authorized keys cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config done for t in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES}; do # known hosts file for client ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' cat $OBJ/$t.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts # use key as host key, too (umask 077; $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t) echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config # don't use SUDO for proxy connect echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy done chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no if test -x "$CONCH" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes fi # If PuTTY is present, new enough and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare # keys and configuration. REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" && "$PUTTYGEN" --help 2>&1 | grep -- --new-passphrase >/dev/null; then REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi case "$SCRIPT" in *putty*) ;; *) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;; esac if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 if ! "$PUTTYGEN" -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ --random-device=/dev/urandom \ --new-passphrase /dev/null < /dev/null > /dev/null; then echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase, skipping test" >&2 exit 1 fi "$PUTTYGEN" -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format cp $OBJ/ssh-rsa $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt > \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >> \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys rm -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt # Setup proxied session mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "Protocol=ssh" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "HostName=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyLocalhost=1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy PUTTYDIR=${OBJ}/.putty export PUTTYDIR fi # create a proxy version of the client config ( cat $OBJ/ssh_config echo proxycommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy # check proxy config ${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken" start_sshd () { # start sshd $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken" $SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" \ ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE trace "wait for sshd" i=0; while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT" } # source test body . $SCRIPT # kill sshd cleanup if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then # wait for any running process to complete wait; sleep 1 VG_RESULTS=$(find $OBJ/valgrind-out -type f -print) VG_RESULT_COUNT=0 VG_FAIL_COUNT=0 for i in $VG_RESULTS; do if grep "ERROR SUMMARY" $i >/dev/null; then VG_RESULT_COUNT=$(($VG_RESULT_COUNT + 1)) if ! grep "ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors" $i >/dev/null; then VG_FAIL_COUNT=$(($VG_FAIL_COUNT + 1)) RESULT=1 verbose valgrind failure $i cat $i fi fi done if [ x"$VG_SKIP" != "x" ]; then verbose valgrind skipped else verbose valgrind results $VG_RESULT_COUNT failures $VG_FAIL_COUNT fi fi if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then verbose ok $tid else echo failed $tid fi exit $RESULT diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.1 b/crypto/openssh/scp.1 index 68aac04b205c..10cd4efb912a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/scp.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.1 @@ -1,309 +1,307 @@ .\" .\" scp.1 .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.105 2021/09/20 06:53:56 djm Exp $ .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2021 $ .Dt SCP 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm scp .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm scp .Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl J Ar destination .Op Fl l Ar limit .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Fl P Ar port .Op Fl S Ar program .Ar source ... target .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm copies files between hosts on a network. .Pp It uses .Xr ssh 1 for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security as a login session. -The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform -.Xr glob 3 -pattern matching. .Pp .Nm will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for authentication. .Pp The .Ar source and .Ar target may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path in the form .Sm off .Oo user @ Oc host : Op path , .Sm on or a URI in the form .Sm off .No scp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path . .Sm on Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid .Nm treating file names containing .Sq :\& as host specifiers. .Pp When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a .Ar port cannot be specified on the .Ar target if the .Fl R option is used. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote hosts. -Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option +Note that, when using the original SCP protocol (the default), this option selects batch mode for the second host as .Nm cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts. This mode is the default. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl A Allows forwarding of .Xr ssh-agent 1 to the remote system. The default is not to forward an authentication agent. .It Fl B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). .It Fl C Compression enable. Passes the .Fl C flag to .Xr ssh 1 to enable compression. .It Fl c Ar cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path When using the SFTP protocol support via -.Fl M , +.Fl s , connect directly to a local SFTP server program rather than a remote one via .Xr ssh 1 . This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. .It Fl F Ar ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for .Nm ssh . This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl J Ar destination Connect to the target host by first making an .Nm connection to the jump host described by .Ar destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a .Cm ProxyJump configuration directive. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl l Ar limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. .It Fl O -Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol. +Use the original SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol. Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do -not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename -wildcard patterns. +not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename +wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a +.Sq ~ +prefix for older SFTP servers. This mode is the default. .It Fl o Ar ssh_option Can be used to pass options to .Nm ssh in the format used in .Xr ssh_config 5 . This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate .Nm scp command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It BindInterface .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It CASignatureAlgorithms .It CertificateFile .It CheckHostIP .It Ciphers .It Compression .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It KnownHostsCommand .It LogLevel .It MACs .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump .It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It SetEnv .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UpdateHostKeys .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .El .It Fl P Ar port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that this option is written with a capital .Sq P , because .Fl p -is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. +is already reserved for preserving the times and mode bits of the file. .It Fl p -Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the -original file. +Preserves modification times, access times, and file mode bits from the +source file. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl R Copies between two remote hosts are performed by connecting to the origin host and executing .Nm there. This requires that .Nm running on the origin host can authenticate to the destination host without requiring a password. .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that .Nm follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. .It Fl S Ar program Name of .Ar program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. .It Fl s -Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol. -Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides -more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol -relied on the remote shell for expanding -.Xr glob 3 -wildcards. -.Pp -A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default. -This option will be deleted before the end of 2022. +Use the SFTP protocol for transfers rather than the original scp protocol. .It Fl T Disable strict filename checking. By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory .Nm checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files. Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected. This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that the server will not send unexpected filenames. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm and .Xr ssh 1 to print debugging messages about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Ex -std scp .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sftp-server 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh HISTORY .Nm is based on the rcp program in .Bx source code from the Regents of the University of California. .Sh AUTHORS .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi +.Sh CAVEATS +The original SCP protocol (used by default) requires execution of the +remote user's shell to perform +.Xr glob 3 +pattern matching. +This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to +the remote shell, such as quote characters. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.c b/crypto/openssh/scp.c index e039350c6093..73ce8554d788 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/scp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.c @@ -1,2144 +1,2146 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.239 2021/09/20 06:53:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). * * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) * * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Parts from: * * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern char *__progname; #define COPY_BUFLEN 16384 int do_cmd(char *, char *, char *, int, int, char *, int *, int *, pid_t *); int do_cmd2(char *, char *, int, char *, int, int); /* Struct for addargs */ arglist args; arglist remote_remote_args; /* Bandwidth limit */ long long limit_kbps = 0; struct bwlimit bwlimit; /* Name of current file being transferred. */ char *curfile; /* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ int verbose_mode = 0; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; /* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped * through this process. */ int throughlocal = 1; /* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */ int sshport = -1; /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; pid_t do_cmd_pid2 = -1; /* Needed for sftp */ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ static void killchild(int signo) { if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); } if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0); } if (signo) _exit(1); exit(1); } static void suspone(int pid, int signo) { int status; if (pid > 1) { kill(pid, signo); while (waitpid(pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; } } static void suspchild(int signo) { suspone(do_cmd_pid, signo); suspone(do_cmd_pid2, signo); kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } static int do_local_cmd(arglist *a) { u_int i; int status; pid_t pid; if (a->num == 0) fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Executing:"); for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { execvp(a->list[0], a->list); perror(a->list[0]); exit(1); } do_cmd_pid = pid; ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); do_cmd_pid = -1; if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) return (-1); return (0); } /* * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. */ int do_cmd(char *program, char *host, char *remuser, int port, int subsystem, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, pid_t *pid) { int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); if (port == -1) port = sshport; /* * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. */ if (pipe(reserved) == -1) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ if (pipe(pin) == -1) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pipe(pout) == -1) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ close(reserved[0]); close(reserved[1]); ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ *pid = fork(); if (*pid == 0) { /* Child. */ close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); dup2(pin[0], 0); dup2(pout[1], 1); close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", program); if (port != -1) { addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%d", port); } if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } if (subsystem) addargs(&args, "-s"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(program, args.list); perror(program); exit(1); } else if (*pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ close(pin[0]); *fdout = pin[1]; close(pout[1]); *fdin = pout[0]; ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); return 0; } /* * This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd(). * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected. */ int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout) { int status; pid_t pid; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); if (port == -1) port = sshport; /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { dup2(fdin, 0); dup2(fdout, 1); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (port != -1) { addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%d", port); } if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "-oBatchMode=yes"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } typedef struct { size_t cnt; char *buf; } BUF; BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); void lostconn(int); int okname(char *); void run_err(const char *,...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (1))); int note_err(const char *,...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))); void verifydir(char *); struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout, remin2, remout2; int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; #define CMDNEEDS 64 char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ enum scp_mode_e { MODE_SCP, MODE_SFTP }; int response(void); void rsource(char *, struct stat *); void sink(int, char *[], const char *); void source(int, char *[]); void tolocal(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct); void toremote(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct); void usage(void); void source_sftp(int, char *, char *, struct sftp_conn *); void sink_sftp(int, char *, const char *, struct sftp_conn *); void throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *, struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n; char **newargv, *argv0; const char *errstr; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP; char *sftp_direct = NULL; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); seed_rng(); msetlocale(); /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ argv0 = argv[0]; newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]); argv = newargv; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); - log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 2); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args)); args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-x"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none"); addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no"); fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* Ignored */ break; case 'A': case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); break; case 'D': sftp_direct = optarg; break; case '3': throughlocal = 1; break; case 'R': throughlocal = 0; break; case 'o': case 'c': case 'i': case 'F': case 'J': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'O': mode = MODE_SCP; break; case 's': mode = MODE_SFTP; break; case 'P': sshport = a2port(optarg); if (sshport <= 0) fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); break; case 'B': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN); break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case 'r': iamrecursive = 1; break; case 'S': ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'v': addargs(&args, "-v"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v"); if (verbose_mode == 0) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; verbose_mode = 1; break; case 'q': addargs(&args, "-q"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); showprogress = 0; break; /* Server options. */ case 'd': targetshouldbedirectory = 1; break; case 'f': /* "from" */ iamremote = 1; fflag = 1; break; case 't': /* "to" */ iamremote = 1; tflag = 1; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(0, O_BINARY); #endif break; case 'T': Tflag = 1; break; default: usage(); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; - log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 2); /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no"); if (iamremote) mode = MODE_SCP; if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; if (pflag) { /* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */ } else { if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec", NULL) == -1) { perror("pledge"); exit(1); } } remin = STDIN_FILENO; remout = STDOUT_FILENO; if (fflag) { /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ (void) response(); source(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ sink(argc, argv, NULL); exit(errs != 0); } if (argc < 2) usage(); if (argc > 2) targetshouldbedirectory = 1; remin = remout = -1; do_cmd_pid = -1; /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); (void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */ toremote(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct); else { if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); tolocal(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct); /* Dest is local host. */ } /* * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked * and no error has occurred yet */ - if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) { + if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && (mode == MODE_SFTP || errs == 0)) { if (remin != -1) (void) close(remin); if (remout != -1) (void) close(remout); if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1) errs = 1; else { if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) errs = 1; } } exit(errs != 0); } /* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */ static int scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s) { off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt; *cnt += s; refresh_progress_meter(0); if (limit_kbps > 0) bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s); return 0; } static int do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb) { /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */ char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2]; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n", (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime), (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime)); if (verb) { fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n", (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime); fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf)); return (response()); } static int parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp, char **pathp) { int r; r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp); if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL) *pathp = xstrdup("."); return r; } /* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */ static int append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np) { char **tmp; if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) return -1; tmp[(*np)] = cp; (*np)++; *ap = tmp; return 0; } /* * Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern. * returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns. */ static int find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp) { int i; int in_bracket, brace_level; *startp = *endp = -1; in_bracket = brace_level = 0; for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) { switch (pattern[i]) { case '\\': /* skip next character */ if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0') i++; break; case '[': in_bracket = 1; break; case ']': in_bracket = 0; break; case '{': if (in_bracket) break; if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') { /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ i++; /* skip */ break; } if (*startp == -1) *startp = i; brace_level++; break; case '}': if (in_bracket) break; if (*startp < 0) { /* Unbalanced brace */ return -1; } if (--brace_level <= 0) *endp = i; break; } } /* unbalanced brackets/braces */ if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket)) return -1; return 0; } /* * Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on * alloc failure. */ static int emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end, int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp) { char *cp; int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1); if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) + tail_len + 1)) == NULL) return -1; /* Pattern before initial brace */ if (brace_start > 0) { memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start); o = brace_start; } /* Current braced selection */ if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) { memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start, sel_end - sel_start); o += sel_end - sel_start; } /* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */ if (tail_len > 0) { memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len); o += tail_len; } cp[o] = '\0'; if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) { free(cp); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded * patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array. * * Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure. * * Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether * pattern was invalid via *invalid. */ static int brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp, int *expanded, int *invalid) { int i; int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level; int sel_start, sel_end; *invalid = *expanded = 0; if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) { *invalid = 1; return 0; } else if (brace_start == -1) return 0; in_bracket = brace_level = 0; for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) { switch (pattern[i]) { case '{': if (in_bracket) break; brace_level++; break; case '}': if (in_bracket) break; brace_level--; break; case '[': in_bracket = 1; break; case ']': in_bracket = 0; break; case '\\': if (i < brace_end - 1) i++; /* skip */ break; } if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) { if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) continue; /* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */ /* Adjust end index for last selection */ sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i; if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end, sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) return -1; /* move on to the next selection */ sel_start = i + 1; continue; } } if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) { *invalid = 1; return 0; } /* success */ *expanded = 1; return 0; } /* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */ static int brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp) { char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL; size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0; int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0; *patternsp = NULL; *npatternsp = 0; /* Start the worklist with the original pattern */ if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL) return -1; if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) { free(cp); return -1; } while (nactive > 0) { cp = active[nactive - 1]; nactive--; if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive, &expanded, &invalid) == -1) { free(cp); goto fail; } if (invalid) fatal_f("invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", cp); if (expanded) { /* * Current entry expanded to new entries on the * active list; discard the progenitor pattern. */ free(cp); continue; } /* * Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to * the completed list */ if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL) *cp2++ = '\0'; else cp2 = cp; if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) { free(cp); goto fail; } free(cp); } /* success */ *patternsp = done; *npatternsp = ndone; done = NULL; ndone = 0; ret = 0; fail: for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++) free(active[i]); free(active); for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++) free(done[i]); free(done); return ret; } static struct sftp_conn * do_sftp_connect(char *host, char *user, int port, char *sftp_direct, int *reminp, int *remoutp, int *pidp) { if (sftp_direct == NULL) { if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, user, port, 1, "sftp", reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0) return NULL; } else { args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "sftp-server"); if (do_cmd(sftp_direct, host, NULL, -1, 0, "sftp", reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0) return NULL; } return do_init(*reminp, *remoutp, 32768, 64, limit_kbps); } void toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct) { char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL; char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ; int sport = -1, tport = -1; struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL, *conn2 = NULL; arglist alist; int i, r, status; u_int j; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; /* Parse target */ r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]); ++errs; goto out; } if (r != 0) { if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &targ) == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]); ++errs; goto out; } } /* Parse source files */ for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { free(suser); free(host); free(src); r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); ++errs; continue; } if (r != 0) { parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); } if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (host && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) { if (remin == -1) { /* Connect to dest now */ conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser, tport, sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid); if (conn == NULL) { fatal("Unable to open " "destination connection"); } debug3_f("origin in %d out %d pid %ld", remin, remout, (long)do_cmd_pid); } /* * XXX remember suser/host/sport and only * reconnect if they change between arguments. * would save reconnections for cases like * scp -3 hosta:/foo hosta:/bar hostb: */ /* Connect to origin now */ conn2 = do_sftp_connect(host, suser, sport, sftp_direct, &remin2, &remout2, &do_cmd_pid2); if (conn2 == NULL) { fatal("Unable to open " "source connection"); } debug3_f("destination in %d out %d pid %ld", remin2, remout2, (long)do_cmd_pid2); throughlocal_sftp(conn2, conn, src, targ); (void) close(remin2); (void) close(remout2); remin2 = remout2 = -1; if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, &status, 0) == -1) ++errs; else if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) ++errs; do_cmd_pid2 = -1; continue; } else { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0, bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp, remin, remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; } } else if (host) { /* standard remote to remote */ /* * Second remote user is passed to first remote side * via scp command-line. Ensure it contains no obvious * shell characters. */ if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { /* This would require the remote support URIs */ fatal("target port not supported with two " "remote hosts and the -R option"); } freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&alist, "-x"); addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&alist, "-n"); for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { addargs(&alist, "%s", remote_remote_args.list[j]); } if (sport != -1) { addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "%d", sport); } if (suser) { addargs(&alist, "-l"); addargs(&alist, "%s", suser); } addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", host); addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); addargs(&alist, "%s", src); addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", thost, targ); if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) errs = 1; } else { /* local to remote */ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) { if (remin == -1) { /* Connect to remote now */ conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser, tport, sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid); if (conn == NULL) { fatal("Unable to open sftp " "connection"); } } /* The protocol */ source_sftp(1, argv[i], targ, conn); continue; } /* SCP */ if (remin == -1) { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd(ssh_program, thost, tuser, tport, 0, bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) exit(1); if (response() < 0) exit(1); free(bp); } source(1, argv + i); } } out: if (mode == MODE_SFTP) free(conn); free(tuser); free(thost); free(targ); free(suser); free(host); free(src); } void tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct) { char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL; arglist alist; struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL; int i, r, sport = -1; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { free(suser); free(host); free(src); r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); if (r == -1) { fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); ++errs; continue; } if (r != 0) parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { ++errs; continue; } if (!host) { /* Local to local. */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP); if (iamrecursive) addargs(&alist, "-r"); if (pflag) addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]); if (do_local_cmd(&alist)) ++errs; continue; } /* Remote to local. */ if (mode == MODE_SFTP) { conn = do_sftp_connect(host, suser, sport, sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid); if (conn == NULL) { - error("Couldn't make sftp connection " - "to server"); + error("sftp connection failed"); ++errs; continue; } /* The protocol */ sink_sftp(1, argv[argc - 1], src, conn); free(conn); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; continue; } /* SCP */ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0, bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) { free(bp); ++errs; continue; } free(bp); sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src); (void) close(remin); remin = remout = -1; } free(suser); free(host); free(src); } /* Prepare remote path, handling ~ by assuming cwd is the homedir */ static char * prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { /* Handle ~ prefixed paths */ if (*path != '~') return xstrdup(path); if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0) return xstrdup("."); if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) return xstrdup(path + 2); if (can_expand_path(conn)) return do_expand_path(conn, path); /* No protocol extension */ - error("~user paths are not currently supported"); + error("server expand-path extension is required " + "for ~user paths in SFTP mode"); return NULL; } void source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn) { char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL; int target_is_dir; if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL) fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno)); /* * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of * the expansions */ if ((target = prepare_remote_path(conn, targ)) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target); if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) { fatal("Target is not a directory, but more files selected " "for upload"); } if (target_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(target, filename); else { abs_dst = target; target = NULL; } debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst); if (local_is_dir(src) && iamrecursive) { if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) { - fatal("failed to upload directory %s to %s", + error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, abs_dst); + errs = 1; } - } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) - fatal("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst); + } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) { + error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst); + errs = 1; + } free(abs_dst); free(target); } void source(int argc, char **argv) { struct stat stb; static BUF buffer; BUF *bp; off_t i, statbytes; size_t amt, nr; int fd = -1, haderr, indx; char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX]; int len; for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { name = argv[indx]; statbytes = 0; len = strlen(name); while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') name[--len] = '\0'; if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) == -1) goto syserr; if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL); name = encname; } if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) { syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); goto next; } if (stb.st_size < 0) { run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size"); goto next; } unset_nonblock(fd); switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFREG: break; case S_IFDIR: if (iamrecursive) { rsource(name, &stb); goto next; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); goto next; } if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) last = name; else ++last; curfile = last; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0) goto next; } #define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), (long long)stb.st_size, last); if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); if (response() < 0) goto next; if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { next: if (fd != -1) { (void) close(fd); fd = -1; } continue; } if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remout); for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) amt = stb.st_size - i; if (!haderr) { if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { haderr = errno; memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr); } } /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */ if (haderr) { (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt); memset(bp->buf, 0, amt); continue; } if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio, &statbytes) != amt) haderr = errno; } unset_nonblock(remout); if (fd != -1) { if (close(fd) == -1 && !haderr) haderr = errno; fd = -1; } if (!haderr) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); else run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); (void) response(); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); } } void rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX]; if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return; } last = strrchr(name, '/'); if (last == NULL) last = name; else last++; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path)); if (response() < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) continue; if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); continue; } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); vect[0] = path; source(1, vect); } (void) closedir(dirp); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2); (void) response(); } void sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const char *src, struct sftp_conn *conn) { char *abs_src = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; glob_t g; char *filename, *tmp = NULL; int i, r, err = 0; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); /* * Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell * expansions */ if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) { err = -1; goto out; } debug3_f("copying remote %s to local %s", abs_src, dst); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) - error("Too many glob matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); + error("%s: too many glob matches", abs_src); else - error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); + error("%s: %s", abs_src, strerror(ENOENT)); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !local_is_dir(dst)) { error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); err = -1; goto out; } if (local_is_dir(dst)) abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) { if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag, 0, 0) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; free(tmp); tmp = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); free(tmp); globfree(&g); - if (err == -1) { - fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src); - } + if (err == -1) + errs = 1; } #define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \ ((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \ (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \ (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) void sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) { static BUF buffer; struct stat stb; BUF *bp; off_t i; size_t j, count; int amt, exists, first, ofd; mode_t mode, omode, mask; off_t size, statbytes; unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerr; char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; char **patterns = NULL; size_t n, npatterns = 0; struct timeval tv[2]; #define atime tv[0] #define mtime tv[1] #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0)) SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size"); setimes = targisdir = 0; mask = umask(0); if (!pflag) (void) umask(mask); if (argc != 1) { run_err("ambiguous target"); exit(1); } targ = *argv; if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(targ); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) targisdir = 1; if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) { /* * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match * the requested destination file glob. */ if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0) fatal_f("could not expand pattern"); } for (first = 1;; first = 0) { cp = buf; if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) goto done; if (*cp++ == '\n') SCREWUP("unexpected "); do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) SCREWUP("lost connection"); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); *cp = 0; if (verbose_mode) fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf); if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { if (iamremote == 0) { (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), NULL, "%s", buf + 1); (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); } if (buf[0] == '\02') exit(1); ++errs; continue; } if (buf[0] == 'E') { (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); goto done; } if (ch == '\n') *--cp = 0; cp = buf; if (*cp == 'T') { setimes++; cp++; if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ mtime.tv_sec = ull; mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 || mtime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("atime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ atime.tv_sec = ull; atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || atime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); continue; } if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { /* * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't * followed. */ if (first) { run_err("%s", cp); exit(1); } SCREWUP("expected control record"); } mode = 0; for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') SCREWUP("bad mode"); mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); } if (!pflag) mode &= ~mask; if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("size not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("size not delimited"); if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull)) SCREWUP("size out of range"); size = (off_t)ull; if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) { run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); } if (npatterns > 0) { for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) { if (fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0) break; } if (n >= npatterns) SCREWUP("filename does not match request"); } if (targisdir) { static char *namebuf; static size_t cursize; size_t need; need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; if (need > cursize) { free(namebuf); namebuf = xmalloc(need); cursize = need; } (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp); np = namebuf; } else np = targ; curfile = cp; exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; if (buf[0] == 'D') { int mod_flag = pflag; if (!iamrecursive) SCREWUP("received directory without -r"); if (exists) { if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { errno = ENOTDIR; goto bad; } if (pflag) (void) chmod(np, mode); } else { /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */ mod_flag = 1; if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) == -1) goto bad; } vect[0] = xstrdup(np); sink(1, vect, src); if (setimes) { setimes = 0; (void) utimes(vect[0], tv); } if (mod_flag) (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); free(vect[0]); continue; } omode = mode; mode |= S_IWUSR; if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) { bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); continue; } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { (void) close(ofd); continue; } cp = bp->buf; wrerr = 0; /* * NB. do not use run_err() unless immediately followed by * exit() below as it may send a spurious reply that might * desyncronise us from the peer. Use note_err() instead. */ statbytes = 0; if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remin); for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + amt > size) amt = size - i; count += amt; do { j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, scpio, &statbytes); if (j == 0) { run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ? strerror(errno) : "dropped connection"); exit(1); } amt -= j; cp += j; } while (amt > 0); if (count == bp->cnt) { /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ if (!wrerr) { if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { note_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = 1; } } count = 0; cp = bp->buf; } } unset_nonblock(remin); if (count != 0 && !wrerr && atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { note_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = 1; } if (!wrerr && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) note_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); if (pflag) { if (exists || omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ note_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); } } else { if (!exists && omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ note_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); } } if (close(ofd) == -1) note_err("%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno)); (void) response(); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (setimes && !wrerr) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(np, tv) == -1) { note_err("%s: set times: %s", np, strerror(errno)); } } /* If no error was noted then signal success for this file */ if (note_err(NULL) == 0) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); } done: for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) free(patterns[n]); free(patterns); return; screwup: for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) free(patterns[n]); free(patterns); run_err("protocol error: %s", why); exit(1); } void throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, char *src, char *targ) { char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL; char *abs_src = NULL, *tmp = NULL; glob_t g; int i, r, targetisdir, err = 0; if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL) fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno)); if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(from, src)) == NULL || (target = prepare_remote_path(to, targ)) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); targetisdir = remote_is_dir(to, target); if (!targetisdir && targetshouldbedirectory) { - error("Destination path \"%s\" is not a directory", target); + error("%s: destination is not a directory", target); err = -1; goto out; } debug3_f("copying remote %s to remote %s", abs_src, target); if ((r = remote_glob(from, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) - error("Too many glob matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); + error("%s: too many glob matches", abs_src); else - error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); + error("%s: %s", abs_src, strerror(ENOENT)); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); err = -1; goto out; } if (targetisdir) abs_dst = path_append(target, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(target); debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) { if (crossload_dir(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 1) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_crossload(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; free(tmp); tmp = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); free(abs_dst); free(target); free(tmp); globfree(&g); if (err == -1) - fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src); + errs = 1; } int response(void) { char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048]; if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) lostconn(0); cp = rbuf; switch (resp) { case 0: /* ok */ return (0); default: *cp++ = resp; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) lostconn(0); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); if (!iamremote) { cp[-1] = '\0'; (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), NULL, "%s\n", rbuf); (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); } ++errs; if (resp == 1) return (-1); exit(1); } /* NOTREACHED */ } void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n" " [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n" " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n"); exit(1); } void run_err(const char *fmt,...) { static FILE *fp; va_list ap; ++errs; if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) { (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); va_start(ap, fmt); (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); (void) fflush(fp); } if (!iamremote) { va_start(ap, fmt); vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } } /* * Notes a sink error for sending at the end of a file transfer. Returns 0 if * no error has been noted or -1 otherwise. Use note_err(NULL) to flush * any active error at the end of the transfer. */ int note_err(const char *fmt, ...) { static char *emsg; va_list ap; /* Replay any previously-noted error */ if (fmt == NULL) { if (emsg == NULL) return 0; run_err("%s", emsg); free(emsg); emsg = NULL; return -1; } errs++; /* Prefer first-noted error */ if (emsg != NULL) return -1; va_start(ap, fmt); vasnmprintf(&emsg, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return -1; } void verifydir(char *cp) { struct stat stb; if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) return; errno = ENOTDIR; } run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); killchild(0); } int okname(char *cp0) { int c; char *cp; cp = cp0; do { c = (int)*cp; if (c & 0200) goto bad; if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) { switch (c) { case '\'': case '"': case '`': case ' ': case '#': goto bad; default: break; } } } while (*++cp); return (1); bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); return (0); } BUF * allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) { size_t size; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE struct stat stb; if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) { run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); return (0); } size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize); if (size == 0) size = blksize; #else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ size = blksize; #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); } void lostconn(int signo) { if (!iamremote) (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); if (signo) _exit(1); else exit(1); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { if (remin > 0) close(remin); if (remout > 0) close(remout); if (remin2 > 0) close(remin2); if (remout2 > 0) close(remout2); if (do_cmd_pid > 0) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); if (do_cmd_pid2 > 0) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0); exit(i); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c index 2dac50232478..0c8e6f950e86 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c @@ -1,3058 +1,3057 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.381 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.382 2021/09/06 00:36:01 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #ifdef __OpenBSD__ #include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB # include #else # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "channels.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth); /* Use of privilege separation or not */ extern int use_privsep; extern struct sshbuf *cfg; /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_listen_addrs = 0; options->address_family = -1; options->routing_domain = NULL; options->num_host_key_files = 0; options->num_host_cert_files = 0; options->host_key_agent = NULL; options->pid_file = NULL; options->login_grace_time = -1; options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; options->ignore_rhosts = -1; options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; options->print_motd = -1; options->print_lastlog = -1; options->x11_forwarding = -1; options->x11_display_offset = -1; options->x11_use_localhost = -1; options->permit_tty = -1; options->permit_user_rc = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->strict_modes = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->num_log_verbose = 0; options->log_verbose = NULL; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_auth_options = -1; options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL; options->kerberos_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; options->permit_user_env = -1; options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL; options->compression = -1; options->rekey_limit = -1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1; options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; options->num_allow_users = 0; options->num_deny_users = 0; options->num_allow_groups = 0; options->num_deny_groups = 0; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->num_subsystems = 0; options->max_startups_begin = -1; options->max_startups_rate = -1; options->max_startups = -1; options->per_source_max_startups = -1; options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = -1; options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = -1; options->max_authtries = -1; options->max_sessions = -1; options->banner = NULL; options->use_dns = -1; options->client_alive_interval = -1; options->client_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_authkeys_files = 0; options->num_accept_env = 0; options->num_setenv = 0; options->permit_tun = -1; options->permitted_opens = NULL; options->permitted_listens = NULL; options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; options->sk_provider = NULL; options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->disable_forwarding = -1; options->expose_userauth_info = -1; options->use_blacklist = -1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ static int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } static void assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) { char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig; int r; all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ do { \ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \ fatal_fr(r, "%s", #what); \ } while (0) ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher); ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac); ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex); ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key); ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig); #undef ASSEMBLE free(all_cipher); free(all_mac); free(all_kex); free(all_key); free(all_sig); free(def_cipher); free(def_mac); free(def_kex); free(def_key); free(def_sig); } static const char *defaultkey = "[default]"; void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line, ServerOptions *options, const char *path, int userprovided) { char *apath = derelativise_path(path); if (file == defaultkey && access(path, R_OK) != 0) return; opt_array_append2(file, line, "HostKey", &options->host_key_files, &options->host_key_file_userprovided, &options->num_host_key_files, apath, userprovided); free(apath); } void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line, ServerOptions *options, const char *path) { char *apath = derelativise_path(path); opt_array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate", &options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath); free(apath); } void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { u_int i; /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 1; /* Standard Options */ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0); #endif servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 0); #ifdef WITH_XMSS servconf_add_hostkey(defaultkey, 0, options, _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 0); #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ } if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) fatal("No host key files found"); /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE); if (options->moduli_file == NULL) options->moduli_file = xstrdup(_PATH_DH_MODULI); if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; if (options->print_motd == -1) options->print_motd = 1; if (options->print_lastlog == -1) options->print_lastlog = 1; if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) options->x11_forwarding = 1; if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) options->x11_display_offset = 10; if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) options->x11_use_localhost = 1; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); if (options->permit_tty == -1) options->permit_tty = 1; if (options->permit_user_rc == -1) options->permit_user_rc = 1; if (options->strict_modes == -1) options->strict_modes = 1; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_auth_options == -1) options->pubkey_auth_options = 0; if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) options->kerberos_authentication = 0; if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 0; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; if (options->permit_user_env == -1) { options->permit_user_env = 0; options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL; } if (options->compression == -1) #ifdef WITH_ZLIB options->compression = COMP_DELAYED; #else options->compression = COMP_NONE; #endif if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1) options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1) options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->max_startups == -1) options->max_startups = 100; if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) options->max_startups_begin = 10; if (options->per_source_max_startups == -1) options->per_source_max_startups = INT_MAX; if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 == -1) options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = 32; if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 == -1) options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = 128; if (options->max_authtries == -1) options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX; if (options->max_sessions == -1) options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; if (options->use_dns == -1) options->use_dns = 1; if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) options->client_alive_interval = 0; if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) options->client_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { opt_array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS); opt_array_append(defaultkey, 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2); } if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD); if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; if (options->disable_forwarding == -1) options->disable_forwarding = 0; if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1) options->expose_userauth_info = 0; if (options->sk_provider == NULL) options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal"); if (options->use_blacklist == -1) options->use_blacklist = 0; assemble_algorithms(options); /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]); #undef CLEAR_ON_NONE /* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */ if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 && strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) { free(options->auth_methods[0]); options->auth_methods[0] = NULL; options->num_auth_methods = 0; } } /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ sUsePAM, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, - sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, - sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, - sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, + sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication, + sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile, sModuliFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sInclude, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding, sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider, sUseBlacklist, sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of config */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */ #define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH) #define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH 0x04 /* Match never matches; internal only */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY 0x08 /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */ /* Textual representation of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int flags; } keywords[] = { /* Portable-specific options */ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "modulifile", sModuliFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "logverbose", sLogVerbose, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */ { "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */ { "pubkeyauthoptions", sPubkeyAuthOptions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ #ifdef KRB5 { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef USE_AFS { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */ { "skeyauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG { "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "persourcemaxstartups", sPerSourceMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "persourcenetblocksize", sPerSourceNetBlockSize, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "useblacklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "useblocklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "noneenabled", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hpndisabled", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hpnbuffersize", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; static struct { int val; char *text; } tunmode_desc[] = { { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" }, { -1, NULL } }; /* Returns an opcode name from its number */ static const char * lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. */ static ServerOpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, u_int *flags) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { *flags = keywords[i].flags; return keywords[i].opcode; } error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return sBadOption; } char * derelativise_path(const char *path) { char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX]; if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0) return xstrdup("none"); expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid()); if (path_absolute(expanded)) return expanded; if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) fatal_f("getcwd: %s", strerror(errno)); xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded); free(expanded); return ret; } static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { u_int i; if (port > 0) add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port); else { for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) { add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, options->ports[i]); } } } static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr; u_int i; /* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) { if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) break; if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0) break; } if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) { /* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */ if (i >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("too many listen addresses"); options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1, sizeof(*options->listen_addrs)); i = options->num_listen_addrs++; if (rdomain != NULL) options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain); } /* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options->address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", addr ? addr : "", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) ; ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs; options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop; } /* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */ static int valid_rdomain(const char *name) { #if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN) return sys_valid_rdomain(name); #elif defined(__OpenBSD__) const char *errstr; long long num; struct rt_tableinfo info; int mib[6]; size_t miblen = sizeof(mib); if (name == NULL) return 1; num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return 0; /* Check whether the table actually exists */ memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib)); mib[0] = CTL_NET; mib[1] = PF_ROUTE; mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE; mib[5] = (int)num; if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1) return 0; return 1; #else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform"); return 0; #endif } /* * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports * and AddressFamily options. */ static void queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, const char *rdomain, int port) { struct queued_listenaddr *qla; options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray( options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1, sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs)); qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++]; qla->addr = xstrdup(addr); qla->port = port; qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain); } /* * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries. */ static void process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) { u_int i; struct queued_listenaddr *qla; if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) { qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i]; add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port); free(qla->addr); free(qla->rdomain); } free(options->queued_listen_addrs); options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; options->num_queued_listens = 0; } /* * Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding * direction (local/remote). */ static void process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode, char **opens, u_int num_opens) { u_int i; int port; char *host, *arg, *oarg, ch; int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE; const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode); channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); if (num_opens == 0) return; /* permit any */ /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0) return; if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) { channel_disable_admin(ssh, where); return; } /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) { oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]); ch = '\0'; host = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (host == NULL || ch == '/') fatal_f("missing host in %s", what); host = cleanhostname(host); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what); /* Send it to channels layer */ channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, host, port); free(oarg); } } /* * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration. */ void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options) { process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen, options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens); process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen, options->permitted_listens, options->num_permitted_listens); } struct connection_info * get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns) { static struct connection_info ci; if (ssh == NULL || !populate) return &ci; ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns); ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh); ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh); ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); return &ci; } /* * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice. * * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are * checked for syntax only. * * The second time is after a connection has been established but before * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any * options set are copied into the main server config. * * Potential additions/improvements: * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers. * * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg: * Match Address 192.168.0.* * Tag trusted * Match Group wheel * Tag trusted * Match Tag trusted * AllowTcpForwarding yes * GatewayPorts clientspecified * [...] * * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive * Match Group shell * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip */ static int match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user) { int result = 0; struct passwd *pw; if (user == NULL) goto out; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does " "not exist", line, user); } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group " "at line %d", user, line); } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) { debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); } else { debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); result = 1; } out: ga_free(); return result; } static void match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib) { fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection " "test specification.", criteria, attrib); } /* * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does * not match. */ static int match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) { int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; if (ci == NULL) debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); else debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s " "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)", ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)", ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)", ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { /* Terminate on comment */ if (*attrib == '#') { cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ break; } arg = NULL; attributes++; /* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) { error("'all' cannot be combined with other " "Match attributes"); return -1; } if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#') cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */ *condition = cp; return 1; } /* All other criteria require an argument */ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); return -1; } if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->user == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user"); if (match_usergroup_pattern_list(ci->user, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->user, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->user == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user"); switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { case -1: return -1; case 0: result = 0; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->host == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host"); if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) { if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0) fatal("Invalid Match address argument " "'%s' at line %d", arg, line); result = 0; continue; } if (ci->address == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr"); switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) { if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0) fatal("Invalid Match localaddress " "argument '%s' at line %d", arg, line); result = 0; continue; } if (ci->laddress == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress", "laddr"); switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d", ci->laddress, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", arg); return -1; } if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->lport == 0) match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport"); /* TODO support port lists */ if (port == ci->lport) debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalPort %d' at line %d", ci->laddress, port, line); else result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) { result = 0; continue; } if (ci->rdomain == NULL) match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain"); if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line); } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); return -1; } } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); return -1; } if (ci != NULL) debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; return result; } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_ignore_rhosts[] = { { "yes", IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES }, { "no", IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO }, { "shosts-only", IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = { { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY }, { "yes", PERMIT_YES }, { "no", PERMIT_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { #ifdef WITH_ZLIB { "yes", COMP_DELAYED }, { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED }, #endif { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "clientspecified", 2 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "no", FORWARD_DENY }, { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE }, { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL }, { NULL, -1 } }; static int process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth, struct include_list *includes) { char ch, *str, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p, *keyword; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0; size_t len; long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; const char *errstr; struct include_item *item; glob_t gbuf; char **oav = NULL, **av; int oac = 0, ac; int ret = -1; /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } str = line; if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&str); if (!keyword || !*keyword || *keyword == '#') return 0; if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') { error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return -1; } intptr = NULL; charptr = NULL; opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, &flags); if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) { error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum); return -1; } ac = oac; av = oav; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude) debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, keyword, str); if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) { if (connectinfo == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed " "within a Match block", filename, linenum, keyword); } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */ ret = 0; goto out; } } switch (opcode) { /* Portable-specific options */ case sUsePAM: intptr = &options->use_pam; goto parse_flag; /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: goto out; case sPort: /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) { argv_consume(&ac); break; } if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", filename, linenum); arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", filename, linenum); options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", filename, linenum); break; case sLoginGraceTime: intptr = &options->login_grace_time; parse_time: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sListenAddress: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing address", filename, linenum); /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { port = 0; p = arg; } else { arg2 = NULL; ch = '\0'; p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (p == NULL || ch == '/') fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL) port = 0; else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum); } /* Optional routing table */ arg2 = NULL; if ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 || (arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax", filename, linenum); if (!valid_rdomain(arg2)) fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain", filename, linenum); } queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port); break; case sAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; parse_multistate: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sHostKeyFile: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum, options, arg, 1); } break; case sHostKeyAgent: charptr = &options->host_key_agent; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); break; case sHostCertificate: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg); break; case sPidFile: charptr = &options->pid_file; parse_filename: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sModuliFile: charptr = &options->moduli_file; goto parse_filename; case sPermitRootLogin: intptr = &options->permit_root_login; multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreRhosts: intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; goto parse_multistate; case sHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos; parse_pubkey_algos: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*arg != '-' && !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case sCASignatureAlgorithms: charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case sPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms: charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos; goto parse_pubkey_algos; case sPubkeyAuthOptions: intptr = &options->pubkey_auth_options; value = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) continue; if (strcasecmp(arg, "touch-required") == 0) value |= PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED; else if (strcasecmp(arg, "verify-required") == 0) value |= PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED; else { error("%s line %d: unsupported %s option %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); goto out; } } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sKerberosAuthentication: intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosTicketCleanup: intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosGetAFSToken: intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; case sGssStrictAcceptor: intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; goto parse_flag; case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPrintMotd: intptr = &options->print_motd; goto parse_flag; case sPrintLastLog: intptr = &options->print_lastlog; goto parse_flag; case sX11Forwarding: intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sX11DisplayOffset: intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; parse_int: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.", filename, linenum, keyword, errstr); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sX11UseLocalhost: intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; goto parse_flag; case sXAuthLocation: charptr = &options->xauth_location; goto parse_filename; case sPermitTTY: intptr = &options->permit_tty; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserRC: intptr = &options->permit_user_rc; goto parse_flag; case sStrictModes: intptr = &options->strict_modes; goto parse_flag; case sTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case sEmptyPasswd: intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserEnvironment: intptr = &options->permit_user_env; charptr = &options->permit_user_env_allowlist; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); value = 0; p = NULL; if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) value = 1; else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) value = 0; else { /* Pattern-list specified */ value = 1; p = xstrdup(arg); } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; *charptr = p; p = NULL; } free(p); break; case sCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case sRekeyLimit: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad %s number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg, strerror(errno)); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: %s too small", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = val64; if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) { (void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case sGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports; goto parse_multistate; case sUseDNS: intptr = &options->use_dns; goto parse_flag; case sLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case sLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case sLogVerbose: found = options->num_log_verbose == 0; i = 0; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* Allow "none" only in first position */ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (i > 0 || ac > 0) { error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" " "argument must appear alone.", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } } i++; if (!found || !*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->log_verbose, &options->num_log_verbose, arg); } break; case sAllowTcpForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowAgentForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sDisableForwarding: intptr = &options->disable_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sAllowUsers: chararrayptr = &options->allow_users; uintptr = &options->num_allow_users; parse_allowdenyusers: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s pattern: \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (!*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, chararrayptr, uintptr, arg); } break; case sDenyUsers: chararrayptr = &options->deny_users; uintptr = &options->num_deny_users; goto parse_allowdenyusers; case sAllowGroups: chararrayptr = &options->allow_groups; uintptr = &options->num_allow_groups; parse_allowdenygroups: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: empty %s pattern", filename, linenum, keyword); if (!*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, chararrayptr, uintptr, arg); } break; case sDenyGroups: chararrayptr = &options->deny_groups; uintptr = &options->num_deny_groups; goto parse_allowdenygroups; case sCiphers: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case sMacs: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case sKexAlgorithms: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*arg != '-' && !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case sSubsystem: if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", filename, linenum); } arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (!*activep) { arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); break; } for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' " "already defined.", filename, linenum, arg); options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", filename, linenum); options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */ p = xstrdup(arg); len = strlen(p) + 1; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { len += 1 + strlen(arg); p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len); strlcat(p, " ", len); strlcat(p, arg, len); } options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p; options->num_subsystems++; break; case sMaxStartups: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", &options->max_startups_begin, &options->max_startups_rate, &options->max_startups)) == 3) { if (options->max_startups_begin > options->max_startups || options->max_startups_rate > 100 || options->max_startups_rate < 1) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.", filename, linenum, keyword); } else if (n != 1) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.", filename, linenum, keyword); else options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; break; case sPerSourceNetBlockSize: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); switch (n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d", &value, &value2)) { case 2: if (value2 < 0 || value2 > 128) n = -1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: if (value < 0 || value > 32) n = -1; } if (n != 1 && n != 2) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep) { options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = value; options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = value2; } break; case sPerSourceMaxStartups: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { /* no limit */ value = INT_MAX; } else { if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.", filename, linenum, keyword, errstr); } if (*activep) options->per_source_max_startups = value; break; case sMaxAuthTries: intptr = &options->max_authtries; goto parse_int; case sMaxSessions: intptr = &options->max_sessions; goto parse_int; case sBanner: charptr = &options->banner; goto parse_filename; /* * These options can contain %X options expanded at * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: * * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u */ case sAuthorizedKeysFile: uvalue = options->num_authkeys_files; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } arg2 = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->authorized_keys_files, &options->num_authkeys_files, arg2); } free(arg2); } break; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sClientAliveInterval: intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case sClientAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case sAcceptEnv: while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env, arg); } break; case sSetEnv: uvalue = options->num_setenv; while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep || uvalue != 0) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg); } break; case sPermitTunnel: intptr = &options->permit_tun; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); value = -1; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) { value = tunmode_desc[i].val; break; } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: bad %s argument %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sInclude: if (cmdline) { fatal("Include directive not supported as a " "command-line option"); } value = 0; while ((arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (*arg2 == '\0') { error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } value++; found = 0; if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') { xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2); } else arg = xstrdup(arg2); /* * Don't let included files clobber the containing * file's Match state. */ oactive = *activep; /* consult cache of include files */ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) { if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0) continue; if (item->filename != NULL) { parse_server_config_depth(options, item->filename, item->contents, includes, connectinfo, (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)), activep, depth + 1); } found = 1; *activep = oactive; } if (found != 0) { free(arg); continue; } /* requested glob was not in cache */ debug2("%s line %d: new include %s", filename, linenum, arg); if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) { if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) { fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" glob " "failed", filename, linenum, arg); } /* * If no entry matched then record a * placeholder to skip later glob calls. */ debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s", filename, linenum, arg); item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); item->selector = strdup(arg); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry); } if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX) fatal_f("too many glob results"); for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) { debug2("%s line %d: including %s", filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]); item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); item->selector = strdup(arg); item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]); if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); load_server_config(item->filename, item->contents); parse_server_config_depth(options, item->filename, item->contents, includes, connectinfo, (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)), activep, depth + 1); *activep = oactive; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry); } globfree(&gbuf); free(arg); } if (value == 0) { fatal("%s line %d: %s missing filename argument", filename, linenum, keyword); } break; case sMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(&str, linenum, (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo)); if (value < 0) fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value; /* * The MATCH_ONLY flag is applicable only until the first * match block. */ *inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY; /* * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail. */ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') argv_consume(&ac); break; case sPermitListen: case sPermitOpen: if (opcode == sPermitListen) { uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens; chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens; } else { uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens; chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens; } arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { *uintptr = 1; *chararrayptr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**chararrayptr)); (*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg); } break; } for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) { if (opcode == sPermitListen && strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) { /* * Allow bare port number for PermitListen * to indicate a wildcard listen host. */ xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg); } else { arg2 = xstrdup(arg); ch = '\0'; p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (p == NULL || ch == '/') { fatal("%s line %d: %s missing host", filename, linenum, keyword); } p = cleanhostname(p); } if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) { fatal("%s line %d: %s bad port number", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2); } free(arg2); } break; case sForceCommand: if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL) options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(str + len); argv_consume(&ac); break; case sChrootDirectory: charptr = &options->chroot_directory; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sTrustedUserCAKeys: charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; goto parse_filename; case sRevokedKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; goto parse_filename; case sSecurityKeyProvider: charptr = &options->sk_provider; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = strcasecmp(arg, "internal") == 0 ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sIPQoS: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case sVersionAddendum: if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (strchr(str + len, '\r') != NULL) { fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s argument", filename, linenum, keyword); } if ((arg = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) { *arg = '\0'; rtrim(line); } if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(str + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(str + len); } argv_consume(&ac); break; case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command; parse_command: len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE); if (str[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(str + len, "none") != 0) { fatal("%.200s line %d: %s must be an absolute path", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(str + len); argv_consume(&ac); break; case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; parse_localuser: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { fatal("%s line %d: missing %s argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); } if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command; goto parse_command; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user; goto parse_localuser; case sAuthenticationMethods: found = options->num_auth_methods == 0; value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */ value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */ while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) { if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) { fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must " "appear alone in %s", filename, linenum, keyword); } value = 1; } else if (value) { fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear " "alone in %s", filename, linenum, keyword); } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) { fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s method list.", filename, linenum, keyword); } value2 = 1; if (!found || !*activep) continue; opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword, &options->auth_methods, &options->num_auth_methods, arg); } if (value2 == 0) { fatal("%s line %d: no %s specified", filename, linenum, keyword); } break; case sStreamLocalBindMask: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (*activep) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case sFingerprintHash: arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, keyword, arg); if (*activep) options->fingerprint_hash = value; break; case sExposeAuthInfo: intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info; goto parse_flag; case sRDomain: #if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) fatal("%s line %d: setting RDomain not supported on this " "platform.", filename, linenum); #endif charptr = &options->routing_domain; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", filename, linenum, keyword); if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 && !valid_rdomain(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: invalid routing domain", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sUseBlacklist: intptr = &options->use_blacklist; goto parse_flag; case sDeprecated: case sIgnore: case sUnsupported: do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, "%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum, opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", keyword); argv_consume(&ac); break; default: fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", filename, linenum, keyword, opcode); } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if (ac > 0) { error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments " "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword); goto out; } /* success */ ret = 0; out: argv_free(oav, oac); return ret; } int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes) { int inc_flags = 0; return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename, linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes); } /* Reads the server configuration file. */ void load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf) { struct stat st; char *line = NULL, *cp; size_t linesize = 0; FILE *f; int r, lineno = 0; debug2_f("filename %s", filename); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { perror(filename); exit(1); } sshbuf_reset(conf); /* grow buffer, so realloc is avoided for large config files */ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) == 0 && st.st_size > 0 && (r = sshbuf_allocate(conf, st.st_size)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "allocate"); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lineno++; /* * Strip whitespace * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r"); if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); } free(line); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8"); fclose(f); debug2_f("done config len = %zu", sshbuf_len(conf)); } void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { ServerOptions mo; initialize_server_options(&mo); parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes, connectinfo); copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0); } int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec) { char *p; while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') { if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) { ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) { ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) { ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) { ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6); } else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) { ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8); } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) { ci->lport = a2port(p + 6); if (ci->lport == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode" " specification %s\n", p+6, p); return -1; } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n", p); return -1; } } return 0; } /* * Copy any supported values that are set. * * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we * do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow(). */ void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) { #define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != -1) \ dst->n = src->n; \ } while (0) M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options); M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); M_CP_INTOPT(ignore_rhosts); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions); M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max); M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); /* * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use * M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler * warnings. */ if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) { dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask; } /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */ #define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \ free(dst->n); \ dst->n = src->n; \ } \ } while(0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\ u_int i; \ if (src->num_s != 0) { \ for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \ free(dst->s[i]); \ free(dst->s); \ dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \ for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \ dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \ dst->num_s = src->num_s; \ } \ } while(0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); /* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */ assemble_algorithms(dst); /* * The only things that should be below this point are string options * which are only used after authentication. */ if (preauth) return; /* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */ M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) { free(dst->adm_forced_command); dst->adm_forced_command = NULL; } M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) { free(dst->chroot_directory); dst->chroot_directory = NULL; } } #undef M_CP_INTOPT #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT #define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16 static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth) { int linenum, bad_options = 0; char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf; if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH) fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes"); debug2_f("config %s len %zu%s", filename, sshbuf_len(conf), (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : "")); if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); linenum = 1; while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) { if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp, filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags, depth, includes) != 0) bad_options++; } free(obuf); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); } void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1; parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes, connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0); process_queued_listen_addrs(options); } static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case sAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case sPermitRootLogin: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin); case sGatewayPorts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); case sCompression: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); case sAllowTcpForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sIgnoreRhosts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_ignore_rhosts); case sFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static void dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val == NULL ? "none" : val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods) return; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0) printf(" any"); printf("\n"); } static char * format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) { int r; struct addrinfo *ai; char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV]; char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL; /* * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to * print these in reverse order. */ for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); continue; } laddr2 = laddr1; if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s", addr, port, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, laddr2); } else { xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s", addr, port, la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, laddr2); } free(laddr2); } return laddr1; } void dump_config(ServerOptions *o) { char *s; u_int i; /* these are usually at the top of the config */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) { s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]); printf("%s", s); free(s); } /* integer arguments */ #ifdef USE_PAM dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); #endif dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); #ifdef KRB5 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); #ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes); dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseBlacklist, o->use_blacklist); /* string arguments */ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); dump_cfg_string(sModuliFile, o->moduli_file); dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers); dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs); dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); dump_cfg_string(sSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, o->authorized_principals_file); dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' ? "none" : o->version_addendum); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms); dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos); #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain); #endif /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* string array arguments */ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files, o->authorized_keys_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files, o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env); dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods, o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sLogVerbose, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose); /* other arguments */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++) printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i], o->subsystem_args[i]); printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin, o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups); printf("persourcemaxstartups "); if (o->per_source_max_startups == INT_MAX) printf("none\n"); else printf("%d\n", o->per_source_max_startups); printf("persourcenetblocksize %d:%d\n", o->per_source_masklen_ipv4, o->per_source_masklen_ipv6); s = NULL; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) { if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) { s = tunmode_desc[i].text; break; } } dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s); printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); printf("permitopen"); if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0) printf(" any"); else { for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++) printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]); } printf("\n"); printf("permitlisten"); if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0) printf(" any"); else { for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++) printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]); } printf("\n"); if (o->permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL) { dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env); } else { printf("permituserenvironment %s\n", o->permit_user_env_allowlist); } printf("pubkeyauthoptions"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options == 0) printf(" none"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) printf(" touch-required"); if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) printf(" verify-required"); printf("\n"); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c index 5bfff90d187f..9de9afa20f68 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c @@ -1,2634 +1,2633 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.154 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.155 2021/09/03 05:12:25 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* XXX: memleaks */ /* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ /* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */ /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted; extern int showprogress; /* Default size of buffer for up/download */ #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Default number of concurrent outstanding requests */ #define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ #define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */ #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64 /* Directory separator characters */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN # define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/\\" #else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ # define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/" #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ struct sftp_conn { int fd_in; int fd_out; u_int download_buflen; u_int upload_buflen; u_int num_requests; u_int version; u_int msg_id; #define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001 #define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002 #define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004 #define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008 #define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010 #define SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT 0x00000020 #define SFTP_EXT_LIMITS 0x00000040 #define SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND 0x00000080 u_int exts; u_int64_t limit_kbps; struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out; }; /* Tracks in-progress requests during file transfers */ struct request { u_int id; size_t len; u_int64_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(requests, request); static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); static struct request * request_enqueue(struct requests *requests, u_int id, size_t len, uint64_t offset) { struct request *req; req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req)); req->id = id; req->len = len; req->offset = offset; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(requests, req, tq); return req; } static struct request * request_find(struct requests *requests, u_int id) { struct request *req; for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(requests); req != NULL && req->id != id; req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq)) ; return req; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount) { struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit; refresh_progress_meter(0); if (bwlimit != NULL) bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount); return 0; } static void send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char mlen[4]; struct iovec iov[2]; if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m)); /* Send length first */ put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m)); iov[0].iov_base = mlen; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen); iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m); iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m); if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) != sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen)) fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static void get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial) { u_int msg_len; u_char *p; int r; sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_u32"); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { do_log2(initial ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, "Received message too long %u", msg_len); fatal("Ensure the remote shell produces no output " "for non-interactive sessions."); } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "reserve"); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != msg_len) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } } static void get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { get_msg_extended(conn, m, 0); } static void send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, u_int len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o", conn->fd_out, code, id, a->flags, a->perm); sshbuf_free(msg); } static u_int get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id, status; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); sshbuf_free(msg); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); return status; } static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id, status; u_char type; u_char *handle; char errmsg[256]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, errfmt); if (errfmt != NULL) vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args); va_end(args); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (errfmt != NULL) error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse handle"); sshbuf_free(msg); return handle; } /* XXX returing &static is error-prone. Refactor to fill *Attrib argument */ static Attrib * get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; u_char type; int r; static Attrib a; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); } if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "decode_attrib"); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } debug3("Recevied stat reply T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o", type, id, a.flags, a.perm); sshbuf_free(msg); return &a; } static int get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id; u_int64_t flag; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); } memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse statvfs"); st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0; st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0; sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } struct sftp_conn * do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, u_int64_t limit_kbps) { u_char type; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sftp_conn *ret; int r; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->msg_id = 1; ret->fd_in = fd_in; ret->fd_out = fd_out; ret->download_buflen = ret->upload_buflen = transfer_buflen ? transfer_buflen : DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN; ret->num_requests = num_requests ? num_requests : DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS; ret->exts = 0; ret->limit_kbps = 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); send_msg(ret, msg); get_msg_extended(ret, msg, 1); /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse type"); if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", type); sshbuf_free(msg); free(ret); return(NULL); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse version"); debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version); /* Check for extensions */ while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) { char *name; u_char *value; size_t vlen; int known = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse extension"); if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "lsetstat@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "limits@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LIMITS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "expand-path@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND; known = 1; } if (known) { debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s", name, value); } else { debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name); } free(name); free(value); } sshbuf_free(msg); /* Query the server for its limits */ if (ret->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) { struct sftp_limits limits; if (do_limits(ret, &limits) != 0) fatal_f("limits failed"); /* If the caller did not specify, find a good value */ if (transfer_buflen == 0) { ret->download_buflen = limits.read_length; ret->upload_buflen = limits.write_length; debug("Using server download size %u", ret->download_buflen); debug("Using server upload size %u", ret->upload_buflen); } /* Use the server limit to scale down our value only */ if (num_requests == 0 && limits.open_handles) { ret->num_requests = MINIMUM(DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS, limits.open_handles); debug("Server handle limit %llu; using %u", (unsigned long long)limits.open_handles, ret->num_requests); } } /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */ if (ret->version == 0) { ret->download_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->download_buflen, 20480); ret->upload_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->upload_buflen, 20480); } ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps; if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) { bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps, ret->download_buflen); bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps, ret->upload_buflen); } return ret; } u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return conn->version; } int do_limits(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_limits *limits) { u_int id, msg_id; u_char type; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) == 0) { error("Server does not support limits@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "limits@openssh.com")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message limits@openssh.com I:%u", id); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &msg_id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received limits reply T:%u I:%u", type, msg_id); if (id != msg_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", msg_id, id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { debug_f("expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); /* Disable the limits extension */ conn->exts &= ~SFTP_EXT_LIMITS; sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } memset(limits, 0, sizeof(*limits)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->packet_length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->read_length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->write_length)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->open_handles)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse limits"); sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } int do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { u_int id, status; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0; size_t handle_len; u_char type, *handle; int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; int r; if (dir) *dir = NULL; id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose OPENDIR"); send_msg(conn, msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } if (dir) { ents = 0; *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[0] = NULL; } for (; !interrupted;) { id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++; debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose READDIR"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int rstatus; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus); if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF) break; error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus)); goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse count"); if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) fatal_f("nonsensical number of entries"); if (count == 0) break; debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames"); if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "couldn't decode attrib"); free(filename); free(longname); goto out; } if (print_flag) mprintf("%s\n", longname); /* * Directory entries should never contain '/' * These can be used to attack recursive ops * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd') */ if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) { error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); } else if (dir) { *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a)); (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; } free(filename); free(longname); } } status = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) { /* Don't return results on error */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = NULL; } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) { /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); **dir = NULL; } return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); } void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) { free(s[i]->filename); free(s[i]->longname); free(s[i]); } free(s); } int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag) error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } Attrib * do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } Attrib * do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; if (conn->version == 0) { if (quiet) debug("Server version does not support lstat operation"); else logit("Server version does not support lstat operation"); return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet)); } id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #ifdef notyet Attrib * do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #endif int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, handle_len, a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */ static char * do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; const char *what = "SSH2_FXP_REALPATH"; if (expand) what = "expand-path@openssh.com"; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; if (expand) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "expand-path@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", what); send_msg(conn, msg); } else { send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path)); } get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse count"); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from %s", count, what); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse filename/attrib"); debug3("%s %s -> %s", what, path, filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return(filename); } char * do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0); } int can_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND) != 0; } char * do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { if (!can_expand_path(conn)) { debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath"); return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0); } return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1); } int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, int force_legacy) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Send rename request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if (use_ext) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose posix-rename"); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose rename"); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose paths"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" : "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) { error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Send link request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if (conn->version < 3) { error("This server does not support the symlink operation"); return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Send symlink request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0) return -1; /* Send fsync request */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } #ifdef notyet char * do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse count"); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames/attrib"); debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return filename; } #endif int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #ifdef notyet int do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #endif int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT) == 0) { error("Server does not support lsetstat@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static void send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static int send_open(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *tag, u_int openmode, Attrib *a, u_char **handlep, size_t *handle_lenp) { Attrib junk; u_char *handle; size_t handle_len; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_int id; *handlep = NULL; *handle_lenp = 0; if (a == NULL) { attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ a = &junk; } /* Send open request */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, openmode)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose %s open", tag); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); debug3("Sent %s message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s M:0x%04x", tag, id, path, openmode); if ((handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "%s open(\"%s\")", tag, path)) == NULL) return -1; /* success */ *handlep = handle; *handle_lenp = handle_len; return 0; } static const char * progress_meter_path(const char *path) { const char *progresspath; if ((progresspath = strrchr(path, '/')) == NULL) return path; progresspath++; if (*progresspath == '\0') return path; return progresspath; } int do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *handle; int local_fd = -1, write_error; int read_error, write_errno, lmodified = 0, reordered = 0, r; u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater; u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; off_t progress_counter; size_t handle_len; struct stat st; struct requests requests; struct request *req; u_char type; TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = a->perm & 0777; else mode = 0666; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = conn->download_buflen; /* Send open request */ if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "remote", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) return -1; local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR); if (local_fd == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } offset = highwater = 0; if (resume_flag) { if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) { error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (st.st_size < 0) { error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path); goto fail; } if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "local file is larger than remote", local_path); fail: do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (local_fd != -1) close(local_fd); return -1; } offset = highwater = st.st_size; } /* Read from remote and write to local */ write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = offset; if (showprogress && size != 0) { start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(remote_path), size, &progress_counter); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { u_char *data; size_t len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = request_enqueue(&requests, conn->msg_id++, buflen, offset); offset += buflen; num_req++; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); } sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse data"); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); lmodified = 1; if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 || atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) && !write_error) { write_errno = errno; write_error = 1; max_req = 0; } else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater) highwater = req->offset + len; else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater) reordered = 1; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req < conn->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { if (reordered && resume_flag) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "server reordered requests", local_path); } debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1) error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (read_error) { error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(write_errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else { if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else status = SSH2_FX_OK; /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) #else if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (preserve_flag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (resume_flag && !lmodified) logit("File \"%s\" was not modified", local_path); else if (fsync_flag) { debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path); if (fsync(local_fd) == -1) error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } } close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; mode_t mode = 0777, tmpmode = mode; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) { error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY) mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src); if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777; tmpmode = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR); } else { debug("Server did not send permissions for " "directory \"%s\"", dst); } if (mkdir(dst, tmpmode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { free(new_dst); free(new_src); filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) || (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) { /* * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation * and get the link target's attributes. */ if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst, S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL : &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Download of file %s to %s failed", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src); } free(new_dst); free(new_src); if (preserve_flag) { if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); } else debug("Server did not send times for directory " "\"%s\"", dst); } if (mode != tmpmode && chmod(dst, mode) == -1) error("Can't set final mode on \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag) { char *src_canon; int ret; if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src); return -1; } ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag); free(src_canon); return ret; } int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int r, local_fd; u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK; u_int id; u_char type; off_t offset, progress_counter; u_char *handle, *data; struct sshbuf *msg; struct stat sb; Attrib a, *c = NULL; u_int32_t startid; u_int32_t ackid; struct request *ack = NULL; struct requests acks; size_t handle_len; TAILQ_INIT(&acks); if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); return(-1); } if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); close(local_fd); return(-1); } if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { error("%s is not a regular file", local_path); close(local_fd); return(-1); } stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; if (resume) { /* Get remote file size if it exists */ if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) { close(local_fd); return -1; } if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) { error("destination file bigger or same size as " "source file"); close(local_fd); return -1; } if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { close(local_fd); return -1; } } /* Send open request */ if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT| (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC), &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) { close(local_fd); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id; startid = ackid = id + 1; data = xmalloc(conn->upload_buflen); /* Read from local and write to remote */ offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0); if (showprogress) { start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(local_path), sb.st_size, &progress_counter); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); for (;;) { int len; /* * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, * thus losing the last block of the file. * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the * server to drain. */ if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) len = 0; else do len = read(local_fd, data, conn->upload_buflen); while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); if (len == -1) fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (len != 0) { ack = request_enqueue(&acks, ++id, len, offset); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose"); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL) break; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id); if (id == startid || len == 0 || id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) { u_int rid; sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, " "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); /* Find the request in our queue */ if ((ack = request_find(&acks, rid)) == NULL) fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid); TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq); debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %zu bytes at %lld", ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset); ++ackid; progress_counter += ack->len; free(ack); } offset += len; if (offset < 0) fatal_f("offset < 0"); } sshbuf_free(msg); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); free(data); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } if (close(local_fd) == -1) { error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a); if (fsync_flag) (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len); if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag) { int ret = 0; DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; struct stat sb; Attrib a, *dirattrib; u_int32_t saved_perm; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY) mprintf("Entering %s\n", src); - attrib_clear(&a); stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 01777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; /* * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST, * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether * the path already existed and is a directory. Ensure we can * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer. */ saved_perm = a.perm; a.perm |= (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR); if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) { if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL) return -1; if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst); return -1; } } a.perm = saved_perm; if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) { error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; free(new_dst); free(new_src); filename = dp->d_name; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) { logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ret = -1; } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) || (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) { if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename); } free(new_dst); free(new_src); do_setstat(conn, dst, &a); (void) closedir(dirp); return ret; } int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag) { char *dst_canon; int ret; if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst); return -1; } ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag); free(dst_canon); return ret; } static void handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous, u_int *nreqsp, u_int *write_errorp) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id, status; int r; struct pollfd pfd; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); /* Try to eat replies from the upload side */ while (*nreqsp > 0) { debug3_f("%u outstanding replies", *nreqsp); if (!synchronous) { /* Bail out if no data is ready to be read */ pfd.fd = to->fd_in; pfd.events = POLLIN; if ((r = poll(&pfd, 1, 0)) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) break; fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno)); } else if (r == 0) break; /* fd not ready */ } sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(to, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "dest parse"); debug3("Received dest reply T:%u I:%u R:%u", type, id, *nreqsp); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { fatal_f("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse dest status"); debug3("dest SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { /* record first error */ if (*write_errorp == 0) *write_errorp = status; } /* * XXX this doesn't do full reply matching like do_upload and * so cannot gracefully truncate terminated uploads at a * high-water mark. ATM the only caller of this function (scp) * doesn't support transfer resumption, so this doesn't matter * a whole lot. * * To be safe, do_crossload truncates the destination file to * zero length on upload failure, since we can't trust the * server not to have reordered replies that could have * inserted holes where none existed in the source file. * * XXX we could get a more accutate progress bar if we updated * the counter based on the reply from the destination... */ (*nreqsp)--; } debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp); } int do_crossload(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, const char *from_path, const char *to_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag) { struct sshbuf *msg; int write_error, read_error, r; u_int64_t offset = 0, size; u_int id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; u_int num_upload_req; off_t progress_counter; u_char *from_handle, *to_handle; size_t from_handle_len, to_handle_len; struct requests requests; struct request *req; u_char type; TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", from_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = from->download_buflen; if (buflen > to->upload_buflen) buflen = to->upload_buflen; /* Send open request to read side */ if (send_open(from, from_path, "origin", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL, &from_handle, &from_handle_len) != 0) return -1; /* Send open request to write side */ a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a->perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a, &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) { do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len); return -1; } /* Read from remote "from" and write to remote "to" */ offset = 0; write_error = read_error = num_req = num_upload_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = 0; if (showprogress && size != 0) { start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(from_path), size, &progress_counter); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { u_char *data; size_t len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = request_enqueue(&requests, from->msg_id++, buflen, offset); offset += buflen; num_req++; send_read_request(from, req->id, req->offset, req->len, from_handle, from_handle_len); } /* Try to eat replies from the upload side (nonblocking) */ handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 0, &num_upload_req, &write_error); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(from, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug3("Received origin reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse data"); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); /* Write this chunk out to the destination */ sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, to->msg_id++)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, to_handle, to_handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, req->offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "compose write"); send_msg(to, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%zu", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); num_upload_req++; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = from->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(from, req->id, req->offset, req->len, from_handle, from_handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req < from->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Drain replies from the server (blocking) */ debug3_f("waiting for %u replies from destination", num_upload_req); handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 1, &num_upload_req, &write_error); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* Truncate at 0 length on interrupt or error to avoid holes at dest */ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { debug("truncating \"%s\" at 0", to_path); do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); free(to_handle); if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a, &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) { error("truncation failed for \"%s\"", to_path); to_handle = NULL; } } if (read_error) { error("Couldn't read from origin file \"%s\" : %s", from_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len); if (to_handle != NULL) do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", to_path, fx2txt(write_error)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len); if (to_handle != NULL) do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); } else { if (do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) status = -1; else status = SSH2_FX_OK; if (to_handle != NULL) { /* Need to resend utimes after write */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(to, to_handle, to_handle_len, a); do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len); } } sshbuf_free(msg); free(from_handle); free(to_handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int crossload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, const char *from_path, const char *to_path, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int follow_link_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_from_path = NULL, *new_to_path = NULL; mode_t mode = 0777; Attrib curdir; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(from, from_path, 1)) == NULL) { error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", from_path); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", from_path); return -1; } if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY) mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", from_path); curdir = *dirattrib; /* dirattrib will be clobbered */ curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; if ((curdir.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) == 0) { debug("Origin did not send permissions for " "directory \"%s\"", to_path); curdir.perm = S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR; curdir.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; } /* We need to be able to write to the directory while we transfer it */ mode = curdir.perm & 01777; curdir.perm = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR); /* * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST, * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether * the path already existed and is a directory. Ensure we can * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer. */ if (do_mkdir(to, to_path, &curdir, 0) != 0) { if ((dirattrib = do_stat(to, to_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", to_path); return -1; } } curdir.perm = mode; if (do_readdir(from, from_path, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", from_path); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { free(new_from_path); free(new_to_path); filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_from_path = path_append(from_path, filename); new_to_path = path_append(to_path, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (crossload_dir_internal(from, to, new_from_path, new_to_path, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) || (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) { /* * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation * and get the link target's attributes. */ if (do_crossload(from, to, new_from_path, new_to_path, S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL : &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag) == -1) { error("Transfer of file %s to %s failed", new_from_path, new_to_path); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_from_path); } free(new_to_path); free(new_from_path); do_setstat(to, to_path, &curdir); free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, const char *from_path, const char *to_path, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int follow_link_flag) { char *from_path_canon; int ret; if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", from_path); return -1; } ret = crossload_dir_internal(from, to, from_path_canon, to_path, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, follow_link_flag); free(from_path_canon); return ret; } char * path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) { char *ret; size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; ret = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(ret, p1, len); if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') strlcat(ret, "/", len); strlcat(ret, p2, len); return(ret); } char * make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd) { char *abs_str; /* Derelativise */ if (p && !path_absolute(p)) { abs_str = path_append(pwd, p); free(p); return(abs_str); } else return(p); } int remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { Attrib *a; /* XXX: report errors? */ if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL) return(0); if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(a->perm)); } int local_is_dir(const char *path) { struct stat sb; /* XXX: report errors? */ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)); } /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ int globpath_is_dir(const char *pathname) { size_t l = strlen(pathname); return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/'; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-realpath.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-realpath.c index 9ac40181227f..2ec779d8f901 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-realpath.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-realpath.c @@ -1,226 +1,225 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.1 2019/07/05 04:55:40 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote * products derived from this software without specific prior written * permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include -#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX # define SYMLOOP_MAX 32 #endif /* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */ char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved); /* * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]); * * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure, * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved). */ char * sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved) { struct stat sb; char *p, *q, *s; size_t left_len, resolved_len; unsigned symlinks; int serrno, slen, mem_allocated; char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX]; if (path[0] == '\0') { errno = ENOENT; return (NULL); } serrno = errno; if (resolved == NULL) { resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX); if (resolved == NULL) return (NULL); mem_allocated = 1; } else mem_allocated = 0; symlinks = 0; if (path[0] == '/') { resolved[0] = '/'; resolved[1] = '\0'; if (path[1] == '\0') return (resolved); resolved_len = 1; left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left)); } else { if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) { if (mem_allocated) free(resolved); else strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX); return (NULL); } resolved_len = strlen(resolved); left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left)); } if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } /* * Iterate over path components in `left'. */ while (left_len != 0) { /* * Extract the next path component and adjust `left' * and its length. */ p = strchr(left, '/'); s = p ? p : left + left_len; if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } memcpy(next_token, left, s - left); next_token[s - left] = '\0'; left_len -= s - left; if (p != NULL) memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1); if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') { if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } resolved[resolved_len++] = '/'; resolved[resolved_len] = '\0'; } if (next_token[0] == '\0') continue; else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0) continue; else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) { /* * Strip the last path component except when we have * single "/" */ if (resolved_len > 1) { resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; *q = '\0'; resolved_len = q - resolved; } continue; } /* * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if * there are no more path components left. */ resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX); if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) { if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) { errno = serrno; return (resolved); } goto err; } if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) { errno = ELOOP; goto err; } slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1); if (slen < 0) goto err; symlink[slen] = '\0'; if (symlink[0] == '/') { resolved[1] = 0; resolved_len = 1; } else if (resolved_len > 1) { /* Strip the last path component. */ resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; *q = '\0'; resolved_len = q - resolved; } /* * If there are any path components left, then * append them to symlink. The result is placed * in `left'. */ if (p != NULL) { if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') { if (slen + 1 >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } symlink[slen] = '/'; symlink[slen + 1] = 0; } left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink)); if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; goto err; } } left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left)); } } /* * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname * is a single "/". */ if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/') resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; return (resolved); err: if (mem_allocated) free(resolved); return (NULL); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c index 69f84cdcf1a4..418f312f7bc6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c @@ -1,2583 +1,2586 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.211 2021/08/12 09:59:00 schwarze Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.212 2021/09/11 09:05:50 schwarze Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H # include #endif #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT #include #else typedef void EditLine; #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" /* File to read commands from */ FILE* infile; /* Are we in batchfile mode? */ int batchmode = 0; /* PID of ssh transport process */ static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1; /* Suppress diagnostic messages */ int quiet = 0; /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */ int global_rflag = 0; /* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */ int global_aflag = 0; /* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */ int global_pflag = 0; /* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */ int global_fflag = 0; /* SIGINT received during command processing */ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; /* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/ int sort_flag; glob_t *sort_glob; /* Context used for commandline completion */ struct complete_ctx { struct sftp_conn *conn; char **remote_pathp; }; int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ extern char *__progname; /* Separators for interactive commands */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* ls flags */ #define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */ #define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */ #define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */ #define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */ #define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */ #define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */ #define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */ #define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS) #define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT) /* Commands for interactive mode */ enum sftp_command { I_CHDIR = 1, I_CHGRP, I_CHMOD, I_CHOWN, I_DF, I_GET, I_HELP, I_LCHDIR, I_LINK, I_LLS, I_LMKDIR, I_LPWD, I_LS, I_LUMASK, I_MKDIR, I_PUT, I_PWD, I_QUIT, I_REGET, I_RENAME, I_REPUT, I_RM, I_RMDIR, I_SHELL, I_SYMLINK, I_VERSION, I_PROGRESS, }; struct CMD { const char *c; const int n; const int t; }; /* Type of completion */ #define NOARGS 0 #define REMOTE 1 #define LOCAL 2 static const struct CMD cmds[] = { { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE }, { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE }, { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE }, { "df", I_DF, REMOTE }, { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "get", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL }, { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL }, { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE }, { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL }, { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS }, { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE }, { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS }, { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE }, { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE }, { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE }, { "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL }, { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE }, { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE }, { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE }, { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS }, { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS }, { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { NULL, -1, -1 } }; /* ARGSUSED */ static void killchild(int signo) { pid_t pid; pid = sshpid; if (pid > 1) { kill(pid, SIGTERM); waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); } _exit(1); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void suspchild(int signo) { if (sshpid > 1) { kill(sshpid, signo); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; } kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void cmd_interrupt(int signo) { const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n"; int olderrno = errno; (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); interrupted = 1; errno = olderrno; } /* ARGSUSED */ static void read_interrupt(int signo) { interrupted = 1; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed. \n"; /* Report if ssh transport process dies. */ while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (pid == sshpid) { (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); sshpid = -1; } errno = save_errno; } static void help(void) { printf("Available commands:\n" "bye Quit sftp\n" "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n" "chgrp [-h] grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n" "chmod [-h] mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n" "chown [-h] own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n" "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n" " filesystem containing 'path'\n" "exit Quit sftp\n" "get [-afpR] remote [local] Download file\n" "help Display this help text\n" "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n" "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n" "lmkdir path Create local directory\n" "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n" "lpwd Print local working directory\n" "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n" "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n" "mkdir path Create remote directory\n" "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n" "put [-afpR] local [remote] Upload file\n" "pwd Display remote working directory\n" "quit Quit sftp\n" "reget [-fpR] remote [local] Resume download file\n" "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n" "reput [-fpR] local [remote] Resume upload file\n" "rm path Delete remote file\n" "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n" "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n" "version Show SFTP version\n" "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n" "! Escape to local shell\n" "? Synonym for help\n"); } static void local_do_shell(const char *args) { int status; char *shell; pid_t pid; if (!*args) args = NULL; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */ if (args) { debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); } else { debug3("Executing %s", shell); execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL); } fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) error("Shell exited abnormally"); else if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } static void local_do_ls(const char *args) { if (!args || !*args) local_do_shell(_PATH_LS); else { int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1; char *buf = xmalloc(len); /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */ snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args); local_do_shell(buf); free(buf); } } /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ static char * path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip) { size_t len; if (strip == NULL) return (xstrdup(path)); len = strlen(strip); if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) { if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/') len++; return (xstrdup(path + len)); } return (xstrdup(path)); } static int parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'a': *aflag = 1; break; case 'f': *fflag = 1; break; case 'p': case 'P': *pflag = 1; break; case 'r': case 'R': *rflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *sflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 's': *sflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'l': *lflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case '1': *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW; break; case 'S': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT; break; case 'a': *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL; break; case 'f': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; break; case 'h': *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS; break; case 'l': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'n': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'r': *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT; break; case 't': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT; break; default: error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = *iflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; case 'i': *iflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ch_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "h")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) { switch (ch) { default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *abs_src = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; glob_t g; char *filename, *tmp=NULL; int i, r, err = 0; abs_src = xstrdup(src); abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); } else { error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); } err = -1; goto out; } /* * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or * unspecified. */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !local_is_dir(dst)) { error("Multiple source paths, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) { if (local_is_dir(dst)) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); } } else if (dst) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(filename); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); /* XXX follow link flag */ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *tmp_dst = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL; glob_t g; int err = 0; int i, dst_is_dir = 1; struct stat sb; if (dst) { tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst); tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd); } memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", src); if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) { error("File \"%s\" not found.", src); err = -1; goto out; } /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */ if (tmp_dst != NULL) dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst); /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) { error("Multiple paths match, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) { err = -1; error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); continue; } tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) { /* If directory specified, append filename */ if (dst_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst); } else if (tmp_dst) { abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); /* XXX follow_link_flag */ if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } } out: free(abs_dst); free(tmp_dst); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa; SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime)); else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ static int do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) { int n; u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; SFTP_DIRENT **d; if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0) return (n); if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { u_int m = 0, width = 80; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) { if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename)); } /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */ tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path); m += strlen(tmp); free(tmp); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); } if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) ; /* count entries */ sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp); } for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) { char *tmp, *fname; if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) continue; tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename); fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path); free(tmp); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) { char *lname; struct stat sb; memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb); lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); mprintf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname); } else { mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); free_sftp_dirents(d); return (0); } static int sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa; u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb; const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a]; const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b]; const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a]; const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b]; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) { #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM) if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, ==)) return 0; return timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <) ? rmul : -rmul; #elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME) return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime)); #else return rmul * 1; #endif } else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ static int do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag) { char *fname, *lname; glob_t g; int err, r; struct winsize ws; u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1; u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path, GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT, NULL, &g)) != 0 || (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) { if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path); } else { error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); } return -1; } if (interrupted) goto out; /* * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory, * then just list its contents. */ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL && S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) { err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag); globfree(&g); return err; } if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i])); columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; } /* * Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare * an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual * unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc. */ for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++) ; /* count entries */ indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices)); for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) indices[i] = i; if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { sort_glob = &g; sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp); sort_glob = NULL; } for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) { i = indices[j]; fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { error("no stat information for %s", fname); continue; } lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); mprintf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else { mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); out: if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(indices); return 0; } static int do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag) { struct sftp_statvfs st; char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16]; if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1) return -1; if (st.f_files == 0) strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity)); else { snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%", (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files)); } if (st.f_blocks == 0) strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity)); else { snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%", (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / st.f_blocks)); } if (iflag) { printf(" Inodes Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n", (unsigned long long)st.f_files, (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree), (unsigned long long)st.f_favail, (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity); } else if (hflag) { strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used)); strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail)); strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root)); strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total)); fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used); fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail); fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root); fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total); printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n", s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity); } else { printf(" Size Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n", (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024), s_dcapacity); } return 0; } /* * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that * does not glob it. */ static void undo_glob_escape(char *s) { size_t i, j; for (i = j = 0;;) { if (s[i] == '\0') { s[j] = '\0'; return; } if (s[i] != '\\') { s[j++] = s[i++]; continue; } /* s[i] == '\\' */ ++i; switch (s[i]) { case '?': case '[': case '*': case '\\': s[j++] = s[i++]; break; case '\0': s[j++] = '\\'; s[j] = '\0'; return; default: s[j++] = '\\'; s[j++] = s[i++]; break; } } } /* * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting, * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3) * wildcards. * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion. * * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments. * * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\""). * * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise. * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set. */ #define MAXARGS 128 #define MAXARGLEN 8192 static char ** makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote, u_int *terminated) { int argc, quot; size_t i, j; static char argvs[MAXARGLEN]; static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1]; enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q; *argcp = argc = 0; if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) { args_too_longs: error("string too long"); return NULL; } if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 1; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; state = MA_START; i = j = 0; for (;;) { if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){ error("Too many arguments."); return NULL; } if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) { if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { /* Terminate current argument */ argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; state = MA_START; } else if (state != MA_START) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') { q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE; if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = q; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = arg[i]; } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) state = q; else if (state == q) state = MA_UNQUOTED; else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '\\') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"'; /* Unescape quote we are in */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ if (arg[i + 1] == quot) { i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * double-escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. NB. string can grow here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. */ argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { /* Unescape everything */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } } else if (arg[i] == '#') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; else goto string_done; } else if (arg[i] == '\0') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { if (sloppy) { state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 0; goto string_done; } error("Unterminated quoted argument"); return NULL; } string_done: if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; } break; } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) && (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) { /* * Special case for sftp: escape quoted * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow * here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } i++; } *argcp = argc; return argv; } static int parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *disable_echo, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, int *rflag, int *sflag, unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2) { const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; char *cp2, **argv; int base = 0; long long ll; int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc; /* Skip leading whitespace */ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* * Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) and '@' (suppress * command echo) */ *ignore_errors = 0; *disable_echo = 0; for (;*cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '-') { *ignore_errors = 1; } else if (*cp == '@') { *disable_echo = 1; } else { /* all other characters terminate prefix processing */ break; } } cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */ if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#') return (0); if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) return -1; /* Figure out which command we have */ for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) { if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0) break; } cmdnum = cmds[i].n; cmd = cmds[i].c; /* Special case */ if (*cp == '!') { cp++; cmdnum = I_SHELL; } else if (cmdnum == -1) { error("Invalid command."); return -1; } /* Get arguments and parse flags */ *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0; *rflag = *sflag = 0; *path1 = *path2 = NULL; optidx = 1; switch (cmdnum) { case I_GET: case I_REGET: case I_REPUT: case I_PUT: if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc, aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { error("You must specify at least one path after a " "%s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Get second pathname (optional) */ if (argc - optidx > 1) { *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Destination is not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path2); } break; case I_LINK: if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_RENAME: if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_SYMLINK: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; parse_two_paths: if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify two paths after a %s " "command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Paths are not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path1); undo_glob_escape(*path2); break; case I_RM: case I_MKDIR: case I_RMDIR: case I_LMKDIR: path1_mandatory = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_CHDIR: case I_LCHDIR: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { if (!path1_mandatory) break; /* return a NULL path1 */ error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Only "rm" globs */ if (cmdnum != I_RM) undo_glob_escape(*path1); break; case I_DF: if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag, iflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (argc - optidx < 1) *path1 = NULL; else { *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); undo_glob_escape(*path1); } break; case I_LS: if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return(-1); /* Path is optional */ if (argc - optidx > 0) *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); break; case I_LLS: /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */ cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); case I_SHELL: /* Uses the rest of the line */ break; case I_LUMASK: case I_CHMOD: base = 8; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: if ((optidx = parse_ch_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) goto need_num_arg; errno = 0; ll = strtoll(argv[optidx], &cp2, base); if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' || ((ll == LLONG_MIN || ll == LLONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) || ll < 0 || ll > UINT32_MAX) { need_num_arg: error("You must supply a numeric argument " "to the %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *n_arg = ll; if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK) break; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); break; case I_QUIT: case I_PWD: case I_LPWD: case I_HELP: case I_VERSION: case I_PROGRESS: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; break; default: fatal("Command not implemented"); } *cpp = cp; return(cmdnum); } static int parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd, const char *startdir, int err_abort, int echo_command) { const char *ocmd = cmd; char *path1, *path2, *tmp; int ignore_errors = 0, disable_echo = 1; int aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0; int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0; int cmdnum, i; unsigned long n_arg = 0; Attrib a, *aa; char path_buf[PATH_MAX]; int err = 0; glob_t g; path1 = path2 = NULL; cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &disable_echo, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); if (ignore_errors != 0) err_abort = 0; if (echo_command && !disable_echo) mprintf("sftp> %s\n", ocmd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); /* Perform command */ switch (cmdnum) { case 0: /* Blank line */ break; case -1: /* Unrecognized command */ err = -1; break; case I_REGET: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_GET: err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_REPUT: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_PUT: err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_RENAME: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag); break; case I_SYMLINK: sflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_LINK: if (!sflag) path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2); break; case I_RM: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_MKDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = 0777; err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1); break; case I_RMDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_rmdir(conn, path1); break; case I_CHDIR: if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') path1 = xstrdup(startdir); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) { err = 1; break; } if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) { free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) { error("Can't change directory: Can't check target"); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not " "a directory", tmp); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } free(*pwd); *pwd = tmp; break; case I_LS: if (!path1) { do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag); break; } /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */ tmp = NULL; if (!path_absolute(path1)) tmp = *pwd; path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag); break; case I_DF: /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (path1 == NULL) path1 = xstrdup(*pwd); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag); break; case I_LCHDIR: if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') path1 = xstrdup("~"); tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid()); free(path1); path1 = tmp; if (chdir(path1) == -1) { error("Couldn't change local directory to " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LMKDIR: if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) { error("Couldn't create local directory " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LLS: local_do_ls(cmd); break; case I_SHELL: local_do_shell(cmd); break; case I_LUMASK: umask(n_arg); printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg); break; case I_CHMOD: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = n_arg; remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!(aa = (hflag ? do_lstat : do_stat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) { if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { error("Can't get current ownership of " "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->uid = n_arg; } else { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->gid = n_arg; } err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_PWD: mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd); break; case I_LPWD: if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) { error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno)); err = -1; break; } mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf); break; case I_QUIT: /* Processed below */ break; case I_HELP: help(); break; case I_VERSION: printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn)); break; case I_PROGRESS: showprogress = !showprogress; if (showprogress) printf("Progress meter enabled\n"); else printf("Progress meter disabled\n"); break; default: fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum); } if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(path1); free(path2); /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */ if (err_abort && err != 0) return (-1); else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT) return (1); return (0); } #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT static char * prompt(EditLine *el) { return ("sftp> "); } /* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */ static void complete_display(char **list, u_int len) { u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest */ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y])); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; m = m > len ? m - len : 0; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); printf("\n"); m = 1; for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) { llen = strlen(list[y]); tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : ""; mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp); if (m >= columns) { printf("\n"); m = 1; } else m++; } printf("\n"); } /* * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word", * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next * characters common to all entries in "list". */ static char * complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count) { if (word == NULL) return NULL; if (count > 0) { u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]); /* Find length of common stem */ for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) { u_int x; for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++) if (list[0][x] != list[y][x]) break; matchlen = x; } if (matchlen > strlen(word)) { char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]); tmp[matchlen] = '\0'; return tmp; } } return xstrdup(word); } /* Autocomplete a sftp command */ static int complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen; char *tmp, **list, argterm[3]; const LineInfo *lf; list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *)); /* No command specified: display all available commands */ if (cmd == NULL) { for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); list[count] = NULL; complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); return count; } /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */ cmdlen = strlen(cmd); for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen)) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); } list[count] = NULL; if (count == 0) { free(list); return 0; } /* Complete ambiguous command */ tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count); if (count > 1) complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); if (tmp != NULL) { tmplen = strlen(tmp); cmdlen = strlen(cmd); /* If cmd may be extended then do so */ if (tmplen > cmdlen) if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); lf = el_line(el); /* Terminate argument cleanly */ if (count == 1) { y = 0; if (!terminated) argterm[y++] = quote; if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ') argterm[y++] = ' '; argterm[y] = '\0'; if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); } return count; } /* * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any) * represent local or remote files. */ static int complete_is_remote(char *cmd) { int i; if (cmd == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c))) return cmds[i].t; } return -1; } /* Autocomplete a filename "file" */ static int complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { glob_t g; char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8]; u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs; int clen; const LineInfo *lf; /* Glob from "file" location */ if (file == NULL) tmp = xstrdup("*"); else xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file); /* Check if the path is absolute. */ isabs = path_absolute(tmp); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if (remote != LOCAL) { tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path); remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); } else glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */ for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) { /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */ if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') { if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') hadglob = 1; break; } if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') tmplen++; if (tmp[tmplen] == '/') pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */ } free(tmp); tmp = NULL; if (g.gl_matchc == 0) goto out; if (g.gl_matchc > 1) complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen); /* Don't try to extend globs */ if (file == NULL || hadglob) goto out; tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc); tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path); free(tmp2); if (tmp == NULL) goto out; tmplen = strlen(tmp); filelen = strlen(file); /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */ cesc = isesc = 0; for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) { if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){ isesc = 1; cesc++; } else isesc = 0; } if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) { tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc; len = strlen(tmp2); /* quote argument on way out */ for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) { if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 || (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2) fatal("invalid multibyte character"); ins[0] = '\\'; memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen); ins[clen + 1] = '\0'; switch (tmp2[i]) { case '\'': case '"': case '\\': case '\t': case '[': case ' ': case '#': case '*': if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) { if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr " "failed."); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); break; } } } lf = el_line(el); if (g.gl_matchc == 1) { i = 0; if (!terminated && quote != '\0') ins[i++] = quote; if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' && (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')) ins[i++] = ' '; ins[i] = '\0'; if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); out: globfree(&g); return g.gl_matchc; } /* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */ static unsigned char complete(EditLine *el, int ch) { char **argv, *line, quote; int argc, carg; u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR; const LineInfo *lf; struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx; lf = el_line(el); if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0) fatal_f("el_get failed"); /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */ cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(cursor + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor); line[cursor] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated); free(line); /* Get all the arguments on the line */ len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer; line = xmalloc(len + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len); line[len] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL); /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */ if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' && line[cursor] != '\n') { free(line); return ret; } if (carg == 0) { /* Show all available commands */ complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1); ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') { /* Handle the command parsing */ if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg >= 1) { /* Handle file parsing */ int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]); char *filematch = NULL; if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ') filematch = argv[carg - 1]; if (remote != 0 && complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn, *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch, remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } free(line); return ret; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ static int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) { char *remote_path; char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL; char cmd[2048]; int err, interactive; EditLine *el = NULL; #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT History *hl = NULL; HistEvent hev; extern char *__progname; struct complete_ctx complete_ctx; if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline"); if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history"); history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100); el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl); el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt); el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs"); el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL); el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1); el_source(el, NULL); /* Tab Completion */ el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete", "Context sensitive argument completion", complete); complete_ctx.conn = conn; complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path; el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL); /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL); } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ remote_path = do_realpath(conn, "."); if (remote_path == NULL) fatal("Need cwd"); startdir = xstrdup(remote_path); if (file1 != NULL) { dir = xstrdup(file1); dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path); if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) { if (!quiet) mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir); snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir); if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0) != 0) { free(dir); free(startdir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (-1); } } else { /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s", global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir, file2 == NULL ? "" : " ", file2 == NULL ? "" : file2); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0); free(dir); free(startdir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (err); } free(dir); } setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO); err = 0; for (;;) { + struct sigaction sa; + + interrupted = 0; + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sa.sa_handler = interactive ? read_interrupt : killchild; + if (sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL) == -1) { + debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(SIGINT), + strerror(errno)); + break; + } if (el == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("sftp> "); if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("\n"); + if (interrupted) + continue; break; } } else { #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT const char *line; int count = 0; - struct sigaction sa; - - interrupted = 0; - memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); - sa.sa_handler = read_interrupt; - if (sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL) == -1) { - debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", - strsignal(SIGINT), strerror(errno)); - break; - } + if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0) { printf("\n"); if (interrupted) continue; break; } history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line); if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n"); continue; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ } cmd[strcspn(cmd, "\n")] = '\0'; /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */ interrupted = 0; ssh_signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, startdir, batchmode, !interactive && el == NULL); if (err != 0) break; } ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); free(remote_path); free(startdir); free(conn); #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT if (el != NULL) el_end(el); #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */ return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1); } static void connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out) { int c_in, c_out; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2]; if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1)) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = pin[0]; *out = pout[1]; c_in = pout[0]; c_out = pin[1]; #else /* USE_PIPES */ int inout[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = *out = inout[0]; c_in = c_out = inout[1]; #endif /* USE_PIPES */ if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1) fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); else if (sshpid == 0) { if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(*in); close(*out); close(c_in); close(c_out); /* * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands, * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal. */ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); execvp(path, args); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild); ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); close(c_in); close(c_out); } static void usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46AaCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n" " [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]\n" " destination\n", __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1, noisy = 0; char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, *file2 = NULL; int debug_level = 0; char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL; char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL; const char *errstr; LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; arglist args; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; struct sftp_conn *conn; size_t copy_buffer_len = 0; size_t num_requests = 0; long long limit_kbps = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); msetlocale(); seed_rng(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; infile = stdin; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1246AafhNpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* Passed through to ssh(1) */ case 'A': case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */ case 'F': case 'J': case 'c': case 'i': case 'o': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'q': ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; quiet = 1; showprogress = 0; addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; case 'P': port = a2port(optarg); if (port <= 0) fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); break; case 'v': if (debug_level < 3) { addargs(&args, "-v"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level; } debug_level++; break; case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* accept silently */ break; case 'a': global_aflag = 1; break; case 'B': copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'b': if (batchmode) fatal("Batch file already specified."); /* Allow "-" as stdin */ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 && (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg); showprogress = 0; quiet = batchmode = 1; addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes"); break; case 'f': global_fflag = 1; break; case 'N': noisy = 1; /* Used to clear quiet mode after getopt */ break; case 'p': global_pflag = 1; break; case 'D': sftp_direct = optarg; break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ break; case 'r': global_rflag = 1; break; case 'R': num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 's': sftp_server = optarg; break; case 'S': ssh_program = optarg; replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); break; case 'h': default: usage(); } } /* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; if (noisy) quiet = 0; log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); if (sftp_direct == NULL) { if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2)) usage(); argv += optind; switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) { case -1: usage(); break; case 0: if (tmp != -1) port = tmp; break; default: /* Try with user, host and path. */ if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host, &file1) == 0) break; /* Try with user and host. */ if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL) == 0) break; /* Treat as a plain hostname. */ host = xstrdup(*argv); host = cleanhostname(host); break; } file2 = *(argv + 1); if (!*host) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n"); usage(); } if (port != -1) addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port); if (user != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", user); } /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */ if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL) addargs(&args, "-s"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? sftp_server : "sftp")); connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out); } else { args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "sftp-server"); connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out); } freeargs(&args); conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps); if (conn == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server"); if (!quiet) { if (sftp_direct == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host); else fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct); } err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2); #if !defined(USE_PIPES) shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR); shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR); #endif close(in); close(out); if (batchmode) fclose(infile); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c index 18e9f1d180c6..4b40768d517f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,3776 +1,3777 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.435 2021/08/11 08:54:17 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.437 2021/09/08 03:23:44 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "sshsig.h" #include "ssh-sk.h" #include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */ #include "cipher.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" #else # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" #endif /* * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be * overridden on the command line. * * These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at * least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57: * Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1. * For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for * which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only * SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 3072 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 #define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 static int quiet = 0; /* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ static int print_fingerprint = 0; static int print_bubblebabble = 0; /* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */ static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ static char identity_file[PATH_MAX]; static int have_identity = 0; /* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ static char *identity_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; /* Key type when certifying */ static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; /* "key ID" of signed key */ static char *cert_key_id = NULL; /* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ static char *cert_principals = NULL; /* Validity period for certificates */ static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; /* Certificate options */ #define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) #define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) #define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) #define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) #define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) #define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5) #define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; static char *certflags_command = NULL; static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; /* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */ struct cert_ext { char *key; char *val; int crit; }; static struct cert_ext *cert_ext; static size_t ncert_ext; /* Conversion to/from various formats */ enum { FMT_RFC4716, FMT_PKCS8, FMT_PEM } convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; static char *key_type_name = NULL; /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ static char *pkcs11provider = NULL; /* FIDO/U2F provider to use */ static char *sk_provider = NULL; /* Format for writing private keys */ static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH; /* Cipher for new-format private keys */ static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL; /* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */ static int rounds = 0; /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* moduli.c */ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); #endif static void type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) { if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); if (*bitsp == 0) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int nid; switch(type) { case KEY_DSA: *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: if (name != NULL && (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0) *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (*bitsp == 0) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; break; } #endif } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL switch (type) { case KEY_DSA: if (*bitsp != 1024) fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits"); break; case KEY_RSA: if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits", SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits", OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS); break; case KEY_ECDSA: if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " "256, 384 or 521 bits"); #else fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " "256 or 384 bits"); #endif } #endif } /* * Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish * to overwrite it. * Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to * overwrite, or zero otherwise. */ static int confirm_overwrite(const char *filename) { char yesno[3]; struct stat st; if (stat(filename, &st) != 0) return 1; printf("%s already exists.\n", filename); printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) return 0; if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') return 0; return 1; } static void ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) { char buf[1024]; char *name = NULL; if (key_type_name == NULL) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; else { switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_SK: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK; break; #endif case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; break; case KEY_ED25519_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK; break; case KEY_XMSS: case KEY_XMSS_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS; break; default: fatal("bad key type"); } } snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); have_identity = 1; } static struct sshkey * load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp) { char *pass; struct sshkey *prv; int r; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0) return prv; if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename); if (identity_passphrase) pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp); freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); if (r != 0) fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename); return prv; } #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) { struct sshbuf *b; char comment[61], *b64; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "put key"); if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64_string failed"); /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k), pw->pw_name, hostname); sshkey_free(k); sshbuf_free(b); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); free(b64); exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0) k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_to_pem(k); break; default: fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format); } exit(0); } /* * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length * instead of 16. */ static void buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value) { u_int bytes, bignum_bits; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes) fatal_f("input buffer too small: need %d have %zu", bytes, sshbuf_len(b)); if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_bin2bn failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "consume"); } static struct sshkey * do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *type, *cipher; u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; int r, rlen, ktype; u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4; size_t slen; u_long e; BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse magic"); if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); return NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); free(cipher); free(type); return NULL; } free(cipher); if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { ktype = KEY_DSA; } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { ktype = KEY_RSA; } else { free(type); return NULL; } if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); free(type); switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_new"); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key); if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) fatal_f("DSA_set0_pqg failed"); dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) fatal_f("DSA_set0_key failed"); dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ break; case KEY_RSA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) fatal_fr(r, "parse RSA"); e = e1; debug("e %lx", e); if (e < 30) { e <<= 8; e += e2; debug("e %lx", e); e <<= 8; e += e3; debug("e %lx", e); } if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_new"); if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) { BN_clear_free(rsa_e); sshkey_free(key); return NULL; } if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("BN_new"); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p); if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) fatal_f("RSA_set0_key failed"); rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) fatal_f("RSA_set0_factors failed"); rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters"); BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); break; } rlen = sshbuf_len(b); if (rlen != 0) error_f("remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); /* try the key */ if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 || sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) { sshkey_free(key); free(sig); return NULL; } free(sig); return key; } static int get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) { int c; size_t pos = 0; line[0] = '\0'; while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { if (pos >= len - 1) fatal("input line too long."); switch (c) { case '\r': c = fgetc(fp); if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); return pos; case '\n': return pos; } line[pos++] = c; line[pos] = '\0'; } /* We reached EOF */ return -1; } static void do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) { int r, blen, escaped = 0; u_int len; char line[1024]; struct sshbuf *buf; char encoded[8096]; FILE *fp; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); encoded[0] = '\0'; while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') escaped++; if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) *private = 1; if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { break; } /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ continue; } if (escaped) { escaped--; /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ continue; } strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); } len = strlen(encoded); if (((len % 4) == 3) && (encoded[len-1] == '=') && (encoded[len-2] == '=') && (encoded[len-3] == '=')) encoded[len-3] = '\0'; if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "base64 decode"); if (*private) { if ((*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf)) == NULL) fatal_f("private key conversion failed"); } else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse key"); sshbuf_free(buf); fclose(fp); } static void do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { EVP_PKEY *pubkey; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { fatal_f("%s is not a recognised public key format", identity_file); } fclose(fp); switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case EVP_PKEY_EC: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); break; #endif default: fatal_f("unsupported pubkey type %d", EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)); } EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return; } static void do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { FILE *fp; RSA *rsa; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = rsa; fclose(fp); return; } fatal_f("unrecognised raw private key format"); } static void do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r, private = 0, ok = 0; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); break; default: fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format); } if (!private) { if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0) ok = 1; if (ok) fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } else { switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA: ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; default: fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); } } if (!ok) fatal("key write failed"); sshkey_free(k); exit(0); } #endif static void do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *prv; struct stat st; int r; char *comment = NULL; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment); if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "write key"); if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0') fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); if (sshkey_is_sk(prv)) { debug("sk_application: \"%s\", sk_flags 0x%02x", prv->sk_application, prv->sk_flags); } sshkey_free(prv); free(comment); exit(0); } static void do_download(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; int i, nkeys; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; pkcs11_init(1); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]), fp, sshkey_type(keys[i])); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else { (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n", *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]); } free(comments[i]); sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(comments); free(keys); pkcs11_terminate(); exit(0); #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static struct sshkey * try_read_key(char **cpp) { struct sshkey *ret; int r; if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) return ret; /* Not a key */ sshkey_free(ret); return NULL; } static void fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment) { char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } static void fingerprint_private(const char *path) { struct stat st; char *comment = NULL; struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL; int r; if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &pubkey, &comment)) != 0) debug_r(r, "load public \"%s\"", path); if (pubkey == NULL || comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') { free(comment); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL, &privkey, &comment)) != 0) debug_r(r, "load private \"%s\"", path); } if (pubkey == NULL && privkey == NULL) fatal("%s is not a key file.", path); fingerprint_one_key(pubkey == NULL ? privkey : pubkey, comment); sshkey_free(pubkey); sshkey_free(privkey); free(comment); } static void do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f; struct sshkey *public = NULL; char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; size_t linesize = 0; int i, invalid = 1; const char *path; u_long lnum = 0; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); path = identity_file; if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) { f = stdin; path = "(stdin)"; } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lnum++; cp = line; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; /* Trim leading space and comments */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; /* * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys * or known_hosts. */ /* * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin). */ if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) { free(line); fclose(f); fingerprint_private(path); exit(0); } /* * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options. * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff. */ if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { int quoted = 0; comment = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } if (!*cp) continue; *cp++ = '\0'; } } /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */ if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum); continue; } /* Find trailing comment, if any */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#') comment = cp; fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); sshkey_free(public); invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */ } fclose(f); free(line); if (invalid) fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path); exit(0); } static void do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) { struct { char *key_type; char *key_type_display; char *path; } key_types[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef WITH_XMSS { "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE }, #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; u_int32_t bits = 0; int first = 0; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private, *public; char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file; int i, type, fd, r; for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { public = private = NULL; prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL; xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s", identity_file, key_types[i].path); /* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */ if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) { if (st.st_size != 0) goto next; } else if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } /* * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with * key generation. */ xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX", identity_file, key_types[i].path); xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX", identity_file, key_types[i].path); xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub", identity_file, key_types[i].path); if (first == 0) { first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); } printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s", prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } (void)close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to reserve a name */ bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { error_r(r, "sshkey_generate failed"); goto failnext; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private"); snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "", comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", prv_tmp); goto failnext; } if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) { error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } (void)fchmod(fd, 0644); (void)close(fd); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, pub_tmp, comment)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); goto failnext; } /* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */ if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) { error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", pub_file, strerror(errno)); goto failnext; } if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) { error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); failnext: first = 0; goto next; } next: sshkey_free(private); sshkey_free(public); free(prv_tmp); free(pub_tmp); free(prv_file); free(pub_file); } if (first != 0) printf("\n"); } struct known_hosts_ctx { const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */ FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */ int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */ int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */ int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */ int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */ int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */ int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */ }; static int known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts; int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts); int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM; switch (l->status) { case HKF_STATUS_OK: case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED: /* * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard * characters or a CA/revocation marker. */ if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) { logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name " "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, l->linenum, l->hosts); } return 0; } /* * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list, * hash and store separately. */ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts); while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { lowercase(cp); if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("hash_host failed"); fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey); ctx->has_unhashed = 1; } free(ohosts); return 0; case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ return -1; } static int known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (ctx->delete_host) { if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } else { /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke * marker, delete it by *not* writing the * line to ctx->out. */ ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n", ctx->host, l->linenum); } return 0; } else if (ctx->find_host) { ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) { printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n", ctx->host, l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" : (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : "")); } if (ctx->hash_hosts) known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); else if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host, sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment[0] ? " " : "", l->comment); if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } } else if (ctx->delete_host) { /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { ctx->invalid = 1; logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } return 0; } static void do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host, int delete_host, int hash_hosts) { char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; u_int foreach_options; struct stat sb; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); free(cp); have_identity = 1; } if (stat(identity_file, &sb) != 0) fatal("Cannot stat %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.out = stdout; ctx.host = name; ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts; ctx.find_host = find_host; ctx.delete_host = delete_host; /* * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout */ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) fatal("known_hosts path too long"); umask(077); if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; unlink(tmp); fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); } fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644); inplace = 1; } /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ? known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL, foreach_options, 0)) != 0) { if (inplace) unlink(tmp); fatal_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach"); } if (inplace) fclose(ctx.out); if (ctx.invalid) { error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); if (inplace) { error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " "file because of errors"); unlink(tmp); } exit(1); } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); if (inplace) unlink(tmp); } else if (inplace) { /* Backup existing file */ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, strerror(errno)); /* Move new one into place */ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); unlink(old); exit(1); } printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); if (ctx.has_unhashed) { logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " "of hostnames"); } } exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key); } /* * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure * for the current user. */ static void do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) { char *comment; char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { if (identity_passphrase) old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else old_passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, &private, &comment); freezero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); if (r != 0) goto badkey; } else if (r != 0) { badkey: fatal_r(r, "Failed to load key %s", identity_file); } if (comment) mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_new_passphrase) { passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); passphrase2 = NULL; } else { passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Verify that they are the same. */ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); exit(1); } /* Destroy the other copy. */ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ free(comment); printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); exit(0); } /* * Print the SSHFP RR. */ static int do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname, int print_generic) { struct sshkey *public; char *comment = NULL; struct stat st; int r; if (fname == NULL) fatal_f("no filename"); if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\"", fname); export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); return 1; } /* * Change the comment of a private key file. */ static void do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment) { char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; struct sshkey *private; struct sshkey *public; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment)) == 0) passphrase = xstrdup(""); else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file); else { if (identity_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &private, &comment)) != 0) { freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file); } } if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS && private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) { error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in " "the new format (-o)."); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } if (comment) printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment); else printf("No existing comment\n"); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); } else { printf("New comment: "); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; } if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) { printf("No change to comment\n"); free(passphrase); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(0); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private"); sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, new_comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); if (strlen(new_comment) > 0) printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment); else printf("Comment removed\n"); exit(0); } static void cert_ext_add(const char *key, const char *value, int iscrit) { cert_ext = xreallocarray(cert_ext, ncert_ext + 1, sizeof(*cert_ext)); cert_ext[ncert_ext].key = xstrdup(key); cert_ext[ncert_ext].val = value == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(value); cert_ext[ncert_ext].crit = iscrit; ncert_ext++; } /* qsort(3) comparison function for certificate extensions */ static int cert_ext_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) { const struct cert_ext *a = (const struct cert_ext *)_a; const struct cert_ext *b = (const struct cert_ext *)_b; int r; if (a->crit != b->crit) return (a->crit < b->crit) ? -1 : 1; if ((r = strcmp(a->key, b->key)) != 0) return r; if ((a->val == NULL) != (b->val == NULL)) return (a->val == NULL) ? -1 : 1; if (a->val != NULL && (r = strcmp(a->val, b->val)) != 0) return r; return 0; } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static void prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) { struct sshbuf *b; size_t i; int r; const struct cert_ext *ext; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); sshbuf_reset(c); for (i = 0; i < ncert_ext; i++) { ext = &cert_ext[i]; if ((ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) || (!ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL))) continue; if (ext->val == NULL) { /* flag option */ debug3_f("%s", ext->key); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "prepare flag"); } else { /* key/value option */ debug3_f("%s=%s", ext->key, ext->val); sshbuf_reset(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ext->val)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "prepare k/v"); } } sshbuf_free(b); } static void finalise_cert_exts(void) { /* critical options */ if (certflags_command != NULL) cert_ext_add("force-command", certflags_command, 1); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) cert_ext_add("source-address", certflags_src_addr, 1); /* extensions */ if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-X11-forwarding", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-agent-forwarding", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-port-forwarding", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-pty", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) cert_ext_add("permit-user-rc", NULL, 0); if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0) cert_ext_add("no-touch-required", NULL, 0); /* order lexically by key */ if (ncert_ext > 0) qsort(cert_ext, ncert_ext, sizeof(*cert_ext), cert_ext_cmp); } static struct sshkey * load_pkcs11_key(char *path) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; int r, i, nkeys; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys, NULL); debug3_f("%d keys", nkeys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { private = keys[i]; continue; } sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); sshkey_free(public); return private; #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } /* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */ static int agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, const char *provider, const char *pin, u_int compat, void *ctx) { int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx; return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); } static void do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent, unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc, int argc, char **argv) { int r, i, found, agent_fd = -1; u_int n; struct sshkey *ca, *public; char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment; char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL, *pin = NULL; struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids; size_t j; struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(1); #endif tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { /* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */ if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); } else if (prefer_agent) { /* * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making * sure the public key specified is actually present in the * agent. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp); if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot use public key for CA signature"); if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Retrieve agent key list"); found = 0; for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) { if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp); ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids); ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; } else { /* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */ ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL); if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) && (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) { if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for CA key: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) fatal_f("couldn't read PIN"); } } free(tmp); if (key_type_name != NULL) { if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) { fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s", sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name); } } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) { /* Default to a good signature algorithm */ key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512"; } ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); finalise_cert_exts(); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { /* Split list of principals */ n = 0; if (cert_principals != NULL) { otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); plist = NULL; for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') fatal("Empty principal name"); } free(otmp); } if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) fatal("Too many certificate principals specified"); tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "load pubkey \"%s\"", tmp); if (sshkey_is_cert(public)) fatal_f("key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", tmp, sshkey_type(public)); /* Prepare certificate to sign */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp); public->cert->type = cert_key_type; public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); public->cert->nprincipals = n; public->cert->principals = plist; public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private (ca key)"); if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) { if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca, key_type_name, sk_provider, NULL, agent_signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify %s via agent", tmp); } else { if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) && (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { notifier = notify_start(0, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp); } r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name, sk_provider, pin); notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed"); if (r != 0) fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify key %s", tmp); } if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) *cp = '\0'; xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); free(tmp); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, out, comment)) != 0) { fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); } if (!quiet) { sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), out, public->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", valid); } sshkey_free(public); free(out); if (cert_serial_autoinc) cert_serial++; } if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); free(ca_fp); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif exit(0); } static u_int64_t parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) { int64_t mul, secs; mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); if (mul == -1 && secs > now) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); } static void parse_cert_times(char *timespec) { char *from, *to; time_t now = time(NULL); int64_t secs; /* +timespec relative to now */ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); cert_valid_to = now + secs; /* * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts * with poorly-synchronised clocks. */ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; return; } /* * from:to, where * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always" * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever" */ from = xstrdup(timespec); to = strchr(from, ':'); if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); *to++ = '\0'; if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0) cert_valid_from = 0; else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0) fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from); if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0) cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0; else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0) fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to); if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); free(from); } static void add_cert_option(char *opt) { char *val, *cp; int iscrit = 0; if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) certflags_flags = 0; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { val = opt + 14; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty force-command option"); if (certflags_command != NULL) fatal("force-command already specified"); certflags_command = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { val = opt + 15; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty source-address option"); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) fatal("source-address already specified"); if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) fatal("Invalid source-address list"); certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 || (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) { val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1); if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL) *cp++ = '\0'; cert_ext_add(val, cp, iscrit); free(val); } else fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); } static void show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical) { char *name, *arg, *hex; struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL; int r; if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb failed"); while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) { sshbuf_free(option); option = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse option"); printf(" %s", name); if (!in_critical && (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 || strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) { printf("\n"); } else if (in_critical && (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse critical"); printf(" %s\n", arg); free(arg); } else if (sshbuf_len(option) > 0) { hex = sshbuf_dtob16(option); printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION: %s (len %zu)\n", hex, sshbuf_len(option)); sshbuf_reset(option); free(hex); } else printf(" UNKNOWN FLAG OPTION\n"); free(name); if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0) fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); } sshbuf_free(option); sshbuf_free(options); } static void print_cert(struct sshkey *key) { char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp; u_int i; key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key), sshkey_cert_type(key)); printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp); printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n", sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, key->cert->signature_type); printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid); printf(" Principals: "); if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) printf("\n %s", key->cert->principals[i]); printf("\n"); } printf(" Critical Options: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->critical, 1); } printf(" Extensions: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0); } } static void do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct stat st; int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0; FILE *f; char *cp, *line = NULL; const char *path; size_t linesize = 0; u_long lnum = 0; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); path = identity_file; if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { f = stdin; path = "(stdin)"; is_stdin = 1; } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { lnum++; sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; /* Trim leading space and comments */ cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { error_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum); continue; } ok = 1; if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1) printf("%s:\n", path); else printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum); print_cert(key); } free(line); sshkey_free(key); fclose(f); exit(ok ? 0 : 1); } static void load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to load KRL %s", path); /* XXX check sigs */ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 || *krlp == NULL) fatal_r(r, "Invalid KRL file %s", path); sshbuf_free(krlbuf); } static void hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, const char *file, u_long lnum) { char *tmp; size_t tlen; struct sshbuf *b; int r; if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum); cp += 7; /* * OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '=' * characters; put them back for decode. */ tlen = strlen(cp); tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1); strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1); while ((tlen % 4) != 0) { tmp[tlen++] = '='; tmp[tlen] = '\0'; } if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: decode hash failed", file, lnum); free(tmp); *lenp = sshbuf_len(b); *blobp = xmalloc(*lenp); memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp); sshbuf_free(b); } static void update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_long lnum = 0; char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; u_char *blob = NULL; size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0; unsigned long long serial, serial2; int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r; FILE *krl_spec; path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { krl_spec = stdin; free(path); path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (!quiet) printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) { lnum++; was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0; cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { cp[i] = '\0'; break; } if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ if (r == -1) r = i; } else r = -1; } if (r != -1) cp[r] = '\0'; if (*cp == '\0') continue; if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); errno = 0; serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); serial2 = serial; if (*ep == '-') { cp = ep + 1; errno = 0; serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); if (serial2 <= serial) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, (unsigned long long)serial, (unsigned long long)serial2); } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { fatal_f("revoke serial failed"); } } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 3; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) fatal_f("revoke key ID failed"); } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum); r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); if (r != 0) fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); } else { if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { cp += 4; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_explicit_key = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha1 = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) { cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha256 = 1; /* * Just try to process the line as a key. * Parsing will fail if it isn't. */ } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum); if (was_explicit_key) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); else if (was_sha1) { if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) { fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", file, lnum); } r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen); } else if (was_sha256) { if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) { fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", file, lnum); } r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); } else r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); if (r != 0) fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); freezero(blob, blen); blob = NULL; blen = 0; sshkey_free(key); } } if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) fclose(krl_spec); free(line); free(path); } static void do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path, unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment, int argc, char **argv) { struct ssh_krl *krl; struct stat sb; struct sshkey *ca = NULL; int i, r, wild_ca = 0; char *tmp; struct sshbuf *kbuf; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (updating) fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0) wild_ca = 1; else { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp); free(tmp); } } if (updating) load_krl(identity_file, &krl); else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) fatal("couldn't create KRL"); if (krl_version != 0) ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version); if (krl_comment != NULL) ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl); if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0) fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); sshbuf_free(kbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); sshkey_free(ca); } static void do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int print_krl, int argc, char **argv) { int i, r, ret = 0; char *comment; struct ssh_krl *krl; struct sshkey *k; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); load_krl(identity_file, &krl); if (print_krl) krl_dump(krl, stdout); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); if (r != 0) ret = 1; sshkey_free(k); free(comment); } ssh_krl_free(krl); exit(ret); } static struct sshkey * load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey) { size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath); char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath); const char *suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL }; struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL; int r; /* * If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the corresponding * private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line * and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key. */ for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); if (plen <= slen || strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0) continue; privpath[plen - slen] = '\0'; debug_f("%s looks like a public key, using private key " "path %s instead", keypath, privpath); } if ((privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL)) == NULL) { error("Couldn't load identity %s", keypath); goto done; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) { error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s", keypath, privpath); goto done; } if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) { /* * Graft the certificate onto the private key to make * it capable of signing. */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified"); goto done; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy"); goto done; } } /* success */ ret = privkey; privkey = NULL; done: sshkey_free(privkey); free(privpath); return ret; } static int sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd, const char *sig_namespace, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno; char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL; char *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL; if (!quiet) { if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename); } if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey)) { if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) { xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key: ", sshkey_type(signkey)); if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) fatal_f("couldn't read PIN"); } if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n", sshkey_type(signkey), fp); free(fp); } } if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, sk_provider, pin, fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Signing %s failed", filename); goto out; } if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); goto out; } if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) { error_f("buffer error"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) { fputs(asig, stdout); fflush(stdout); } else { xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename); if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) { if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0666)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("Cannot open %s: %s", wfile, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig, strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) { oerrno = errno; error("Cannot write to %s: %s", wfile, strerror(errno)); errno = oerrno; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if (!quiet) { fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n", wfile); } } } /* success */ r = 0; out: free(wfile); free(prompt); free(asig); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); if (wfd != -1) close(wfd); return r; } static int sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv) { int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1; int agent_fd = -1; struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL; sshsig_signer *signer = NULL; /* Check file arguments. */ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0) continue; if (i > 0 || argc > 1) fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input"); } if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Couldn't load public key %s", keypath); goto done; } if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) debug_r(r, "Couldn't get agent socket"); else { if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0) signer = agent_signer; else debug_r(r, "Couldn't find key in agent"); } if (signer == NULL) { /* Not using agent - try to load private key */ if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL) goto done; signkey = privkey; } else { /* Will use key in agent */ signkey = pubkey; } if (argc == 0) { if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) goto done; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0) fd = STDIN_FILENO; else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) { error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s", argv[i], strerror(errno)); goto done; } if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) goto done; if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) close(fd); fd = -1; } } ret = 0; done: if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO) close(fd); sshkey_free(pubkey); sshkey_free(privkey); return ret; } static int sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, uint64_t *verify_timep, int *print_pubkey) { size_t i; time_t now; *verify_timep = 0; - *print_pubkey = 0; + if (print_pubkey != NULL) + *print_pubkey = 0; for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) { if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12, verify_timep) != 0 || *verify_timep == 0) { error("Invalid \"verify-time\" option"); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } else if (print_pubkey && strcasecmp(opts[i], "print-pubkey") == 0) { *print_pubkey = 1; } else { error("Invalid option \"%s\"", opts[i]); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } if (*verify_timep == 0) { if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) { error("Time is before epoch"); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } *verify_timep = (uint64_t)now; } return 0; } static int sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace, const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) { int r, ret = -1; int print_pubkey = 0; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; char *fp = NULL; struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; uint64_t verify_time = 0; if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &verify_time, &print_pubkey) != 0) goto done; /* error already logged */ memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details)); if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace, &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0) goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp); if (sig_details != NULL) { debug2_f("signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x", sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags); } free(fp); fp = NULL; if (revoked_keys != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) { debug3_fr(r, "sshkey_check_revoked"); goto done; } } if (allowed_keys != NULL && (r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys, sign_key, principal, sig_namespace, verify_time)) != 0) { debug3_fr(r, "sshsig_check_allowed_keys"); goto done; } /* success */ ret = 0; done: if (!quiet) { if (ret == 0) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); if (principal == NULL) { printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n", sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); } else { printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n", sig_namespace, principal, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); } } else { printf("Could not verify signature.\n"); } } /* Print the signature key if requested */ if (ret == 0 && print_pubkey && sign_key != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_write(sign_key, stdout)) == 0) fputc('\n', stdout); else { error_r(r, "Could not print public key.\n"); ret = -1; } } sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshkey_free(sign_key); sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); free(fp); return ret; } static int sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) { int r, ret = -1; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp; uint64_t verify_time = 0; if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &verify_time, NULL) != 0) goto done; /* error already logged */ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) { error_fr(r, "sshsig_get_pubkey"); goto done; } if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key, verify_time, &principals)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) error_fr(r, "sshsig_find_principal"); goto done; } ret = 0; done: if (ret == 0 ) { /* Emit matching principals one per line */ tmp = principals; while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') puts(cp); } else { fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n"); } sshbuf_free(sigbuf); sshbuf_free(abuf); sshkey_free(sign_key); free(principals); return ret; } static void do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ u_int32_t memory = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; int moduli_bits = 0; FILE *out; size_t i; const char *errstr; /* Parse options */ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) { memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, opts[i]+7); } } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) { /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0) fatal("Invalid start point."); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) { moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", opts[i]+12, errstr); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " "generation", opts[i]); } } if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); if (moduli_bits == 0) moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS; if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0) fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ fatal("Moduli generation is not supported"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } static void do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* Moduli generation/screening */ char *checkpoint = NULL; u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0; unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; int prime_tests = 0; FILE *out, *in = stdin; size_t i; const char *errstr; /* Parse options */ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) { lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) { start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) { checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11); } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) { generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum( opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) { fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)", opts[i]+10, errstr); } } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) { prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", opts[i]+12, errstr); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " "screening", opts[i]); } } if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); } } if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests, generator_wanted, checkpoint, start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) fatal("modulus screening failed"); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ fatal("Moduli screening is not supported"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } static char * private_key_passphrase(void) { char *passphrase1, *passphrase2; /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else { passphrase_again: passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { /* * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and * retry. */ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n"); goto passphrase_again; } /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); } return passphrase1; } static const char * skip_ssh_url_preamble(const char *s) { if (strncmp(s, "ssh://", 6) == 0) return s + 6; else if (strncmp(s, "ssh:", 4) == 0) return s + 4; return s; } static int do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device) { struct sshkey **keys; size_t nkeys, i; int r, ret = -1; char *fp, *pin = NULL, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath; const char *ext; if (skprovider == NULL) fatal("Cannot download keys without provider"); pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (!quiet) { printf("You may need to touch your authenticator " "to authorize key download.\n"); } if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin, &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) { if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys"); return -1; } if (nkeys == 0) logit("No keys to download"); if (pin != NULL) freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (keys[i]->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && keys[i]->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) { error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)", sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->type); continue; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug_f("key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", i, sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp, keys[i]->sk_application, keys[i]->sk_flags); ext = skip_ssh_url_preamble(keys[i]->sk_application); xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s", keys[i]->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk", *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext); /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) { free(path); break; } /* Save the key with the application string as the comment */ if (pass == NULL) pass = private_key_passphrase(); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(keys[i], path, pass, keys[i]->sk_application, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", path); free(path); break; } if (!quiet) { printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n", sshkey_type(keys[i]), *ext != '\0' ? " " : "", *ext != '\0' ? keys[i]->sk_application : "", path); } /* Save public key too */ xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path); free(path); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(keys[i], pubpath, keys[i]->sk_application)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving public key \"%s\" failed", pubpath); free(pubpath); break; } free(pubpath); } if (i >= nkeys) ret = 0; /* success */ if (pass != NULL) freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(keys); return ret; } static void save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path) { mode_t omask; int r; if (path == NULL) return; /* nothing to do */ if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0) fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data"); omask = umask(077); r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest); umask(omask); if (r != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to write attestation data \"%s\"", path); if (!quiet) printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in " "%s\n", path); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" " [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]\n" " [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n" " [-w provider] [-Z cipher]\n" " ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n" " [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]\n" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" " ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" #endif " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n" " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]\n" " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n" " ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n" #endif " ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n" " [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n" " [-z serial_number] file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]\n" " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" " file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file [file ...]\n" " ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n" " ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n" " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n" " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file]\n"); exit(1); } /* * Main program for key management. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char comment[1024], *passphrase; char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; int r, opt, type; int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0; int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0; int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0; int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0; unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL; char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL; char *sk_attestation_path = NULL; struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL; size_t i, nopts = 0; u_int32_t bits = 0; uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; const char *errstr; int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; char *sign_op = NULL; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); msetlocale(); /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); pw = pwcopy(pw); if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); /* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy" "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:" "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'A': gen_all_hostkeys = 1; break; case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'F': find_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'I': cert_key_id = optarg; break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'L': show_cert = 1; break; case 'l': print_fingerprint = 1; break; case 'B': print_bubblebabble = 1; break; case 'm': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PEM; private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM; break; } fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); case 'n': cert_principals = optarg; break; case 'o': /* no-op; new format is already the default */ break; case 'p': change_passphrase = 1; break; case 'c': change_comment = 1; break; case 'f': if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Identity filename too long"); have_identity = 1; break; case 'g': print_generic = 1; break; case 'K': download_sk = 1; break; case 'P': identity_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'N': identity_new_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'Q': check_krl = 1; break; case 'O': opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1, sizeof(*opts)); opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'Z': openssh_format_cipher = optarg; if (cipher_by_name(openssh_format_cipher) == NULL) fatal("Invalid OpenSSH-format cipher '%s'", openssh_format_cipher); break; case 'C': identity_comment = optarg; break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; case 'e': /* export key */ convert_to = 1; break; case 'h': cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; certflags_flags = 0; break; case 'k': gen_krl = 1; break; case 'i': case 'X': /* import key */ convert_from = 1; break; case 'y': print_public = 1; break; case 's': ca_key_path = optarg; break; case 't': key_type_name = optarg; break; case 'D': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'U': prefer_agent = 1; break; case 'u': update_krl = 1; break; case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else { if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; } break; case 'r': rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'a': rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'V': parse_cert_times(optarg); break; case 'Y': sign_op = optarg; break; case 'w': sk_provider = optarg; break; case 'z': errno = 0; if (*optarg == '+') { cert_serial_autoinc = 1; optarg++; } cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'M': if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0) do_gen_candidates = 1; else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0) do_screen_candidates = 1; else fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg); break; case '?': default: usage(); } } #ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL if (sk_provider == NULL) sk_provider = "internal"; #endif /* reinit */ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); argv += optind; argc -= optind; if (sign_op != NULL) { if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) { if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" "missing signature file"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" "missing allowed keys file"); exit(1); } return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file, opts, nopts); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) { if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing namespace"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing key"); exit(1); } return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals, argc, argv); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) { if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: " "missing signature file"); exit(1); } return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, NULL, NULL, NULL, opts, nopts); } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) { if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing namespace"); exit(1); } if (ca_key_path == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing signature file"); exit(1); } if (!have_identity) { error("Too few arguments for sign: " "missing allowed keys file"); exit(1); } if (cert_key_id == NULL) { error("Too few arguments for verify: " "missing principal ID"); exit(1); } return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname, opts, nopts); } error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op); usage(); /* NOTREACHED */ } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { error("Too few arguments."); usage(); } } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl && !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) { error("Too many arguments."); usage(); } if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); usage(); } if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); usage(); } if (gen_krl) { do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path, cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv); return (0); } if (check_krl) { do_check_krl(pw, print_fingerprint, argc, argv); return (0); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (cert_key_id == NULL) fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) add_cert_option(opts[i]); do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent, cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv); } if (show_cert) do_show_cert(pw); if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) { do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host, delete_host, hash_hosts); } if (pkcs11provider != NULL) do_download(pw); if (download_sk) { for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]); } } return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device); } if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) do_fingerprint(pw); if (change_passphrase) do_change_passphrase(pw); if (change_comment) do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (convert_to) do_convert_to(pw); if (convert_from) do_convert_from(pw); #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (convert_to || convert_from) fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time"); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (print_public) do_print_public(pw); if (rr_hostname != NULL) { unsigned int n = 0; if (have_identity) { n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, rr_hostname, print_generic); if (n == 0) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); exit(0); } else { n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, print_generic); if (n == 0) fatal("no keys found."); exit(0); } } if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) { if (argc <= 0) fatal("No output file specified"); else if (argc > 1) fatal("Too many output files specified"); } if (do_gen_candidates) { do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts); return 0; } if (do_screen_candidates) { do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts); return 0; } if (gen_all_hostkeys) { do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); return (0); } if (key_type_name == NULL) key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); switch (type) { case KEY_ECDSA_SK: case KEY_ED25519_SK: for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) { sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "verify-required") == 0) { sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD; } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) { sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY; } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) { sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5); } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10, &challenge)) != 0) { fatal_r(r, "Unable to load FIDO " "enrollment challenge \"%s\"", opts[i] + 10); } } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) { sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18; } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "application=", 12) == 0) { sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12); if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) { fatal("FIDO application string must " "begin with \"ssh:\""); } } else { fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]); } } if (!quiet) { printf("You may need to touch your authenticator " "to authorize key generation.\n"); } if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((sk_flags & (SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY))) { passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for " "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); } else { passphrase = NULL; } for (i = 0 ; ; i++) { fflush(stdout); r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device, sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application, sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge, &private, attest); if (r == 0) break; if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal_r(r, "Key enrollment failed"); else if (passphrase != NULL) { error("PIN incorrect"); freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); passphrase = NULL; } if (i >= 3) fatal("Too many incorrect PINs"); passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for " "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (!quiet) { printf("You may need to touch your " "authenticator (again) to authorize " "key generation.\n"); } } if (passphrase != NULL) { freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); passphrase = NULL; } break; default: if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_generate failed"); break; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private"); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(identity_file, !quiet); /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file)) exit(1); /* Determine the passphrase for the private key */ passphrase = private_key_passphrase(); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); } else { /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); } /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); exit(1); } freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); if (!quiet) { printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n", identity_file); } strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0) fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); if (!quiet) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n", identity_file); printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } if (sk_attestation_path != NULL) save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path); sshbuf_free(attest); sshkey_free(public); exit(0); } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 index 645962bc9d9c..b854f9e5bdb2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 @@ -1,1771 +1,1780 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.425 2021/07/28 05:57:42 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.427 2021/09/10 10:26:02 dtucker Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 28 2021 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 10 2021 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh .Nd OpenSSH remote login client .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh .Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy .Op Fl B Ar bind_interface .Op Fl b Ar bind_address .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec .Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl e Ar escape_char .Op Fl F Ar configfile .Op Fl I Ar pkcs11 .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl J Ar destination .Op Fl L Ar address .Op Fl l Ar login_name .Op Fl m Ar mac_spec .Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl Q Ar query_option .Op Fl R Ar address .Op Fl S Ar ctl_path .Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port .Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Ar destination -.Op Ar command +.Op Ar command Op Ar argument ... .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and .Ux Ns -domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. .Pp .Nm connects and logs into the specified .Ar destination , which may be specified as either .Sm off .Oo user @ Oc hostname .Sm on or a URI of the form .Sm off .No ssh:// Oo user @ Oc hostname Op : port . .Sm on The user must prove their identity to the remote machine using one of several methods (see below). .Pp If a .Ar command is specified, -it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. +it will be executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. +A complete command line may be specified as +.Ar command , +or it may have additional arguments. +If supplied, the arguments will be appended to the command, separated by +spaces, before it is sent to the server to be executed. .Pp The options are as follows: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .Pp .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .Pp .It Fl A Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent such as .Xr ssh-agent 1 . This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's .Ux Ns -domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see .Fl J ) . .Pp .It Fl a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. .Pp .It Fl B Ar bind_interface Bind to the address of .Ar bind_interface before attempting to connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems with more than one address. .Pp .It Fl b Ar bind_address Use .Ar bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .Pp .It Fl C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and .Ux Ns -domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by .Xr gzip 1 . Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the .Cm Compression option. .Pp .It Fl c Ar cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. .Ar cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the .Cm Ciphers keyword in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp .It Fl D Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port .Sm on .Xc Specifies a local .Dq dynamic application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address . Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Nm will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of standard error. .Pp .It Fl e Ar escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot .Pq Ql \&. closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to .Dq none disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. .Pp .It Fl F Ar configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is .Pa ~/.ssh/config . If set to .Dq none , no configuration files will be read. .Pp .It Fl f Requests .Nm to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if .Nm is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies .Fl n . The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like .Ic ssh -f host xterm . .Pp If the .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to .Dq yes , then a client started with .Fl f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. Refer to the description of .Cm ForkAfterAuthentication in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl G Causes .Nm to print its configuration after evaluating .Cm Host and .Cm Match blocks and exit. .Pp .It Fl g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified on the master process. .Pp .It Fl I Ar pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library .Nm should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. .Pp .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. +You can also specify a public key file to use the corresponding +private key that is loaded in +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +when the private key file is not present locally. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple .Fl i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the .Cm CertificateFile directive, .Nm will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to identity filenames. .Pp .It Fl J Ar destination Connect to the target host by first making a .Nm connection to the jump host described by .Ar destination and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This is a shortcut to specify a .Cm ProxyJump configuration directive. Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line generally apply to the destination host and not any specified jump hosts. Use .Pa ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump hosts. .Pp .It Fl K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .Pp .It Fl k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .Pp .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : remote_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Ar local_socket : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Ar local_socket : remote_socket .Sm on .Xc Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address , or to a Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to either .Ar host port .Ar hostport , or the Unix socket .Ar remote_socket , from the remote machine. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp .It Fl l Ar login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .Pp .It Fl M Places the .Nm client into .Dq master mode for connection sharing. Multiple .Fl M options places .Nm into .Dq master mode but with confirmation required using .Xr ssh-askpass 1 before each operation that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session). Refer to the description of .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl m Ar mac_spec A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the .Cm MACs keyword for more information. .Pp .It Fl N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports. Refer to the description of .Cm SessionType in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl n Redirects stdin from .Pa /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when .Nm is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, .Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The .Nm program will be put in the background. (This does not work if .Nm needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the .Fl f option.) Refer to the description of .Cm StdinNull in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the .Fl O option is specified, the .Ar ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: .Dq check (check that the master process is running), .Dq forward (request forwardings without command execution), .Dq cancel (cancel forwardings), .Dq exit (request the master to exit), and .Dq stop (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). .Pp .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddKeysToAgent .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It CASignatureAlgorithms .It CertificateFile .It CheckHostIP .It Ciphers .It ClearAllForwardings .It Compression .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It DynamicForward .It EscapeChar .It ExitOnForwardFailure .It FingerprintHash .It ForkAfterAuthentication .It ForwardAgent .It ForwardX11 .It ForwardX11Timeout .It ForwardX11Trusted .It GatewayPorts .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It Hostname .It IdentitiesOnly .It IdentityAgent .It IdentityFile .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It KnownHostsCommand .It LocalCommand .It LocalForward .It LogLevel .It MACs .It Match .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PermitLocalCommand .It PermitRemoteOpen .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump .It ProxyUseFdpass .It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RemoteCommand .It RemoteForward .It RequestTTY .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It SessionType .It SetEnv .It StdinNull .It StreamLocalBindMask .It StreamLocalBindUnlink .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It Tunnel .It TunnelDevice .It UpdateHostKeys .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .It VersionAddendum .It VisualHostKey .It XAuthLocation .El .Pp .It Fl p Ar port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .Pp .It Fl Q Ar query_option Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the following features: .Ar cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), .Ar cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), .Ar help (supported query terms for use with the .Fl Q flag), .Ar mac (supported message integrity codes), .Ar kex (key exchange algorithms), .Ar key (key types), .Ar key-cert (certificate key types), .Ar key-plain (non-certificate key types), .Ar key-sig (all key types and signature algorithms), .Ar protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions), and .Ar sig (supported signature algorithms). Alternatively, any keyword from .Xr ssh_config 5 or .Xr sshd_config 5 that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the corresponding query_option. .Pp .It Fl q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. .Pp .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : local_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Ar remote_socket : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Ar remote_socket : local_socket .Sm on .Xc .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port .Sm on .Xc Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local side. .Pp This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP .Ar port or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by .Ar host port .Ar hostport , or .Ar local_socket , or, if no explicit destination was specified, .Nm will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS client. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a .Ar bind_address . An empty .Ar bind_address , or the address .Ql * , indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with .Ic -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. .Pp .It Fl S Ar ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlPath and .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\& .Xr sftp 1 ) . The subsystem is specified as the remote command. Refer to the description of .Cm SessionType in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .Pp .It Fl T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. .Pp .It Fl t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple .Fl t options force tty allocation, even if .Nm has no local tty. .Pp .It Fl V Display the version number and exit. .Pp .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .Pp .It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to .Ar host on .Ar port over the secure channel. Implies .Fl N , .Fl T , .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure and .Cm ClearAllForwardings , though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using .Fl o command line options. .Pp .It Fl w Xo .Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Xc Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified .Xr tun 4 devices between the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . See also the .Cm Tunnel and .Cm TunnelDevice directives in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp If the .Cm Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . If a different .Cm Tunnel forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before .Fl w . .Pp .It Fl X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. .Pp For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the .Nm .Fl Y option and the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp .It Fl x Disables X11 forwarding. .Pp .It Fl Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. .Pp .It Fl y Send log information using the .Xr syslog 3 system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. .El .Pp .Nm may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. .Pp The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, keyboard-interactive authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though .Cm PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order. .Pp Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv or .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, the user is non-root and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files .Pa ~/.rhosts or .Pa ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server .Em must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] .Pp Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. .Nm implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of .Xr ssl 8 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. .Pp The file .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the .Nm program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. .Pp The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a different method. These may be viewed by increasing the .Cm LogLevel to .Cm DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the .Fl v flag). .Pp The user creates their key pair by running .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . This stores the private key in .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in their home directory on the remote machine. The .Pa authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional .Pa ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. .Pp A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for more information. .Pp The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See .Xr ssh-agent 1 and (optionally) the .Cm AddKeysToAgent directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Pp Keyboard-interactive authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary .Qq challenge text and prompts for a response, possibly multiple times. Examples of keyboard-interactive authentication include .Bx Authentication (see .Xr login.conf 5 ) and PAM (some .Pf non- Ox systems). .Pp Finally, if other authentication methods fail, .Nm prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. .Pp .Nm automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, .Nm warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. .Pp When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. .Pp If an interactive session is requested .Nm by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. The flags .Fl T and .Fl t can be used to override this behaviour. .Pp If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape characters noted below. .Pp If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to .Dq none will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. .Pp The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. .Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, .Nm supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. .Pp A single tilde character can be sent as .Ic ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the .Cm EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the .Fl e option. .Pp The supported escapes (assuming the default .Ql ~ ) are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm ~. Disconnect. .It Cm ~^Z Background .Nm . .It Cm ~# List forwarded connections. .It Cm ~& Background .Nm at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. .It Cm ~? Display a list of escape characters. .It Cm ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the .Fl L , .Fl R and .Fl D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with .Sm off .Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for local, .Sm off .Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for remote and .Sm off .Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for dynamic port-forwardings. .Ic !\& Ns Ar command allows the user to execute a local command if the .Ic PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Basic help is available, using the .Fl h option. .It Cm ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~V Decrease the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .It Cm ~v Increase the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .El .Sh TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. .Pp In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly support encrypted communication. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using .Nm , specifying the ports to be used to forward the connection. After that it is possible to start the program locally, and .Nm will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote server. .Pp The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC server at .Dq server.example.com , joining channel .Dq #users , nickname .Dq pinky , using the standard IRC port, 6667: .Bd -literal -offset 4n $ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1 .Ed .Pp The .Fl f option backgrounds .Nm and the remote command .Dq sleep 10 is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections are made within the time specified, .Nm will exit. .Sh X11 FORWARDING If the .Cm ForwardX11 variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl X , .Fl x , and .Fl Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set .Ev DISPLAY . Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. .Pp The .Ev DISPLAY value set by .Nm will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because .Nm creates a .Dq proxy X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. .Pp .Nm will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). .Pp If the .Cm ForwardAgent variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl A and .Fl a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. .Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .Pp If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .Fl E option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. .Pp Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, using .Em random art . By setting the .Cm VisualHostKey option to .Dq yes , a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. .Pp To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts .Pp If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. .Pp In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, .Dq host.example.com . The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. .Ed .Pp The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: .Pp .Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com .Pp Finally the client connects: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? .Ed .Pp See the .Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS option in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS .Nm contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the .Xr tun 4 network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The .Xr sshd_config 5 configuration option .Cm PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). .Pp The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. .Pp On the client: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 .Ed .Pp On the server: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 .Ed .Pp Client access may be more finely tuned via the .Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the .Cm PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on .Xr tun 4 device 1 from user .Dq jane and on tun device 2 from user .Dq john , if .Cm PermitRootLogin is set to .Dq forced-commands-only : .Bd -literal -offset 2n tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john .Ed .Pp Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as .Xr ipsecctl 8 and .Xr isakmpd 8 . .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Nm will normally set the following environment variables: .Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" .It Ev DISPLAY The .Ev DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by .Nm to point to a value of the form .Dq hostname:n , where .Dq hostname indicates the host where the shell runs, and .Sq n is an integer \*(Ge 1. .Nm uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set .Ev DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). .It Ev HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. .It Ev LOGNAME Synonym for .Ev USER ; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. .It Ev MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. .It Ev PATH Set to the default .Ev PATH , as specified when compiling .Nm . .It Ev SSH_ASKPASS If .Nm needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If .Nm does not have a terminal associated with it but .Ev DISPLAY and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm from a .Pa .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from .Pa /dev/null to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE Allows further control over the use of an askpass program. If this variable is set to .Dq never then .Nm will never attempt to use one. If it is set to .Dq prefer , then .Nm will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY when requesting passwords. Finally, if the variable is set to .Dq force , then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase input regardless of whether .Ev DISPLAY is set. .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. .It Ev SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. .It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. .It Ev SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. .It Ev SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by .Xr sshd 8 to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested by the client. .It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by .Xr sshd 8 , this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication methods successfully used when the session was established, including any public keys that were used. .It Ev TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). .It Ev USER Set to the name of the user logging in. .El .Pp Additionally, .Nm reads .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , and adds lines of the format .Dq VARNAME=value to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Xr sshd 8 reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the .Xr sshd 8 manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see .Sx ENVIRONMENT , above. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). .Nm will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using AES-128. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Nm exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr tun 4 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr ssh-keysign 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh STANDARDS .Rs .%A S. Lehtinen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4250 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4251 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4252 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4253 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4254 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Schlyter .%A W. Griffin .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4255 .%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints .Re .Pp .Rs .%A F. Cusack .%A M. Forssen .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4256 .%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A P. Remaker .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4335 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Bellare .%A T. Kohno .%A C. Namprempre .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4344 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes .Re .Pp .Rs .%A B. Harris .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4345 .%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Friedl .%A N. Provos .%A W. Simpson .%D March 2006 .%R RFC 4419 .%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A R. Thayer .%D November 2006 .%R RFC 4716 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format .Re .Pp .Rs .%A D. Stebila .%A J. Green .%D December 2009 .%R RFC 5656 .%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer .Re .Pp .Rs .%A A. Perrig .%A D. Song .%D 1999 .%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) .%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c index a5f04f5d0b19..19e13d4f212c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c @@ -1,2383 +1,2385 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.566 2021/08/08 08:49:09 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.569 2021/09/20 04:02:13 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Modified to work with SSLeay by Niels Provos * in Canada (German citizen). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "packet.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "channels.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "utf8.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE static char **saved_av; #endif /* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */ int tty_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and * a new mux-client launched in the foreground for ControlPersist. */ int need_controlpersist_detach = 0; /* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground mux-client */ int ostdin_null_flag, osession_type, otty_flag, orequest_tty; /* * General data structure for command line options and options configurable * in configuration files. See readconf.h. */ Options options; /* optional user configfile */ char *config = NULL; /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ char *host; /* * A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is * not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead. */ char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL; /* socket address the host resolves to */ struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* Private host keys. */ Sensitive sensitive_data; /* command to be executed */ struct sshbuf *command; /* # of replies received for global requests */ static int forward_confirms_pending = -1; /* mux.c */ extern int muxserver_sock; extern u_int muxclient_command; /* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n" " [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n" " [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n" " [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n" " [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" -" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]\n" +" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command [argument ...]]\n" ); exit(255); } static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, const struct ssh_conn_info *); static void load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *); static void main_sigchld_handler(int); /* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */ static void tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths) { u_int i; char *cp; for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid()); free(paths[i]); paths[i] = cp; } } /* * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords * in the client that support percent expansion. * Caller must free returned string. */ static char * default_client_percent_expand(const char *str, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { return percent_expand(str, DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo), (char *)NULL); } /* * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords * AND perform environment variable substitution. * Caller must free returned string. */ static char * default_client_percent_dollar_expand(const char *str, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { char *ret; ret = percent_dollar_expand(str, DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo), (char *)NULL); if (ret == NULL) fatal("invalid environment variable expansion"); return ret; } /* * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); if (cname != NULL) *cname = '\0'; + debug3_f("lookup %s:%d", name, port); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (cname != NULL) hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA)) loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) { if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) { error_f("host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *cname = '\0'; } } return res; } /* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */ static int is_addr_fast(const char *name) { return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL || strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name)); } /* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */ static int is_addr(const char *name) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; if (is_addr_fast(name)) return 1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port()); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0) return 0; if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) { freeaddrinfo(res); return 0; } freeaddrinfo(res); return 1; } /* * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address. * Returns a canonical address string. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen) { char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { debug2_f("could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (res == NULL) { debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", name); return NULL; } if (res->ai_next != NULL) { debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", name); goto fail; } if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { debug_f("Could not format address for name %.100s: %s", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); goto fail; } if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) { error_f("host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", name, addr, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *caddr = '\0'; fail: freeaddrinfo(res); return NULL; } return res; } /* * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname * and perform the replacement if it is. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static int check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname) { int i; struct allowed_cname *rule; - if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 || + if (*cname == '\0' || !config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) || strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0) return 0; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return 0; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!direct && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return 0; debug3_f("check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", *namep, cname); for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 || match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1) continue; verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); free(*namep); *namep = xstrdup(cname); return 1; } return 0; } /* * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL * if no name was found after canonicalization. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port) { int i, direct, ndots; char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct addrinfo *addrs; /* * Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of * whether hostname canonicalisation was requested */ if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) { debug2_f("hostname %.100s is address", *hostp); if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) { debug2_f("canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, newname); free(*hostp); *hostp = xstrdup(newname); } return addrs; } /* * If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might * be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further * attempts at canonicalisation. */ if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) { debug_f("hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address", *hostp); return NULL; } if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return NULL; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.jump_host == NULL; if (!direct && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return NULL; /* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */ if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') { debug3_f("name is fully qualified"); fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) goto found; free(fullhost); goto notfound; } /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */ ndots = 0; for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '.') ndots++; } if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) { debug3_f("not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)", *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots); return NULL; } /* Attempt each supplied suffix */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.canonical_domains[i], "none") == 0) break; xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp, options.canonical_domains[i]); debug3_f("attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) { free(fullhost); continue; } found: /* Remove trailing '.' */ fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0'; /* Follow CNAME if requested */ if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) { debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); } free(*hostp); *hostp = fullhost; return addrs; } notfound: if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local) fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp); debug2_f("host %s not found in any suffix", *hostp); return NULL; } /* * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and * fatal()ing for others. */ static void check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message) { switch (r) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: fatal_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: /* Ignore missing files */ if (errno == ENOENT) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path); break; } } /* * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. */ static void process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass, int *want_final_pass) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; int r; if (config != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 && !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options, SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass)) fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass); /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host, host_name, &options, final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass); } } /* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */ static void set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port) { struct addrinfo *addr; for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) { switch (addr->ai_family) { case AF_INET: ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin_port = htons(port); break; case AF_INET6: ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin6_port = htons(port); break; } } } static void ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { if (cinfo == NULL) return; free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); free(cinfo->shorthost); free(cinfo->uidstr); free(cinfo->keyalias); free(cinfo->thishost); free(cinfo->host_arg); free(cinfo->portstr); free(cinfo->remhost); free(cinfo->remuser); free(cinfo->homedir); free(cinfo->locuser); free(cinfo); } /* * Main program for the ssh client. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms; int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0; char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile, *host_arg; char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST]; struct stat st; struct passwd *pw; extern int optind, optreset; extern char *optarg; struct Forward fwd; struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL; size_t n, len; u_int j; struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo = NULL; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */ saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_av[i] = NULL; compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_av; #endif seed_rng(); /* Get user data. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) { logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); exit(255); } /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we * don't set the modes explicitly. */ umask(022); msetlocale(); /* * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been * set. */ initialize_options(&options); /* * Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures */ if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't allocate session state"); channel_init_channels(ssh); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ host = NULL; use_syslog = 0; logfile = NULL; argv0 = av[0]; again: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" "AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '1': fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': /* Ignored */ break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'n': options.stdin_null = 1; break; case 'f': options.fork_after_authentication = 1; options.stdin_null = 1; break; case 'x': options.forward_x11 = 0; break; case 'X': options.forward_x11 = 1; break; case 'y': use_syslog = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = optarg; break; case 'G': config_test = 1; break; case 'Y': options.forward_x11 = 1; options.forward_x11_trusted = 1; break; case 'g': options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1; break; case 'O': if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing " "command with -W"); else if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Multiplexing command already specified"); if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE; else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP; else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY; else fatal("Invalid multiplex command."); break; case 'P': /* deprecated */ break; case 'Q': cp = NULL; if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0) cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */ strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) cp = xstrdup("2"); else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) { cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0)); len = strlen(cp); for (n = 0; n < len; n++) if (cp[n] == ',') cp[n] = '\n'; } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { cp = xstrdup( "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n" "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n" "protocol-version\nsig"); } if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); printf("%s\n", cp); free(cp); exit(0); break; case 'a': options.forward_agent = 0; break; case 'A': options.forward_agent = 1; break; case 'k': options.gss_deleg_creds = 0; break; case 'K': options.gss_authentication = 1; options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; break; case 'i': p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid()); if (stat(p, &st) == -1) fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " "not accessible: %s.\n", p, strerror(errno)); else add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1); free(p); break; case 'I': #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 free(options.pkcs11_provider); options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); #else fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); #endif break; case 'J': if (options.jump_host != NULL) { fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted " "(use commas to separate multiple " "jump hops)"); } if (options.proxy_command != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand"); if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1) fatal("Invalid -J argument"); options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); break; case 't': if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES) options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE; else options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES; break; case 'v': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else { if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { debug_flag++; options.log_level++; } } break; case 'V': if (options.version_addendum && *options.version_addendum != '\0') fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, options.version_addendum, OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING); else fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING); if (opt == 'V') exit(0); break; case 'w': if (options.tun_open == -1) options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT; options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote); if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'W': if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("stdio forward already specified"); if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O"); if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host; options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port; free(fwd.connect_host); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE; break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'e': if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'c': if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ? optarg + 1 : optarg)) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } free(options.ciphers); options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'm': if (mac_valid(optarg)) { free(options.macs); options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'M': if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES) options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK; else options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES; break; case 'p': if (options.port == -1) { options.port = a2port(optarg); if (options.port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } } break; case 'l': if (options.user == NULL) options.user = optarg; break; case 'L': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0)) add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'R': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) || parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) { add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad remote forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'D': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'C': #ifdef WITH_ZLIB options.compression = 1; #else error("Compression not supported, disabling."); #endif break; case 'N': if (options.session_type != -1 && options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) fatal("Cannot specify -N with -s/SessionType"); options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE; options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'T': options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_config_line(&options, pw, host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line, "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) exit(255); free(line); break; case 's': if (options.session_type != -1 && options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM) fatal("Cannot specify -s with -N/SessionType"); options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM; break; case 'S': free(options.control_path); options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'b': options.bind_address = optarg; break; case 'B': options.bind_interface = optarg; break; case 'F': config = optarg; break; default: usage(); } } if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0) opt_terminated = 1; ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && !host) { int tport; char *tuser; switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) { case -1: usage(); break; case 0: if (options.user == NULL) { options.user = tuser; tuser = NULL; } free(tuser); if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1) options.port = tport; break; default: p = xstrdup(*av); cp = strrchr(p, '@'); if (cp != NULL) { if (cp == p) usage(); if (options.user == NULL) { options.user = p; p = NULL; } *cp++ = '\0'; host = xstrdup(cp); free(p); } else host = p; break; } if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) { optind = optreset = 1; goto again; } ac--, av++; } /* Check that we got a host name. */ if (!host) usage(); host_arg = xstrdup(host); /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); /* * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. */ if (!ac) { /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM) { fprintf(stderr, "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); usage(); } } else { /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s", i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); } } /* * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. */ if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL) fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E"); if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); log_init(argv0, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility, !use_syslog); if (debug_flag) /* version_addendum is always NULL at this point */ logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING); /* Parse the configuration files */ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass); if (want_final_pass) debug("configuration requests final Match pass"); /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */ fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options); /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */ if (options.hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */ cp = percent_expand(options.hostname, "h", host, (char *)NULL); free(host); host = cp; free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); } /* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */ if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0) lowercase(host); /* * Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the * hostname is an address. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr) addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port); /* * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed * as a result of CNAME following. * * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules. * * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via * CanonicalizeHostname=always */ direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.jump_host == NULL; - if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (direct || + if (addrs == NULL && config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) && (direct || options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) { if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) { /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */ if (direct) cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */ } else check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname); } /* * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration * files as new stanzas may match. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) { debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, " "will re-parse configuration"); want_final_pass = 1; } if (want_final_pass) { debug("re-parsing configuration"); free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1, NULL); /* * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so * reset it in address list */ if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0) set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port); } /* Fill configuration defaults. */ if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0) cleanup_exit(255); if (options.user == NULL) options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); /* * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now. */ if (options.jump_host != NULL) { char port_s[8]; const char *jumpuser = options.jump_user, *sshbin = argv0; int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); if (jumpport <= 0) jumpport = default_ssh_port(); if (jumpuser == NULL) jumpuser = options.user; if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport && strcmp(options.user, jumpuser) == 0) fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host); /* * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to * "ssh" if it appears unavailable. */ if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0) sshbin = "ssh"; /* Consistency check */ if (options.proxy_command != NULL) fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump"); /* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */ options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0; snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port); xasprintf(&options.proxy_command, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s", sshbin, /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */ options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ", options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user, /* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */ options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ", options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s, /* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */ options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ", options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra, /* Optional "-F" argumment if -F specified */ config == NULL ? "" : " -F ", config == NULL ? "" : config, /* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */ debug_flag ? " -" : "", debug_flag, "vvv", /* Mandatory hostname */ options.jump_host); debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s", options.proxy_command); } if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) lowercase(options.host_key_alias); if (options.proxy_command != NULL && strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 && options.proxy_use_fdpass) fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible"); if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with " "ControlPersist; disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 || options.remote_command != NULL || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with " "remote command execution; disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { /* no point logging anything; user won't see it */ options.update_hostkeys = 0; } } if (options.connection_attempts <= 0) fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts"); if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL) fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command."); /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ if (options.fork_after_authentication && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL && options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " "to execute."); /* reinit */ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog); for (j = 0; j < options.num_log_verbose; j++) { if (strcasecmp(options.log_verbose[j], "none") == 0) break; log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[j]); } if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) tty_flag = 1; /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL) tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; /* Force no tty */ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || (muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY)) tty_flag = 0; /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || options.stdin_null) && options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) { if (tty_flag) logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because " "stdin is not a terminal."); tty_flag = 0; } /* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */ cinfo = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cinfo)); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); cinfo->thishost = xstrdup(thishost); thishost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; cinfo->shorthost = xstrdup(thishost); xasprintf(&cinfo->portstr, "%d", options.port); xasprintf(&cinfo->uidstr, "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); cinfo->keyalias = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : host_arg); cinfo->conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(cinfo->thishost, host, cinfo->portstr, options.user); cinfo->host_arg = xstrdup(host_arg); cinfo->remhost = xstrdup(host); cinfo->remuser = xstrdup(options.user); cinfo->homedir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); cinfo->locuser = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); /* Find canonic host name. */ if (strchr(host, '.') == 0) { struct addrinfo hints; struct addrinfo *ai = NULL; int errgai; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family; hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai); if (errgai == 0) { if (ai->ai_canonname != NULL) host = xstrdup(ai->ai_canonname); freeaddrinfo(ai); } } /* * Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later, * after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local * tunnel interface name allocated. */ if (options.remote_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); cp = options.remote_command; options.remote_command = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); free(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command, strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); } if (options.control_path != NULL) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid()); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); free(cp); } if (options.identity_agent != NULL) { p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, getuid()); cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo); free(p); free(options.identity_agent); options.identity_agent = cp; } if (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) { p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path, getuid()); cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo); free(p); free(options.forward_agent_sock_path); options.forward_agent_sock_path = cp; if (stat(options.forward_agent_sock_path, &st) != 0) { error("Cannot forward agent socket path \"%s\": %s", options.forward_agent_sock_path, strerror(errno)); if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) cleanup_exit(255); } } if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 0 && strcasecmp(options.system_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) { if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 1) fatal("Invalid GlobalKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" " "appears with other entries"); free(options.system_hostfiles[0]); options.system_hostfiles[0] = NULL; options.num_system_hostfiles = 0; } if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 0 && strcasecmp(options.user_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) { if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 1) fatal("Invalid UserKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" " "appears with other entries"); free(options.user_hostfiles[0]); options.user_hostfiles[0] = NULL; options.num_user_hostfiles = 0; } for (j = 0; j < options.num_user_hostfiles; j++) { if (options.user_hostfiles[j] == NULL) continue; cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfiles[j], getuid()); p = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(options.user_hostfiles[j], p) != 0) debug3("expanded UserKnownHostsFile '%s' -> " "'%s'", options.user_hostfiles[j], p); free(options.user_hostfiles[j]); free(cp); options.user_hostfiles[j] = p; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) { cp = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path; p = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded LocalForward listen path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } if (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) { cp = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path; p = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded LocalForward connect path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) { cp = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path; p = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded RemoteForward listen path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } if (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) { cp = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path; p = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path = default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo); if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0) debug3("expanded RemoteForward connect path " "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p); free(cp); } } if (config_test) { dump_client_config(&options, host); exit(0); } /* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */ if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' && strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) { if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) { debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; " "disabling", options.sk_provider); free(options.sk_provider); options.sk_provider = NULL; } else { debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s", options.sk_provider, cp); free(options.sk_provider); options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp); } } if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL) fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command"); if (options.control_path != NULL) { int sock; if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) { ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock); ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh); goto skip_connect; } } /* * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now. */ if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) { debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port); if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ } if (options.connection_timeout >= INT_MAX/1000) timeout_ms = INT_MAX; else timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) exit(255); if (addrs != NULL) freeaddrinfo(addrs); ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval, options.server_alive_count_max); if (timeout_ms > 0) debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms); /* * If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth * enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign * helper to sign challenges. */ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; sensitive_data.keys = NULL; if (options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 10; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey)); /* XXX check errors? */ #define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \ if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \ check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \ p, "pubkey"); \ } while (0) #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \ if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \ check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \ } while (0) if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) { L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7); L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8); L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9); } } /* load options.identity_files */ load_public_identity_files(cinfo); /* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */ if (options.identity_agent && strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) { if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) { unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); } else { cp = options.identity_agent; /* legacy (limited) format */ if (cp[0] == '$' && cp[1] != '{') { if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) { fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent " "environment variable name %s", cp); } if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL) unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); else setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1); } else { /* identity_agent specifies a path directly */ setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1); } } } if (options.forward_agent && options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) { cp = options.forward_agent_sock_path; if (cp[0] == '$') { if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) { fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp); } if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL) forward_agent_sock_path = xstrdup(p); else options.forward_agent = 0; free(cp); } else { forward_agent_sock_path = cp; } } /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles); ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo); /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { /* Destroys contents safely */ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; } } free(sensitive_data.keys); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; if (options.identity_keys[i]) { sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]); options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; } } for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { free(options.certificate_files[i]); options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 (void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider); #endif skip_connect: exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo); ssh_conn_info_free(cinfo); ssh_packet_close(ssh); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */ ssh_kill_proxy_command(); return exit_status; } static void control_persist_detach(void) { pid_t pid; debug_f("backgrounding master process"); /* * master (current process) into the background, and make the * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: fatal_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); case 0: /* Child: master process continues mainloop */ break; default: /* Parent: set up mux client to connect to backgrounded master */ debug2_f("background process is %ld", (long)pid); options.stdin_null = ostdin_null_flag; options.request_tty = orequest_tty; tty_flag = otty_flag; options.session_type = osession_type; close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; muxclient(options.control_path); /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); } if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); daemon(1, 1); setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path); } /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ static void fork_postauth(void) { if (need_controlpersist_detach) control_persist_detach(); debug("forking to background"); options.fork_after_authentication = 0; if (daemon(1, 1) == -1) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); } static void forwarding_success(void) { if (forward_confirms_pending == -1) return; if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) { debug_f("all expected forwarding replies received"); if (options.fork_after_authentication) fork_postauth(); } else { debug2_f("%d expected forwarding replies remaining", forward_confirms_pending); } } /* Callback for remote forward global requests */ static void ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; u_int port; int r; /* XXX verbose() on failure? */ debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d", type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path : rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "", (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); if (port > 65535) { error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote " "forward to %s:%d", port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); /* Ensure failure processing runs below */ type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE; channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); } else { rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port; logit("Allocated port %u for remote " "forward to %s:%d", - rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, + rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_path ? + rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } } else { channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); } } if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } else { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } } forwarding_success(); } static void client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { debug("stdio forwarding: done"); cleanup_exit(0); } static void ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); } static void ssh_tun_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) { error("Tunnel forwarding failed"); if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) cleanup_exit(255); } debug_f("tunnel forward established, id=%d", id); forwarding_success(); } static void ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int in, out; if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL) return; debug3_f("%s:%d", options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port); if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) fatal_f("dup() in/out failed"); if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port, in, out, CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL) fatal_f("channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed"); channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); } static void ssh_init_forward_permissions(struct ssh *ssh, const char *what, char **opens, u_int num_opens) { u_int i; int port; char *addr, *arg, *oarg, ch; int where = FORWARD_LOCAL; channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); if (num_opens == 0) return; /* permit any */ /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */ if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0) return; if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) { channel_disable_admin(ssh, where); return; } /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) { oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]); ch = '\0'; addr = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); if (addr == NULL || ch == '/') fatal_f("missing host in %s", what); addr = cleanhostname(addr); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what); /* Send it to channels layer */ channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, addr, port); free(oarg); } } static void ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname) { int success = 0; int i; ssh_init_forward_permissions(ssh, "permitremoteopen", options.permitted_remote_opens, options.num_permitted_remote_opens); if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) forward_confirms_pending = 0; /* track pending requests */ /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote " "address %.200s:%d", (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); } if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request local forwarding."); if (i > 0 && success == 0) error("Could not request local forwarding."); /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to " "local address %.200s:%d", (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path : options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) { client_register_global_confirm( ssh_confirm_remote_forward, &options.remote_forwards[i]); forward_confirms_pending++; } else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request remote forwarding."); else logit("Warning: Could not request remote forwarding."); } /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh, options.tun_open, options.tun_local, options.tun_remote, ssh_tun_confirm, NULL)) != NULL) forward_confirms_pending++; else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); else error("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); } if (forward_confirms_pending > 0) { debug_f("expecting replies for %d forwards", forward_confirms_pending); } } static void check_agent_present(void) { int r; if (options.forward_agent) { /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) { options.forward_agent = 0; if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug_r(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket"); } } } static void ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { extern char **environ; const char *display, *term; int r, interactive = tty_flag; char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; if (!success) return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ interactive = 1; } check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv, options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0') term = getenv("TERM"); client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM, term, NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ); } /* open new channel for a session */ static int ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int window, packetmax, in, out, err; if (options.stdin_null) { in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); } else { in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1) fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (tty_flag) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self); channel_send_open(ssh, c->self); if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_session2_setup, NULL); return c->self; } static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { int r, id = -1; char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL; /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname); if (options.local_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); cp = options.local_command; options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo), "T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname, (char *)NULL); debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); free(cp); } /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh)) muxserver_listen(ssh); /* * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground * client attach as a control client. * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the client until * after the connection is fully established (in particular, * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure). */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) { ostdin_null_flag = options.stdin_null; osession_type = options.session_type; orequest_tty = options.request_tty; otty_flag = tty_flag; options.stdin_null = 1; options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE; tty_flag = 0; if (!options.fork_after_authentication && (osession_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE || options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)) need_controlpersist_detach = 1; options.fork_after_authentication = 1; } /* * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE) id = ssh_session2_open(ssh); else { ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); } /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO && (ssh->compat & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) { debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); } /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here * so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd. * NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed, * as it may want to write to stdout. */ if (!need_controlpersist_detach && stdfd_devnull(0, 1, 0) == -1) error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (options.fork_after_authentication) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); } /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ static void load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { char *filename, *cp; struct sshkey *public; int i; u_int n_ids, n_certs; char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; char **comments = NULL; int nkeys; #endif /* PKCS11 */ n_ids = n_certs = 0; memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys)); memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files)); memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates)); memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0, sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, &keys, &comments)) > 0) { for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { sshkey_free(keys[i]); free(comments[i]); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */ n_ids++; } free(keys); free(comments); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; continue; } cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid()); filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); free(cp); check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), filename, "pubkey"); debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.identity_files[i]); identity_files[n_ids] = filename; identity_keys[n_ids] = public; identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) continue; /* * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try * to add the default certificate variant too. */ if (options.num_certificate_files != 0) continue; xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL), filename, "pubkey"); debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, public ? public->type : -1); if (public == NULL) { free(cp); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate", cp, sshkey_type(public)); sshkey_free(public); free(cp); continue; } /* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */ identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); identity_keys[n_ids] = public; identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; n_ids++; } if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) fatal_f("too many certificates"); for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i], getuid()); filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); free(cp); check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), filename, "certificate"); debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.certificate_files[i]); options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; if (public == NULL) { free(filename); continue; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate", filename, sshkey_type(public)); sshkey_free(public); free(filename); continue; } certificate_files[n_certs] = filename; certificates[n_certs] = public; certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; ++n_certs; } options.num_identity_files = n_ids; memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided, identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); options.num_certificate_files = n_certs; memcpy(options.certificate_files, certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files)); memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates)); memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided, certificate_file_userprovided, sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); } static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR)) ; errno = save_errno; } diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config index d2a1db35d42e..3b2ca9aa6d8d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config @@ -1,49 +1,49 @@ # $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.35 2020/07/17 03:43:42 dtucker Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See # ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for # users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files # or on the command line. # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the # ssh_config(5) man page. # Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP no # AddressFamily any # ConnectTimeout 0 # StrictHostKeyChecking ask # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 # Port 22 # Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc # MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com # EscapeChar ~ # Tunnel no # TunnelDevice any:any # PermitLocalCommand no # VisualHostKey no # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com # RekeyLimit 1G 1h # UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k # VerifyHostKeyDNS yes -# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20210907 +# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20211221 diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 index 3ca36e231c0d..d2ae7f282346 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 @@ -1,2184 +1,2189 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.362 2021/08/12 23:59:25 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.366 2021/09/25 09:40:33 kn Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 12 2021 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 25 2021 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh_config .Nd OpenSSH client configuration file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr ssh 1 obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: .Pp .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact .It command-line options .It user's configuration file .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config .It system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config .El .Pp For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by .Cm Host specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions). .Pp Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. .Pp The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one .Ql = ; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the .Nm ssh , .Nm scp , and .Nm sftp .Fl o option. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single .Ql * as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is usually the .Ar hostname argument given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname keyword for exceptions). .Pp A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . If a negated entry is matched, then the .Cm Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the .Cm Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria or the single token .Cm all which always matches. The available criteria keywords are: .Cm canonical , .Cm final , .Cm exec , .Cm host , .Cm originalhost , .Cm user , and .Cm localuser . The .Cm all criteria must appear alone or immediately after .Cm canonical or .Cm final . Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but .Cm all , .Cm canonical , and .Cm final require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . .Pp The .Cm canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option). This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. .Pp The .Cm final keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled), and matches only during this final pass. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, then .Cm canonical and .Cm final match during the same pass. .Pp The .Cm exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. Arguments to .Cm exec accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section. The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the .Cm Hostname or .Cm CanonicalizeHostname options. The .Cm originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The .Cm user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The .Cm localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running .Xr ssh 1 (this keyword may be useful in system-wide .Nm files). .It Cm AddKeysToAgent Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running .Xr ssh-agent 1 . If this option is set to .Cm yes and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent with the default lifetime, as if by .Xr ssh-add 1 . If this option is set to .Cm ask , .Xr ssh 1 will require confirmation using the .Ev SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see .Xr ssh-add 1 for details). If this option is set to .Cm confirm , each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the .Fl c option was specified to .Xr ssh-add 1 . If this option is set to .Cm no , no keys are added to the agent. Alternately, this option may be specified as a time interval using the format described in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 to specify the key's lifetime in .Xr ssh-agent 1 , after which it will automatically be removed. The argument must be .Cm no (the default), .Cm yes , .Cm confirm (optionally followed by a time interval), .Cm ask or a time interval. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are .Cm any (the default), .Cm inet (use IPv4 only), or .Cm inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm BatchMode If set to .Cm yes , user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to interact with .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .It Cm BindInterface Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the source address of the connection. .It Cm CanonicalDomains When .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. .It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, .Cm yes , will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of .Cm no will cause .Xr ssh 1 to fail instantly if .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by .Cm CanonicalDomains . .It Cm CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, .Cm no , is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to .Cm yes then, for connections that do not use a .Cm ProxyCommand or .Cm ProxyJump , .Xr ssh 1 will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the .Cm CanonicalDomains suffixes and .Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is set to .Cm always , then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. .Pp If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching .Cm Host and .Cm Match stanzas. A value of .Cm none disables the use of a .Cm ProxyJump host. .It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, 1, allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). .It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of .Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list , where .Ar source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and .Ar target_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to. .Pp For example, .Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com will allow hostnames matching .Qq *.a.example.com to be canonicalized to names in the .Qq *.b.example.com or .Qq *.c.example.com domains. +.Pp +A single argument of +.Qq none +causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization. +This is the default behaviour. .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp .Xr ssh 1 will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those specified. .It Cm CertificateFile Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to use this certificate either from an .Cm IdentityFile directive or .Fl i flag to .Xr ssh 1 , via .Xr ssh-agent 1 , or via a .Cm PKCS11Provider or .Cm SecurityKeyProvider . .Pp Arguments to .Cm CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .Pp It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm CertificateFile directives will add to the list of certificates used for authentication. .It Cm CheckHostIP If set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will additionally check the host IP address in the .Pa known_hosts file. This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add addresses of destination hosts to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the process, regardless of the setting of .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking . If the option is set to .Cm no (the default), the check will not be executed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Bd -literal -offset indent 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q cipher . .It Cm ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the .Xr ssh 1 command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by .Xr scp 1 and .Xr sftp 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. .It Cm ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange. .It Cm ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the .Cm ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same .Cm ControlPath with .Cm ControlMaster set to .Cm no (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. .Pp Setting this to .Cm ask will cause .Xr ssh 1 to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using .Xr ssh-askpass 1 . If the .Cm ControlPath cannot be opened, .Xr ssh 1 will continue without connecting to a master instance. .Pp X11 and .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. .Pp Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: .Cm auto and .Cm autoask . The latter requires confirmation like the .Cm ask option. .It Cm ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the .Cm ControlMaster section above or the string .Cm none to disable connection sharing. Arguments to .Cm ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. It is recommended that any .Cm ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. .It Cm ControlPersist When used in conjunction with .Cm ControlMaster , specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to .Cm no (the default), then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to .Cm yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the .Qq ssh -O exit ) . If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in .Xr sshd_config 5 , then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. .It Cm DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port . .Sm on IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Cm localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Xr ssh 1 will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. .It Cm EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to .Cm yes in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program .Xr ssh-keysign 8 during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See .Xr ssh-keysign 8 for more information. .It Cm EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, .Ql ^ followed by a letter, or .Cm none to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). .It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\& if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port). Note that .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not, for example, cause .Xr ssh 1 to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Cm md5 and .Cm sha256 (the default). .It Cm ForkAfterAuthentication Requests .Nm ssh to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if .Nm ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies the .Cm StdinNull configuration option being set to .Dq yes . The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like .Ic ssh -f host xterm , which is the same as .Ic ssh host xterm if the .Cm ForkAfterAuthentication configuration option is set to .Dq yes . .Pp If the .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to .Dq yes , then a client started with the .Cm ForkAfterAuthentication configuration option being set to .Dq yes will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (same as the .Fl f option) or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument may be .Cm yes , .Cm no (the default), an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable (beginning with .Sq $ ) in which to find the path. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Cm ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and .Ev DISPLAY set. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. .It Cm ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . X11 connections received by .Xr ssh 1 after this time will be refused. Setting .Cm ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to .Cm yes , remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no (the default), remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the .Xr xauth 1 token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. .Pp See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, .Xr ssh 1 binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . These hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the file's contents are disclosed. The default is .Cm no . Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported signature algorithms. This was formerly named HostbasedKeyTypes. .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key signature algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . .It Cm HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files and when validating host certificates. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. .It Cm Hostname Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to .Cm Hostname accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in .Cm Hostname specifications). The default is the name given on the command line. .It Cm IdentitiesOnly Specifies that .Xr ssh 1 should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files (either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the .Nm files or passed on the .Xr ssh 1 command-line), even if .Xr ssh-agent 1 or a .Cm PKCS11Provider or .Cm SecurityKeyProvider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. .It Cm IdentityAgent Specifies the .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the authentication agent. .Pp This option overrides the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket name to .Cm none disables the use of an authentication agent. If the string .Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. Otherwise if the specified value begins with a .Sq $ character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the location of the socket. .Pp Arguments to .Cm IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .It Cm IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless .Cm IdentitiesOnly is set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by .Cm CertificateFile , .Xr ssh 1 will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the path of a specified .Cm IdentityFile . .Pp Arguments to .Cm IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). .Pp .Cm IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with .Cm IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. .Cm IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction with .Cm CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with the identity. .It Cm IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if .Nm contains options that are unrecognised by .Xr ssh 1 . It is recommended that .Cm IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. .It Cm Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain .Xr glob 7 wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like .Sq ~ references to user home directories. Wildcards will be expanded and processed in lexical order. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in .Pa ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or .Pa /etc/ssh if included from the system configuration file. .Cm Include directive may appear inside a .Cm Match or .Cm Host block to perform conditional inclusion. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are .Cm af11 , .Cm af12 , .Cm af13 , .Cm af21 , .Cm af22 , .Cm af23 , .Cm af31 , .Cm af32 , .Cm af33 , .Cm af41 , .Cm af42 , .Cm af43 , .Cm cs0 , .Cm cs1 , .Cm cs2 , .Cm cs3 , .Cm cs4 , .Cm cs5 , .Cm cs6 , .Cm cs7 , .Cm ef , .Cm le , .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , a numeric value, or .Cm none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Cm af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and .Cm cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is a deprecated alias for this. .It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: .Cm bsdauth and .Cm pam . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + -character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - -character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ -character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the +character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q kex . .It Cm KnownHostsCommand Specifies a command to use to obtain a list of host keys, in addition to those listed in .Cm UserKnownHostsFile and .Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile . This command is executed after the files have been read. It may write host key lines to standard output in identical format to the usual files (described in the .Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS section in .Xr ssh 1 ) . Arguments to .Cm KnownHostsCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. The command may be invoked multiple times per connection: once when preparing the preference list of host key algorithms to use, again to obtain the host key for the requested host name and, if .Cm CheckHostIP is enabled, one more time to obtain the host key matching the server's address. If the command exits abnormally or returns a non-zero exit status then the connection is terminated. .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to .Cm LocalCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the .Xr ssh 1 that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. .Pp This directive is ignored unless .Cm PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. .It Cm LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument specifies the listener and may be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on or a Unix domain socket path. The second argument is the destination and may be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport or a Unix domain socket path if the remote host supports it. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Cm localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. .It Cm LogVerbose Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel. An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function and line number to force detailed logging for. For example, an override pattern of: .Bd -literal -offset indent kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:* .Ed .Pp would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of .Pa kex.c , everything in the .Fn kex_exchange_identification function, and all code in the .Pa packet.c file. This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. .It Cm MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q mac . .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses). The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .It Cm PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the .Ic LocalCommand option or using the .Ic !\& Ns Ar command escape sequence in .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm PermitRemoteOpen Specifies the destinations to which remote TCP port forwarding is permitted when .Cm RemoteForward is used as a SOCKS proxy. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitRemoteOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitRemoteOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitRemoteOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The wildcard .Sq * can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied names. .It Cm PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or .Cm none to indicate that no provider should be used (the default). The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library .Xr ssh 1 should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. .It Cm Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. .It Cm PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\& .Cm keyboard-interactive ) over another method (e.g.\& .Cm password ) . The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password .Ed .It Cm ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed using the user's shell .Ql exec directive to avoid a lingering shell process. .Pp Arguments to .Cm ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an .Xr sshd 8 server running on some machine, or execute .Ic sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the .Cm Hostname of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to .Cm none disables this option entirely. Note that .Cm CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. .Pp This directive is useful in conjunction with .Xr nc 1 and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p .Ed .It Cm ProxyJump Specifies one or more jump proxies as either .Xo .Sm off .Op Ar user No @ .Ar host .Op : Ns Ar port .Sm on or an ssh URI .Xc . Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited sequentially. Setting this option will cause .Xr ssh 1 to connect to the target host by first making a .Xr ssh 1 connection to the specified .Cm ProxyJump host and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there. Setting the host to .Cm none disables this option entirely. .Pp Note that this option will compete with the .Cm ProxyCommand option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the other from taking effect. .Pp Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied to jump hosts. .Pa ~/.ssh/config should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts. .It Cm ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that .Cm ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to .Xr ssh 1 instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm no . .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Cm default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. .It Cm RemoteCommand Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. Arguments to .Cm RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .It Cm RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel. The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first argument is the listening specification and may be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on or, if the remote host supports it, a Unix domain socket path. If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport or a Unix domain socket path, otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy. When acting as a SOCKS proxy the destination of the connection can be restricted by .Cm PermitRemoteOpen . .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. .Pp If the .Ar port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. .Pp If the .Ar bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the .Ar bind_address is .Ql * or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .It Cm RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: .Cm no (never request a TTY), .Cm yes (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), .Cm force (always request a TTY) or .Cm auto (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the .Fl t and .Fl T flags for .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm RevokedHostKeys Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .Pp If the specified value begins with a .Sq $ character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the path to the library. .It Cm SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local .Xr environ 7 should be sent to the server. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note that the .Ev TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. Refer to .Cm AcceptEnv in .Xr sshd_config 5 for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm SendEnv directives. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .Pp It is possible to clear previously set .Cm SendEnv variable names by prefixing patterns with .Pa - . The default is not to send any environment variables. .It Cm ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr ssh 1 receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If, for example, .Cm ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and .Cm ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. .It Cm ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, .Xr ssh 1 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. .It Cm SessionType May be used to either request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system, or to prevent the execution of a remote command at all. The latter is useful for just forwarding ports. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm none (same as the .Fl N option), .Cm subsystem (same as the .Fl s option) or .Cm default (shell or command execution). .It Cm SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to be sent to the server. Similarly to .Cm SendEnv , with the exception of the .Ev TERM variable, the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable. .It Cm StdinNull Redirects stdin from .Pa /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). Either this or the equivalent .Fl n option must be used when .Nm ssh is run in the background. The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes (same as the .Fl n option) or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no (the default). .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 will never automatically add host keys to the .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it can be annoying when the .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. .Pp If this flag is set to -.Dq accept-new +.Cm accept-new then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user's .Pa known_hosts file, but will not permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag is set to -.Dq no +.Cm no or -.Dq off , +.Cm off , ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If this flag is set to .Cm ask (the default), new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is USER. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. .Pp The default is .Cm yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Cm no . See also .Cm ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives. .It Cm Tunnel Request .Xr tun 4 device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm point-to-point (layer 3), .Cm ethernet (layer 2), or .Cm no (the default). Specifying .Cm yes requests the default tunnel mode, which is .Cm point-to-point . .It Cm TunnelDevice Specifies the .Xr tun 4 devices to open on the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun . .Sm on The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Cm any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Cm any . The default is .Cm any:any . .It Cm UpdateHostKeys Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has completed and add them to .Cm UserKnownHostsFile . The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm no or .Cm ask . This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones are removed. .Pp Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user, the host was authenticated via .Cm UserKnownHostsFile (i.e. not .Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile ) and the host was authenticated using a plain key and not a certificate. .Pp .Cm UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default .Cm UserKnownHostsFile setting and has not enabled .Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS , otherwise .Cm UpdateHostKeys will be set to .Cm no . .Pp If .Cm UpdateHostKeys is set to .Cm ask , then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible with .Cm ControlPersist , and will be disabled if it is enabled. .Pp Presently, only .Xr sshd 8 from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the .Qq hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. .It Cm User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. .It Cm UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. Each filename may use tilde notation to refer to the user's home directory, the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section and environment variables as described in the .Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 . .It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to .Cm yes , the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to .Cm ask . If this option is set to .Cm ask , information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option. The default is .Cm yes if compiled with LDNS and .Cm no otherwise. .Pp See also .Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS in .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm VersionAddendum Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify OS- or site-specific modifications. The default is -.Dq FreeBSD-20210907 . +.Dq FreeBSD-20211221 . The value .Cm none may be used to disable this. .It Cm VisualHostKey If this flag is set to .Cm yes , an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to .Cm no (the default), no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh PATTERNS A .Em pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, .Sq * (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or .Sq ?\& (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the .Qq .co.uk set of domains, the following pattern could be used: .Pp .Dl Host *.co.uk .Pp The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: .Pp .Dl Host 192.168.0.? .Pp A .Em pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the .Qq dialup pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&" .Pp Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself. For example, attempting to match .Qq host3 against the following pattern-list will fail: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&" .Pp The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match, such as a wildcard: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&" .Sh TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: .Pp .Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact .It %% A literal .Sq % . .It \&%C Hash of %l%h%p%r. .It %d Local user's home directory. .It %f The fingerprint of the server's host key. .It %H The .Pa known_hosts hostname or address that is being searched for. .It %h The remote hostname. .It \%%I A string describing the reason for a .Cm KnownHostsCommand execution: either .Cm ADDRESS when looking up a host by address (only when .Cm CheckHostIP is enabled), .Cm HOSTNAME when searching by hostname, or .Cm ORDER when preparing the host key algorithm preference list to use for the destination host. .It %i The local user ID. .It %K The base64 encoded host key. .It %k The host key alias if specified, otherwise the original remote hostname given on the command line. .It %L The local hostname. .It %l The local hostname, including the domain name. .It %n The original remote hostname, as given on the command line. .It %p The remote port. .It %r The remote username. .It \&%T The local .Xr tun 4 or .Xr tap 4 network interface assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested, or .Qq NONE otherwise. .It %t The type of the server host key, e.g. .Cm ssh-ed25519 . .It %u The local username. .El .Pp .Cm CertificateFile , .Cm ControlPath , .Cm IdentityAgent , .Cm IdentityFile , .Cm KnownHostsCommand , .Cm LocalForward , .Cm Match exec , .Cm RemoteCommand , .Cm RemoteForward , and .Cm UserKnownHostsFile accept the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %k, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Pp .Cm KnownHostsCommand additionally accepts the tokens %f, %H, %I, %K and %t. .Pp .Cm Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h. .Pp .Cm LocalCommand accepts all tokens. .Pp .Cm ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r. .Sh ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES Arguments to some keywords can be expanded at runtime from environment variables on the client by enclosing them in .Ic ${} , for example .Ic ${HOME}/.ssh would refer to the user's .ssh directory. If a specified environment variable does not exist then an error will be returned and the setting for that keyword will be ignored. .Pp The keywords .Cm CertificateFile , .Cm ControlPath , .Cm IdentityAgent , .Cm IdentityFile , .Cm KnownHostsCommand , and .Cm UserKnownHostsFile support environment variables. The keywords .Cm LocalForward and .Cm RemoteForward support environment variables only for Unix domain socket paths. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by .An Tatu Ylonen . .An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , .An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt and .An Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. .An Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h index 94a391ee5f45..d815e5791900 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h @@ -1,937 +1,935 @@ /* * This file was machine-@generated. Do not edit manually. * Run crypto/openssh/freebsd-namespace.sh to regenerate. */ #define Blowfish_decipher Fssh_Blowfish_decipher #define Blowfish_encipher Fssh_Blowfish_encipher #define Blowfish_expand0state Fssh_Blowfish_expand0state #define Blowfish_expandstate Fssh_Blowfish_expandstate #define Blowfish_initstate Fssh_Blowfish_initstate #define Blowfish_stream2word Fssh_Blowfish_stream2word #define Decode Fssh_Decode #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv Fssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv Fssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv #define Encode Fssh_Encode #define Hide Fssh_Hide #define Rq_mult_small Fssh_Rq_mult_small #define Short_random Fssh_Short_random #define _ssh__compat_glob Fssh__ssh__compat_glob #define _ssh__compat_globfree Fssh__ssh__compat_globfree #define _ssh_exchange_banner Fssh__ssh_exchange_banner #define _ssh_host_key_sign Fssh__ssh_host_key_sign #define _ssh_host_private_key Fssh__ssh_host_private_key #define _ssh_host_public_key Fssh__ssh_host_public_key #define _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs Fssh__ssh_order_hostkeyalgs #define _ssh_read_banner Fssh__ssh_read_banner #define _ssh_send_banner Fssh__ssh_send_banner #define _ssh_verify_host_key Fssh__ssh_verify_host_key #define a2port Fssh_a2port #define a2tun Fssh_a2tun #define add_host_to_hostfile Fssh_add_host_to_hostfile #define add_p1p1 Fssh_add_p1p1 #define addargs Fssh_addargs #define addr_and Fssh_addr_and #define addr_cmp Fssh_addr_cmp #define addr_host_is_all0s Fssh_addr_host_is_all0s #define addr_hostmask Fssh_addr_hostmask #define addr_invert Fssh_addr_invert #define addr_is_all0s Fssh_addr_is_all0s #define addr_match_cidr_list Fssh_addr_match_cidr_list #define addr_match_list Fssh_addr_match_list #define addr_netmask Fssh_addr_netmask #define addr_netmatch Fssh_addr_netmatch #define addr_ntop Fssh_addr_ntop #define addr_pton Fssh_addr_pton #define addr_pton_cidr Fssh_addr_pton_cidr #define addr_sa_pton Fssh_addr_sa_pton #define addr_sa_to_xaddr Fssh_addr_sa_to_xaddr #define addr_unicast_masklen Fssh_addr_unicast_masklen #define addr_xaddr_to_sa Fssh_addr_xaddr_to_sa #define argv_assemble Fssh_argv_assemble #define argv_consume Fssh_argv_consume #define argv_free Fssh_argv_free #define argv_next Fssh_argv_next #define argv_split Fssh_argv_split #define ask_permission Fssh_ask_permission #define asmprintf Fssh_asmprintf #define atoi_err Fssh_atoi_err #define atomicio Fssh_atomicio #define atomicio6 Fssh_atomicio6 #define atomiciov Fssh_atomiciov #define atomiciov6 Fssh_atomiciov6 #define bandwidth_limit Fssh_bandwidth_limit #define bandwidth_limit_init Fssh_bandwidth_limit_init #define barrett_reduce Fssh_barrett_reduce #define baud_to_speed Fssh_baud_to_speed #define bcrypt_hash Fssh_bcrypt_hash #define bcrypt_pbkdf Fssh_bcrypt_pbkdf #define bitmap_clear_bit Fssh_bitmap_clear_bit #define bitmap_free Fssh_bitmap_free #define bitmap_from_string Fssh_bitmap_from_string #define bitmap_nbits Fssh_bitmap_nbits #define bitmap_nbytes Fssh_bitmap_nbytes #define bitmap_new Fssh_bitmap_new #define bitmap_set_bit Fssh_bitmap_set_bit #define bitmap_test_bit Fssh_bitmap_test_bit #define bitmap_to_string Fssh_bitmap_to_string #define bitmap_zero Fssh_bitmap_zero #define blf_cbc_decrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_decrypt #define blf_cbc_encrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_encrypt #define blf_dec Fssh_blf_dec #define blf_ecb_decrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_decrypt #define blf_ecb_encrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_encrypt #define blf_enc Fssh_blf_enc #define blf_key Fssh_blf_key #define blob_section Fssh_blob_section #define cert_free Fssh_cert_free #define chacha_encrypt_bytes Fssh_chacha_encrypt_bytes #define chacha_ivsetup Fssh_chacha_ivsetup #define chacha_keysetup Fssh_chacha_keysetup #define chachapoly_crypt Fssh_chachapoly_crypt #define chachapoly_free Fssh_chachapoly_free #define chachapoly_get_length Fssh_chachapoly_get_length #define chachapoly_new Fssh_chachapoly_new #define chan_ibuf_empty Fssh_chan_ibuf_empty #define chan_is_dead Fssh_chan_is_dead #define chan_mark_dead Fssh_chan_mark_dead #define chan_obuf_empty Fssh_chan_obuf_empty #define chan_rcvd_eow Fssh_chan_rcvd_eow #define chan_rcvd_ieof Fssh_chan_rcvd_ieof #define chan_rcvd_oclose Fssh_chan_rcvd_oclose #define chan_read_failed Fssh_chan_read_failed #define chan_send_eof2 Fssh_chan_send_eof2 #define chan_shutdown_extended_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_extended_read #define chan_shutdown_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_read #define chan_shutdown_write Fssh_chan_shutdown_write #define chan_write_failed Fssh_chan_write_failed #define channel_add_permission Fssh_channel_add_permission #define channel_after_select Fssh_channel_after_select #define channel_by_id Fssh_channel_by_id #define channel_by_remote_id Fssh_channel_by_remote_id #define channel_cancel_cleanup Fssh_channel_cancel_cleanup #define channel_cancel_lport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_lport_listener #define channel_cancel_rport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener #define channel_clear_permission Fssh_channel_clear_permission #define channel_close_all Fssh_channel_close_all #define channel_close_fd Fssh_channel_close_fd #define channel_connect_by_listen_address Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_address #define channel_connect_by_listen_path Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_path #define channel_connect_stdio_fwd Fssh_channel_connect_stdio_fwd #define channel_connect_to_path Fssh_channel_connect_to_path #define channel_connect_to_port Fssh_channel_connect_to_port #define channel_decode_socks4 Fssh_channel_decode_socks4 #define channel_decode_socks5 Fssh_channel_decode_socks5 #define channel_disable_admin Fssh_channel_disable_admin #define channel_find_open Fssh_channel_find_open #define channel_format_extended_usage Fssh_channel_format_extended_usage #define channel_free Fssh_channel_free #define channel_free_all Fssh_channel_free_all #define channel_fwd_bind_addr Fssh_channel_fwd_bind_addr #define channel_handler Fssh_channel_handler #define channel_init_channels Fssh_channel_init_channels #define channel_input_data Fssh_channel_input_data #define channel_input_extended_data Fssh_channel_input_extended_data #define channel_input_ieof Fssh_channel_input_ieof #define channel_input_oclose Fssh_channel_input_oclose #define channel_input_open_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_open_confirmation #define channel_input_open_failure Fssh_channel_input_open_failure #define channel_input_status_confirm Fssh_channel_input_status_confirm #define channel_input_window_adjust Fssh_channel_input_window_adjust #define channel_lookup Fssh_channel_lookup #define channel_new Fssh_channel_new #define channel_not_very_much_buffered_data Fssh_channel_not_very_much_buffered_data #define channel_open_message Fssh_channel_open_message #define channel_output_poll Fssh_channel_output_poll #define channel_parse_id Fssh_channel_parse_id #define channel_permit_all Fssh_channel_permit_all #define channel_post_auth_listener Fssh_channel_post_auth_listener #define channel_post_connecting Fssh_channel_post_connecting #define channel_post_mux_client Fssh_channel_post_mux_client #define channel_post_mux_listener Fssh_channel_post_mux_listener #define channel_post_open Fssh_channel_post_open #define channel_post_port_listener Fssh_channel_post_port_listener #define channel_post_x11_listener Fssh_channel_post_x11_listener #define channel_pre_connecting Fssh_channel_pre_connecting #define channel_pre_dynamic Fssh_channel_pre_dynamic #define channel_pre_listener Fssh_channel_pre_listener #define channel_pre_mux_client Fssh_channel_pre_mux_client #define channel_pre_open Fssh_channel_pre_open #define channel_pre_x11_open Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open #define channel_prepare_select Fssh_channel_prepare_select #define channel_proxy_downstream Fssh_channel_proxy_downstream #define channel_proxy_upstream Fssh_channel_proxy_upstream #define channel_register_cleanup Fssh_channel_register_cleanup #define channel_register_fds Fssh_channel_register_fds #define channel_register_filter Fssh_channel_register_filter #define channel_register_open_confirm Fssh_channel_register_open_confirm #define channel_register_status_confirm Fssh_channel_register_status_confirm #define channel_request_remote_forwarding Fssh_channel_request_remote_forwarding #define channel_request_rforward_cancel Fssh_channel_request_rforward_cancel #define channel_request_start Fssh_channel_request_start #define channel_send_open Fssh_channel_send_open #define channel_send_window_changes Fssh_channel_send_window_changes #define channel_set_af Fssh_channel_set_af #define channel_set_fds Fssh_channel_set_fds #define channel_set_x11_refuse_time Fssh_channel_set_x11_refuse_time #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip #define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener #define channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener #define channel_still_open Fssh_channel_still_open #define channel_stop_listening Fssh_channel_stop_listening #define channel_update_permission Fssh_channel_update_permission #define check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type Fssh_check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type #define check_key_in_hostkeys Fssh_check_key_in_hostkeys #define child_set_env Fssh_child_set_env #define choose_dh Fssh_choose_dh #define choose_t Fssh_choose_t #define chop Fssh_chop #define cipher_alg_list Fssh_cipher_alg_list #define cipher_authlen Fssh_cipher_authlen #define cipher_blocksize Fssh_cipher_blocksize #define cipher_by_name Fssh_cipher_by_name #define cipher_crypt Fssh_cipher_crypt #define cipher_ctx_is_plaintext Fssh_cipher_ctx_is_plaintext #define cipher_free Fssh_cipher_free #define cipher_get_keyiv Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv #define cipher_get_keyiv_len Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len #define cipher_get_length Fssh_cipher_get_length #define cipher_init Fssh_cipher_init #define cipher_is_cbc Fssh_cipher_is_cbc #define cipher_ivlen Fssh_cipher_ivlen #define cipher_keylen Fssh_cipher_keylen #define cipher_seclen Fssh_cipher_seclen #define cipher_set_keyiv Fssh_cipher_set_keyiv #define cipher_warning_message Fssh_cipher_warning_message #define ciphers_valid Fssh_ciphers_valid #define cleanhostname Fssh_cleanhostname #define cleanup_exit Fssh_cleanup_exit +#define client_converse Fssh_client_converse #define colon Fssh_colon #define compare Fssh_compare #define compare_gps Fssh_compare_gps #define compat_banner Fssh_compat_banner #define compat_cipher_proposal Fssh_compat_cipher_proposal #define compat_kex_proposal Fssh_compat_kex_proposal #define compat_pkalg_proposal Fssh_compat_pkalg_proposal #define compression_alg_list Fssh_compression_alg_list #define connect_next Fssh_connect_next #define connect_to_helper Fssh_connect_to_helper #define convtime Fssh_convtime #define crypto_hash_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hash_sha512 #define crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec #define crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc #define crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair Fssh_crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair #define crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 Fssh_crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair #define crypto_sign_ed25519_open Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_open #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime #define crypto_verify_32 Fssh_crypto_verify_32 #define daemonized Fssh_daemonized #define dangerous_locale Fssh_dangerous_locale #define dbl_p1p1 Fssh_dbl_p1p1 #define default_key_sign Fssh_default_key_sign #define dh_estimate Fssh_dh_estimate #define dh_gen_key Fssh_dh_gen_key #define dh_new_group Fssh_dh_new_group #define dh_new_group1 Fssh_dh_new_group1 #define dh_new_group14 Fssh_dh_new_group14 #define dh_new_group16 Fssh_dh_new_group16 #define dh_new_group18 Fssh_dh_new_group18 #define dh_new_group_asc Fssh_dh_new_group_asc #define dh_new_group_fallback Fssh_dh_new_group_fallback #define dh_pub_is_valid Fssh_dh_pub_is_valid #define dh_set_moduli_file Fssh_dh_set_moduli_file #define dispatch_protocol_error Fssh_dispatch_protocol_error #define dispatch_protocol_ignore Fssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore #define do_log Fssh_do_log #define dollar_expand Fssh_dollar_expand #define ecdsa_do_sign Fssh_ecdsa_do_sign #define encode_constraints Fssh_encode_constraints #define exited_cleanly Fssh_exited_cleanly #define export_dns_rr Fssh_export_dns_rr #define filter_list Fssh_filter_list #define fingerprint_b64 Fssh_fingerprint_b64 #define fingerprint_hex Fssh_fingerprint_hex #define fmprintf Fssh_fmprintf #define fmt_scaled Fssh_fmt_scaled #define fmt_timeframe Fssh_fmt_timeframe #define format_absolute_time Fssh_format_absolute_time #define forward_equals Fssh_forward_equals #define free_hostkeys Fssh_free_hostkeys #define freeargs Fssh_freeargs #define freerrset Fssh_freerrset #define freezero Fssh_freezero #define fwd_ident Fssh_fwd_ident #define gen_candidates Fssh_gen_candidates #define get_hram Fssh_get_hram #define get_local_ipaddr Fssh_get_local_ipaddr #define get_local_name Fssh_get_local_name #define get_local_port Fssh_get_local_port #define get_peer_ipaddr Fssh_get_peer_ipaddr #define get_peer_port Fssh_get_peer_port #define get_rdomain Fssh_get_rdomain #define get_sock_af Fssh_get_sock_af #define get_sock_port Fssh_get_sock_port #define get_socket_address Fssh_get_socket_address #define get_u16 Fssh_get_u16 #define get_u32 Fssh_get_u32 #define get_u32_le Fssh_get_u32_le #define get_u64 Fssh_get_u64 #define getrrsetbyname Fssh_getrrsetbyname #define glob0 Fssh_glob0 #define glob2 Fssh_glob2 #define globexp1 Fssh_globexp1 #define globextend Fssh_globextend #define host_delete Fssh_host_delete #define host_hash Fssh_host_hash #define hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir Fssh_hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir #define hostfile_read_key Fssh_hostfile_read_key #define hostfile_replace_entries Fssh_hostfile_replace_entries #define hostkeys_foreach Fssh_hostkeys_foreach #define hostkeys_foreach_file Fssh_hostkeys_foreach_file #define hpdelim Fssh_hpdelim #define hpdelim2 Fssh_hpdelim2 #define init_hostkeys Fssh_init_hostkeys #define input_kex_dh_gex_group Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_group #define input_kex_dh_gex_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_init #define input_kex_dh_gex_reply Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_reply #define input_kex_dh_gex_request Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_request #define input_kex_gen_init Fssh_input_kex_gen_init #define input_kex_gen_reply Fssh_input_kex_gen_reply #define iptos2str Fssh_iptos2str #define ipv64_normalise_mapped Fssh_ipv64_normalise_mapped #define is_key_revoked Fssh_is_key_revoked #define kex_alg_by_name Fssh_kex_alg_by_name #define kex_alg_list Fssh_kex_alg_list #define kex_assemble_names Fssh_kex_assemble_names #define kex_buf2prop Fssh_kex_buf2prop #define kex_c25519_dec Fssh_kex_c25519_dec #define kex_c25519_enc Fssh_kex_c25519_enc #define kex_c25519_keypair Fssh_kex_c25519_keypair #define kex_derive_keys Fssh_kex_derive_keys #define kex_dh_compute_key Fssh_kex_dh_compute_key #define kex_dh_dec Fssh_kex_dh_dec #define kex_dh_enc Fssh_kex_dh_enc #define kex_dh_keygen Fssh_kex_dh_keygen #define kex_dh_keypair Fssh_kex_dh_keypair #define kex_ecdh_dec Fssh_kex_ecdh_dec #define kex_ecdh_dec_key_group Fssh_kex_ecdh_dec_key_group #define kex_ecdh_enc Fssh_kex_ecdh_enc #define kex_ecdh_keypair Fssh_kex_ecdh_keypair #define kex_exchange_identification Fssh_kex_exchange_identification #define kex_free Fssh_kex_free #define kex_free_newkeys Fssh_kex_free_newkeys #define kex_gen_client Fssh_kex_gen_client #define kex_gen_hash Fssh_kex_gen_hash #define kex_gen_server Fssh_kex_gen_server #define kex_input_ext_info Fssh_kex_input_ext_info #define kex_input_kexinit Fssh_kex_input_kexinit #define kex_input_newkeys Fssh_kex_input_newkeys #define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec #define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc #define kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair Fssh_kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair #define kex_load_hostkey Fssh_kex_load_hostkey #define kex_names_cat Fssh_kex_names_cat #define kex_names_valid Fssh_kex_names_valid #define kex_new Fssh_kex_new #define kex_prop2buf Fssh_kex_prop2buf #define kex_prop_free Fssh_kex_prop_free #define kex_protocol_error Fssh_kex_protocol_error #define kex_ready Fssh_kex_ready #define kex_send_kexinit Fssh_kex_send_kexinit #define kex_send_newkeys Fssh_kex_send_newkeys #define kex_setup Fssh_kex_setup #define kex_start_rekex Fssh_kex_start_rekex #define kex_verify_host_key Fssh_kex_verify_host_key #define kexc25519_keygen Fssh_kexc25519_keygen #define kexc25519_shared_key Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key #define kexc25519_shared_key_ext Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key_ext #define kexgex_client Fssh_kexgex_client #define kexgex_hash Fssh_kexgex_hash #define kexgex_server Fssh_kexgex_server #define krl_dump Fssh_krl_dump #define load_hostkeys Fssh_load_hostkeys #define load_hostkeys_file Fssh_load_hostkeys_file #define log_change_level Fssh_log_change_level #define log_facility_name Fssh_log_facility_name #define log_facility_number Fssh_log_facility_number #define log_init Fssh_log_init #define log_is_on_stderr Fssh_log_is_on_stderr #define log_level_get Fssh_log_level_get #define log_level_name Fssh_log_level_name #define log_level_number Fssh_log_level_number #define log_redirect_stderr_to Fssh_log_redirect_stderr_to #define log_verbose_add Fssh_log_verbose_add #define log_verbose_reset Fssh_log_verbose_reset #define lookup_env_in_list Fssh_lookup_env_in_list #define lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type Fssh_lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type #define lookup_marker_in_hostkeys Fssh_lookup_marker_in_hostkeys #define lowercase Fssh_lowercase #define mac_alg_list Fssh_mac_alg_list #define mac_check Fssh_mac_check #define mac_clear Fssh_mac_clear #define mac_compute Fssh_mac_compute #define mac_init Fssh_mac_init #define mac_setup Fssh_mac_setup #define mac_valid Fssh_mac_valid #define match_filter_allowlist Fssh_match_filter_allowlist #define match_filter_denylist Fssh_match_filter_denylist #define match_host_and_ip Fssh_match_host_and_ip #define match_hostname Fssh_match_hostname #define match_list Fssh_match_list #define match_pattern Fssh_match_pattern #define match_pattern_list Fssh_match_pattern_list #define match_user Fssh_match_user #define match_usergroup_pattern_list Fssh_match_usergroup_pattern_list #define mktemp_proto Fssh_mktemp_proto #define mm_choose_dh Fssh_mm_choose_dh #define mm_receive_fd Fssh_mm_receive_fd #define mm_send_fd Fssh_mm_send_fd #define mm_sshkey_sign Fssh_mm_sshkey_sign #define monotime Fssh_monotime #define monotime_double Fssh_monotime_double #define monotime_ts Fssh_monotime_ts #define monotime_tv Fssh_monotime_tv #define mprintf Fssh_mprintf #define ms_subtract_diff Fssh_ms_subtract_diff #define ms_to_timeval Fssh_ms_to_timeval #define msetlocale Fssh_msetlocale #define newkeys_from_blob Fssh_newkeys_from_blob #define newkeys_to_blob Fssh_newkeys_to_blob #define nh_aux Fssh_nh_aux #define nh_final Fssh_nh_final #define note_key Fssh_note_key #define notify_complete Fssh_notify_complete #define notify_start Fssh_notify_start #define open_preamble Fssh_open_preamble #define opt_array_append Fssh_opt_array_append #define opt_array_append2 Fssh_opt_array_append2 #define opt_dequote Fssh_opt_dequote #define opt_flag Fssh_opt_flag #define opt_match Fssh_opt_match #define ossl_error Fssh_ossl_error #define parse_absolute_time Fssh_parse_absolute_time #define parse_ipqos Fssh_parse_ipqos #define parse_prime Fssh_parse_prime #define parse_uri Fssh_parse_uri #define parse_user_host_path Fssh_parse_user_host_path #define parse_user_host_port Fssh_parse_user_host_port #define path_absolute Fssh_path_absolute #define pem_passphrase_cb Fssh_pem_passphrase_cb #define percent_dollar_expand Fssh_percent_dollar_expand #define percent_expand Fssh_percent_expand #define permission_set_add Fssh_permission_set_add #define permitopen_port Fssh_permitopen_port #define pkcs11_add_provider Fssh_pkcs11_add_provider #define pkcs11_del_provider Fssh_pkcs11_del_provider #define pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap Fssh_pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap #define pkcs11_fetch_certs Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_certs #define pkcs11_fetch_keys Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_keys #define pkcs11_find Fssh_pkcs11_find #define pkcs11_get_key Fssh_pkcs11_get_key #define pkcs11_init Fssh_pkcs11_init #define pkcs11_k11_free Fssh_pkcs11_k11_free #define pkcs11_login_slot Fssh_pkcs11_login_slot #define pkcs11_provider_finalize Fssh_pkcs11_provider_finalize #define pkcs11_provider_unref Fssh_pkcs11_provider_unref #define pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt #define pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt #define pkcs11_rsa_wrap Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_wrap #define pkcs11_terminate Fssh_pkcs11_terminate #define plain_key_blob Fssh_plain_key_blob #define platform_disable_tracing Fssh_platform_disable_tracing #define platform_pledge_agent Fssh_platform_pledge_agent #define platform_pledge_mux Fssh_platform_pledge_mux #define platform_pledge_sftp_server Fssh_platform_pledge_sftp_server #define platform_sys_dir_uid Fssh_platform_sys_dir_uid #define pledge Fssh_pledge #define poly1305_auth Fssh_poly1305_auth #define poly64 Fssh_poly64 #define poly_hash Fssh_poly_hash #define port_open_helper Fssh_port_open_helper #define prime_test Fssh_prime_test #define private2_uudecode Fssh_private2_uudecode #define put_host_port Fssh_put_host_port #define put_u16 Fssh_put_u16 #define put_u32 Fssh_put_u32 #define put_u32_le Fssh_put_u32_le #define put_u64 Fssh_put_u64 #define pwcopy Fssh_pwcopy #define qfileout Fssh_qfileout #define read_mux Fssh_read_mux #define read_passphrase Fssh_read_passphrase #define recallocarray Fssh_recallocarray #define record_hostkey Fssh_record_hostkey #define reduce_add_sub Fssh_reduce_add_sub #define refresh_progress_meter Fssh_refresh_progress_meter #define replacearg Fssh_replacearg #define revoke_blob Fssh_revoke_blob #define revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE #define revoked_certs_for_ca_key Fssh_revoked_certs_for_ca_key #define revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE #define rijndaelEncrypt Fssh_rijndaelEncrypt #define rijndaelKeySetupEnc Fssh_rijndaelKeySetupEnc #define rtrim Fssh_rtrim #define safe_path Fssh_safe_path #define safe_path_fd Fssh_safe_path_fd #define sanitise_stdfd Fssh_sanitise_stdfd #define scan_scaled Fssh_scan_scaled #define seed_rng Fssh_seed_rng #define send_error Fssh_send_error #define set_log_handler Fssh_set_log_handler #define set_nodelay Fssh_set_nodelay #define set_nonblock Fssh_set_nonblock #define set_rdomain Fssh_set_rdomain #define set_reuseaddr Fssh_set_reuseaddr #define set_sock_tos Fssh_set_sock_tos #define sftp_realpath Fssh_sftp_realpath #define shadow_pw Fssh_shadow_pw #define sieve_large Fssh_sieve_large #define sig_alarm Fssh_sig_alarm #define sig_winch Fssh_sig_winch #define skip_space Fssh_skip_space #define snmprintf Fssh_snmprintf #define sock_set_v6only Fssh_sock_set_v6only #define speed_to_baud Fssh_speed_to_baud #define ssh_add_hostkey Fssh_ssh_add_hostkey #define ssh_add_identity_constrained Fssh_ssh_add_identity_constrained #define ssh_agent_has_key Fssh_ssh_agent_has_key #define ssh_agent_sign Fssh_ssh_agent_sign #define ssh_alloc_session_state Fssh_ssh_alloc_session_state #define ssh_clear_newkeys Fssh_ssh_clear_newkeys #define ssh_close_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_close_authentication_socket #define ssh_compatible_openssl Fssh_ssh_compatible_openssl #define ssh_digest_alg_by_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_by_name #define ssh_digest_alg_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_name #define ssh_digest_blocksize Fssh_ssh_digest_blocksize #define ssh_digest_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_buffer #define ssh_digest_bytes Fssh_ssh_digest_bytes #define ssh_digest_copy_state Fssh_ssh_digest_copy_state #define ssh_digest_final Fssh_ssh_digest_final #define ssh_digest_free Fssh_ssh_digest_free #define ssh_digest_memory Fssh_ssh_digest_memory #define ssh_digest_start Fssh_ssh_digest_start #define ssh_digest_update Fssh_ssh_digest_update #define ssh_digest_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_update_buffer #define ssh_dispatch_init Fssh_ssh_dispatch_init #define ssh_dispatch_range Fssh_ssh_dispatch_range #define ssh_dispatch_run Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run #define ssh_dispatch_run_fatal Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run_fatal #define ssh_dispatch_set Fssh_ssh_dispatch_set #define ssh_dss_sign Fssh_ssh_dss_sign #define ssh_dss_verify Fssh_ssh_dss_verify #define ssh_ecdsa_sign Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sign #define ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify #define ssh_ecdsa_verify Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_verify #define ssh_ed25519_sign Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sign #define ssh_ed25519_sk_verify Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sk_verify #define ssh_ed25519_verify Fssh_ssh_ed25519_verify #define ssh_err Fssh_ssh_err #define ssh_fetch_identitylist Fssh_ssh_fetch_identitylist #define ssh_free Fssh_ssh_free #define ssh_free_identitylist Fssh_ssh_free_identitylist #define ssh_gai_strerror Fssh_ssh_gai_strerror #define ssh_get_app_data Fssh_ssh_get_app_data #define ssh_get_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket #define ssh_get_authentication_socket_path Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket_path #define ssh_get_progname Fssh_ssh_get_progname #define ssh_hmac_bytes Fssh_ssh_hmac_bytes #define ssh_hmac_final Fssh_ssh_hmac_final #define ssh_hmac_free Fssh_ssh_hmac_free #define ssh_hmac_init Fssh_ssh_hmac_init #define ssh_hmac_start Fssh_ssh_hmac_start #define ssh_hmac_update Fssh_ssh_hmac_update #define ssh_hmac_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_hmac_update_buffer #define ssh_init Fssh_ssh_init #define ssh_input_append Fssh_ssh_input_append #define ssh_input_space Fssh_ssh_input_space #define ssh_krl_check_key Fssh_ssh_krl_check_key #define ssh_krl_file_contains_key Fssh_ssh_krl_file_contains_key #define ssh_krl_free Fssh_ssh_krl_free #define ssh_krl_from_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_from_blob #define ssh_krl_init Fssh_ssh_krl_init #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range #define ssh_krl_revoke_key Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256 #define ssh_krl_set_comment Fssh_ssh_krl_set_comment #define ssh_krl_set_version Fssh_ssh_krl_set_version #define ssh_krl_to_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_to_blob #define ssh_libcrypto_init Fssh_ssh_libcrypto_init #define ssh_local_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_local_ipaddr #define ssh_local_port Fssh_ssh_local_port #define ssh_lock_agent Fssh_ssh_lock_agent #define ssh_msg_recv Fssh_ssh_msg_recv #define ssh_msg_send Fssh_ssh_msg_send #define ssh_output_consume Fssh_ssh_output_consume #define ssh_output_ptr Fssh_ssh_output_ptr #define ssh_output_space Fssh_ssh_output_space #define ssh_packet_check_rekey Fssh_ssh_packet_check_rekey #define ssh_packet_clear_keys Fssh_ssh_packet_clear_keys #define ssh_packet_close Fssh_ssh_packet_close #define ssh_packet_close_internal Fssh_ssh_packet_close_internal #define ssh_packet_connection_af Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_af #define ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket #define ssh_packet_disconnect Fssh_ssh_packet_disconnect #define ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress Fssh_ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress #define ssh_packet_get_bytes Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bytes #define ssh_packet_get_connection_in Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_in #define ssh_packet_get_connection_out Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_out #define ssh_packet_get_input Fssh_ssh_packet_get_input #define ssh_packet_get_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_get_maxsize #define ssh_packet_get_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_get_mux #define ssh_packet_get_output Fssh_ssh_packet_get_output #define ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout #define ssh_packet_get_state Fssh_ssh_packet_get_state #define ssh_packet_have_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_have_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_is_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_is_interactive #define ssh_packet_is_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_is_rekeying #define ssh_packet_log_type Fssh_ssh_packet_log_type #define ssh_packet_need_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_need_rekeying #define ssh_packet_next Fssh_ssh_packet_next #define ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_payload Fssh_ssh_packet_payload #define ssh_packet_process_incoming Fssh_ssh_packet_process_incoming #define ssh_packet_put Fssh_ssh_packet_put #define ssh_packet_rdomain_in Fssh_ssh_packet_rdomain_in #define ssh_packet_read Fssh_ssh_packet_read #define ssh_packet_read_expect Fssh_ssh_packet_read_expect #define ssh_packet_read_poll2 Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll2 #define ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr #define ssh_packet_read_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_seqnr #define ssh_packet_remaining Fssh_ssh_packet_remaining #define ssh_packet_send2 Fssh_ssh_packet_send2 #define ssh_packet_send2_wrapped Fssh_ssh_packet_send2_wrapped #define ssh_packet_send_debug Fssh_ssh_packet_send_debug #define ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_set_authenticated Fssh_ssh_packet_set_authenticated #define ssh_packet_set_connection Fssh_ssh_packet_set_connection #define ssh_packet_set_input_hook Fssh_ssh_packet_set_input_hook #define ssh_packet_set_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_set_interactive #define ssh_packet_set_log_preamble Fssh_ssh_packet_set_log_preamble #define ssh_packet_set_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_set_maxsize #define ssh_packet_set_mux Fssh_ssh_packet_set_mux #define ssh_packet_set_nonblocking Fssh_ssh_packet_set_nonblocking #define ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits Fssh_ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits #define ssh_packet_set_server Fssh_ssh_packet_set_server #define ssh_packet_set_state Fssh_ssh_packet_set_state #define ssh_packet_set_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_set_timeout #define ssh_packet_set_tos Fssh_ssh_packet_set_tos #define ssh_packet_start_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_start_discard #define ssh_packet_stop_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_stop_discard #define ssh_packet_write_poll Fssh_ssh_packet_write_poll #define ssh_packet_write_wait Fssh_ssh_packet_write_wait #define ssh_remote_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_remote_ipaddr #define ssh_remote_port Fssh_ssh_remote_port #define ssh_remove_all_identities Fssh_ssh_remove_all_identities #define ssh_remove_identity Fssh_ssh_remove_identity #define ssh_request_reply Fssh_ssh_request_reply #define ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters Fssh_ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters #define ssh_rsa_sign Fssh_ssh_rsa_sign #define ssh_rsa_verify Fssh_ssh_rsa_verify #define ssh_set_app_data Fssh_ssh_set_app_data #define ssh_set_newkeys Fssh_ssh_set_newkeys #define ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback Fssh_ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback #define ssh_signal Fssh_ssh_signal #define ssh_tty_make_modes Fssh_ssh_tty_make_modes #define ssh_tty_parse_modes Fssh_ssh_tty_parse_modes #define ssh_update_card Fssh_ssh_update_card #define sshbuf_alloc Fssh_sshbuf_alloc #define sshbuf_allocate Fssh_sshbuf_allocate #define sshbuf_avail Fssh_sshbuf_avail #define sshbuf_b64tod Fssh_sshbuf_b64tod #define sshbuf_check_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_check_reserve #define sshbuf_cmp Fssh_sshbuf_cmp #define sshbuf_consume Fssh_sshbuf_consume #define sshbuf_consume_end Fssh_sshbuf_consume_end #define sshbuf_dtob16 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob16 #define sshbuf_dtob64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64 #define sshbuf_dtob64_string Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64_string #define sshbuf_dtourlb64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtourlb64 #define sshbuf_dump Fssh_sshbuf_dump #define sshbuf_dump_data Fssh_sshbuf_dump_data #define sshbuf_dup_string Fssh_sshbuf_dup_string #define sshbuf_find Fssh_sshbuf_find #define sshbuf_free Fssh_sshbuf_free #define sshbuf_from Fssh_sshbuf_from #define sshbuf_fromb Fssh_sshbuf_fromb #define sshbuf_froms Fssh_sshbuf_froms #define sshbuf_get Fssh_sshbuf_get #define sshbuf_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2 #define sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct #define sshbuf_get_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_get_cstring #define sshbuf_get_ec Fssh_sshbuf_get_ec #define sshbuf_get_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_get_eckey #define sshbuf_get_string Fssh_sshbuf_get_string #define sshbuf_get_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_string_direct #define sshbuf_get_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_get_stringb #define sshbuf_get_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u16 #define sshbuf_get_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u32 #define sshbuf_get_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u64 #define sshbuf_get_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u8 #define sshbuf_len Fssh_sshbuf_len #define sshbuf_load_fd Fssh_sshbuf_load_fd #define sshbuf_load_file Fssh_sshbuf_load_file #define sshbuf_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_max_size #define sshbuf_mutable_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_mutable_ptr #define sshbuf_new Fssh_sshbuf_new #define sshbuf_parent Fssh_sshbuf_parent #define sshbuf_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_peek_string_direct #define sshbuf_peek_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u16 #define sshbuf_peek_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u32 #define sshbuf_peek_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u64 #define sshbuf_peek_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_peek_u8 #define sshbuf_poke Fssh_sshbuf_poke #define sshbuf_poke_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u16 #define sshbuf_poke_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u32 #define sshbuf_poke_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u64 #define sshbuf_poke_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_poke_u8 #define sshbuf_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_ptr #define sshbuf_put Fssh_sshbuf_put #define sshbuf_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2 #define sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes #define sshbuf_put_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_put_cstring #define sshbuf_put_ec Fssh_sshbuf_put_ec #define sshbuf_put_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_put_eckey #define sshbuf_put_string Fssh_sshbuf_put_string #define sshbuf_put_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_put_stringb #define sshbuf_put_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u16 #define sshbuf_put_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u32 #define sshbuf_put_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u64 #define sshbuf_put_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u8 #define sshbuf_putb Fssh_sshbuf_putb #define sshbuf_putf Fssh_sshbuf_putf #define sshbuf_putfv Fssh_sshbuf_putfv #define sshbuf_refcount Fssh_sshbuf_refcount #define sshbuf_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_reserve #define sshbuf_reset Fssh_sshbuf_reset #define sshbuf_set_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_set_max_size #define sshbuf_set_parent Fssh_sshbuf_set_parent #define sshbuf_write_file Fssh_sshbuf_write_file #define sshfatal Fssh_sshfatal #define sshkey_advance_past_options Fssh_sshkey_advance_past_options #define sshkey_alg_list Fssh_sshkey_alg_list #define sshkey_cert_check_authority Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority #define sshkey_cert_check_authority_now Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority_now #define sshkey_cert_check_host Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_host #define sshkey_cert_copy Fssh_sshkey_cert_copy #define sshkey_cert_type Fssh_sshkey_cert_type #define sshkey_certify Fssh_sshkey_certify #define sshkey_certify_custom Fssh_sshkey_certify_custom #define sshkey_check_cert_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_check_cert_sigtype #define sshkey_check_revoked Fssh_sshkey_check_revoked #define sshkey_check_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_check_sigtype #define sshkey_curve_name_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_curve_name_to_nid #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_name Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_name #define sshkey_drop_cert Fssh_sshkey_drop_cert #define sshkey_dump_ec_key Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_key #define sshkey_dump_ec_point Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_point #define sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg Fssh_sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg #define sshkey_ec_validate_private Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_private #define sshkey_ec_validate_public Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_public #define sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name #define sshkey_enable_maxsign Fssh_sshkey_enable_maxsign #define sshkey_equal Fssh_sshkey_equal #define sshkey_equal_public Fssh_sshkey_equal_public #define sshkey_fingerprint Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint #define sshkey_fingerprint_raw Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint_raw #define sshkey_format_cert_validity Fssh_sshkey_format_cert_validity #define sshkey_format_text Fssh_sshkey_format_text #define sshkey_free Fssh_sshkey_free #define sshkey_from_blob Fssh_sshkey_from_blob #define sshkey_from_blob_internal Fssh_sshkey_from_blob_internal #define sshkey_from_private Fssh_sshkey_from_private #define sshkey_fromb Fssh_sshkey_fromb #define sshkey_froms Fssh_sshkey_froms #define sshkey_generate Fssh_sshkey_generate #define sshkey_get_sigtype Fssh_sshkey_get_sigtype #define sshkey_in_file Fssh_sshkey_in_file #define sshkey_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_is_cert #define sshkey_is_shielded Fssh_sshkey_is_shielded #define sshkey_is_sk Fssh_sshkey_is_sk #define sshkey_load_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_cert #define sshkey_load_private Fssh_sshkey_load_private #define sshkey_load_private_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_private_cert #define sshkey_load_private_type Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type #define sshkey_load_private_type_fd Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type_fd #define sshkey_load_public Fssh_sshkey_load_public #define sshkey_names_valid2 Fssh_sshkey_names_valid2 #define sshkey_new Fssh_sshkey_new #define sshkey_parse_private2 Fssh_sshkey_parse_private2 #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type #define sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type #define sshkey_perm_ok Fssh_sshkey_perm_ok #define sshkey_plain_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_plain_to_blob #define sshkey_private_deserialize Fssh_sshkey_private_deserialize #define sshkey_private_serialize Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize #define sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign #define sshkey_private_serialize_opt Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize_opt #define sshkey_private_to_blob2 Fssh_sshkey_private_to_blob2 #define sshkey_private_to_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_private_to_fileblob #define sshkey_putb Fssh_sshkey_putb #define sshkey_putb_plain Fssh_sshkey_putb_plain #define sshkey_puts Fssh_sshkey_puts #define sshkey_puts_opts Fssh_sshkey_puts_opts #define sshkey_read Fssh_sshkey_read #define sshkey_save_private Fssh_sshkey_save_private #define sshkey_save_public Fssh_sshkey_save_public #define sshkey_set_filename Fssh_sshkey_set_filename #define sshkey_shield_private Fssh_sshkey_shield_private #define sshkey_sig_details_free Fssh_sshkey_sig_details_free #define sshkey_sigalg_by_name Fssh_sshkey_sigalg_by_name #define sshkey_sign Fssh_sshkey_sign #define sshkey_signatures_left Fssh_sshkey_signatures_left #define sshkey_size Fssh_sshkey_size #define sshkey_ssh_name Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name #define sshkey_ssh_name_plain Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name_plain #define sshkey_to_base64 Fssh_sshkey_to_base64 #define sshkey_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_to_blob #define sshkey_to_certified Fssh_sshkey_to_certified #define sshkey_try_load_public Fssh_sshkey_try_load_public #define sshkey_type Fssh_sshkey_type #define sshkey_type_from_name Fssh_sshkey_type_from_name #define sshkey_type_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_type_is_cert #define sshkey_type_plain Fssh_sshkey_type_plain #define sshkey_unshield_private Fssh_sshkey_unshield_private #define sshkey_verify Fssh_sshkey_verify #define sshkey_write Fssh_sshkey_write #define sshlog Fssh_sshlog #define sshlogdie Fssh_sshlogdie #define sshlogdirect Fssh_sshlogdirect #define sshlogv Fssh_sshlogv #define sshpkt_add_padding Fssh_sshpkt_add_padding #define sshpkt_disconnect Fssh_sshpkt_disconnect #define sshpkt_fatal Fssh_sshpkt_fatal #define sshpkt_fmt_connection_id Fssh_sshpkt_fmt_connection_id #define sshpkt_get Fssh_sshpkt_get #define sshpkt_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_get_bignum2 #define sshpkt_get_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_get_cstring #define sshpkt_get_ec Fssh_sshpkt_get_ec #define sshpkt_get_end Fssh_sshpkt_get_end #define sshpkt_get_string Fssh_sshpkt_get_string #define sshpkt_get_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_get_string_direct #define sshpkt_get_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u32 #define sshpkt_get_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u64 #define sshpkt_get_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u8 #define sshpkt_getb_froms Fssh_sshpkt_getb_froms #define sshpkt_msg_ignore Fssh_sshpkt_msg_ignore #define sshpkt_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_peek_string_direct #define sshpkt_ptr Fssh_sshpkt_ptr #define sshpkt_put Fssh_sshpkt_put #define sshpkt_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_put_bignum2 #define sshpkt_put_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_put_cstring #define sshpkt_put_ec Fssh_sshpkt_put_ec #define sshpkt_put_string Fssh_sshpkt_put_string #define sshpkt_put_stringb Fssh_sshpkt_put_stringb #define sshpkt_put_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u32 #define sshpkt_put_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u64 #define sshpkt_put_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u8 #define sshpkt_putb Fssh_sshpkt_putb #define sshpkt_send Fssh_sshpkt_send #define sshpkt_start Fssh_sshpkt_start #define sshpkt_vfatal Fssh_sshpkt_vfatal #define sshsigdie Fssh_sshsigdie -#define sshsk_add_option Fssh_sshsk_add_option #define sshsk_enroll Fssh_sshsk_enroll -#define sshsk_key_from_response Fssh_sshsk_key_from_response #define sshsk_load_resident Fssh_sshsk_load_resident -#define sshsk_open Fssh_sshsk_open #define sshsk_sign Fssh_sshsk_sign #define start_progress_meter Fssh_start_progress_meter #define stdfd_devnull Fssh_stdfd_devnull #define stop_progress_meter Fssh_stop_progress_meter #define stravis Fssh_stravis #define strdelim Fssh_strdelim #define strdelim_internal Fssh_strdelim_internal #define strdelimw Fssh_strdelimw #define strnvis Fssh_strnvis #define strvis Fssh_strvis #define strvisx Fssh_strvisx #define subprocess Fssh_subprocess #define sys_tun_open Fssh_sys_tun_open #define tilde_expand Fssh_tilde_expand #define tilde_expand_filename Fssh_tilde_expand_filename #define timeout_connect Fssh_timeout_connect #define to_blob Fssh_to_blob #define to_blob_buf Fssh_to_blob_buf #define tohex Fssh_tohex #define tun_open Fssh_tun_open #define umac128_delete Fssh_umac128_delete #define umac128_final Fssh_umac128_final #define umac128_new Fssh_umac128_new #define umac128_update Fssh_umac128_update #define umac_delete Fssh_umac_delete #define umac_final Fssh_umac_final #define umac_new Fssh_umac_new #define umac_update Fssh_umac_update #define unix_listener Fssh_unix_listener #define unset_nonblock Fssh_unset_nonblock #define urldecode Fssh_urldecode #define valid_domain Fssh_valid_domain #define valid_env_name Fssh_valid_env_name #define vasnmprintf Fssh_vasnmprintf #define vdollar_percent_expand Fssh_vdollar_percent_expand #define verify_host_key_dns Fssh_verify_host_key_dns #define vfmprintf Fssh_vfmprintf #define vis Fssh_vis #define waitfd Fssh_waitfd #define waitrfd Fssh_waitrfd #define write_host_entry Fssh_write_host_entry #define x11_connect_display Fssh_x11_connect_display #define x11_create_display_inet Fssh_x11_create_display_inet #define x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing Fssh_x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing #define xasprintf Fssh_xasprintf #define xcalloc Fssh_xcalloc #define xcrypt Fssh_xcrypt #define xextendf Fssh_xextendf #define xmalloc Fssh_xmalloc #define xreallocarray Fssh_xreallocarray #define xrecallocarray Fssh_xrecallocarray #define xstrdup Fssh_xstrdup #define xvasprintf Fssh_xvasprintf diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 index be9a57cf2ff7..877621b011a4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 @@ -1,1032 +1,1037 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.316 2021/07/30 14:28:13 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.317 2021/09/10 11:38:38 dtucker Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 30 2021 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 10 2021 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd .Nd OpenSSH daemon .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sshd .Bk -words .Op Fl 46DdeiqTt .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec .Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl f Ar config_file .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl u Ar len .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for .Xr ssh 1 . It provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. .Pp .Nm listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from .Pa /etc/rc.d/sshd . It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. .Pp .Nm can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ; command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. .Nm rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, .Dv SIGHUP , by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\& .Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl C Ar connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the .Fl T extended test mode. If provided, any .Cm Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple .Fl C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are .Dq addr , .Dq user , .Dq host , .Dq laddr , .Dq lport , and .Dq rdomain and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name, local address, local port number and routing domain respectively. .It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify .Nm during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the .Fl h option or the .Cm HostKey configuration directive. .It Fl D When this option is specified, .Nm will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of .Nm sshd . .It Fl d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not .Xr fork 2 and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple .Fl d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of the system log. .It Fl e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. .It Fl f Ar config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config . .Nm refuses to start if there is no configuration file. .It Fl g Ar login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. .It Fl h Ar host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if .Nm is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different host key algorithms. .It Fl i Specifies that .Nm is being run from .Xr inetd 8 . .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl p Ar port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the .Cm Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the .Cm ListenAddress option override command-line ports. .It Fl q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. .It Fl T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, .Cm Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more .Fl C options. .It Fl t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating .Nm reliably as configuration options may change. .It Fl u Ar len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the .Li utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than .Ar len , the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying .Fl u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the .Pa utmp file. .Fl u0 may also be used to prevent .Nm from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include .Cm HostbasedAuthentication and using a .Cm from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in .Cm AllowUsers or .Cm DenyUsers . .El .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. Each host has a host-specific key, used to identify the host. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host key. The client compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC). .Pp Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. .Pp Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in .Cm DenyUsers or its group is listed in .Cm DenyGroups \&. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( .Ql \&*LK\&* on Solaris and UnixWare, .Ql \&* on HP-UX, containing .Ql Nologin on Tru64, a leading .Ql \&*LOCKED\&* on FreeBSD and a leading .Ql \&! on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg .Ql NP or .Ql \&*NP\&* ). .Pp If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. .Pp -After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. +After this, the client either requests an interactive shell or execution +or a non-interactive command, which +.Nm +will execute via the user's shell using its +.Fl c +option. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. .Pp When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. .Sh LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, .Nm does the following: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and .Pa /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by .Pa ~/.hushlogin ; see the .Sx FILES section). .It If the login is on a tty, records login time. .It Checks .Pa /etc/nologin and .Pa /var/run/nologin ; if one exists, it prints the contents and quits (unless root). .It Changes to run with normal user privileges. .It Sets up basic environment. .It Reads the file .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Changes to user's home directory. .It If .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists and the .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm PermitUserRC option is set, runs it; else if .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs .Xr xauth 1 . The .Dq rc files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See .Sx SSHRC , below. .It Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the system password database. .El .Sh SSHRC If the file .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists, .Xr sh 1 runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and .Ev DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call .Xr xauth 1 because .Nm will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. .Pp The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. .Pp This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: .Bd -literal -offset 3n if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi .Ed .Pp If this file does not exist, .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 . Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments). Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional. The supported key types are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 .It sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com .It ssh-ed25519 .It ssh-dss .It ssh-rsa .El .Pp The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). .Pp Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the .Pa id_dsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa_sk.pub , .Pa id_ed25519.pub , .Pa id_ed25519_sk.pub , or the .Pa id_rsa.pub file and edit it. .Pp .Nm enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm agent-forwarding Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. .Pp Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. .It Cm command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify .Cm no-pty . A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. .Pp This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the .Cm restrict key option. .Pp The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by a .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ForceCommand directive. .Pp If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the two commands are identical. .It Cm environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .It Cm expiry-time="timespec" Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time in the system time-zone. .It Cm from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .Pp In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a .Cm from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. .Pp The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). .It Cm no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. .It Cm no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the .Cm command option. .It Cm no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). .It Cm no-user-rc Disables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . .It Cm no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. .It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port" Limit remote port forwarding with the .Xr ssh 1 .Fl R option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitlisten options may be applied separated by commas. Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in .Xr ssh_config 5 . A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. Note that the setting of .Cm GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses. Note that .Xr ssh 1 will send a hostname of .Dq localhost if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses .Dq 127.0.0.1 and .Dq ::1 . .It Cm permitopen="host:port" Limit local port forwarding with the .Xr ssh 1 .Fl L option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses. A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. .It Cm port-forwarding Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm principals="principals" On a .Cm cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the .Cm cert-authority option. .It Cm pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm no-touch-required Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made using this key. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .It Cm verify-required Require that signatures made using this key attest that they verified the user, e.g. via a PIN. This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms .Cm ecdsa-sk and .Cm ed25519-sk . .It Cm restrict Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files they will be included in this set. .It Cm tunnel="n" Force a .Xr tun 4 device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. .It Cm user-rc Enables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .It Cm X11-forwarding Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the .Cm restrict option. .El .Pp An example authorized_keys file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments are allowed at start of line. Blank lines are allowed. # Plain key, no restrictions ssh-rsa ... # Forced command, disable PTY and all forwarding restrict,command="dump /home" ssh-rsa ... # Restriction of ssh -L forwarding destinations permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa ... # Restriction of ssh -R forwarding listeners permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitlisten="[::1]:22000" ssh-rsa ... # Configuration for tunnel forwarding tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa ... # Override of restriction to allow PTY allocation restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa ... # Allow FIDO key without requiring touch no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ... # Require user-verification (e.g. PIN or biometric) for FIDO key verify-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ... # Trust CA key, allow touch-less FIDO if requested in certificate cert-authority,no-touch-required,principals="user_a" ssh-rsa ... .Ed .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. .Pp Each line in these files contains the following fields: marker (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. .Pp The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of .Dq @cert-authority , to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or .Dq @revoked , to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. .Pp Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns .Pf ( Ql * and .Ql \&? act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When .Nm sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , this will be the canonical client host name. When .Xr ssh 1 is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given by the user, the value of the .Xr ssh 1 .Cm HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the .Xr ssh 1 .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option was used. .Pp A pattern may also be preceded by .Ql \&! to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within .Ql \&[ and .Ql \&] brackets then followed by .Ql \&: and a non-standard port number. .Pp Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a .Ql | character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. .Pp The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they can be obtained, for example, from .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub . The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. .Pp Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are ignored as comments. .Pp When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the .Dq @cert-authority marker described above. .Pp The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the .Dq @revoked marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from .Xr ssh 1 when they are encountered. .Pp It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. .Pp Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 or by taking, for example, .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. .Xr ssh-keygen 1 also offers some basic automated editing for .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. .Pp An example ssh_known_hosts file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... .Ed .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and .Pa /etc/motd , if .Cm PrintLastLog and .Cm PrintMotd , respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by .Cm Banner . .Pp .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Nm reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp If this file, the .Pa ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, .Nm will not allow it to be used unless the .Cm StrictModes option has been set to .Dq no . .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with .Ql # ) , and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.allow .It Pa /etc/hosts.deny Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here. Further details are described in .Xr hosts_access 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 ) . It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will be used. .Pp .It Pa /etc/motd See .Xr motd 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/nologin If this file exists, .Nm refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that .Nm does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Nm sshd . The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to .Pa ~/.ssh/rc , it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /var/empty .Xr chroot 2 directory used by .Nm during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-writable. .Pp .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the .Nm listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr chroot 2 , .Xr hosts_access 5 , .Xr login.conf 5 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr inetd 8 , .Xr sftp-server 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config index 7555b01be832..eb9bdcc437fb 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config @@ -1,121 +1,121 @@ # $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.104 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See # sshd_config(5) for more information. # This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin # The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with # OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the # default value. # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and # FreeBSD has a few additional options. #Port 22 #AddressFamily any #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 #ListenAddress :: #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key # Ciphers and keying #RekeyLimit default none # Logging #SyslogFacility AUTH #LogLevel INFO # Authentication: #LoginGraceTime 2m #PermitRootLogin no #StrictModes yes #MaxAuthTries 6 #MaxSessions 10 #PubkeyAuthentication yes # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none #AuthorizedKeysCommand none #AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts #HostbasedAuthentication no # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for # HostbasedAuthentication #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files #IgnoreRhosts yes # Change to yes to enable built-in password authentication. #PasswordAuthentication no #PermitEmptyPasswords no # Change to no to disable PAM authentication #KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes #KerberosGetAFSToken no # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes # Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the KbdInteractiveAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via KbdInteractiveAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'. #UsePAM yes #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no #X11Forwarding yes #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes #PrintMotd yes #PrintLastLog yes #TCPKeepAlive yes #PermitUserEnvironment no #Compression delayed #ClientAliveInterval 0 #ClientAliveCountMax 3 #UseDNS yes #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid #MaxStartups 10:30:100 #PermitTunnel no #ChrootDirectory none #UseBlacklist no -#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20210907 +#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20211221 # no default banner path #Banner none # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no # AllowTcpForwarding no # PermitTTY no # ForceCommand cvs server diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 index c3a747061b8e..527f3d4bb46e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 @@ -1,2002 +1,2002 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.334 2021/08/12 23:59:25 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.335 2021/09/03 05:25:50 dtucker Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: August 12 2021 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 3 2021 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd_config .Nd OpenSSH daemon configuration file .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr sshd 8 reads configuration data from .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with .Fl f on the command line). The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's .Xr environ 7 . See .Cm SendEnv and .Cm SetEnv in .Xr ssh_config 5 for how to configure the client. The .Ev TERM environment variable is always accepted whenever the client requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters .Ql * and .Ql \&? . Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid arguments are .Cm any (the default), .Cm inet (use IPv4 only), or .Cm inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is permitted. The default is .Cm yes . Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm all to allow StreamLocal forwarding, .Cm no to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, .Cm local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Cm remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Cm yes (the default) or .Cm all to allow TCP forwarding, .Cm no to prevent all TCP forwarding, .Cm local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Cm remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication method names, or by the single string .Cm any to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication method. If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. .Pp For example, .Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. .Pp For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier .Cm bsdauth or .Cm pam . depending on the server configuration. For example, .Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the .Cm bsdauth device. .Pp If the publickey method is listed more than once, .Xr sshd 8 verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for subsequent authentications. For example, .Qq publickey,publickey requires successful authentication using two different public keys. .Pp Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. .Pp The available authentication methods are: .Qq gssapi-with-mic , .Qq hostbased , .Qq keyboard-interactive , .Qq none (used for access to password-less accounts when .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled), .Qq password and .Qq publickey . .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see .Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS in .Xr sshd 8 ) . .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is tried after the usual .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile files and will not be executed if a matching key is found there. By default, no .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of .Xr sshd 8 . Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be set to .Cm none to skip checking for user keys in files. The default is .Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed certificate principals as per .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile . The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. .Pp The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By default, no .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized principals commands. If .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in .Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in .Xr sshd 8 ) . Empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are ignored. .Pp Arguments to .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. The default is .Cm none , i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. .Pp Note that .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys , though the .Cm principals= key option offers a similar facility (see .Xr sshd 8 for details). .It Cm Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is .Cm none then no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed. .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 .Ed .Pp If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for public key or host-based authentication. .It Cm ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to .Xr chroot 2 to after authentication. At session startup .Xr sshd 8 checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, .Xr sshd 8 changes the working directory to the user's home directory. Arguments to .Cm ChrootDirectory accept the tokens described in the .Sx TOKENS section. .Pp The .Cm ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically .Xr sh 1 , and basic .Pa /dev nodes such as .Xr null 4 , .Xr zero 4 , .Xr stdin 4 , .Xr stdout 4 , .Xr stderr 4 , and .Xr tty 4 devices. For file transfer sessions using SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use logging may require .Pa /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see .Xr sftp-server 8 for details). .Pp For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which .Xr sshd 8 cannot detect. .Pp The default is .Cm none , indicating not to .Xr chroot 2 . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It 3des-cbc .It aes128-cbc .It aes192-cbc .It aes256-cbc .It aes128-ctr .It aes192-ctr .It aes256-ctr .It aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q cipher . .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without .Xr sshd 8 receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive . The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive. .Pp The default value is 3. If .Cm ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and .Cm ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. Setting a zero .Cm ClientAliveCountMax disables connection termination. .It Cm ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, .Xr sshd 8 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. .It Cm Compression Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm delayed (a legacy synonym for .Cm yes ) or .Cm no . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm DisableForwarding Disables all forwarding features, including X11, .Xr ssh-agent 1 , TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may simplify restricted configurations. .It Cm ExposeAuthInfo Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the .Ev SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Cm md5 and .Cm sha256 . The default is .Cm sha256 . .It Cm ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by .Cm ForceCommand , ignoring any command supplied by the client and .Pa ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a .Cm Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of .Cm internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support files when used with .Cm ChrootDirectory . The default is .Cm none . .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, .Xr sshd 8 binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be .Cm no to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, .Cm yes to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or .Cm clientspecified to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to .Cm yes then the client must authenticate against the host service on the current hostname. If set to .Cm no then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms . This was formerly named HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes. .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the .Pa ~/.shosts , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . A setting of .Cm yes means that .Xr sshd 8 uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by .Cm HostKey . The default behaviour of .Xr sshd 8 is not to load any certificates. .It Cm HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The defaults are .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . .Pp Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible and that the .Cm HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which of the keys are actually used by .Xr sshd 8 . .Pp It is possible to have multiple host key files. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .It Cm HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string .Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the host key signature algorithms that the server offers. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . .It Cm IgnoreRhosts Specifies whether to ignore per-user .Pa .rhosts and .Pa .shosts files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The system-wide .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv and .Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv are still used regardless of this setting. .Pp Accepted values are .Cm yes (the default) to ignore all per-user files, .Cm shosts-only to allow the use of .Pa .shosts but to ignore .Pa .rhosts or .Cm no to allow both .Pa .shosts and .Pa rhosts . .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should ignore the user's .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication and use only the system-wide known hosts file .Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Include Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain .Xr glob 7 wildcards that will be expanded and processed in lexical order. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in .Pa /etc/ssh . An .Cm Include directive may appear inside a .Cm Match block to perform conditional inclusion. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are .Cm af11 , .Cm af12 , .Cm af13 , .Cm af21 , .Cm af22 , .Cm af23 , .Cm af31 , .Cm af32 , .Cm af33 , .Cm af41 , .Cm af42 , .Cm af43 , .Cm cs0 , .Cm cs1 , .Cm cs2 , .Cm cs3 , .Cm cs4 , .Cm cs5 , .Cm cs6 , .Cm cs7 , .Cm ef , .Cm le , .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , a numeric value, or .Cm none to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Cm af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions and .Cm cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. All authentication styles from .Xr login.conf 5 are supported. The default is .Cm yes . The argument to this keyword must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is a deprecated alias for this. .It Cm KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for .Cm PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as .Pa /etc/passwd . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + -character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - -character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ -character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the +character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The supported algorithms are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It curve25519-sha256 .It curve25519-sha256@libssh.org .It diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .It diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 .It diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp521 .It sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms . .It Cm ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses .Xr sshd 8 should listen on. The following forms may be used: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar hostname | address .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar hostname : port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar IPv4_address : port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port .Sm on .Op Cm rdomain Ar domain .El .Pp The optional .Cm rdomain qualifier requests .Xr sshd 8 listen in an explicit routing domain. If .Ar port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all .Cm Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default routing domain. Multiple .Cm ListenAddress options are permitted. For more information on routing domains, see .Xr rdomain 4 . .It Cm LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. .It Cm LogVerbose Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel. An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function and line number to force detailed logging for. For example, an override pattern of: .Bd -literal -offset indent kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:* .Ed .Pp would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of .Pa kex.c , everything in the .Fn kex_exchange_identification function, and all code in the .Pa packet.c file. This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. .It Cm MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It hmac-md5 .It hmac-md5-96 .It hmac-sha1 .It hmac-sha1-96 .It hmac-sha2-256 .It hmac-sha2-512 .It umac-64@openssh.com .It umac-128@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com .It umac-64-etm@openssh.com .It umac-128-etm@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q mac . .It Cm Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the .Cm Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another .Cm Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple .Cm Match blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. .Pp The arguments to .Cm Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token .Cm All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are .Cm User , .Cm Group , .Cm Host , .Cm LocalAddress , .Cm LocalPort , .Cm RDomain , and .Cm Address (with .Cm RDomain representing the .Xr rdomain 4 on which the connection was received). .Pp The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section of .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp The patterns in an .Cm Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively. .Pp Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a .Cm Match keyword. Available keywords are .Cm AcceptEnv , .Cm AllowAgentForwarding , .Cm AllowGroups , .Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding , .Cm AllowTcpForwarding , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm AuthenticationMethods , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , .Cm Banner , .Cm ChrootDirectory , .Cm ClientAliveCountMax , .Cm ClientAliveInterval , .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm DisableForwarding , .Cm ForceCommand , .Cm GatewayPorts , .Cm GSSAPIAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , .Cm IgnoreRhosts , .Cm Include , .Cm IPQoS , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , .Cm LogLevel , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , .Cm PasswordAuthentication , .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , .Cm PermitListen , .Cm PermitOpen , .Cm PermitRootLogin , .Cm PermitTTY , .Cm PermitTunnel , .Cm PermitUserRC , .Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms , .Cm PubkeyAuthentication , .Cm RekeyLimit , .Cm RevokedKeys , .Cm RDomain , .Cm SetEnv , .Cm StreamLocalBindMask , .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , .Cm X11DisplayOffset , .Cm X11Forwarding and .Cm X11UseLocalhost . .It Cm MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. .It Cm MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection multiplexing. Setting .Cm MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting forwarding. The default is 10. .It Cm MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the .Cm LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. .Pp Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). .Xr sshd 8 will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60). .It Cm ModuliFile Specifies the .Xr moduli 5 file that contains the Diffie-Hellman groups used for the .Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and .Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key exchange methods. The default is .Pa /etc/moduli . .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. See also .Cm UsePAM . The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is .Cm no . .It Cm PermitListen Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen. The listen specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitListen .Sm off .Ar port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitListen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all listen requests. The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in .Xr ssh_config 5 . The wildcard .Sq * can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports. By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted. Note that the .Cm GatewayPorts option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. Note also that .Xr ssh 1 will request a listen host of .Dq localhost if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of .Dq 127.0.0.1 and .Dq ::1 . .It Cm PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Cm any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Cm none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The wildcard .Sq * can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied names. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. .It Cm PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm prohibit-password , .Cm forced-commands-only , or .Cm no . The default is .Cm no . Note that if .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication and .Cm UsePAM are both .Cm yes , this setting may be overridden by the PAM policy. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm prohibit-password (or its deprecated alias, .Cm without-password ) , password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm forced-commands-only , root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the .Ar command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no , root is not allowed to log in. .It Cm PermitTTY Specifies whether .Xr pty 4 allocation is permitted. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PermitTunnel Specifies whether .Xr tun 4 device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm point-to-point (layer 3), .Cm ethernet (layer 2), or .Cm no . Specifying .Cm yes permits both .Cm point-to-point and .Cm ethernet . The default is .Cm no . .Pp Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected .Xr tun 4 device must allow access to the user. .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether .Pa ~/.ssh/environment and .Cm environment= options in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid options are .Cm yes , .Cm no or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept (for example .Qq LANG,LC_* ) . The default is .Cm no . Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as .Ev LD_PRELOAD . .It Cm PermitUserRC Specifies whether any .Pa ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PerSourceMaxStartups Specifies the number of unauthenticated connections allowed from a given source address, or .Dq none if there is no limit. This limit is applied in addition to .Cm MaxStartups , whichever is lower. The default is .Cm none . .It Cm PerSourceNetBlockSize Specifies the number of bits of source address that are grouped together for the purposes of applying PerSourceMaxStartups limits. Values for IPv4 and optionally IPv6 may be specified, separated by a colon. The default is .Cm 32:128 , which means each address is considered individually. .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH daemon, or .Cm none to not write one. The default is .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . .It Cm Port Specifies the port number that .Xr sshd 8 listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also .Cm ListenAddress . .It Cm PrintLastLog Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PrintMotd Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print .Pa /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, .Pa /etc/profile , or equivalent.) The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. Alternately if the specified list begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq - character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a .Sq ^ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default set. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . .It Cm PubkeyAuthOptions Sets one or more public key authentication options. The supported keywords are: .Cm none (the default; indicating no additional options are enabled), .Cm touch-required and .Cm verify-required . .Pp The .Cm touch-required option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm (i.e.\& .Cm ecdsa-sk or .Cm ed25519-sk ) to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator). By default, .Xr sshd 8 requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option. The .Cm touch-required flag disables this override. .Pp The .Cm verify-required option requires a FIDO key signature attest that the user was verified, e.g. via a PIN. .Pp Neither the .Cm touch-required or .Cm verify-required options have any effect for other, non-FIDO, public key types. .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Cm default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. .It Cm RevokedKeys Specifies revoked public keys file, or .Cm none to not use one. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RDomain Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication has completed. The user session, as well as any forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this .Xr rdomain 4 . If the routing domain is set to .Cm \&%D , then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied. .It Cm SecurityKeyProvider Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the built-in USB HID support. .It Cm SetEnv Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started by .Xr sshd 8 as .Dq NAME=VALUE . The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters). Environment variables set by .Cm SetEnv override the default environment and any variables specified by the user via .Cm AcceptEnv or .Cm PermitUserEnvironment . .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm no . .It Cm StrictModes Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is .Cm yes . Note that this does not apply to .Cm ChrootDirectory , whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. .It Cm Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. .Pp The command .Cm sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem. .Pp Alternately the name .Cm internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP server. This may simplify configurations using .Cm ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. .Pp By default no subsystems are defined. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving .Qq ghost users and consuming server resources. .Pp The default is .Cm yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Cm no . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or .Cm none to not use one. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm UseBlacklist Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 attempts to send authentication success and failure messages to the .Xr blacklistd 8 daemon. The default is .Cm no . For forward compatibility with an upcoming .Xr blacklistd rename, the .Cm UseBlocklist alias can be used instead. .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should look up the remote host name, and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. .Pp If this option is set to .Cm no , then only addresses and not host names may be used in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .Cm from and .Nm .Cm Match .Cm Host directives. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to .Cm yes this will enable PAM authentication using .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication and .Cm PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. .Pp Because PAM keyboard-interactive authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either .Cm PasswordAuthentication or .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication . .Pp If .Cm UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run .Xr sshd 8 as a non-root user. The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is -.Qq FreeBSD-20210907 . +.Qq FreeBSD-20211221 . The value .Cm none may be used to disable this. .It Cm X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm yes . .Pp When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the .Xr sshd 8 proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see .Cm X11UseLocalhost ) , though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for .Cm ForwardX11 in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) . A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a .Cm no setting. .Pp Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable to .Cm localhost . This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. .Cm X11UseLocalhost may be set to .Cm no to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be .Cm yes or .Cm no . The default is .Cm yes . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program, or .Cm none to not use one. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh TIME FORMATS .Xr sshd 8 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: .Sm off .Ar time Op Ar qualifier , .Sm on where .Ar time is a positive integer value and .Ar qualifier is one of the following: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It Aq Cm none seconds .It Cm s | Cm S seconds .It Cm m | Cm M minutes .It Cm h | Cm H hours .It Cm d | Cm D days .It Cm w | Cm W weeks .El .Pp Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. .Pp Time format examples: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) .It 10m 10 minutes .It 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) .El .Sh TOKENS Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at runtime: .Pp .Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact .It %% A literal .Sq % . .It \&%D The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received. .It %F The fingerprint of the CA key. .It %f The fingerprint of the key or certificate. .It %h The home directory of the user. .It %i The key ID in the certificate. .It %K The base64-encoded CA key. .It %k The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication. .It %s The serial number of the certificate. .It \&%T The type of the CA key. .It %t The key or certificate type. .It \&%U The numeric user ID of the target user. .It %u The username. .El .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. .Pp .Cm RoutingDomain accepts the token %D. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Xr sshd 8 . This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp-server 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by .An Tatu Ylonen . .An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , .An Theo de Raadt and .An Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. .An Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. .An Niels Provos and .An Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h index bce1a257b927..ddbdbf778fe0 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/version.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.91 2021/08/20 03:22:55 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.92 2021/09/26 14:01:11 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.7" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.8" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE -#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20210907" +#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20211221" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #define OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION) #else #define OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING "without OpenSSL" #endif diff --git a/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/ssh_config b/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/ssh_config index d2a1db35d42e..3b2ca9aa6d8d 100644 --- a/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/ssh_config +++ b/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/ssh_config @@ -1,49 +1,49 @@ # $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.35 2020/07/17 03:43:42 dtucker Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See # ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for # users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files # or on the command line. # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the # ssh_config(5) man page. # Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP no # AddressFamily any # ConnectTimeout 0 # StrictHostKeyChecking ask # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 # Port 22 # Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc # MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com # EscapeChar ~ # Tunnel no # TunnelDevice any:any # PermitLocalCommand no # VisualHostKey no # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com # RekeyLimit 1G 1h # UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k # VerifyHostKeyDNS yes -# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20210907 +# VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20211221 diff --git a/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/sshd_config b/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/sshd_config index e3020bbfcacf..81ff5a66d22c 100644 --- a/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/sshd_config +++ b/tools/tools/nanobsd/rescue/Files/etc/ssh/sshd_config @@ -1,121 +1,121 @@ # $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.104 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See # sshd_config(5) for more information. # This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin # The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with # OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the # default value. # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and # FreeBSD has a few additional options. #Port 22 #AddressFamily any #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 #ListenAddress :: #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key # Ciphers and keying #RekeyLimit default none # Logging #SyslogFacility AUTH #LogLevel INFO # Authentication: #LoginGraceTime 2m PermitRootLogin yes #StrictModes yes #MaxAuthTries 6 #MaxSessions 10 #PubkeyAuthentication yes # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none #AuthorizedKeysCommand none #AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts #HostbasedAuthentication no # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for # HostbasedAuthentication #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files #IgnoreRhosts yes # Change to yes to enable built-in password authentication. #PasswordAuthentication no #PermitEmptyPasswords no # Change to no to disable PAM authentication #KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes #KerberosGetAFSToken no # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes # Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the KbdInteractiveAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via KbdInteractiveAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'. #UsePAM yes #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no #X11Forwarding yes #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes #PrintMotd yes #PrintLastLog yes #TCPKeepAlive yes #PermitUserEnvironment no #Compression delayed #ClientAliveInterval 0 #ClientAliveCountMax 3 #UseDNS yes #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid #MaxStartups 10:30:100 #PermitTunnel no #ChrootDirectory none #UseBlacklist no -#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20210907 +#VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20211221 # no default banner path #Banner none # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no # AllowTcpForwarding no # PermitTTY no # ForceCommand cvs server